ZAPU

THROUGH ZENZO NKOBI'S LENS



ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ARCHIVE

The South African History Archive (SAHA) is an independent human rights archive dedicated to documenting, supporting and promoting greater awareness of past and contemporary struggles for justice in South Africa.

SAHA aims to:

- Recapture lost and neglected histories;
- Record aspects of South African democracy in the making;
- Bring history out of the archives and into schools, universities and communities in new and innovative ways;
- Extend the boundaries of freedom of information in South Africa;
- Raise awareness, both nationally and internationally, of the role of archives and documentation in promoting and defending human rights

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FRONT COVER:
TOP: Conducting a class under trees in JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM: ZPRA cadres in training
BACK COVER:
ZAPU supporters on election day in Harare, 1980.

ZAPU

THROUGH ZENZO NKOBI'S LENS

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The liberation movements that led the armed struggle for Zimbabwean independence evolved from trade union and nationalist organisations which, in turn, developed into mass protest in the 1950s. As the people's movement grew stronger at the end of the decade, the settler politics moved ever further to the right, restricting the possibility of a negotiated road to majority rule and then independence. The Southern Rhodesian African National Congress was banned in 1959 by the government of Edgar Whitehead, its successor, the National Democratic Party, met the same fate in December 1961 after it rejected constitutional proposals which had been accepted by the white electorate, proposals that would have paved the way for independence in Rhodesia without the achievement of majority rule, thus leaving power in the hands of the white settlers.

The successor to the NDP was the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), formed at a time when peaceful paths to independence under a black government were closing, and nationalist supporters, especially in the Youth Wing, were becoming increasingly militant, demanding they be provided with weapons to seize power themselves. By the time ZAPU was banned in September 1962, plans were already being made for the acquisition of those weapons, and the first cadres were undertaking sabotage. Soon after the banning, the party leadership took two important decisions: they would not form another legal party and they would begin to prepare for a war of liberation. Seventeen years later, independence was won and an African government took power.

In 1962, ZAPU established its offices in Luzaka, Zambia, a country already moving towards independence with majority rule. The party began to build an army to conduct guerrilla war. It recruited and trained many thousands of young people to fight for liberation. It also received tens of thousands of refugees towards the end of the war in the late 1970s, and was responsible for accommodating them and educating those who were too young to fight.

The record of that long struggle survives in many quarters – official documents, news reports, academic articles and books, photographs, and most importantly in the memories and private papers of the participants who are still alive more than 30 years later. However, the Zimbabwean government has, since 1980, been dominated by ZANU, a political party formed as a break-away from ZAPU in 1963. Within this context, the story of ZAPU's role in the liberation struggle has been eclipsed, deliberately underestimated by official Zimbabwean sources, and largely not understood by many sympathisers.

An important collection of photographs relating to ZAPU activities came into the possession of SAHA in 2007. The photographer was Zenzo Nkobi, a Zimbabwean, who was an unofficial ZAPU photographer from the mid-1970s until well after independence in 1980. Negatives of nearly 10,000 photographs survived, taken primarily in Zambia during the late 1970s. The photographs present an intriguing glimpse into the struggle waged by ZAPU's armed wing, ZPRA, and provide evidence of the significant role it played in combating the Rhodesian regime. This donation presented an exciting opportunity for SAHA to seek out some of the ZAPU survivors to talk about events and individuals depicted in the photographs and, at the same time, discuss their experiences and their understanding of the role of ZAPU in achieving independence in Zimbabwe.

This report, along with the related virtual exhibition, tell the story of ZAPU's liberation war, through the lens of Zenzo Nkobi's camera and in the voices of those interviewed to tell us about the photographs.

LEFT: ZPRA cadre with toddler, 1978
RIGHT: People waiting to cast votes in Bulawayo, 1980

ABOUT ZENZO NKOBI



Zenzo was born at the village and mission of Dombodema, in south-western Zimbabwe, near Plumtree. His father, Thomas Nkobi, left Zimbabwe for South Africa soon after his birth, where he spent the rest of his life in politics, rising to the top echelons of the African National Congress. Zenzo remained in Zimbabwe, where he was raised by his mother and went to school, trained as a teacher, and then went to teach at a rural school not far from the Botswana Border. His cousin, Callistus Ndlovu explains:

> That's when he got tied up in politics because he was accused of teaching small kids anti-Smith songs like … he would compose some songs in Kalanga or Sindebele which were talking about the regime and so one policeman observed this and so they wanted to arrest him so he escaped and went to Botswana and ran away.

This took place in 1967. From Botswana he reached Lusaka, and made contact with ZAPU there. It was at that time that he first made the acquaintance of his father and developed a close relationship, as they were now both engaged in the liberation struggle within the region.

ZAPU eventually sent Nkobi to German Democratic Republic (East Germany) on a scholarship to be trained as a photographer. He studied there for several years, proceeding beyond the first degree to complete a Masters. He met and married a German woman by the name of Edelgard, and they raised two daughters together, eventually settling in Bulawayo after 1980.

While in Germany, he became something of an elder brother or mentor figure to many Zimbabweans who followed in his footsteps to study photography. Caroline Mhlanga, who was one of those ZAPU cadres who knew him in Germany and later worked with him in the ZAPU publicity department in Lusaka described how he taught them the artistic side of photography:

> ... he made me understand photography better. I came to like it, you know, so that each time you know I saw a project I was looking at it as a picture, through him, and each time he saw whatever, even passing animals or anything, he would remind you that that is a picture, that is an object.

He also returned to Lusaka on numerous occasions, and became something resembling an official or semi-official photographer for ZAPU. Towards the end of the1970s he moved to Lusaka on a more permanent basis and worked within the publicity department in ZAPU offices, providing the photographs for many ZAPU publications. He accompanied the ZAPU President, Joshua Nkomo, on numerous occasions, both to the military and refugee camps in Zambia and to international meetings and recorded the activities on film.

Zenzo returned to Zimbabwe before independence and began recording the events of the 1980 election campaign. After independence he continued chronicling public and political events, particularly those relating to ZAPU, but was not employed, and established his own photographic studio in order to earn a living. The artistic side of his personality seemed to predominate, however, and the business did not succeed. Later he joined the staff at the Bulawayo Polytechnic where he taught Photography until he died suddenly in the mid 1990's.

After Zenzo's death, Edelgard found comfort within the South African ANC community through her close connections with Zenzo's parents, and eventually married former treason trialist and ex-detainee Dennis Goldberg. It was Goldberg who deposited the negatives of Zenzo's photographs with SAHA after Edelgard's death.

ABOUT THE SAHA COLLECTIONS:

There are three collections in the SAHA archives relating to the history of ZAPU and ZPRA:

SAHA Collection AL3265 – The Zenzo Nkobi Photographic Collection

This collection, donated to SAHA by Dennis Goldberg in 2007, comprises approximately 10,000 negatives and slides created by Zenzo Nkobi, the majority of which have now been digitised.

Scope: The time frame of the collection is from 1976 up to the mid 1980's, with a few being slightly later than that. The vast majority are taken in Zambia in the later 1970s, and portray ZAPU's military activities, refugee camps, party activities, funerals, as well as some international meetings. Some were taken in Zimbabwe during the 1980 election campaign and later, reflecting a few post-Independence events. The photographs do not include any taken within Zimbabwe during the fighting, nor do they show actual fighting within Zambia, although they do include some of the damage suffered by ZAPU there as a result of Rhodesian air raids.

The photographer: The vast majority of photographs appear to have been taken by Zenzo Nkobi, as they were mixed with many which were purely personal. However, it is clear that some photographs are not taken by him as he himself is pictured. It is probable that others were the work of other ZAPU photographers such as Albert Ndindah, who was the chief photographer in the ZAPU Publicity Department.

Purpose of the photographs: Nkobi took most of these photographs as part of ZAPU's publicity work to provide documentation for the international community of ZAPU's activities and progress. During the pre-Independence years many were used to illustrate ZAPU publications, and copies will be found in the ZAPU magazine Zimbabwe Review. Many photographs of individuals are mug shot photos apparently taken for passport applications. Others are portraits of ZAPU leaders on different occasions and still others simply photographs of friends and their social activities, especially those taken after Independence. Some are photographs of public events which have little to do with ZAPU.

Previous Publication: It is believed that many of the photographs in this collection has not been published or displayed to the public. However, some were used in ZAPU publicity materials, and a number were included in the ZAPU-PF publication *Zimbabwe in the struggle: a contemporary documentation* (1978), a copy of which was donated to SAHA, along with the photographic negatives.

SAHA Collection AL3289 - The Mafela Trust Collection

The Mafela Trust organisation was established in 1989 by a group of ex-combatants of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to research and document the political and military activities of ZAPU and its political wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA), during the liberation war in Zimbabwe. Records pertaining to ZAPU and ZPRA history, including war records, were confiscated by the government-led Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1982 during the post-independence struggle, and never returned.

In the absence of a documented history, the Mafela Trust has been guided by their mission statement "When you go home tell them of us and say for your tomorrow we gave our today", to launch numerous national projects in an attempt to recoup what has been lost. Most notable of these projects are the 'Fallen Heroes' project - an identification and commemoration of those who died during the liberation war, and the 'War Graves' project – the location and subsequent exhumation of war graves. Further research and oral history projects bear testament to the Mafela Trust's determination to recover the ZAPU/ZPRA history, including documenting the history around the formal alliance with Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC).

The materials produced as part of these projects form the bulk of the Mafela Trust collection at SAHA and include paper-based and digital materials, photographs, oral history interviews and video material. These materials were identified as endangered in the course of a research, digitisation and oral history project conducted by SAHA in 2010 and 2011, and the materials were relocated to Johannesburg in 2011 for comprehensive archival processing, and digitisation.

SAHA Collection AL3291: The ZAPU / Zenzo Nkobi Oral History Project Collection

This collection is the result of the oral history component of a research project conducted by SAHA in 2010 and 2011, with initial funding from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in 2010, and the majority of the funds provided by the National Lotteries Distribution Trust Fund in 2011.

Twenty-six interviews were held, in which the interviewees were asked to explain the photographs and give the background to the events they depict. Each interviewee was asked to concentrate on one category, but some categories were handled by more than one person. Each was also asked to explain how and why he or she joined ZAPU and the struggle, and some added much more information about particular incidents they wanted to relate which were not connected to any photograph. The categories range from various aspects of military life – recruitment, training, operations - to life in the refugee camps, ZAPU administration and leadership, regional and international relations, as well as the 1980 election and political events after Independence. The interviews have not been edited but are presented verbatim.

Six of the interviewees were women and the rest men. This seems like a small proportion of women, but it must be accepted that the vast majority of the ZPRA cadres and of the ZAPU administration were male, so the balance is probably not unreasonable. The majority of interviewees were either military men – mainly in roles of command, but not all – or administrative personnel. Others had lived in the refugee camps as children, and one as a teacher. One non-Zimbabwean was interviewed as an activist from Canada who was instrumental in organising material support for the camps – Victory Camp and Freedom Camp farm – as well as political support for the liberation struggle within Canada. One interview was conducted on a topic which had not been identified and had no particular group of photos – that was with one cadre who was seriously disabled in a bombing raid while awaiting his military training, and discussed his experience as a disabled veteran, both before and after independence. Some of those interviewed are now elderly, representing those who joined the struggle as early as the 1950s or early 1960s, with the youngest being those who were children at the refugee camps, making them now around the age of 50.

ACRONYMS

AAPSO Afro Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation

ANC African National Congress

CGT Camp for Guerrilla Training

FC Freedom Camp

FRELIMO The Liberation Front of Mozambique, the Portuguese Frente de Libertacao

FROLIZI The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe

GDR German Democratic Republic

JZ JZ Moyo Camp

MK Umkhonto we Sizwe (armed wing of ANC)

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MWHA Matopo World Heritage Area

PAIGC African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Portuguese: Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)

RSA Republic of South Africa

SWAPO South West Africa People's Organisation

UN United Nations

UNIP United National Independence Party

VC Victory Camp

ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (armed wing of ZANU)

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army-Patriotic Front

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZIPA Zimbabwe People's Army

ZPRA Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (armed wing of ZAPU)

ZAPU IN THE STRUGGLE

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ZAPU

There are no photographs within the Zenzo Nkobi collection at SAHA which reflect the initial development and growth of ZAPU, other than ones that were taken of historical photographs of trade unionists from the 1950s. But several of the people interviewed were elderly survivors who recalled events of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Jack Ngwenya describes the awakening of his political consciousness in Johannesburg in the mid-1950s through acquaintance with members of the ANC, thus establishing the regional link in the growth of the liberation movement:

> I attended my first political meeting in South Africa in 1954, an ANC meeting. It was a man from our home area there who was a member of ANC..... when I went there one Sunday morning he said, "No, no, no, today I wanted to go to a meeting. At a place called Sophiatown [inaudible] Square," … so we went there … I was surprised. Big speakers, JB Marx, Moses Potane ... so one man spoke about the way Africans were being treated. ... He mentioned all the things … at that time you … in the evening at night there if you did not have a pass you would be arrested. He mentioned all those things ....then I said, "Yes, we should ... take over power then we`ll play *amadice*[1], we will not be arrested" … it was a high .... I really was very impressed. ... It was from that day I stopped going to church. Whenever I heard there was a meeting I would not miss that meeting. Then I began to think about what was happening in my country.

Ngwenya tells how he returned home in 1957 and immediately sought to locate the nationalist leadership in Bulawayo, joined up and attended crucial meetings such as the formation of the NDP and the January 1963 executive meeting of ZAPU, already banned, which confirmed the earlier decision not to form another legal party and to prepare for armed struggle. Later he was sent to open an office in Lusaka, Zambia, in March 1963.

By that time weapons were already being smuggled into Rhodesia through Zambia. Abraham Nkiwane describes how he was approached in 1962, before Zambian independence, to act as a weapons runner:

> In 1962 when ZAPU was banned we were summoned to UNIP headquarters by President Kaunda .... At the end of the meeting I was summoned to Mr Kapwepwe's home where I met Joshua Nkomo, Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe. At that meeting they asked me if I could spare some time[s] in the following weeks and months in assisting ZAPU cadres who were to do some missions between Mbeya in Tanzania and Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. It is from that time, it is where I got involved in ZAPU. The mission was all about moving arms of war from Tanzania into then Rhodesia…
>
> …When I did the transfer of weapons first I was not trained because Zambians did not train anybody for anything. They didn't go in for the armed struggle. But later on at the .... beginning of '63 ... Nkomo had arranged that the Tanzanian camps take me for three months doing some training because the type of weapons that were being moved included detonators, grenades and other things which could not be handled by a person without any knowledge of that type of equipment.

[1] 'Dice' in Ndebele

Thereafter he relates some of the adventures. At the other end of the pipeline, Thomas Ngwenya was delivering the weapons to hiding places through other contacts within the country:

> Arms were coming in now, I remember the year - vital year - that was 1962. Arms were coming from Tanganyika through Northern Rhodesia, by Sikhwili Moyo and other people, right through to Bulawayo. They would not come by train up to Bulawayo but they would be off-loaded [before] Bulawayo - Dete, Hwange and then taken by cars to their rightful places which was Matopo Hills, where they were being kept ... I was the main contact with Salisbury. Salisbury had one man who would contact me and I would deal with that man and he would not deal with anybody else… Until one time when he was arrested. So this man I think he was squeezed a little bit. He did mention my name, even the house number....

Ngwenya was able to flee while on bail at the end of 1962 and joined the comrades in Lusaka from where he proceeded in 1963 for military training in Ghana. From those early beginnings ZAPU built an army, first known as the Special Affairs Department, and later from 1971, the Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ZPRA or ZIPRA).

RECRUITMENT

Many of those interviewed spoke about how they joined the struggle, what attracted them, and how they journeyed out of the country. Most passed through Botswana, and some of the photographs which relate to recruitment were taken at Francistown transit camp, close to Zimbabwe's western border. Others were taken at Nampundwe in Zambia, where new recruits were sorted out after they were flown to Zambia from Botswana. But the photographs were taken in the late 1970s when there were large numbers of military recruits as well as refugees flooding to Zambia. One interviewee, Precious Nleya, was asked specifically about Francistown, while another spoke specifically about Nampundwe, but all had something to say about how they joined the struggle.

Many joined the struggle much earlier. Some, like Amos Ngwenya, were first acquainted with ZAPU in South Africa; others were challenged by their elders to go and join, while still others encountered guerrillas who then interested them in joining the struggle, others were inspired by the stories of ZAPU's Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns in 1967-8. But for all, their immediate reasons came against a backdrop of the history of disempowerment, of repression by a government that operated in the interests of the white settlers.

Mtshana Ncube, who joined ZAPU while in school and attended the Cold Comfort Conference in 1963, explained how the movement of his family from their ancestral land in the 1940's when he was a child made an indelible impression on him:

> One of my great grandparents died in the movement and was lost and never seen again in the process, and this is one of the things that triggered my interest in the nationalist movement and the independence movement as it subsequently became. So I joined the youth movement. In fact I was interested in this as early as 1957 when I was at Tekwani[2] and quietly followed the process and linked up with people that were later to become very active in the movement – 1958 and joined the NDP in 1960 when it was formed, and later ZAPU.

[2] A Methodist mission school near Plumtree, also referred to by Mzila-Ndlovu

Mzila-Ndlovu also talks about the childhood experience of direct oppression by the white government as a basis for joining the struggle:

> … the rural area experiences of discrimination by white men coming from the Ministry of Agriculture, I think, who wanted to make sure that the size of herds of cattle per family unit was the prescribed one; they would count regularly our stock and issue stock books and to ensure that you don`t keep … more than the number you are allowed to, and the abusive language and what as a young person [you thought when] you saw this happen. And you also saw it happen when they came to your home to ensure that, to check if you actually cultivated more than the stipulated size of land. And all these things, you know, had an impact on you.

Grace Noko lived near the Botswana border in Gwanda South, and she remembers:

> … as I was young I didn't know what was really happening but the elders they used to tell us … they would see people crossing by the road there four-five, two-three, then they'd say, "You see, people are going, people are going... things are bad now… the situation here is no longer good, so those people are going to the struggle." So one day I remember my uncle… he called us. I think we grew up when we were about three... three-four girls of about the same age, fourteen, fifteen, so he said, "Why are you seated here, can you see those people there, they are crossing, they are going to the struggle... so what do you think about other children?

Zakhele Ndebele, who had first interacted with ZPRA guerrillas when they approached his school in Lupane for food, explained what persuaded many young men to join the war:

> Some of the colleagues or some of the young guys in the area we lived with, we learned that they had been taken for call-up[3]. So most of us especially I didn`t like to say we be taken for call-up because I understood what it meant to be taken for call-up. It would be taken that one … you are taken to go to be a soldier for a cause you are not interested to be in, and again you are going to fight your brothers who are already involved in the liberation movement, since some time whilst I was still at home I had met a few guerrillas.

Others were recruited from within Zambia, as there were many Zimbabweans employed there and others who had been resettled during the Federation from Southern Rhodesia to Northern Rhodesia. Charles Madonko mentions that they were preferred at one point because they were less likely to be spies. Alfred Nikita Mangena, the later commander, was amongst this number as was Jack Mpofu. Others, such as Parks Ndlovu were recruited from South Africa even in the mid-1970s.

[3] Conscription of Africans who had reached a certain standard of education to the Rhodesian army

Refugees in their sleeping quarters in the Francistown transit camp

By the mid-1970s ZAPU structures were well organized in Botswana and, with many young people leaving the country, they were able to select those for military training whom they felt were truly committed. Ndebele described his experiences in Botswana:

> ...they put us at Francistown Police Station where some people from ZAPU came and had some interviews with us. Fortunately most of us, we were still young guys, of course we were already above 19, because they asked us what we were interested in much : are we interested in going to school or interested at going to liberate our country? Then most of us, all of us in fact said, no, we were interested in going to liberate our country. So they tried to explain that, no, with people going to struggle, people should know the consequences they face and then we all said, no, it would be better that we had some hardship or meeting some hardship already, knowing what we are doing than being at home or wait.

The process of sorting out who would go for military training and who would not thus began already in Botswana. Precious Nleya was an intelligence officer assigned to Francistown transit camp, with the responsibility of identifying possible Rhodesian infiltrators among the recruits:

> So these people [spies] were … were joining our camps as part of us, as cadres, as recruits, you see, and then they would go up the ladder and you would find, at times, our camps were … you know … were, like, they were known to the enemy on attacks, so after realising that maybe the enemy operatives found out that was another way of the people getting into us, so we were deployed in the camps. So I came back to Francistown on a mission this time, not as a cadre, a recruit.

Life was not easy in Francistown transit camp, and by the late 1970s as numbers increased, it was crowded and sometimes unpleasant. Many had, in fact, spent time in Botswana police stations or even prisons before being taken to the Francistown Camp. Nleya explains how they were housed in dormitories like in a boarding school, and the photographs give an impression of many people in a constrained space. But once there, there was great expectation and everyone was excited to be joining the struggle and waiting to be ferried to Zambia by plane.

From Francistown, the recruits were taken to Zambia. Experiences varied according to the date of arrival in Zambia. Up to about 1976, the systems had not been put clearly in place, and confusion could sometimes reign during the period of political negotiations, from the early 1970s up until 1976, when all efforts were being made to create a single army from the different nationalist parties. For a while, all those coming from Botswana were initially taken to Nampundwe, but it was not long before Victory Camp became a staging place for all women and girls, from early 1977.

Nampundwe Camp became the main sorting place for the men and boys. From there, some were sent for military training, while others who were younger were sent to school. Physical fitness became a factor in being selected for the military, as Benjamin Dube describes:

> You see, at Nampundwe… that was a transit camp - people who were arriving from home via Botswana mostly, and coming there in their hundreds. They needed to be screened before they could undergo military training. You would be surprised that … you thought perhaps people here at home were fit, all of them, and there was no need. But … when these people underwent screening, there were a lot of disabilities that one discovered.

TOP: Recruits boarding a plane from Botswana to Zambia, 1978
BOTTOM: A group of refugees eating in the Francistown transit camp


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

Refugees in Francistown Camp



Mzila-Ndlovu describes how he had to struggle to be allowed to join the military as he was a trained and experienced teacher and came under suspicion when he said he no longer wanted to teach, but instead wanted to become a freedom fighter:

> And I argued my case to say, "No, no, look, I left teaching back home and I can't be seen, I don't want … I want to go for training". But that was source of suspicion from some of the trained personnel… Killion [camp commander] said, "No, it can't be if this man … I interviewed him and I`m happy … he`s an activist, he`s a ZAPU person. He was a student activist, in Senga, in Gweru, so where is your source of suspicion?" And they were arguing right in front of me to say, "Does he go to the guys who are going to start the school, does he go to what was called a special unit which would go to the Soviet Union to do pilot training, does he go with the rest of the ordinary rank and file guys to Angola?

There were also, of course, younger boys who did not want to go to school and preferred to go off to fight, and many had to be returned after jumping out of the trucks that were heading to the schools rather than the military training camps. Edward Nare was one of those who was disappointed by being considered too young for the military:

> …in 1977 and 1978, people were joining the struggle in droves, therefore those who were responsible for military training now they… they had a chance to choose, to say now … like, we had a number of people, some coming from South Africa, the Wenela4, and they were automatically … even when we were maybe to go for training. You would know that the moment they come, yours would be delayed… really it was frustrating and … because you know nobody went there for any other purpose other than what we were recruited for…

Cetshwayo Sithole was interviewed specifically about Nampundwe, and the life there. He describes the type of basic training and political education which took place at Nampundwe in order to prepare the young people for further training frequently done by foreigners or Zambians. The recruits were to understand the importance of the struggle and the necessity of making sacrifices and also were expected to gain some basic understanding of socialism. Physical exercises induced discipline and prepared the recruits for rigorous military training elsewhere. He also talks about what happened to the spies identified, initially being imprisoned underground, but ultimately they attempted to re-educate many of them to turn them into their own counter-intelligence. He ends with a description of an attack on Nampundwe by Rhodesian aircraft in which most escaped because he had taken them out of the camp, leaving only the medical team and the sick as well as some identified as spies who lost their lives.

Initially, girls were also taken to Nampundwe, as Precious Nleya experienced, but later they went to Victory Camp where they too were sorted for either schooling there at the camp, for further education in specialised courses, or for military training. As Elingworth Poli states:

> By that time we, we had a choice. You were allowed to choose what to do, and as someone who was already doing secondary level at home I was eager to continue with my education, so I chose to remain in the camp where there was a school.

TOP LEFT: Teacher Enos Malandu giving a lesson on Marxism and Leninism to refugees in Nampundwe Camp
TOP RIGHT: Young men at Nampundwe Camp
BOTTOM: T.G. Silundika addressing cadres at Nampundwe transit camp

[4] Reference is to those recruited for labour in the South African mines

Others, like Sibongile Khumalo[5], preferred to take the military option.

Recruitment is a topic that virtually all the interviewees discuss in one way or another, as all were recruited or made a decision to join the struggle. Many of the interviews discuss at length their efforts to join the struggle, and the events of their journey out of Zimbabwe to Botswana where many met further adventures with the Botswana police and military, or even their own relatives on the Botswana side of the border who wanted to dissuade them from joining the struggle and send them back to school in Zimbabwe.

MILITARY TRAINING

As mentioned above, the first military training took place in 1963, and it continued thereafter until 1979. Guerrillas were trained initially in other countries – Tanzania, Ghana, China, Algeria, the Soviet Union – but ZAPU eventually established its own training camps in Zambia where the bulk of the later training took place – as well as in Angola. Most of those interviewees who were in the military mention their training in one way or another, but two were specifically interviewed on the subject of training. Jack Mpofu was trained as early as 1967 in Tanzania by ZAPU cadres, including Alfred Nikita Mangena, the later commander. He describes how they were trained for nine months on small weapons, mortars, obstacle crossing, tactics and reconnaissance, as well as political science. He characterises the training thus:

> …the aim of the training was to make a man, that he can survive in a very, very tough situation. Then that's why we did all these things that a man himself, he could be a commander even if he's alone or he could train others even if … he's alone … and then he could be also be a politician or something like a …[commissar]

Later, after spending some time on operations, Mpofu became a trainer himself, when ZPRA had set up camps for training within Zambia. One of the main camps was at Mwembeshi, in the Zambezi valley, towards the Zambian/Rhodesia/Mozambiquan border. The training was intense, beginning with practice in carrying the heavy weight of a gun, sometimes using logs. Next would come the stripping and assembling of light weapons, and shooting or target practice later. The shooting training began in the lying position:

> …as time goes on you find that the man now is used in firing when on the lying position; then you teach him to shoot …. on the kneeling position and then on the … standing position, and then if they qualify there then there's no problem. But you don't allow them to stay with the ammunition as … as they can make an error and kill others.

Many different types of weapons had to be learned, along with the ammunition to be used, and then also hand-to-hand combat with bayonets or judo and anti-aircraft. Again, tactics, reconnaissance, topography were essential additional skills to master. When they had sufficient skills, they would be sent on manoeuvres with very little food, to see if they could survive in the bush for several days. The physical exercise which had been a part of the routine at Nampundwe now became useful, as was the political orientation, as hardships were many during the preparation for even greater difficulties across the river. During the training suitable candidates would be identified to be appointed to command their units, and then they would be ready to go on operations within the country. Mpofu also talks about the importance of discipline, because a disciplined man

TOP AND BOTTOM: Cadres in training, 1978

[5] Pseudonym



> even if he's alone he can maintain the struggle, he can continue fighting. There was nothing … nothing more important than discipline itself because a person who … holds a gun and if he's not disciplined he can be a terrible person; he can fire to anybody he wants because he's having power in his hands.

In 1976, the training camp in Tanzania at Morogoro was closed and a camp was established in southern Zambia, towards Kariba, known as CGT1 [Camp for Guerrilla Training] to cater for large numbers of recruits who were flooding in to join the struggle. The first trainings took place there in 1977. At the same time, large numbers were also being sent to Angola.

Mzila-Ndlovu describes his training in Angola in 1977, by the Cuban military. The journey itself was an enormous adventure for the young men, travelling by truck across that part of Angola which showed the scars of recent war:

> I remember the day we left we were transferred from Nampundwe to FC[6] [Freedom Camp]. We were a group of some 2,000 … 2,000 recruits, yeah. A group of 2,000 recruits. We … took seven days to drive from Lusaka to Boma. …… it was my first time to come into contact with Cubans. We were driven by Cubans … everything, security, food, logistics, and what have you, was done by Cubans. It was a highly organized, you know, convoy.

Once there, they were organized for training which lasted six months.

> The first ten units or companies did infantry training. And because maybe of my education then they put me into artillery training …and the Cubans were so good at it because they had clearly laid out programmes of how to … you start with the physical training, and then of course if you were in an infantry you would then go to small arms like grenades, and … small arms like AK, the pistols and so forth. You know, this kind of became basic. We did this, but in addition to this basic training including the communications and including … reconnaissance …

In the interview Mzila describes in detail the process of training on different skills, and explains what was going on in each of the photographs. He also gives us information on the different types of uniforms used. Mzila was selected for heavy weapons, artillery training and he also describes the handling of these weapons and how to ensure you get the target. He talks about the Cubans and the Russians:

> All the instructors were Cuban, but we also had a Russian contingent, the Soviets. They were there but they kept their distance from the Cuban activities. I think they were monitoring because … I think they must have been sponsoring …..They were providing the weapons. … the food came from Cuba, the rice came from Cuba, the fish came from Cuba .. but they [the Soviets] were smaller, a smaller contingent who were also based there. Later of course I came to understand that … well as a major sponsor of ZPRA they needed to be on the spot and they would be reporting to Moscow on a wide range of activities and also even taking the responsibility in the event of an attack like what happened some two years after I had left when that same camp was attacked by the Rhodesian forces together with the South Africans.

TOP AND BOTTOM: Cadres in training, 1978

[6] Freedom Camp

Mzila-Ndlovu also talked about the political classes and when asked about whether elements of international law or warfare were taught, he replied:

> … I remember there were laws that we learned all through our training that you cannot use some of these weapons for extra-military, you know … ways of killing your enemy. You want to be humane in the manner in which you kill your enemy … like you don't want to tie a grenade to the head of your enemy and, and, and you blow them up. It's unethical …..
>
> This is one other area of our training that I think many people did not understand. Of course given also the kind of information that came from different operational areas, the kind of ways of elimination of the enemy our people were using, it meant probably they didn't understand that component of our training to say that even if you are to kill your enemy kill them in a humane way … … and I had a special interest in that because somewhat it had coincided with my religious training in the home that, you know, you can't be cruel and being a soldier it meant you had to overcome that, but it remained kind of being part of you … that you have to be humane … you may have to kill because of the greater cause, but you want to do it in a humane way.

Another element of training was to provide for medics. Benjamin Dube, a ZAPU doctor who was responsible for military camps, commented that some were trained separately, but some were trained within the context of the general training:

> Some we trained them, some were trained separately. What used to happen is, as the struggle, you know, grew, as we grew in numbers, is that when a battalion or a… let's say a battalion or a brigade went for training, it was at the same time when people to train as medics were identified and trained at the same time.

Mzila-Ndlovu describes the training he received as "advanced guerrilla warfare":

> So the training that was being done there … saying advanced guerrilla meant that you had a kind of combination of guerrilla warfare, kind of hit and run you know activities, but you want to transform those … those operations to hit, assault and stay. And the hit, assault and stay approach would then be useful when you go for settlements – enemy settlements…

After spending some time on operations Mzila-Ndlovu was later sent for training on heavier mortars in Egypt, and he finally learned to use the strela heat-seeking missile from ZPRA cadres in Zambia who had been trained in the Soviet Union. He commented on the quality of the training received as follows:

> … look, I did not receive a training anywhere else, but I can compare with what I saw in Egypt for instance where I was doing actually commando training together with some Arab fellows, guys from the PLO, yah, guys from Sudan …..you are able to compare yourselves with other armies like the Egyptian army for instance where you felt look your basic training was more superior than some of these fellows were getting from an established army like the army of the state of Egypt . You really felt someone proud to be ZPRA …

Besides discussing training, Mzila-Ndlovu's interview deals with several aspects of operations as well as the military strategy, which are referred to below in the section on operations.

TOP: Cadres in training, 1978

Towards the end of the war, in 1978, a new camp was opened at Mulungushi north-east of Lusaka, where training on conventional warfare began. There soldiers were trained on heavier weaponry, such as heavy mortars, and including the use of tanks and armoured cars. Five battalions – nearly 10,000 men were trained there.

Women were also receiving military training. The early arrivals trained along with the men, and both Precious Nleya and Grace Noko refer to their training at Mwembeshi. Grace was amongst the first eight women to be trained along with the men, and she described it as very tough. They were in the same platoon with men but:

> … we had our own section, section A... So we trained there for two … a month or two months and the supreme commander Dumiso Dabengwa came, he was sent by Dr. Nkomo to say "No, ask those ladies if they could come back to be sent to school", So when Dabengwa came we told him that "No we can't go back, we want to be trained as soldiers.

Grace went with others to be trained in Tanzania, during the period when there was pressure for ZANLA and ZPRA to train together, and then returned to become an instructor at Mwembeshi for the next group of women – this time numbering 25.

Joshua Nkomo was clearly concerned about the combined training of men and women and eventually found a way out of that situation. From early 1977 women who wished to go for military service were channeled to a special women's brigade. A separate camp was constructed for them at Mkushi in central Zambia, where they received complete military training, first with male instructors, and later with a full complement of women instructors.

Sibongile Khumalo[5] gives a detailed description of that training when being interviewed about the Women's Brigade. They spent 6 to 8 months and were being prepared to proceed to the front to fight:

> We were trained on combat and tactics and we were trained on political science. This is where we were taught about things like socialism, imperialism, capitalism, we had to understand all those … all those issues and how they..they related to our struggle, yes and what the party policy was and the focus, what it was. … we were young and from school, and we enjoyed it, we really, really enjoyed it. And we were taught topography and map-reading. You would have to know and say "If this shadow … the shadow of a tree is here, what time could it be?" Things like that those came under topography. How the sound, the echo of a bird … why is such a bird making noise? How … is it because the bird is seeing a lion or seeing a human being … and those were various signals we would get from natural things and we were taught all those things.
>
> I learned to use the Semenov, which was a semi-automatic rifle, and then the AK 47, a bazooka and I can tell you, and my friends will tell you, that during our pass-out parade when we were doing demonstrations, I was hit by bazooka flings from the bazooka …

The basic pattern of the training emerges through the various interviews – first basic training, either in Zambia or in another neighbouring country, followed by more specialized training for some, interspersed with periods deployed inside the country or along the Zambian border. Only the women were not deployed into the front. All those interviewed praised the training received as very thorough and preparing them for all eventualities.

TOP: Gun stripping lesson
BOTTOM: Cadres attending bush training camp

[5] Pseudonym

WOMEN'S BRIGADE

The decision to form a separate unit for women soldiers was evidently motivated by Joshua Nkomo. From evidence in the interviews he was uncomfortable having the men and women together and was also uncomfortable with the women becoming a fighting force. Sibongile Khumalo elaborates:

> You know he had a good policy. His thinking was that "Why waste a seed? These women are the ones who will replace those soldiers who would have died in the front, so why waste a seed. All we have to do is to prepare these girls for administrative work, yes".

He preferred to deploy them after basic training for training in such roles as police, nurses, secretarial etc. However, it is not clear from the interviews exactly how the decision was taken to form a separate brigade.

The brigade was first formed in 1977. At that time Victory Camp was being designated as a holding camp for women and girls, and selections were made for those who wanted to be trained as soldiers, those who would continue with education and those who might be teachers or sent for other non-military training. There appeared to be a policy that everyone not going for primary or secondary education should have military training first before going for other training, but evidently this was not strictly adhered to, as many went straight for other courses.

The brigade was formed at Victory Camp, and the first group remained there while the training camp at Mkushi was being prepared. It seems that almost all of the photographs of the brigade were taken at Victory Camp, perhaps even mostly on the same day when there was a parade. The chief of personnel, Ambrose Mutinhiri, is seen addressing them in one photograph. Grace Noko explains how the brigade was formed and what role they initially played:

> …when the brigade was now being formed, we had about 200 ladies who were now at the Victory Camp … So since we now had the trained personnel among women … it was also now on the security side, helping men and the Zambians to … teach our people, the ladies, … how they should behave in that camp, and also teaching those who were supposed to go for the training the slight or light training like how to handle guns, stripping the guns and also some … doing some exercises in the morning.

Sibongile Khumalo[5] talks about many of the individual girls shown in the photos, saying where they came from and in some cases where they are today. She mentions the practice of equality, without special privileges, without special uniforms or insignia, even for commanders, and the spirit which prevailed of trying to live socialism. She was in the first group of women to be sent to Mkushi, in about October 1977. She describes the experience:

> The whole idea was for us to receive political orientation, military training, so that we are ready for any situation to defend the country… So we went to Mkushi and when we got to Mkushi … I was in the first group, I can say in the lead truck - as I told you that I was in Company A - the lead truck that got to Mkushi and when we got there already, as organized as ZAPU was, we found a team already there … and they had already sort of like laid out the area where we would be, the company, and also where the kitchen would be, and nothing was done. It was a complete bush. And we were told, "Company A, this is your block" …and the block was just trees, and we were given tents, and we had to pitch up the tents … in that tent it would be like a section, maybe two sections in one tent, depending on the size. Our friends from Cuba gave us some airbeds. We had airbeds, we also had beautiful uniforms, beautiful uniforms, and they were brand, brand new…

[5] Pseudonym

TOP LEFT: Soldiers of the Women's Brigade hoisting the ZAPU flag
TOP RIGHT: Khanyile Mazwi and Nompumelelo Moyo enjoying mealtime with other cadres of the Women's Brigade
BOTTOM: Chief of personnel Ambrose Mutinhiri addressing the Women's Brigade at a parade



TOP: Cadres of the Women's Brigade marching at the Castle Arms Parade
BOTTOM: ZPRA cadres Syvester (deputy camp commander) and Sijabuliso Gumede in combat attire



> …and then we said "Now, where are the toilets?" …. And we were shown … we were shown the map in fact, the following day after everybody had arrived, we went to the parade and then we were shown the map of the camp "This is where the toilets will be. This is where your bathroom will be" …We said "bathroom" … and that was the stream; it was just a river; yes, it was just a river. And then we were shown where the kitchen will be, and then we were given the housekeeping issues, like "Don't wander as far as this area, because this … I think the area was highly infested with wildlife and also there were … a few kilometers away there were farmers …

Sibongile Khumalo[5] describes the training in some detail (covered under the section on Military Training) and then explains how after completion, sometime in the first half of 1978, some were selected to go for various other trainings. She remained to become one of the instructors for the next group of girls. It was this second group of young women who suffered a vicious air and ground assault by the Rhodesian forces. Cecilia gives a detailed emotional and very moving account of this attack in which many young women died just when they were about to begin their training. The camp had been alerted to the possibility of some activity, and some had managed to get out of the camp and taken cover, but when they first saw the jets approaching, the group she was with ran for the river, where many were able to conceal themselves. Those new recruits who headed for the defence pits took the full brunt of that air attack:

> …they taught us that … in case of any aerial attack, how we should retreat … so that's why we had to run eastwards, the enemy was coming from the east going the opposite side and I remembered Makanyanga, he …and then the jet, when they saw us coming out of there where we were taking cover, and you know what they did, they realized there were people underneath the trees, they just started increasing speed …. it was too late for them to dive, and so they just released the bombs… they were like silver and underneath they were dark, and you could just hear the whistle, and I remember the old man Makanyanga and that was the river where he was teaching us. He said "*ungezwa ukhwelo lala pansi, dakhe*" [trans: when you hear the whistle, lie down, recruits] He came, I tell you it was vivid and it … from nowhere I said "Ground" and we all went down. A few metres away from us, where we were hiding, where those big trees were, those where the bombs were dropped .. then there were two of us … some of us, two.. ..Nhamo, she didn't take cover, she continued running, and then she was hit by splinters, but she didn't die.

Then came helicopters, dropping paratroopers, to finish off whoever was still alive:

> They were white guys "There's some in the river" and we kept quiet, we were still. We told each other that … we were holding the semi-automatic rifles … we had ammunition, we said "If anything happens, we just take our lives". That's what we were prepared to do, but that would be the last resort, yes. If we see them coming for us, we'd rather kill ourselves, not them kill us. And then one of them said, "No, no, no, maybe it's fish, let's move on move on, move on".
>
> Now they were moving towards the helpless girls who had not received military training. After the bombs … they dropped bombs everywhere … now the girls were confused, and they couldn't move out of those pits… we watched as they shot them straight on the heads pah, pah, pah, pah … and one of the girls who was part of our group - I think she was overwhelmed, she couldn't move after the bombs were dropped. Then she crawled – she was trained in Mwembeshi – she crawled to where these other girls now were trying to run out of the pit and they were … they were just holding each other. There were about three of four and they were already dead from the bombs.

[5] Pseudonym

The rest of her chilling story can be read in the full interview - how they managed to survive in the river, how they then left the camp in the night and walked for two full days looking for some kind of assistance, finally reaching Kabwe, where they were rescued by sympathetic Zambians and local members of ZAPU.

That disastrous incident took place in October 1978, at the same time as the attack on Freedom Camp close to Lusaka. It effectively ended the military training of women. The camp was abandoned by ZAPU and the surviving girls settled at a camp near Kafue, south of Lusaka. Gradually they were redeployed, some for civilian types of training in other countries, others to work in the offices in Lusaka or to attend courses in the local colleges. They were given duties such as publicity at international meetings or were trained as secretaries.

We meet the Womens' Brigade for the last time in 1980, when they are seen parading at the Castle Arms hotel, a property which had been bought by ZAPU, on their return home just before Independence. From Castle Arms most of them went to Sierra Assembly point, where they were selected for incorporation into the new army being formed (Zimbabwe National army) or for the police or prison service. Some chose to leave the military and found their way in civilian life.

The story of the women's brigade is a fascinating one, as it represents an attempt to treat women equally, but yet not equally, and find a military but non-combatant role which would allow them to make their own contribution to the struggle. The young women themselves expected eventually to go to the front, and perhaps if the struggle had continued longer they might have, but with so many men available for training and deployment, and especially after the massacre at Mkushi, they never took on that role.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

A significant number of photographs in the Nkobi collection as well as several of the accompanying interviews depict various aspects of military operations. These include military parades, weapons captured in battle, casualties of the war, relations with the civilian villagers, military strategy as well as specific incidents. Since most of the photographs were not taken during actual operations, we rely purely on the oral testimony for such information, and of course there are significant gaps in the record provided here. Rather than presenting a coherent overall narrative of the military aspect of ZAPU's role in the struggle, we deduce the flow of events from the glimpses given by individuals when narrating their own experiences.

The early stages of armed struggle were mentioned earlier, with the first smuggling of arms from Egypt via Tanzania through Zambia. Thomas Ngwenya referred to the early contacts with the enemy as they brought more weapons into Rhodesia working with Dabengwa, finally leading up to the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of 1967. Those were the first big operations launched by ZAPU, in alliance with the ANC of South Africa, and they signaled to the Rhodesians that they were facing a determined and capable enemy. Unfortunately none of those interviewed here were involved in either of these campaigns, but interviews with those who were can be accessed elsewhere[7].

[7] Interviews have been carried out by Mafela Trust and can now be accessed through SAHA.

Since ZAPU was operating primarily from Zambia in the 1960s, a major obstacle was the crossing of the Zambezi, and one of the primary tasks was to establish viable crossing points, and use them to take arms into the country to stockpile. Sabotage was also an important activity, especially of the railway line from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls. Jack Mpofu describes these activities:

> So I was appointed [in 1968] to … to lead a certain group as a reconnaissance, head of reconnaissance, from east of Livingstone up to next to where the Kariba starts, then we were looking for … the routes where we could cross.

These operations were rudely interrupted by a disagreement between the politicians in Lusaka which led to withdrawal of two of the executive – James Chikerema and George Nyandoro - two mutinies amongst some of the cadres, and the formation of FROLIZI[8]. Eventually the crisis passed and ZAPU was able to revive its military thrust under the newly formed ZPRA. Jack Mpofu again describes a sabotage operation which must have taken place in 1972 or 73:

> I remember one day when we crossed with me and Mazinyane and Machimini to go and destroy the railway line at Victoria Falls. Then we went at night carrying a box of explosives with the detonating cord and fuse and so on. We thought it was a small bridge but it was just a culvert; No, let us break some stones which were on the side of that culvert and then put it under that culvert and on the side both, both corners; then we lit the explosives and then we left the area.

They succeeded in hitting their target and blowing up the train, but the next problem was to get the three-man unit back across the river. The other three men in their group had waited with the boat to take them back across the river, but were frightened away when they threw a stone into a gorge, thinking that the Rhodesians were firing:

> Then I decided that no let us take the dry log, two of them and then we tied two of them. I sat on those logs and then I started rowing, rowing those logs so that I can take the boat because it was on the open …I could see the boat. Then the current was too powerful when I was right … when I was inside the river. Then the logs were taken away by the water and then I .. I swam back to … Rhodesia, Zimbabwe. Then I said, no I failed. Then Mazinyane pulled me when I was about to …touch the banks of the river then we stayed there the whole day. But in the morning, then the enemy started bombing, from the bridge coming towards where we were and you could see even monkeys and baboons running away, fearing the sounds of the bombs.

That story had a happy ending as the Rhodesians retreated at nightfall and the comrades returned to rescue them. But in fact there were many casualties by drowning in the Zambezi[9].

It wasn't long before the ZPRA forces moved from such hit-and-run sabotage operations to something more sustainable. Mpofu explains:

> Their aim was to come inside the home, train others and see whether they can get small… small targets of the enemy, like police, or those soldiers who are patrolling maybe along the railway line and so on and then destroy those people, and take the guns and then give their recruits..

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[8] Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe

[9] The writer's brother-in-law was one who did not make it when trying to swim after their unit's boats had been discovered by the Rhodesians.

Some rudimentary training was carried out amongst the villagers, especially for defence, and then, too, the political education during training was important in establishing procedures for relating to civilians. The guerrillas relied on villagers for food and other essentials as well as information on enemy movements:

> It was very common in fact it was a daily thing to be fed by the locals because guerrillas could not carry food all the time. The source of feeding was … were the masses. But this picture also indicates that even if these women came to feed these guerrillas they … came with their babies. It indicates that they were very aware of the fact that there were no soldiers within the area. Otherwise they would not have allowed the women to bring in … their babies … the mujiba network I think was very much active in this situation, for this situation to take place.

Dube notes that in the photograph the guerrillas are being fed outside the village:

> it was necessary that whenever this kind of feeding was to take place it was to take place away from the …the eyes of the … of the … civilians, because within the civilians there could be informers.

Mzila-Ndlovu gives some detail of the difficulties of moving on foot, guerrilla-style while transporting artillery, and intersperses his discussions of particular weapons with examples of when they were used in the field and how they moved:

> … I remember many of our infantry guys went through Sipolilo, that's Feira I think … many of them because I mean they were many, they were then broken down to smaller units to actually suit the situation . So in groups of tens, groups of twenties, no more in groups of five hundred or 120 [as they were organized for training].

But later the groups became bigger:

> …towards the end of 79 when our units became even bigger in the front, like the attack on Makuti, Makuti[10]… you know Magunje police camp. That attack, it was the noisiest when our guys wrote ZPRA … I always remind people in Magunje when I go there to say that "Do you remember ZPRA inscribed on this police station?" The police fled that police station.

Mzila-Ndlovu also describes the strategy as it developed:

> So the training that was being done there saying advanced guerrilla meant that you had a kind of combination of guerrilla warfare, kind of hit and run you know activities, but you want to transform those … those operations to hit, assault and stay. And the hit, assault and stay approach would then be useful when you go for settlements – enemy settlements, whether they were police camps, they were farms…

As larger and larger numbers began to be staged along the Zambian border for deployment across the river, the Rhodesians began to take the war to the camps, generally with aerial bombardments. Dube describes the impact on the operations there:

TOP: Joshua Nkomo with A. Mangena (army commander), and E. Masengu (chief of training) at a pass out parade
BOTTOM: ZPRA guerrilla forces being given food by women

[10] Mashonaland West, near where the road to Kariba diverges from the Chirundu road

> What used to happen in the camps in Zambia during those days when the Smith … regime was bombing… the camps in Zambia … what we used to do … each morning we would … the commander would evacuate the base, or the camp, move the people maybe some ten kilometers north, others south, others east so that the camp remained an empty space vacant and empty of people. … when the camp was empty even if the enemy came it would just bomb the camp and the people would be safe … far away from the centre of the camp.

During these years Joshua Nkomo was based in Lusaka, and assumed the role of supreme military commander, visiting his men to encourage them, as Dube describes:

> Usually the message that he passed to the men was that, especially when they are through with their training, "Comrades you are through with your training, the enemy is across the river. It is you to liberate your country, it is you to liberate that country." Because …it was at that time the enemy was always afraid of the … operations especially by ZPRA… in a parade of this kind this is exactly what he [would] say, that "The enemy is afraid of you; get home and fight the enemy."

As activities built up there were both successes and failures. Failures were particularly painful when lives were lost, especially those of leaders. Two of the interviewees, Mpofu and Dube, were present at the incident in which the commander at the time, Alfred Nikita Mangena, was killed in 1978. They explain how a unit which had returned from training in Angola was being deployed in southern Zambia to cross the river for operations when they met an ambush and many – up to 30 – were killed. Mangena then went on a mission to investigate exactly what had occurred. In spite of warnings not to take any vehicle into the area as there were mines, Mangena called for his land rover when he was returning, fatigued from walking on a recently injured leg. It hit a landmine and he died on the spot. Jack Mpofu, who refused to get in the vehicle, was shot in the leg. The outbreak of shots was somewhat mysterious and led to speculation that Mangena was assassinated by his own men. Both Mpofu and Dube deny this, with Dube explaining:

> … some people, of course, well, were heard to be talking about Mangena [being] assassinated Mangena was killed by … some of his soldiers … this talk was there but it wasn't really pronounced … but there were some people who used to talk like that.

Both pay tribute to the qualities of Mangena as a leader. Photographs were also taken at the funeral of Mangena, which followed, and show Lookout Masuku leading the cortege as the coffin arrives at Zimbabwe House in Lusaka. ZAPU's policy was that if a commander falls in the field, the political commissar of the unit assumes command. Lookout was the chief of the commissariat so he automatically took over as commander.

But there were also successes, demonstrated by the capture of weapons. Then the administration could display these to the public, to the diplomats and journalists as was done on several occasions. A series of photographs show these captured materials, including rifles, mines, mortars, explosives, even uniforms. One captures a press conference at Zimbabwe House in Lusaka and another, a display of material at a public meeting. Sometimes markings on the material could show where the material was manufactured, thus proving complicity of certain western nations in Smith's war. Frequently planes were downed, especially spotter planes and helicopters; many photographs show these, probably all the same plane or planes, but one has been selected which appears to have parts of both a spotter plane and a helicopter.

TOP AND BOTTOM: Nikita Mangena's funeral in 1978



TOP LEFT: Rocket used in bombing in 1978
TOP RIGHT: A cadre inspects captured weapons in Lusaka
TOP MIDDLE: Captured explosives, weapons and ammunition in Lusaka
BOTTOM: Joshua Nkomo is making a statement next to a display of captured weapons



TOP: Cadres inspect parts of the downed spotter plane
BOTTOM: Display of captured weapons

Mzila-Ndlovu relates how his unit used a strela heat-seeking missile to shoot down a Rhodesian troop carrier returning from the attack on Mkushi women's camp. They were stationed near Mwembeshi and were unaware of the attack which had been staged until later. They saw a large number of helicopters flying from the north:

> …and we counted those helicopters …and I decided no we cannot want to use a missile. Little did we know that they actually were flying ahead of a bigger troop carrier, a Dakota. And when it appeared … I don`t know … it was around about 4 o`clock, 5 o`clock. It was really getting …kind of … it was cloudy, kind of getting dark....but that Dakota was flying below the cloud level but higher than the altitude of the helicopters, and so we hit it and our guys went to assault and found that they were already dead, burnt.

By 1978-79 with three trained battalions already in the field, the Rhodesians were trying to contain ZPRA forces within Zambia, but were not succeeding. Mzila-Ndlovu describes the strategy:

> The understanding was that more battalions would be deployed along the Zambezi River, thereby you know testing the enemy's strength in terms of dislodging us from the gorges, the mountains along the Zambezi Valley. If then that failed [i.e. the Rhodesians failed] we'd push further inland and then the strategy was eventually we'd go for towns and capture towns.

The enemy failed to dislodge the ZPRA soldiers when they fought against a single battalion at Feira. For two weeks they tried and finally had to withdraw. That then told ZAPU leadership that the time was ready for their final strategy "The Turning Point". Those troops trained in conventional warfare would be thrown in to assist the guerrillas on the ground to seize and hold territory. Richard Dube described it thus:

> Now, the turning point was a result of the fact that in the country here, especially in Matabeleland North we had semi-liberated zones. I can give you my experience of the semi-liberated zones we had. I was one time assigned to come and make an assessment inside in NF 2[11] which includes… Hwange, Lupane, part of Nkayi, Tsholotsho up to Plumtree. I left Zambia of course with a group of men; we walked through … Hwange up to Lupane, walked up to Nkayi, walked through up to through Tsholotsho and then Plumtree and finally I … crossed over to Botswana. Now, you can be surprised that during my movements around this country at certain places I could ride on a bike during the day along the roads .., in uniform …
>
> Now the idea of the … Turning Point was - we had reached a point where we wanted to capture land and defend it and … how we were going to do that without regular soldiers. This is what necessitated us to train five battalions initially which we were going to use the armaments of course that our Russian friends had already given us, the tanks, the amphibious I mean the pontoons and so on which we were going to use for …Yes we were going to bring the tanks on pontoons[12]. We … were really amassing the arsenal to … move in the regular battalions and defend the areas … the liberated areas.

Dube describes how the Rhodesian commander on the southern side of the river later told him that they realized that they would not be able to defeat the three battalions amassed on the Zambian side:

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[11] Northern Front 2
[12] Across the Zambezi

> They had already tested that when they … they attacked the battalion at … Kariba. It was one of … the battalions that had been trained at Mulungushi. The battle at Feira it took about …. it took about almost two weeks. Then they were unable to defeat that battalion and they lost quite a good number of planes and men. So they … they realized if they could be resisted by a single battalion using all the … equipment they had, all the … special forces they had on one battalion … they were being resisted by one battalion, how more … what more with … three battalions…
>
> …General Schute - when he was Brigadier actually - in One Brigade here in Bulawayo … he is the one who was responsible for that area. He sent his MIO's, his intelligence group about three times going there to make reconnaissance and so on. Each time they came back they thought they had come to the final … the point where they would decide to go and attack but all the three times they made reconnaissance and came down here and assessed what they had discovered they aborted … the decisions to go and attack those battalions.

Meanwhile, though, ZPRA forces were themselves moving. Dabengwa explains how six hundred troops with heavy artillery had already crossed and attacked from within Rhodesia:

> When the Rhodesians started bombing the ZPRA forces in 1979 and they actually started bombing them when the forces were already being deployed towards the front, that is along the Zambia and Zimbabwe border, and most of the fighting that took place took place really in the border areas and the ZPRA forces were ready to cross. One battalion had already crossed on the western side of the country, … between Kazangula and the Victoria Falls. The destruction of the … the Elephant Hills Hotel at Victoria Falls was a result of … it was hit by the ZPRA forces using artillery fire.

Dube expressed the view that the knowledge of the strength of these ZPRA battalions was certainly a factor in pushing Ian Smith to accept talks at Lancaster House which led to a negotiated settlement by the end of 1979. Of course this deprived the ZPRA forces of the battlefield victory which they so desired, but as Dube reflects:

> Now I must say the ZPRA operations were a decisive factor in the liberation of this … of this country because without ZPRA fighting I don't see the actual reason why the Rhodesians or Ian Smith would have given up this country to be taken by … I don't. This is the way I see it. It's unfortunate of course that things have gone the way they have gone, but we in ZPRA actually liberated this country with our own … our own strength. It's a fact.

RHODESIAN ATTACKS

The attack on Mkushi Camp was not the only bold assault by the Rhodesian forces on ZAPU installations in Zambia. As the war intensified such attacks became a daily threat and a frequent occurrence, not only for the military staging and training camps in the Zambezi Valley, but also for the refugee camps, for administrative and military personnel housed in Lusaka, and for the transit camps. The attack on Nampundwe Camp in which several people died has been described by Cetshwayo Sithole and Benjamin Dube, Regina Ndlovu refers to threatened attacks on Victory Camp. Mzila-Ndlovu refers to an attack on the training camp in Angola; the boys' school at JZ Moyo Camp nearby was bombed and even after it moved far north to Zambia's north-western province near Solwezi the children were subjected to bombardment again.

Joshua Nkomo's house in Lusaka was attacked from the ground and the air, the Liberation Centre was attacked on the ground and a house used by military intelligence was attacked by helicopter-borne paratroops[13]. Nothing and nowhere was safe. However, by far the most devastating in terms of loss of life was the attack on Freedom Camp in October 1978, just at the same time as the Mkushi attack.

Photographs showing the damage caused by these assaults appear with great frequency in the Nkobi collection. Most relate to the Freedom Camp attack, and some to the attack on Nkomo's house, with only a few apparently showing the damage to Works Camp not far from Victory Camp[14]. Joshua Nkomo's house was the subject of a direct night assault by a ground force using land rovers, and was simultaneously bombed from the air. A fierce firefight took place in which several on both sides lost their lives, but Nkomo escaped, having received a tip-off from intelligence. No account of this attack emerged from the interviews here, but an interesting side event featured in Zephaniah Nkomo's story. At the time Zephaniah was an intelligence officer detailed to the security of the Presidency. The day before to the attack on Nkomo he had, during reconnaissance in the vicinity of Lusaka, come on a white farmer painting land rovers in the colours of the Zambian police:

> I sneaked to one white man along the farmland and this man had a farm along Aaron Milner's farm. I sneaked in, armed, and went to see what was happening in this farm, where I found the owner of the farm, a white man, busy spraying land rovers and also doing a lot of mechanical work. I did not shoot him, but my intention of coming there was to carry out reconnaissance and make sure whatever decision would follow was to be supported by what I saw. I was instructed to move out when he saw me, having entered without permission in his premises.
>
> I was at Makeni that night [of the attack]. It happened around 11 p.m. The whole town, Lusaka, was shaking with vibrations from bombs, shelling, shooting, the sound was just unbearable. The following day we made our reconnaissance missions around Lusaka and some other suspected areas and we found and apprehended one suspect who confessed before us that he took part in Nkomo's house bombing the previous night. I interrogated the man and he revealed astonishing information that they had come all the way from Rhodesia heavily armed, well equipped in a number of groups or units with specific tasks, and his task among other tasks was to capture him [Nkomo] alive or dead. Some were to capture material, some were armed with bazookas, all sorts of weapons that were fired and used in Nkomo's house attack. Having interrogated this man we reported him to Joshua Nkomo who came and also interviewed him. After interviewing him he advised us or instructed us to take him and surrender him to the Zambian authorities.

Freedom Camp was located about 25 kilometers north of Lusaka. The party was using a farm in that area to produce food for the cadres as well as the refugees. But it was also frequently used as a transfer base when recruits were being sent for training out of the country. On the day when it was attacked a large number of recruits were waiting for transfer to Angola. They had been assembled for a parade addressed by the commander Mangena, who had left, but they were still waiting to be dismissed. Zakhele Ndebele was there, as was Christopher Moyo.

TOP: Effects of ground and air attack on the house in Lusaka given to Joshua Nkomo by Kenneth Kaunda
BOTTOM LEFT: Bodies of bombing victims being moved into a mass grave after the Freedom Camp massacre
MIDDLE RIGHT: Freedom Camp massacre - charred bodies of bombing victims
BOTTOM RIGHT: The remains of a building and truck after the Freedom Camp bombing

[13] The writer was living in the same suburb, Roma, at the time, and saw the helicopters approaching
[14] This was where some mechanical workshops were located as well as accommodation for many older people who worked in the self-reliance productive activities at Victory Camp



Moyo relates:

> We saw a spotter plane hovering around. We thought that it was something .. Zambians, because it went just like that and came back and came again. That was for the second time. Then it was followed by jet .. jet fighters from Rhodesia. ..those Canberra and Mirage and things like that. Within some minutes there were about six or so planes were hovering over our head … It was just empty, very few trees you see. Then within a short time then air force just started bombing, bombing the whole camp, bombing … the people were crowded like this …it was a horrible thing. … Then people started running here and there and they couldn't reach that place [the area protected by trees where they were sleeping]. So those people were just squeezed in the place and many of them were killed, … those planes were going around, when they come down the first thing they will open machines and sub-machines, something like that, then when they go up they will start dropping drums … dropping napalm over these people. … we were in the parade, so people were just in that … in that manner, so they started dropping … dropping napalms, dropping everything that they can do.
>
> ….there were helicopters again which came after some minutes after those airplanes they have done their job. Then the helicopters … about 6 to 9 ..6-9 yes, helicopters, start hovering again, shooting people now, using heavy machine guns. So people, those people who were trying to run away from the sector, then they were killed by helicopters … Because they were just going like this ,just going around … around the camp…around the … whoever is trying to run away was killed. Trying to run away, was killed just like that.

Moyo was injured, but not seriously, so that after spending some time in hospital he was able to return to his unit and eventually departed for Angola for training, and later participated in the frontline. Zakhele Ndebele was not so lucky, as his injuries were more permanent:

> I was already a company … logistic, I was hit when I was in the shed giving some other comrades some combats [uniforms]. So the other group of comrades were at the parade and some of us were giving some combats to some of our colleagues who were there.

Initially while in the shed he was injured on the arm, but that was just the beginning:

> When I came out here this building was already on fire, so instead of going this side, I went towards the parade, and before I … before I was just near the kitchen, where there's an open space, that's when I noticed four jet fighters coming, and by the time when I took the position, I was somehow blown up, for the bomb probably burned about three or five metres from me, then my foot was shattered.

He confirms Moyo's story about the helicopters following the planes and trying to catch anyone who was escaping:

> So by the moment when those planes had gone, there happened to be some helicopters at the side where I was … I think there were about three. They were the ones which went around shooting people who were trying to have a break-through, for those helicopters were trying to push people who were in the camp so that they could not come out and the planes could hit their target.

TOP: ZPRA headquarters after the bombing
BOTTOM: Joshua Nkomo, journalists and visitors viewing the damage after the Freedom Camp attacks

Many young recruits died that day, some from napalm burning and others from other cluster bombs or from shooting. The dead were buried there on the spot in mass graves. There was also considerable property damage which appears in several of the photographs.

After training Moyo experienced further bombing attacks at the camp where he was taken before being deployed into battle:

> Then before going home [into the front] then we were taken to Mulungushi, it's a ZPRA training camp. We stayed there for … three weeks and there, daily there was bombardment, in the morning when we were about to drink tea, there the planes were coming; there's a dam somewhere nearer the camp. Then in the afternoon, but the time when you are going for the lunch, then the bombardment is coming. Around 5 somewhere the bombardment is coming and we were collecting fish, dead fish .. from the dam after … after the bombardment. We were just collecting dead fish from around there and we used the … we had those fish.

Ndebele, on the other hand, was too severely wounded ever to join the battle. He spent several months in hospital in Lusaka, and then was sent to Czechoslovakia to be fitted with an artificial limb. But they could not stay there indefinitely and eventually he was returned to Zambia into the care of ZAPU. It then became a problem for ZAPU of what to do with the now disabled, how to keep them profitably occupied, both to make some form of contribution and to avoid degeneration into depression:

> So when I came home to Lusaka I… the first night I slept at Makeni[15], and when I was at Makeni we were told that we were to open a school at Kafue, so that's the place where I stayed a bit longer. When we got to Kafue we opened a school for the disabled. So I was one of the teachers there, I was teaching other comrades, so we could even be driven to VC and to JZ Moyo Camp where we could meet some other teachers there and make some drafts, they helped us with our books so we could help our comrades … even in their education. And one of the most pleasing things was that some of our comrades in their education … that most of our comrades whom we were teaching, some of them they had left home without even seeing the door of a school, so they were very pleased to get the chance of reading.

REGIONAL ALLIANCES

ZAPU could certainly not have developed its military capacity without support from other regional players, as well of course as those further afield. The first and most important ally was Zambia, as we have seen, even before it gained independence under UNIP. The political friendships dated to a much earlier period still, during the struggle against the Federation before it was formed. And many Zimbabweans, especially from the Matabeleland region had spent time in South Africa working (see for example, Amos Ngwenya) or obtaining education (for example Joshua Nkomo, T.G. Silundika and Edward Ndlovu from among the ZAPU leadership). There they had not only been politicized, they had made acquaintances which were to be continued and renewed in the years of struggle. The Zambians welcomed the ZAPU exiles as early as 1962, as we have seen, facilitating at the highest level the establishment of military operations. And they continued to provide that base throughout, up until Independence.

TOP: Joshua Nkomo, Kenneth Kaunda and J. Msika at Victory Camp BOTTOM: Oliver Tambo and Joshua Nkomo attending the UNIP conference at Mulungushi Rock in 1978

[15] A ZAPU property on the outskirts of Lusaka

TOP: ANC delegates Oliver Tambo and Moses Mabida at the Non-Aligned Conference in Maputo
BOTTOM: SWAPO youth protesting at a rally in Lusaka in 1979

Charles Madonko described how he went with the commander of the air force:

> Yes, when I was asked to go and find that Mkushi Camp, for the ladies, we went to see the commander of the air force, Zuze, with Joshua and, and others, and where we made it out that I should go down and find out a place with water and far from the young guerrillas in Lusaka, because we were afraid of pregnancy. So I had to find Mkushi; the water was good, although Zuze said " it's a bad .. it's a bad corridor, because if the enemy comes he might push the girls into a corner, they might end up going into the water". And we saw that, but that was about the best we could do.

The closeness to the Zambians is evident from the large number of photographs in Nkobi's collection which were taken at Zambian events – Independence celebrations, medal ceremonies at State House, UNIP congresses, May Day parades and so on. Normally ZAPU would have been invited as guests. Students were accommodated in the University of Zambia, ZAPU officials developed cordial relationships with Zambian officials, which provided the co-operation necessary for the approval of transport of individuals and groups as well as materiel coming into or through the country. The Zambian support was, therefore critical. Nkomo is frequently shown with President Kaunda, as in a photograph of the two of them with Joseph Msika at Victory Camp. By all accounts, Kaunda and Nkomo were very close.

Next to the Zambians, the closest alliance was with the ANC of South Africa. As Nkiwane makes clear, a personal friendship between Nkomo and Oliver Tambo dated to Nkomo's days in South Africa in the 1940s:

> Tambo and Mandela, these two were always inseparable, and Nkomo was within their group.

It is popularly believed that the military alliance of Smith's Rhodesia and Vorster's South Africa began after the joint Wankie and Sipolilo incursions of 1967-68. However, Nkiwane states that the reverse was true:

> ... when we started operating we started infiltrating people through the Zambezi into Rhodesia then, and as we went exploring ways where we could cross people over to Zimbabwe, every time we were at the Zambezi River, it doesn't matter at what point, big South African Buccaneers were overflying the area almost at water level. So we realised that the Zambezi was being… the surveillance was being done by the South African armed forces. ... Then we realised that the South African Defence Forces had transferred the defence line onto the Zambezi. Then we thought it was worthwhile that ZAPU and the ANC came into some form of alliance and tried to fight the enemy where he was found.

The military co-operation, the alliance, began having playing a significant role very early on. Nikwane again:

> …we then came together and started working together until late in 1963[16] we had a high command made up of cadres from the ANC and … ZAPU.

The story of the 1967-68 campaigns does not appear in this collection, and has been told elsewhere, but it had a major impact on the development of the struggle, in spite of its ultimate failure, as it inspired many and taught many lessons. Its failure did of course produce some finger-pointing from both sides of the alliance, but in the end it strengthened rather than weakened it.

[16] This date cannot be correct. Dabengwa and others put this as 1965

When Jack Mpofu completed his training in 1968 they were deployed together with ANC cadres, even though their training had been separate. The alliance became important during the time of the split in ZAPU and the formation of FROLIZI. The Zambians had confined all the leadership together to try to force them to sort out their differences. He relates the following incident:

> Then it came a time that … the group of Chikerema went and shot a buffalo somewhere, but we were staying together; then we also shot a kudu to prove that we were also having arms but we were not allowed to have any arms, but we had to show them that we have got arms. We took those arms from the ANC of course…

The military co-operation continued, in fact, up until after Independence. Christopher Moyo refers to being deployed into the Hwange area along with six ANC cadres in 1979. After Independence the situation changed, but ultimately ANC's needs were still the same – they needed to be helped to cross Zimbabwe with their weapons and enter South Africa. Nkiwane recalled that he was actually accommodating ANC intelligence personnel while others accommodated MK cadres:

> These [at Nkiwane's residence] belonged to [Jacob] Zuma because only Zuma came to see them, came to give them instructions, and not [Joe] Modise. Modise went to Akim to see his group, because Modise was military, and Zuma was intelligence.

Even as late as 1987, Nkiwane was assisting ANC to get their personnel and weapons into South Africa through Beitbridge.

The alliance with other liberation movements was not restricted to ANC. In the 1960s, a loose alliance existed between six movements – ANC, ZAPU, FRELIMO, SWAPO, MPLA and PAIGC. They called themselves the "authentic" liberation movements, and supported each other diplomatically, trying to promote each other amongst the international community. Nkiwane elaborates:

> we operated together. Even our camps in Tanzania, we were accommodated at a place away from Dar Es Salaam at a place called Dodoma, which was… which is now the capital of Tanzania and this was where we established our camps… ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO and us. …We were together in one camp. Ours was commanded by Moyo and later Nxele took over. And FRELIMO was commanded by Machel who became President, after, and the commander of FRELIMO was Philip Magaya who died in an accident, a shooting accident across the Ruvuma River in northern Mozambique and Dr Mondlane who was killed by bombing in Dar Es Salaam, so Machel was brought from the… he was the next in that lot, he was brought from Dodoma.

In Lusaka, they sometimes assisted each other with the use of properties and shared celebration days. But it was not only ANC which gave military assistance. According to Nkiwane, both MPLA and FRELIMO helped out as well:

> We got weapons from Mondlane, we got weapons from Augostino Neto with Shipenda who was their representative in Dar Es Salaam. He gave him authority to give us any amount of weapons because the two Portuguese countries had more weapons stored in the harbor, in the port in Dar Es Salaam than anybody else. Ethan [Dube] and myself we could walk there into a ship and select as much weapons as we could.

TOP: R.G. Mugabe and T.G. Silundika at the Non-Aligned Conference in Maputo
BOTTOM: Joshua Nkomo, Kenneth Kaunda and R.G Mugabe at the formation of the Patriotic Front


FRENTE PATRIOTICA


STUHARDT AVE
ARCADIA CO

Supporters outside Arcadia Hall during a campaign rally

Here Nkiwane is describing how ZAPU managed to obtain sufficient weapons for the Hwange campaign in 1967, at a time when Nyerere was trying to frustrate ZAPU. Later, MPLA assisted by providing the facilities for training in Angola, after they had taken power in 1976. But ZAPU also were able to assist others as well, particularly with transport, giving crucial help to FRELIMO to open the Tete province:

> We … opened the Tete province for … Philip Magaya, for FRELIMO. We, at our expense, we carried the weapons, we took them there; we carried their personnel into… Zambia and then into the Tete province, we did the same. We were carrying that lorry of ours - it was a ten ton truck - it was on the road every time carrying fuel for FRELIMO, for MPLA for ZAPU, for ANC.

FRELIMO shared close working relationships with ZAPU in the earlier days, until they were disrupted by the confusion which prevailed in ZAPU from 1970-72 during the formation of FROLIZI, and the Tanzanian President Nyerere took the opportunity to promote ZANU to work with FRELIMO in Tete province.

The political and diplomatic situation in the region was complicated for ZAPU, as various newly independent African states sought to flex their muscles and attempt to extend their influence beyond their borders. The OAU (precursor of the AU) had embraced the cause of liberation in the southern African states, and purported to provide assistance through its liberation committee. However, behind them stood imperial powers still trying to keep some influence in the region. And the fact that for each of the countries in southern Africa not yet free there was more than one liberation movement enabled rivalries to blossom. In the eyes of most ZAPU people - and this is reflected in the interviews as well as elsewhere - President Nyerere was the *eminence grise*, being used by the British to promote ZANU in place of ZAPU, hence his attempts to obstruct ZAPU activities. Nkiwane puts it this way:

> Nyerere .. here he knew the game plan …. to advance ZANU, at all cost. This was a British plan. It's only now that we.. we know it was.

The photographs being discussed here were taken at the formation of the Patriotic Front in 1976. The Patriotic Front was, of course, formed at the instigation of African states, insisting that the two Zimbabwean liberation movements must work together instead of separately.

Relations with ZANU had been far from cordial ever since it had been formed through a break-away from ZAPU in 1963. Even that was blamed by some in ZAPU on the British:

> ZANU was formed in 1963, and that it was formed at the instigation of a British intelligence agent who told ZANU - Sithole - lies about what he thought Nkomo was trying to do after his visit to Egypt and after his visit to Tanzania – i.e. that he was trying to form a government in exile. And it was that that we understand infuriated Sithole and Sithole as a result of that decided to break away from ZAPU and led people like Robert Mugabe and Enos Nkala out of ZAPU because of that instigation that had been … that had been made by the British, so it was formed by the British when they realized ZAPU was very strong and that it had united the people of Zimbabwe together under ZAPU and it had become very powerful, and they decided to split it by proposing to Sithole that he breaks off from them, from ZAPU.

But ZANU had not developed militarily as far as ZAPU by the late 1960s. It was only when the second split in ZAPU occurred, with Chikerema and Nyandoro forming FROLIZI, leading to mutinies among the armed cadres, that some of the senior ZAPU trained personnel left ZAPU to join ZANU, forming a solid core for their military development from 1972. But they too underwent internal problems surrounding the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, their effective leader in exile in Zambia, in 1975. Nkiwane has this to say about their internal problems:

> '75 when the massacres started, ZAPU sympathised with … what was happening in ZANU, and we didn't delight in them butchering one another. It was no gains to us at all …This is

> the argument that we always don't understand, the thinking behind ZANU. Here we are.. Here they send Chitepo into Lusaka where ZAPU is dominating the whole countryside, town, Lusaka, camps teeming with ZAPU… we don't even touch them with a finger, but they themselves kill one another… so people were horrible people. First, Nkomo could not have persuaded Kaunda to release the jailed ZANLA chaps, two, if we were malicious sufficiently enough we could have killed some of them ourselves, but we did not.

After Chitepo's assassination the Zambians had arrested several ZANU officials, including Josiah Tongogara, and constituted an international commission of enquiry, which laid the blame on ZANU itself. Said Nkiwane:

> … after all it was Nkomo who set free the … ZANLA leadership; they were all jailed for killing one another …yes as was alleged. And Nkomo thought it was going to cripple our effort and… Nkomo and Kaunda, who understood one another so well that Kaunda could never ever betray Nkomo… so Kaunda listened.

However, Nkomo's efforts did not bring any comfortable co-operation between the two movements. The OAU, prompted by Nyerere made several attempts to bring together not only ZANU and ZAPU, but also later Muzorewa's ANC and that part of ZANU which remained loyal to Sithole after Mugabe took over the leadership.

Of those interviewed, three described the experience in 1976 when the OAU insisted that ZPRA recruits be sent to Tanzania to train jointly with ZANLA. Parks Ndlovu relates:

> …in Mgagao camp we found the Chinese, the Tanzanians, the ZANLA instructors, plus our instructors, I think ours were about 60, then, over 50. They said "There's no integration, these are very few; they must get into the sections". That is a military way of talking if you want to integrate. No, we refused. We said "No, we will remain as a unit". Days, days passed; they starved us like anything. ... The sad part of it, that was my experience I experienced...at one stage for three days I was given two seeds of beans plus a piece of old [hair?] and a lot of soup; no food for three days but giving … two seeds of beans. Ha, after some days the war started. When I left Jo'burg I had three, we were three … two brothers. When the situation became tense and the [fighting] broke off the first brother whom I came with to Zambia was chopped by .. they used a panga; he was chopped like anything. The third one whom I went with was shot by the Chinese. Out of the three, I am the only survivor from the Brunapeg area. We were three....one was killed by the ZANLA, using chops, one was shot…

Eight ZPRA women were included in the group, and they also relate their experiences of this massacre, as described below first by Noko, then by Parks Ndlovu:

> We were moved from Mwembeshi Camp when this ZIPA was formed; then the two parties ZANU and ZAPU agreed to have what they called a ZIPA whereby they could have the Zimbabwean soldiers trained together. But eventually there was a misunderstanding in that camp because you would find that Tanzania had given more support to the ZANU side, so it's like the ZANLA were having an upper hand on us. Then there were some Koreans .. Koreans or Chinese[17] who used to be in that camp. Whether they were the ones who had been initially training the ZANLA or not, that one I cannot say much but we had found that there were some Koreans there or Chinese there, who were also giving much support to the ZANLA side. As I said that, when we clashed they were the people who were now firing guns against the ZPRA or killing the ZPRA cadres who had … who were not armed by then.

[17] Evidently they were Chinese

> I'm saying it was a planned thing because as I mentioned it before that the Tanzanians were much on the ZANLA side. How it was planned that we should move from Zambia to Tanzania and that day was also planned, that when these people … because it was during lunch hour and that day it was the ZANLA who were in the kitchen not ZPRAs so eventually some misunderstanding there broke up and they started to shoot at us ….After that episode, in which over 50 ZPRA men were killed, it was very difficult for ZAPU to trust ZANU or the Tanzanians at all, and they were moved to be trained separately.

Nevertheless, the Patriotic Front was formed, before the Geneva Conference of 1976, promoted according to Nkiwane, by President Nyerere. The photographs mentioned above were taken at the Zambian State House, where the agreement was cemented. And after that at least a façade of unity was retained even up to the Lancaster House Conference in 1979. At international conferences ZANU and ZAPU formed a joint PF delegation. It only unraveled after Lancaster house when ZANU suddenly announced that they would contest the 1980 election not as PF but separately as ZAPU. According to Dabengwa, ZAPU once again saw the hand of the British behind this:

> And then in 1980 when they also realized the game - the South Africans were involved - when they realized that they could not allow a situation where after Zimbabwe has been independent the Zimbabweans are going to be able to assist the ANC MK comrades to use Zimbabweans to launch their attacks into South Africa which was the last bastion of white domination, and they decided they should frustrate that.

Finally the alliance with the ANC which had seemed so fruitful now appeared as a stumbling block for ZAPU, as the British feared that connection would assist the ANC to move towards victory in South Africa.

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

The neighbouring countries were necessary allies for facilitating bases and movement of logistics, but in their undeveloped state they did not have the resources to provide weapons and other materials. These had to come from further afield. Again, alliances were sought, and again minefields and pitfalls appeared as the ZAPU leadership attempted to negotiate the unpredictable field of international diplomacy. Not only were the early 1960s the height of the cold war, 1962 saw the rift between the Soviet Union and China which had previously been allies themselves against NATO.

Initially ZAPU sought assistance from Ghana and Egypt, Ghana being the first British colony in Africa to gain independence and Egypt under Nasser hosting the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). Representatives were sent to these countries to seek support, and the first weapons smuggled into the country came via Egypt. Egypt at the time was closely allied to the Soviet Union, the one nation which was in a position to provide the type of training and material support needed. Thus the relationship with the Soviet Union was to become the centerpiece of international solidarity for ZAPU. A few cadres were sent to China before its open rift with the USSR, but once their relations deteriorated, ZAPU concentrated on the Soviet Union. There are virtually no photographs which can demonstrate this assistance, not surprisingly; this was something which had to be carried out in the greatest secrecy. Through the Soviet Union, ZAPU was able to establish contacts with all the Warsaw Pact nations. Military and intelligence assistance in the form of training as well as equipment was provided mainly by the Soviet Union itself as well as the German Democratic Republic (GDR commonly known as East Germany), but they also provided scholarships for training in a variety of civilian fields, as did other eastern European countries. Callistus Ndlovu was the representative in New York, and was able to describe a great deal about the solidarity from different countries:

> .. the Soviets did quite a lot, in fact they produced … they brought most of the big equipment that we had. But the GDR also did a lot, but these … you see, African countries would not accept military equipment to be displayed openly, so they'd be brought in clandestinely and taken to camps somewhere

TOP LEFT: International solidarity – ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo with Cuban president Fidel Castro
TOP RIGHT: Joshua Nkomo meeting Erich Honecker during his visit to the refugee camps in Zambia
MIDDLE RIGHT: Yugoslavian delegation arriving at the airport to present donation of goods to ZAPU
BOTTOM: ZAPU representatives and general staff in Zambia

The accounts of training given in the interviews frequently refer to Russian weapons, including heavy mortars, assault rifles and anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Other interviewees refer to courses they took, for example, Zenzo Nkobi himself was trained in Berlin in photography as was Caroline Mhlanga; Charles Madonko went to Hungary to study locomotive engineering.

This assistance fitted with the communist ideology of popular revolution and a heavy dose of political education was included with all training, whether military or civilian. But of course this support also fitted with the cold war interest in extending influence in order to combat capitalist imperialism on the world stage. One could say that interests of ZAPU and of the Soviets coalesced. Through the Soviets ZAPU contacted the Cubans, and Edward Ndlovu represented ZAPU at the famous Tri-continental conference in Havana in 1965 where Castro assumed the role of benefactor of third world liberation. This association became very significant ten years later, when Cubans began providing training in Angola for ZPRA after assisting MPLA to drive out the South African invaders. [described in Mzila-Ndlovu's interview]. Nkomo also visited Cuba and established close relations with Castro, as reported by Callistus Ndlovu:

> they [Cubans] trained in all sorts, commandos, trained even … some people trained as policemen. Even in eastern Europe, you know, we had people who were trained as policemen, in other words, ZAPU actually tried to train a civil service of its own, both military and civilian.

Assistance came not only from the socialist bloc, but also from elsewhere. Callistus Ndlovu continues the story:

> So ZAPU at this stage [1971-2] was now getting support not just from the eastern bloc countries, but also from North African countries like Algeria, Egypt and the Middle East – Iraq.

And the OAU had a liberation committee which channeled funds and other assistance to the movements:

> … the OAU Liberation Committee … was dominated by Colonel Mbita [of] Tanzania; it did quite a bit because it co-ordinated all support towards liberation movements from the OAU. People who supported the liberation movement either did it directly through … I mean bilaterally going to the movement itself, like the Soviets used to do with ZAPU, or they paid through the OAU … so the OAU actually controlled quite a lot.

But the relationships were often shifting and had to be continuously reinforced, especially when changes occurred within the Zimbabwean political context. Ndlovu relates a critical period:

> during the time of the FROLIZI phase there was an attempt to derecognize ZAPU, and again there, we did something to stop it. Edward [Ndlovu]sent me an emergency message to go and talk to the embassy of Iraq in New York. … It was at that stage that actually ZAPU was saved from collapse because the Baghdad regime gave ZAPU about a million … three million dollars to counter what Chikerema was trying to do, and that grant turned the Soviets around who were doubting now, they were beginning to move towards Chikerema. And it must be noted that actually even the Zambian government was inclined to thinking that even Chikerema might be the right leader[18].

[18] This would not necessarily have betrayed Kaunda's close relations with Nkomo, who was still in detention

ZAPU had established a network of representatives in offices throughout Europe, Africa, the Middle East and even North America to nurture the relationships formed and extend them wherever possible. The role of these representatives was primarily diplomatic but they might also have responsibility for looking after the welfare of ZAPU students in the country or others there for medical treatment. Several photographs show Nkomo assembled with some of these representatives when they were recalled for periodic briefings.

Later, when refugee camps placed heavy pressure on ZAPU to look after thousands of non-combatants, mainly women and children, other support was required. The eastern bloc again came to assist. One series of photos shows Erich Honecker of the GDR arriving at Lusaka airport. Ndlovu elaborates:

> … what you see there is Honecker coming to deliver materials for refugee camps and also food, clothing, and other things like that. And normally, see, when they came like that they wouldn't … the military things would not be brought in this fashion, but mostly it was really things to support refugees.

The Yugoslavs, too, are pictured bringing material for refugees.

When there was need for support for civilians, especially children, westerners who had sympathized with the struggle but were reluctant to support military efforts, now came on board as well. Governments were still unwilling, having bought Smith's descriptions of freedom fighters as "terrorists", but non-governmental organizations as well as churches were willing to assist. Some from the Scandinavian countries, from Germany, Britain, Canada were prominent in providing support in the form of food, clothing, funds for building, medical equipment. Victory Camp was constructed almost entirely from such assistance. David Beer worked at the time for a Canadian organization known as CUSO[19] and described their assistance:

> we would raise funds in Canada through telling the stories of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and because of Edward Ndlovu's connection with … Canada through family … he could be hosted by the NGOs, trade unions, churches, on trips across the country and he would be telling the story of … Zimbabwe`s independence struggle. So we raised funds, CUSO did, also in collaboration with the churches like the United Church of Canada we were able to put together funds that came to Lusaka and went into the … projects. Now we had proper project proposals out of the Director of Projects in Lusaka for ZAPU, those were the documents that we used in Canada to fund-raise.

He also explained how CUSO acted as a kind of agent for other NGO's who did not have offices in Lusaka:

> There was a CUSO field officer for Zambia but we also had a separate liberation support officer, and that person was dealing with other NGOs including European NGOs who saw that office as a conduit for funds that would go to liberation support projects in the frontline states. Because our staff were able to visit the very projects that the Belgian Red Cross or Oxfam UK etc were providing money [for], … the CUSO office acted as an arbiter for those projects and of course our people were visiting the camps and visiting the projects and writing the reports.

[19] In its early days this organisation sent young Canadians to work in developing countries and was known as Canadian University Service Overseas. Later when it began funding projects the name was abandoned and the acronym alone retained.

TOP: The Red Cross delivering food supplies to Joshua Nkomo's house
BOTTOM: Joshua Nkomo and delegates visiting Victory Camp



TOP LEFT: Samora Machel inspecting military arms at the Non-aligned conference in Maputo with Oliver Tambo and others
Top right: ZAPU delegates at the International Conference in support of Liberation Movements in Southern Africa, held in Lusaka
BOTTOM: R.G. Mugabe and Samora Machel viewing a display of photographs at the Non-aligned Conference in Maputo

But it was later that western governments came on board:

> At that time there was no transfer of funds from government. We did have a relationship with CIDA[20] – CUSO did - as Oxfam and the churches were - we could get matching grants for so much money that was raised from the Canadian people. In the case of Zimbabwe, the government did not match grants… It was much, much later under the Trudeau government with Mitchell Sharp that as foreign minister he announced - and it must have been in the late 70`s of course - that Canada would match monies for NGOs for Zimbabwean projects for refugees or exiles

Besides raising funds and providing support for activities in the refugee camps, the effort also involved education of the Canadian people and political pressure on government to change their stance:

> ...we were trying to convince the Canadian government to do more in support of the people's liberation and also to raise money for our projects and so it was a concerted effort with the other NGOs and churches of Canada.

This Canadian effort was typical of NGO's in countries of Western Europe and the U.S.

In addition to the eastern bloc and NGOs in the west, there were international organisations which provided support for ZAPU – primarily on the diplomatic side or the provision of humanitarian assistance. The International Committee of the Red Cross was one of these which provided food, in particular, for the refugee camps. The United Nations was also a player. ZAPU had observer status at the UN as a recognised liberation movement, and leaders did travel to address the General Assembly and to lobby member states not to recognise Ian smith's government or the government formed with Muzorewa after the internal settlement of 1978. But it was the agencies which had the biggest impact on the ground – the UNHCR and UNESCO as well as UNICEF which provided assistance to the refugee camps.

The Commonwealth Secretariat was active diplomatically, and of course it was the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka in 1979 which broke the political logjam and led to the Lancaster House talks in 1979. The photographs of the Commonwealth Secretary General Sridath Ramphal touring Victory Camp and JZ Moyo Camp were probably taken during that meeting. David Beer describes how that meeting provided an opportunity for publicity about the refugees and ZAPU in general with Canadian journalists and political leaders:

> …we saw the Commonwealth Conference right in our lap in Lusaka as an opportunity to inform and educate primarily the large Canadian press delegation. There were fifty journalists, and it was a new Prime Minister Joe Clark and Flora McDonald his foreign minister. So we had arranged with ZAPU to get journalists to come to Victory Camp…. So we also were involved in trying to get the Minister of External Affairs Flora McDonald to go to the Camp and she did do that. It wasn't because of CUSO but she was very keen to visit the camp, Victory Camp, see all the women and the girls and they were absolutely thrilled to see her. (Beer)

Finally there were solidarity meetings, generally organised by third world countries, often sponsored by the Soviet Union. This gave encouragement to ZAPU but also gave them an opportunity to display to a wider audience their problems, strategies and achievements

Certainly, ZAPU depended for its successes on the support it received from the international community. They had to work long and hard to develop and maintain these contacts and ensure they bore fruit to help them towards their goals.

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[20] Canadian International Development Agency – a government department

LIFE IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS

Refugee camps were certainly not part of ZAPU's plan or design. They were rather one inevitable outcome of the developing war situation within the country. As the guerrillas established themselves and pushed into more areas, the Rhodesian regime retaliated ever more viciously and the civilians became the victims. The majority supported the guerrillas and when daily life became intolerable, they fled across the borders to seek refuge. Some remained in Botswana, particularly in the refugee camp known as Dukwe, but thousands were transported by air to Zambia. At first there was no particular programme or plan as to what to do with them, how to occupy them. However, as more and more arrived, it was necessary to develop a strategy. The party was assisted when MPLA, returning their personnel home after the end of their war of liberation, in 1976 offered ZAPU the use of a farm outside Lusaka. This became known as Victory Camp, and was immediately put to use to accommodate refugees. Another location was also obtained in the same area, and was named JZ Moyo Camp – after Jason Ziyaphapha Moyo who was assassinated in January 1977.

For just the next three years these camps became the centre of many activities for ZAPU refugees. At first Victory Camp was the main holding area for the women and girls and all the younger children. Although there were some buildings left behind by the Angolans, most of the refugees were accommodated in tents and carried water from bowsers in buckets. Bathing was in a near-by stream at the beginning. Regina Ndlovu arrived at Victory Camp in early 1977 and she explains in her interview how things changed as the camp developed and the party's plans took shape.

When she arrived the camp still had a military atmosphere, which was evidently quite intimidating for the girls, as she described her memory of her arrival:

> … the security officers who were manning the camp were ladies in their uniforms and with guns. … it was quiet to all of us in the car. And the driver had to report in a language that we were not used to, it was a military language. And he was shown where to drop us. We were made to queue in a military way and we were immediately addressed, "Welcome, this is Victory Camp. We are, we are not trusting you. Some of you might be Selous Scouts. We will be conducting personal interviews and from now on, forget your name. We are going to give you another one. And get used to it. Remove your shoes. The ladies will be searched by other ladies and the males by other males…"

This was at a time when the Women's Brigade was still housed at VC and before the school was formally established. According to Ndlovu:

> Before it was a refugee camp, we would rotate, according to companies. We called ourselves companies - Company A, Company B, platoon so and so is taking care of the catering.

Within each unit individuals would be given duties, and she describes her role as a medic which was:

> to make sure anyone who is not feeling well, I report to the relevant authority, get medication or if there is need for anyone to be taken to hospital, I would accompany the person to the hospital. When they come back, if they are not well, I monitor whether they are getting their medication, etc…

The harshness of the military life could be felt more by the young girls – as she relates:

> I remember when I was menstruating; I did not have enough cotton wool. And we were supposed to wake up at around 4 o'clock for military exercises we called toyi-toyi. And I was wondering what would happen when I am toyi-toying…. I then said to myself, what do I do? Should I go and wake up the medic [she did not remain the medic throughout] and tell her that today I would not be able to go for toyi-toyi? But that was not supposed to be an excuse because they would tell you, this is a lifetime process. What would you do if you were in the bush and the enemy was following you behind? Would you say, today I am menstruating, I will not shoot?

It could not have been easy to keep such large numbers controlled and occupied, and yet discipline was necessary in such an insecure environment. The girls dug pits for defence, with each one having their individual hole. They knew that they were really more camouflage than effective defence from aerial attack, except they would protect anyone who took refuge in them from flying shrapnel or from napalm. Elingworth Poli explained:

> ...you know when they throw the napalm on us, we could be safe, because the pit was such that you dig downwards and then to sideways, such that this one is just an entrance, we would be behind there.

A system of whistle warnings was instituted to warn of a threatened attack. No direct attack on Victory Camp ever took place, but the sight of war planes overhead was enough to cause panic, especially when it was known that other camps nearby had been attacked. Later the defence pits were abandoned and a proper anti-aircraft defence was organised.

The camp command was at pains to create a united group of Zimbabweans, and had strict rules about tribalism. On arrival they were told:

> No tribalism. You don't come from Gwanda, you come from this camp. You don't have a language of your own. Any language which is spoken here is your language. We don't want to hear anyone calling someone Shona, Ndebele, a Venda, Kalanga. You are one. From today onwards.

She learned that punishment could be harsh when she let slip a tribal comment one day and was forced to spend the rest of the day carrying a heavy back pack. Others were punished for sometimes sneaking out of the camp – not normally to run away, but just to try to reach Lusaka and spend a day in town or looking for relatives. Many of the girls did have relatives living in or around Lusaka and it was possible to get permission to spend a weekend with them if they were known to the party, but sneaking out without permission was absolutely forbidden.

Boredom must have been a constant companion in those early days before the school was organized. But gradually things were put in place for a formal school to be established, entertainments, choirs, sports competitions were arranged, and some semblance of the elements of normal life was created. A school was established and those members from amongst the refugees and recruits who were trained teachers were drafted in to teach. Meeting Nkala relates how he had been assigned to the boys as a teacher, but was then sent to VC because there weren't enough qualified female teachers.

At first classes were held outside with movable blackboards leaning against trees. But structures were starting to go up. A borehole with a tank supplied running water; dormitories went up and the shade they created provided a good location for classes to be held. Later a large hall was built, and it could also provide space for classes. Finally classrooms were constructed, and a routine lay down.



TOP: Tent accommodation at Victory Camp
BOTTOM LEFT: Girl carrying two buckets of water in Victory Camp
BOTTOM RIGHT: Clean water being delivered to Victory Camp by truck

TOP: Girls relaxing in Victory Camp, with one looking out from a defence hole
BOTTOM: A closer look at the defence hole in Victory Camp

Besides the school girls and the younger boys under about the age of 9, there were several other categories of refugees at VC First, there were the mothers with babies, some of whom were born at the camp, there were older women who were too old for either schooling or military training. Some became mother surrogates for the girls, sleeping with them in the dormitories. Some took on duties in the kitchen once the school was established. VC never had a proper kitchen or dining room, so cooking was in large drums and the girls ate outside, squatting or sitting wherever they could. In other respects, though, it came to resemble a large boarding school. Entertainments were arranged, with choirs and traditional dancers as well as sport activities.

It was the policy of ZAPU to occupy everyone in one way or another and at the same time to try to produce as much as they could to satisfy their own needs. Hence a clothing factory was established at VC where clothes were sewn for the refugees and uniforms were made for the military. Ndlovu elaborates:

> There was a very big building.[the hall known as Big Bawa]. It was then developed to be a factory. Machines were put in there. And elderly people within Victory Camp and other males from the workers' camp would come every day to sew uniforms. .. amongst this group there were people who left from Bulawayo who were working in the clothing industry… who had the knowledge of designing, some who had knowledge of fixing the machines when they had broken up. And especially those who did not qualify for military training but had other skills.

Victory Camp became a showcase for ZAPU to demonstrate to their international supporters how they were looking after refugees and what their needs were. Thus many visitors were taken there. The children would be assembled to greet them, Elingworth Poli recalls:

> Yes, there were a lot of people coming in there, and sometimes we were called to come and see them, greet them, sometimes they would have asked to see us, because they were told we were dying there, we were having some diseases, so they wanted to … to have a look and experience it themselves, so they were called so that they could see us…

The needs of the camp were met by assistance from the UN agencies and other international donors – funds for construction, for food, for books, learning materials, sports equipment, clothing. Often the donors themselves would be present to hand over the material.

The boys located at JZ Moyo Camp had somewhat different experiences than the girls at Victory Camp. In the first place, the camp never developed physical infrastructure the way Victory Camp did. They lived in tents more or less throughout, and never experienced dormitories or classrooms constructed as at VC They maintained a more military structure than the girls did after the school was started, as Nare explains:

> Every day there was a parade, where all … right, remember even the set-up was a military set-up. There were companies there were battalions. And each company has its own instructors, you see, therefore when you go to the parade, all the instructors they stand in front of you, even though that day there will be someone in charge of the main parade. Thereafter you'll break to wherever you will be instructed by your instructor.

The cooking and eating arrangements were even more rudimentary than at VC Boys collected firewood to bring to the cooking fires, but the cooking was generally done by older men who were casualties of the war or who were beyond the age of active duty.

JZ Moyo Camp was also more of a target than Victory Camp, and moved more than once, which could explain the lack of extensive permanent structures. Nare explains a grass shelter in one of the photographs:

> There was a time when there were a.. a lot of bombardments, so nobody was spending the whole day in the camp, so every morning …you would wake up at around four a.m. and disperse into the bush, and it is in the bush outside the camp, maybe about five kilometres away from the main camp where people will spend the whole day and as such you … you'll always decide to put some structures for you to spend the whole day hiding there and actually remember … at times it would be raining so you … without being told by anybody you would decide what you think can save you, so as such some people will come up with such structures.

Nare also tells of a plan to move to Freedom Camp:

> … actually it was a planned thing that young people from JZ Moyo Camp they should be moved to FC camp where just because even farming and other activities were taking place, where enough of food was being produced by our own but unfortunately a week .. it was just about a week when we were supposed to be moved there and before that a bombardment took place ..

Instead they were moved to the far northwest at Maheba, another camp formally used by the Angolans, where JZ Moyo Camp 2 was set up. But it too became the target for Rhodesian planes. Nare explains:

> … after the bombardment and the whole camp was deserted and we stayed in the in the bush I think for two weeks or so and we were just cooking in the bush there and imagine that is the equatorial region, where it rains on daily basis … and we even developed some skills like just a mere blanket you just turn it into a tent, it is a good tent you see, those are some of the experiences anyway. It was then after those two to three weeks staying in the bush it was only then later we were told that everybody is going to JZ Moyo Camp 3.

Another move, another camp, but refugee life went on:

> … in JZ Moyo Camp 3 there were a number of activities which were taking place. There were those who were in the playing soccer, we had a number of choirs especially choirs. I can`t remember how many were there like this old man, uNare he had his own choir..

In fact the north western province of Zambia was a difficult place as it was far from Lusaka and the roads were hardly passable in the rainy season. Logistics became a nightmare and there were times when food was completely inadequate. Certainly the boys had a more difficult time than the girls did at Victory Camp.

But education went on for both boys and girls, and sometimes even much older boys and young men and women were fitted into classes. It was considered important to ensure that everyone attained literacy.

TOP: School lesson in progress at Victory Camp
MIDDLE LEFT: Teachers and learners during a lesson in Victory Camp
MIDDLE RIGHT: Women with their babies in Victory Camp
BOTTOM LEFT: Women busy preparing food in Victory Camp
BOTTOM RIGHT: Traditional dancers in action during an Open Day in Victory Camp





TOP: School children assembling for a visit of foreign dignitaries to Victory Camp
BOTTOM: Officials with donated goods from a solidarity country in Victory Camp



TOP: Delegates and refugees at a parade in JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM: Food distribution in Nampundwe Camp

Meeting Nkala talked about the education programme which was similar for both camps, but less disturbed at VC They continued with the Rhodesian syllabuses except in History, which was replaced by political education. While the girls eventually had classrooms, the boys always learned in the open with classrooms under the trees for camouflage and sometimes rudimentary benches made from logs. The majority of the teachers were qualified at home, but sometimes the older children who had completed Form 4 were drafted as teachers. And political education classes could be given by commissars from the military. The Zambians allowed the children to write their Form 2 and O-Level exams, so some of the children went with certificates when they returned home. It seems that the standards were acceptable as on their return, most of the children were fitted into schools at the same level they had been doing in the refugee schools. One specialized course was provided at Victory Camp, which was a secretarial course. This was offered to some of those who had finished Form 4.

One other aspect of camp life which was discussed by Dr Benjamin Dube was the issue of health. In such situations of large numbers of people without proper facilities there was considerable danger of disease outbreaks, especially in relation to poor hygiene and sanitation. Dr Gordon Bango was in charge of the health department with Dube as his deputy, and they took responsibility for health issues in both refugee and military camps. Prevention was always better than cure, and the kitchens were a possible danger point so had to be inspected and those cooking instructed in how to maintain proper hygiene. And there was a means of organising for hygiene, as well, as Benjamin Dube explains:

> Well it wasn't all that difficult to keep the cleanliness because the people were divided into sections and there were commanders in each section where there ... people appointed to be responsible for hygiene and all those things.

Pregnancy was an issue, and the pregnant girls and women had to be attended to. Presumably this was the reason for separating boys and girls in separate camps, but there were always loopholes, and Joshua Nkomo would not accept the provision of contraception:

> In the refugee camps, well, apart from these pregnancies … you know, Zambia, the terrain… there was a lot of malaria which was prevalent. There were a lot of other diseases. As you can see, people were living together. Sometimes with water shortages and hygiene … then we had problems, diseases like scabies, diarrhoea from time to time, malnutrition because they were not getting really food all the time, especially among boys in the camps up there in Solwezi where there was really malnutrition and all that. We lost, we lost some cases, we lost some lives because of malnutrition and all that.…

Health and medical supplies was one area in which donors were always prepared to assist. Before the end of the war Victory Camp had a field hospital, as did Solwezi. Solwezi, as described by Dube:

> We had a big field hospital there [VC] which had everything, as you can even see, with microscopes and all those things. Things were expanding. We were even in the process of establishing an x-ray sort of unit. In the big camps in Solwezi, we had a big field hospital which was donated by the Swedes. It had almost everything you can think of. It was a field hospital as you can say, with operating theatres… the laboratory was at Victory Camp. It was through the assistance of a German couple. The husband was a doctor; the wife was a laboratory technician. And she's the one who assisted us to train … to do in-house training for the girls who were there.

TOP: Children feeding at the JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM LEFT: Firewood in JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM RIGHT: Skills training - typewriting at Victory Camp, Zambia



TOP: Teacher conducting his class in the open in JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM LEFT: Children being taught by a soldier with a gun in JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM MIDDLE RIGHT: A class being conducted in the open under trees in JZ Moyo Camp
BOTTOM RIGHT: Secretarial school for refugees in Zambia



TOP: A pregnant woman being attended to by Dr Bango at the health centre in Victory Camp
BOTTOM LEFT: Inspection of kitchen utensils before food is served in Victory Camp
BOTTOM RIGHT: Working in the clinic at JZ Moyo Camp

And before the field hospitals were established, and when they could not cope with serious injuries or the numbers of people, the Zambians were very generous in allowing their facilities to be used:

> We had a very good working relationship with the University Teaching Hospital, Zambia, Lusaka. We also had a very good cooperation with the hospitals, Kabwe where our cadres were nursing; we used to get them admitted there. We had a good working relationship with the hospitals at Solwezi. When we were bombed, I think over 100 of our chaps at one time they filled that hospital. And also in the Copperbelt, that is Kitwe and Ndola. We had a good working relationship with those people.

Thus, ZAPU did eventually have good medical provision for the refugees in the camps and did make an effort to avoid those problems which might be caused by poor sanitation or poor hygiene.

In spite of the hardships and the difficulties, the two women interviewed about life in Victory Camp felt that on balance, the experience of being a refugee there was a positive one. Speaking of the discipline Elingworth said:

> Yes, it was fair, because if you live as a group and such measures are not taken, obviously things will go wrong, so discipline has to be maintained all the time. Of course they were fair. The … the people who looked after us were heads of schools; they had a know-how of how to care for a child. Yes. It was o.k. Even with instructors they knew if they overdo it, Comrade Nkomo will be after them so they made sure they had the correct measure of control.

Regina said about her experience:

> I felt proud to have participated because I am strong psychologically. And I perceive difficulties as something that shall come to pass because I was once exposed into some difficult, very difficult conditions but I managed to pull through. And I have that passion of taking care of other people in the manner that I was taken care of by people whom I did not know. And provided all the support, provided all the education. I am what I am today because someone went out of her way or his way and provided me with the knowledge I have today.

And referring to the fear of attack, Nare commented:

> … the orientation itself was enough to make each and every individual to understand why he … he joined the liberation struggle, and in the struggle it was always made very clear that one way or the other one might die and that is … should be part of it anyway … just because you'll be taught about the history of other countries, how they liberated themselves and how even some people lost their lives, and we were not a different nation altogether, so really there was nothing you can say it was really frightening.

These are doubtless idealized reminiscences many years later, but the fact remains that many of those who experienced camp life were prepared, looking back, to see the positives and accept some of the negatives as necessities.

ADMINISTRATION AND LEADERSHIP

The administration of all these activities over such a long time span (17 years) was no small task, and with constant comings and goings and security threats to deal with, as well as political and military matters, it was a major effort to achieve orderly decision-making and implementation. ZAPU never officially established a "government in exile", but they were in fact virtually running one – not to govern the country but to direct the war effort and manage the refugees. The period up to 1970 was more straightforward, as the party leaders established offices and built up diplomatic relations as well as developing an army. Serious problems came in 1970 with the first sign of the split within the leadership leading to the formation of FROLIZI and mutinies among some of the cadres. For two years virtually no movement could take place on the military front, and from 1972 the whole operation had to be rebuilt – but rebuilt in the context of pressure from the OAU to form a combined effort with the other liberation movements. Before that was resolved, the leaders restricted within Rhodesia were released and joined those in Lusaka, and at the same time the dramatic increase in flow of both recruits and refugees began. From 1976 to the end of the war there were continuing new political developments at the same time as logistics nightmares and yet dramatic progress on the military front.

The first administration in Lusaka was established in March 1963, when Amos Ngwenya was sent with Willie Musarurwa to set up offices. Ngwenya remained as the administrator until 1977. In 1964 Lusaka became the external headquarters, when Zambia gained independence and all liberation movements moved from Dar es Salaam. Musarurwa returned home and was arrested and joined others in detention, but five executive members were sent to run the operation in Lusaka. The Vice President James Chikerema, and Jason Moyo took responsibility for military developments after the first trainees returned to Lusaka in 1965 and a high command was formed under the Department of Special Affairs. George Silundika, Edward Ndlovu and George Nyandoro were the other members of the executive in exile, with Silundika taking prime responsibility for publicity, and Ndlovu assuming the role of a diplomat. Together these five built up the diplomatic and military strategies.

The effort was assisted by large numbers of Zimbabweans living in Zambia. As Ngwenya tells it:

> We formed branches in all the major cities of Zambia. Livingstone, Choma, Mazabuka, Lusaka, Kabwe - which was Broken Hill at the time - Ndola, Lunashya, Kitwe, Mufulira, Chingola, Bancroft, and then also rural areas like Mumbwa, Liteta, these were areas with a large population of Zimbabweans; they all also belonged to ZAPU.

Charles Madonko was one of those members who played a key role as he was based in the Copperbelt, working for the railways:

> Yes, I was running an office there. And therefore because I was busy with the railways so I asked the office to give me some guys who were not so busy in Lusaka. So they gave me Attwell and Butshe, and we worked together until I left Zambia for Hungary [to go to study]. While I was in Kitwe with Butshe and Attwell, I had the largest number of recruits from my province.

Besides recruiting the members would contribute funds through monthly subscriptions:

> That was the purpose of the office, why I had those two guys, because they … they would look after the finance and I would … either Chikerema and Nyandoro would come there. So that`s what we did and therefore because the volume of the supporters in Kitwe, so I had to ask for assistance, and then I got these two boys.

The administration under Chikerema and Moyo continued up until 1970 and was responsible for the early military activities, including the major campaigns of Wankie and Sipolilo. But political differences produced a split which went along tribal lines when Chikerema and Nyandoro withdrew and formed a rival party known as FROLIZI. The quarrel also resulted in the military efforts coming to a standstill and that in turn produced mutinies from restless cadres in the camps who blamed the leaders for neglecting the struggle. Ngwenya tells the story thus:

> ...after the departure of Chikerema and George Nyandoro, you see in 1971 … 1970-71. We were detained There were also some young people who carried out a mutiny, arrested the leaders – this was 1970; then the Zambian government intervened, then took everybody to a camp - Mboroma that's where we were camped there; and then they asked one of their senior officials - Aaron Milner who was the Secretary General of the Zambian government - to assist to, to solve the problems there and then he did that.

The mutineers were handed over to the Zambians and most were eventually sent overseas for academic studies.

The remaining leadership returned to Lusaka and set up a new decision-making body, the Revolutionary Council which would have representation from both the politicians and the military. Later administrators were also added. Jason Moyo now was elected to chair the Revolutionary Council and Dumiso Dabengwa was the secretary. Alfred Nikita Mangena became the new military commander. Under this new arrangement, the military was rebuilt and ZAPU's role in the armed struggle surged forward.

Jason Moyo is remembered with great respect by most of his colleagues. Says Ngwenya:

> He was a very courageous person, discipliner, some of us did a good job because of his discipline positions [inaudible] yes and faithful, he would not listen to lies, in fact, you could not tell lies to him.

Mtshana Ncube saw him very much as a team player:

> the Revolutionary Council was an active body that seemed to me at the time to take over all of the duties of what might be the duties of a President in an organization and although all of us knew that the head then was JZ Moyo it seemed he did not want to put himself too much in the limelight. Whether this was by design or whether this was by structure I couldn't … I couldn't say, but I know that he seemed to work very much in concert with a number of other comrades to produce whatever decisions needed to be produced and then he would publish them or read them when necessary.
>
> JZ Moyo was the focal point there, and very, very well respected indeed… a man of very few words, but a man of great effect. When he spoke he spoke because he had to speak, and when he spoke he spoke what moved the people, and that's how I remember him and I sometimes wonder whether some of the leaders shouldn't learn a great lesson from JZ Moyo - that it's not the speaking and it's not being present in the eyes of the people every minute that makes the difference. It is what you bring to their eyes, what you bring in terms of action, what you bring in the few necessary words that makes the difference. And JZ Moyo had it.

TOP: Jason Ziyapapa Moyo
BOTTOM: Joshua Nkomo with ZPRA commanders at a party in Lusaka

The Revolutionary Council then took over the functions of the former executive, although the executive was not dissolved and remained in existence. The council was apparently very active, as recalled by Ncube:

> ... it created the impression in my mind that they had taken over the functions of the executive, because they seemed to be always in session and maybe this of course explains the times also, because these were very busy times at the military front, so that perhaps emphasis would necessarily shift to matters military than … than civilian.

Another feature of the mid1970s was the constant insistence by the frontline states, that the various Zimbabwean parties should come together in a joint effort. With FROLIZI, the ANC of Muzorewa was also added to the mix; after successfully organizing a "no" vote for the Pearce Commission in 1972 on behalf of ZAPU, it then took on a life of its own:

> In 1974 there was a …we had a unity accord that was actually imposed on us … that is, all political parties in this country, ZAPU, ZANU and the ANC Zimbabwe National Council that was led by Bishop Muzorewa to organize people to oppose the Pearce Commission … so it had become a party that was operating … so then the Frontline states, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania you see well initiated it... this unity accord, I remember it was in November 1974, I can`t remember the date.

This was not the first attempt to force unity, but the situation became far more complex when the imprisoned and restricted leadership of ZAPU and ZANU were released by Ian Smith at the end of 1974, and internal struggles in ZANU led to the assassination of Chitepo in Lusaka in 1975. Once released, Nkomo did not immediately leave the country to base himself in Zambia. This only happened later, after the assassination of Jason Moyo by a parcel bomb in January 1977.

The death of Moyo was a great loss to ZAPU. Ncube recounts:

> … I had just left the office. I could have died in the office on the same day. I don't think it was even 15-20 minutes after I had left the office when the explosion … went off and that brought quite a sad atmosphere throughout the liberation movement and I think for a while I might not be exaggerating if I say some paralysis because we didn't know what that might mean in terms of our operations … the direction, the effectiveness, our ability to collect resources, our ability to connect with the international community to say we are still there … all of that became a big question mark.

It was at this point, then, that Nkomo decided to leave Rhodesia to base himself in Lusaka. Of course he had been visiting frequently since his release but now he came to take over the administration. Says Ngwenya, "instead of appointing someone to lead, to replace JZ Moyo, he chose to come outside to lead the party".

Those final years of struggle from 1977 to 1980 were ones of intense activity. Not only Nkomo but several other of the detained leaders came to Zambia, as well as thousands of members who could be drafted into administration instead of the military. It was not easy to fit all of them into a coherent structure where everyone feel useful, would know their place and perform effectively. However, due to the development of military activities and the flood of refugees, there was far more work to be done, so administration had to be expanded. New offices were constructed at Zimbabwe House in

TOP: Abraham Nkiwane in discussion with ZAPU officials outside Kabwata Hall after a meeting
BOTTOM: Crowd commemorating Zimbabwe Day

Emmasdale to accommodate all those who had to manage the logistics, the publicity and general administration of people coming and going, needing accommodation, passports, visas, food and offices. Nkomo took charge of operations himself and it seems that his style was somewhat different from JZ Moyo's. Ncube recalls:

> Nkomo for whatever else people may have thought of him … he was a man who understood the mind of the people. He understood very, very well. … he also understood the … need to mould an organization. He understood it very, very well. One of the ways he did it, he had to bring himself forward to be leader of the organization, and being leader of the organization didn't mean being President of ZAPU only, in the overall sense, but also being able to be leader of the units of ZAPU. Like the military, hence that uniform.

Nkomo had to draw together not only the military and the civilians but also those who had been in exile for ten years or more and those who had been sitting in restriction at Gonakudzingwa. Ncube speaks about the tensions but also about Nkomo's strong leadership and ability to provide the unifying glue:

> There were [tensions], yes, as there would always be in any movement, because you are talking here of … not only are you talking of different class backgrounds, you are also talking about different orientations in terms of knowledge, people who have been exposed to all sorts of ideas coming together to try and sit with someone who hasn't got a clue where the world starts and where it ends. Naturally there would be those tensions, and the differences were felt, however, I hasten to say in many instances they were handled quite, quite correctly, in discussions.

The Revolutionary Council, however, lost its central role in decision-making and became more of a consultative body, with the critical decisions being taken by the military and intelligence leadership along with Nkomo and his senior politicians. Ncube discusses all these issues as well as the burgeoning administration having to handle both military and refugee logistics as well as diplomacy.

Once again the ZAPU membership in Zambia became of critical importance in assisting. The branches were active throughout Zambia, under the leadership of Desire Khuphe the chairman of ZAPU's Zambia province. Frequently meetings were held at Kabwata Hall in Lusaka, in rural areas such as Mumbwa and at homes in urban areas.

In addition to the earlier roles of funding and recruitment there were new functions added for the members. Charles Madonko played a particularly important role as a farmer. After returning early from Hungary he entered the University of Zambia to study agriculture, however again he did not complete but joined the Zambian Ministry of Agriculture's research institute. From there he was asked by the party to obtain a farm, which he did with the help of the Zambians. Then he began to provide food for the military and the refugee camps:

> I was growing vegetables, I was growing huge acreage, like 10-12 hectares of vegetables, where from the camps the guys would come and pick up the vegetables… and beef. I had money from the party to buy beef on the commercial farms… the cattle would stay on the farm, then they would come weekly and slaughter two, three up to ten…

TOP: ZAPU chairperson Samuel Munodawafa addressing a meeting of party members in Mumbwa
BOTTOM: Addressing a members meeting in Zambia

‘The Turning Point’ - Joshua Nkomo and Amos Ngwenya signing the oath agreement

The Mulungushi Camp which trained the regular army was his main responsibility, but he also supplied food for the women at Mkushi Camp. When they were attacked he, along with members in Kabwe, played a big role in rescuing the survivors and getting them to Kabwe hospital. Before moving to his farm in Mkushi Madonko occupied a smaller farm near Lusaka, where he regularly accommodated some guerrillas who guarded caches of arms which he stored for ZPRA.

These were the roles which a member could play; few were as active as Madonko. But without people like him it would have been difficult to manage such large numbers of military cadres and refugees.

Mtshana Ncube discusses how the administration attempted to deal with so many issues at once, and also goes into a little more detail on the manner in which education was handled. He talks about how not only members living in Zambia but also many of the administrative personnel could easily become confused about the overall plan and progress towards the ultimate goal. Hence an overall strategic vision was drafted and communicated to the party members as well as the general public. This vision was known as the "Turning Point". Most other interviewees as well as writers of ZAPU history have understood the Turning Point as a purely military strategy. Probably that was what came across most clearly to the public, but Ncube, who drafted the document which was read by Nkomo at a press conference, presents it as an all-embracing vision which was meant to inspire and motivate all members. Interestingly enough, this new strategy was taken so seriously that every member of the Revolutionary Council, being privy to further information that was not released to the public, participated in a signing ceremony during which they had to pledge to secrecy:

> So we were signing what was called a secrecy agreement which each individual leader was asked to sign – swear and sign – before the President, affirming their own understanding that they were being held responsible if any information should be leaked which they came to have by reason of service to the struggle.

Various aspects of the administration are referred to in many of the interviews. It was a complex thing, running several departments, especially towards the end - a large publicity department with its own printing press and photo laboratory, schools for several thousand children, transport, even a research unit, and few individuals would have had a clear grasp of the many processes at work. The fact that it worked at all and moved the struggle forward must be a tribute to the dedication and leadership qualities of many.

1980 ELECTIONS

At the end of the Lancaster House conference in December 1979, agreement was signed on a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe, a ceasefire process and an election in March 1980 for the first independence government. Parks Ndlovu was interviewed specifically on the topic of this election, and Dumiso Dabengwa also referred to the election process during his interview.

Dabengwa had major responsibility for ensuring that guerrillas entered the assembly points and observed the ceasefire. This was not an easy task, as the ZPRA forces had already defeated the Rhodesians as they tried to destroy them in Zambia, and had crossed some of their regular units with heavy artillery into Rhodesia.

> ... they thought they could really give the Zimbabwean [Rhodesian]forces a hiding when the ceasefire arrangement was then brokered. And when we got to the camps and told them that it was necessary for them to cease the fighting and congregate at assembly points they were very suspicious about the whole idea.

But things began to go wrong for ZAPU very quickly:

> When we parted at Lancaster it had generally been agreed and in actual fact, we almost at Lancaster decided to choose the Patriotic Front leadership - who would be president, who would be secretary general and so on, but then other people said, “No let’s go and do this at home. When we get home let’s … let’s choose the Patriotic Front leadership”. So we almost were confident it was going to be done. People like Tongogara, the late Tongogara, wanted to make sure that that would be done, because he actually threatened at Lancaster that “If you people go into the country as separate parties after we have agreed on this unity arrangement, and you lose that election we are going to salute Muzorewa if he wins the election”.

But, without consultation, ZANU decided to go it alone, as Dabengwa explains:

> ZAPU was surprised on the final day of the registration when they were told by the Registration Office that they were waiting for them because ZANU had registered to participate in the elections as ZANU PF and what was the position of ZAPU. And we rushed at the last minute to go and register.

Parks Ndlovu, a trained fighter with considerable experience, was the ZPRA regional commissar in southern Matabeleland. When news came of the ceasefire agreement it was his task to persuade his men that they must move into the assembly point from where they would be either demobilized or integrated into a new Zimbabwe national army:

> We were given to Brunapeg, my home area, that’s where we had our first assembly point. I did not stay more than four days. Then came Dumiso [Dabengwa] who saw me “Oh you are here, commissar”. “Yes ” “We are looking for commissars to go and work, so I’m going with you”

So Parks entered the campaign, mobilizing people to vote. He worked from a base in Bulawayo, under the leadership of Abel Siwela, a ZAPU activist and chairman of the party in Bulawayo. He states that he was not optimistic from the beginning that ZAPU would win:

> I was telling them... “Madala”, they said, “we’ve got a lot of support”. But I said, “Yes even if you have a lot of support, there will be a lot of rigging here. You must be prepared for a surprise”….According to how I read the books I knew there were no fair and free elections. He [Siwela] said “Why”. I said, “No there are a lot of things involved in election things. One, we don’t have I.D.s. People don’t have I.D.s here. I don’t know whether the register is in order

They proceeded to campaigning, and he travelled throughout the country organizing rallies and ensuring that people were able to attend. Huge rallies were held in Bulawayo which were attended by people from all over the country, at White City and at Barbourfields Stadium. In rural areas:

> … they would walk even twenty kilometres … because they liked their party. Even we … the party would provide … party members would provide transport, those who had transport and they would use even scotch carts, bicycles to go in those areas

> Harare showed considerable support as well, with large meetings being held, and enthusiastic supporters being transported by bus from as far as Hurungwe. The party regalia were openly worn,

> Our campaign materials, the pictures, were showing ZPRA … now we are using a ZPRA logo … you see a soldier carrying a baby, two hoes. Now there is peace. We are

TOP, LEFT: Joshua Nkomo addressing the crowds at a PF ZAPU rally at White City Stadium in Bulawayo
TOP, RIGHT: Joshua Nkomo addressing a rally at Barbourfields Stadium

BOTTOM: Crowds gathering at the Godlwayo rally

> assuming that now there is peace. People can have children, people can go and plough, assuming that we were going to win.

But the names ZAPU and ZPRA did not appear - they used T shirts that had been printed when it was still believed that they would contest as the Patriotic Front.

In spite of Parks' scepticism, ZAPU were confident:

> All over there was ZAPU, only that because ZAPU had structures … ZAPU was a party which had structures. Having structures, it was easy for us to communicate even if we failed as campaigners to get into the area, people were knowing that we were for … ZAPU ….we as ZAPU, we knew that we have got structures all over. I think it came again as a complacency part of it because we …. had everything, all the materials were in place; we were fighting for this … freedom of expression, association, what you can name … whatever freedoms you can think of, it's what we were fighting for…

ZANU, Ndlovu says, had not built structures, but relied rather on the gun, and what he refers to as "violence which is non-violent", having sent mujibas to the assembly points and left many of their trained cadres in the communities to influence the elections:

> ... these people who had guns, they would rob old people you know where there is the barrel of the gun there is that aiming thing. They would say it is a telescopic thing …"You see that thing that is peering there…" "Yes" … "It is going to see you in the box who you are voting for". That is … intimidation. That's why most of the people, even in Mashonaland they voted for ZANU because they were intimidated by ZANLA who remained in the bush.

Dabengwa described the situation this way:

> ZANU decided to say there were no-go areas, there were certain areas in the country where they would not allow [a] political party to participate in … and those are the areas where ZANLA forces had had a strong presence. ZAPU believed that that would not be allowed… Nkomo actually made a very strong protest to Lord Soames to say that we can't call that a free and fair election where you have one party refusing people to come and campaign in the areas where their forces are.

Nevertheless, that occurred in the north-eastern and eastern areas:

> And Lord Soames had promised Nkomo that those elections would not be counted in actual fact, those votes would not be taken into account and he said "Leave them, since they have refused to abide by the ceasefire arrangement, the rules of the ceasefire arrangement, we are going to make sure that those votes are not brought in", but after the elections, the polling had stopped, those votes were counted. And the British still called that a free and fair election.

ZAPU was thus very disappointed when the results of the election were announced and showed a strong win for ZANU. They looked for an explanation, after all the support they had found on the ground during the campaign throughout the country, and even during the war. Ndlovu comments that ZAPU was not a tribal party as later alleged, In spite of being headquartered in Bulawayo, the top leadership was primarily Shona with Chinamano as Vice President, Msika, Secretary General, Munodawafa, Chairman, and others such as Madzimbamuto and Musarurwa in senior positions.

TOP: Supporters in front of the Zengeza branch banner during the 1980 election campaign in Harare
BOTTOM: ZAPU supporters being transported by bus during the 1980 election campaign in Harare


.(PF).
IYAPAPA BRANCH
ZENGEZA
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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
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THE PEOPLES PARTY
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VOTE PF
PATRIOTIC FRONT
PF
THE LIBERATO

ZAPU supporters during the 1980 election campaign in Harare


The Herald
NOON EDITION
MASSIVE WIN FOR MU
57 seats go to ZANU (PF)
I'm jubilant: Mugabe calls on Governor

Their loss was then attributed to two factors – ZANU did not play by the rules, using violence and intimidation, and the British had deliberately favoured ZANU.

Parks states:

> ZANLA did not go to the assembly points. They did put mujibas and most of these senior ZANLA people remained in the… in the bush.

Dabengwa takes a strategic view of the election process and its outcome, assessing how the British saw the situation. He imagined they would be asking themselves:

> who of the two parties ZAPU or ZANU will be able to block the MK ANC coming through and who is behind those parties. ZANU - they say "China ah China we don't think it's a problem".

But the Soviets were a different matter, and they had supported ZAPU:

> The Russians have already gained ground in Angola, which is independent. They have already gained ground in Mozambique, which is also independent. The only obstacle between those two oceans, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, is Zimbabwe. If Zimbabwe falls under ZAPU the Russians' presence is going to be very strong again. So the Russians have got the whole territory from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and they will come in and they will just push into South Africa …And the whole of Southern Africa is going to be under Russian domination. That was the consideration, and of course the South Africans also feared that sort of scenario.

And so Dabengwa concludes that there was deliberate collusion between the British and ZANU, with the aim that ZANU should win the election and form a government. And he makes the following rather chilling statement, with great import for the post-independence history of Zimbabwe:

> So they actually, they actually taught ZANU PF … how to rig the elections and how to make sure that the only way you can win an election is by the use of force. So it was two things, two factors: you must use force in order to win an election and two, you must have the tactics of … of rigging.

POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS

The 1980 election set the stage for everything that followed. ZAPU was deeply suspicious of ZANU, believing that no true will of the people was reflected in the election result. ZANU, apparently, feared ZAPU, presumably because of its continuing military strength by virtue of the heavy weaponry, including armoured cars, that it had brought across the Zambezi. Nevertheless a coalition government was formed, to include not only ZAPU ministers but also a representative of the white settlers. ZANU did not need to include ZAPU, so the question must be asked – why did they? Dabengwa believes it was done knowing that they had cheated ZAPU so now they must compensate somehow:

> I think it must have been again some advice by some of the people who … knew what had happened and who probably wanted to make sure that there was peace, and that it would then be wise instead of leaving ZAPU on their own, …it was important that they should bring ZAPU into a coalition arrangement, so at least they are be there with them and they would be able to monitor them.

Top: Reading the election results in *The Herald*
Bottom: ZAPU PF leaders Joshua Nkomo, Josiah Chinamano, A. Nxele and S.K. Moyo

Nkomo was pressured by some supporters to resist, but he wanted the war to end, preferring to attempt to build the nation through peaceful efforts, and so accepted the arrangement, and the cabinet was duly sworn in. ZAPU supporters were happy to see their elected MPs entering Parliament for its first session. George Silundika, who was one of ZAPU cabinet ministers, died suddenly the following year, and became the first to be buried at the new Heroes Acre outside Harare.

Most of the military cadres had come into the assembly points before the election, but through 1980, after the elections[21], the ZAPU refugees and disabled were being brought home as quickly as possible so that they could be reunited with their families and returned to normal life. A reception centre was set up at Luveve, near the railway station.

When the trains arrived at the station the passengers were transferred to buses to carry them to the reception centre. There was of course great excitement on the part of the returnees and their families. But in many cases people were not sure of finding their family members, as deaths had taken place both in Zambian and in Zimbabwe. In some of the photos the children look very anxious:

> … they look worried and some were even reluctant to get out of the train; they are not sure, they are still searching for known faces to them in case they might identify their … their relatives.

Other photos show emotional reunions. We don't know whether they were tears of joy or of sadness at receiving bad news.

Nkomo was responsible for receiving them and giving them documentation, which the vast majority were lacking, and then dispatching them with bus vouchers to their homes or to the new boarding schools where many of the school children went.

Disabled fighters fell into a different category. They could not simply be sent off to their homes if they still needed care, or special facilities, and many in any case preferred to stay together.

Zakhele Ndebele explains some of the physical problems:

> …the accommodation which we were given at Luveve was not good for us, because some slept in the tents and you know as somebody who is having an artificial … some of us we could not squat on the toilets which were there and even the place for washing was not really conducive.

They were temporarily housed at Ntabazinduna Training Centre about 40 kilometres north-east of Bulawayo. Psychologically they felt more comfortable staying together. Ndebele captures the feeling shared not only by the disabled but also by many disoriented soldiers returning from war anywhere in the world:

> ... without your comrades you feel that there is something is amiss, for the people you would be staying with at home or wherever you gather, then there'd be no comrade by that time, you feel that somehow you are lost, you'd be like a stranger among those people. Whilst those people would be really interested to be with you, but you'd be feeling as if you are a stranger. You see that's the major thing which made most of my time I preferred to live with my fellow comrades.

TOP: First cabinet waiting to be sworn in at the opening of parliament in 1980
MIDDLE: Ruth Chinamano waiving to the crowds at the opening of parliament in 1980
BOTTOM: George Silundika's funeral at Heroes Acre in Harare

[21] In Nkomo's interview he states the arrivals were before elections, but other evidence shows that in fact JZ Moyo Camp near Solwezi continued operating up until at least July


AMHLOPHE

Luveve Reception Centre in Bulawayo

ZPRA disabled had a very difficult time in those post-war years, and only stayed at Ntabazinduna a few months until they were driven out by ZANLA attacks.

The disturbances which erupted early in 1981 were caused by the on-going political tensions, often being sparked by fiery politicians such as Enos Nkala, the only Ndebele speaking person to hold a high rank in ZANU. Photographs of protests in the collection all feature complaints against him. And before long open fighting did break out between ZPRA and ZANLA forces waiting to be integrated into the new army. Government had brought some of them into urban areas and in Bulawayo they were housed at a new housing development in Entumbane, but with a fence separating the two groups. After Nkala had addressed them one weekend, fighting began. As Dabengwa relates it:

> A number of civilians had died, and Nkomo summoned both myself and Masuku [Lookout, the ZPRA commander] and he said "At all costs this cannot continue, please go and stop that fighting". And we had to intervene … after we had met, we agreed that the ZANU would go and stop their own people and that we would go and stop our guys. We spoke to … the commanders by radio and told them that we were coming towards the camp and that they should stop firing at us and we described the sort of vehicle. But there was firing. When we got there the ZANLA guys were firing at our vehicle, because they were the ones who were on the nearer side of the road … but we managed to drive through up to the ZPRA side of the camp and stopped .. it was all blamed on Nkala having incited it, and that's what the ZANLA commanders also said. They said you get some of our politicians being very careless in their speeches, and that's what Nkala has done.

But meanwhile, a more serious threat emerged as ZPRA cadres from outside of Bulawayo decided to come to help their comrades:

> … our guys at the assembly camp at Gwayi started coming in with artillery, with heavy weaponry and they were coming to participate on the ZPRA side in that fight, and then the other guys who were at Esigodini also started moving similarly towards the city in order to come and [support those at Entumbane].

The tanks coming from Esigodini were stopped by the British forces assisting with the integration of the army (BMatt), who blew out two tanks, and those coming from the north were ordered by the ZAPU leadership to return.

But the potential for trouble remained strong, and it became important to do something about those soldiers who would have to be demobilized. Even the disabled ZPRA men such as Zakhele Ndebele had become victims of attacks by ZANLA. Ndebele describes how he and other disabled ZPRA veterans were attacked at Ntabazinduna when a fight broke out between the integrated soldiers in the Zimbabwe National army camp nearby. Some of the ZANLA's threatened the disabled so that they were forced to flee their camp.

Dabengwa describes how ZAPU embarked on its own programme to assist its demobilized cadres when a programme that ZPRA and ZANLA presented to government to train veterans in various skills before demobilization was rejected. ZAPU formed their own company, Nitram, and with contributions from demobilized ZPRA cadres using their allowances and also those integrated into the army using their salaries, they purchased properties where the demobilised could find both jobs and training. There were several large farms where various agricultural activities took place as well as a hotel in Bulawayo, Castle Arms and several other businesses. These then became an excuse for government to pounce in 1982.

Top: Arrival of refugees at South Mpopoma Station
Bottom: Arriving by bus in Luveve



TOP LEFT: Relatives reunited at Luveve
RIGHT: Man returning on crutches
BOTTOM: Returnees arriving with their luggage



TOP: ZPRA cadre addressing civilians in the bush
BOTTOM: Disabled returnees


HERE LIES THE BRAINS OF THE LATE ENOS
DIED 6-7-1980
=
BURIED 13-7-1980
NKALA
THE LATE ENOS NKALA
THE SELF STYLED ZANU P.F. PRESIDENT
NKALA
DOWN WITH THE MONSTER NKALA
NKALA You Didn't See
FATHER ZIMBABWE


NKALA-FORGET YOUR DREAM OF A ONE PARTY STATE
NKALA-NO ROOM FOR
DAYDREA
NKALA
AWA
YO
NKALA-FORGET YOUR DREAM OF A ONE PARTY STATE

In February of that year, government announced that weapons caches had been discovered on one of the Nitram farms. Immediately they alleged that ZAPU was planning a coup or an armed uprising. ZAPU ministers, including Nkomo, were sacked from government and Dabengwa and Masuku were arrested and charged with treason. Many other ZAPU members were also detained and held without trial, something which was legal at that time because of the state of emergency which continued from before Independence. Dabengwa and Masuku were tried and found not guilty by the High Court, but nevertheless were detained, and remained incarcerated at Chikurubi Prison for a total of four years:

> …we proved in court that there was never anything like a coup plot at all, it was an imagination that had been coined by both Mnangagwa, and the Rhodesian forces and South Africa because they wanted to destabilize the country. The court finally found us not guilty and .. but we were still detained.

Meanwhile ex-ZPRA were also being mistreated in the army. As Dabengwa explains it:

> ZPRA cadres were all accused of being enemies of the state, they were not to be trusted, even those that … had been commissioned into officer ranks they were not being trusted, and from time to time they would be arrested and locked up and tortured to reveal exactly what plots they had against the government, and a number of cadres, ZPRA cadres, especially the junior ones, were just really ill-treated deliberately and frustrated. A number of them decided to leave the army. We understand that [a] few of those that had left the army decided that they were not just going to leave the army, they were going to fight back.

Those few who took to the bush became known as “dissidents”. They were very few, and some were rather more in the nature of bandits, trying to feed themselves by force. And there was widespread suspicion that some of the so-called dissidents were in fact agent provocateurs from the army or police:

> Then of course we also came to know that a number of other incidents were being perpetrated by the Zimbabwean forces themselves. People who were masquerading as dissidents and who went around and killing people and saying they were ZPRA dissidents.

Government made these an excuse to launch a full-scale attack on the civilian population of Matabeleland who were ZAPU supporters, but hardly any of whom supported any armed rebellion. Thus began the terror of the Gukurahundi, the work of a special army unit known as the Fifth Brigade. They descended on rural Matabeleland where they arrested, abducted, tortured and killed ZAPU members and especially local leadership, and burned villagers, massacring many of their inhabitants:

> Well the whole idea really was to get rid of ZAPU – not just the people, anyone who was ZAPU and as far as government was concerned everyone in Matabeleland was ZAPU and therefore people had to be killed and be taught a lesson so that those that remain can never again support any other party than the ruling party ZANU PF.

Dabengwa states that ZANU really did consider ZAPU a threat:

> ...at one time it came out very clearly that we were a threat because of the backing that we had from the Russians. We were a threat to the government of Zimbabwe, and that remained the case right through, and we knew that was the whole reason we were being persecuted in the manner we were being. …They did not believe that Nkomo’s acceptance, final acceptance of ... the result of that election was genuine and [believed] that ZAPU had some scheme that they would undertake, and they really believed that we were going to …

TOP: Mock funeral of Enos Nkala
BOTTOM: Part of the crowd at the mock funeral of Enos Nkala

> that we had something … and they believed that we were a threat indeed.

He describes a visit to himself and Masuku in prison by Edison Zvobgo, who was then Minister of Justice, who told their guards:

> …don't ill treat them, they have no crime, keep them… the state wants them here to make sure that they are not a threat, that's all.

Sadly, Masuku became very ill in prison in 1986 and shortly after being transferred to hospital, died without tasting freedom. Dabengwa was not allowed to attend the funeral. A year later, however, when Masuku's tombstone was unveiled, he was present as he had been released.

What had changed? Negotiations had begun for a "unity accord" between ZAPU and ZANU. He had been approached while still in prison by three ZANU ministers to buy his release by joining ZANU:

> And I said "Over my dead body, I'd never do it. Not after all these Gukurahundi massacres that you people have been carrying out on our people in Matabeleland. I'd never join ZANU PF". So when I came out and I found that there were negotiations to go into this unity accord, I was very critical of it.

But Nkomo once again was forced to play the role of peacemaker with a rival who only knew violence, and it was not easy for him to persuade his lieutenants that what amounted to surrender was necessary. Dabengwa was one of those who had to be persuaded:

> … his concern was: "Do we allow our people to continue to be killed … in the manner they are? How do we stop it?" … like the story he gave, he said, "You know, it's like you have a madman and who is wielding an axe and he wants to kill people and you go and confront him straight on like that. He'll manage to chop about three or four of [your] heads off but finally you'll be able to overcome him. Is that what we should do or shouldn't we try and settle that person and finally hold his hands and stop him from doing it?...
>
> …We've got to save this nation, we've got to save our people. If we don't do that these young men, ….we're going to have a similar situation as in Mozambique …with Renamo, we're going to have a similar situation we had in Angola with UNITA, and where does it end up?

Nkobi's collection did not have any photographs of the signing of the Unity Accord, and very few in fact post-dated this major event in ZAPU's history. So we leave the story there, at a very low point of almost total defeat, even though the memories, the pride lived on, to be resuscitated more than 20 years later.

MIDDLE: Homestead in Matopos destroyed by the 5th Brigade
BOTTOM: Remains of a house in Matopos



TOP: Mrs Masuku and her children at the gravesite during the memorial service for her husband, Lookout Masuku
BOTTOM: ZAPU and church leaders attending the memorial service for Lookout Masuku
RIGHT: Lookout Masuku's coffin being carried to McDonald hall during the burial

APPENDIX A: List of interviewees

Audio recordings and transcripts of interviews referred to in this report are archived in SAHA Collection AL3291: the ZAPU / Zenzo Nkobi Oral History Project Collection

Name	Date of interview	File name - audio recording	File name - transcripts
Beer, David	08/12/2011	AL3291_A1	AL3291_B1
Khumalo, Sibongile[5]	07/05/2011	AL3291_A2	AL3291_B2
Dabengwa, Dumiso	07/07/2011	AL3291_A3	AL3291_B3
Dube, Benjamin	10/14/2011	AL3291_A4	AL3291_B4
Dube, Richard	11/29/2010	AL3291_A5	AL3291_B5
Madonko, Charles	07/03/2011	AL3291_A6	AL3291_B6
Mhlanga, Caroline	12/04/2010	AL3291_A7	AL3291_B7
Moyo, Christopher	11/16/2010	AL3291_A8	AL3291_B8
Mpofu, Jack	04/20/2011	AL3291_A9	AL3291_B9
Nare, Edward	01/18/2011	AL3291_A10	AL3291_B10
Ncube, Mtshana	11/23/2011	AL3291_A11	AL3291_B11
Ndebele, Longman	03/01/2011	AL3291_A12	AL3291_B12
Ndlovu, Callistus	07/06/2011	AL3291_A13	AL3291_B13
Ndlovu, MzilaMoses	10/16/2011	AL3291_A14	AL3291_B14
Ndlovu, Parks	11/12/2010	AL3291_A15	AL3291_B15
Ndlovu, Regina	06/05/2011	AL3291_A16	AL3291_B16
Ngwenya, Amos	11/22/2010	AL3291_A17	AL3291_B17
Ngwenya, Thomas	01/19/2011	AL3291_A18	AL3291_B18
Nkala, Meeting	04/20/2011	AL3291_A19	AL3291_B19
Nkiwane, Abraham	11/24/2010	AL3291_A20	AL3291_B20
Nkomo, Zephaniah	11/29/2010	AL3291_A21	AL3291_B21
Nleya, Precious	11/16/2010	AL3291_A22	AL3291_B22
Noko, Grace	11/17/2010	AL3291_A23	AL3291_B23
Pholi, Ellingworth	11/14/2010	AL3291_A24	AL3291_B24
Sithole, Cetshwayo	11/17/2010	AL3291_A25	AL3291_B25

[5] Pseudonym

This report draws on an oral history and research project undertaken by the South African History Archive (SAHA) in 2010 and 2011 into aspects of the armed struggle for Zimbabwean independence. At the centre of this project was an important collection of nearly 10,000 photographic negatives, donated to SAHA in 2007. Taken by Zenzo Nkobi, a Zimbabwean photographer with ties to the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) from the mid-1970s until well after independence in 1980, these images provide an intriguing glimpse into the struggle waged by ZAPU's armed wing, ZPRA, and provide evidence of the significant role it played in combating the Rhodesian regime.

The donation of these materials presented an opportunity for SAHA to seek out some of the ZAPU survivors to identify those events and individuals portrayed in the photographs and, at the same time, discuss their experiences within ZAPU and ZPRA and their understanding of the role played by ZAPU in achieving independence in Zimbabwe.

Twenty six oral history interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011, using a selection of Nkobi's photographs as a starting point to discuss the history of ZAPU and ZPRA. These interviews, now transcribed and archived at SAHA, explore various aspects of this history, from the early development of ZAPU, its administration and leadership, through recruitment and military training within ZPRA, including the women's brigade, military operations, regional alliances, international solidarity, to life in the refugee camps, and post-independence politics in Zimbabwe.

This project report and accompanying CD bring together images and extracts from the interview transcripts to tell the story of ZAPU's liberation war, as seen through the lens of Zenzo Nkobi's camera and told in the voices of ZAPU survivors.

For more information about this project, please visit the related SAHA virtual exhibition at *www.saha.org.za/zapu*.

south african history archive

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