

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONSECTION 29 HEARING

DATE: 07.05.98  
HELD AT: JOHANNESBURG  
NAME: MNISI

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CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. I welcome everybody, starting with the translators to the extent that they will be needed. To the persons operating the sound system that definitely will be needed and I welcome you Mr Mnisi as well as Mr Kupedi (indistinct) the legal representative

This is a Section 29 inquiry. It is a private inquiry by which the Act 62 make it understood and known that information that will be dealt with and will be gathered at this hearing is confidential and will remain confidential until and then unless the commission on due and proper notice to those affected adversely thereby decides to make it public. For the moment however information gathered in this process will be private and confidential. I have already taken note mr Mnisi that you are legally represented by Mr Kupedi and we are glad that you have taken the services of a legal adviser. For my part I am Ntsebeza and Commissioner (indistinct) Investigative Unit and will be sitting alone as a panellist. I will be assisted in the task of gathering information from you by, sitting on my immediate right Zenselekweswa one of the investigators and by Mr Wilson Magasa

who is the most senior and the Operational Director of the Investigative Unit that deals with HRV related matters. I believe there will be a tea break at about 11 or half past 11 and if we go that far there will be a lunch break at 1 o'clock.

Before we begin however we will have to swear you in and just for the record I would like your legal representative to formally place himself on record.

MR KUPEDI: Thank you Commissioner Ntsebeza. My name is Brian Kupedi and I appear in this Section 29 hearing with Mr Mnisi, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr Kupedi. Mr

Mnisi we will swear you in if you should stand up.

MR MNISI: (Sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may sit down Mr Mnisi you have been sworn in.

Mr Kupedi I don't know, there are documents which have been made available to us and which seek and just appearances thereof seem to indicate that there is a submission which your client wants to make. I don't know whether you intend to proceed by way of your client reading his submission into the record. I will be guided by you.

MR KUPEDI Thank you Commissioner Ntsebeza. There is a submission prepared by Mr Mnisi. The idea was that he would like in previous section 29 hearing, read it for the record, and may I point out that this submission was prepared on the basis of the

letter inviting him to the section 29 hearing. So if it pleases the Honourable Commission, we would request that he read the submission and thereafter, if there are any questions. I hope there will not be, he can respond to the questions. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well then if Mr Mnisi could proceed.

MR MNISI : Thank you mr Commissioner and the TRC for allowing me this opportunity to put my side of the story. It is my intention to answer all the questions to the best of my ability. However, if I may miss something, I beg the Commission to bear with me, because it has been a long time ago. I shall at this time not be answering to any questions relating to the role of the National commissar, because I have never held that position before. Therefore I would like to proceed by starting with my background.

I was born of the 14 the of December 1959 in Tudusa in Nigel. My earliest recollection of politics goes back to my days in 1976 during the June 16 upsurges. That was prior to leaving the country. Later that year to Swaziland where I officially joined the A.N.C. My training is as follows:

I did my basic military course in Angola from May 1977 to January 1978. Thereafter I went to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic where I did intelligence and urban commanders course. That was a one year course starting from April 78 to May 1979. Then in 1981 I did VIP protection in the then German Democratic Republic from April 1981 to August of that year. Again in 1984

July until December I went to GDR where I did counter-intelligence and security. In 1986 from January to April I did counter-intelligence at senior management level in the USSR. That is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1994 January until April, there's a misprint here, I did a intermediate staff course at the staff college in Zimbabwe. My deployment during my service with the A.N.C. and M.K. were as follows.

Soon after doing my basic military course. I was appointed as a small arms instructor from January until May 1978. Then a convoy security commander from May 79 until August. Later that year I was appointed a recording officer at a camp in Pangu from August 1979 until May 1980. Then later on I was transferred to camp 32, where I was both a recording officer and a Chief of staff from 1980 May until April 1981. Then 1981 September until 1982 I was a recording officer in Luanda. From 1982 until 1983 June I was a recording officer at a camp Kashito, north of Luanda. From 1983 June until 1984 I was deployed in the Eastern Front where together with FAPLA. That is the government forces. We were involved in counter-insurgency warfare against UNITA. There I was the operational counter-intelligence officer. In 1984 until 1986 I was appointed as the Regional Head of investigation in Angola. In 1986 until 1987 I was the deputy chief of security and intelligence. From 1987 until 1990 when there was restructuring of the department of intelligence and security in the

A.N.C. I was appointed as a personal assistant to the chief of counter-intelligence. That is all about my deployment.

Coming to the detention facilities of the A.N.C. The olden facility in camp 32 was established 1979 and officially came into operation in 1980. It was my view then and now that the A.N.C. never anticipated establishing that kind of a facility, because it relied on it's policy of political persuasion to convince enemy agents and finally transform them. By years 1976 to 1979 saw an influx of enemy agents and their activities to the Imperial of the organisation resulting in the following:

The Black Wednesday, that is 18 September 1977 poisoning of the June 16 detachment which comprised of about ± 600 cadre in Novakatenge where unfortunately I also was a victim. Enemy S strikes against the same camp Novakatenge in 1979. This location of command and control in Fazenda a camp north of Luanda in 1979. The seizure of arm caches by the Apartheid regime inside South Africa and in neighbouring countries comprising of cadres internally due to premature contacts resulting in their death, arrest, injury and demoralisation of those who were not yet deployed, but were due to deployed, either in the front line stage or internally. The above activities mr Commissioner left the A.N.C. with limited options and those options was to amongst others to drastically improve it's counter-intelligence apparatus by establishing a strong counter-intelligence and security organ comprising of the following:

A strong voting system in order to determine the security competence of its personnel. Investigation section and the holding centre amongst other measures.

Due to limited resources a penal section was combined with an investigation holding section. The structure of camp 32 was as follows:

At that time between 1979 and 1981 when I left camp 32 there was a commander who was Sizwe Mkhonto, otherwise known internally here as Gabriel Mthembu. The commissioner was Morris Seabelo responsible for political guidance. I was the chief of staff. The chief of staff was myself George Zulu. Then there was the staff commander who was having a staff commissioner officer in charge of communications, an officer in charge of construction, a medical officer, propaganda officer and a recording officer. We had one platoon at that time with three sections and as a chief of staff I also had the chief of logistics, chief of ordinance and a chief medical officer. At its inception the camp had different command and control structure because it was in two phases that is construction and post construction phase. The procedures at camp 32 were as follows:

Let me start first at the purpose. The purpose of camp 32 was:

To serve as a rehabilitation centre, through proper and humane treatment of the inmates, political education, interaction between the guards and the inmates, recreation. I will divide personnel procedures into the following categories. There are

procedures which entailed the detainees and those that entailed the security guards and officers. Immediately a detainee arrives at camp 32, the following procedure was followed:

There was a reception, a recording classification of an inmate, isolation, interrogation, integration with other inmates, evaluation of information and dissemination of the information gathered through briefings and reports. As to the security guards we sent our officers around Angola to do spotting that is spotting candidates, prospective candidates, selection of the prospective candidates, interviewing the prospective candidate and if he suits us, we give him the necessary briefing and brief training

Thereafter we transfer him to camp 32 where he is going to be deployed and given in-house training and later on he will receive further training either in Angola or externally and upon returning from the camp he will get a new deployment.

#### Command and Control:

Command and control is the exercising of authority and control by the commander over the allotted forces and means. Its functions are carried out by means of an arrangement of personnel equipment, telecommunication facilities and procedures that the commander uses in planning coordinating and control of forces and operation in order to successfully carry out his task. The above definition was not applicable in the initial stage due to the fact that it was a construction and a post construction phase. During the construction phase the camp fell under the command

and control of camp 13, which was about five kilometres from camp 32. Camp 13 was commanded by Kenneth Mahamba, otherwise known to the commission as Timothy K. Seremani. The post construction phase, the structure that I'd given you had complete command and control and its responsibilities included the following:

Planning guidance, organising security, delegation, training counter-intelligence, investigation and political work. The interrogation of detainees was divided into two phases, preliminary and the actual interrogation phase. The preliminary phase consisted of the following:

The receipt of files of the suspects, recording of the files, classification of the files skimming of information out of the files and from the suspects,

informants reports about the suspect from people who might know the suspect and from the suspect himself.

Interviews, appreciation of cases. The above mentioned appreciation of cases consisted of the following:

Analysis of the files, information available, extra information that is needed, the method of approach, prioritisation of cases, grouping of cases

appointment of a group leader, assignment of a group to carrying out interrogation, the issuing of guidelines to that particular group.

The actual interrogation entailed the following:



General discussion with a suspect which will flow into a political discussion. A request to him to make a statement or a confession if possible and then general questioning emanating from the statement or non refusal to give statement or confession and from time to time there will be a some break. Then after that we'll go into focused questioning, if the need arises there will be an intensive focus questioning, the initial conclusion, the confrontation stage, either by a person who implicated him or her or with the information that we have at hand or other evidence available.

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The closure of the case, reinterrogation and then final conclusion. I must point out mr Commissioner. There was no authority given for the use of force. We were advised and trained to use interrogation skills and political persuasion because of the democratic composition of the inmates. At that time it was mainly black inmates.

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Now, what went wrong? The security department and the command and control structures were also infiltrated. They were not immune from infiltration. There was lack of maturity and formal training in counter-intelligence by some members of the security apparatus.

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There were provocations from the inmates. The escapes and attempted escapes by inmates, conspiracies by the inmates to escape and to lock us up, time constraints and requirements outstripping our capabilities.

Mechanisms for control of exercises and abuses: There were standing operational procedures that ensured control over exercises and abuses and some of them are the following:

Constant guidance, especially of the new comers, that is guards and officers. Constant political discussions of the unit and the inmates including the treatment of political prisoners, The Geneva convention, the international law of conflicts, review of past experiences, reprimanding of the offenders, punishment which included extra duties, demotions, transference, that is taking him out of camp 32.

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Limit vocations dismissals:

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Information and further particulars of the following, Timothy K. Seremani, Boitlomo Mahibantlho, Phillip Mangwana, Josef Mokoena, Edward Malobe and Gabriel Paki, Mswewu. Their death occurred in my absence. I am unable to give you further information as to that, because I was in the G.D.R. and later deployed in Luanda. Although I took part in the interrogation, I cannot have further information. I also took part in the interrogation of Gordon Mswewu and William Maslotala. Particularly one and two belonged to a wider network of spies that had infiltrated the organisation with long term strategic goals. As your guidelines in procedures in respect of judicial proceedings, particularly the tribunal.

This did not fall within my responsibilities. I cannot give you any further information about them. This is as far as I can go with my submission mr Commissioner.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Khoisan.

MR KHOISAN: Morning Mr. Mnisi. Thank you for your submission and we appreciate the fact that you had taken time to answer all of the questions put before in your letter of invitation. It certainly helps our work here. As you well know, you are the third person to come before us in respect of, in this particular format, in respect of allegations concerning abuses, or alleged abuses and accesses which have said to have occurred particularly

in camp 32, also known as Quatro. In respect from that I have noticed from your submission that for the most part and in the main your service to the African National Congress and by extension to the struggle as I understand your submission. It has been one which is in the field of intelligence and security. Now correct me if I'm wrong on that. Is that correct?

MR MNISI: Yes, that is correct.

MR KHOISAN: Now in terms of the particular situation that we are trying to probe here, there are allegations by families and relatives of persons who said to have been executed by whole of the tribunal. This is particular true in the case of Kenneth Mahamba also known as before us as Timothy K. Seremani. Then there's the matter of Me. Mswewu and Mr. Masitanu and their allegations in respect of abuses, particularly those of torture.

Now I want to ask you. At the time that you joined, became a recording officer in Pangu 1979 August to May 1980. As a recording officer you would have interfaced to some degree with information relevant to the persons who are mentioned now in this letter of invitation. At that time when you were at Pangu, did you know:

1. That there was a network of spies,
2. Did you know that they involved some of the people whose names appear in your letter of invitation to which we have called you to answer questions in respect of that?

~~MR MNISI: At that time in Angola we had several tanks. We~~  
had Novakatenge, which was in the south.

We had Funda centre which was about twenty kilometres outside Luanda.

We had Fazenda, which was about 300 kilometres north of Luanda. We had Kibashe which was close to 250 kilometres north of Luanda and Northwest of Luanda we had Pangu, about 210 to 220 kilometres.

After completing my training in the USSR and after Black Wednesday, I started having a feeling that there was a network of enemy agents within the organisation. However, I didn't have a particular name or a particular network in mind. When I was employed as a recording officer in 1979. It was at the time the recording section was doing mainly personnel work overlapping into security matters. That was before it was completely

transformed to deal with mainly security matters in 1981. Therefore as a recording officer in Pangu, which is what you asked me, I didn't know about the existence of a particular network and referring to the names mentioned. I note that the guys that you mentioned because I trained with them. I was not with them in Pangu, they were in Kibashe. Gordon Mswewu was a commissioner in Fazenda whilst Timothy Seremani was a commander in Kibashe. That was when I was a recording officer in Pangu.

MR KHOISAN: I was actually trying to solicit your assistance on that because that, in my view if I understand it, we wouldn't

want to question you. You've pointed very clearly to us in your submission that you cannot account for anything above your station and I believe we accept that, but the time when you were a recording officer in Pangu, we just had Black Wednesday as you

quite correctly pointed out, but then there was the issue of the air

strikes at Novakatenge in early 1979. I'm trying to find out and solicit from you whether this in any way influenced the thinking of people at your level. That is at the recording officer level or whether in any way at that stage there were instructions that were filtering through from the leadership, from the national

commissars officers through the ranks to inform people and to

basically inform you in respect of how you would conduct yourself as a recording officer. I'm trying to find out whether that particular position with the information in respect of Black

Wednesday and Novakatenge, because now we're in 1979 had filtered through and how that information was interpreted at the level of the recording officer. I'm trying to understand two things:

1. What was the political line that was filtering through from the top to the recording officers and
2. Also what was the state of mind, the psychological framework within which the recording officers and other members at your level in the security operators, or function?

MR MNISI: Well at the time of Black Wednesday and the air strikes, there was a confusion I don't know whether this confusion was due to the fact that I was not closer to the leadership or is it because we were all confused, I don't know, but the information circulating around on Black Wednesday was initially that this was food poisoning because we ate fish that was rotten according to some other sources who were in the kitchen staff at that time. Those were rumours, that was not official. Some rumours were saying that they used the wrong method of cooking this fish, they never cleaned the fish properly, and so on and so forth. Those were rumours circulating around. So as to a formulation of attitude at that time, there wasn't an attitude because I was limited to rumours. I never had something official from the leadership even the camp leadership, that is the military leadership. So I was totally blank, except for those rumours.

As to the air strike against Novakatenge. It happened a week before we returned from the USSR. I remember immediately we arrived from Luanda, we took a convoy to, logistic convoy to Novakatenge. That was the first contact we had after the air strike. We were the first people from outside to go to that place.

Speculations then by the Russians because we were there when they told us about this incident, was that as the SADF was attacking the Southern Angola at that time you'll remember operation Protea, operation Daisy and so on and so forth. This was part of the targets that were planned by them. We never thought that there was a specific information from inside the camp to the boers about the camp. We thought it was just part and parcel of the strategy because the camp was based south of Angola. It was about 1800 kilometres from Luanda south of Evimbengwela. Maybe closer to the 17th parallel. So before going to camp 32, I was generally ignorant about what happened in Novakatenge on the 18th of September and how did the air strike come about.

MR KHOISAN: But it's a fact that what at that time was in the theatre of conflict would have been enemy forces. The fact that they had got in that close and made such precise incursions into the African National Congress and it's military structure must have set off a sense of panic, paranoia and that must have instructed the mind set of people in the security apparatus. Am I correct?

MR MNISI: Yes you are right, but remember at that time I was young. I never had a factor in mind that would start thinking about this happened because of this. I had an ignorant mind. Even though I was trained in intelligence. That time intelligence was offensive. I was mainly offensive, a collector. I wasn't trained to be a counter-intelligence officer at that time, taking into consideration my age and the fact that I was not trained in counter-intelligence. I never entertained the ideas of suspects within us, because I believed that we are all black, and nobody could have any other motive except the liberation of South-Africa within us.

MR KHOISAN: But Mr. Mnisi, you have the Novekatenge thing which understandably creates confusion in terms of could it have been the cooks messing up, you know, just not paying attention or could somebody have maybe talked black swallow or something into the - well it's one thing.

Then you have precise air strikes on a military installation of the liberation movement. Then later in 1979 you find another problem which is occurring, which is what you refer to as point C on page 4 of your document here. To the dislocation of the command and control in Fazenda. So here you have incident in Novekatenge, have an incident in Fazenda, the dislocation of the command and control in Fazenda in 1979. Did that result in any steps taken by your immediate leadership in the security apparatus to tighten things up to streamline to focus the work and I



understand that you were working as a collector and if you are working collection, you are not working in processing. You're basically doing investigations. You bring things in. You are collecting information and somebody else is going to process that information. But surely that must have sharpened the focus, even of the work of the collectors and resulted in situations where you had the feeling that you were working under pressure or under siege. Am I correct?

MR MNISI: Up to late 1979 before Fazenda issue I still maintain that I was a blank, ignorant, but as a collector, I was not a defensive collector in order to create a condition of security

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I was an offensive collector in order to create a condition conducive to attack, and not to defend. I would go out with a recognisance team around our camps to see if whether there are traces, of because at that time their main trouble was UNITA, of UNITA FNLA around the area, So that we together with FAPLA can make a joint operation and attack or follow up particular traces against FNLA and UNITA. Maybe I should remind you that, actually not remind you, inform you that in 1979 there was an ambush in Kibashe conducted by FNLA where four of our comrades were injured and one passed away. That was comrade

Pshi. So the need to act against FNLA and UNITA to me was primary as a collector. I was not a counter-intelligence collector or an investigation collector. I started working with counter-

intelligence later in 1979. So at that time when I was a recording officer I was still developing. It is only after that time when focus changed from collection of personnel into security matters that I started opening up. Therefore I can only give you an answer to the questions that you are asking after 79.

MR KHOISAN: Well, that's appreciated and the fact is that we've been given to understand that some of the people who had do they charge were placed in positions of authority at camp 32 also known as Quatro, was fairly young and all of this was in a theatre which was very fluid where you had a mobile and offensive structure fighting against you at any time. Now, let me refer you to a document. It's called Quatro, the need for a detention centre. It's an appendix to the A.N.C. policy's statement to the TRC. It should be the second annexure in your file.

MR MNISI: Yes, I have it.

MR KHOISAN: O.k. In the third paragraph of this document it says: The decision to establish camp 32 was taken by the security and intelligence department then under the leadership of Mr. Piliso. I think we are referring to Mr. Zwandile Zwahi Piliso. The intention was to create for the organisation a lock-up facility at which people who were regarded as in need of rehabilitation could be rehabilitated. That was in 1979. I see that in 1980 in 1979, 1980, you were a recording officer. In 1979 when this particular structure was developed, Quatro. How were you selected to go to Quatro and what can you give me as four or five

elements that in your view represented, or were the requirements for the candidates who would take charge of this facility or be in a position of authority in this facility in Quatro.

MR MNISI: Mr. Commissioner. I was deployed in camp 32 in 1980 in May. I was a recording officer in Pangu from 1979 until 1980 May. When the decision was taken to establish camp 32 it was not taken in the open. It was a secret of the organisation, and I was not privy to that information. So therefore I cannot answer that question. As to my selection to camp 32 I can only tell you what I suspect was what led them to co-opt me to the structure because I was not told that we took you because of 1 2 3. As a soldier I was going to be deployed at any area where the movement felt that I was suitable to serve it best. That was criteria number 1.

Secondly, maybe the training that I had in the USSR led them to say because there was a crisis. At least this man was trained in intelligence. Therefore it will be easy to transform him into a counter-intelligence officer. Unlike taking somebody who was not trained at all in the field of intelligence and counter-intelligence.

Thirdly, maybe my discipline then was high. My security competency was deemed to be suitable. This is what I suspect led the movement into appointing me as a recording officer and a chief of staff in camp 32.

MR KHOISAN: Because you joined camp 32, your entering to camp 32 in May of 1980 comes close on the heels of youth

arrival back from the Soviet Union as you quite correctly pointed out here for intelligence in urban commanders course.

MR MNISI: I came back at 1979 and I left in 1978.

KHOISAN: So in 1979. So were there any other courses that you undertook before because of course you were going to be holding a senior position. You would be chief of staff at the detention facility for errant or suspected members of the movement. Was there any intermediary course that you undertook, any kind of training, was there anything that you were taken through to enable you to assume this responsible position at camp 32?

MR MNISI: Yes, when I was in the USSR. Maybe I should give you the breakdown of that course so that you should understand it better. It was I still remember. It was 400 hours intelligence for the whole year, It was 300 hours urban warfare, another 300 hours for conventional warfare and staff duties. Then there was sabotage, which was around 60 hours. Russian language which was around 100 hours, communication, small arms, artillery, anti-air, international politics and relations anti-tank weapons.

This training was by then regarded as suitable for a position of a commander, a chief of staff in a camp because it involves staff duties and conventional warfare. So I was competent to handle that position at that time.

MR KHOISAN: What I'm trying to find out here Mr. Mnisi is that you have a situation where and we fortunately have been able

to solicit from people who were senior to you at that time what you refer to as secret decisions and how they were formulated to establish Quatro. So we wouldn't address that to you, because I would be unfair. But I'm asking you.

I understand that you had been in the Soviet Union, you've gone through an extensive and a very impressive range of work here. But could that have prepared you for a situation, and we've been given the understanding that the ratios mentioned by Pik Botha were to some degree to a lesser or greater degree, that they were accepted by the intelligence establishment, the intelligence security establishment of the movement that some like 50% of the people who came across for training, were agents and that that is the kind of percentages that you were dealing with.

So what I'm asking you is whether with this background before you assume the position of chief of staff at a detention facility which would be dealing with your countrymen, who had to be, where you literally had to sort out the sheep from the cows, the chaff from the wheat, the pigs from the donkeys, whatever. Or you had to literally engage in a sorting exercise and at the same time protect the integrity of the movement and the sovereignty of the movement.

Were you given anything which would have prepared you to be able to handle a facility where you are now going to be dealing with the processing of large numbers of persons, suspected persons in your own rank? Did you have an idea before then, or a

suspicion that those were the kind of figures and situations that you were going to be dealing with in respect of what was perceived to be the enemy?

MR MNISI: Well. When I was trained in the USSR then, we also had what we called an imperialist secret service, which involved how the functioning of their intelligence, and counter-intelligence apparatus. By imperialist secret service we meant the Western countries and South Africa included. So out of that though ignorant I could get to know what is counter-intelligence from their perspective which I was not going to apply, because I was not taught the counter-intelligence from the perspective of the progressive forces and the A.N.C. at that time. So I was influenced by that counter-intelligence at that time. I used to view things from the point of view of the lecture that I received in imperialist secret service.

Secondly we had procedures that were drafted and given to us. They were loose procedures, they were not organised and professional procedures. These were the procedures that were drafted. Perhaps by somebody who was trained in 1963 or ten years before our arrival. So they served as a guideline, but later on we changed those procedures. Maybe we changed 90%, if not 95% of those procedures, because they were irrelevant.

They were dealing with a situation whereby people were taken, were recruited by the A.N.C from the rural areas and to Tanzania and Lesotho whatever country, you name it. It was not

dealing about people from urban areas, people from a riot situation or uprising situation like we were. So we rendered that document ineffective with drastically changing its contents. So in a nutshell I relied on both, their training on imperialistic service and that document.

MR KHOISAN: O.K. Now let's talk about the time that you became the chief of staff at camp 32. When you arrived at camp 32 and I want to address you to page 32, page 42 of the same document Quatro, because it is the view of the A.N.C.

I'll address you to point number 6 on page 42, Problems.

They say that camp 32 was a sudden almost knee jerk reaction to the enemy onslaught which threatened the very existence of the organisation. It was not properly planned and became a make shift camp. It goes on to, deals with the fact that there was a banana ripening centre and the point after that talks about the fact there were problems of overcrowding and other problems relating to access to medical care for people there etcetera. But let's deal with this particular thing.

When you came to camp 32 in May of 1980, what was the situation you encountered and what can you describe for the best as your job description and how you set about accomplishing it.

MR MNISI: Can you come again?

MR KHOISAN: With this particular thing as the background where the A.N.C. in its submission states that this was the position. It wasn't a planned thing, it was make shift, we had to

deal with it, catch as catch can. That's the one point. But with that as the background, by the time that you got there in May 1980, what did you encounter in terms of the physical structure and the problem in terms of the people were there and number two what was your job description laid out for you, and how did you set about accomplishing it?

MR MNISI: Amongst the stories that were circulated around by the leadership was that that camp was going to be used for females so that it should have adequate facilities in order to cater for females as opposed to other camps which didn't have adequate facilities to cater for females. This was one of the stories that was circulated around.

When I was deployed in camp 32, I remember it was on a weekend, Sunday. That was after playing a game of soccer in Pangu. I was approached by the late Vuki who told me that there is a crisis of personnel in camp 32 and especially personnel which was trained in staff duties and conventional warfare. So there is a need that we should have more personnel who are trained in that way at camp 32. Later on that evening I was informed by my camp commander then Thami Zulu that I will be deployed to camp 32. So I should take all my belongings, block, stock and barrel and go together with Vuki to camp 32. Vuki was the recording officer of camp 13 which at that time was commanded by Mahamba and it was responsible for camp 32 as I had indicated that during the construction phase, camp 13 was responsible for camp 32. Upon



my arrival in camp 32 there was no distinction between an inmate and for simplicity sake I would say a warder, because they all used the same uniform. They all shared the same plates, the same pot.

The only difference was that some others were armed and others were not armed and at the end of the day these were locked up and these were not locked up. That was the situation that I found at camp 32. Friendship was across the spectrum. You would find somebody going to a cell, open a cell and play a chess with a particular inmate because he liked his style of playing chess. Somebody would play draft, cards and all the games. When

we played volley ball you would find may being in that team of which comprises of about four inmates and two of us.

That was the set-up that I found there. Still then we believed then that there is no need to be harsh on those comrades, because they were misled. So the situation was that of interaction, friendship and above all consultation. We used to consult with them and seek advices from them, because some of them were politically trained more than us. So in some of the thorny issues, internationally and inside the country would go to them and get an advice. We would go to them and ask them what is the position in Afghanistan, now that the Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan. What is the position about this constellation of Southern African states as passed by P.W. Botha. What is this and

what is that, and they would give us advice on all these issues. That was the spirit, the situation that I found in camp 32.

My duties as the chief of staff differed from those of a recording officer. My duty as a chief of staff was to put into practise the orders of the commander. I was in fact an administrator. If the commander decides that this must be done, I would go down and see to it that that happens. I will choose the suitable people to execute the order. I would choose the best combination, co-ordination, arrange defence of the camp, arrange internal duties, plan the daily routine, co-ordination between the camp and other camps, visits by personnel from outside, visits from our personnel to other camps and so on and so forth.

This was my task as the chief of staff. I would receive reports from junior commanders, compile a report, hand it over to the camp commander. That is in a nutshell what I did as the chief of staff.

As a recording officer I continued with personnel work, but this time the focus was not on personnel, but I had to do personnel because there was personnel which entailed both the warders and the inmates. So I had to cater for their needs. But this time I was much more involved in investigations and what is commonly referred to as interrogation. But my involvement was limited due to the fact that I had another job which was that of a chief of staff.

I wanted to execute both my tasks in a manner that was going to be acceptable by the support unit, by the inmates, by the leadership and to myself. I think I achieved that because we managed to break away from camp 13. We motivated why should we break away from camp 13. We managed to establish electricity, we managed to start our own small farming. We had poultry, we had piggery. We built our own water reservoir so that there isn't much up and down between the camp and the river which was about 2 kilometres down and because we never had facilities of collecting that water. So we established a reservoir though it was not adequate from time to time would go back to that river, but it lessened the traffic between the camp and the river.

We managed to get our own transport, our own uniform as distinct to the one which was worn by the inmates. We managed to give up our medical centre because before we relied on camp 13. There were so many things that were established in camp 32 at that time that I feel proud of as a chief of staff that I set to achieve, and achieved. Although there were some mishaps along the way, but the intention was not to do that, the intention was to uplift the standard of the camp.

#### HEARING ADJOURNS

#### HEARING RESUMES

MR KHOISAN: In terms of the situation in Quatro, you've given us from your perspective. We also have to test what you say. The

fact that you found the situation and we're dealing with the Quatro document. The document on the need for a detention centre. There are certain things that are listed in that document. I want to draw your attention to page 3, 4 and 5. The issue is of Quatro. I beg your pardon. I'm on a document called the Stewart commission. Report 1984, page 3, 4 and 5. We just want to test some of the things that you informed us about. 3 and 4, 4 and 5 for background and page 6.3. Disciplinary measures as a point of reference for testing the information. To read into the record. From 1979 practically all disciplinary problems "resolved", resolved in quotation marks. By severe punishment and beatings.

Destructive punishment as distinct from earlier revolutionary constructive punishment became the order of the day.

The tragic fact is that it was at its worst in the training camps. This undoubtedly left a very bad impression on everybody.

In fact some of those punished have been maimed and scarred for life and there have been deaths. The bitterness and hostility in the men is great. They talk of "Forgetting but not forgiveness."

Many identify our methods with that of the boers and in some cases feel that we are worse. The aim of the punishment seems to destroy, demoralise humiliate, and humiliate comrades and not correct and build. Then there's some examples that are listed immediately underneath that in terms of punishment.

I just want to ask you as the chief of staff in the camp. Did this situation obtain at the time that you arrived there in camp 32

when you arrived there in 1980 in May? Can you maybe elucidate, help us out a little bit on this particular issue.

MR MNISI: The situation referred to here, as I can remember pertains to a camp in Malantse and Kibashe. This was after the comrades were in Zimbabwe who were taking part in the assembly points and in the fighting against Smith there, were repatriated to Angola. When they were repatriated to Angola, there was a need of changing some of our tactics, training people for physical endurance. So these comrades were employed, in training our people. You might know that Eszepra had a way of disciplining their cadres which was not acceptable to the A.N.C. and M.K.

Hands from time to time we would withdraw some of our comrades who were trained by Eszepra back to our camps. This overwhelming majority of the comrades who were brought back from the assembly areas, were deployed in some of our camps.

That is excluding camp 32. They were never deployed in camp 32.

So what is referred to in page 6 didn't apply in camp 32. It was something that applied in Pangu, in Kibashe and Malantse. The timing was around 1980, late, as you remember that the assembly areas in Zimbabwe, the process in Zimbabwe started in 1980. It started in 1979 and the elections in 1980 and only after independence were they repatriated. So what is being said in page 6 is what happened from 1980 and basically in the in the three camps.

MR KHOISAN: Let me refer you back to page 44 of the Quatro document. The document that you were with there, point 9, under abuses.

CHAIRPERSON: That is before Mr Mnisi replies to Mr. Khoisan. What were these methods that were used by Eszpra of which were objection to the M.K. If you could just without elaboration just mention them or quite a few of them.

MR MNISI: Well, I'm told by some of the Eszepradise that I was with during training and some of the comrades who came back from Zimbabwe that amongst other methods was ekwedili, meaning that a dungeon. They would lock you up in a dug out

underground for some two months or so. You'll be there without seeing the light for some two months, as a disciplinary merge. You'll be forced to carry fifty kilogram of sand and run with it around the camp. Sometimes he'll carry twenty five kilograms and force you to swim in a swamp, and things like that.

Something like abopondolewashi, you'll be forced to round the whole day. Those were some of the methods which were not acceptable in M.K.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Khoisan, you can continue.

MR KHOISAN: O.k. For the purpose of just going back you stated that those were abuses that took place in other camps, but now specifically with regard to Quatro. When there was a commission of enquiry at camp 32 and let me read into the record. However it was evident that there was no clear cut line of

authority in the camp as all the staff were ex-M.K. who now served in Bukodo, one former camp commander of camp 32 informed the commission that his appointment was a joint decision of, and he was reporting to both the security department and the M.K., This would refer who he felt should supervise his work. Close monitoring of this camp was not evident in the testimony.

But in point 9, In abuses inmates were not only abused by the general conditions in which they were kept, but also by actual acts of ill treatment meted out against them, forms of ill treatment reported to the commission by complainants were these.

Lengthy isolation in solitary confinement, regular beatings under the feet or else were with guava tree sticks, guava treatment; or with coffee sticks, coffee treatment, napalm, pompa, pawpaw, Beirut, helicopter, being tied to a tree and remaining there in public view for a long time, red ants slaughter, digging a hole under a shoulder deep and being beaten on the head and hands as you obey instruction to come out of the holes, starvation, chopping wood for hours on end; thousand litre tank; third degree interrogation.

Can you state for the record, give us an indication whether during your ten years as the chief of staff of camp 32, any of these particular situations and treatments meted out to inmates obtain, and if so, what was your position in respect of it?

MR MNISI : Some of the abuses happened during my period as the chief of staff. However, in any institution, you'll find that being the chief up there, you do not know what is happening on the ground. Some of the things that happen without your knowledge and sanction. Yes I do agree that there was lengthy isolations in solitary confinement. But this was not punishment. As I said due to lack of facilities, there was not distinction between a penal section and investigation section.

You'll find that as your case has being investigated, you are not supposed to be integrated to other inmates, in a bigger cell, because we wanted to confine you so that we can get all the information from you, so that you are not influenced until we complete your case. This was not a form of punishment. But at times we were forced to say we are going to put you in isolation, because there was sticks, I think he is Mokoena now. He used to be in the security department. He was a chief in the security department in Angola. After completing his case, he was integrated with other inmates. He would tell them all the tactics that are being used by the security department, what is going to happen to them, that they should come to us and retract their stories. Because some of the stories were unable to verify them inside the country, that they should do this and that. Such a person was destructive. He was not suitable to be in a communal cell, because of his negative influence. Therefore we took him to



an isolation until we felt that what he knows about the security department has been changed.

Like I said that the one thousand litre tank we never had water reservoirs We tried to build them and that lessened people throwing water from the river. There was no other way. We had to get water, we had to drink water, including the inmates, they had to drink water, they had to wash. Some of the things even if we wanted to do them on our own, we couldn't because we were protecting the camp at night, whilst they were sleeping. You can't take a man from duty, from having done a six hour duty the whole night and force him to go and throw water. You'd rather take the one who was sleeping because he's not tired. It was a question of not exhausting this other one, because he had a multiple task to protect the camp in case the camp is attacked.

By the way the camp was also targeted by the enemy. As we later on find out that the camp was targeted by the enemy because it held some of their most important agents. So therefore they wanted to destroy it so that there is no evidence or alternatively to take out their agents and bring them to South Africa.

MR KHOISAN: But it says further here. Since the defendants who testified before the commission, denied that they had administered any of these forms of human abuse and denied that most of them were used at all. However beating, strenuous interrogation and tying to a tree were admitted specifically by some of the witnesses like Mr. Poliso and Mr. Mtambo. It goes on

again to refer to doctor Jordan and in reference to Mr. Hani and also reference to statement in respect of the late O.R. Thambo. Saying that the A.N.C. could do without camp 32.

My question to you is: The fact that some of these things did occur. Let me just go through one example, third degree. Did it occur?

MR MNISI: Yes, it did occur. Hence I referred to, there were times when this particular information was needed and due to time constraints we had to get it, by whatever means possible. There were requirements that were outstripping our capabilities. From time to time we were forced to resort to those methods. But

do not forget also like I mentioned in the case of Sticks Mokoena. Even Gordon Mswewu, those who infiltrated the organisation. They did this in order to impress the organisation.

The blame at the end of the day remains with the security department and not with them. Now that they are no longer there,

they are on the other side. So it's like they did nothing, but some of the severest beatings were administered by Gordon Mswewu. I once visited Kibashu, where somebody by the name of Tacks Sloslaimajwe, who was injured in an ambush. He was severely beaten by Gordon Mswewu. He had no mandate to ask him about

his whereabouts, because he was a commissar. His was to give political guidance in the camp but he interfered with security work for what purpose that time we didn't know, but later on we came to know that he did this because of his position.

There was a Eskom Malulega who tried to escape. He was arrested by the guys where was operating anti aircraft in camp 13.

We arrived before the commander of camp 13 but he dismissed us and he said that he interrogated Eskom alone and tortured him and threatened him that if he could reveal information about his work, he will collect him from camp 32, because he's got the power. That's why he dismissed us. That was Timothy Serimane. When Eskom told us that, we didn't believe it, hence we never took measures against Mahamba. It was until that information came from Botswana that we took measures against him. By all in all what I was trying to saying is that yes, some of this things did

happened. Due to pressure, due to infiltration within the security and the intelligence apparatus, due to lack of maturity and there was no other way at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: Go on Mr. Mnisi. I don't know if you are finish. I was just going to indicate that Mr Magaza is going to be next to ask a question.

MR MNISI: At that time there was no other way because we was still at the developmental stage. The situation changed towards the end of 83 and early 1984. When we had the necessary training, the necessary political training, when we had copies of the Geneva Convention when we were given lessons on international law of conflicts, treatment of prisoners of war and so on and so forth. That's when the situation started to change

drastically. But the period 1980 to late 1983 it was a developmental stage. Thank You.

MR MAGAZA: Thank you Mr. Chair. Mr. Mnisi I'm going to ask questions around the people you have just spoken about the Mswewu's and the Serimane's. Firstly, I would like to find out as to whether though you were in charge of the camp you have mentioned, whether at that time you would also have fallen under the group called Boboto or you were not part of that?

MR MNISI: Boboto was a nickname for the security section of the A.N.C. in Angola. Initially the security section was separate from the recording section. At that time Mr Mzandile Pilosi was

head of the recording section which dealt with personal matters and overlapping into security methods because the security section which was based in Luanda, was not deployed in the camp. So certain security functions were executed by the recording department. But later on they had two structures where combined and integrated into one. It was called the department of security and intelligence. Commonly referred to as boboto.

MR MAGAZA: Now the camp under your command would also have the security personnel conducting the function of security in that camp under your command.

MR MNISI: I was never a commander. I've never commanded any camp.

MR MAGAZA: The camp that you've mentioned was it that where you were a recorder.

MR MNISI: Ja I was a recorder. I was in the staff section. In camp 32 I was the chief of staff, executing the orders of the commander.

MR MAGAZA: Okay, thanks. Are you aware as to the reasons for the detention of Joe Serimane, himself, and not the brother. Was Joe Serimane not detained at any time.

MR MNISI: No.

MR MAGAZA: The detention of Gordon Mswewu

MR MNISI: Yes, I am aware.

MR MAGAZA: Now why was he detained? What information was there that that led to his detention?

MR MNISI: In 1980 Eskom Malulega who was trained in Namibia, implicated some of the elements in the hierarchy of M.K. in Angola at that time. Amongst them was Gordon Mswewu popularly known then by the name Grenade, Vosi Majekiso, Timothy Seremani and Pypa. But upon processing evaluating the information we decided that he was telling us lies. Because Timothy Seremani ensured that he is transferred to camp 32, even though under strange circumstances. Because we were there to collect him, but he took his own time. But we thought that he was doing that as a form of vengeance and because Timothy, Pypa, Gordon and Vosi were close friends. He decided to implicate a lot.

MR MAGAZA: Is this now Eskom?

MR MNISI : Yes. Eskom as we analysed the information came from Natal, and from Natal he went to Namibia. We couldn't find a linkage between him and those guys, because they came from Randfontein, Mafeking and Hamanskraal. So we decided to dismiss that information. Until 1981 when Pypa, his name was Elliot Mazibuko. That was his pseudo name. I don't remember his real name. Vosi Majekiso, I had his name here. Just give me a second there.

MR MAGAZA: Derick, Boitlhemmo Labelo. Maikesho Sivose, is that the one you want.

MR MNISI : I thought I had their names, but I don't have them.

MR MAGAZA: The person with the code name of Vosi Mahikesho, is Derick Boitlhemmo Labelo.

MR MNISI : O.k. So I have a name list here. Pypa, that is Elliot Mazibuko, Gabriel Fatimoswewu and Phillip Mangena tried to escape to Botswana whereby they told the authorities there that they are working with the system in South Africa. They want the Botswana government to facilitate their deportation to South Africa. the Botswana government then was still as being on the fence, and being afraid of South Africa. So that they thought that the government of Botswana would take them to South Africa. So unfortunately for them the government decided to get more information out of them. They confessed to the government. They revealed the names of the others, amongst them Mahamba, Gordon Moswewu, William Maslotani, Balini Mpile, that is Joseph

Melketze Mokoena. They revealed those names and instead of taking them to South Africa, the government in Botswana handed them back to the A.N.C. together with their confessions and the comrades in Lusaka who were in Lusaka by then, worked on this confessions and gave us information and later on brought these suspects to Angola.

This corroborated the information that was given to us by Eskom. That information that we dismissed. So this strengthened our case against them, because initially we dismissed information against them, and now here is information which was not extracted out of the suspects by the A.N.C., but by so called neutral force which when it suits them sometimes, it will work in favour of the government in South Africa, when it suited them, they would work in favour of the A.N.C.

Nobody will say it's because of this attitude or that attitude that they were arrested, but this was a neutral force who gave us that information and they agreed, and in their agreement they implicated other people. Fortunately we had that information that we unfortunately dismissed and never investigated further, because we believed in their integrity and most of them were senior personnel within M.K. That was how they were arrested.

MR MAGAZA: Did you at any point manage to establish that some of those people who were in actual fact members of the South African police, not just informers? If you did, which one of the lot that you managed to identify as being so?

MR MNISI: According to the confession of Elliot Mazibuko, I don't remember his real name. They were trained in Kimberley. According to my records here in South Africa, Kimberley was where the school of military intelligence was during that time, until it was transferred to Potchefstroom. They were trained in Kimberley, in leadership courses, intelligence, infiltration, and recruitment. That training did not necessarily entitle them to become policemen. But they were agents, agents who could handle other agents. So they were senior, because amongst some of their tasks was to recruit and to expand their networks. So I could simply say that they were a support network of the police in South Africa. However out of all of them Vosi Maikesho was said to have been a member of the special branch. Although we didn't establish that from him but he was implicated as a member of the special branch serving in the special branch, before he left the country.

You will know as I know Mr. Commissioner that some members of the special branch would masquerade as insurance brokers, this or that. So his cover suited him at that time when he was a special branch. But I cannot say this one was a policeman, maybe I should say that they were the auxiliary or the support service of the police department.

MR MAGAZA: If there could be an allegation that this group of people which included Mahamba, Gordon Moswewu and Gordon Moswewu's brother, was a group who had come from under



Mangope, and that in the camps once the name Mangope or Mangope's people was mentioned, immediately those people would be under a suspicion that they were informers. How would you react to that kind of allegation?

MR MNISI: Can you rephrase your question please?

MR MAGAZA: The group of Mahamba and Moswewu's brother and some of those people who came from the former Bophuthatswana. If there was an allegation that they were always under suspicion if people came into exile, into the camps and it got to be known that they came from under Mangope, then that was the thing for them, they would have had it, they would be

under suspicion, they would be investigated and eventually they should be arrested and they would be maybe executed in the end.

MR MNISI: Most of this group, of the network, they came from Randfontein, Hamanskraal, but they had connections in Mafeking.

Either as students in Mafeking or relatives or whatever, but they had connections. Amongst their connections there were a sergeant, called Slow. That is his nickname. I don't remember his real name. Slow, Recruited them, because most of them were soccer players and he was an owner of a soccer club, around Mnsiwa in Mafeking. So he would interact with those guys, especially that they came mostly from Johannesburg. They knew what was happening in Soweto. So they were politically enlightened and therefore suitable candidates for recruitment.

There was a pattern that was followed by every person who recruits people. Now when you come from a certain environment. Let's say you come from Johannesburg, they will meet at John Foster. He follows a certain pattern of recruiting people. Obviously if you had a brush with him, I wouldn't just let your name pass. I would have tried to follow up on that case, but not by mere fact of coming from Johannesburg, then therefore you are an enemy agent, or a suspect because you came from Mangope. Therefore you are an enemy agent. That was not the criteria. But if your story, or information about you fits into that particular pattern. Therefore there was a need for a follow-up. Not necessarily that you are an agent. We were following up that case in order to make you security competent and along the way, you will prove us wrong, by proving yourself to be security incompetent. Once you become security incompetent that will be the basis for us to start investigating you and of course developing suspicions around you.

MR MAGAZA: Now, Gabriel Mpake Mswewu. What information was there that led to his detention and his isolation and eventually his execution?

MR MNISI: Gabriel Mswewu was the brother of Gordon Mswewu. He came with that group from Lusaka having been implicated by the group that tried to escape to Botswana.

MR MAGAZA: So he was one of those people?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR MAGAZA: Is there a possibility for one to establish as to who in Botswana exposed to this people. To whom in Botswana did they make this confession that they were working for the South African government.

MR MNISI: I don't remember that one, because the case was in Botswana, transferred from Botswana to the head quarters, and from head quarters in Lusaka, it was transferred to Angola and in Angola it was transferred to camp 32. So during this process obviously some details would be omitted. We would be giving the necessary details at camp 32 to continue with the case.

MR MAGAZA:

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At what time did Gordon Mswewu stop people from interviewing and interrogating Eskom Mahuleka? Was it after Eskom had implicated him Gordon Mswewu, or was it before that?

(End of tape 2, side A)

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MR MNISI: It was not Gordon Mswewu, it was Timothy Serimane.

MR MAGAZA: I thought you were saying it was Gordon Mswewu who tried to stop people to talking to Eskom, so that he could do it himself.

MR MNISI: It was Timothy Serimane. That was in 1980.

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Eskom was arrested in 1979 together with the group that brought the total collapse of command and control in Fazenda. They virtually took over the camp in Fazenda and they ran their affairs

in Fazenda, and some of them were on the verge of deserting the movement.

They sent their guys to Luanda, around the harbour. Some of the tactics I got from them. That they would read a newspaper that such and such a ship will leave Luanda and go to Walvis Bay or Durban or whatever. Then they know that if this ship is going to leave, we can simply jump into that ship and then we'll safely be in Walvis Bay or Durban.

This is what they were preparing for. Unfortunately some of them never had secrets. So as they were drinking, I don't know somewhere in Luanda, they decided to talk about that information which landed into our hands. By saying in our hands, I don't mean particularly my hand, but the securities department, which resulted into that soup, where most of them were arrested, including Eskom Maluleka.

Initially they were taken to camp 32 for bringing a total collapse of command and control in Fazenda. That was the initial reason that they were there. But as they were there, some of them came with their stories as to why they did that. Some would confess that they were enemy agents.

Eskom at that time said that he is an enemy agent. He wants to come and converse, but we should give him time to think about it. So we gave him time unaware that he has planned to escape. So they tried to disarm one comrade, they failed, and then they escaped.

We tried to pursue them. They knew the area better than us, until they were arrested by the comrades in Kibashu. Remember I said Kibashu was about five kilometres from camp 32. Immediately after they were arrested, the commander was informed, that there is a person like this one who has been arrested and immediately on his trail we arrived there. I was personally there. But the commander said no, I will not hand him over to you, I will bring him to the camp, so go back to the camp. So we went back to the camp and despite the fact that he had his own transport, he decided to bring him to camp 32 on foot, he never used any transport.

MR MAGAZA: Who was the commander?

MR MNISI: Timothy Serimane. So between camp 32 and camp 13, this is where he tortured him and where he threatened him that if he can expose further information, he is going to deal with him, because he's got powers.

So that was around 1980, I should say August. And when he was arrested, he was arrested around February 1981. So the time lapse between that time and the time when he was arrested. It was about six months. So we didn't arrest him on the basis of what was said by this fellow, but because of a combination of information that was collected.

MR MAGAZA: Would you have information as to the make up of the tribunal which tried these people and convicted them?

MR MNISI: No, I went to Germany in April 1981.

MR MAGAZA: That was before they were brought before the tribunal?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR MAGAZA: According to your knowledge of what happens after a tribunal has decided to, or has found people guilty and decided that they should be executed. According to your knowledge of that. Would it also include the sentence, would it be allowed for other people, after the people have been sentenced and they are waiting for execution, that they still be further tortured for whatever reason?

MR MNISI: Unfortunately I was, if I can use that word, mobile.

I never stayed in one camp. After leaving camp 32 in 1981 I started having contact with camp 32 in 1984. By that time I was not in camp 32, but I was regional head of investigation. So I wouldn't know the nitty gritty's of what happens, after a person was sentenced.

MR MAGAZA: I mean if you were to hear that those people were convicted, and they were waiting execution, but despite all that, they were tortured. Would you, what would be your comment in that type of thing.

MR MNISI: I think it wouldn't make a sense, by the mere fact that he has been sentenced, it means that you have exhausted your case against that particular individual. Therefore there is no need absolutely to revisit the case, unless you say you revisit the case then you ask from the leadership or from whoever the relevant

structure that we have further information against this particular individual. So we request that his case be reversed, so that we can deal with this aspect but it wouldn't make a sense to need to visit a case that is already been concluded and a person's sentenced.

MR MAGAZA: Ja, because there is such an allegation and it goes further to say that the conditions there were such that indeed they were sort of a, the person would say there was sadism there, those people would enjoy torturing these people even after they have been sentenced, not for the purpose of revisiting, not for the purpose of obtaining any information, just for the purpose of just punishing them even further. Would that have been allowed in a camp?

MR MNISI: It wouldn't ~~have been allowed.~~

MR MAGAZA: Would it have been condoned in any way?

MR MNISI: Yes it would have been condemned that kind of an action. It was our belief that if you keep a person in a lock-up facility, it takes an effort to you because a human being, if you beat up a person, if you assault a person, it takes an effort. There's no source of enjoyment there. If you beat your child, it doesn't come as easy as that. It takes an effort, your feelings, your whole psychological make-up, is affected in a way if you are forced to beat somebody, I think you also feel some torture and regrets. You are also tortured. So it was not an encouraged

practise, because somewhere along the lines, a person would feel the consequences of doing that.

MR MAGAZA: Now, the beating up of Doctor Limajwe by Gordon Mswewu. How did that take place, and why was it so?

MR MNISI: That was not in camp 32. This happened in camp 13 where he was a political commissar. At that time there was a briefing being done about the raid in Madola. So I went to camp 13 to go and collect a cassette about the briefing about what happened during Madola raid.

Upon my arrival there I found Sticks Mokoena and Gordon Mswewu. They were not with the camp commander, the late Livingstone Gaza. He's a comrade from the Western Cape. He was a coloured. They were not together with him but they were there drinking. Later on they tried to insinuate that Tacks was an enemy agent. The way he survived during that ambush. That was what they was trying to tell me. He's suspicious. Sticks was at that time responsible for security in Luanda and in the region. I tried to tell him that you'd better go to your principals in Luanda. Tell them about this case and then come back when you are sober. But otherwise, he told me that this is not my jurisdiction, and you have to be brutal against the enemy. It seems as if you are trying to treat him with kid gloves.

In any case, we'll continue with the case. So I went to the commander, and I asked for the cassette. On coming back, I found them with this guy, Tacks Sloslaimajwe. That time he was



bleeding, through the mouth and nose and grenade was still continuing with the assault. I therefore went to the commander and I asked him to stop that because they are not in a competent state to deal with that case, as they had taken some intoxicating stuff. The commander thanked me, and then I left. I don't know what happened there after.

MR MAGAZA: Where is Tacks now, to your knowledge?

MR MNISI: Due to the injuries that he sustained in that ambush, he was a person who was on and off sick, on and off sick. So I cannot say, whether he is still alive, or not, and where he is right now.

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MR MAGAZA: Where had he come from himself? Which area? Transvaal, Cape, Natal where?

MR MNISI: No, it sounds like he was from Transvaal. He was not fluent in Zulu, so he should have been somebody from, either Southern Sotho, or Northern Sotho.

MR MAGAZA: Just two more people I'll just ask about two more people who are not in this list. One is Ronny Masangu. His other name, his MK name was Msinga. Do you know the person?

MR MNISI: I think I know him. He's from Pretoria.

MR MAGAZA: May be. He was also detained there according to him.

MR MNISI: Ronny Masangu. Singer Ramsella. I met him in Mamelodi, during Easters. He told me that he is a lawyer or something like that. I know him, I met him in Mamelodi.

MR MAGAZA: Do you remember about his detention?

MR MNISI: No, he was never detained, unless may be he talks about. He was never in camp 32. According to my knowledge.

MR MAGAZA: You don't know about his detention at all?

MR MNISI: No.

MR MAGAZA: When he met you during the Easters, he did not mentioned any of this sort?

MR MNISI: No, it was Mnkululi Victor, Singer and another guy. I was with Victor, they were with Mnkululi. In a Honda Ballade. We were in a Venture. We were going to Entangala. They were going to Elardis Park. So they invited us to Elardis

Park, for some drinks, but as we tried to follow them, we missed each other, until we decided to go to Entangala.

MR MAGAZA: O.k., thank you.

MR KHOISAN: We won't be too much longer Mr. Mnisi but you will understand and appreciate, that part of the invitation to you to present information from your perspective to this commission relates to the fact that we have affidavits, we have statements and allegations, but at the end of the day we have to weigh up what the people are telling, and what you are telling us you see.

~~In respect of that, without belabouring the point, I want to refer~~

you to the affidavit if you can call it that of Gordon Mswewu. It would be in the annexure that begins with, it should have a, the front of that annexure should have the Mail and Guardian A.N.C. boss who tortured Seremani's brother. The position is here, if you

were referred to paragraph, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. In paragraph 12 it states.

This particular annexure which is the affidavit which begins: I Yosione, Gordon Mswewu generally known in the A.N.C. as Godfrey Mpuli, and particularly known amongst members of M.K. June 16, detachment as Grenade. Hereby wishes to give an account of the terrible plight that befell Timothy Chief Seremani, popularly known as Mahamba amongst both the A.N.C. in general and specifically M.K. It goes on through a whole lot of different things. In the paragraph to which I drew your attention.

It says: One night I was woken up by the torture officers of the A.N.C. namely Sizwe Mkhonto, Jomo George Zulu and others. I was taken to one of the cells in the middle of Quatro. In the cell there was a badly tortured and beaten person standing in the dark, in the back of the cell. A light was brought into the cell for us to see each other. I could hardly identify this figure. In the middle of my wanderings, Sizwe Mkhonto asked this figure to tell me what he had told them. "Give them the guns" that figure attacked, only then did I realise that this disfigured person was Chief Seremani. Before we could say anything, to each other, I was taken to another cell to receive my share of torture.

The next time chief Seremani and I saw each other when we as inmates were filling the water tank, it was on top of the middle cells at Quatro.

In respect of this particular. How do you respond to the allegation that,

1. You would together with Gabriel Mthembu, also known as Sizwe Mkhonto and others took this person, Gordon Mswewu into a cell and showed him a badly tortured figure?

2. In respect of him receiving his own share of what he calls, torture? Do you agree with that, or is it in your view a fabrication?

MR MNISI: You remember Mr. Khoisan that in the middle of June of 1981, I was already in the German Democratic Republic.

So that could have been a fabrication on his part. I would also like to bring to your attention the following that some of these guys you train with them. We know each other. Now when he wants to relate something then a name doesn't appear. He will always refer to the name of a person that he knows.

MR KHOISAN: Do I understand therefore that you deny having been involved in the torture, or do you dispute the inference, that is sought to be drawn, from the opening words in the statement which associates you with being a torture group, or torture team?

MR MNISI: ~~Yes, there was nothing like a torture team. There~~ was nothing like a group of people who were assigned a task to torture people. Besides I was doing mainly the chief of staff work and not interrogation work, but I did participate in some sessions of interrogation. But keep this in mind that most of my

occupation in camp 32 was that of a Chief of Staff and since it was a new camp, the crucial issue was that of defence.

We had to plan defence. We had to plan where to lay mines, where to lay single mines, where to dig trenches, how many guns we needed how many artillery guns, which shelter, what type of shelter was needed and which personnel was suitable and how many personnel was suitable to do that job. So that occupied most of my time in camp 32.

MR KHOISAN: The way we understand it and I'll put it to you and maybe you can confirm it. The way we understand it is that after all the allegations had been laid against one, Kenneth Mahamba also known as Timothy K. Seremani. The action that was taken against him to obtain this personality and bring him for review as it were to camp 32. He was taken by the national commissar himself, now general Msondo. Is that correct?

MR MNISI: What I can say is that it wouldn't have been easy for me to go to camp 13 or to any other security official and say to Timothy, come with me to camp 32, because he was my senior and it needed somebody senior to convince him to come to camp 32. I don't know who actually did it, but when he came to camp 32 there were senior MK cadres with him, although he knew that what was going to happen to him. We did not search him in camp 13, because of his seniority.

MR KHOISAN: So in difference to his rank, he was not obtained by anybody local at camp 32. He was obtained by a higher ranking person.

MR MNISI: By a higher ranking person.

MR KHOISAN: Can you maybe give us. Because you see the allegations here. There are two things. The way I understand what the family is putting on the table, is that they are not necessarily contesting the issue, although that is part of it, is not the issue of whether or not he may have been somebody working for another establishment, like the former government. But it's the issue of his treatment while in detention. The way I understand it is there

is this one incident that you'd mentioned about Seremani, where he actually tortured somebody who was actually being brought to Eskom Maluleka. He tortured somebody. But we also understand that there were issues relating to damage to property, sabotage of logistics, clothing, unauthorised minefields around the camp, etcetera, etcetera and that there were a wide range of complaints before the leadership acted against him. When he was brought and actually placed in detention. As the chief of staff at camp 32, did you instruct either a recording officer or any another person ~~involved in collection to obtain information from this person in~~ respect of allegations that had been lodged against him?

MR MNISI : There were a number of allegations against Mahamba. This unofficial mines, resulted in the death of one cadre. But at that time, we sort of viewed it as a mistake in the

process of carrying out your duties. We had the same problem in camp 32 when he was the officer in charge of camp 32, but not in camp 32(?), because we were going to get logistics from camp 13. He would go to Luanda, fetch logistics and then distribute it between 13 and 32. He would starve us. He wouldn't give us transport, he wouldn't give us generators. There was so many things that he did against us. But we never held a grudge against him. We decided to do our own things.

We sacrificed some of our clothes. We sort of buttered a generator for clothes with the local peasants which didn't know what to do with that generator. We brought it into the camp. We exchanged our clothes for livestock, pigs, goats, poultry, because of that shortage of logistics in the camp.

It's only and only after he was implicated in Lusaka that we started recalling all those things. We started putting into effect that information that we had previously against him. Although we didn't act against him initially, but we still kept that information, because we believed that you can't destroy information, irrespective whether it says positive or negative about you. You don't destroy information, until after a certain period. I wouldn't like to be held responsible for destroying information saying that acts was involved in this. I should be accountable to that information in the next five or six years. But maybe after a certain period, then that information can be destroyed. It was put into effect after he was implicated.

The arrest of this group let me say, by saying this, I'm putting my head on the block. It was per chance it was the way the A.N.C. trusted them, whatever allegation that came, it was dismissed. There were so many allegations, weapons get lost, this will be done, but, we had trust in them. It was only that incident of Botswana that led the ANC to act against them. Had it not been of that situation, I don't know what we could be saying today. If they were been alive, they would have been the generals of the army today if they continued with their activities maybe the A.N.C. wouldn't have survived because they were moving up the ladder. They were being promoted. Mahamba was supposed to be a regional commander in a foreseeable future.

Maybe by 81 he would have been appointed as the regional commander. Elliot Mazibuko was about to be appointed in the executive of SACTU. Things were moving faster for them. It was a blessing in disguise that the situation in Botswana happened, and they were implicated.

MR KHOISAN: And the sub text of it, or let me put it another way because what I do detect and I appreciate the fact that you addressed the issue very delicately and because of your relationship with the organisation, which you serve. But I do detect, and I must proceed with it that somebody in a responsible position could have acted to pre-empt certain catastrophes. I may be wrong, but I'm reading it as a sub text of what you're saying.



MR MNISI: Somebody in the leadership's position could have acted to prevent a catastrophe, a looming catastrophe.

MR KHOISAN: What I'm saying is that you informed us Mr. Mnisi that you have people who were rising like rising styles in the organisation, and left to their own devices and unchecked. They could possibly today be your commander possibly serve in a senior position in this country's military. Protecting the very constitution which they had fought against by their acting as fifth columns for another institution. So do I read you correctly. Let me put it this way. Would that have been a sore point between the security and intelligence personnel on the ground and the security

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and intelligence personnel at command level about their refusal to take these allegations seriously?

MR MNISI: Most of the allegations were dismissed at the ground level, when Eskom confessed and implicated Mahamba.

We dismissed that, we didn't wait for the leadership or senior security personnel to come and tell us that there's no substance in this. We dismissed it at that level. However we sent reports to seniors, by the way, maybe we conditioned the minds of the seniors by saying so and so is saying this, but we don't believe this because of this. So it wouldn't have been somebody in the

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leadership protecting him. It was from grassroots level right to the top.

By the way he was an impressive soldier, due to the fact that unlike some of us, he had training here internally.

MR KHOISAN: And just on the question of. So you were there when he was arrested and detained?

MR MNISI : Like I said that he was brought to camp 32 by senior officials. Let me say he was brought under pretext in camp 32. That's when we arrested him in camp 32 because he was already there.

MR KHOISAN: He was brought under pretext of destroying that ambulance, or driving an ambulance without?

MR MNISI : No I think the pretext if my memory still serve me, was that we are going to have a meeting in camp 32, so come with us.

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MR KHOISAN: Oh! So he was obtained unofficially and then incarcerated as a matter of procedure and cause. So he had no idea of what was coming, or what was looming?

MR MNISI : He had no idea.

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MR KHOISAN: Just to put a couple of, so you're saying that you, now this Gordon Mswewu, you can say emphatically you did not torture this chap, you didn't beat him, you didn't interrogate him, put him through anything that could be in any way construed as a gross abuse of his human rights. Can you say that?

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MR MNISI : ~~I did take part in his interrogation. But let me say~~ that at that time the leadership was around. One wouldn't like to do such a thing in the presence of the leadership because they never gave us the mandate to do those exercises. So we wouldn't have done torture or whatever in the presence of the leadership

and by the time the leadership left, I left with them, going to Luanda and in Luanda, I had to go for an interview in the embassy of the German democratic Republic and take photos, prepare documents for my departure. So at that time the leadership was there. So we wouldn't have done such a thing in their presence.

MR KHOISAN: So the principal was at the school, the principal was in the class. So there wouldn't be any undue situation. Alright no, I mean I'm finished. I just wanted to clarify with you, and I think, to a large degree I think I have been able to obtain the information that we need. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I would just like to ask you if you knew Mr Piliso whilst you were in Angola and what you thought of him as a person, especially in the light of claims of him participating in torture. In fact he himself admitted to this Koheja commission that he participating in the beating of people in the soles of their feet because he wanted information at any cost. So there's no question of beating having come from him, that he justified the use of torture, and especially that form of torture in order to extract information from people and secondly the other person I would you to state your views about is Mr. General Masondo, especially with regards to the abuse of women. If you knew anything in that regard as far as he was concerned?

(End of tape 2 - side B)

MR MNISI: Commissioner Ntsebeza I knew both, comrade Zwandile Piliso and General Andrew Masondo. Both of them

were my leaders. Mr. Piliso was the head of National security and intelligence which included all the places where A.N.C. personnel was found, not particularly in Angola.

Some of the allegations would have come from personnel placed in Tanzania, Zimbabwe or Zambia or maybe in Malantse south of Angola or. I don't remember him taking part in beatings suspects. As to Mr. Masondo, unfortunately wherever I went to we generally use to say, this place we called the places No woman, no cry, because when I was in Pangu, unfortunately there were no women. It was only when it was turned into a training centre that there were women and by then I was in camp 32.

When I went to Gasito there were no women. It was only later that women came in. So I couldn't have been in a place together with him where there were women and therefore I can't answer that question.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it also your observation that the ratio of women, there were women was, I think you put it 1022 women and he referred rather to the offence of the women (indistinct) Piliso had that day of the situation being one that was akin to the law of supply and demand, and therefore explained why there were rapes, and there was abuse of women because where you have 22 women and over 1000 men. The law of supply and demand as you saw it dictated that people would want to take for themselves what is available. Was it your observation also that

those were the sort of ratios and would you agree with this sort of law of supply and demand attitude?

MR MNISI: When I was training we were about seven hundred and the Cuban instructors and the security personnel of the Cubans, would have been about 8 to 900. This I remember clearly. There were 32 women and in my company, that is company 4 we had 3 women.

CHAIRPERSON: How many are there in a company?

MR MNISI: Ordinarily in a company about 150. So there were 3 women. The other one fell pregnant during the course of training. So she was excused. We were left with two.

There were instructors. There were Cubans who would provide incentives and who were trained, who knew the world better than us. So the women wouldn't concern themselves a lot about us, because we knew nothing. We would group ourselves into an anti female factions. There were so many anti female factions. There was a one that even if we are training, may be doing physical training and she falls down here, we wouldn't help her, because she doesn't share what she has with you, she shares it with somebody. So that somebody will come and help her.

~~There were those who were liberal who would assist her, take~~  
her up to a certain point and leave her there. So there were so many attitudes. Maybe there were those who believed in the law of supply and demand. But I was in the faction that was against women at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it because you were not getting any favours from the women or what informed your attitude?

MR MNISI: Yes, besides not getting any favours. Generally I'm what is called in Sesotho eshmane. So even if I was going to get favours, I wouldn't have known how to solicit those favours out of the women.

CHAIRPERSON: That's a very frank and candid (indistinct), I must say. Well that seems to bring us to the end of these proceedings and it remains for me to thank you Mr. Mnisi and Mr. Kupedi or your lawyer for having found the time in view of your commitments which were known to us. But non the less you found it necessary to come and feel this yawning gap.

The rights of individuals and also encompass the right of a person to be able to give their own side of the story as you are aware. We have been sitting with allegations and affidavits which have been implicating you in particular and those were called before you in acts which amount in terms of the Act to gross violations of human rights.

It has been our understanding secondly from General Masondo that in all the commissions that have heard evidence in ~~relation to the goings-on in Angola and in the various camps~~ there. He himself in spite of being implicated to the extent that he was had never been given an opportunity to be heard. I would not know if this is the same thing about you, but I would assume that it is so.

I found that very remarkable and which is why as he explained it. He had taken the opportunity to come and take the first opportunity since all of these things happened and were talked about to give his own side of the story.

When it appeared that the SANDF note their point, he know who this Zulu is. We were quite afraid that we may never get to hear your story, and we might sit with an affidavit that purports to implicate you from the various people Gordon Mswewu, and others. Without you having had an opportunity to say your side of the story. As an information gathering exercise the investigative unit is going to obviously look at all the evidence and make available to the human rights violations committee. The sum total of all the information gathered in connection therewith and we would have been poorer in our endeavours to get information if you had not come. So we welcome you. As far as I'm concerned this brings to the end of not only these proceedings but this chapter relevant to abuses in exile by the A.N.C. in particular in Angola. We thank you very much.

HEARING ADJOURNS