

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONSECTION 29 HEARING

CHAIRPERSON: This is a hearing in terms of s 29 of the Act. It is going to be held in camera. These proceedings are recorded and we will ask you to either take the oath or the affirmation.

Before we begin, could I ask you to place your full names on record, please. Mr Williamson?

MR WILLIAMSON: Craig Michael Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any objection to taking the oath?

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you swear that the evidence you will give before the Commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing else but the truth?

MR WILLIAMSON: So help me God.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Could I ask your legal representatives to place themselves under oath.

COUNSEL: My name is...(inaudible) of the firm Allan Levin and Associates, Johannesburg. I am assisted by Mr Robert Levin of the same firm.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

COUNSEL: Before we start, Madam Commissioner, I would call your attention, not for any frivolous reasons but for the sake of good form and good order, to two particular issues. The one is to

s 29(2) of the Act. I am sure that you are familiar with that section and its wording. One of the requirements of that section is that the notice referred to in 29(1) of the Act, that is for want of other words, the subpoena, shall be signed by a Commissioner, served by a member of staff, and shall specify the reason why the article is to be produced or the evidence is to be given.

Now I have had an opportunity - although if you will look at the notice under s 29 of the Act which is provided for - and I have had a look at Annexure A. I do not appear to have been able to identify any specification of the reason why the evidence is to be given. If, of course, you are able to assist me, I will gladly appreciate that.

I would submit to you that at face value this subpoena does not comply with s 29(2) of the Act, but I am very happy to be corrected in that particular regard.

CHAIRPERSON: So your primary reason for the point that you are taking is that the subpoena does not specify the reason why this evidence is to be taken?

COUNSEL: Yes. What I would ask you to appreciate, as well as Mrand Mr Daniels, is that we have in the past cooperated extensively and are happy to cooperate but we cannot be said to have ignored possible lacuni in the documents summoning us to appear here, because this might render nullity the proceedings here. It might perhaps do away with the in camera situation

which we are being met with and which we appreciate in terms of the Act. And if we are going to deal on the matter of strict form, then my submission as a legal representative is that strict form must apply throughout. I am very happy to comply with every one of the regulations and to advise my client to do so but then we must have reciprocal situation. That is the first of the issues which I would commend for your attention.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to give me the second?

COUNSEL: Certainly. We were advised - and, of course, I must ask you, Madam Commissioner, to look at this matter and to deal with it on the basis that, as has been our custom, we have spent a really substantial period of time with your investigators, Mr Chaskalson, for numerous days; Mr....., Mrs Pollicut - all on an informal basis, and have given all of the information as again being requested of this. This was made clear in the letter of 30th January 1998 addressed to Mr Kjellberg, and one of the things that was recorded in such letter to him was his advices that the Committee that is presiding here today would be your goodself, himself, Mr Daniel and another party whose name was not disclosed. In other words, that there were going to be four Commissioners.

Now, I only see three parties and I am interested to know who the fourth party is or was designated to be in attendance here and who is not in attendance. That is the second issue.

The third issue is, you, of course, is a Commissioner; Mr Daniel is a Commissioner....or is a Committee member.

CHAIRPERSON: No, may I correct you. If you read the Act correctly you will notice that this is a hearing. It is really an investigation hearing for the purposes of gathering information. It is usually chaired by a commissioner and other commissioners or committee members may be present, but the proceedings itself, the questionings, are actually handled by our staff in our investigation and research unit. Mr Daniel is a member of our research department; Mr Kjellberg is the head of our regional investigation unit in Gauteng. The additional person that should have been here, would have been from the national investigation unit. Up until yesterday was I informed that Mr Wilson Magadla, the head of the national investigation unit, would be present during these proceedings. He has not actually arrived, but because there was uncertainty about which member of the national unit it would be, that is why the fourth name remained blank.

COUNSEL: I see. So, as I understand it then, the purpose of today's discussion will be to gain information?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

COUNSEL: May I ask why this was not done in the previous format where we met informally - and Mr Kjellberg will

corroborate what I am saying when I state that we cooperated in every way and at great length.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

COUNSEL: The problem that my client has and which my client has had all along is that he is using the services of attorneys, to which he is entitled, but he is being asked say for a niggardly sum which is allowed, to foot the costs himself. Now I can understand if there was new ground to be traversed that this could be dealt with in this manner, but the majority of the issues raised are not new matter; they have been dealt with fully with Mr Chaskalson, with Mr Kjellberg and with Mrs Podecat. Granted, there are a few questions which are not being dealt with, particularly in regard to the late Mr Biko, which our knowledge is virtually minimal, but to actually, Madam Commissioner, have to a it were re-invent the wheel on a plethora of questions with which we have dealt with at length, is, with great respect, unnecessary, constitutes undue hardship to my client, not only financially by way of a direct outlay of monies to legal advisers but indirectly, because he is being asked to give up three days of his business time when he could be earning a living, towhat he requires to support his family.

Now, we have set aside three days but with the questions that constitute new matter, we hardly, with respect, believe that we will be here for more than a morning.

But, having said that, that is my next issue that I have outlined. The final issue is: these proceedings are held in camera; what, however, is the fate of the typed transcript of the record once the tapes have been transcribed? Where do these transcripts go and under whose control do these transcripts remain so that we are absolutely sure in our own minds, because of the sensitivity of the entire situation, that the in camera rule is fully applicable?

CHAIRPERSON: Is that your final point?

COUNSEL: Those are my submissions to you. As I say, not in any way intended to be capricious, but being matters of real importance to the client whom I represent.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to deal with the first point later on because I actually want to go through the subpoena myself to deal with the point that you have taken. But in regard to the substance of what you have said, may I say that it has always been intended that these proceedings should be of an informal nature. But what has been brought to my attention by Mr Kjellberg is that in a sense you would be prejudiced - your client would be prejudiced by the informal nature of the proceedings because if you are not subpoenaed to appear before a committee of the Commission then the legal assistance rule does not kick in, and I was in fact brought ...it was brought to my attention that your client's legal expenses incurred during the previous informal

consultations between yourselves had been such where your client was sharing information. But because it was not protected by the provisions of the Act you would not be able to apply to the State for legal assistance and to have that paid by them, and in order to ensure that your client was able to avail himself of that assistance I agreed to issue the subpoena. Because technically that is when people are entitled when they are subpoenaed to appear before any committee of the Commission either a public hearing or an in camera hearing before any of the committees, it is at that stage that you are entitled to legal representation and in terms of the provisions of the arrangement that we have between ourselves and the Minister of Justice, if you are a former member of either the Police, the military or any of the armed forces you are entitled to be assisted in terms of the budget from the respective department. If you, however, are on the other side either you are an ex MK member or an ordinary civilian, then of course you go on to the lesser rate which is the legal aid budget which the Commission in fact provides for. So I think we need to clear up front that the reason the subpoena was issued was not so as to bring your client under compulsion to appear before this Committee; it is purely in order to assist so that he could be rendered proper legal assistance, and so that you could apply properly to the State for that to happen. So I need to put just that up there.

COUNSEL: May I deal briefly so that we don't lose the context of the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

COUNSEL: The legal assistance that is offered is really derisory having regard to the amount of work and to the costs involved suggest an appearance fee of I think it is R350 a day, something of that nature, and a very small amount per hour is really not going to assist, but none of this was ever brought to our attention. We said and we adopted the view, if you want us we are prepared to sit with you, pay for our legal expenses. We were met with a 'no' from Mr Shadrack.

Now, certainly at no stage was I advised that you are therefore issuing a subpoena so that you can apply for the legal assistance, and in any event it is drawn to my attention that the SAPS and the SA Defence Force have contractual obligations to cover all the costs arising from duties incurred here. So that obligation is what we would rely on rather than the budgeted amount. But obviously we believed that in the past we had rendered an assistance to Mr Kjellberg et al and that we wished to be paid for that assistance.

We were not told that we were being brought here, as it were, as a favour to us so that we could apply for a really niggardly amount of an allowance which does not begin to cut my client's legal costs. But I have noted what you say and I note that the

intention expressed by you now which has never been expressed to us, is one that is made bona fide, and I thank you for that gesture.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I am not going to really debate the issue at great length. Suffice it to say that, as I have explained, unfortunately the amount is niggardly by any professional legal service standard, but that is the amount which Justice is actually set aside. I think it is an hourly rate of R350 per hour and, of course, an appearance fee of R2 000 per day. Let me assure you that the amount on the other side in terms of the Commission's own budget is actually even more niggardly, so quite frankly, the fact that your client was in the employ of the SAP is certainly an advantage. But let me just put that on the table that it is certainly for that reason that we issued a formal subpoena.

COUNSEL: I accept your bona fides, but that was not ever conveyed to me and as to my client's advantages of having been in the service of the SAP, I'm not going to.....

CHAIRPERSON: In regard to points two and three that you have raised, the question of why your client is being asked to address a number of these issues again: I think it is fair to place on record that your client certainly has a considerable amount of information. He possesses knowledge about certain incidents which is certainly germane to a great deal of the Commission's work. You will appreciate also that as we deal with more and

more amnesty information and applications, and as more of the research information becomes available, the nature of the questions we want to direct to your client often become much more detailed and directed at a certain point. So I would say that it is for that reason that we have asked your client again to answer questions on specific issues, because the information that is required is...obviously we are going to ask him to be more particular about some of his answers. He can of course at any stage during the proceedings object to the line of questioning and I will consider it and make a ruling. There are new matters that have been traversed, but quite frankly, as we begin to learn more about the operations that have taken place, it becomes necessary to check more things with your clients.

It is very difficult for me to be more specific than that, but if your client at any stage does feel that particular issue has been traversed and that no new information is to be gained, then certainly you can object to it.

COUNSEL: Madam Commissioner, I certainly, in my capacity as legal adviser, will not allow my client to be twice traduced on matters where he has already given answers, not only given answers but supplied voluminous documentation to your investigating members and been totally cooperative, and his version is certainly not going to change in any way. Because these issues were well researched by my client when the

supporting documentation was prepared for handing over to the representatives, and he cannot answer beyond what he has answered now. If there are issues which require to be dealt with arising from his answers and arising from information which the investigating body has at its disposal, then I believe my client should be advised in advance as to when this new information came into existence and why that particular aspect was not asked at the time that my client gave over all this information.

Which brings me to a final point, and that is, you spoke of amnesty applications. I have written, in vain I might say, a number of letters wanting to know when my client's amnesty application is going to be heard and not received any answer. I have also, Madam Commissioner, dealt with the problems that arise from s 20 of the Act, I believe it is in regard to amnesty as such. I have written to Mr Hanief Valli; I have written to Mr Justice Moll, Dr Borraine, Archbishop Tutu, seeking some answer to the amnesty issue. It is all very well that my client seeks amnesty but how does that amnesty affect him in regard to allegations of actions which took place outside of the borders of the Republic of South Africa? Because, let us assume my client is granted amnesty whenever that matter is heard, how good is that amnesty outside of the Republic? The mere fact that I have not received any meaningful answers save to say that the matter is being addressed, seems to fortify, with respect, my view that

the amnesty offered certainly cannot assist my client if he was sitting in terminal 4 at Heathrow Airport and he was detained for an offence being investigated in London or in Stockholm or anywhere else. That is just another issue which, with respect, I cast into the mix because it is highly relevant in my submission.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Let me deal with point number four which you have raised. As you have said, you would like to know what the fate of the typed transcript is.

COUNSEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The transcript remains the possession of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is certainly made available to you; it is made available to all the committees of the Commission. One of the issues that we do raise is the question of when does the information contained become public. That of course is subject to a special resolution of the Commission. It would need to take a formal position, pass a resolution which would give effect to that and then the information is made public. You of course are notified before that time, so if your client has any objections to any of the information being made public then you certainly can address us on that issue. All documentation of the Truth Commission remains under the control and possession of the Commission; eventually all our matters pass on to the State archives. We are in discussion with them at present in terms of what the kind of

information is that will be made accessible immediately and what will remain covered in terms of the Archives Act. So I cannot fully assure you that at the end of the life of the Commission the documentation will not be made public. It is a matter which is transient at this point.

COUNSEL: Well this is what precisely we fear. We believe that under the guise of in camera we will give you information - when I say 'you' I speak of the Commission - and that a resolution, as you mentioned, may well be passed and we are rendered remediless save for a token objection or alternatively a further enormous cost of applying to court for an interdict. I believe that this is an issue which should be clarified before my client and numerous other people for whom I have no brief are called upon and are perhaps lulled into a sense of safety on the basis that this is being held in camera when in truth and in fact it is evident that this litigation could arise where the statement 'being held in camera' amounts to nothing more than paying lip service to the terms that appear in the Act. I say this with no disrespect, but I say it being alive to the pitfalls of a witness under these circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: I agree absolutely. I can't give you the assurance that the evidence your client is going to give here is going to remain secret. I think you know that the business of the Truth Commission is the gathering of information so that we can

get closer to the truth. The provisions of the Act are quite clear.

The nature of these proceedings is that they are being held in a sense behind closed doors. They are, however, recorded and transcripts are made of that recording. You get a copy of it, I keep a copy, but it certainly passes to other committees within the Commission. Should we decide at some stage that some of that information is made public, unfortunately that is a decision that clearly will be determined by our needs. Your client will simply be given an opportunity to address us on some of those aspects. So I am not going to pretend that these proceedings are anything else but an attempt to get information. I need to place that on the table.

Let me say that in regard to the final point you have raised, which is the question of the validity of the amnesties outside of this country, I think you will know as well as I do that there is no clear position on this. Technically, in terms of international criminal law someone should not be punishable for an offence for which they cannot be punished in their own state. Obviously, once one has received amnesty that would automatically mean that they should not be able to be tried in any country outside of South Africa. But there is a difference of opinion on this matter which is complicated further by, I think, the case that took place last year relating to the extradition of people to Namibia, which means that the law is quite muddy around that point. So while

one can say absolutely that the amnesties are valid here, it is a matter of contestation as to whether it remains outside of the borders.

COUNSEL: Do you refer there to what I would call the Lobotsky matter?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. What I do know is that the ministry is in discussion with justice departments around the world, particularly the governments of England, France and Sweden because those are countries where perhaps your client obviously would have a major interest. There is also the question of cross-border raids. We are in discussion with African countries as well. It is not a clear issue and I am not going to pretend that I can give you that assurance. Mr Valli, our legal officer, is here; he has arrived for another meeting, and I am sure he can address you quite adequately on the legal position, but you know it as well as I do.

COUNSEL: To date I have not been assisted at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but we can certainly give you some of the documentation relating to opinions that have been prepared for us, and I think by the Justice ministry. I will try and get that to you.

COUNSEL: I would very much appreciate that.

CHAIRPERSON: You have raised an issue, the first point, which I will certainly need to look at. There is a second issue about

whether we are going to be traversing new matter. I am going to need to consult with the investigation unit. But before I do ...I would prefer...As I said, we really wanted this to be an informal consultation, but we certainly wanted to afford you the protection of the Act in the sense that your client would be able to obtain legal assistance. Now, if your client is willing to, we are willing to let the proceedings stand under this section of the Act. But it certainly could still be of an informal nature where I remove myself from the proceedings, the investigators have access to your client, you remain in attendance. That is up to you.

I know that the amount that the Act makes provision for is niggardly, but nonetheless it is there and your client can avail himself of that. You can take instructions from your client in the meantime on that. I would much more prefer it to be of an informal nature where I'm only called in perhaps to assist in terms of making rulings where you object to a particular line of questioning. That would certainly be our preference. But you can take that up with your client while I consult with the members of this unit.

COUNSEL: I would be indebted if you could then have a short adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

COUNSEL: Thank you very much.

PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED

.....

UPON RESUMPTION

COUNSEL: I am sorry, Madam Commissioner, I was under a misunderstanding. - I thought you would come back and let us know when you are ready.

CHAIRPERSON: I have had an opportunity to talk to the people who handled the subpoena; I have also checked the subpoena itself, and if you go to page 2 of the subpoena, the jurisdictional point is dealt with in the second paragraph.

COUNSEL: By jurisdictional point you mean the purpose?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. It says there that -

"you are required to give evidence and to answer questions relating to the above, and to produce such articles relating thereto as may be in your possession for the following reasons:

- (i) the investigative unit of the Commission is in terms of the provisions of ss 28 and 29 of the Act conducting investigations into the aforementioned matter;
- (ii) the Commission is of the opinion that you possess information in relation to the abovementioned matter which it requires in order to fulfil its obligations as set out in the Act."

I think that is sufficient reason for your client to be subpoenaed.

COUNSEL: But what are 'the aforementioned matters'?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. It should have been 'in respect of the annexure now the aforementioned matter'.

COUNSEL: Well, you see, that is why, in my submission, the subpoena is really inadequately prepared, inadequately drawn, and constitutes a nullity save insofar as my client might withdraw an objection to the subpoena in its present form, which I will advise you shortly.

CHAIRPERSON: Right. In terms of the question you asked about why your client needs to be asked these questions; why matters need to be traversed again: I have been advised by the members of this unit that your client was cooperative and did assist them in terms of the media hearing. It is quite true that he was interviewed by Jerome Chaskalson, a member of the national unit, but I believe that when our client's assistance was sought at the media hearing, he did say that he would cooperate fully in respect of knowledge he possessed in terms of matters of a general nature. It is for that reason that this interview was sought.

We don't in any way want to suggest that your client has not been cooperative. I think we do appreciate the assistance that he has rendered. They will endeavour not to traverse matters which have been raised, but they have had a look at the transcript of the interview your client had, or the notes rather. I am not

going to use the word 'transcript'. The interview was not recorded and they do want to obtain further detail from him in respect of some of the matters that have been raised by Jerome.

I have looked at the issue which I think...as I suggested, I think there probably is quite a difference of opinion. The question of the evidence that we obtained from this hearing: You know, the Act is quite specific in the sense that derivative evidence obtained in this way cannot be used in a criminal matter against him. The question of course which probably concerns your client is not whether it can be used here but whether it can be used outside the borders of this country. The Act is quite clear that we will not be ...the Commission cannot be compelled by any party outside of these borders or even inside to pass on the information. So, yes, whilst your client may be picked up while he is at terminal 3 in London and then technically it would become a question of interpretation of the law, but they cannot use information obtained by the Truth Commission in any action against him. That I can give you an assurance on.

COUNSEL: Why do you say that, with great respect. You dealt with two issues: The Truth Commission cannot be compelled to furnish information; what if there is no compulsion at all? What happens - and I raise this only because it is the most obvious issue to raise, and without any way seeking to affect personalities or to introduce personalities - what happens if

there is no compulsion at all? Mr Kjellberg goes back to Sweden, he has with him a copy of this evidence and he passes it on to his authorities as any good citizen of Sweden or the United Kingdom or Botswana or anywhere else might do. Then there is no compulsion. It is an act which is done very simply.

CHAIRPERSON: Every person who is employed by the Commission takes an oath of confidentiality to the Commission. You can be quite sure that information that is obtained by the Commission remains the property of the Commission. If Mr Kjellberg should endeavour to do that, for want of an example, there certainly is provision in terms of the Act as well as in terms of the oath that he takes when he performs this kind of work, that he will be prosecuted. I know that is not much of an assurance but that is the best I can give at this stage.

COUNSEL: Well, it may happen that the Swedish government, for argument's sake, might then give him amnesty so he could not be extradited.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levin, the examples are endless. The one thing we have a problem with in any case is the leaking of information. I can only tell you what the provisions of the Act say, and, save to say that we have chased a lot of stuff back to the sources, the Commission has in instances where it has found that information has been leaked by staff members, they have

sought to prosecute those people. Beyond that assurance I can't tell you very much more.

Having dealt with all your points in limine that you have raised this morning, I wonder if I can get some feedback from you on the proposal that I did put on the table before we actually left?

COUNSEL: As far as we are concerned, conditional upon the limiting of the questions to issues which were not dealt with before, we are happy to deal with this matter on an informal basis and to pursue our rights for recovery of legal fees from sources either than that within the budget mentioned by you. We are quite happy to get back to the point that I addressed in my letters, namely that information sought cannot occupy more than several hours. We will be of assistance in regard to the remark interpreted to my client at the media hearing, that he would assist in regard to general issues. I am not so sure that was in fact the gravamen of his assurance. What he said was, he would continue to render such assistance as might be necessary. On general issues he can't assist because it would have no probative effect or value whatsoever. It would be purely.....

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. May I also say that we are of course appreciative of your client's efforts. As you know, these difficulties do exist, particularly in relation to operations which

took place out of this country. So we certainly value the fact that your client is willing to assist.

In terms of your pursuing the question of the payment of your fees, where we can be of assistance please address me in that regard and I will see whether it is within the nature of my function to assist you on that matter. So if I can be of assistance, let me know.

COUNSEL: Well, what we would need would be a certificate or a letter from the Commission that they spent so much time with us on such a day and such a day, informally but dealing with matters relating to the affairs of the Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me have the particulars and I will see to the letter.

COUNSEL: I am indebted to you for that.

CHAIRPERSON: I am grateful that you have agreed to pursue the matter informally. I have spoken to the members of my unit, asking them to refrain from traversing a matter which has been attended to before, but I would equally be grateful if your client could see his way in to assisting them with greater detail because I think it is the detail that they are pursuing as well as the new matters that they intend traversing.

I would also ask that if your client objects to answering any question, that both you and them note that so that we can pursue that matter further.

Thank you. I am going to excuse myself.

COUNSEL: May I, at the risk of perhaps incurring some displeasure, deal with one issue which has not yet been meaningfully responded to, and that is, when is my client's amnesty hearing going to take place? We made amnesty applications in four different categories and, of course, in the amnesty applications per se when viva voce evidence is being led there may be a lot of fleshing out of what I might call the bare bones to make a full preparation of the issues which we believe should be fleshed out as it were. Speaking entirely from selfish motives now, I have a terrible programme and I would like to be in a position not only for my client's sake but for the sake of the Commission to be able to devote sufficient time to preparing him for his amnesty application. This is why I would like to know (a) when it is intended to hold that particular hearing and (b) whether this can be done in order to.....if at all possible arrive at an accord as to dates.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me start off by saying that I would be as grateful as you would be if I could tell you when this amnesty application is to be set down. At the last Commission meeting the question was raised about whether the Amnesty Committee would in fact complete its work by 31 July. I think we have conceded, certainly in the Commission, that there is no likelihood that they will complete their work either this year, and

I quite frankly think even next year. So I am not able to tell you with any degree of certainty that it is going to be held before July or after. What I can certainly endeavour to do is to pass on to Martin Coetzee, the secretary of the Amnesty Committee, that he should consult with you in regard to arranging dates and if he has any kind of scheduled plan, that he should acquaint you with that if your client is going to come up in that schedule. You obviously will be given each provision within their own procedures for you to be given sufficient time to prepare. Quite frankly, I cannot with any degree of certainty be more factual than I am at present.

It has been a great source of displeasure to the Commission that the one committee which the Commission has had very little control over has been the Amnesty Committee, and that is because of the nature of proceedings because of the kind of issues that are at risk. Hearings often take a lot longer than they should. Because of the presence of many attorneys, attorneys appearing for both amnesty applicants and of course the vast number of victims it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty how long those proceedings are actually going to take. That is a factor in the reason for the delay.

Also, the Amnesty Committee has waited very patiently for government to enlarge the numbers of the Amnesty Committee, and to date they are still waiting for the Justice ministry to give

them the names of the remaining 8 members. Once they have that in hand then probably you can have a simultaneous sitting of three different committees. But right now you have a committee preparing applications in chamber and one more that is actually hearing matters. To my knowledge, they have not actually heard any new matters this year. But I will pass that on to Martin and see if we can get you some kind of response.

COUNSEL: I would appreciate that. There seems to be a simple solution which I have heard before and that is, kill all the lawyers.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, the Commission might well come out with that recommendation; they certainly plagued these proceedings. Thank you very much, Mr Levin. If I can be of assistance, please pass that on to the members of my unit. I will excuse myself now.

COUNSEL: Thank you. I take it we are off record?

CHAIRPERSON: We are off record in the sense that I think we are going to record the hearing, but that is to, I think, make sure that there is no misunderstanding between the parties. But I think you can rest assured that we can talk about how we handle the transcripts of this matter.

COUNSEL: As long as the transcript is given to us to study...

CHAIRPERSON: Absolutely.

COUNSEL: We don't have a problem, it would be, the same as your notes have been dealt with.

CHAIRPERSON: Absolutely, only more accurate. Thank you.

(MS YASMIN SOOKA IS EXCUSED)

.....
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Williamson, welcome. You have been given a set of questions; it has been provided quite a long time ago. I want to start to ask you, have you prepared any written submission, any written affidavit for this hearing?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I just have some documents.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just explain? We are quite aware that you have discussed some of the issues raised in this document. We are aware that you have discussed some of the issues raised; some of the questions have been answered. We have a copy of the notes provided by Mr Jerome Chaskalson, and I would like to see this more like a framework for our discussions and in some respects we would like to go into more details than we understand Jerome Chaskalson did with you. In his notes that we have been provided with, he has given a description of your career within the security branch and defence force as well, but I would like to go back to...just to get an understanding also about the structures within the Police and the security forces in South Africa in the early 70's.

You were recruited into...According to the notes I have you were approached by Lt Roy Brand at the security branch and then later introduced to Mr Jan Coetzee and apparently recruited into S4. Can you give us a description of how the structure worked and what was S4, and what was the relation between the security branch and the public intelligence at that time?

MR WILLIAMSON: You've got to understand that from the time I was recruited I was an ordinary uniform policeman. I knew that the security branch existed but, if I'm not wrong, my rank was sergeant, and I did not really at that time know about structures.

So what I am telling you is what I gleaned from being involved, because from that time, from 1972 right up until 1980 I wasn't actually involved in the office or its structures or knew how it worked; I was under cover.

As far as I understood, there was an organisation called Republican Intelligence. This organisation was superseded, which was run basically by the Police and was the intelligence arm of the security branch. This was then superseded approximately in 1969 by the Bureau of State Security, and many police officers, Genl Van den Berg and many other police officers who had been involved in Repen, what was called RI, went across to form the Bureau. Many of them...they had up until that time served in embassies abroad under cover in the

normal secret service type of capacity, but they were police officers.

So there was some, and there always is and I suppose always will be friction between the different arms of the intelligence community, and I understood that there was a feeling in the Police amongst certain people that while the division of work had been made, the Bureau of State Security would be a non-executive arm, would be an intelligence gathering arm and that the security branch would form more or less like on the British model then just the special branch function, the legal function like the security service, MI5, and the special branch work in the UK. There was a feeling within the Police that the security branch itself should still have some intelligence capability, and that is how Section 4 came about. But I was not involved; I was just recruited into sectionI was recruited into the security branch and when I arrived I was told I was now part of something called Section 4. Now Section 4 was completely clandestine; it didn't have offices in police stations or police headquarters. It was a totally clandestine operation.

Obviously, Genl Coetzee who was at that time the colonel and he was in charge of the security branch, Witwatersrand. Now he ran Section 4 but not openly. There were officers at Section 4, obviously. I can remember our commanding officer at that time was Blackie Swart and obviously he reported to Coetzee.

There was a Blackie Swart, there was Marius Haystack, and then there were several security branch officers like them and then there were lots of people like myself who were undercover.

In those days they had some strange ways of doing things. We had to go to Wits during the term and then during the vacation we had to go to Section 4 office and work there. We weren't allowed to take vacation, and at night sometimes we were sent to Soweto to do surveillance. I mean it was a very weird way of using undercover people but also like fulltime policemen, but that evolved after that because it didn't work. That is as far as I know the genesis of the thing.

Then, after some while, I don't really know what happened to Section 4 but when I went to Cape Town there was no Section 4 in Cape Town. But at that time Roy Brand was working in the security branch Cape Town, so they used him to handle me, but again I was still operating completely clandestine and I had no relationship with the commanding officer of the security branch in Cape Town except every now and again I was taken secretly on a Sunday night to something to his house and we had a braai and he just talked to me to see if I had any problems.

I think Section 4, the officers, as I told Jerome, I don't know whether it is all there...the officers were in Fordsburg and the company was a milkpowder company which was related to Brigadiers Films, and they were former police officers.

CHAIRPERSON: So they were not front companies?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, they were real companies but we had the office upstairs, so if you arrived there it looked like the milkpowder company.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you were recruited into S4...I understand that quite soon after you were recruited, you were registered at Wits.

MR WILLIAMSON: I did not know S4 existed until even after I was at Wits. I was first told just to register and do everything and once I was registered then I was one day taken down, because Roy Brand did not handle me. I was then told S4 would handle me; I am now part of S4, so did not work with Roy Brand. Roy Brand was at that time at the branch.

CHAIRPERSON: What was your task? What was the....

MR WILLIAMSON: Our own main brief was Communist Party, ANC and my specific brief was to become involved in the White leftwing activities at the University with the aim of identifying SACP and Communist Party involvement there.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any knowledge of other people with the same background?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, there is a famous photograph, the 1973 or '74 SRC where I think the majority of the executive were all members of different intelligence agencies.

MEMBER: Did you know each other?

MR WILLIAMSON: I did not know McGivern. I only found out about McGivern when he defected in 1980. I sort of knew about Paul Sabat, but I had basically been told that he was BOSS...and I knew about Derek Bruner because he worked in the same S4. I think I only got to know about him because of the stupid rule where we had to - in fact, another stupid rule which was, we had to go and draw our salaries every month where in the normal police way where you had a paypoint and you had to sign. One day he was in the building when I arrived to get my salary, and I saw him. That is how we then knew each other.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have a task to recruit, to establish your own network of informers; to recruit pupil students and so on within the university?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, that was the idea. We were still given the old Republican intelligence numbers; they continued with the numbering. We were RS agents and the idea was to spot potential agents and not normally for us to carry out the recruitment but just to spot. But mainly what they were doing was spotting people before they went to varsity, even at schools and then putting them into university, and then the senior agents would sometimes be involved with handling some of those other.....But there were sources and there were fulltime agents. But that was the job.

CHAIRPERSON: Because I believe that you were fully employed as a member of the Police. You had your own...you gathered information and intelligence of people and so on and besides you had sources - I think you call it sources...

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, but I didn't. I was an agent so what I was doing was just doing my job reporting. I didn't handle at that stage. I spotted some people and would say: I think Mr So-and-so or So-and-so might be amenable. And then of course the branch ... it was very complicated because different levels of the organisation were doing the same job. I mean, Witwatersrand branch were also running agents at Witwatersrand University. S4's role was not really we were passing through the university. We were building credibility knowledge, getting to know people. We were on the way to other places. We weren't just doing the day-to-day what is Wits up to? You know, what is the publisher of Wits Student going to write this week about John Vorster? If that came my way, obviously I would send it in, but that was more the task of the branch because the branch also had its student desk, so it was a deal...

MEMBER: Did you understand that at the time that Wits was a building block process for your career.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, ...I...I mean...Look, right in the very beginning my involvement was supposed to be in a way that I would go into source management because it wasn't believed I

would be a successful infiltrator because of my background. I was known to be politically conservative at school. A number of people I had been at school with were politically active at Wits. I had been a uniformed police officer. In 1971 I was at the other side of the road in uniform with a section of riot police, and the next year I was standing as a demonstrator. So we didn't really think that I had too much chance of becoming a longterm infiltrator, but that happened.

CHAIRPERSON: So, with all this information that you gathered, I suppose, with regard to people and activities within the university which you passed on then to the security branch, are you aware of any action taken by the Police relating to the information that you provided to them?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not...Well, a lot of...In those days there was quite a lot of ... I don't know ... unrest or dissatisfaction, and a lot of the information we gave was on two levels, strategic and tactical. The strategic was basically what the longterm objective of the various anti-government organisations were; what were their policies, how were they going to try and achieve it. To give you an example: the one we were really interested in was the development of the wages commissions which led ultimately to the union movement. That was what was strategically interesting to us. Tactically, obviously things came across. If we knew, for example, that certain leftwing students were planning to have a

type of a demonstration ...I remember, I am sure that the Wits Union was raided at times by the police to findbecause we had reported that there was either banned literature or there was some other bits and pieces or something there that was of evidential value for something, and also disrupt whatever was happening; yes. But nothing ... That was just the day-to-day conflict that was going on between the police and the students.

CHAIRPERSON: In 1974 I understand that you moved to Cape Town and you took up the fulltime job, as the finance officer of Nusas. Did that change in any way your past....?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, it was important in the sense that I was elected to the national executive of the union, and it became obvious that I was going to be able to get further. At that time my task remained the same. We were looking for people like Tony Holiday and the Rabkins, and the white Communist Party members who were active either academically or in journalism but on the fringes of the White left. Also it was the time, as I said, of quite a lot of conflict. The students, black and white, were playing a pretty important role in the conflict with the state. Nusas was being funded from overseas and that had become an important factor. I think by 1974 or certainly the next year they passed a law called the Affected Organisations Act in order to curtail this foreign funding of political activity in South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: Who were the founders of Nusas at that stage when you took up?

MEMBER: Founders?

CHAIRPERSON: Founders, ja.

MEMBER: Governments - ???Cedar, Benida, ?? Collins, the Canadians, British ...

MR WILLIAMSON: The foreign governments were mainly the three: Scandinavian government, the British government, the Canadian government, some French, some Dutch mainly, through aid agencies, and that became the focus of attention in order to stop that funding coming not only to Nusas, to Race Relations, the Christian Institutes - the three, I think.

CHAIRPERSON: But that support from the Scandinavian countries and so on ...that was a wellknown fact also for the South African government?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: But it was stopped then.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well they made it illegal but it still continued. But it was more than that. The focus became ...My investigation or my involvement was mainly on the use of Nusas, the white student organisation in anti-government activities, and that this was being funded by foreign governments and being coordinated or at least coordinated with the liberation movements. By then Nusas had of course split. Nusas was white

and in 1969, 1968, Sasa had split away, the black student organisation, and there was the black consciousness movement. There were attempts to coordinate opposition to the government between the white and the black student groups. Of course the blacks at that time had rejected Nusas as being irrelevant and liberal, and there was a pretty strong attempt amongst more leftwing whites to show that Nusas did have a relevant role to play. So that was my focus. By 1974 it was clear that I would be able to go somewhere in Nusas and that therefore perhaps I could go further and see what was behind this whole operation. I have, if you wish, because it relates to one of the questions you asked, a report....Sorry, the jetline print is messed up, so I have only my original. I can give it to you if you can give me the original back. This is a report of my overseas trip in 1975 to Sweden - I think I went to Sweden...

CHAIRPERSON: Norway.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. This is a full report, and then at the end my recommendations which I have typed in red, which related to then the further infiltration of IUF. So this is where the later IUF operations ... the genesis of that operation. Forgive me, some of the comments I made are 20 some years later a bit embarrassing (laughter) and a bit politically naive, but I was young.

CHAIRPERSON: So this was in November 1975?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. So in 1974 I became the finance officer, in 1975 I was then elected vice president; in 1975 I was vice president - 1975/76. 1974/5 I was finance officer; 1975/76 I was vice president.

MEMBER: Are these the origins of the idea of moving into the IUF? You saw it as possible doing this trip?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. I mean to go on the trip was an important step, that is where I met ... you can see all the people I met. That is where I met the ANC, and that trip meant that the previous years of investment of getting me somewhere was paying off.

MEMBER: By this time had Ericson stopped coming into South Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, he had been stopped.

CHAIRPERSON: You submitted this report and I suppose then you had a discussion with Genl Coetzee or some other people. What was their opinion about your suggestion to start this operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I was told to continue, that I must concentrate on the path that we were going on. The idea was to get as close as possible to the foreign donors and to the ANC Communist Party.

CHAIRPERSON: So, without having read your report, knowing now that you here supported and should support Nusas for the

future and maybe also I suppose it was known that they might support the liberation movements in South Africa, was your task to ...Can you tell us a little bit about your task, and of course to control the financial support for Nusas and other movements in South Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, I think that came later. At this stage I was just receiving and broadcasting. I was the vacuum-cleaner. I was out there and my job was to talk, consider, find out. I was learning; I had never met these people before. I had never met the Abdul Minties and the ...I met Reg September and Tom Ngobi, real ANC people. And I talked to - if you read that report - it must be hundreds. I met on that report Pahló Frere, famous people. I had studied and written reports on liberation theology and the use of literacy and Latin American revolutions, and these were people started meeting. I was at that time just finding out what all these people were doing and saying, and I was transmitting it to Pretoria. Yes, afterwards it became more a case of trying to play and manipulate, but at this stage it was still really getting into the position to understand that to manipulate would be possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you then tell us about the set-up, how was it organised? You have mentioned that in your discussions with Jerome Chaskalson, how it was set-up, I mean the handler, who should handle you ...

COUNSEL: With respect, this issue has been fully traversed and it really is just a duplication.

MEMBER: If I could just ask, what has Chaskalson got in his notes there?

CHAIRPERSON: Chaskalson mention here that you proposed that you should leave South Africa and start this operation..

MR WILLIAMSON: That is in that report.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but what is right in this note here is that there was a meeting set up between the police and BOSS...

MR WILLIAMSON: That was later. The report was sort of towards the end of 1975, then during the first months of 1976 there were problems with Nusas between the moderate students, more PFP type students and the Marxist wing, and the Marxist wing lost at the end of the day, which we were also involved in. We were pushed. As far as I know, all the agents in Nusas were pushing Nusas as left as possible. I think I was the last member of the national executive to leave because I put all the finances into final books and trial balances, and then handed the organisation over to Dirk Kempen. Then I left, so I was in limbo. I had now been kicked out of Nusas basically, together with the rest of the leftwing group. Then the specific proposal came up ...

CHAIRPERSON: You left Nusas in 1976, when about was it, do you remember?

MR WILLIAMSON: Middle.

CHAIRPERSON: Mid 1976?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then after that you had this meeting...

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, but I had already through this meeting had communications with IUF. I have another report that will help you on this genesis, but this one is a huge one. It is a whole report on IUF, from A to Z. Again, this is my only copy.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that report prepared by you?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. I think it starts on its inception, the nature - basically this is a report on Operation Daisy. It does not deal in the detail you are asking; it just says that Nusas was identified as a major recipient of IUF funding. Captain Williamson of the SAP concentrated on the financial aspects of Nusas's projects and the financial assistance received. By 1979 Captain Williamson had risen to be IUF deputy director. So that the aim of that operation was then to step from the association into IUF and doand then Nusas's activities, its support for black consciousness movement, white student and youth, other revolutionary movements overseas, support for the ANC - it's all set out and it's got voluminous documentation about thesouthern future's Anstalt....It has got the secret report we did on the finances of the IUF; international defence and aid fund

Canon Collins,resisters, various diplomats. It is the whole story of IUF and Operation Daisy.

CHAIRPERSON: When was this written?

MR WILLIAMSON: 1980, when we came back here.

MEMBER: Can I ask some questions before we move into the European operation, or was part of your life? You mention you were an RS agent; what was the difference between, say, someone like you who was RS something or other and someone like Ludi who was QO something....? What are QO...?

MR WILLIAMSON: They changed from Qs to RSs, but there are Rs as well which are contract. Like Peter Caselton you will find was an R. Like you will get an RO92 or ...You might find some confusion because BOSS also used R, but they had a four letter digit, so Carl Edwards was R1652 or 653.

MEMBER: So R plus four letters equals BOSS?

MR WILLIAMSON: Equals BOSS. R plus three is police contracts, not fulltime but on contract, not permanent staff.

MEMBER: In the questions we submitted to you we made reference to a false flag operation, this pamphlet bomb. Can you tell us a bit about that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. I never actually carried out any pamphlet bombs. I ordered them on the orders of our Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils and our Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Assiz Bahad, and they were carried out. My

ANC cell was supposed to be carrying them out and they did carry them out. I don't really know how they were carried out; I have heard a lot of stories but it is all hearsay about all sorts of funny things that happened. Basically, if the ANC told me to put up a pamphlet bomb, I'd say, OK I will do it, and three weeks later it happened and the ANC was very happy with them.

MEMBER: Can you remember more or less when that was?

MR WILLIAMSON: That was in 1976/77.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was after your trip?

MR WILLIAMSON: Oh, I think there were a couple before I left the country, before the end of 1976. It was after I was recruited and I started working with them, from that report that I gave you of my trip.

MEMBER: So in that ANC cell that you set up after your trip, there was some genuine...?

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MEMBER: You were all agents?

MR WILLIAMSON: All agents, but it did not really exist. That cell was the security branch. I did not go out and recruit real ... I mean non security force members to that; that was all security force. There were obviously people whom the ANC and other people met who they did not know were security force members, but they were all security force members. The people who went to London to get detonators from Stephanie Kemp, pick

up suitcases full of the propaganda material, they were police officers. This sort of aside is that just it was funny. People who were arrested by the flying squad after setting off a pamphlet bomb were police officers. On one occasion the flying squad managed to detect an arrest sa pamphlet bomb in the library gardens, and the people who were arrested were police officers which caused some... I was overseas, I just heard that it caused some ...they had to recruit the staff, the flying squad guys into the security branch to keep them quiet.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the point?

MR WILLIAMSON: It was to get us infiltrated into the ANC. I mean, if you read that report and you see the documentation and the level of discussions I was having with these people...I was having intimate...I could go to London and sit down not with the junior members, with senior members of the ANC and have very serious discussions about what the ANC was up to, and this was coming back here. It was veryI mean when I came back and we said literally we had roomfuls of information, that is true. They had arrangingThis was a small selection of important information that had been got. It was a massive, massive intelligence gathering operation.

MEMBER: Basically setting up your credibility with the organisation abroad?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I also had an escape net route. Cecilia Mesondu left this country under my escape network. A whole lot of other people were taken out through Gaborone. There were people who were saying, "I am sure Williamson must be a spy", and there were other people in the ANC saying, "We know he isn't because they would never do the things he is doing". But they were wrong, they would.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I go back to the question I asked you before? I am sure it is in this report, but just to give us a picture about this setup for IUEF. You were taught to infiltrate IUEF; that was the main reason why you left South Africa through Botswana. That was the purpose. That is correct. There was no other alternate organisation that would ...

MR WILLIAMSON: I had already liaised with Ericson and my ... Look, we did not know ... Again, we could not plan that I was going to become the deputy director of the IUEF, but the IUEF was going to broker my entry into anti South African organisations based in Europe, so I was just going in the same way as I had been brokered into Nusas through Wits, I was now going abroad, and we didn't really know how or what position I'd get. But Ericson ... I mean I had established already confidence with him; I had established some confidence with the ANC, and people said, yes, there is a useful role for me to play in the

liberation struggle, I should come and play it. I went, but obviously the IUEF was to be the main channel.

CHAIRPERSON: You were briefed by the ANC when you left, what was the background to that? What kind of ...?

MR WILLIAMSON: I understand it was...what do you call it...standard procedure. They interviewed me in Lusaka and just got my whole story and what I'd done, my student involvement, but again I think I was eased through that process because I had in fact already got clandestine links with the ANC, so it wasn't that I was somebody new just arriving at the door. I think some people in London then said: "Look, we know the guy, we have been working with him". Because I was working with Kasrils and Assiz and Thabo Mbeki, but that was on a very secret level.

CHAIRPERSON: So the fact that you had been a police officer and your background as a more right conservative orientated student, that was never raised or discussed during this....

MR WILLIAMSON: It was. In 1979 it became a problem because of the fact that the Swedishofficial who raised the issue with the ANC, and Thabo Mbeki wrote a letter to the Swedes and to me, saying that they were happy to work with me. But after McGivern revealed the situation a few months later, it did not really help.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you came to Geneva and you took up your position in IUEF as information manager, I believe. Where is

Operation Daisy now? Operation Daisy, was that the whole operation to infiltrate, or was Operation Daisy a part of your...

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Operation Daisy was ... Once it had been decided that should leave South Africa and go overseas, Operation Daisy was formed to run that whole operation, because as we told Mr Chaskalson, there was this argument between BOSS and the Police as to who should control this operation. Then it was decided that it would be a separate joint operation. BOSS would control it overseas and the, Police would control the information in South Africa, but they would have joint operational control of the operation. I was actually asked to join ... to leave the Police and to join BOSS but Genl Coetzee did not want that to happen.

CHAIRPERSON: For your communication, did you have a handler based in Europe for

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I used deaddrop. There was no physical link, and on two or three occasions, probably once a year, there was a personal meeting, face to face meeting with somebody or people who were sent to come and talk to me and to give me specific questions and to guide me go through and say: You have given us this information, we want more of this, or concentrate on that.

CHAIRPERSON: But still you must have had a support in Europe if you had used deaddrops to deliver your information.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, but did not know...I put the information into the deaddrop and that was it.

CHAIRPERSON:

Was there any other operation? Operation Daisy was there, then there was the general operation infiltrating. Was there any other specific operation that you were tasked with in your time within the IUEF?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. Operation Daisy was largely the tail wagging the dog. I knew more what was going on and whatI was tasked on every now and again on specific questions to ask, but mainly it was me informing them here what was happening in particular spheres. IUEf was involved in quite an amazing range of activities, so it covered the whole spectrum. It was not only ANC/Communist Party, it was the black conscious movement, the PAC; it was things like the old Unity movement, Joseph Najavosi, it was the trade union movement, SATU, the ICFTU. It was amazing. It was....

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have any contact with any European intelligence agencies?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not as intelligence agencies. I am sure I met other people who were involved with intelligence, for example there were several guys in Geneva...Geneva was a nest of agents andand Ericson seem to attract them like flies. There was one particular Romez Chandra, for example, was

...there was the World Peace Council, the famous KGB operation.

So on that level yes, but not "Hullo, I am from South Africa, you are from Britain, let's get together".

CHAIRPERSON: Were there other agents from South Africa within the IUEF?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, not to my knowledge. I am in fact pretty sure there weren't.

CHAIRPERSON: Or of other agencies?

MR WILLIAMSON: There were definitely other. I know there were ...I don't think I should go into it because ... I mean just to tell you, I've actually met after, when I was back here, I've met Western intelligence officials who were involved with setting up operations. In fact, one guy from a Western agency specifically when he came to South Africa asked to meet me because he said they'd been set up by UIEF and he wanted to meet me because they had set it up and I have destroyed it, so he was now completing the circle.

MEMBER: But were you aware at the time when you worked in Geneva that you had other Western agencies working?

MR WILLIAMSON: Look, we were intelligence people. We assumed; we did not know. We had identified the people who we suspected, and you know as well as I do the background of IUEF, its prominence, the International Student Conference, the whole East/West thing, British and American involvement. One of the

reasons we were so interested in IUEF was to decide whether this was I mean quite frankly, whether this was a CIA operation or whether this was a socialist international controlled operation.

Who was driving IUEF? That was also something that we wanted to try and understand. And I think, you know I have speculated.

The answers, as far as I can give them, are there. I don't think we really know. All I know is that a lot of southernbut there was other money which was used to pay expenses of all sorts of politicians, Socialist Party politicians, and it is there. But I think that was Losken Ericson. I don't think too today anybody can say -- we can't certainly; I don't know what has happened since, but I can't tell you who was behind UIEF. I think IUEF was started by Western intelligence and then became a very useful organisation for a number of other intelligence agencies, including the West Germans. The whole Latin American operation was very...If you look at the individuals who were involved, money being given to, on the one hand, Pumaros and Monteneros, and on the other hand to Eden Pastorom whose Commandant Sero you know, this was intelligence driven. I believe at the end of the day that Losken Ericson was a dedicated I don't know, maybe he fooled me, but I think he was a dedicated anti Communist, anti Moscow, and I think he was a very he really believed in the Socialist International, and I think he was trying to drive a genuine third force in the world,

but he created something that was a vehicle of great attraction and use to a number of intelligence agencies.

MEMBER: So he was not ever fully in control of the vehicle?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I think that anybody would be naive to think that you could be in control of something like that, unless you controlled it one hundred per cent, or you staffed it with all Swedes from the Swedish intelligence. Then you could say, yes, I have got it under control. But when you start having all these other funny people being employed, coming in to do different programmes, how can you control it? You don't know who you are employing.

MEMBER: : You mentioned the term 'third force'. He was particularly keen on Did he not see BC as that third force...?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. I had to make this point, I will make it again. Before when we discussed it...we are not talking about the same third force that everybody talks about in South Africa. But at that time there was this whole third force idea that the ANC was controlled by the Communist Party which was controlled by the Soviet Union, and that the white South African apartheid government was what it was and that in order to actually get somewhere in the liberation of South Africa, there had to be a third political element which would be a non Soviet-controlled, democratic organisation representing the majority of the people of South Africa. This is where the whole black consciousness

BPC idea came from. There were lots of political problems between the BCM and the ANC, particularly relating to funding.

MEMBER: Because a lot of that IUEF funding was going to be seen and the ANC did not like that.

MR WILLIAMSON: Did not like it. A lot of documentation on that there.

MEMBER: You posed a question about whether you had met Biko before you left.

MR WILLIAMSON: No...

MEMBER: Never met him in any situation ever? But there was communication clearly?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, but mainly through other people like...When I was at IUEF the main channel of communication was Runwedzi Namakulu and the Reverend Malope or something like that.

MEMBER: This is not something we gave you any advanced warning of but perhaps I could raise it. What about the role of Turo in Botswana at this

MR WILLIAMSON: It is mentioned in there. I wrote that report and my only knowledge about Turo was that he was killed in a pamphlet bomb which had an IUEF sticker on it. My theory in that report, you will read, which might be because that was the way we would always say things. I know nothing about whether he was actually killed by South Africa. I speculate in

that report that he perhaps that they were playing with explosives. But I think that was the standard answer we always gave. If anybody was killed mysteriously then they said, no well....like even the London bomb they said the ANC was storing explosives in the basement, and the same with this bomb here. That was the standard South African reaction to anybody being killed by a bomb. But further than just giving the standard propaganda on it, I never....There were obviously a lot of speculation about that, but I don't know anything about it.

CHAIRPERSON: You mention that you had good contacts with ANC representatives in Europe. You mentioned earlier a couple of names. Were there any people who actually worked for you? Were you able to infiltrate the ANC either as a false flag operation or....

MR WILLIAMSON: No. I never infiltrated or recruited. Afterwards when I returned to South Africa, I obviously recruited people, but during my time as an agent I never showed my flag at all. I obviously suggested people and I againI can't tell you one hundred per cent because I was not actually involved in operations, but I know because of my involvement that Solly Smith ultimately fell ... he was ultimately recruited. I new he was recruitable and I reported that he was recruitable, and I used to give him money and I reported his vulnerabilities which were, I heard later, successfully exploited.

CHAIRPERSON: So you identified potential people to be recruited?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: After you came back to South Africa are you aware of anybody who actually were recruited during your time in Geneva from the ANC? Solly Smith, I believe he was recruited much later.

MR WILLIAMSON: He was recruited after ... in the mid 80's. No, most of my operations were mainly run in the same way as I was run. It was infiltration operations. The agents that I later handled in ANC and in other places were all people who had been sent there, either as war resisters or students or whatever. But they have been Obviously, because I knew the situation very well by then, I knew where to send them and how to send them. I knew that if I sent a South African with good leftwing credentials to Sussex University, I could enter him into the right area. I knew if I sent a war resister to get amnesty in Amsterdam that he would enter the right field. So that was I never ... Ja, maybe I recruited one but I think we don't have to reveal names, but the ANC know anyway. There was one.

CHAIRPERSON: That was a big risk you took....

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no, that was after I was out. I mean that was the only person that I ever in the ANC whom I had known before that I approached and recruited.

CHAIRPERSON: One of your tasks, I suppose, was to try to follow up the financial support to the liberation movements in South Africa, which was quite extensive, I suppose, from IBF? Can you tell us a little bit how you controlled it? What knowledge you had about the establishment, for example, of Southern Futures....

MR WILLIAMSON: Right. The whole story is there. Obviously, that was our focus. We wanted to know who was giving the money and where it was going. I spent ... I would go to work at IUEF at, say, seven, eight in the morning and I would often, when I was in Geneva because I travelled a lot ...so when I was in Geneva I would often stay in the office until eleven, twelve at night. My wife would come and help me with photocopying. That is how I kept control of the finances. I just kept control of all the records that were being generated by IUEF's record department. Then I saw within, I suppose the first year that there was a lot of monkey business going on in IUEF. There were project account that were being controlled separately from others. So there was the general accounting setup which was quite....they had a bookkeeper, they had an accountant , they had a finance officer. So they had three, four people who were only doing accounting. But then Losken Ericson also had some accounts which he dealt with, clandestine accounts and so on. Obviously, that is what we concentrated on, and in fact the order

came from Genl Coetzee because he said we must not get into the situation where we are going to one day be blamed for what is going in IUEF. And when Losguno Ericson was away and I was in charge of IUEF, I commissioned the British chartered accountant to do the ...report. I wrote a report saying the organisation was bankrupt by more than one million Swiss francs.

Losken nearly had a heart attack because it was the Danish auditors that were sniffing. All the internal documentation is there, he basically was using He set up a thing called Southern Futures Verdus. the documents are there. I never had anything to do with Southern Futures Verdus, except I received copies of their information and I on occasion passed on money to South African projects.

What Losken did is, he pumped most of the clandestine operation money into Southern Futures Verdus, and then what he was doing is taking the money out of Southern Futures Verdus and paying the deficit. If I can explain to you quite simply what was happening; it happens in a lot of organisations. You have got donors who give money for specific programmes. Now what you should do is, if you get a million krone from Sweden for XYZ scholarship programme, you should then take the 15% or 7% or whatever is agreed as admin fee and you should put that in an administration account. Now they did not do that; they kept the accounts whole and then they started playing with the

administration costs. Losken - John knew him - was a flamboyant guy, he liked to, if some people came to him and said to him, 'Losken, we need to fly to a conference somewhere or other', he would give them the money and he would not care which account the money came out of, this was for the liberation the ANC wanted, I have given them the money, 'per techma' whatever, you solve how you do the books, as long as the Swedes or the Danes or whoever comes, looks happy. At the end of the day they had loans to office-bearers, loans to not Solly Smith so much but certain other liberation movement guys who would come and say, 'my wife and children are starving and my house and my that...' and he would give them money. So he ended up with a big hole, about half a million Swiss franc big hole, money that had been spent that could not be accounted for because it had been spent on programmes or for things that were not authorised by the donors. So what he started doing to cover the hole was putting money into Southern Futures and then saying, 'Ok, the Swedish government will give me X amount of krone for this internal programme and for this ANC programme or that ANC programme'. He would put all the money into this pot and then he would dish out money to the ANC and so on, get a one page receipt, and it just used to say 'From Ncobi - Dear Losguno, we received £30 000 for our XYZ programme - which was the name of the budget programme - thank you very much', and then that

would just be used to clean the ...because the auditors would take that as proof of expenditure. He ultimately got the state auditors coming from the donors to accept that when a transfer was made to Southern Future Verdus, the responsibility for accounting responsibility was complied with. So he had a slush fund and he did what he liked with the slush fund, amongst other things using it to cover this half a million Swiss franc hole that had been dug in our money. If you read some of the memo's he wrote to us...He sent me to dress up in a suit to go to the bank manager to borrow one hundred thousand Swiss francs so that we could put it in before the Danish auditors came. You know this sort of playing, just keeping the story clean. So I got the report, and basically because he had such a lack of control and because he was raising money for certain programmes that did not exist, he was vulnerable to us because he needed me to have programmes in South Africa which people could come and visit and see, and which he could say really we are spending more money than they were. Because otherwise people would start questioning and the whole pack of cards pack would collapse. Losguno's biggest vulnerability was on that; that is where he had problems and he knew that he could not be nasty to me because I had been in Nusas finance. I am not trained in finance but I had been a Nusas finance officer, I had beenI knew where the problems in his life lay. His accounting requirements were

such that it made him vulnerable to being manipulated, which he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell us a little bit about how the money was transferred; in what way...?

MR WILLIAMSON: Different ways, sometimes in cash, sometimes straight bank transfers, sometimes via, like for example to the Council of Churches. They would sometimes disguise it. We would give them the money then they would give one of the South African Council of Churches - the World Council would give the SACC money and the SACC would give to some programme here. There were various....It depended whether this waslike the Prison Support programmes and that sort of thing. These happened, they were done. We were running at least one of them here, but that was being donewe didn't mind giving the money to the families of the political prisoners because all the people giving the money were security branch people and we were building that relationship with those families, talking to them, knew what they were doing and saying. So that was a very effective way. The families were getting the money which the donors wanted them to get, the ANC were happy the families were getting the money, and we were happy because the security branch was running the programme so we knew everything anyway. That sort of thing was running.

But then some of the more clandestine things were done in cash. A lot of the payments to ANC was done in cash which was not supposed to happen, it was meant to be but it was given to them in cash because we all knew they weren't going to use the money for some leadership training programme, they were going to use the money for airtickets. That was a reality because they always used to complain that the one thing they need was cash. The one thing donors won't give them is cash. So Losguno found a way to give them cash and the donors thought that it was being given in another way.

There were a couple of so-called white liberation movements, whites projects which were controlling, and all that money was sent from IUEF to the programme either in cash or directly, and they would then give the receipt back to the IUEF which he was happy with, but the money, I know, came here either to BOSS or to the Police. Because there were several ...like, for example Carl Edwards was at that time BOSS and he was running that environmental development agency which was being funded, and it was being funded from overseas but it was an intelligence operation. So his funding came through and went to him.

We were supposed to be running some white leadership training programme. That money they used to buy Daisy Farm which Losguno knew had been bought. I think Paul Brandrup

from the Dunida even visited the farm. He just thought this was a very nice place where white leftwing activists were trained to bring down the South African government but it was the opposite.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any idea how much money was transferred through, I would say, these secret channels into South Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't, but there are figures.

CHAIRPERSON: Because my impression of this description is that it must have been almost impossible actually to control how much money was spent on these secret channels and how much actually was given to the people who were supposed to receive the money.

MR WILLIAMSON: Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there any.....?

MR WILLIAMSON: Matz Holstrum and Pierre Churee, those guys used to come to visit Geneva; we used to pay their hotel bills and their dinner out of Southern Features Verdus, money that was supposed to be going to some liberation...Carl Nissen from Denmark, all these...Losguno used Southern Futures because that was fund and all he had to do was make sure that the money that went in was accounted for, and that was accounted for by certificate. After that neither you or I or anybody has any idea of what he actually did with the money.

CHAIRPERSON: So if for example now we are talking about this Prisoners Support Trust Fund which I think was a security branch...

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, PST.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there any questions raised concerning this from, for example, the ANC or from other liberation movements

MR WILLIAMSON: No, because we used to spend the money. There was one question once raised by Bishop Tutu, not raised by him; he, in fact, wrote a letter to me or to Losguno saying he had to lend them R5 000; they had asked for R10 000 and he had to lend them R5 000 because he did not have the rest, and he just put that as a footnote. I put a huge ring around it with a questionmark and sent it back, you know, we can't have that. I mean, people are going to start saying 'what's going on?' So I think there were very few.....I mean, I was sitting there and ANC guys would ask me 'please make sure that Mrs So-and-so, this person Vladiki, whatever something....' I sometimes even got secret writing, secret from the ANC, where I would have to develop it and then there would be this name and address. Of course, that is exactly what we wanted.

If Asiz Bahad or Ronnie Kasrils or Mac Maharaj asked me 'Send money to this guy in Port Elizabeth', I am delighted. We were delighted to send money to him. We were delighted to get to

know the man. To Toyvoya, Toyvoya's mother - my sister used to go once a month to Namibia and go and give her money, and she'd get a chicken in return. We were happy to develop these relationships.

For example - just to give you an example - I must give you a letter for your archives that you wrote about 1700 Malangeni that you needed to pay the admission of guilt offence for two ANC guys who had been arrested for arms offences. Do you remember?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: We did not have that money in a scholarship programme to pay. Losgurna just said, 'Southern Features Verdus, pay the money'. If Stanley Magazela wanted a house, you can't go to the Swedish government and say he wants a house. They'll say you are crazy. You know, this is scholarship money which it was taken from. That's how it worked. But a lot of money was routed through Swaziland and through house's office.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sure you are aware that there has been quite a big discussion in the Scandinavian countries about the money that was given to IUEF and how much actually was used for the purpose, and I think from Ceda, for example, their opinion is that they had a quite good control over the money that was distributed into South Africa. What is your opinion about it?

MR WILLIAMSON: My opinion is that if you define was the money used to support the liberation struggle in South Africa, then the majority was used to support the liberation struggle in South Africa. If you say, was the majority of the money used for the programmes that it was budgeted for, then I have to say you are joking. It was struggle accounting. IUEF invented struggle accounting before all these guys here started talking about struggle accounting. The point is that they saw the money as beingThey saw themselves often as being the bridge between a politically will but uncomprehending donor who did not understand the complexities of the liberation struggle, and had all sorts of accounting requirements that were ridiculous, and a liberation movement that could not care about accounting requirements and this, that and the next thing. And he saw himself as bridging this and helping this. The amount of money that was used, for example, by the South AfricanThere has been people who have said we used the money to fund police operations. Yes, we did but that money till went to the people that it was supposed to go to. The lady who came and got her monthly amount from the Prisoners Support Trust was the lady who should have got the money. So at the end of the day the money still went there. It achieved some other purposes as well. It achieved some South African government intelligence purposes.

The amount of money that was actually used, that really went astray, was money that was used to pay hotel bills and this, that and the next thing, but if you look at it in the broad context, that too was....If all these guys came to Geneva and stayed in the hotel, they were busy with this whole overall struggle, so who was going to pay their hotel bill? You could never get a donor to pay a hotel bill or an airticket. I used to spend my life to try and convince donors that the liberation movement needed a certain amount of money a year to pay airtickets, and it was one of a big 'No, we can't'. So, yes, I would say the vast majority of the money was used to support the broad aims and objectives, but to give figures on whether the money actually went for a scholarship or it went into airtickets, that is where you are going to have a difficulty.

CHAIRPERSON: But you must have been able to create a lot of possibilities to actually fraud money out of it with a structure like the Prison Support Trust Fund where you had your colleagues receiving the money...?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, it could easily have been done, but you have to meet Genl Coetzee first.

CHAIRPERSON: But some was used; Daisy Farm was established, paid from this money.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, but you know the moneythat farm was supposed to have been bought on behalf of the sort of ANC

supporting unit of white students, where it would be used for various operations. At the end of the day it went to the state, so it belongs to the ANC anyway. So the money has gone to them. So, I am saying.....Genl Coetzee...Ja, because I think it still belongs to the state. But Genl Coetzee was very tough on accounting the money that went in; I mean that was a whole different structure. You would have to talk to somebody who was involved. But the money that was given to the operation here and who it was given to and how it was given to them, it was pretty carefully...it was controlled in the same way as part of the secret fund. Again, I am not saying it is infallible, but he is not famous for giving away money.

MEMBER: Can you remember what the farm cost?

MR WILLIAMSON: R40 000. That's the figure that is in my mind, and they made quite a big profit on that.

MEMBER: And the year?

MR WILLIAMSON: About 1977/78.

CHAIRPERSON: It could be of interest to you to see a letter that we have been able to obtain a letter which is dated 6th July 1977 from a Mr George Seal; he was working for the Amnesty International in Germany. He brought to you or to IUEF and actually raised questions, doubts about the Prisoners Support Trust. He had been advised by you to actually provide money, financially support to the Prisoners Support Trust. He also

mentioned in his letter that they had some doubts and they also had asked questions to representatives from anti apartheid movements in Europe. He wanted to have clarification about this. Your answer is also here, which is quite interesting.

MR WILLIAMSON: I can't even remember it. It's nasty.

CHAIRPERSON: It's nasty, yes. Your last sentence - you can get a copy of this - 'incidentally, you may be interested to know that the fulltime worker on the Trust himself served 10 years on Robben Island. I have informed the Trust of your attitude and they would be glad if you would not contact them again'.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, it's true, he did spend 10 years on Robben Island.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Gerald Benjana.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was questions obviously raised about this...

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I mean not surprisingly. The Trust's...I mean it still baffles me how we got away with what we got away with. But I think at the end of the day the previous answer to the question applies, and that is that there were doubt raised about my bona fides and about things that therefore I was running in South Africa. But because of a lot of things we were doing that the sort of people who raised the questions did not know about, these doubts were always just swept aside as...like he, he is from

Amnesty International Germany, he has got some problems, he is not deeply involved in what's going on so therefore he doesn't really know, and that's....

MEMBER: Talking about exchanging letters, I can show you a letter that Lasguno wrote to me. I always remember this letter because it is dated 16th June 1976. It is at the time when I was asked to handle some money and I think he uses the term in his letter 'I want to give you an absolute assurance, Craig Williamson is our man in South Africa'.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, well, as I said before, that was.... we did a lot.... I mean, the balance in an intelligence operation is always how far do you go, because you are promoting the aims and objectives of the organisation you are working for. So what you to benefit them must be balanced by the amount of information you are getting. That's where you get the classical argument between the strict policeman and the intelligence officer. Because the policeman, once he has got some evidence, wants to then go to court and that might we have always had that argument. Yes, you can take somebody to court for some stupid offence and end years of information.

MEMBER: You mention though that by, say 1979/80 Williamson was quite vulnerable on these financial irregularities. Was it a surprise to you that he didn't actually buy the deal?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ericson, you mean?

MEMBER: Yes. Did you think he'd take the deal..?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I thought he had taken the deal. As I have said before, he did what we told him specifically not to do, and that was to tell Allison. The moment he told her... we knew if he told her it would blow, and he did.

MEMBER: That's his wife?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: If I may divide your operation, Operation Daisy, in two parts; there might have been other parts, but one clearly is to control or to gather information about the financial support, the waste, the money to South Africa and who was supported, and so on. The other part might be to gather information about the activities of the liberation movements; the people involved, the structures, the plans, the tactics, and so on.

I am sure with your contacts, with your good contacts within different liberation movements, you came across a lot of information that could have been useful for the security branch or security forces in South Africa. I don't know if you ever saw the inquest, the report of the commission of inquiry... You saw that? In that report it raised a couple of incidents that they possible linked to your activities. What is your comments on that. Steve Biko, for example, is one, an example of that.

MR WILLIAMSON: Steve Biko was the leader of the BCM. The Black Conscience Movement were planning with ambassador

Mohamed Sagnun, who is now the OAU Secretary General, to undergo military training in Algeria. There was planning to try and coordinate the Black Conscience Movement with the ANC. Losguno Ericson was always involved in trying to support the non Communist Party elements in the ANC. Johnny Maketeeni, the whole Lokela affair was all related to that. He always regarded Oliver Tambo as being non communist and Canon Collins always used to say Tambo is not a communist but unfortunately he might as well have been a communist because he seems to listen to everything they say to him.

There was a plan for Biko to meet Tambo to discuss ... this was going to be some very important meeting. I did report that there was that plan, and that's all I... Whether that was why they detained him, I have no idea, but it was, in terms of time it was in that time frame.

There was another incident there; they mentioned about this guy who was in Lesotho or something. The aeroplane was forced down or....

MEMBER: Incondo?

MR WILLIAMSON: Incondo, ja. I think we issued his ticket. I think we bought his ticket but whether that's what led to what happened I really don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Sat down in Bloemfontein and he was arrested.

He was travelling to Lesotho and the plane sat down in Bloemfontein.

MEMBER: Ja, they made the plane land in Bloem and then he was arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: So did you ever receive any instruction or any request to gather information on specific issues that you later became aware of that was used for operations?

MR WILLIAMSON: You know, I was asked often, obviously, about important people, not that Umkondo or whatever specifically...People like Biko, any, all of it was being reported virtually on a weekly basis, but I mean in great depth, and maybe I was still naive in those days but I was just pumping the information through. It never really...In fact, often I used to wonder what they were doing with the information. I mean, whether they were doing anything with it. I didn't really have any specific knowledge about what they were doing. I used to worry that they even understood my information.

CHAIRPERSON: But in your position you must also have been able to establishI mean, you got feedback also, I suppose...

MR WILLIAMSON: Very little. I used to get feedback maybe once a year or now and again a question...

MEMBER: Tell us more about this or that.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not talking about the feedback from the security branch but I am talking about the feedback you can get from your contacts with the ANC or the liberation movements.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but that is why....I always had two problems. I always used to wonder whether they understood my information. I mean, I have always had that wonder. And, secondly, I always had a fear about whether they would use it and how they would use it. I never once got an indication....For example, if I hadn't been blown in 1989, Renfrew Christy would never have gone to jail. It's just that was blown at the wrong time so that they could then use the information that they had about him to convict him. The game was more a strategic one than a tactical one, and I have great doubts personally that they wouldI mean, if you look through all the stuff and see...I think a lot of people in the ANC and so on downplay how much Operation Daisy was gathering about what was going on and how much we actually knew on a global level of what was happening.

I mean right down to name of refugees, each refugee in the house, which house...because IUEF was paying money for all this, so we had a legitimate reason for wanting to know who was in this house, who was in that house; how many houses did the ANC have. So right from the lowest tactical thing, right up to my discussions with Freddy Ghinwhala about how we could get Chapter 7 sanctions against South Africa or how we could have a

conference about military and nuclear collaboration and embarrass the West; how we could have links with Swiss banks to find out how financing was being done to South Africa....From the one side to the other it was all flowing through IUEF, and never once did I get an indication that any information that I had given had jeopardised, had rocked the boat, because they would be very careful about that. So, if Biko was arrested on the basis of information that had been got from me, I doubt very much they would ever have told...I seriously doubt they would ever have told the security branch in Port Elizabeth the specific information. They may have said, 'Look, we think Biko is up to something, why don't you pull him in and interrogate him?' But I doubt they would ever have said...I mean, it would blow the whole story.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja. I suppose...But after you were blown, I would guess that you would expect some sort of reaction from the security forces because now you were already exposed...

MR WILLIAMSON: There were a number of legal actions then that were taken.

CHAIRPERSON: Based on the information that you had gathered?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. I mean, the most famous one, Renfrew Christy ...

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR WILLIAMSON: Look, some of it did not happen immediately but over the next couple of years there were a number of trials involving white supporters of the ANC Communist Party, most of whom....You can link most of them. I think everyone was convicted except Allan Fine.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you had this detail...

MR WILLIAMSON: No, they had years and years of information of what the people had been doing and what had been...

CHAIRPERSON: And who they were, where they were staying...

MR WILLIAMSON: Who they were, where they were, what they had done, how they operated.

CHAIRPERSON: And intelligence information gets old very quick, and so I suppose there must have been an effort to act immediately after you were exposed. Do you have a feeling that really happened, or can you give us another example of action that was taken based on your information?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, not based on my information alone.

The one that I could say based on my information alone was Renfrew Christy, but he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. If it had been another few months, he would have got away with it. But all the ... I would say from 1980, 1981 to 1985, probably most of the action against the white left had in someand I suppose also stuff that I would not even know about because lots of reports and names of people who we knew to be

involved with the ANC now could be....Like, for example, the lists of names of people who had received money from us on instructions of Mac Maharaj or whatever. Now there would be no reason to be coy about using that information, but that was all file information I suppose given to somebody. I wasn't specifically involved.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you discuss it with Genl Coetzee after you came back, the possibility...?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja...No, because they were making a whole propaganda story and they were saying, yes, now we have got a lot of information, you had better all be careful and everybody was running for cover. You know, they were playing that game also. They were trying to make everybody think now we know everything which

I am just looking here; I thought there was a statistic. Ja, ten ANC Communist Party agents have been arrested and found guilty. But that, as I have said, wasn'tthat was between 1980 and 1984, so we destroyed at least ten operations, and all those operations ... the idea that they existed and the peopleThe only one that gotThey say the Allan Fine case did not succeed in court as a result of a naive judge. Sedric Mason left the country. He would have also gone down, but he ran away.

MEMBER: Did you also collect information on Swapo?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: There may have been repercussions in Namibia as a result of your coming back, using the information?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, well again because I think most of the information we were involved with there was very sensitive and obviously, once I was back that would no longer be black flagged information. It could be thrown out forI know there was ...they did take a lot of the files that were being kept completely secret and they started processing it and putting it through, but again that wasn'tI only know about things that I was then specifically involved in. You know my job was then more to plan the future than to....

MEMBER: What was the exact date of your flight to Botswana; your leaving? Late 1976?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. No..yes, in the last two weeks of 1976, just after Christmas. I had Christmas here, then I left.

MEMBER: In the four year you were away, did you come back to South Africa only once? Did you actually come back into the country only once for that pre Moscow defecting?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I would have come twice, but I only came once because the one time was aborted. There was a problem with the aircraft or the helicopter.

MEMBER: How did you get back that time when you were being briefed for the Moscow trip?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I didn't come back. I came back in 1979. I was going to come back earlier.

MEMBER: Did you come back through Swaziland that time?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: You were flown in by Casilton?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I didn't know him until 1981. I am trying to remember. I flew from Gaborone to Manzini, to Matsapa in a chartered plane. I thenThere was mist and the chopper couldn't take off. I was going in an Airforce Aloette, not from Matsapa; driven to where the helicopter was standing, and we could not fly it so we went by road.

MEMBER: What was the purpose?

MR WILLIAMSON: The real purpose was to see my father.

MEMBER: It wasn't a crisis or anything like that?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, he was dying.

MEMBER: Did they come to you to prepare you for the Moscow trip, the national intelligence people?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, Moscow was ...When did I go to Moscow? I should have gone in....Ah, no you are talking about the 1980 trip to Moscow.

MEMBER: Hmm..

MR WILLIAMSON: I should have gone, I never went because I was blown here. I went to Moscow in 1977 and I was going again in 1980, and I did talk about the Moscow trip when I was

here but it never happened. I was going to go in All the contacts in Moscow were Losgo Ericson's contacts.

MEMBER: Were you worried about that trip?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I was worried about the first one. I don't know if you ever went to Moscow in those days. You go through seven different passport checks on the way out. If you are working for Pretoria it is an uncomfortable feeling, and I wasn't looking forward to repeating it.

MEMBER: Because we were told in a briefing that we had with old national intelligence people....as an aside they said that they were damn worried about you going.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, in 1979 we had this problem with the Swedish diplomat in Angola, in Lusaka. That had been dealt with but - I can't remember his name - Motumbuke, minister in the Mogabe government. I can't remember his first name ... Motumbuke. He had taken a particular dislike to me because he was very upset about the move of IUEF to support the ANC and, of course, my links with ZAPO, with Joshua Nkomo's people because he said this was a ... It wasn't that he thought it was a Pretoria operation, he thought it was a Moscow operation, and it had caused some....He was making formal - and, of course, he was quite high level - objections to my involvement in things. I had been in Lusaka; I was there the night that they attacked ... the Rhodesians attacked and blew up Liberation Centre and so

on. We were there to open it the next day. Of course, they didn't tell me they were coming otherwise I might not have been there. But I think there were... Look, I wasn't worried but ... I mean not worried to the extent that I would not have gone, but, ja, I thought we were pushing our luck. I thought particularly there were too many questions and after Moscow I was going to Luanda. I was a lot more worried about that. That's what really worried me because I thought if somebody wanted to get me into a controllable situation and interrogate me, Luanda would be a good place to do it, which ultimately happened but some years later. Well, I thought Moscow and Luanda would both be good places, so I was a bit ...

CHAIRPERSON: What was your relation or IUEF's relation to other organisations or other organisations who supported the liberation movements in South Africa? Was there any coordination or any?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, not many of them liked IUEF or Losguno very much because he was very pushy and was pushing IUEF always as being the main I would say after World Peace Council itself, he was pushing IUEF and he regarded just as a political sort of joke. But IUEF was the vice chairman of the

International Non-governmental Organisations Committee on Apartheid, Racism, Colonialism and whatever else in the UN, of the category to representatives. I was often I usually was

the representative of IUEF, so it was a difficult situation because a lot of those organisations were very pro Moscow and a lot of them knew that Losgarno Ericson and I were not on that side of the fence. Some of them knew that I was more ANC Communist Party orientated. But we had links right from Geneva to New York - Special Committee, United Nations body, to all the anti apartheid movements and then of course some other refugee organisations but many of which were not political. But all the anti apartheid movements everywhere we had formal links with and used to meet with regularly.

CHAIRPERSON: So that means that you also had quite a lot of knowledge about their support and who they supported and the way their support took...?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, because we were often fighting them for money also, and often some of them would be supporting a programme and would work with us. It was very....And obviously that was a very important, very usefulWe regarded this as important, I mean from an intelligence point of view.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja. To end the discussions about IUEF, I think you had a discussion with Jerome about what actually happened when you were exposed, and I don't think we need to go into that in more detail. Shall we then leave the UIEF period?

Can I just ask you about how you are feeling about lunch?

Shall we take a break now and come back, or ...

MEMBER: I think about maybe half an hour.

COUNSEL: I would like an indication, if I might, as to how long you anticipate the to go on because we have really been sitting and listening. A lot of the matters are repetitive and have been told to Jerome.

MEMBER: Why don't we take a half an hour break now and during that break we will consult about the timetable.

COUNSEL: Well, let us know please because a lot of the stuff is just traversing.

MEMBER: I think there is a lot more questions but they are more specific. I think the IUEF was a very long thing.

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry, there is one question you have not asked under the UIEF and that is the safe houses. We never had any, in Europe you mean.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, as a part of the operation. If there was an operation where you have handlers in Europe and you had sources that you used, you would have used safe houses to brief them or contact or be debriefed. But I think you indicated quite clearly at the beginning that there was no such...

MR WILLIAMSON: No, never...when I did meet, I did explain I think to Jerome about Mr Claasen coming to Brussels where we just met. I spent a day getting there; I spent three hours in trade craft and counter surveillance to get to the meeting. When I got to the meeting and asked for him at the desk, they said, 'Oh yes,

the man from the South African embassy;ja, that is ...' So that was the safe house.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we then take a break for half an hour and come back? Thank you.

COMMISSION ADJOURNED

.....

UPON RESUMPTION

COUNSEL:that this kind of questioning would run and I would like to know, perhaps selfishly for my own professional convenience.

MEMBER: We want to finish this today and we will target round about four o'clock.

COUNSEL: I have a commitment which I had not taken into account, which is at four o'clock, and I am wondering if we can target 3:40 to enable me to get back to my office?

MEMBER: Let's shoot for that anyway.

COUNSEL: Thank you.

MEMBER: Can we just have one last question on the pre 1980 period. How significant a figure was Steve Biko regarded in security branch circles in the 70's?

MR WILLIAMSON: Very significant, but now I am saying that...People like I regarded him as very significant. As I said before, I don't know how ... what degree of understanding there was sometimes of the reports we were writing, but I think that on

the high level there was an understanding that this waswell, that the whole black consciousness movement was far more dangerous in fact than the ANC. By 1975, 1976 I think the ANC was really pretty irrelevant as far as the state security structures were concerned. The black consciousness movement was a big problem, and Biko was seen as the intellectual and charismatic driving force of that and as something that was far more potentially threatening than the ANC or PAC.

MEMBER: How would the top levels of the security police, such as Genl Coetzee ...How did they feel about his having been killed?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know because I wasn't here, I was overseas. I can just tell you generally on Genl Coetzee is that if you just look at the statistics, you will see that from the time he became chief of the security branch, deaths and detention virtually stopped. Neil Agad died while he was there and I was there the day Agad died. I was in headoffice the day they reported Agad had died, and I saw Genl Coetzee's reaction. If I can judge by that, he would have been furious that they had been so stupid to allow Biko to die in the way he died.

MEMBER: But if one has to gauge the reaction of someone like Kruger, it was quite clear that he lacked the political sensitivities of ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, that is why I am saying sometimes one wondered whether people actually understood. I can't remember who it was who told the Commission that - was it Genl Constant who said one of the worst things the defence force was guilty of was hiding realities from the politicians, and I go along with that; not only the defence force, the security forces were shielding politicians from reality. Politicians often did not really understand what was really going on. Their reaction to Biko's death was a very good example of that.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we should turn to period 3 according to our questions and relate it to the period after you came back from Europe in 1980. Can you give us a description how ... We are trying now to focus on intelligence operations. When you came back from Europe, what was the situation? What kind of operations did the security branch run outside South Africa?

COUNSEL: I don't want to interrupt, but I think this was very fully dealt with in response to Jerome Chaskalson as also, I believe, at the media hearing.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, there is a document because the document is quite brief.

COUNSEL: Please do it because we are now running into a lot of overlap.

MR WILLIAMSON: Quite simply, my operation, as we said, was a joint operation. When I came back it was 1980 and, in fact,

that famous Simonstad Paraat of 1979 had taken place. There had been so-called division of responsibility. There were arguments within the security forces about who dit what, and despite what was the wording of the agreements at Simon's Town, for example, it was decided very clearly that when it came to the ANC, the Communist Party, the PAC, when it came to foreign South African organisations operating externally, carrying out physical terrorist actions in South Africa, the police were to play a major role. So we were allowed to operate externally as long as it was focused on organisations that were carrying out criminal activities in South Africa. So that meant I couldn't legitimately have sources in the British Labour Party or somewhere, but if I had a source in ANC headquarters then I was doing what was called our line function. I was put in charge of that foreign intelligence capability to try and modernise it. The special branch up until then security branch had a situation where a lot of foreign operations were being run by different branches, so the idea was to coordinate it and get it working according to the new structures as agreed in Simon's Town as well.

There was one other small division and that is that the Soweto security branch had an RS broker which we assisted in training and setting up and so on, but they handled completely separately. So people who ended up going to Quarto, for example, and getting caught by the ANC a spies who were

perhaps RSs weren't handled by my section; that was a separate operation." I handled everything else.

The report I have given you more or less details... This was a report in 1985 at a meeting of the intelligence section from the whole country and at which I wrote the document. When it gets to 'Besprekingspunte' - I wasn't actually at this conference because by then I was already on my way out. I was on leave because I was leaving. But I wrote this and it was like my final contribution to say, 'This is what we have achieved in the last four years; this is what we have done, this is how we are doing it'. It explains really almost everything except it does not go into details of specific operations. But I think you will see clearly there how we were trying to operate, that it was to infiltrate into... and based on my experience of the previous years, the previous nearly ten years.... to put people into key positions. So I started putting people into Europe first; that was the first priority, into Africa second, and then the Americas, Canada was the third.

From the very beginning I used RS people and I put most of them either into journalism, war resisters - Posal, yes - and into the sort of anti apartheid type of organisations. There were some people who were not RS; they were recruited sources, people who were involved in anti apartheid movements.

We did agree in the previous meeting that names - I think it was decided that we would leave names out, but we didn't control any organisations except we did control one anti apartheid movement and through that, because it was part of the it was an official anti apartheid movement, we had the ongoing access to the whole world anti apartheid movements. We actually even funded that movement. The man who ran it used to run fundraising to pay for it and of course we would pay as it was fundraising coming in. So we ran the whole anti apartheid operation.

Then Cosawha (?) in all the places had our people involved and then we had some like journalistic type of people. The one name, we did agree, because it has all been in the Press and everything, was Bertie Lowedien. He was acting as a freelance journalist and I structured that on the basis and, in fact, the British court found afterwards that it was according to how I thought it was. I reckoned that if a freelance journalist was paid by ...that its was not illegal for him to be paid by a South African intelligence agency to do research and reports and get to know people; do normal journalistic sort of work, and ultimately he was found not guilty in his trial because that was upheld that he had in fact not broken any laws.

So really that started from 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and there is somewhere - I will try and find it; I think I gave it to a

journalist - there is a list of all the different operations that were being carried out. I looked at the list about a year ago, one of the newspapers had it. There are several operations there that I can't even remember. I can remember the operation but I can't remember the real name of the person who was involved because I was essentially at that stage then manager and it grew as you will see from this pink report I gave you ...it grew from ... in four years it grew from 5 people, myself and four others with two sources, right through an intelligence group with 9 sections and a control personnel of 30, with probably, I don't know, but maybe 50 or more officers, I mean agents and sources. I was busy putting the thing together; I was quite busy for those years. Yes, I communicated with them; I had people who first of all just travelled to Europe. The story about us using hostesses on SAA is true, as couriers, I mean just to load and offload deaddrops, because they travel the whole time, they go to all cities and then they stay 2 or 3 days, and they go on tours and they do things. That story that has been alleged is true.

I used to go pretty regularly to have personal meetings, particularly when we were setting up operations. Payments were made usually by the handler. What I did, I would imagine within any year or two, we actually had handlers based in certain of the countries and they would move around. Payments...We had a structure, a veryI based it on the defence and aid fund's

payment structure. They thought that they were very clever that we didn't know how they were doing it. We knew exactly how they were doing it but there was nothing we could do about it because it was legal and it was structured by client/attorney confidentiality. We structured our payments in a similar way through banks and through attorneys and payments made into certain accounts but then also cash given to people. But a lot of the payments were done in a very similar way to IDA. Other intelligence agencies used the same systems.

Then also, somebody like Casilton, for example, was at one stage also based in England to be not a handler but an agent in place, somebody who would load and unload deaddrops, who would see people, give payments to them. He was not actually like responsible to politically instruct or debrief because he wouldn't have had the capability, but if he had to meet somebody and make a payment or give them something or receive something, that is what he was supposed to do.

Coordination, ja. From 1980 right up to the time I went to the defence force and even afterwards, that was the thorny issue.

From 1980, 1981, there was very little coordination although there was, but by 1985 there was very structured state security council managed systems that were in place, so that there had to be a cross-flow and communication of information to make sure that you were not operating on other people's area and you

weren't recruiting other people's sources, etc. That is generally what I can say.

MEMBER: We have a note from one of your briefings that the international was run by Capt Nel. By international you meant...is that everywhere except Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. He certainly ran it when I was leaving. I think, as it was said in the report, when Group G came into being, that was when it became really ... up until then I had been very much trying to be an octopus, the whole thing really fell under me and in 1984 it was then formalised into a proper group with sections and desk officers, and I think he was the first ... I think MacPherson was Africa, Louis van Niekerk was internal....

MEMBER: International, Piesang Nel, Africa, Vic MacPherson.

MR WILLIAMSON: Then counter espionage, Willie Botha, technical, Gerry Raven, training, Bruner.

MEMBER: Would Nel have operated outside of South Africa? Did he have a base outside South Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: He didn't, but he had some people under him who did, in Brussels.

MEMBER: And the African operation, was that largely Malawi based?

MR WILLIAMSON: And Botswana. Don Gold wasJa, if you look at it that way it was the most important because there was

an actual police officer based in Malawi, and other countries they just visited.

MEMBER: And Malawi focused essentially on Lusaka?

MR WILLIAMSON: Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. We were trying to get to the Solomon Mthanglu Freedom College which was not far north of the Malawi border. We started a little shop...

MEMBER: Oh, you started that shop?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, when I left they were starting it, I don't think it ever...But they were going to have a shop which...there was a shop very close to Solomon Mthanglu gate which they were going to buy from some trader or other and put some people in to run it, black guys.

MEMBER: Was this a Collections Operations or Collections and Operations?

MR WILLIAMSON: It was mainly Collection but Collection had to assist with Operations.

MEMBER: So can we assume, for example, that a bomb going off in Lusaka could well have been an operation run from Malawi?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, there was one bomb which I ...it happened more or less at the time when I was leaving. I think Vic McPheron probably told you about it.

MEMBER: Vic or Don..

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but it was ... that was actually a military operation. Our people helped with the delivery. I remember ...I

was very peripherally involved but I have a feeling it was a military operation and then it was one of our they couldn't deliver it. It was for the Cowboy Conference and they couldn't deliver it so finally one of the Africa section sources actually physically carried it to Lusaka.

MEMBER: Was that the one that went off in the Secretary General's office?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: Would the Malawian government have been fully appraised of what this operation was about?

MR WILLIAMSON: Which one? Do you mean the bomb?

MEMBER: No, did the Malawian government know that you had an operation...

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, and I was very upset - I'm still upset because they killed the source...

MEMBER: Who is 'they'?

MR WILLIAMSON: Banda's people.

MEMBER: Banda's people killed the source?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. Then I tried to ...It was one of those tragedies. Maybe his family should get something. They were absolutely appraised because basically we were feeding them information on the Malawian intelligence, on the Malawian opposition, in return for them just letting our operation go on.

At a certain time there was competition between the national

intelligence and the police. I know because of what I heard, but I'm sure Gold and them can tell you much more. National intelligence service, the source resigned from the Police and joined national intelligence service to do exactly the same task as he had been doing before, the only difference is that while we had been channelling his information on the Malawian resistance, and we wanted information about the ANC, they were more interested in the Malawian resistance. The next minute he was arrested because of his involvement with the Malawian resistance. They put him in gaol and we then heard that he was executed. National intelligence denied all knowledge of him and refused to give his family any pension. I could not organise anything about he had officially resigned from the Police, so that was a very upsetting, dirty little episode. The national intelligence guy got expelled out of Malawi. He got arrested but then expelled because he was a diplomat, and it caused huge problems between South Africa and Malawi.

MEMBER: What year would that have been?

MR WILLIAMSON: After I left already, so it must have been 1987, 1988 even. His name was Frackson Zgambo, popularly known as Frackie, introduced to merecruited by Peter Casilton because he was the licensing officer of the Directorate of Civil Aviation. He was the first qualified black airline pilot I think in the subcontinent. He flew that BAC 111 of Malawi

Airways and then he was promoted into DCC. He then became our source and they finally ... Banda had him killed. That was done purely because National Intelligence couldn't run an operation properly.

MEMBER: Is there any truth to the allegation that this cooperation with the Malawi government extending to you doing operations for them against the opposition?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, that explosion was in Harare somewhere, it wasn't us. It may well have been South African but it wasn't us. I heard from our links with Malawi it was them, it was the Malawians because they were boasting about it. We had direct links at the highest level with the Malawian police.

MEMBER: Did we give them any training, the Malawi Security?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, training and equipment.

MEMBER: Training and equipment. Anything more on G?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, you mention here that you had people based in Europe: Peter Casilton was based in Europe even though he might have been a handler according to what you are saying. There are other people who were followed by him. The sources, the informers that thee people used, were they recruited in South Africa or did you also use was it South Africans, all of them, or were they foreigners?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, there was some foreigners but mostly all recruited here. . Not that they lived here and recruited here, but

people who came here and who were met. I can give you an example. Wedien was here on the normal journalist and somebody ...because he went around and he was now writing stories and interviewing people, somebody met him and talked to him and found out that he was quite ...he had been in the Swedish intelligence or military or something and he was quite....he was definitely quite conservative politically. The stuff that he had been writing seemed to be very pro South African, if you want to put it that way. It was as a result of a report to us that there was this Swedish journalist who wasseemed to be politically correct in our terms, that he was approached and then the normal....just the spotting and then the recruitment process starts, and then he was amenable.

He was in fact false-flagged in the beginning but very quickly knewI mean, he accepted ... the false flag was a very vague flag that was working forsomething like this Longreach report; political whisk analysis work. That was ...but at the end of the day he knew who I was and Arthur Clayton. He knew I was Craig Williamson.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you read Jacques Pauw's book, the new book. He interviewed Peter Casilton and Peter Casilton mentioned to him that there was a Dutch police officer who was used also as an informer. Were you ever involved in that, in the recruitment...

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, all I can say is that there was a Dutch police officer.

CHAIRPERSON: I know that you don't want to mention names here, but...

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but much of what Casilton said I just have to say is alcoholic dementia.

CHAIRPERSON: But we know that these people were based in Europe and there is reason to believe that this continued in the late 80's, the beginning of the 90's. I would say that the Security Branch had people based in Europe and they then debriefed or handled these people, these sources for the information. You mentioned that you sometimes travelled to Europe to meet the informers, the sources, I suppose. Did you have any sources by yourself that was not handled by the people based there?

MR WILLIAMSON: Only one. I had a very highly placed official in Greece and Genl Coetzee and I were the only ones who handled him.

CHAIRPERSON: As an army officer?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, military secret service.

CHAIRPERSON: These people who were based in Europe, they obviously infiltrated the liberation anti apartheid movements, and you could, through these people, access information about their activities; the ANC people in exile and so on. Do you know if they used that information for operations in South Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: Who? Do you mean...?

CHAIRPERSON: The Security Branch, either during your time or afterwards?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. The information, by the time I was running it, was very carefully handled. My biggest task was managing and handling that information as it came in, and to make sure it was then channelled to the right structures, but in the right way. Our information...I know what you are getting at.

Let me put it this way: We were never, to my knowledge, told that, for example - and I am giving now an example that did not happen - say for example something like Dulcie September, ...but never with thesaying, 'look, we are going to do XYZ with that'. It was just standard procedure. If there was an ANC house or office, it was to be fully documented and that would go out of my hands because there was no threat to that. It wouldn't blow my source. Maybe if I said, like one occasion the job done here, if I said, 'In the office there is XYZ' that might blow my source, but if there was just a sketch plan of the building and this and that and photographs and whatever, that was done. There was a separate group entirely which was first in my day called 'Teikenidentifikasie'; later on I hear it became.... and all that. That did exist and, yes, but never to my knowledge ... they would never say, 'We are going to take action against somebody, we need a plan of their house or their office'. The plan of the house

and the office was always one of the first things that was done in any place anywhere and obviously they were used mainly, I would imagine, for bugging, for access, but then also it could be used if they wanted to go and take somebody out. But on no occasion was I aware of any other operational activity. Just to finish, most of the information would be disguised. If I had information on what was going in, for example, a certain apartheid office, we had to be very careful the way we put that information into the system. So that was what was done in Pretoria to make sure that we didn't compromise our source.

CHAIRPERSON: You mention also that one of the target areas for you was America and Canada. Did you manage to also recruit or handle any source informer based in America?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not while we were in the Police. It was in the process ... Just when I left it was starting, but we had quite extensive links - I won't say official but it was official in a way.

There was a lot of common ground between us and American political and other organisations, specifically relating to the Soviets and what they were up to. For example, the last operation my people did together on the American side was that conference of the World Freedom Fighters at Jamba in 1985. We brought the Muja Mohadien from Afghanistan, we brought everybody from everywhere, the Nicaraguans, any anti communists, and we had all sorts of strange people here. We

flew them from Lanseria to Jamba where Zavimbi held this big conference. Adolpho Colero was one from I think Nicaragua. Through that, what later happened when I was in the military, is that we had some sources that grew out of that, but more on a very political level than anything else.

In Canada we had one source related to the anti apartheid movement by the time that I left, a woman who was working with the anti apartheid movement.

MR WILLIAMSON: I would like to go into of course more details about the sources in Europe but we have an agreement that we shall not mention any names, so I think we will leave it at that.

MEMBER: Let me just jump backwards. You mentioned the Simonstad Beraad. Basically, was the primary purpose of the meeting to effect a division of labour?

MR WILLIAMSON: Number one, and number two to work out a way to take off the gloves.

MEMBER: Yes, because I was going to ask you... You mentioned in your statement at the Truth Commission that the Security Police were told to take the gloves off...

MR WILLIAMSON: The Security Forces.

MEMBER: The Security Forces, in regard to external operations?

MR WILLIAMSON: Generally, but things were getting out of hand ..All reorganisation that was done there was because the perception was that our structures were not efficient...

MEMBER: And that the situation was reaching a revolutionary situation ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Now there must be some real attention given to the problem, stop playing, take off the gloves.

MEMBER: And that expression could be interpreted in the same way as 'elimineer'.

MR WILLIAMSON: That is where it all....If you look, in 1980 ..from 1970 ir 1980 that is where the whole coordinated reaction to the 'totale aanslag' started.

MEMBER: You went back by then, at the time of Simon's Town. P W chaired that conference?

MR WILLIAMSON: From what I am told, yes. Because everything I did was as a result of whatYou know, at Simonstad we were told, 'Right, this is now what the Police had to do, and your job is this specific element'...

MEMBER: So, in the sense of the revolutionary situation that had developed in the region, was based on the situation in Angola, Mozambique, and the fact was clear that the Smith regime was collapsing?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just go back to the question I've put to you about the informers, the sources that you had in Europe. Would it possible for them ... you had now your agents based in Europe and they were handling the sources. Would the sources also be able to run their own informers, a network of informers?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but normally that wouldn't be ...It could happen, but that would be rare that the source would then...Yes, they would have sub sources, but they would not be witting. It could happen but it does not jump to mind.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't recall that any of your sources were running....

MR WILLIAMSON: Had witting sub sources.

CHAIRPERSON: It was suggested to me that this Dutch police officer was running his own network.

MR WILLIAMSON: They would not I don't think he was running witting sources. His involvement was actually not as exciting as some people make out. But one of the things he did help us with, for example, he had access to Interpol and we didn't at that time. We could check people with Interpol. We could ask him, say, 'Is there anything on European records on this guy?'...that sort of thing. It wasn't anything....I think maybe he had somebody who he would ask, who knew he was very friendly with South Africa. It wasn't like a big secret. I think people

knew. He was pretty well connected in South Africa on an official level, almost on a colleague to colleague...

MEMBER: Craig, in addition to the Simonstad Beraad, I can't recall who but we had a briefing from a military person who talked about the significance of the Fort Klapperkop conference of December 1978. Is that something that is wellknown in the security circles? It was a conference of top police generals plus Genl D'Almeida from Argentina.

MR WILLIAMSON: I can't During those years there was quite a lot of cooperation with Argentina. I've been in 1980 at Klapperkop or at Koepel, Die Koepel not Klapperkop. You know, Die Koepel they call it, the observatory.

MEMBER: What is it?

MR WILLIAMSON: It is the intelligence school.

MEMBER: Okay.

MR WILLIAMSON: It is on the site of the old observatory in Pretoria. It is near Klapperkop. They call it Die Koepel because the old observatory building is still there with the telescope. We even had this guy who was captured, the famous torturer,...

MEMBER: Aztees?

MR WILLIAMSON: Aztees. He lectured us, but not on how to torture people, on the leftwing threat, the 'totale aanslag' in Argentina. There were quite close relations.

CHAIRPERSON: Just one more question: When you left the Police in 1985, did you continue to use the sources in Europe or America, or wherever it was?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I had to make a complete plat and one of the things we had to do was make sure we didn't poach. I took some personnel. I took Paula...

CHAIRPERSON: Louis van Niekerk?

MR WILLIAMSON: Louis, Paula; I took them initially and we then started building a completely new structure similar practically to what I had been doing.

MEMBER: Paula de Beer.

CHAIRPERSON: We know that .. You mentioned yourself...Treverts was established in 1985/86 which was really an effort to try to join the operations between the Security Forces, the intelligence gathering also. My question is then, were you ever involved in this discussion or the work of the Treverts?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I didn't know about...I never heard the word Treverts until it came out in the newspapers. In my day it was called Teikenidentifikasie and that was a joint...They used to get....But then it was usually done specifically. They would ask, 'Do you have information on eggs?'and then everybody would have to bring what they had and get together, and give it to the military usually, like Maseru in 1982. All these sketch

plans.... There was at one stage an instruction that the photographs and sketches of any ANC installation must be done and sent through to the military.

MEMBER: Anton Nieuwoudt has given us a quite detailed explanation of how Teikenidentifikasie, that section operated, and it clearly involved levels higher than you in terms of approving a target, for example. If a target is recommended for action.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: Without impinging on your amnesty application, I mean one would assume that when you are asked to prepare ... you are asked to get the technical section to prepare a letter bomb, that it was because a target had been identified. Did you make that assumption even if you did not know who the target was?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, if they asked me, 'Craig, your sources in charge of Botswana, tell them to get all the stuff on So-and-so's house in Botswana', I would then tell them to get it all and go and do whatever you do. They go and have meetings and then they would come back and maybe after two weeks we'd suddenly hear the house blew up. Yes, from very early on I made that correlation between...but that was how at that stage they did it. They just asked anybody who should have information on that area for it, but later it became much more, it became a whole

structure on its own. Because Teikenidentifikasie also - if I understood it correctly - was...you know how the military plan. They have got contingency plans for everything and they had to have at hand targets ready even if they weren't...So if some politician or somebody said, 'We need a target', they could rush off with four or five files and say....Without having to prepare them it was already all done, now just choose which one you feel like, which one is the best. They used to keep these....That is how I understood it and that is why we had to keep feeding them with that type of information.

CHAIRPERSON: Then in 1985 you decided to leave the SA Police. At that stage, had you already been in contact with the people from Military Intelligence and decided to join them? Or was that a decision you took later?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I knew the people from Military Intelligence because I obviously had worked with them for the previous 5 years. My reasons are very simple. Number one, I thought that things were in certain areas getting out of control. I didn't like the Vlakplaas/Swazi type operations. I didn't feel very comfortable with some of the operations I have been involved in, not because I had moral or other objections but because I thought they were counter productive. The states of emergency and the whole way things were going, it was heading for an attempt to solve a political problem by force, and I said,

'Well, then we must all just get ready for a big war here because that is what is going to happen'. That was the one reason.

The other reason was, I was getting more and more senior. They were promoting me to colonel and I always used to joke about it and say that in order for me to get - and Genl Coetzee and others used to tell me, 'For you to get more promotion, to go ahead in the organisation you are, I'm going to have to go and get ...' And I had them, big books on force orders about regulations pertaining to mortuaries and the tyres for police vehicles. If I did not know that stuff I could not be promoted. I said I am not interested in mortuaries, police vehicles or the station commander's job in John Vorster Square, I am an Intelligence guy and that is all that interests me. I said that I wanted to stay purely on Intelligence. I am fascinated by Intelligence operation, I like them and I'll go and do pure Intelligence, I mean in that sense. But I also had political aspirations. I thought that if I got a chance I would like to go to parliament. So I resigned and, obviously, I needed a job. I wanted to do something Intelligence related, and I did speak to the military before I resigned and they organised me a job, then I went straight from the one to the other. Somebody told me, and I did tell Chaskalson that they say there is no record of me ever working for the military. Somebody at one stage said that, but my attorneys have got my

IRP5 tax returns, signed and stamped by them, so I can prove I worked for them.

That was really it. So from 1 January 1986 I joined Directorate of Koeberg and I really only stayed there just over a year so hadn't really got very far by the time I left because I then stood for parliament.

CHAIRPERSON: At the time when you joined DCC it was headed by Botha?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Within the structure of DCC where did Longreach fit in? What was the ...?

MR WILLIAMSON: It was a cover operation for my section.

CHAIRPERSON: And the purpose...? What was the task?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, my section was called 'Ander Lande', other countries and we were completely clandestine, so we needed a front. So we created a company called Longreach which acted as our front. When we operated we were in 31 Princess of Wales Terrace in Parktown as a company called Longreach, but that was 'Ander Lande', it was 'DCC Ander Lande'. That is where Longreach comes from. Longreach was the South African subsidiary of a Jersey based company and that was established purely as our cover. We were political risk consultants. So there was never any Operation Longreach, and I told people before and they checked it; the name Longreach, we went to an attorney in

Jersey and said, 'We need a shelf company' and he gave me a piece of paper with a whole lot of names and I looked and I said, 'Goodness, here Longreach, that sounds good; what do you guys think?' They all said, 'Yes, it sounds nice', and that was Longreach. That was after Olaf Parma was already dead. So there was never any Operation Longreach.

MEMBER: There were other front companies that the DCC funded?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, because we were paid by other front companies, like PIA, GC and Afrimfo. My driver still has a car registered in the name of Afrimfro. It was African Information Systems. There were the two and we used to get our money from those, and as far as I know those were controlled by the direct Chief of Staff, Finance, because they were financial... I knew nothing about them, I just used to see the papers.

MEMBER: For how long had there been something called the DCC?

MR WILLIAMSON: A long time. It goes right back to the sixties, as far as I know. All the time I have been involved there was a DCC, Directorate Covert Collection under Chief of Staff, Intelligence. But DCC became more and more clandestine. At one time DCC was just sitting in Ponting building but then it slowly started learning how... As the guys were brought from the tank school, schooled a bit in Intelligence, they started learning

that you should perhaps try and be a bit more discreet about Intelligence operations. So DCC started becoming...But even when I was involved, DCC was still being run out of Liberty Life building, so it was really quite open. Tolletjie Botha used to wear uniform when he went to meetings of State Security Council.

CHAIRPERSON: I suppose one of the results from the Longreach was these reports we have been given an example of?

MR WILLIAMSON: That is what we did on a monthly basis, really just to justify the existence of Longreach. If people said, 'You are Longreach, what do you do?' we would have a card and say, 'No, we do this political report, you have to pay R3 000 or R4 000 a year and you get this; and you get a weekly special briefing', but that was purely a cover.

CHAIRPERSON: Besides this cover, it is correct that you were also running from Longreach sources, informers? For example, in Europe or all over the world?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, but the idea was for us to build. DCC had different sections; the ones I know were Oosfront - East front - Wesfront, Tuisfront - home front - Vyandelike Organisasies which was more a counter espionage; they only worked on foreign intelligence services. Ander Lande which was everywhere except Oos, Wes and Tuis; ANC which was a new one because they offered me the job of... I had a choice, ANC desk or

Ander Lande and I deliberately did not take the ANC desk because I was sick and tired of the ANC. I went off and did Ander Lande because I had then a mandate to do much broader military intelligence gathering relating to the South African military political situation. It had to be militarily related otherwise we would be on National Intelligence's field. So my first job was to set up cover and to set up then access. My first target was the OAU Liberation Committee, and that is where the whole Seychelles saga came about. Because basically we were running the Seychelles Intelligence Service like EO, very similar to EO. We had a contract to run Intelligence, and because we were now the Intelligence Service of an independent African state member of the OAU, it gave us access through to the OAU.

I started on OAU and started on Uganda and then I started an operation in London ... also a journalist based operation, BBC based operation.

CHAIRPERSON: With your experience from the Security Branch intelligence gather in ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry, the one I mentioned, the one American...You would think all the international freedom foundation which was a dual operation...It was an Army Intelligence Operation for Comops, Communications, but in it we had our man who was and intelligence gatherer, and he was sitting in Washington and just bringing in political intelligence

related to Washington's attitude to everything to do with Unita, South Africa, etc.

CHAIRPERSON: With your experience from the Security Branch and the resources you had for international intelligence gathering, and now you came into the military intelligence ...If you compare the resources, the Security Branch Military Intelligence was that on a similar level, or...

MR WILLIAMSON: What do you mean? The sources or resources?

CHAIRPERSON: Resources.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, the military had many more resources.

CHAIRPERSON: Money spent for the Military Intelligence International operations...

MR WILLIAMSON: Much more money. I could easily propose a budget for over a million to the Military and they did not bat an eyelid. If you did that to the Police they'd have a heart attack. The Police were very tight on money. The Military had a lot of money. For example, our American operation they funded because they had huge funds for Army Intelligence Comops, so they took a lot of that money to fund Freedom Foundation, millions, literally millions. My operation was actually quite cheap, but we used that money to run the thing in tandem. A part of it was being handled by Brigadier Ferdie van Wyk and my

people were handling the intelligence gathering component, but the Army had much more money.

CHAIRPERSON: So, with a number of people based in Europe and sources you were running from the Security Branch, compared now with the Military Intelligence, if they had that much more money, much more resources and so on, would you also say that the informers based in Europe working for the Military Intelligence - there were more people in Europe?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I think....They obviously had a few sources in Europe but mainly, that I knew of, that was still handled directly by Tolletjie Botha, of a high level. But otherwise they did not have a network as good as the previous one I had run for the Police, and that was the idea, to build up. But we were going to concentrate more on the military aspects and more on the campaign against military cooperation, against sanctions, against all that, especially on the military side. Because the Police had the ANC pretty well tied up. But on the political military side I think there were a lot of gaps, and that's what we wanted to fill. But, as I said, I really only had about a year.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you use the legal representation, the intelligence representation in the various countries?

MR WILLIAMSON: We could use it because it fell under DCC.

All the attaches are part of DCC.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you coordinate also with the National Intelligence representation?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: At the embassies?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, there was not much love lost. The Police and the Military tolerated each other.

MEMBER: You mentioned that you had this contract to run the Seychelles Intelligence operation; how did you get that? Did you sell the idea to them or did you hear that it was up for grabs?

MR WILLIAMSON: I got involved in the Seychelles, I don't even really remember how exactly it happened, but it had to do with me ... after the Hall episode. Then they were trying to get the guys released from the Seychelles and I had some sources; anyway, ultimately....But then by the time I left the Police I had the contacts. Rene's government was totally paranoid about coup attempts from South Africa, and I had met the biggest businessman in Seychelles, Mario Ritchie, who was and still is the big friend and supporter of the president. He was funding international intelligence operations against the Seychelles opposition. So I proposed and he proposed that we sort of decided that this was a good idea, Longreach being this political risk type operation that one of our first contracts would be the political intelligence work related to any threats to the Rene government from South Africa or elsewhere. Oh no, I will tell

you. After all, there was another attempt to overthrow, and my people were in fact...my section actually in the Police stopped the coup and arrested the guys. So that's how they got to know me and they thought, you know, maybe this guy is sort of serious; he is against people who want a coup in the Seychelles. So we got the contract; we monitored the Seychelles people here, which was easy to do because we had official....I mean, we were DCC so it wasn't difficult. Then we got involved. They had some other foreign operations. They had hired some British and other private detective to do things.

The second component was to come up with a defence strategy for the Seychelles. By then I had a British general, retired general, and some ex Royal Marines and people who came and did consultancy work but on a serious level, on giving them a strategy for military protection systems but a marine based because of the nature of the Seychelles.

MEMBER: So this contract was a formal written agreement between the government of the Seychelles and Longreach?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, between the government and GMR ...sub contracted Longreach to do the job. But at that stage GMR was really running the external intelligence service.

MEMBER: How long did that arrangement last, or does it still apply?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. It really lasted not very much longer after I left. I actually then formally joined the GMR group and we still used Longreach for a while because I knew obviously who Longreach were. It lasted until basically the Commonwealth conference in Harare - when was that? 1988. It lasted until that conference when Ogilvie Burlouis lost his position...Rene went flying back and they accused Ogilvie Burlouis, the Minister of Defence who was our big friend, a personal friend of mine by then, of being planning a coup against Rene, but it was a Soviet disinformation thing. It was very well done. so basically they knew what we were up to and they made a whole thing....They convinced Rene basically that we were the fox in the henhouse and that we were going to do what we were paid not to prevent. He believed the story and that was that and so Longreach was kicked out. Ogilvie Burlouis lost his position as Minister of Defence.

MEMBER: Going back to the 1981 attempted coup; what was the level of authorisation in your view of that operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: I had a ... well, not I; Durban Security Branch had a source who reported the coup attempt. I can't remember his name now. If you give me a list of the guys, I'd tell you which one. He reported ... It was reported to Durban and to Pretoria that this whole thing was on, and he was officially told, 'Don't worry, it's fine; it is all approved, go ahead,

if they are going to pay you to on the coup, go on the coup', and he ended up serving...

MEMBER: It's Dolanchec.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no, Dolanchec was working for NI. No, this was a source of Durban branch. They checked with Dolanchec and other people, and everybody said, 'No problem, let him go, he will get paid to do the job', and he was officially told by Vic MacPherson, 'You can go; you can participate, it is all approved'. And he went to gaol for two years, and his source fees were paid every month.

MEMBER: But it would not have extended ... Piet Botha may not necessarily be lying when he said he didn't know about it.

MR WILLIAMSON: I....You see, I wasn't involved, although I was involved afterwards and Vic came and told me, 'Now what do we do about this poor source who is in gaol?' I said, 'Well, we'd better just pay his family his salary every month and tell him to keep his mouth shut, and we'd try and get him out as soon as possible', and we did. He served like 12 months in Baviaanspoort.

MEMBER: When you say you set up a BBC operation, did you recruit from inside or did you place people in?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I recruited somebody who was working with

CHAIRPERSON: A question that was put in that document was related to Mocambique. I just want to ask you, do you know about any DCC operation in Mozambique, intelligence gathering operation in Mocambique?

MR WILLIAMSON: I knew there was one; Oosfront handled...East Front handled Mozambique, Colonel At Nel. He was the boss of the East Front like I was the boss of other countries, and I knew he was working in Mozambique. After I left DCC and I was in the President's Council, I visited Mozambique many I was there a lot and I saw DCC people, in fact we would smile at each other at the Polano Hotel or at the restaurant, the Sheik Restaurant. I saw DCC people and they were ostensibly working on a demining project, but it was DCC. They were demining but they were all DCC.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know about any details about the people or....

MR WILLIAMSON: No, they were there and also counter intelligence were working there, DCI. They were trying to recruit some people in the Mozambique Intelligence, but Mozambique Intelligence knew who was trying to recruit them and it was all a game they were playing.

CHAIRPERSON: The name - I don't know how to pronounce it - Ziao....

MR WILLIAMSON: Ziao....

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, obviously you knew him.

MR WILLIAMSON: Knew him very well. You know he is dead?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ex member of Mozambican Intelligence, but was undercover as a businessman, or was a businessman with very close Intelligence connections. The only thing I ever did with Letaure is we worked on the Peace Process, and I've given you a whole lot of stuff and on breaking sanctions. I have given you several documents relating.... just to tell you that this RFB is Pik Botha and PWB is P W Botha. But I was very involved with bringing about the negotiations between Renamo and the Mocambicans and Ziao was involved. The other thing I was involved with Ziao was sanctions because after I left DCC I went to the President's Council and I was working with Giama ... that is what we did. We were involved on the political and sanctions busting....

CHAIRPERSON: Can you recall a meeting that was set up by him or the Swedish ambassador in Maputo in 19...it must have been 1987?

MR WILLIAMSON: For what purpose?

CHAIRPERSON: Well I'm not sure about that.

MR WILLIAMSON: Do you mean he had a meeting or he ...

CHAIRPERSON: He set up a meeting with the Swedish ambassador, and Litau invited you, that was for a dinner with the Swedish ambassador.

MR WILLIAMSON: I remember, ja.

CHAIRPERSON: You recall that, and ...

MR WILLIAMSON: She is a lady.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no...

MR WILLIAMSON: Oh, it was a lady after

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I remember it.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you remember the purpose for that meeting?

MR WILLIAMSON: No...

CHAIRPERSON: You don't remember?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I remember it happened, ja, but I've got a feeling Ziao said that I don't think he told me 'Come to dinner with the Swedish ambassador'.

CHAIRPERSON: Obviously he had a very good relation to the Swedish ambassador at the time, but you don't remember that there was any specific issue that should be raised during the meeting?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, now that you mention it, I remember the incident and Maybe we were going to try and recruit him.

(Laughter)

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, everything was possible.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I don't actually remember what the

Now that you mention it, I remember and I think I was a little uncomfortable because I assumed that the Swedish ambassador would very quickly find out who I was and the IUEF background and things.

CHAIRPERSON: When he heard that you also were coming for dinner, he cancelled it?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I remember the occasion.

CHAIRPERSON: During this period from 1985 to 1990, did you have any dealings with Philip Powell?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. From?

CHAIRPERSON: From 1985. I think he was ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Even earlier. I probably met him; I don't know. He was a sergeant, he was a youngster. I knew he existed and I think probably spoke to him on an occasion or occasions, but I don't know him, never dealt with him. He was mainly ... During my time he was on the Freedom Foundation side of things, Louis van Niekerk and them dealt with him.

CHAIRPERSON: Leon Simmers?

MR WILLIAMSON: Jonty Leon Simmers, nothing to do with Mozambique except that he wanted us to buy some palm trees. We used him to set up a thing called Victims Against Terrorism, Vat, VAT, which he did for some years. But he was on Comops and he was also involved when John Gogotshe, who is now an MP

for the National Party ...he had some militarily funded political party or something, the Federal Party or something. They were trying toJonty dealt with John. In fact, we met him. I think John Gogotshe went on the first demonstration of VAT outside the London ANC offices on the first anniversary of the Pretoria car bomb. That Jonty handled, really VAT, a propaganda operation, and that was Police not Military.

MEMBER: When you were working in DCC what was Eben Barlow's role at DCC?

MR WILLIAMSON: I just knew his name. We were very ... We didn't have offices with them. We weren't allowed to go to the farm. Ours was a totally clandestine operation. Afterwards when I left, Louis and them started going to the braais at the farm and so on, but in my day I never allowed...We didn't have any communication except via Tolletjies, 2 IC; Marietjie orThen with Tolletjie himself I used to his house. Then we had of course a computer link but I totally in fact, I even put my offices in Parktown, Princess of Wales Terrace instead of in
I've a different way of doing things.

MEMBER: You mentioned to us at some point I thinkthis was a discussion we had in Cape Town that the CCB ...they did not necessarily use that term, CCB, but they tried to recruit you into running their international or their European operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: And you turned it down. You were sick of ANC, you did not want to do the kinds of things that they were indicating they were going to do.

MR WILLIAMSON: That was Jo Verster.

MEMBER: Ja. Could you confirm that once you turned it down Eben Barlow took the job?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I never ... I've heard that subsequently but I never had any personal knowledge of it myself.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we should go into the more general questions.

MEMBER: Here we were fishing somewhat.

MR WILLIAMSON: The stuff I gave you, you will see, this is all about Litaua and what we were up to with Renamo andI think there is even....They wanted purchase of some aircraft for the Mozambican Defence Force and Airforce, and the promotion of the trade and investment. Just to tell you... this thing...You will see the letter SNCT, it stands for the Secretariats for Non Conventional Trade. Have you got one like that? Andries Brink.

When I was with Gioma, with Litaua, we were building this link between the Bulgarians and the First Red Chinese. The first mainland China delegation came here under my auspices. I opened the conference so as not to upset the Taiwanese by getting a real politician. I mean, a member of the President's Council could be explained away, but if somebody more higher

had opened it....So that really gives you the background on what I was doing with Litaua and Giovan.

MEMBER: You mentioned a little bit earlier, when you were getting tired of your work with the Police in the early 80's. You said something about operations in Swaziland. What were you referring to?

MR WILLIAMSON: My understanding in 1984, 1985 was that there had been a division of work, that Botswana was Army and that Swaziland the Army were told to keep out of because the Police had it completely I mean they were running the place. We even had ... There was a guy called Stan Hancock; he was based ... a Security Branch guy was officially in the trade mission there, liaising every day. All our police cars ... the links between the Swazi Police and the SA Security Branch ... used to go and visit them with Genl Coetzee in a helicopter, go and have lunch. The relations were like one of the homeland police forces. It was very close. Obviously all the hits against the ANC there were done by Vlakplaas, and that's what I was referring to.

MEMBER: In Dirk Coetzee's 1989 sort of confession document he talks about the elaborate infrastructure that had existed in Swaziland.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, he ran it before...He was in charge of it until the time he was brought to head office.

MEMBER: Some of these people were paid informers and some of them collaborated for ideological reasons, did they? He talks about, for example, restaurant owners, hotel owners, farmers..

MR WILLIAMSON: Holiday Inn. We never paid for our rooms. We were all on the same side and we had common If I went to Swaziland on a mission, I stayed at the Lugaga Spa and I never paid.

MEMBER: And that was a sort of arrangement with Rennies, or what?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, it was with the guys who were running this. Now sometimes I go into a Sun International Hotel and the guys who see me nearly die of fright and disappear. In those days There are still people ...Ja, they liked to be friends of the Security Branch, and they could ask favours, make no error. That's where Dirk got into trouble.

MEMBER: A lot of that support came from ex patriot communities?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

MEMBER: What about ... And you had close working relations with the Swazi Police and the Swazi Special Branch. Were some of those people on payroll?

MR WILLIAMSON: I can't tell you directly yes, but to my knowledgenot to my general impression, knowing how the situation is working and the information we were getting, yes.

MEMBER: Would you say the same was true or be it to a lesser extent in Lesotho and Botswana?

MR WILLIAMSON: Absolutely. There were police officers being paid and there were sources in the post offices being paid.

I mean, it is standard procedure; if the Swazi Police are tapping a whole lot of people's phones in Swaziland, all you do is recruit the guys in charge of the phone-tapping and then you don't have to tap the phones yourself, you just get the transcripts. That's the basis of the idea, and if at the end of the day you are both fighting the same enemy and they don't like the ANC anymore than you do, except they have to be a bit more polite to them because they are an independent African state and the politicians go to the OAU and shake Oliver Tambo's hand, that makes no difference on the ground. Those Special Branch guys there regarded the ANC as communists and a threat to their kingdom, especially in Swaziland, as a threat to the traditional.... you know, their ideas were a bit wild, so they watched them and would hand over that information. I know it happened because I used to see some of that information because I never had to run operations in Swaziland. That's what I'm telling you, on that basis, because I was never asked to run operations in Swaziland, because we didn't have to. You know, Middelburg ran Swaziland. In fact, we were often told, 'Keep', you know, 'keep out of, don't mess in Swaziland'. It was sown up.

MEMBER: You used to stay at the Tavern quite often as well, didn't you?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: There was a Swiss source in the Tavern, an ANC source that you guys kidnapped.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.... not me.

MEMBER: Talking about this support for surrogate forces in general, recalling your response to Glen Goosen's question that you ran surrogate forces in every southern African country bar Botswana and Swaziland, clearly Zambia falls into that categorisation. What I wanted to ask you about was this Operation Plathond which we received information about which indicates that as far back as 1972 there was an operation in the Caprivi to train a Zambian dissident force.

MR WILLIAMSON: Again, I wasn't involved, but I saw papers come across my desk, and there was Caprivi interest, obviously, in....The only name that jumps into my mind was Hephlethwaite, and in those days that he was British, I think, but he was connected with Cheluba, and they were.... so, I mean, Cheluba's.... There was right back in those days some help and assistance on that level. Cheluba was then, I think, in the trade unions. Because of my position then I used to read the intelligence reports; they were sent to me.... any report of outside South Africa, so I'm just recalling stuff I've read.

MEMBER: I think we have been able to corroborate that 1970.... in fact, it goes back I think to 1971, 1972 operation. There was a second operation from 1974 which was the Mashala gang, which, I think, was taken over from the Portuguese.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but there were... I mean, both in Zambia and Lesotho the Governments sitting now had relations with the security forces here before..... I mean the National Party security forces.

MEMBER: Can we correctly assume that that operation where the three white former Rhodesians were killed in Matabeleland was probably a SADF destabilisation operation of some kind?

MR WILLIAMSON: Or reconnaissance, ja, that went wrong.

MEMBER: But the idea that these guys were on a private trespassing mission is beyond credibility?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

MEMBER: We were told Rich Verster, this guy who is sitting in gaol in Britain, gave testimony and he indicated that there were military operations, covert or clandestine operations to attack some of the - what do you call these areas where they were moving the guerrillas into these staging areas prior to the election; that the SADF in conjunction with Zulu scouts attacked some of those staging areas. Have you ever heard anything about that?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I was only involved in moving some of the Zulu scouts out afterwards.

MEMBER: Tell us about that.

MR WILLIAMSON: I was justRight after the election they had to evacuate a whole of Zulu scout families. Casilton flew them out.

MEMBER: Was there a prior arrangement, a prior agreement that that would happen?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know. I just was called in a panic and told there were these guys there and we had to get them from Harare to Joh'burg. I sent a plane in and met the source in Harare, and we managed to get them out. They were all then arrested at Mesina when they arrived, when he landed there. By that time it was okay and it was Brigadier Victor, he was then colonel or whatever; he then went off and solved the problem because nobody was supposed to know that the plane and the pilot was anything to.....because you know we were using a clandestine operation toSo it seems that I was the only one who had the capability at that moment. After that they kept them at Daisy for a while and then they all joined the defence force. We never saw them again.

MEMBER: What was the panic? Was there a fear that the Mugabe government would arrest them?

MR WILLIAMSON: That they were going to be killed.

MEMBER: Kill them?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, that was the fear. So they were moved out but they all joined the military and probably started working against Mugabe.

MEMBER: Because, you know, we have been told about something called Operation Winter which was to recruit extensively from the white members of special forces in Rhodesia, RLI, SAS etc. General Loots apparently went to Harare.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I don't know about it but they did. There were plenty of former Rhodesian special forces especially who came into special forces and into military intelligence, and especially into DST, what's....Special Tasks....

MEMBER: Special Tasks, ja. And Moserewa's auxiliaries were also moved down to Messina?

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know about that. I was only involved in the Selous Scouts. Oh, and I think why we did the Selous Scouts is we were funding the Selous Scouts, Pretoria, the security branch was funding this.

MEMBER: Had all along?

MR WILLIAMSON: The Intelligence component was being paid for out of our secret fund so they were very close....

MEMBER: From how far back do you think?

MR WILLIAMSON: Oh I don't know, but it was a running operation when I got there. It was a guy called McGuinness who

was the intelligence head of Selous, and a lot of South African money was....Selous and the South African Police, and through the fund and so on. I am just saying again things I saw in the passage that they definitely had, and that's probably why they came to us to pull those guys out, rather than to the military, because I think they only really became linked with the military after they came to South Africa. Up until then they had been working with the security branch.

MEMBER: I see. And some of them went into DCC?

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry. All the guys who fought in Rhodesia there with them were Security Branch, like Jean de Kock and Dirk Coetzee. They were Security Branch guys who were sent up there.

MEMBER: Hans Dreyer..?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: Some of these Rhodesians ended up in DCC or were integrated into DCC?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, I saw them there... Eric May.

MEMBER: Geoffrey Price?

MR WILLIAMSON: I know of him and may have met him, but I...

MEMBER: What is interesting is that even though there was this massive evacuation and recruitment, etc., it does seem that left in place was still a fairly sophisticated network of people who were willing to collaborate with South Africa inside the CIO.

Ultimately the CCB operation in Zimbabwe was almost an entirely and indigenised operation.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I talked to a few people who were involved afterwards, the guys, but they were all mainly ex Rhodesian Special Force guys who were involved, and they used friends and acquaintances to do things. I think in certain instances the people didn't know what I think some of the guys who went to gaol for putting the money somewhere and then people came and fetched the money, they didn't actually know why somebody phoned them and said, 'Hey, it is So-and-so here, you know I have got a big problem, please put some money in this toilet there', and the guy ended up infor doing it, not knowing what he was actually getting himself involved in. The operations there were based very much on Rhodesians.

MEMBER: You mentioned special tasks and running Renamo was one of those special tasks. Again going back to your evidence in Cape Town in answer to some of Glen's questions, you said that basically after Nkomati, Renamo became was converted from an official project to an overt operation.

MR WILLIAMSON: You mean after Nkomati?

MEMBER: Nkomati. From what had been an official project became an overt operation.

MR WILLIAMSON: Let me just make it clear there. What I mean is that the same objective could be met without having to put on

a piece of paper 'I need a budget to continue supporting Renamo'.

And that's basically how they did it. I know because I was - you will see from those documents I have given you - I was at the highest level in Mozambique involved in trying to bring I was at one stage more or less the liaison between Chisano and P W Botha because I was the one who was non ... no longer military or police intelligence, who had a political position and who was going as a businessman in Mozambique the whole time. But you will see from the reports I have written there; I was involved at the highest level, and I had this constant problem of the suspicion of the Mozambicans about what our guys were really up to. Our guys kept denying what they were really up to, and at the end of the day the result of my whole involvement, I can say they did it, was that if you say, 'Okay, we no longer support Renamo', that's fine. But if you say to the directorate now of DCC Oosfront, 'Well, you know you guys must continue keeping us apprised of the situation in Mozambique' and he now starts paying all those Renamo guys as sources for information, what's the real difference? Instead of them now being paid a salary and then they get on with shooting up to government, now you fly in before the peace accord enough war material to last five years and you dig holes and hide it, and then you say, 'Okay, the game's over', and then you tell DCC, 'Well, you'd better recruit all those top guys so that we've got good information coming in

and maybe they'll win the war and maybe they'll be in the government...' and you start paying them salaries for sources, what's the difference? But if the difference is on paper you can say you are no longer doing it. If Pik Botha or somebody comes and says, 'Oh, but I've got it on good information you've still got relations with that guy', you can turn around and say, 'No, no, I'm not paying him to destabilise Mozambique anymore, you don't understand. Yes, I'm paying him money but he is giving us information; that is standard Intelligence practice, you can't stop me doing that'. So that's how they did it. So the political will to continue doing the thing by other means was what was done, and the legal piece of paper of how it was done was changed, that's all.

MEMBER: And there was never any effort made to close the farms or to tell DST to stop its operations?

MR WILLIAMSON: They made a little bit of an effort. At one stage just before I left the Police we were told, 'Investigate and close down all these Renamo things' and within about four days I was told to stop. Then they said, 'Oh no, we didn't realise you guys would...we thought it was all clandestine you would not find it'.

MEMBER: But is Pik being disingenuous then when he claims that Konstant Viljoen went behind his back and doublecrossed the government over Renamo?

MR WILLIAMSON: Look, I wish I could answer the question. Pik confuses me completely. What I hear him saying now and what I used to hear him saying then when he wore a uniform, come and braai with us with his uniform, with his colonel epaulettes, the two just don't gel. When I went to him to sign a piece of paper to raid Gaborone, the man I met there also seems to have forgotten it. So, you know

MEMBER: Where did you find him on that? You were sent by somebody in Cape Townwas it General Coetzee?to get his clearance basically.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, there was the memo of the operation.

P W signed it as commander-in-chief and said, 'Do not carry out this operation until Pik Botha ha countersigned it'. We had to chase him all round where he was hunting antelope, eland on some farm near Thabazimbi.

MEMBER: And he signed?

MR WILLIAMSON: Signed.

MEMBER: Was every cross boarder operation of that kind authorised in the same way?

MR WILLIAMSON: That's right. This is why it confuses me because he says he did not even know about some of the raids until he heard it on the news.

MEMBER: On the EPG raids even Magnus Malan is saying that he was instructed by P W to undertake those raids. It was never discussed by the Cabinet or the State Security Council.

MR WILLIAMSON: But that's how it worked. He is commander-in-chief, he can do that. And he may not have told Pik then, but the Gaberone raid, Pik knew. And he didn't go to his car and get onto his fancy satellite phone or whatever, and phone P W. He just ... 'Waar's die brandewyn, manne? Kom ons drink'.

MEMBER: We asked in our document there if you had any information on the role of the Commores vis-a-vis support for Renamo.

MR WILLIAMSON: I know the allegation. I liaised with Bob Denar on a couple of occasions but it was not to do with Renamo; it was just to do with the politics in the Commores. All I can tell you is that Denar's operation in Commores was one hundred per cent military, South African military operation. Paid, and I suspect of course the French too, but the South African government was propping up the whole Commores government. The building of those hotels, everything was South African government funding. That research station that's there was South African government funding, and everybody knew it was military.

MEMBER: Was it for sanctions-busting purposes?

MR WILLIAMSON: They were sending arms also to Iraq via Commores. That's the story...The links between They had a strong Armscor role to play as well.

MEMBER: Did you ever hear anything or come across this guy Francois Roche?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no information.

I have forgotten to do something very important. May I make a call just for two minutes?

MEMBER: Can we continue? Craig, when you set up your UK operation, Klue was not part of that operation? Klue was simply a contact, a useful....I think you used him....

MR WILLIAMSON: I used him as DCC but I did not know that at that time.

MEMBER: How did you get in touch with him? Were you told that ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, because our communications to and from Europe were arranged with DCC, between theThat's how I got to know them so well, because instead of using National Intelligence, Police and DCC were working together. So we did not have embassy presence; we were completely clandestine, so we were using their channels.

MEMBER: So when you were told to organise this London bombing operation, you were put in touch with Klue as somebody who could handle the bag?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no, I didn't... Klue was in London.

MEMBER: Ja, he received the bag full of the explosives.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. I don't even know whether I knew. I knew that there was a link. I'm not sure whether I actually knew his name. I knew there was a guy at the embassy who was liaising with this Peter we were sending, because Peter was basically at that timeit would be handled by me but was mainly by the whole...by the international section. If I remember correctly, what happened was that the material was all it was not assembled, it was all separate, you know, the actual explosives. If I remember, it all came from military. It was assembled by the Police into they made it into some it looked like a radio. It looked like military communications equipment, and it was given to the military. It was just to follow the same route as anything else we sent to our agents ...

MEMBER: Would the bag be intercepted at the airport? The diplomatic bag, when would it have been put into the bag?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, they had access...they ran...I don't know who runs the bag, but the military use it. There is one...I don't know whether there is a ... I think there is one bag, but all the departments represented in the embassy use the bag. Then you would have to find out the way it works.

MEMBER: I have always assumed it was a DFA, Department of Foreign Affairs operation.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but I think one can ask them how does it work. For example, I can guarantee you that neither the military or National Intelligence hand over their stuff to DSA. There must be a way that National Intelligence or Intelligence stuff is transmitted via the bag. There must be a procedure that is followed, and I assume that procedure was followed.

MEMBER: So Klue was DCC, you say?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: But not Ander Lande. He was a military attache.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, a military attache.

MEMBER: And are all military attaches DCC?

MR WILLIAMSON: To my knowledge.

MEMBER: We put the bunch of questions from Aspinall's, are we right..? Abdul Minty ...

MR WILLIAMSON: I don't know. This was Aspinall and Casilton. Yes, those make sense but those definitely were not instructions. I thinkWell, he went off the rails completely at the end. Casilton was a little bit off the rails. As I described him before, he is an unguided missile which is whyHe carried out an unauthorised petrol bombing at the anti apartheid movement as well.

MEMBER: In London?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MEMBER: Off his own bat?

MR WILLIAMSON: Totally. He even paid for it out of his own money.

MEMBER: And the ANC office in Stockholm, any information on that? 1986, wasn't it?

MR WILLIAMSON: It was after my time. I rememberI've got vague recollections, people have talked about it, but I don't have any information about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Just in relation to that question. You have heard people talking about it; is that people in the Security Branch, former colleagues...

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, and people have asked me before. I think ...I'm pretty sure the ... I can't remember who...maybe it was those Swedish investigators on the Parma thing who asked me about it as well. I actually think the person who I have heard about that from is Casilton. I mean, when he started talking about things, but unfortunately, as I say, he wasfrom 1989, 1990 his problem was drinking. Every time he drank he would start talking, and he never knew whether he was Walter Mitti or Baron Von Muntchhausen or who it was. Him and Riaan Stander should have got together and written a book, and it would be a bestseller, about our role in the Intelligence Services.

CHAIRPERSON: To go back to DCC. The name Bacon, the surname Bacon, is that a name that you can recall?

MR WILLIAMSON: Bacon?

CHAIRPERSON: He was an operator.

MR WILLIAMSON: Kevin Bacon...Is it Bacon, B-a-c-o-n?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR WILLIAMSON: No. In which area was he?

CHAIRPERSON: He was based in Maputo.

MR WILLIAMSON: Maputo?

CHAIRPERSON: Working for At Nel.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, the only guy I knew who was working for At Nel was an ex Rhodesian not Bacon but ...I'll remember it now. An ex Rhodesian guy ...got also....car stealing ...But he was one of the wellknown operatives who was running up and down for

CHAIRPERSON: Was working for At Nel on the eastern front, this person that you...?

MR WILLIAMSON: The guy I am talking about. Ja, I

CHAIRPERSON: The person that you are thinking about, was he based in Maputo? Was that the person who?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. Yes, sort of and then in Swaziland at one stage.. I only knew about him because we had to bail him out of trouble. At some stage he got arrested for stealing cars or something, smuggling Mandrax, or...

MEMBER: In the 80's?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. We had to. ... He is the brother-in-law of a guy who worked for me...Botha

MEMBER: In Longreach?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Police, counter intelligence. He is still in the Police.

MEMBER: You haven't got his name, this Police, counter intelligence, Botha?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, Captain Willy Botha, his brother-in-law. Because of Willy and because of DCC we helped the guy out of trouble. That is the only operative I ever got to know about...

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that you had during this period ...I mean you knew, or know At Nel quite well, you had a good relation with him...

MR WILLIAMSON: I was in National Intelligence and he trained me before I even went to Europe, so I've known him ...I knew him when he joined the military.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he ever mention any operation, any detail of any operations in Maputo?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I'll tell you, they were very sensitive about telling me anything about Mozambique because of my ...Before my connections in Mozambique theyand after I left DCC they were very careful; they were very worried about me ever knowing what they were doing because I was very ...I mean I used to go and visit Matzimio, the Minister of Security, and they were a bit worried about how much I knew.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know about any connection between DCC, any of the DCC front companies and Goldstar Shipping which is a Hong Kong based shipping agency?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, unless it is DCC not CCB?

CHAIRPERSON: No, DCC. One of the fronts was, as I understand, PAIGC, Pan African ...

MR WILLIAMSON: PAIGC, Industrial and Agricultural Consultants.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MR WILLIAMSON: That is who used to pay my salary. The cheque used to have that...

CHAIRPERSON: There was a link, as far as I understand it, between this and Goldstar Shipping, a Hong Kong based shipping agency used by DCC also as a cover.

MR WILLIAMSON: When was that?

CHAIRPERSON: Eighties.

MR WILLIAMSON: Interesting because I never operated Far East.

CHAIRPERSON: They were also based in Durban. They had representatives based in Durban as well.

MR WILLIAMSON: Oh, ja. I don't know the name but they were involved in some shipping operations that was working in Mozambique. I knew they were. They had two operations, the one was the aircraft that was distributing the food, Interocean,

and the other was the shipping operation. But I did not know the name, I just knew that they were in and how they were operating.

CHAIRPERSON: Goldstar is interesting because of its connection with Israeli intelligence agencies. How was the relation between the South African military intelligence and the Israelis? Was it a good relation, a bad relation..

MR WILLIAMSON: No, it was pretty close.

CHAIRPERSON: It was pretty close. Goldstar is probably a front for Israel's intelligence agency. Could that also have been used by the South African intelligence...?

MR WILLIAMSON: I never worked in a joint operation with the Israelis, but I met many of them. We used to discuss ...they were in the embassy here. There was a lot of common ground but I don't know about this. I have never heard of Goldstar, but anything is possible.

MEMBER: You opened your statement to the Truth Commission quoting Klauswitz' "The State of Circumstances from which an event ..." you know the quote. You now have the benefit of hindsight, as we all do, how do you assess the counter revolutionary effort of the seventies and eighties? Did it in fact change anything? Did it in fact delay the day of whatever you like to call it, liberation, by a single day? Was it all worthwhile?

MR WILLIAMSON: We'll have to go and have a lot of beers, like Losguno, before we answer that one, spend until midnight. No, I ask myself that question most days..

MEMBER: I wrestle with it because we are writing the section of the report and it is very difficult, especially for someone like me, to avoid analysis. That is not my job in this particular report. You know, when you read the minutes of the 1983 Bosberaad that the State Security Council had in the operational area, and it is addressed by Tienie Groenewald as director of Military Intelligence, and he identifies the primary problem that the communists, supported by certain Western nations, are advocating black majority in a unified state, and seven, eight years later the same party is negotiating that very arrangement, and in the meantime tens of thousands have died ...

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, but you know, John, that's it, so when you ...The reason I resigned from the National Party and from parliament was the day we had a caucus meeting at which I was told because now, of course, we have had 1990 and we had unbanned the ANC, and all this, now we have this Bosberaad, and we are going to be told how, you know, what the leader has in mind. I was told that our job is now to go out and tell the electorate that we are going to win the election against the ANC.

That's when I realised that I'd wasted 20 years of my life because I think most of the people in the security forces knew

that...ja, and I think we did delay liberation. But the day it was decided to stop using the security forces to prevent liberation, the day they decided that the price of using the security forces to prevent a black majority rule in a military state was too high to pay, that was the day then that that became possible. It may well have still also happened, but it would have happened oversomething that would have madelook quite gentle.

MEMBER: I think one of the important parts in your statement is that you say this whole thing might ...the 80% political, 20% military was for many of these people(inaudible) They intended to win..

MR WILLIAMSON: That is why I ultimately ducked out because they misread the situation, in the same way as Klaus...was misread...There can be a military victory and there cannot be a military victory. And the price that has to be paid to have a temporary military victor becomes too high politically. At the end of the day, that is the mistake they made. There were guys who believed that the military victory was possible, but ...

MEMBER: P W was one.

MR WILLIAMSON: Oh absolutely. P W was prepared to pay the price. P W was prepared to ... and he had people running. P W was prepared to knock any neighbouring state when he felt like it. I don't think FWI think that this is ...If you look at the role of the Broederbond in this whole thing, Afrikaner

intellectuals, because during PW's day they were sidelight, and immediately when Barend lost the caucus vote by 8 votes to FW, it came as a because Barend was the military's man.

COUNSEL: As you say, you will have to have a lot of drinks...

MEMBER: My last question is this: Which is the bank that gave you the credit cards?

MR WILLIAMSON: American Express, Nedbank....

MEMBER: I'm glad you answered that question. Thank you very much.

MR WILLIAMSON: You knew already.

MEMBER: No, I thought you would say Volkskas.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, Nedbank, American Express Gold Card.

COUNSEL: I assume that my client is excused

MEMBER: Yes.

COUNSEL: I assume that my client is excused for the ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he is excused.

COUNSEL: Will we get a copy of today's proceedings?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you will get a copy of the transcription.

MEMBER: It will be produced here?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja.

MEMBER: How quickly?

CHAIRPERSON: It normally takes more than a week.

COUNSEL: You can advise us and we'll come and collect it...

CHAIRPERSON: We will read it through and see if there is anything we would like to copy. We'll do that and I will bring it back to you.

COUNSEL: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MEETING ADJOURNS

.....