

**INQUIRY IN TERMS OF SECTION 29**

**HELD AT**

**DURBAN**



**WALTER SIDNEY FELGATE**

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CHAIRMAN: This is an inquiry in terms of section 29 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995. It is not a hearing, it's an investigative inquiry, and as such it is held in camera. No findings obviously are made at the hearing, it is just an investigative tool of the Truth Commission.

The duties and obligations of the respective parties are set out in the Act, and they are as follows.

The person subpoenaed today, Mr W Felgate, he has the right to legal representation, but he has waived that right.

In terms of section 31 of the Act any person who is subpoenaed to give evidence is compelled to answer any question put to him, notwithstanding the fact that the answer may incriminate him. But there are conditions applicable to this section, and they are as follows: that there must have been consultation with the Regional Attorney-General, the Chairperson of the inquiry must be satisfied that the request for information is reasonable, necessary and justifiable in an open and democratic society, and, three, the witness must have actually refused to answer the question.

The Act also provides that any incriminating evidence obtained at an inquiry of this nature is not admissible against the person concerned in any court forum. There is one proviso to this, and that is that any evidence obtained at such a hearing may be used against the person giving the information where the person is charged with perjury arising out of the giving of false information or contradictory information - conflicting information.

Finally, just to draw to your attention the offences

/and penalties and penalties which are contained in the Act. Any person who hinders the Commission or the Commission staff or Commissioners in the exercise or performance of their duties is guilty of an offence, or any person who wilfully furnishes the Commission, the Commissioners or staff of the Commission with any information which is false or misleading is guilty of an offence, and there are appropriate remedies or sanctions laid down in the Act.

Those then are the preliminary formalities. The hearings - the proceedings will be recorded in full today, and they are - because the proceedings are held in camera the proceedings may not be released to anyone until such time as the Commission decides that they should be released to the public or to the press.

The panel today is Mr Ilan Lax, Human Rights Violations Committee, Miss Virginia Gcabashe, Human Rights Violations Committee, and the Chair, myself, Richard Lyster, also Human Rights Violations Committee, and researchers John Daniel, Linda McLean and Debra Quinn.

Before we start we have to get the recording technician to be sworn in. If you could just come up here, Jurgen, and take the oath.

RECORDING TECHNICIAN SWORN IN

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. And then if you could stand to take the oath, or a solemn affirmation, whichever you choose.

MR FELGATE: I'll take the oath.

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WALTER SIDNEY FELGATE (Sworn, States)

CHAIRMAN: We're going to proceed on the basis that researchers who have gone through your documentation - and

/thank you

thank you very much for letting us have that documentation well in advance - will start the proceedings by asking you questions from that, and members of the panel will, when appropriate or necessary, or when they want to, will intervene and ask clarifying questions. Are there any things that you want to ask before we start? --- No, just to make the statement that I don't see how one can look at human rights violations without looking at the totality of the circumstances. I don't distinguish between questions relating to human rights and questions of the other nature, political nature, and I don't hold the present hearing to the view that I will only be asked and talk about human rights violations as such, in the narrow, legal definition. So, I am quite happy to talk about anything at any time.

No, I think that's really the point of the proceedings. Obviously our job is to investigate and uncover information about human rights violations, but equally as importantly is the context and the environment and the milieu in which those violations took place and in which they were allowed to take place, and that's what we hope that you will help us with today. Okay, John, are there - will you start?

MR DANIEL: Fine. Morning, Walter. --- Morning.

I am going to basically work off the shorter document you submitted yesterday, and then refer at other points to the larger documentation. I think the overwhelming impression one gets in reading this documentation you've supplied is the absolute domination of the IFP and the KwaZulu-Government by Chief Buthelezi, and the portrait that you present of him is, in my view,

/not a very

not a very flattering one, particularly if one judges his actions in terms of democratic criteria, respect for human rights, or even in terms of a principal position.

The impression that comes through is of an individual driven by personal ambition, a lust for power, who is prepared basically to shift position, abandon previous positions, form alliances with all sorts of groups to pursue his particular ambition. So, I think the first area to look at is the one that you start with, this relationship between Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government, and the point you make in your opening paragraph is that there was a very close working relationship between Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. In point 10 you make it a little stronger when you refer to member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, that whatever they did they did for Inkatha, and acted as Inkatha. And there are various other places where you make this point, and it would seem to me that it's almost impossible in a sort of objective analysis to draw a distinction between Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government. Or, we could also put it that essentially the KwaZulu Government was the instrument of Inkatha. Would you agree with that ...

(incomplete)

--- No, I would agree with that. That is predominantly the position. The interests of Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government were indistinguishable. There was never a conflict of interest. I can bring to mind no conflict between Inkatha and the KLA on any matter of principle, any matter of strategy. There was complete unity and unism in both theoretical, political, ideological and practical affairs. They were just one amalgam with two operating bases and nexuses of people.

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So, would you say that the KwaZulu Government, that whole network which made up the KwaZulu Bantustan Government, was used essentially to further the interests of Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi, and in particular would you say that it was a financial slush fund or milch cow for the IFP? I think - I like to distinguish between a slush fund, milk cow for the IFP, in terms of cash available, etcetera. There were very stringent Buthelezi dictates about what could and could not be done. He was quite adamant that neither he nor any of his senior officials would ever be charged with contravening financial regulations. He would do nothing that Armstrong or the secretaries before him advised him were dangerous in terms of those regulations. So, in that sense what actually took place was an over-utilisation of the advantages any party has got who has got a dominating position in the Legislature, in the executive in government. It was just the normal advantages taken to the extreme. There were a number of things which took place which no one will ever be able to prove. I know quite categorically

that at times vehicles, KZG vehicles, would be given different numberplates and taken off to do IFP work, particularly carrying out of raids and illegal things. Now, everyone knew that this was taking - well, not everybody, those involved knew it was taking place, but it took place in such a way that you would never be able to trace them, you would never be able to pin them down, you would never be able to prove it. So, Buthelezi knew that, but he also knew that there would have to be personal betrayals against him to prove any of those points. He never spoke to people in committee about any /of these of these things, he only spoke to them one at a time in privacy. I had an expression that I used in order to convey to him that I wanted to see him about something privately, and I would say, "Let's go and shoot ants(?)", which is a Zulu idiomatic expression about if you were having a beer drink and you want to go and urinate you make that - you make that statement and off you go. So, those kind of situations there was a - there was a culture of, you knew how to deal with it. I never knew what MZ Khumalo told Buthelezi, he never told me what he told Buthelezi, Buthelezi never told me what Khumalo told him. There was a lot of sharing of confidentiality, but there was a very strict observance of the necessary precautions against any charge of abuse. He was very emphatic that he didn't want his image tarnished as somebody who had in fact embezzled money or used money wrongly. He wanted the image of a clean administration, and generally speaking he strove for a clean administration. But there was an extension of the privileges that I am talking about which - where

the real matter and the working relationship actually be in final place(?) .

Just focusing on that question on the use of finances. If, for example, KwaZulu Government funds were used to transporting members to rallies, etcetera, are you suggesting that there would be some form of authorisation for that? --- Yes, a car would be booked. The Department of Works would book out a truck to go down to Umzumbe to take - to go and fetch whatever it is the Department of Works wanted. The truck went down empty, you jumped on the truck and off you went, but you arranged that trip in that way so that it was legitimate KwaZulu

/Government

Government - and you could always find some reason to go somewhere. And your heads of department, and your heads of your police were - I am talking about people below the secretary level, which were all from Pretoria - if you had Nkeshe's(?) position, Director of Food and Development, Youth Affairs, you authorised your staff's movements, and petrol vouchers would then be accepted. So, you filled in a log book for every trip you made, and, provided that it met the requirements of the regulations, you could go wherever you wanted to go. So, there were a number of vehicles, particularly amongst the school inspectors, where they had to, and could, range over wide areas, community development, welfare and work generally. So, there was always scope for the use of Government vehicles within the prescribed, laid-down regulations. You just arranged that work on those days in such a way that you could do Inkatha work with them.



Of course it raises interesting questions which we might pursue later as to how that relationship works now between the predominant party and the Provincial Legislature, because clearly what has been established over the years is a culture and a practice of utilising the Legislature for the purpose of the party, and it would be interesting to speculate as to whether that continues. But to slightly shift, you mentioned earlier policy making, strategic thinking. Can you tell us how policy was formulated within the party? --- Policy within the party, to the extent that policy was formulated, and it's one of the characteristics of the IFP and KwaZulu Government departments, that there were no policy positions. Until 1994 I think I can genuinely say that

/policy  
policy documents on crucial socio-economic and political issues were non-existent in KwaZulu. Predominantly Buthelezi laid down policy in his addresses to the National Council and the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in his annual address to it, his appropriation speech, which became known as the policy speech. So, once Buthelezi had issued a directive in terms of a discussion document, and in a discussion document, there would be no real open question, it was a decided matter.

It was then a question of how this was internalised by the IFP. So I don't think policy matters were formulated in discussion, there was no real working of a policy nature. The IFP's - tell me if I am going into too much detail. The IFP's central committee, the then National Council, was broken up into a number of portfolios, which roughly reflected the portfolios of

the central government. Each portfolio had a chairperson and a committee. They were supposed for formulate policy and produce discussion documents for National Council Central Committee. They hardly ever met. They were basically paper structures, which never had any significance, and one of the reasons for that was that policy matters could not be formulated independently, but there was the dominance of the Buthelezi thinking. Buthelezi himself didn't operate within a framework of clearly-defined policies. His leadership was very predominantly a leadership based on a running strategic battle, and the selection of options on a day-to-day basis to maximise whatever advantage could be maximised. Ja, I think that's what one can say about policy formulation.

Well, as opposed to policy, what about strategy, in terms of negotiating strategies or strategic positions

/around  
around relationships with the ANC in the 70s and 80s?  
Were these again directives that simply came from above?

--- Ja. There's a long story on that one. People would be charged with heading negotiating teams, or discussion teams. They went off and had discussions, came back and reported. If you did that, and you came up with proposals or agreements which Buthelezi didn't approve of, they were just, I mean, negated. I mean, for example, I was chairperson of the regional work group established by the committee which set up CODESA, and I was charged with the responsibility of formulating the terms of reference for CODESA. It was a very difficult job, very arduous job to bring together minds

from all the parties. We succeeded in the end and produced a unanimous agreement about the wording of CODESA. I consulted Buthelezi repeatedly about developments. In the plenary session of the first meeting of CODESA in December Buthelezi arrived the night before to meet Professor Blaauwsteen, who criticised the formulation, and the next day Buthelezi publicly rejected it. Now, that's the fate that you've got to risk whenever you head something, a committee, doing something for Buthelezi. Knowing that, people make quite sure that they're not in that invidious position of having to be rejected by their leader in public, or even in the National Council, with great loss of face. So, you made quite sure that as you went you phoned and checked and corroborated the position. And I can give you crucial instances where this happened in my own experience. If you want more such examples I can give them. For example, in the question of the provincial constitution I was recalled from Cape Town by Buthelezi - I was then a member

/of the  
of the National Assembly - to take over the constitution-writing process in this province. We were faced with a fait accompli by the province, and I had to resort to tactics to completely dismantle the Constitutional Committee and revamp it, start it again on new principles, and start from scratch, which I did.

I then chaired the meeting, and we eventually produced a constitution which was a compromise. Now, on the eve of the meeting of the Legislature which would adopt this I had called together a caucus of the IFP. Out of the 41 people I think there were something like only three

or four people absent. It was a well represented group.

They endorsed the compromise unanimously initially, then there were two objections - to abstentions and one objection in the final voting which I called for. That was about 11 o'clock at night. We went back with it to the ANC to finalise the actual text. I heard rumblings in the middle of the night, reconvened the committee at six the next morning, because we were all there overnight, and again got a 90 odd percent endorsement.

That was on a Thursday night and on Friday. On Saturday the whole of the National Council, including all the members of that caucus and all the members of my own IFP segment of the committee, were turned down flatly, the constitution was rejected because Buthelezi so decided.

Now, there's a case where not only was a committee unanimous in its support, but the whole of the provincial caucus supported that committee's position.

We come to National Council, not one single word of defence, not one single objection. Buthelezi slammed it. Mariam Brossini(?) wrote a technical rejection of it, Buthelezi used it, and that was the end of it. So, when

/you're  
you're dealing with matters, and you're aware that that's what Buthelezi does, both publicly and privately, you make sure that your committee work meets with his requirements and there's this close consultation. In the whole of the proceedings of CODESA there are numerous occasions in which the leadership of the CODESA group met with Buthelezi, and if necessary convened closed committee meetings, flew down to Ulundi, had a consultation, went back to him with further

instructions. On crucial issues such as, for example, the withdrawal of the IFP from CODESA, the matter arose were Hartzenburg phoned Buthelezi and told him that the Conservative Party would probably withdraw from CODESA.

Buthelezi phoned me with an instruction that if they did so I was to withdraw the IFP team as well. In the end Hartzenburg didn't do that, but I am just giving that example of Buthelezi making a decision of that crucial nature without any consultation. He would then call in - predominantly members of his Cabinet, because they were more accessible, and he would get an endorsement for a decision that he made. He not only held people to what he wanted them to do, come hell or high water, both privately and publicly, but he at times took very crucial decisions entirely on his own and then had them justified and rubber-stamped. The decision to enter into elections came right out of the blue. It was contrary to everything he had said and done. In the end he couldn't face the enormous growth of critical comment on the IFP not participating. He made the decision. And then of course it was endorsed by everybody and it was then an Inkatha decision. But I of all people ought to know that that decision was made entirely on his

own, because  
own, because at that stage I was running the Indunazulu camp, which was convened and developed specifically to disrupt elections. I had to go back to camp and just dismantle the whole camp. So, not only - I am repeating myself now.

Yes, I think we'll want to ask you questions about that pre-election training camp a little bit later. It seems to me then that it would seem to be something of a

misnomer when people like yourself and Dr M Brossini and others were referred to as advisors. It seems like you were less advisor than functionaries. --- In that sense yes, but there's another aspect of it too, and that is this. For example, when Buthelezi was faced with the Ingwavuma crisis, taking Ingwavuma, giving that land to Swaziland, he had absolutely nowhere to go, he didn't have any idea of how to respond. I suggested to him the question of legal action, which then subsequently became the Inkatha response. And we actually won in the Supreme Court in the Appellate Division. But on crucial questions which hit him out of the blue Buthelezi frequently has very flat feet. Because he doesn't operate on policy issues his leadership is an ad hoc, day-to-day taking advantage of circumstances, which is perhaps general for all political leaders to a larger extent than people realise. He's quite often unprepared. In those circumstances he will consult, he will talk, he will share. When it came to how to respond to the government's refusal to continue with international mediation he had no - he didn't know how to respond, and in addressing a caucus meeting in Cape Town he told them, "I've got flat feet. I don't know what to do." So there are those

/situations situations which he does consult. When he is faced with something which is absolutely out of the blue he normally - or has been festering a long time because people don't know how to deal with it. He can't force his will on issues in some cases, for example the capital of KwaZulu-Natal. Every National Council that

has ever discussed it has said, "Yay, Ulundi must be the capital," but no premier has done anything about it. Now, he's reached a stage where he doesn't know what to do, because he says so publicly, and in a meeting the premier will agree with him, and, "Yes, we'll go and do it," but it just never gets done. So, there is a lot of consultation in those circumstances on those issues.

One of the things that comes through your documentation is how skilful Buthelezi has been at myth-making, how history has been re-interpreted, re-invented, how tradition has been manipulated to serve certain ends, and this is not a unique characteristic. I mean if you look at Swazi history you'll see the same kind of tendencies. Now, one of these myths in my view is Buthelezi's support for the ANC. He has made a great deal about the fact that he claims that at one time he was a member, and that ~~other members~~ of his family were strong supporters of the ANC, that he had a close relationship with Chief Luthuli, that he had at one time a close relationship with Tambo, and that Inkatha was created to continue the work of the ANC inside. There is an alternative position which has been developed, most notably by Mzalo, Jabulani Khumalo, who has argued, for example, that Buthelezi was never a member of the ANC, not even of the ANC Youth League, and that in fact he was

/never even  
never even really a sympathiser of the ANC; that he may have attended one or two ANC meetings, but never joined the organisation; that in the 1950s he participated in none of the great campaigns of the ANC, he was not - he did not participate in the defiance campaign, he played

no role in the campaign against bantu education. Mzalo points to the fact that Buthelezi's mother was much more involved in ANC matters and women's protests, etcetera, but that throughout the 50s Buthelezi's primary concern seemed to be to impress Eiselen with the fact that he was "fit" to become chief, that he was at that time working for bantu education. And so Mzalo argues that in fact there is really no basis at all to Buthelezi's assertion that he was in the 50s and 40s a strong supporter of the ANC. Would you like to comment on that? --- I think there's validity in what you're saying. There is no evidence that I could find of Buthelezi ever being in any way active in the ANC. And if you think of the leading roles that Oliver Tambo and Mandela played in the formation of the ANC Youth League and the revamping of the ANC's leadership, I mean he is completely out of sight. He was a nonentity in terms of those developments. On the other hand Mandela, as a lawyer, wound up his father's estate, and he had frequent trips to Johannesburg, where he met Oliver Tambo and Mandela, and there was a very notable personal relationship between those three in that period. In all the dealings that I had with Tambo on a personal level, coming from Buthelezi and Beyers, meeting Tambo in various parts of the world, and I spent some time - up to a week with him, I've had a lot of opportunity to speak to him about Buthelezi. His view of Buthelezi was /that he that he could not be ignored, and should be won over to support ANC strategies. So, I think there is a personal relationship between himself, Tambo and Mandela. I think it's also true that Buthelezi genuinely saw



about the internal development they would lose out. So,  
I was told that I had to support - I

/had to  
had to assist him in the destruction of Buthelezi, and I  
said, "Well, I can't do it." I had been working for  
what was then four years with Beyers and Buthelezi and  
Tambo to bring about the minimisation of black on black  
conflict. I found myself in an invidious position where  
I just couldn't do it. So, Oliver Tambo told me in '78  
that I had virtually made my choice and that was that.  
So, the relationship with the ANC after '78 - I had made  
a choice, rightly or wrongly, and the only base I had  
was an Inkatha base.

CHAIRMAN: I think it's time to have a short break.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRMAN: (Inaudible) before we move on to the  
relationship between the IFP and the ANC, I think you  
mentioned in your first submission that there was no  
party executive at all, an IFP executive. In fact the  
Cabinet of the KwaZulu Government functioned as the  
executive for the party, so in that sense they were more  
than intertwined, they were two parts of the same thing.  
One thing that hasn't been covered in the questions is  
the notion or the whole issue relating to IFP membership  
being a criterion for entry into KwaZulu Government  
positions. Something which in my experience over the  
last 12 years that was all pervasive, from dealing with  
people, victims of violence on both sides of the  
physical spectrum, was that any number of people would  
come to us and say that their children were refused  
entry or access to schools, nurses were required to

produce proof of IFP membership to write exams, to obtain promotions, even to enter certain hospitals in Ngwelezana and those sorts of places. The

/civil service

civil service generally it was - the picture that I picked up dealing with people as an attorney for many years was that the issue of party membership was used consistently, and quite ruthlessly, to obtain - the goodies of government, if you like, whether it was a house in a KwaZulu Government-run township, a job in a hospital, a job as a civil servant. Can you comment on that? --- The debate really came to a head in the question of whether or not KwaZulu could continue supporting university students who were not in favour of the KwaZulu Government. The KwaZulu Government was giving the bursary. Students were going to Ngoya and they were participating in demonstrations against Buthelezi and against the KwaZulu Government, and they were saying this is the hand that - "You're biting the hand that feeds you." So, that's the issue that was debated. As a result of that issue there was the declaration - a declaration - and I have to go back to the documentation to get the terminology right. It was a declaration of support for the policies of the KwaZulu Government. Now, if you don't distinguish between the KwaZulu Government and the IFP that's meaningless, but in terms of civil service activities civil servants are always expected to be loyal to the government of the day. Being loyal to the government of the day in KwaZulu was then extended, like all things were extended, as I mentioned earlier. So, you start off with the normal practice that civil servants have to be

loyal to the government of the day, and then you take that a bit further, and a bit further, and a bit further, and eventually get into a practice or a cult which is not officially enunciated, there's no policy

/document

document on it, it just happens because people throw their weight around, and encouraged by this forceful KwaZulu Government, which means in their minds support for the IFP, or you don't give people advantages who don't support the government. So I think that it's more a growth of that mentality, or a development of a cult.

There certainly wasn't any official document, or any official decision ever made not to give housing to anybody who were non-KwaZulu, for example, but it did happen, and it happened because the whole process of the development of the IFP was one in which the emphasis was on the establishment of branches, which meant that in every region it became more and more dependant on a big man, a big name, a big personality, who could mobilise communities, could establish branches, and you became more and more dependant on such a person, and you queried less and less what he or she was doing. So, the nature of the IFP as such is one in which this kind of growth, and the dependence on local people led to organisational problems. And it's worth just looking at this just a bit more closely. The IFP has never been able to control any of its regions. The IFP is a fragmented body, because when it gets down to a local region, whether you're talking about Soweto, East Rand, West Rand, KwaMashu, or Umzumbe area, you're talking about the IFP being personalised by some person, whether it was a Shabalala, or whether a Khawula, or whether it

was Gibson Thula in the East Rand. Take that person away and there's no IFP left. It was a power structure around persons. And if you interfered with them you lost your IFP support, or you fragmented your IFP. And in each of these there was a power struggle

/for these

for these predominant positions, and the National Council Central Committee, Buthelezi, wouldn't touch them with a barge pole. So, you had a lack of control from Central Committee National Council over these, despite the autocracy of Buthelezi as a man. So, there's a strange anomaly in the IFP to understand, and if you don't understand that there are a lot of things you can't make sense of in the IFP. Nkosi Khawula, down in Umzumbe area, is a complete law unto himself in terms of what he does and what the IFP is down there. When it comes to places like Pietermaritzburg Ntombela will dominate over everybody. Shabalala here in Durban. There's never been a really predominant personality in KwaMashu, but there's been a huge infight in KwaMashu and conflict in KwaMashu and Inanda, which has been intolerable. After Wellington Sabela died in Umlazi there was no replacement for him. The Umlazi IFP went to pieces, and the IFP - the whole place is fragmented.

So, unless you understand this aspect of the IFP you don't understand a lot about violence, because this is where you get these warlords evolving who are laws unto themselves, and they run the show the way they want to run their show, and they run their show to their personal power advantages. And when it comes to housing, or other advantages - employment, it's these people in those positions who you've got to please

before you can get a job or a house or whatever. There doesn't have to be a policy about it from the IFP, it's part of the structure and the nature of the animal, which must really be understood. Soweto was lost to the IFP because of these infights. When Gibson Thula left the IFP as chief urban representative Thembisa fell apart.

/There was

There was never a Pretoria structure worth a dime, and in fact the whole of Gauteng for the last 15 years has been IFP-leadershipless. Mthethwa dominated. You would go up and deal with the hostels and with the indunas from parts of Natal, who were then established as indunas in hostels, and that became the IFP. The IFP became a hostel phenomena, but you had nobody to carry the IFP in the townships, so the genuine IFP supporters in Zulu Soweto fell by the wayside. So, you had this structure, and then you had in these structures the capacity of people like Mthethwa, to move from one place to another place and to lead whatever he did. Another such a one was Gideon Zulu. While he was predominantly Eshowe he dominates in Empangeni, Richards Bay area, in many cases in Durban area. So, you had this nature of the IFP beast developing this kind of idiom, this kind of cult, and the capacity, and you daren't touch it, because if you touch that you touch things you can't control. So, IFP to a very large extent is - you can't direct it, you can't instruct it, you can only go with what it's doing. And if you developed what Buthelezi has developed, a mythological charter as I call it, justifying the defence of what you're doing in the IFP, then that is an all pervasive blanket licence in which

people do what they want to do. When Khumalo MZ developed his relationship with Captain Botha, which none of us knew anything about, and then the IFP scandal blew, that whole question of the R500,00 and - R500 000,00 all from Security Police, which actually came from Military Intelligence. At the National Council there were a lot of shocked people. How could this man be dealing with Security Police? And there was need for

/Khumalo to

Khumalo to make his very impassioned statement that if he hadn't done what he had done he wouldn't be living, and all he had been doing was supporting the president's call for defence of the most valued things, the cherished things in life. So ... (inaudible - end of Side B, Tape 1) ... I know from talking to Khawula that on a number of occasions when Gideon Zulu had come to Durban he sent out SOSS for support, and Khawula would rush in a couple of busloads of people from Umzumbe to come and support what was being done here, or what was being done in Empangeni area, Richards Bay, Ngwelezana. But those were never part of IFP official strategic decisions or strategies. It was part of the nature of the beast at work doing what IFP evolved in doing.

MS GCABASHE: Ja, can I just ask a question? Earlier you said Chief Buthelezi - you didn't even have a policy because he was the kingpin, he was the one who takes decisions, he was the one who - he was almost, you know, very autocratic. Now, how do you explain the scenario that you have just explained of people doing whatever they liked in the different regions? Wouldn't you say it was because he allowed it, or what happened? How did that happen when this man was so autocratic, this man

was so ... (inaudible) ... this man was so all-powerful?

How do you explain that? --- I don't agree with - you're assuming that there had to be a conflict which he didn't or wouldn't control. This development of Inkatha suited Buthelezi very well. He is a shocking administrator. He wants nothing to do with anything. In the 20 years that I've known him I've never known him once even to go to visit his own head office. I mean he's never put foot in

/IFP head

IFP head office here in Durban. He's never put foot in it. He doesn't know what it looks like. He doesn't want anything to do with administration. He's a bum administrator. So, the more people carry on with the business down there the better. And the whole of the evolution of the IFP is the evolution of a machine at work, which suits him very well. He doesn't see the need to be able to control Khawula. When it comes to Shabalala, for years - I mean there have been a number of debates in National Council on how to deal with Shabalala. I mean there are lots of them.

CHAIRMAN: Just for the record, you're talking about Mandla Shabalala of Lindelane? --- Ja. It was only very recently when there was a real conflict between Shabalala and the Secretary-General, and it revolved around Shabalala's exercising of his power in favour of his taxis against buses that the thing eventually came to a head. So, it was that issue, but the march that he led on Pretoria on the eve of the local government elections was the final excuse to get rid of him, but it was just part of a long, ongoing problem. But there was sufficient evidence at the time to show that he,

Shabalala, no longer controlled Lindelane in the way that he used to, and that the IFP would lose a lot of voting support unless they moved against Shabalala, because there was a resentment building up against him, and if you supported him you would earn the wrath of those resenting people.

MR LAX: What you describe, in some ways almost simplistically, reflects a kind of almost feudal structure within the IFP, where you have, as you have called them, warlords or leaders in areas, some of whom are traditional

/leaders,

leaders, some of whom are not traditional leaders, but people with connections to traditional leadership.

Ntombela, for example, derived a lot of his initial support from the fact that he was Shayabantu Zondi's son-in-law - or brother-in-law, I can't remember, one of the two. But there's a certain reflection of a quasi tribal arrangement, where PC Buthelezi is the leader, and then you see these other structures below. There is that certain ethos that seems to pervade. How do you comment on that? --- If you look at the people who have emerged as warlords - that's probably the wrong term. The literature on rural societies strongly supports the phenomena of the emergence of big men, big women, dominant personality, who have a large degree of sway over the people, and who can actually run counter to traditions, and - and the evolution of a power base which rewrites the nature of traditions, the nature of local law even. So, it's a phenomena rooted in the nature of a man in society. You've got a phenomena in which dominant personalities arise, and in the



"ubukhosi(?)" traditions and cult those dominant people have a huge advantage if they are an inkosi. So, inkosis have got a lot of support going for them by the nature of their society. I mean you get a person like Khawula, who's a very dominant personality in his own right, or Ntombela, or Gideon Zulu, they dominate over, and because there is a very strong Zulu culture in the IFP if somebody like the new secretary-general emerges, and he starts becoming a somebody, the traditionalists sort of gang up against him and discredit him. So, the non-traditionalists have got a problem. That's why there's no leadership in Gauteng, there's only

/people people vying for leadership and never actually making it. So, traditionalism goes very deep, and particularly in Zulu society, where the self-awareness of the Zulu people is perhaps higher than the self-awareness of other people as a people. Look at the way that Buthelezi for 20-odd years has dramatized the Shaka day speeches and cultural element. So, the culture - the culture dictates an idiom, extends into that society in urban as well as rural areas. So, your dominant persons emerge by nature as the IFP leaders who have established the IFP structures in rural areas.

MR DANIEL: And this would explain the critical importance to Buthelezi of this whole myth of the traditional prime minister, because if the party is a coalition of big men how do you retain number one spot unless you manufacture and perpetuate and inculcate that myth? --- Ja. That actually wants to be looked at.

I am - my own view is that there has never been a traditional prime minister in KwaZulu society ever.

Shaka ruled for 12 years only, and there was the dependency on Buthelezi ancestors for military purposes, but nothing like any set up in which a traditional prime minister could have any role. Shaka didn't have such a rule, he didn't have such an idiom around him. He had no council to which he deferred. There's no such - I mean it's an anomaly in history, but Buthelezi has evolved this as a myth that he is in the footsteps of a traditional prime minister. Zulu society is patriarchal. He's got no royal blood in him other than through his mother, and biologically that is as important as anything else, but in terms of Zulu society he is no leading member - no other

/leading

leading member of Zulu society has ever emerged through the only connection to royalty through his mother. So, that's another myth ~~that's evolved.~~ I, as a social anthropologist, was quite often put into a situation where I had to assist in the redirection of traditional society. I mean the reed dance is totally foreign to Zulu culture, but I had to develop the mythology in speeches about the reed dance because the king wanted it, and develop something which is something like the Swazi reed dance, and gave it a mythological background. But now everybody will accept the reed dance as part of traditional life in South Africa in Zulu society. So, whether you're talking about that, or you're looking at the interpretation of Zulu society, or the re-interpretation of it, and one of the things Buthelezi had to do - since the turn - since the Mbatha Rebellion in fact, or earlier, since Cetewayo's incarceration and death, Zulu kings have been nobodies, they have been

totally inconsequential, so he had to develop the mythology of the importance of Zulu kings, which only started with Cetewayo. Cetewayo never ever wanted to fight any war, but the presentation of Cetewayo as the first real negotiator, who spent his life negotiating and - is a re-interpretation of an old king in the image of Buthelezi. So, you start then with the turning of history, and then you've got to build up the mythology of the importance of the kingdom, the importance of the king in the kingdom, and until Buthelezi arrived there was nobody. I mean whoever took any king seriously? I mean they sat there with inconsequential positions worth nothing. So, there was a cultural revival which an oppressed people latched onto quite phenomenally.

That's



/a whole a whole inquiry which - interpretation of developments which requires a book in its own right. But the distortions of Zulu history - I mean these Shaka Day speeches every year were gross distortions of what really took place in Zulu society. But society is a living thing, and suddenly these things become living, and that's the people's view of themselves and that's the end of the matter.

CHAIRMAN: If you could continue with that theme after our break. I think we should have a break now and give ... (incomplete)

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRMAN: There are just a couple more things to clear up from what you said before the break, before we move on to a different theme. You mentioned your opposition

to the formation of a UWUSA. Who was that primarily initiated and facilitated by, that process, as you recall? --- Buthelezi, ever since the 1973 strikes, was aware of the need for paying attention to trade unions. He had established in - I think it was '73 - with Rick Turner, and with Laurie Schlemmer and others - what did they call themselves - the Industrial - whatever it is, they established a training group, and there the - at that stage of trade union development the crucial question was moving towards reliance on shop stewards as opposed to trade union leaders dealing with the government and wheeling and dealing, to bring in the shop stewards as an important ingredient in trade union authority. So, Buthelezi had always fought for a trade unionism for blacks, a legalisation of trade union movements for



/blacks.

blacks. So, it was an old preoccupation of his, but when it came to the actual development and the emergence of the minefield that it was, when Dladla started becoming more and more autonomous in what he was doing, because he was getting more and more support from Zulu workers, a vacuum was left, and he did something, he got rid of Dladla, but there was this vacuum, and he was aware also that at those stages the emergence of COSATU and UDF were going to invade the workforce field. So, he moved to block that, and the establishment of UWUSA was then proposed. I opposed it on the ground that no sweetheart(?) union had ever succeeded at all, and secondly, that you can't have national trade unions, you must have industry trade unions. There's no room for a global, national, umbrella trade union body unless it's

a truly federal system. But they wanted to establish UWUSA as a national body, because you'd have then direct control over the executive. Mgongo(?), a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was appointed as a trusted chairperson or president of UWUSA under the auspice of Sithebe(?), whose portfolio would control labour matters in the KwaZulu Government, and I saw that all as being suicidal for trade unionism as such, and on that basis, on those grounds - but that's the circumstances in which Buthelezi established UWUSA.

Do you know - do you recall the names of individuals within the IFP, or advisors to the IFP, who drove that process, or can't you recall that? --- I can't recall names. I don't think there were individuals who drove the process. It was the Buthelezi preoccupation with trade unionism which found expression the proposal for an UWUSA, which was supported by everybody in Inkatha.

/You mentioned

You mentioned Sithebe, that was - was that Steven Sithebe? --- Mmm.

It's kind of ironic in a sense that he was the person under whose auspices Mgongo would then work, because in the early 80s, particularly in about '83, he was involved in leading Amabutho that smashed certain strikes in the Ladysmith area, particularly one at the Dunlop factory in Ladysmith. I don't know if you remember that incident at all. --- Sithebe was a law unto himself again. He was a strong man from Ladysmith area. He was bent upon establishing his own Inkatha, almost militia force, in Ladysmith. It was an area in which very little was being done until the

industrialisation of Newcastle and the environment. Ja, he was a law unto himself, but again because he was somebody influential from a rural area he had to be lived with. So he had a huge sway, and for years - I mean even as - I mean he was on a kidney dialysis programme, he was hardly ever in the office, but he was still the guy who wielded the big stick.

That action by him I recall very specifically because it gave rise to - it was the final straw, if you like, where particularly a whole lot of land organisations made a decision after that to stop working with Inkatha, and before that various land organisations had worked with Inkatha in a sort of co-operative effort, particularly around forced removals and things of that nature. And that was the final straw that I recall that gave rise to a hardening of attitudes, where certainly the one particular land organisation I was involved in said finally, "We can't actually work with Inkatha any longer,"

/and we and we severed our ties at that point. And that was '83. What did Inkatha do to deal with that sort of situation, where these - there was an increasing violence, if you like, that began to emerge in the early 80s, and that finally exploded in '85, '87 and so on?

--- Buthelezi ... (intervention)

I mean Ngoya, for example, was even before that, but ... (incomplete) --- You must remember that prior to -I think it was '83 which was probably the year, KwaZulu-Natal was relatively free of violence. there was eruptions in June 16, 1976, and its aftermath, and there was protest policies all over the place, but

there was no real development of militancy in South African politics in this province. When violence did erupt Buthelezi was actually hugely shocked about it. He thought he had led this province out of that possible scenario, and when that violence emerged it was predominantly anti-Inkatha and not so much anti-apartheid in his view. Whether it was Sarmcol, or whether it was - whatever it was, it's developments which he thought was good for Inkatha and for his politics.

Was that because it enabled him to begin the rhetoric which you've referred to in your extracts from his speeches of the just struggle, and, you know, not lying down like lambs to the slaughter, and the juxtaposition of how he has always espoused anti-violence, but that no one can be seen to continuously turn the other cheek? What you've suggested in your second submission is that - that one saw a gradual movement towards the use of violence as a constructive thing. --- You can't in any sense of the word hope to escape violent confrontation if

/you, as an you, as an internal organisation, take on and try and displace - or replace a liberation movement. Now, if you look at what the ANC itself was saying, and the BBC abstracts, world broadcasts, is a mine of information. The ANC were exhorting people to attack the establishment, to form work groups, to arm themselves, to cripple factories. Now, Buthelezi knew that he was taking on a militarist organisation, and he had to develop an organisation which had the will to resist, otherwise they would just be defeated. So, his rhetoric

actually goes back to pre-'83 days, and by '83 that rhetoric had already established a militancy in Inkatha - what I call their mythological charter of the justification of Inkatha violence in defence of what it was doing. It is essential idiom if you're going to tackle that kind of objective.

Perhaps we could use this then, John, as an appropriate stage to go into your next theme, which I understood related to ... (intervention)

MR LAX: Just hold on, before you do that. There was some unfinished business from right in the beginning, before I started dealing with the profile. I said we'd go back, and we did the profile, and there were some things that arose out of - particularly around funds and so on. And you speak in the beginning of your December submission, the one we received yesterday or the day before - you say that although there was very little done to - or the way that officials, who were in essence carrying out Inkatha agendas, through their positions in KwaZulu Government you say that they were able to do this without jeopardising their careers, and you gave one or two instances. I just wondered if you could elaborate a

/little bit  
little bit more on that before we move on to other areas. You've given as an example the question of vehicles, for example, and the question of positions in which inspectors of schools, or health inspectors and so on, people who then would have a certain freedom of movement - but how else was that process facilitated for those people? --- I think I also indicated that the KwaZulu Government - and I forget the exact details, but



I've got them, I can dig them out - spent like R1,6 million per annum in supporting the Inkatha Institute. Now, the rationale of the Inkatha Institute was that it was a research organisation in support of policy needs of the KwaZulu Government, thus it was legitimate expenditure.

Ja. --- But the Institute itself adopted courses of action which stretched what it was doing to the very limit. They had a training programme that was actually predominantly funded by Adenauer(?), the training of trainers and the motivation of self-development structures - teaching them how to run committees and run organisations, and so on. But this was the framework within which your activists operated.

Now Sam Armstrong, as the person responsible for the KwaZulu finances legally, as accounting officer of the government, each year had to face funding this organisation and what it was doing, and reports to the board each year, via the Institute, reported only on those things which were defensible. So, on paper he was doing something which was defensible, but he was constantly under pressure not to - to fund what he was doing, but not look too deeply, but at that same time to guard his own back. He was enormously preoccupied with his pension rights and wouldn't do

/anything anything which would jeopardise his future. All civil servants, senior civil servants, were appointed by Pretoria, sometimes - or often in discussion with Buthelezi, but he had no say in who was appointed in those capacities. And Stan Armstrong every now and again had to face a demand for expenditure which could

only be got if he got other secretaries, their departments, to cut their budgets and to divert funds from what they were originally intended for and make it available. There were a couple of ad hoc expenditures which - I can bring to mind very few of them, but, for example, at one stage Buthelezi got enamoured with some Nigerian author, writer, who produced a book on the marvellousness of Buthelezi and Inkatha, which wasn't worth the paper written on, would never get anywhere, and suddenly there was a shipment of something like 40 000 books, I think, in Durban Harbour, and a payment demand was made. Buthelezi was faced with a situation, and so he instructed Stan Armstrong to pay the bill. Stan Armstrong had enormous difficulty in that, but in the end he was instructed to do it, and they shipped all these books from the containers into the Inkatha Institute offices to somehow store and deal with. I don't know what happened to them, but there was a case where he was just told what to do. In the one case I was renegotiating my own contract - I think it was after we came back from Hibberdene to Ulundi, and there was a meeting between Stan Armstrong, myself and Buthelezi on the terms of the contract, and Stan Armstrong was adamantly refusing to accept the contract and I was refusing to go further unless the contract was accepted. Eventually Buthelezi said to Armstrong, "Do it. Just go

/and do it,"

and do it," and he went and did it. So, there were those occasions when Buthelezi could throw his weight around, but they were very rare. Ja, I think - I don't think much more can be said about it from my knowledge.

from time to time by either BOSS or the Security Branch or Military Intelligence, or all of them. Now, you were associated with him for a long period of time, and you've mentioned that this chap Alkers, for example, was involved with you in NTE. Was Alkers in that very early time the link to Buthelezi as well? --- Yes. When I met Alkers he was already having monthly meetings with Buthelezi. So, that was prior to '73. Because I met Alkers in '73,

/and prior and prior to '73 he was already meeting Buthelezi.

Okay. Can you recall which other people met with Buthelezi on a regular basis, or that sort of thing? -- After Alkers - I don't know what happened to him, but the - the Durban BOSS representative subsequently was transferred to East Africa because he was French-speaking, and then to Paris. I am trying to think of his name. He took over from Alkers as the contact person between BOSS, later National Intelligence, and Buthelezi.

And after that? --- Well, then it was '94, so ... (incomplete)

So this person was transferred in '94 you say. -- I don't know the dates. All I know is that he is the - I know that he took over from Alkers in this monthly meeting with Buthelezi.

Ja. Because from '73 to '94 is 21 years basically. It's highly unlikely there would have been one person during that whole time. --- No. I only know of those two.

Ja. So, you wouldn't have been party to those

briefings by ... (intervention) --- No.

I mean we have, you know, minutes, Military Intelligence minutes, which record meetings between Buthelezi and senior Military Intelligence people. We know those took place, specifically with regard to ... (intervention)

MR ?: Briefing him on the security situation.

MR LAX: ... to Caprivi. Ja.

MR ?: Did you meet Buchner, Shan Buchner? --- Ja.

When did you first see Shan Buchner? --- After he was appointed as commissioner.

/You said

You said that Buthelezi wouldn't have had an opportunity, or wouldn't be permitted to appoint which civil servants were on secondment from Pretoria. I think you said that. --- Mmm.

Ja. Whereas, if it was his own back garden, like the Bureau, he could appoint Nick Steele. Is that generally correct? --- That's correct.

So, you don't know to what extent there was any request that a man like Buchner should head up the KwaZulu Police, or whether he was just foisted on him by Pretoria. --- He was foisted on him by Pretoria. I know that Buthelezi was perturbed when Buchner was sent to Ulundi, but soon was very satisfied with what he was doing. A number of eyebrows were raised but Buthelezi didn't, as far as I know, ask for him, and was a bit perturbed about the appointment.

Buchner made it very clear to us that his transfer to Pietermaritzburg was simply a precursor to his going to Ulundi, and that it was always the intention of the State to ensure that he ended up in Ulundi because of

his

particular skills. Does that surprise you at all? ---  
No, it doesn't surprise me at all.

What was your relationship with Buchner around?

--- I met him once or twice on - perhaps security matters for annual conference arrangements and so on. I had no working relationship with Buchner.

MR DANIEL: You've mentioned these regular security briefings that Buthelezi had from BOSS, etcetera, etcetera.

"Buthelezi passed many security briefings on to me for use as background

/information."

information."

Is that amongst the material that we have here? ---

Ja. Actually it's ... (intervention)

In your office. --- ... somewhere in your office, but there's a box full this thick, which I haven't had time to systematically go through and categorise, dating back from '78 through to '95. So, even after the '94 elections Buthelezi continued to receive security briefings, a lot of which were inside information about what was happening in ANC, COSATU executive meetings, and planning and strategy discussions, and so on.

Did you sit in on some of those meetings? ---

No, never once.

Never once. Was he the only person from ...

(intervention) --- As far as I know. He might have brought in one or two Cabinet Ministers with him, but as far as I know they were personal, one-to-one meetings.

So, you wouldn't be able to tell us whether certain information that would be passed to him could have been at his request. --- No. If you look at that documentation analytically and critically quite clearly it was a mechanism the State was using to disseminate misinformation to direct Buthelezi's mind the way they wanted him to direct it. I think it's as simple as that.

MR ?: (Inaudible)

MR LAX: Sorry, just before you do, you've just said that these things continued through to 1995 even. --- I've got a file of documents about this thick for 1995 alone.

Who was the source of that stuff? --- I don't know. Stan Armstrong ran a private KwaZulu security department committee - a section of Retief Rose's(?)

/department department - and I think he was instrumental in a lot of the channelling. Documents come just marked confidential, strictly confidential, and with a militarist type frontpiece saying, "This is the assessment of the veracity of the document," but it could have come from any of the security departments or from none of them.

Buchner worked for Buthelezi and KwaZulu even after he stopped being Commissioner of the KwaZulu Police. --- I didn't know that.

He had a private contract with them. --- That I didn't know.

And - the allegations anyway, and they haven't been totally verified, is that he was paid a great deal

of money to continue that work until fairly recently, when he left the area. --- I don't know what the sources of those documents are. I know just from speaking to people like Esterhuizen, from Bop Security, that there was a lot of trading of information between sources, various sources, between the various homelands and the central government groups, and Buchner could well be on that sort of circulation list for that kind of information, and he could have supplied them. I don't know. I've got no idea where those documents came from.

MR DANIEL: For my own information, was Stan Armstrong a seconded official? --- Ja.

Throughout? --- Throughout. From beginning to end.

From the Department of Finance? --- I don't know from what department. I mean he had been down in Ciskei, Transkei, before coming to KwaZulu.

With regard to the Indunazulu Camp, you ran that /camp for camp for what period? I know up until the even of the election. The training began when? --- December '93.

So it was approximately three months. --- Three months, yes.

And your instruction to set up that camp came from MZ Khumalo? --- No, MZ Khumalo came to me with a problem on his hands and asked me what he could do with that problem. I suggested that he use those guys to train them into resistance to make elections in KwaZulu rural areas impossible, because that was my interest at that stage, and that camp was established for that

purpose.

So, you will claim this was something of an initiative on your part. --- Initiative on my part, ja, which Buthelezi approved of, and ... (incomplete)

Can we just clarify that then? Khumalo comes to you, "I've got a problem." You suggest, "Let's train them to resist the election." He then took that to Buthelezi? --- I don't know.

But when did you hear that Buthelezi had approved it? --- Well, I went to Buthelezi. I would not do it

- I wouldn't do such a thing without going to Buthelezi and saying, "Look, this is what I want to do, this is what I intend doing." And I went to him before I did anything and told him, "This is what I propose doing," and then I went ahead and did it.

Okay. The decision to ~~the~~ the date of the election had been announced a month before that. Was there a clear strategy - I am assuming there wasn't - to disrupt these elections? Quite clearly right from the time the election date was announced it was your understanding that the IFP would not participate, and would do everything possible to

/sabotage


sabotage the elections. --- Certainly in rural areas, where there was the capacity to do so. You had to use a limited number of facilities. Schools were virtually the only places where you could use, and courthouses. Buthelezi refused access to schools on the ground that community schools were not under the control of the KwaZulu Government, they were under control of the communities. In the rural areas you had one single



telephone line which you could disrupt, and there was only one road which you could block, so it leant itself logistically to thinking in that direction.

Now, earlier you told us that you were opposed, for example, to the setting up of UWUSA, but here you seem to have wholeheartedly embraced the strategy of disruption. --- I don't see any connection between the two whatsoever. If you are serving Buthelezi, and you're resisting the new constitution, and Buthelezi's intention was to make the elections in KwaZulu-Natal impossible, yes, you set about assisting that in whatever way you could.

Ja, but, you know, there were lots of things that Inkatha did over the years that you didn't know too much about, or you didn't approve of, but you couldn't stop.

But here was something that was clearly illegal, but you embraced it.  It was not illegal. The training camp itself was not illegal. I think the question of how far you take protest politics is a question which is very debatable. It was a question of strategy and tactics, and ... (intervention)

How far were you - did tell them to take it? ---

It never got that far. Firstly there was a complete lack

/of money,  
of money, a lack of trainers, a lack of training equipment, and so the actual training - you just tried to stretch out whatever training you were giving to the maximum possible extent, where there was tracking, ambushing, or whatever it is. The training never actually developed any distance.

But the - if you like the philosophy of the training was not that it would be limited to non-violent, civil disobedience tactics necessarily. ---

The philosophy of the training was that you should erect roadblocks, you should disrupt telephone communications, to make the running of an election impossible - an awareness that you might have to face the consequences of doing what you were doing, and you taught people how to deal with that.

You taught the trainees if the police moved in and attempted to, say, remove the roadblock, that they would resist? --- I think one would say that's inescapably a conclusion of the intention of that camp, yes.

So, people could have been killed? --- I think people could have been killed, ja.

CHAIRMAN: But just to get back to what you said a few minutes ago. I mean it's clearly unlawful. Forget people being killed, because that's a question of foreseeability. I mean it's clearly illegal to put up a roadblock across a national or a public road, or to pull down telephone lines. It's against the law. One can't do such a thing. --- Okay. One can say that very simply the answer obviously is yes, yes, yes. The alternative is what the ANC did in August after they walked out of CODESA on their mass action. People died. They died in the streets. The ANC did things which were illegal. It's part of the idiom

/of protest  
of protest politics. Now, where does that protest politics licence begin and where end? When does it become legislative? When does it become illegislative? It depends what side of the political fence you're

sitting on. All I am saying is that one conceives that as an act of political protest against having elections under a constitution which the IFP had rejected.

No, I am not making a moral comment on it at all.

I mean I certainly am not. I just took issue with the specific thing you said that it wasn't unlawful in terms of the law of the land, and it clearly was unlawful. -

-- Oh ja, in that sense, ja. So was the defiance campaign also unlawful.

MS GCABASHE: I just would like to ask what did you hope to achieve by disrupting the elections? ---

Well, hoped to achieve a revision of a constitution. Remember that Buthelezi went into CODESA 1 under protest because the King was not permitted a delegation. He didn't participate in it at all. The IFP had walked out of the finalisation of the constitution, walked out of the

negotiating council. I was involved in, right through to the ending, trying to negotiate some kind of compromise with Meyer and Ramaphosa, and this wasn't forthcoming. The only course of action open to you was one of this kind of protest.

MR DANIEL: When you say that the training involved reconnaissance work, reconnaissance on who or what? Would it, for example, have been reconnaissance on areas where UDF had strength? --- Ja. Part of the training would be to gather the information of where the danger lay, and if you've got MK UDF activists in the area you need to

/know who know who they are and where they are. So, reconnaissance was a question of gathering intelligence.

On the enemy? --- On the enemy, ja.

I think you need to clarify, because if you look at point 19 here the training given covered, right, and you list the 10 or so topics. But on the other hand you say that obviously you were hampered by lack of facilities, money, etcetera, etcetera. Could you give us an assessment of just how prepared the group were for a programme of action at the time the programme was abandoned? --- Very unprepared. A number of them

had obviously been given previous training somewhere or other, because they were either ex-army or ex-police.

Of the 64-odd people who I took over initially some very clearly knew what they were doing in terms of handling weapons and so on. They were trained in - well trained in the use of small arms, the management and the maintenance of small arms, so they had a capacity to use arms effectively. ~~They were trained in such activities~~ as picking blockade sites, ambush sites. So, in that sense I think they had

a certain capacity, even on the limited training that was given to them. Had you go so far as to draw up a sort of schedule? I mean the election was what, only weeks away. --- No. No.

So you hadn't got a - "We're going to hit this area, hit that area." You hadn't gone that far. --- No.

Okay. You were about 60 people? --- Thereabouts, ja.

Is this a very remote area? I am not familiar with the area. What I want to know was did the National Intelligence people know about this camp and what was

/going on?

going on? --- When I - before I set up the camp I took a trip to Manguse, met the station commander, and informed the station commander that I was going to set up this self-defence training camp. I told him exactly where. I subsequently learnt that there was a Military Intelligence presence near Ndumo. The Ndumo guys came across fairly frequently, to the extent that it disturbed me, so the police knew, and Military Intelligence knew, BOSS knew, the Security Police knew what the camp was, where it was, and who was there.

And nothing was done to stop it? --- No. No, no. Because as far as, I think, the legality of the camp itself was concerned it was entirely a legal camp.

How did the information come out about this camp?

--- It was never publicised. I didn't talk about it in Central Committee, I only talked about it to Buthelezi. But you've got 60 people in a camp. Some of the camp members there was a great desire or ambition, to leave that camp and to join the Mlaba Camp. So, some of the people left Indunazulu Camp and actually became Mlaba

trainees. There was a number of in-camp disputes about people, as there normally is in a situation like that. There was a number of discontents who would have gone home and talked about the camp, so I think that's - I mean there's very little known about the camp, it was hardly ever talked about. It's a background thing which nobody knows about.

And the decision to close it came out of the blue?

You were just told. --- Ja, Buthelezi told me that he had decided to enter the elections. I had to close

the camp immediately, which I did.

/How did

How did the trainees react? --- The trainees by that time were - they had been recruited some time in '93. I don't quite know when. I took them over in December. They had been there, and by March they had been something like five or six months without pay. Not one of them received any cent of payment for the period. There was no inducement award, financial inducement award. They all had families. They all anticipated they would go for a training camp which would last about three months and they'd go home again. There was a bit of agitation, and I think there was great relief when the whole thing was eventually closed down.

Now, you said your role was a managerial one essentially, and you brought in various people to do the training. Who would have done the training in reconnaissance and who did the training in political awareness? --- Political awareness wasn't part of my training programme, it was part of the training programme that was undertaken in the Transvaal. I myself had undertaken to do a course of political awareness in terms of awareness of the circumstances in which those people would be deployed.

And reconnaissance, who did that? --- Bob - okay, I'll think of his surname just now.

The man from Bop? --- Ja.

And the small arms training the same man? --- We only had one trainer.

Okay. --- If it's important I could - if the name's important I could - my wife has got the name. I

could phone her and I could give you the surname. At the moment it - it was a guy from Boksburg. I can't remember

/the surname

the surname at the moment.

I think it would be useful. You know, I think it's - an interesting question is the whole role of Rhodesians post 1980 in South Africa.

CHAIRMAN: John, are there any other sort of themes, as it were, or major issues which you intend to pursue, or can we just go back to other questions? Just something on the KwaZulu Police. You said you didn't have anything to do with Buchner really, but just looking at the KwaZulu Police on a conceptual level - again I am going back to my own experience, and much of my experience was with victims of political violence in areas like Mpumalanga Township in the late 80s, '88, '89, in Ndwedwe - sorry, Ntuzuma, which was on the borders of Lindelane, KwaMashu, and other areas in which there was a strong KwaZulu Police presence, and the general impression that I gained over this three or four or five years, having worked with victims of political violence, and bringing many actions against the Government and against the KwaZulu Police from people's experiences in those areas, it that the KwaZulu Police were really in essence nothing more than a sort of legitimate armed extension of the party, of Inkatha. That's a generalisation. In some areas they did carry out normal policing duties within the limited resources that they had, because they had very limited resources. They did do crime prevention and crime investigation. But in unrest areas certainly the impression that I

gleaned over those several years was that they assisted, aided and abetted in IFP attacks into, for example, neighbouring townships. That's how it usually happened.

You'd have - a township would tend to be UDF or ANC oriented. The

/local or

local or nearby informal settlement tended to be IFP, and that situation pertained at Mpumalanga, where you had the informal settlement of Inkandla, which was just across the way from Mpumalanga township. In Ntuzuma it was Lindelane. In KwaMakutha you had the township and then you had the informal settlement. And the pattern was that there would be sort of almost armed incursions from the informal settlements into the township areas, and very, very frequently you would have KwaZulu Police elements assisting. When township youth rallied to defend themselves or fight back they would be shot at, and the general impression, as I have said, was that the KwaZulu Police were - I mean to say that they were biased would be a gross understatement, or to say that they were partial in the execution of their duties would be an under-statement. Is that - how does that sit with you? --- My understand is that IFP activists knew

which police stations and which police sergeants and which police officers they could go to for IFP logistic support and IFP back-up or IFP refuge. I think there was a very clear

indication of this when, after '94, the police were taken over, the KwaZulu Police were taken over. There were something like 120 people who did not want this transfer, they were dissatisfied with it, and they were grouped in Durban, the police not knowing quite how to



deploy them and where to send them because they didn't want this element in their midst. So, I think you're talking about a proportion of the KwaZulu Police in the way that you're talking. You know, I think you're talking legitimately about a proportion. How high that proportion is I don't know. I think there would have been a situation in which

/people like people like - ag, what's the guy's name, the black guy below Buchner during ... (intervention)

Martez(?). --- Martez. He was influential in transferring and locating particular persons. I think in trouble spots for the IFP he would have specifically located the IFP kind of element in the KwaZulu Police and sent the others to more neutral zones. So, I think places like Ngwelezana or Izingolweni or - there would have been an attempt - no, there are no KwaZulu Police in Izingolweni. There would have been an attempt to make sure you had hand-picked, pro-IFP station commanders, and so on and so forth. I think that's more likely what we're looking at.

Just one other observation. I mean at that time it didn't matter which police station you went to. If you weren't IFP, or non-ANC or UDF, you simple wouldn't get helped at that police station generally speaking. Certainly from Pietermaritzburg region, where I come from, that was the experience of a lot of people that I worked with at that time. --- Oh yes, I think the police force trained them to look at the world in that kind of way, and ... (intervention)

Precisely. --- ... and to have this kind of anti-ANC, anti-UDF, anti-COSATU kind of outlook.

Obviously in relation to unrest-related issues. In relation to ordinary crimes there was a sort of disjunction. In relation to ordinary crime anybody would get help, but in relation to political crime, if you want to call it that, it was - definitely the first question that you were asked when you walked through the doors, "What are you?" And if you were not IFP, or non-UDF, up

/to a particular to a particular point in time, you were simply ... (intervention) --- (Inaudible)... all pervasive idiom.

Just going back to a remark you made just off the record during the break this morning about financial control of the IFP, perhaps you could just place that on record as well, the issues relating to how audits and budgets were dealt with, particular from wholly-owned KwaZulu projects, which themselves were, you know, registered institutions or companies which required auditing, such as Ilanga newspaper. Sorry, IFP-owned institutions or companies. What controls were introduced at party level to control and to audit the party's annual budget and that sort of thing? --- The party made quite sure that it had its own party accounts audited every year, sometimes with great difficulty, but they were done. Mandla Matla(?) would necessarily have an audit every year to meet the requirements of the Receiver of Revenue and the Companies Act. Again you start saying the limitations of normal action. Normally if you went to a

shareholders' meeting you'd be given a complete written account of the company's affairs and an audited statement. There's nothing in law which says that any board or executive need do that, so if you read out the statement it meets the requirements, formal requirements of the law, whether you read it out sketchily by just mentioning highlights, or ... (inaudible) ... and present it, and then have it adopted. And then you can take that process to say minimal things about it. All I am saying is that in Inkatha - everybody knows that there are presidential funds or deposits or bank accounts which only the president can authorise. Everybody would know that Mandla

/Matla makes

Matla makes money available to Inkatha as a shareholder, and it's not ever - how that money is used is never discussed, and should form part of some kind of audit process. These accounts have never been really laid before the Council, certainly not in written form in advance to give you time to discuss them, and there's been a great degree of secrecy about how Buthelezi dispenses this money. Incoming donations, I know from my own fundraising in this country people don't want to give Inkatha money, but people who want to support Inkatha will make out a cheque personally to Buthelezi because they say well, he will do whatever he does with it. So, a lot of money goes to Buthelezi, made out to himself, for Inkatha, whether it's from Anglo or whoever. I don't think you'll find any record of Harry Oppenheimer ever having given Inkatha money, but I've taken cheques made out to Buthelezi. So, Buthelezi sits on incoming money, and it runs into millions, which he

himself only knows about, and he would then have somebody - usually Khumalo, or sometimes Konigkramer - as a signatory to that account and nobody else will know about it. And those accounts and the details of those accounts would never be discussed with any IFP structure.

MS GCABASHE: Are you then saying you are not sure whether that money was - eventually was transferred to the coffers of Inkatha? --- Well, if they were given for Inkatha work by, say, Harry Oppenheimer in a cheque to Buthelezi there would be no legal need to incorporate them in the Inkatha accounts. Buthelezi could then dispense with that money as he saw fit for Inkatha.

Can I just ask another question. You said earlier /that one that one of the reasons why Inkatha pulled out of the negotiations was because the King was not allowed to be part of that delegation. I think from our experience we know that the King didn't quite have such a royal time with Inkatha. Why was it so important that he should be part of that negotiation? --- Buthelezi was fighting for the recognition of KwaZulu as a kingdom in the new constitution, and he needed a KwaZulu delegation from the King as part of the process which incorporated KwaZulu as a kingdom in the new South Africa. So, it was important from that point of view. It was also a point of view to establish the legitimacy of his own leadership, and the legitimacy of the KwaZulu Government, because the KwaZulu Government is the King's government. So, I think it was important from those points of view for Buthelezi to have a delegation from the King at CODESA.

MR ?: (Inaudible - end of Side B, Tape 3) ... was as the speech writer and, you know, Buthelezi is one of the world's biggest talkers. And you pointed to the importance of his annual general conference speech, and to the Shaka Day speeches, etcetera. I am interested in how these speeches were constructed. Did he meet with you beforehand and says, "This is the kind of thing I want to pursue this year," and you'd go out and construct the speech, and to what extent would the delivered version be often different? I mean to what extent did he have the final say in terms of the document? --- The procedure generally is I would be given his itinerary for something like two weeks in advance and I'd start preparing documentation. On some of the issues there would be a written instruction about what he wanted to say. On many

/occasions occasions there were telephone discussions about how he wanted this speech or that speech to be handled. Every speech was drafted, it was sent to him, and he then made whatever amendments he wanted to make, sometimes very substantial, but quite often just a sentence here or there. In the delivery of the speech he ad libbed a lot, so the written speech was some kind of aid. I've never really understood why he insisted on a speech wherever he went, for whoever, at whatever time. It was one of the anomalies of the man.

He rarely, if ever, spoke off the cuff? --- He spoke off the cuff frequently if he had a speech on which - from which to depart. He had to have a speech in his hand.

So, what we are reading here are the transcripts of the speech, or are they the draft? --- They are the draft that he was given to deliver.

But he may not necessarily have said all these things. --- He will have said those things, plus more. He always read the speech, but he would then stop after

paragraph (b) and ad lib, and then go back to paragraph (c). The speech was delivered as written, but there was a lot of ad libbing in addition to the words. Those speeches were certainly delivered. And all those speeches were mass produced and taken and given out at meetings at 10 000 at a time.

One last question from my side. I asked you earlier, you said that as of 1975 you saw no conflict between your allegiance to the ANC and the work you were doing with Buthelezi, and that continued right up until about the late 70s, and then the crisis with the ANC and

/Tambo round

Tambo round 1977. Basically you were given a choice, and you made a choice, and you said whether it was the right one or not you don't know, but you made that choice. So, in a sense I got the impression that you found yourself in the mid-70s with a foot in either camp, and then sort of willy-nilly in '79 you found both feet in the IFP camp. But in '86 you extract yourself and you go down the South Coast. In '89 you're persuaded to go back. What I'd like to ask you is, with the benefit of hindsight, as we've referred to on several occasions, do you regret going back in '89, and the role you played in the 1990s? --- No, I don't regret it, because I'll always value the work that I did

to establish the Peace Accord. That was really tough going, and I think in the end it was worth doing. I don't regret the CODESA experience, because by the end of '93 it became clear to me that the IFP had to change its strategy, its tactics, and if I had not been in the CODESA process I would have still been trapped in the National Council/Buthelezi fan club kind of mentality. But having been exposed to a wide range of very penetrating thinking from other parties in CODESA I could extract myself and see things in greater perspective. So, I could start fighting in '94 for the return of Inkatha to the negotiating assembly to complete the constitution. I could start arguing for the merits of dropping confrontationism in favour of learn-to-live-in-the-new-South-Africa, and to transform the IFP role from a protest group to a parliamentary, democratic workforce. The perspectives I've got now, which I value, I think come out of that experience, and I've got my own sense of justification of having genuinely, strongly opposed

/Buthelezi

Buthelezi in National Council and in the fields of work that I did for him, and I feel quite at ease about it.

The only thing that doesn't sort of fit there is the decision then to disrupt the elections. It seems to be discordant with the insight that you say that you gained from the CODESA process. --- That was in December '93 that the camp was established. Negotiations continued into February '94 and early March with Roelf Meyer, and then there was the international mediation which I was involved in, and it was that final set of discussions, where you're faced with the

inevitability of the constitution, that one had a different perspective seeping into what you were doing.

So, at the time the elections came in '94 you had a completely different frame of mind which emerged over that period.

Now in late 1997 how - and, you know, if you look back over the last 15 or so years, and the tragedy of the civil war in this province, how do you think that - how the history 10 or 20 years down the line will judge Chief Buthelezi, and how do you judge him? --- I think

history will judge him very harshly, and will judge people like me, who participated in what he did, very harshly, and justifiably so. I think the final tragedy of Buthelezi is yet to come. It's going to come on the local government issue in rural areas. I cannot see how Buthelezi is going to be able to survive those circumstances. I cannot see him succumbing to them. After I had been able no longer to influence events from within the National Council I took to private correspondence with Buthelezi, urging him to move away from confrontationism and into democratic parliamentary /politics.

politics. In that correspondence when I point to the fact that the only thing left to him is parliamentary democracy his response to me in writing is, "What then? Sinn Fein?" And when I say there's only parliamentary politics ahead he then asked me in writing, in a letter to me, "What about the IRA? What then of the IRA?" He's prepared to die for what he believes in. I think he's facing the terrible tragedy of being trapped in his own mistakes, and is totally convinced that he's right,



and he sees himself as some kind of person being prepared to pay the ultimate price.

MR LAX: Can I take us back to less philosophical issues for a moment? Just looking - and one area I meant to cover with you earlier was the Inkatha Institute, and we spoke about the time Laurie Schlemmer left. That was in '84 you said. --- I think it was later, '85/'86. He left at the same time as Bosman arrived. Bosman arrived as a result of Schlemmer going.

No, that was about '84/'85. By the end of '85 Bosman had - by early '86 he had already left. There was already that blow-up with him. If you look at the Caprivi documents he was out of there. By April '86 he was gone. But let's not get bogged down in the dates too much. Who took over from Schlemmer? --- Peter Mansfield.

And after that? --- Gavin Woods. Under Mansfield Gavin Woods was recruited as accounting officer, and then succeeded as director of the Inkatha Institute.

Right. What was the main source of funding of the Inkatha Institute besides the money that was voted by the KwaZulu Government? --- They had two grants, one from the Adenauer Foundation, which was a substantial grant,

/and the and the KwaZulu Government Urban Foundation spent quite a bit of money on the study that the Institute was doing on squatter development settlements, that very specific project, and not a programme of funding for the Institute at large. Predominantly, very predominantly, perhaps to the extent of 90% of its income was from the

KwaZulu Government and Adenauer.

Besides that Urban Foundation work what other work did the Institute actually do? --- It produced many position papers, information papers. It conducted training schemes for the development of NGOs and democratic structures, establishing committees, and roles of committee members, and ... (intervention)

So, organisational development type work? ---

Ja. It also to some extent was involved in the establishment of welfare projects, but those were predominantly Adenauer-run, because even if they came in under the Inkatha Institute's auspices they were actually run by the Adenauer people.

There was a certain degree of - or a fairly substantial amount of violence monitoring that went on through the Institute. Are you familiar with that work? Who ran that side of it? --- Gavin Woods.

Gavin Woods. --- Gavin Woods had a team which he sent out to various areas.

Where are those records of - that they gathered, the sort of ... (intervention) --- It's a total mystery. The Institute occupied premises here in Durban. It had two floors of a building which Adenauer Foundation bought, and it would have become the property of Inkatha had Inkatha occupied it for a period of five years

/continuously.

continuously. But when '94 came it became clear that there would be no KwaZulu Government funding for the Inkatha Institute. The Inkatha Institute would not be able to exist because it had no funding base. So, they then closed the Inkatha Institute down and instead

established this ... (incomplete)

DPP? --- Ja, DPP. Now, I've asked Gavin Woods on a number of occasions, because as a researcher I am interested to know where that documentation is. He doesn't know, he won't tell me. I think it's either in his garage or been dumped, or - it's nowhere in IFP custody.

Ja. I mean we would be quite interested in some of that material simply because it will help us verify a whole range of things as well - from our own research into violence generally. --- Well, search and seize his garage. Ask Adenauer Foundation first of all whether they left any of the documentation there. And there was a very considerable library at the Institute which somebody's done something with.

Just - what is Woods' background? I am just interested. How did he come to be involved in the Institute? You said he was brought on as accounting officer. --- He was accounting - he was in accounting with Premier Milling, I think it was, and when Schlemmer left it was clear that we'd had to have a qualified accounting person, and he was engaged by the Inkatha Institute, recruited from - I think it was Premier Milling.

CHAIRMAN: Just to get back to an issue - Philip Powell. We have the criminal trial of Colonel Eugene de Kock, we

/have the  
have the record of that, and in his plea in mitigation of sentence, as well as in his amnesty application, he refers to the transfer of an enormous amount of weaponry to Philip Powell in 1993. He talks in a very detailed

way about KwaZulu Government trucks coming to Pretoria -  
to Mechem, which is a subsidiary of Armscor - with their  
numberplates covered up, and taking delivery of, he  
estimates, about six tons of weapons ranging from, you  
know, ammunition right up to - through the range of  
local and eastern bloc weapons right through to rocket  
propelled grenades, landmines, hand grenades, that sort  
of thing. And he says that Philip Powell told him that  
they were for distribution within KwaZulu in the pre-  
election phase. Do you know anything about that? ---

No, I know nothing about that.

Nothing at all. And there's evidence that we have  
also from somebody who says that he witnessed them being  
-or some of the weapons being offloaded at the KLA  
building in Ulundi. --- I've got no knowledge of  
that whatsoever.

Have you ever ~~been in conversation~~ with people  
like Philip Powell about his intentions in the pre-  
election period, what - other than Mlaba, or even  
including Mlaba -what the intentions of the party were,  
or people like him, or, you know, the strong men of the  
party? Because we have no reason to disbelieve Eugene  
de Kock about his handing over that weaponry to Philip  
Powell, and obviously it's of great concern to us where  
it is, and we're just ... (intervention) --- I don't  
know. I can't be helpful in any way in those words.  
Philip Powell and I - from his side, I don't know why,  
there's a huge antipathy

/and antagonism.

and antagonism. He's very polite to me, but there's  
never been any kind of working relationship, which I  
found strange because I was ardently doing what I was

doing, and would have thought that he would have been helpful and supportive in what I was doing, but he has never been that. So, I've had no working relationship with Philip whatsoever. I don't know anything about that weaponry. I am surprised that one could even think of the IFP being able to assimilate and deal with it, because, knowing the IFP that I know, there isn't anybody with that capacity. I don't know who could have worked with him in that kind of thing. We've always got MZ. MZ will bear more knowledge about these things than anybody else in the party. But there's a very paucity of those kind of people in the IFP.

Ja, I think - I don't think there's any suggestion that they were actually distributed to the regions. -  
-- They're stockpiled somewhere.

But they've been stockpiled somewhere, ja.

MR LAX: Maybe that's the answer to your Sinn Fein comment in that letter. --- You mean Buthelezi thinks he's got sufficient stockpile of ... (inaudible) ... the IRA.

Ja, anything's possible. You said earlier that you understood Powell to come from a Security Branch background. What verification do you have of that? -  
-- I've got no verification. It's just common knowledge. Everybody speaks about it as though it is a fact of life.

Ja. Buchner made it very clear to us that he had absolutely no doubt that Powell was a Security Branch operative. He in fact described him as an under cover  
/agent. So,  
agent. So, we have more verification of that than you do. --- (Inaudible)

No, I was just wondering if you'd ever spoken to him about his past, or whatever. Just one last aspect that I wanted to cover, and that was - it relates to Powell in a sense, but it relates more to David Ntombela. What dealings did you have with him? --- Very few. The Midlands was an island until itself. I really only started interacting with him in the Provincial Legislature, so I don't know the man personally.

You're familiar with what happened in the Pietermaritzburg area in the end of March 1990, the so-called seven day war. --- Ja.

It was in fact more like 12 days of total violence, but at times there were something like between 10 000 and 12 000 people on the move. When I say, "on the move," I am talking about Amabuthos of various descriptions that had been trucked in from all sorts of areas. That seems a fairly substantial operation by any account when one looks at how those people ranged over a fairly wide area, and was there any - do you have any idea why that happened? --- The version that I would have as a member of the Central Committee, and having dealt with the issues in - the correspondence between Buthelezi and Mandela on the subject suggests to me that Ntombela had the capacity to raise that kind of task - that kind of a mobility from amongst the people in his area. If you think in terms of moving even 2 000 people by truck or by bus it's a formidable logistic problem. And then they arrive there and there's nothing to eat, there's no mess facilities. So, it's unlikely that something like 10 000

/people could

people could possibly have been trucked in. There may have been activists trucked in to assist with directing events, but I think - my understanding was that there was a whipped-up IFP sentiment in a last-ditch stand against what they saw as the invasion of Edendale area.

So, in essence it was - if one looks back at the period from '85 onwards in the Edendale Valley one sees successive waves of different degrees of paramountcy, if you like, between the UDF on the one hand and the IFP on the other, as successive recruitment drives and bits of war took place between the two groupings within that valley. Do you think it would be fair to say that in essence the release of Mandela in February 1990 allowed for people to now say that the ANC was now a legitimate organisation, for example, because one of the things that struck me in discussion with a number of IFP people was the extent to which they regarded themselves as ANC people who were working within the IFP as a legitimate successor internally, and who saw their interests still with the ANC externally, and who, the minute the ANC was unbanned and Mandela was released, renounced the IFP leadership and signed up with the ANC. In spite of having in essence bought all the propaganda they still maintained their main loyalty in their own hearts to the ANC. Do you think there may have been some strategy in terms of which - here you have a situation where the ANC is unbanned, and its leaders are now coming back into the country, and this is a very serious potential threat to the IFP? --- There is the potential threat to the IFP. In '94 - '95, when I took over the constitutional work in KwaZulu-Natal one of the things that Buthelezi

and I did was to present the

/National

National Council with a resolution stating that unless the other members of the Legislative Assembly, other parties, accepted the IFP's 12-point plan the IFP would consider calling another election so we could increase our majority, so we were not dependent on one lonely vote by Rajbansi, or whatever, which was a serious move on the part of Buthelezi. In that debate, and in the subsequent lobbyings about it, Ntombela was the most adamant that Buthelezi should never attempt that because the IFP does not have the support that it did have. And he was arguing that even in his own region he can't count on the support that he could have counted on the previous year, and that there was a terrible drop in IFP support in the greater 'Maritzburg area. Of course the '96 election results showed that clearly to be the case.

So, there was an awareness of that drop in '95. Ntombela tended to locate the reason for that in the practice of the Amakhozi in the area to levy migrant workers R5,00 a month, or whatever it was, to keep their shows going. So, he said it was that practice and the lack of the IFP activity in the area. He blamed those factors for the lack of support, but the lack of support in 'Maritzburg generally has been phenomenal, whether it can be traced to the release of ANC leaders - to what extent that is a matter causing it, I don't know. It will be a factor.

Okay, we'll be finished very, very soon. There are just a couple of issues we're just picking off - picking up just to round off with. --- Mmm.



You mentioned that you were in Hibberdene in the 1986-1989 period, and that there were some Caprivians staying at Khawula's house. Do you remember when that

/actually actually was? --- Did I have ... (incomplete)

Do you remember exactly when that was? --- No, I don't.

Was it later on or earlier on? --- I could go back and find it somewhere.

It doesn't matter. No, it doesn't matter. I was just because ... (intervention) --- My guess is it was around '87, late '87. It wasn't after I had been there for a short while, because when I went there I didn't know Khawula, and it was only after a year or two, working through my daughter, that I eventually got to know him. So, I think it was probably '87/'88.

Okay. The reason I am asking, just for the record, is that the people - the four SAP members who participated with Captain Brian Mitchell in the Trust Feeds Massacre in December 1987 were - prior to their arrest and subsequent conviction they were hidden by the IFP at Chief Khawula's house in Umzumbe, and that is where they were arrested by Colonel Frank Dutton. I am just wondering whether these ones that you refer to were the ones that ...

(intervention) --- I didn't gather that. I just heard from Khumalo that - when I asked him about this group, because when I raised the issue Khawula was very negative about establishing a group of IFP comrades in his area. So I asked Khumalo about it and he said, ja, these Caprivi guys had got the girls pregnant, and they were drinking, and they were idle hands making mischief,

and he, Khumalo, removed them from the area.

That does accord with what Mkhize told us in his evidence.

MR ?: (Inaudible)

/MR LAX:

MR LAX: Yes, but - no, he himself had been posted down the South Coast, and he said that the people that he had been posted with were specifically people he didn't want to rely on in the hit squad, because he spoke about them womanising and drinking too much and being very undisciplined. So, there is a certain resonance there.

CHAIRMAN: Just going a bit further than that. The so-called hit squad which operated in Esikhwini in 1991-92, we heard evidence at a hearing in August from people who were members of that hit squad - two of them were Caprivians, one of them was a KwaZulu Policeman, and their evidence was to the effect that they took instructions to kill a number of people from - senior IFP people like Prince Gideon and Mrs Mbuyase, Chief Metaba, Robert Mzimela, speaker of the KLA, and Major Langeni of the KwaZulu Police. Did you know anything about that sort of thing going on at the time? ---

No.

Three of them have been convicted for those crimes, for some of those crimes, and they are serving life terms of imprisonment. They have told us obviously of a far greater number of crimes which they committed at the specific instance and behest of those people, and others. Would that sort of thing be - just in your general experience, be in accordance with how strong men, strong women, warlords, operated on a regional

basis, that they did what they had to do to fight their battles and fight their wars? --- I think it's consonant with my understanding of what could happen in those circumstances. Ja, I think it's quite likely that - to put it the other way round, I am not at all surprised to hear that that kind of thing did take place there.

/Ja. I

Ja. I mean the same thing happened in Clermont, where, according to the people who have been convicted there, they were called in there by Jamile himself, who said, "I have got problems in this area, I want you to kill these people," and they went ahead and killed them.

After they had done work there they then went to Mpumalanga township, and then briefly to 'Maritzburg, and then to Esikhawini, and Sundumbili near Mandini. And there's no direct evidence that the then Chief Minister knew about these specific targets or assassinations, but it seems to be that this was general currency within the party, that if you wanted a - you know, a threat or an irritant or even an enemy, you know, who was about to do you harm, removed, then that's how you did it, that you called on a structure, whether it was within the KwaZulu Police or a paramilitary structure, to do it for you. --- I don't think there's any doubt that those kinds of things happened. The extent to which you could characterise the IFP with them is another matter - the extent to which it was IFP phenomena and not what is to be expected of people in those circumstances with that capacity to call on.

Because, just to quote from your submission, you said on page 51 that,

"Central Committee members were aware that warlords were at work giving expression to Buthelezi's exhortations of the nobleness of defending cherished values. They were aware that Khawula was controlling the South Coast, Ntombela the 'Maritzburg area, Gideon

/Zulu the

Zulu the Eshowe/Richards Bay area, Mthethwa the Witwatersrand, and the migrant indunas there. There were no Central Committee committees overseeing what was being done. These warlords came together at times, but it was only Buthelezi who knew what everyone was doing."

So, when you say that they were at work in these areas giving expression to Buthelezi's exhortations, do you mean - that incorporates a whole range of activities I suppose. --- A whole range of activities, ja, a whole range of activities from disrupting UDF meetings, or whatever.

To, presumably, including the sorts of things that I have talked about. --- Well, no National Council member or Central Committee member would have been surprised to find that IFP people had killed some people in Esikhawini area, and although nobody would say, "Ja, Khawula did it," one made the assumption that it was people like Khawula who went and did those kind of things.

MR LAX: Just in terms of the other part of that quote Richard's just read to you from your submission, you said that warlords did come together at times. --- I'm basing that only on the kind of remarks one would hear. In talking to Khawula he would regale the company with what he and his group did when they arrived to support Gideon Zulu in Umlazi, or whatever it is. So, I knew this from that point of view, that these people did sometimes call on each other to assist them.

The sense that you're using it, that you're talking about here though, implies that there was a certain degree

/of co-operation,

of co-operation, not just in terms of defending each other but in terms of getting together, and in terms of co-ordinating their activities. --- No, I don't think I imply that. That's reading too much into what I said there, and I've worded it badly. There would be support for the one by the other in some circumstances, and that did take place.

So, that would explain, for example, how people from Maqonqo, which is Table Mountain area just outside 'Maritzburg, might come to Ntombela's assistance, and vice versa, and people from Mafunzi and so on, and then if one looks at the areas further afield, Bulwer, Patheni and so on. The work that - talking about Patheni again, we sort of glossed over it very quickly earlier, but Philip Powell had a camp, you said, at Patheni, where he was involved in SPU training. Now, Patheni is in the Richmond area, and it in fact verges on Sifiso Nkabinde's area. What - do you know anything about the relationship between Nkabinde and Ntombela,

for example? --- None at all.

Because although they are constantly threatening to kill each other they seem to have co-operated more than they seem to have actually managed to fight each other, if one looks carefully at what happened. --- These are anomalies which one raises eyebrows at, but I don't know anything about the details of it.

And your statement that it was only Buthelezi who knew what everyone was doing, what did you mean by that?

--- Made on the assumption that I know I could not do anything, would not do anything without briefing him in detail about what I am doing and how I am doing it. Knowing the man and his leadership style, and knowing the

SAHWA ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE /IFP, it's IFP, it's unthinkable that somebody would be doing something that Buthelezi didn't know about. It's as simple as that. It's not more than that. I think you're getting from me what you'll get from a lot of IFP people, is that they can tell you something that they know, but there was very little collaboration between them and whoever - the planning at executive level.

It sounds very much like PW Botha's leadership style as well. We spoke to various people, like Leon Wessels and Roelf Meyer, Vlok, Malan. All of them say that all reported to him, but they certainly didn't share information with their Cabinet colleagues nearly as much as one might have expected. In fact they were all quite suspicious of each other, and they seem to have relied on the need-to-know basis as the one major situation why they didn't know what the others were up

to. This need-to-know idea or ethic, did you people operate on that same basis as well? --- I think it was more - I speak perhaps more for myself than of others, but I am certainly, I think, speaking for more than myself when I say that you didn't trust anybody not to run around blabbing what you were doing, and the less people knew what you were doing the better it would be. And whatever strategies you were involved in, whether it was a political rally or a negotiating position, you certainly didn't want to talk about it generally, so you kept things to yourself simply to protect what you were doing. And if you were involved in anything illegal the last thing in the world you would want to do is to spread around what you were doing with people who weren't directly involved and who would not pay the same price as you had the information come out.

/Just one

Just one last area. There certainly were some quite notorious gangs that were not overtly politically aligned, but were certainly pro-State, and were seen as surrogates of the State, if you like. I am talking about the gangs like the A Team, the AmaSenora, the AmaVaravara, the Black Cats. Some of them seem to have had links with Inkatha structures. What do you know about those? --- I can't mention anything whatsoever.

CHAIRMAN: Anything you want to add before we close down? --- Just a question. Why are you not subpoenaing people like Gideon Zulu, Khawula, Ntombela?

On these matters surely you cannot arrive - I mean I am giving you genuinely everything I can possibly know, and

I can't help you on those matters. I think nobody else can, and yet one gets the impression that you're pussyfooting on these issues. I mean this is just off the record.

Ja, perhaps there is an element of that. Perhaps I think the other is a more realistic or pragmatic prediction of what an encounter like that would be like, that it's likely to be met with a refusal to co-operate or participate, and, you know, the endless litigation that

will ensue, such as we are now pursuing with Mr Powell and - and if people like that did come it's likely to be met with a bland sort of, "I didn't do anything, I am not going to tell you," so there's a variety of reasons.

And we really - you know, the point of this thing obviously isn't to put people through the - make them jump through the hoops or in any way humiliate them.

It's really to gather information, and we just don't believe that certain people are capable of giving information in a rational way, so ... (incomplete) ---

Okay, that sounds

/probable

probable to me.

Okay, well thank you very much. Thank you for your frankness, and obviously you will be happy to co-operate with our researchers if there are other issues which we need to clear up and clarify. --- No, certainly. I am always there. My next bite at these kind of things is looking at the development of the IFP's negotiating stance in 1990 and 1991, and an understanding of why Buthelezi adopted the obstructionist position he did adopt.



Good, okay. Well then, unless we need to meet  
again then we're adjourned. Thanks very much.

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