

**TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**

**SECTION 29 HEARING**

**"IN CAMERA"**

**DATE:** 15TH JUNE 1998

**NAME:** CHRISTO NEL

**HELD AT:** CAPE TOWN

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**CHAIRPERSON:** Ladies and gentlemen we are about to start, thank you very much. This is a continuation of the proceedings that were remanded to this date on the 18th of May 1998.

Mr Christo Nel is testifying on issues relevant to the Civil Co-operation Bureau and in particular around issues that we raised in the letter of invitation that summonsed him to these proceedings.

He continues to be represented by Mr Kobus Malan as far as I see. That continues to be the position Mr Malan, is that so?

**MR MALAN:** That's positive Mr Chair.

**CHAIRPERSON:** Well thank you very much.

Mr Nel, I only have to remind you that you are still under oath.

**CHRISTO NEL:** (s.u.o.)

**CHAIRPERSON:** Mr Khoisan?

**MR KHOISAN:** Good morning Mr Nel. As we were talking the last time we were here, this hearing of course is in respect

primarily of the Civil Co-operation Bureau but as we did at the last time it also involves all other related issues which involves building a bigger and broader picture to give a sense of what was really going on in the country during our period of mandate.

Over the last week there has been dramatic testimony which has indeed shocked the country and the world to the effect of an offensive Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme and specifically this much in respect of the targeting of activists, leaders and institutions which was supportive of the liberation struggle.

From your perspective, from where you sit, did you view any of these, did you have an opportunity to observe any of the media and initially what were your impressions of what went on there, this last week?

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chair. Yes, I did follow the media reporting on this issue but I did not read every little bit of it because it did not surprise me at all. I was aware of the existence of such a programme, I just didn't know all the detail that came out during the testimony.

I think during my previous appearance I did mention that we were in fact part of the end user system, the CCB was one of the users of the products that came out of these laboratories. I did explain how I was personally involved in two or three such incidents where I used some of the products of these laboratories.

One thing that I found lacking so far, I was hoping that I could identify the person who was in the permanent employment of the CCB. If you can maybe remember I mentioned a certain Doctor that I only knew by the name of Franz, I thought that he would ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: This is the one who came to CCB offices dressed in a white coat appearing like a pharmacist or a doctor, is this the one you are talking about?

MR NEL: Yes, that is correct. From those who appeared in front of the Commission here he was not amongst them. Maybe he is a silent witness somewhere but I think through establishing who that person was one can establish the link between the laboratories and the offensive use of these chemicals or the biological part specifically that I was aware of.

So I think if that is not already known to the Commission it may be an area to be exploited in further detail because I was maybe aware of about 1% of the use of these chemicals or laboratory substances by the CCB while Doctor Franz was the link man to the whole of the organisation and there will be a lot more to be said by him.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Just ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I just wanted to find out, if Mr Nel is able to expand on the three instances in which he personally was involved in the use of these chemical weapons.

MR NEL: Yes, I did explain the last time how a certain letter was prepared to be used in Zimbabwe because we became aware - should I continue?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, go ahead Mr Nel.

MR NEL: ... where we became aware of one our co-operatives, our agents playing a double role and the decision was to get rid of that person and whoever was handling him and how a letter was prepared through the help of Doctor Franz, which I handled very delicately, which I was told contained the spores of a spleen disease, I don't know what it is called, well I'm advised here that's it could be Anthrax. It was explained to me there's very, very small particles of a disease that is well-known in Africa. It is called in Afrikaans: "mult siekte" and that was then sent with this double agent to Zimbabwe.

And at another occasion where I was approached by National Intelligence to assist them with a chemical or with a substance that they could add to beer or to alcohol or a drinking substance to get rid of a threat towards one of their agents, where I assisted a certain Mr Danie du Plessis from National Intelligence, my handing over a bottle of unknown, I do not know what the contents of that was. It was according to the description, something that would knock the person out for a long time for them to do with him what they wanted to do.

And then at another occasion where I handed over a similar substance to Mr Henry van der Westhuizen from the Directorate of Counter Covert Collection and I was told this was to be used in either Swaziland or Mozambique on a specific operation.

CHAIRPERSON: You were not aware what the substance was, specifically?

MR NEL: No, it was a white transparent fluid type of substance that you add to whatever the persons were going to drink.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Nel.

Mr Khoisan?

MR KHOISAN: Okay, now just in terms of that, I just want to clarify that. You say that the last time you were here, if I recall correctly, you said that Danie gave you all the specifications that he needed and that he didn't want the guy to die immediately but he wanted him to die later. Now when he came to you - first of all, was this unusual for a member of the National Intelligence Service to approach you with the request of trying to resolve a problem with one of their assets?

MR NEL: That was my first experience of that nature, first and last. It was not surprising to me because I met Danie earlier while he was a member of Trevits and he was quite intimately aware of what we were doing and he also explained to me that National Intelligence had their own operational section or he was part of that section before he got involved at Trevits.

He was a member of that operational wing or branch or whatever they wanted to call it, where they solved some of their own problems referring to, I believe internationally it is like that, if Intelligence agents pick up problems there are some James Bond types of operations carried out to protect own sources and to kill threatening people that can expose your covert operations.

It was somewhat surprising that he approached me in such an open way for assistance in this regard. I had a little bit of doubt in the back of my mind whether this was not a trick, I don't know what to call it, by National Intelligence to determine whether we were in fact using that kind of substance as a method of operations.

When I approached Mr Joe Verster - and I knew he had contact with National Intelligence at a much higher level, he once explained to me that he co-ordinates certain activities with their counter espionage people and he then came back to me and gave me authority ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Would that be like Doctor Scholtz, Spaarwater, people like that?

MR NEL: I am not sure, he never mentioned a name to me. I just know about certain meetings that did take place between them by word of mouth. He did mention that they clarified certain operations with National Intelligence on a one on one basis.

He also mentioned to me at one stage that he would prefer that all liaison with National Intelligence would be done via himself and not by the rest of the CCB intelligence system. He didn't want us to liaise too much, it could lead to security leaks.

He did come back to me then at, I can't remember whether it was the same day or shortly afterwards, and he gave me the green light to go ahead and then to contact Doctor Franz. He gave me an instruction to contact Franz with all the detail so that they could provide me with the correct substance.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, and then they brought you three bottles?

MR NEL: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, and were these three bottle labelled?

MR NEL: To my recollection, no. I can remember they were properly sealed, they were quite small, round about two or three inches high and they were transparent, they had a water-like fluid inside.

MR KHOISAN: Mm.

MR NEL: There might have been a label on them, I just cannot recall it exactly now. They were kept in a fridge in the CCB offices and in that fridge there were quite a number of other little funny bottles as well kept by other people there, which didn't belong to me.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, now that was the National Intelligence person. Now with regard to Henry van der Westhuizen, can you develop that for us?

MR NEL: Ja. In that, that was - I did not give all the bottles that I received at that stage from Doctor Franz. They guy from National Intelligence only wanted one or two, I'm not 100% sure of my facts here, but say there was one bottle left that I gave to Henry van der Westhuizen. It was not a separate request from Doctor Franz, it was part of the initially substances that he gave to me.

And I gave that to Henry van der Westhuizen after he requested help on a personal basis from me because they needed it for a specific operation in Maputo.

MR KHOISAN: I just want to clarify because the last time round, in the last go-around you informed us that you gave the one to this Danie du Plessis and then you kept two back which you gave to Henry van der Westhuizen. Now this Doctor Franz, he gave you detailed instructions?

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. To your mind was he a person who was knowledgeable about the substance and the object that he had issued you with and what is your assessment of his understanding of what he had given you?



MR NEL: He was an expert, he knew exactly how these things worked and what it was and how it was supposed to be used and how it was supposed not to be used. It also sounded to me as if he was part of the experiment or he was, the way he explained to me the need for feedback. He wanted to know afterwards what the effects were and whether something happened to the person within the first 15 minutes because that was problems that they were working on.

It was clear from the discussion with me that they had a previous bad experience where somebody started to show symptoms shortly after this substance was administered and the questions that he asked me about the weight of the person and what type of food they were going to use and what type of alcohol they were going to use and the general condition of health of this person, he sounded as if he was a medical practitioner, as if he was somebody involved in an experiment of this type of substance.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And just to be clear, he is somebody that you can attest to that he was, shall I say the chemical and biological contact or liaison with the CCB, this Doctor Franz, would you say that?

MR NEL: Ja. If I can maybe just elaborate a little bit here. At Special Forces Headquarters Doctor Wouter Basson had a wing there, they were part of Special Forces Headquarters and 7

Medical Battalion formed an extension of Special Forces. That I became aware of already in 1986 when I started working at Special Forces Headquarters, that there was a medical capability attached to Special Forces but a lot of it was revolving around medical people being trained as Special Forces operators to accompany Special Forces people during operations but I also became aware of chemical and biological capabilities at that stage.

When I moved to the Special, to the CCB ... [intervention]

MR KHOISAN: No, no, when you say you became aware of chemical and biological capability, what were the specific indicators that made you form such a conclusion or deduction?

MR-NEL: While I was still with the projects team at Special Forces Headquarters there was a lot of talk about capabilities and ways and means of killing a cat, how to go about doing the job and there was always this winking of the eye, sort of indications towards the capabilities of Basson. No clear indications of what they were doing but we all knew without me knowing the facts at that stage.

But when I came to the CCB it was evident that part of our, the need for covert work or non-traceability also required a non-traceable execution wing, a capability that can use these toxins in a non-traceable way. It would be a total compromise if certain very secret projects would be exposed to people in the overt

structure so the CCB lent itself perfectly as an organisation to make use of these substances on an experimental basis and on operational, in cooperational use for purposes of non-traceability.

It was also a requirement from CCB's side to have such a capability because it lent itself towards the method that government wanted us to operate of non-traceability.  
...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Non-traceability also translates into plausible deniability, is that it?

MR NEL: Yes, yes, that is where government can openly say that they, or given on a polygraph test try to deny their involvement. That is what they tried to achieve through CCB operations, to say: "We didn't know and we were not involved". In fact, non-traceability actually meant pointing the finger away from government, in the part of the disinformation campaign to point, to make other people suspect in this regard.

I became fully aware of this capability when I became a full member of the CCB where Doctor Franz was also then part of the structure and I was told by other members in the CCB offices that this is the link towards Doctor Wouter Basson and the laboratories, through Doctor Franz.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And now in that respect did you ever have an opportunity to have an interaction with one Deon Erasmus?

MR NEL: I knew a guy by the name of J C Erasmus. I don't know what the J C stands for, it's the initials but I do not know, I can't put the J C and a Deon. I do not know a Deon Erasmus, I know a J C Erasmus. It could be the same person, it could be two different people.

MR KHOISAN: What I'm trying to establish from you, I'm trying to find out from you Mr Nel, is whether you say this thing of Doctor Wouter Basson, and to be clear here on the record, there is another Wouter Basson but that is Wouter Jacobus Basson who is the co-ordinator of the CCB, we're not talking about him. We're talking about the person who is in the news right now, Doctor Wouter Basson himself, the medical doctor, the Head of 7th Medical Battalion.

Now, I'm asking you in connection to Wouter Basson, whether you ever heard of the name or interacted with Deon Erasmus who is alleged to have been one of the people who worked closely with Wouter Basson and also interacted with and worked with within the circle of the CCB.

MR NEL: According to that description it is a possibility and I do not have the facts to state it as a fact. If that is the person who acted as the link between Doctor Wouter Basson whom I know personally and the other Wouter Basson I also know so I, if that person, Deon Erasmus was the link between Doctor Wouter Basson and the CCB, it is most possible that the Doctor Franz

that I am referring to because there was only that one person in the CCB structures who went around with the title of Doctor and who was always the person that you would be referred to in the event of such assistance.

MR KHOISAN: And so to your knowledge Doctor Franz has never been in the TV and never appeared and as such would be a crucial link in your view from the laboratory, the experimentation side, to the offensive side, the actual end use, the end run of the product?

MR NEL: Ja, that is correct, that is why I said in the beginning that I was looking for that link. I was always curious who this person was because I only know him as Franz and he was definitely not one of those that I saw on TV or in the newspapers.

If you could show me a photo of Deon Erasmus I could maybe confirm or deny whether that is the same person. I have a strong suspicion that Deon Erasmus could be Doctor Franz.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. In terms of the person of Deon Erasmus, there's another allegation that has come up and we just want to run it by him(?) The last time you were here we discussed the matter of Francis Mele and Solly Smith.

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: As you know they are both deceased.

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And it was in the circumstances I believe of having admitted that they had become, one way or another, assets of the former government and its intelligence structures.

Now the way in which they died, I believe if I consider the case of Francis Mele, I believe it was alcohol poisoning, do you know anything about a Francis Mele or Solly Smith? Is there anything that you do know that you can share with us in respect of the way they died or whether anybody at that time wanted to sort out the problem of these assets?

MR NEL: Ja. I am aware of all the publicity around the case and knowing the covert methods of operations and there were a few cases like this. I think Tommy Zulu was one of them, Solly Smith and Francis Mele the other, where things can be thrown around in different directions.

I never had any doubt in my mind that those people were the victims of a dirty trick operation, that they were in fact poisoned or that was my perception, that they died because somebody wanted them dead, not because of natural causes.

There are various opinions and theories whether to whose advantage it would have been for them to die. Some people would say that they were killed by the ANC because it was found out that they were in fact agents, South African agents and the other side of the story was also that they were silenced by their own handlers or those people who had contact with them, in order

to prevent them from exposing certain dirty work that they were involved in.

I cannot unfortunately shed any light on which on of those two angles are in fact the truth. What I know about them is what I read in articles and publications and from discussions with guys like Henry van der Westhuizen.

But my suspicion was that if the theory about them being poisoned or killed by South African agents, the possibility that this was an NI operation, NIS operation, that was my perception of it because it was on a level beyond the capability and the normal level of operation of the military and the SAPS or the SAP at that stage. I suspected it to be an NIS operation.

MR KHOISAN: And if it was an NIS operation it would be the operational wing that you spoke about of NIS. You know the issue us that there is something that you are of course going to have to explain to us and help us with. Shall I say there has been public testimony by for instance, the Director General, the former Director General of the National Intelligence Service, Neil Barnard, where he refuses the suggestion that the National Intelligence Service was an end user of target information for instance.

There is also a document that you have in your possession by the National Intelligence Service, where they present their role in Trevis for instance as secondary to the Security Police and

never as an end user. In fact I think the position is that they have no knowledge of the end users of the information, that theirs is purely an analytical function.

Now what you are suggesting is that, and what you have suggested before, is that the National Intelligence Service had an operational capability which could result in for instance, the elimination of assets. Could you maybe take us through that process and explain it to us so that we can be able to have more information to be able to form an opinion of what you are putting on the table?

MR NEL: I wouldn't like to speculate on issues like this but the only fact that I can base my argument on is what I was told by Danie du Plessis. I had very limited exposure to NIS, they were, they are even still today a very covert or some of their structures are very covert and they limited liaison to the minimum and they exposed the minimum of their members to the rest of the structures. My suggestion in this regard is that the person, Danie du Plessis, I believe he is no longer a member of the new NIA structure or SAS(?) but such a person could shed a lot of light in this regard.

It was explained to me that they specifically used former policemen in that role, that they had a capability to, if one can use the slang: "to take out" certain individuals who posed a threat to their covert networks and their agents. They will not involve



any other agency in doing the sweeping work for them because it would result in compromises of their agents and security risks.

So the typical type of operation that I understood from Danie du Plessis that they would be involved in, and that is how he explained to me at the time when he requested me for the poison, that there was direct threat to one of their agents, that he could be exposed and they wanted to get rid of the person who posed this threat. In our discussion I explained to him that we would be willing to do that ourselves if they would supply us with the information about that specific threat or that person and he insisted that they, that his bosses would not allow that. And that is unfortunately all I can specifically mention.

Gene de-Kock at one stage mentioned the name of the head of this section but I cannot recall, I cannot remember, I do not know what the name of that person is. Gene will most probably be able to tell you a little bit more in this regard. But what I have explained to you is what Danie du Plessis told me and that is all I know about that capability.

MR KHOISAN: Ja. Just to take that further, this is the same Danie du Plessis who, according to you, knew Zimbabwe like the back of his hand?

MR NEL: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: And is this the same Danie du Plessis who arranged the infiltration of the white exile network in Zimbabwe, particularly in Harare?

MR NEL: Ja, that is correct. We were dependant on National Intelligence to provide us with information on high profile targets. High profile targets meaning specifically the ANC in London or in Europe in general then and then the white element in Harare or in Zimbabwe then. They had very good information and I can remember Leon Nefdt who during the period when we were involved in the project section at Special Forces, he made a special effort to make very good friends with Danie du Plessis and I can't remember who the other guy was who represented NIS at Trevits, specifically because of the fact that they knew the movements of Derek Hanekom and many others ...[indistinct] and I can't remember all the names. Zimbabwe was never my specialisation but there were quite a number of whites like the Brickhill incident, Father Lapsley and others where NIS provided most of that information.

If I remember correctly, the operation that was carried out by Special Forces in Harare where a number of officers were blown up, NIS contributed in that regard also, for target information.

MR KHOISAN: And specifically this Danie du Plessis?

MR NEL: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now, there was one incident that you talked about in which a woman's or a woman who had been studied as a target had an overcoat poisoned at a hotel.

MR NEL: I remember the incident that you in fact told me about and my comment was something to the effect that it sounded or it resembles the typical type of chemical operation where a substance could have been sprayed onto such items of clothing.

It was known to me that such capabilities existed due to a planning cycle that we once went through, to explore the possibilities of contaminating a consignment of clothes destined for Dar es Salaam, so when that specific case was mentioned to me the last time I appeared here, I confirmed that it is probably such an operation but I did not know about that specific operation prior to the last hearing.

MR KHOISAN: Now you were working in Dar es Salaam but who instructed you to begin a planning cycle in respect of poisoning clothes etc? Where did that instruction come from and who participated in it, how did it, how was it operationalised, did you use a front company and other nationals, for instance in Europe, in this project, how did that occur?

MR NEL: I must recall this specific incident and how it came about now. We had access to information from National Intelligence through what I explained the last time, the "valkoog" system, where telex intercepts specifically between the

international offices of the ANC were passed on to Special Forces and the CCB.

There was a specific period when a lot of planning went into how to take action at Arusha. There was a very big conference and in that same period there was also talk about a lot of T-shirts and clothing that was going to be sent to Tanzania for purposes of some kind of a big celebration. I can't remember what it was, whether it was one of the 70th celebrations of the existence of the Party or the ANC or whatever, but we came across information about a consignment of clothes that were going to be sent to Tanzania.

I was responsible for Tanzania at that stage as intelligence officer but Eben Barlow was responsible for the international community, in other words Region 5, so if any planning had to be executed in the donor countryside I would not be aware of it. But we initiated planning due to instruction that came from Special Forces Headquarters, that the Arusha Conference should be disrupted and there was extensively planning going on and that went in disregard at a much higher level which I was not involved in.

I was later, I later became aware of a plan to rig some of the - no, let me explain this to you. The plan was to make big posters with the face of certain leaders and frame them but behind them there would be a sheet of explosives and a layer of shrapnel,

it was going to be a sheet bomb. It's quite technical, it's difficult to explain.

The idea was to fly these things in and to hang them in the conference room the night prior to the big meeting or gathering, directed at the seats where the prime targets or the dignitaries would be sitting.

At the same time there was also talk about the possibility of this consignment of T-shirts that could be contaminated. That plan to my knowledge never came to anything further than the possibility being discussed because of the fact that either the planning was taken to a level at Region 5 and I was never told about it being executed or it did not take place at all but it was discussed and information was available to that effect.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. I'll come back later Mr Nel. Mr Magadla would ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Magadla?

MR MAGADLA: Thank you Chair.

Mr Nel, we have talking to a lot of people involved within the Security Force areas. We've been talking to the Security Branch, some people with Military Intelligence background and CCB people and also NIS people.

What we seem to gather from the Security Branch especially is that, and also from Military Intelligence, is that Military Intelligence or the SANDF people were the only ones who had to

perform duties outside the borders of the country but we also hear that the members of the Security Branch also felt that for some reason they needed to go to do things outside the borders of the country. In some other way an intrusion into an area set aside for military people and because of that there is also talk that there was a kind of not seeing eye to eye with these people.

There was some kind of animosity that was taking place because there was some kind of competition but with the Security Branch people actually doing things in a terrain which was not theirs. But what they were doing there is abduction of certain activists and torturing and killing them and also turning some of them into Askaris.

And up to this point we are exhuming bodies along the borders of the country but mostly inside the country of activists who were killed, who were abducted from Swaziland or who were involved in skirmishes with Security Forces within the South African part of that situation but we do not hear anything about the activities of the people whose area it was to conduct whatever they were to conduct.

Now you had Special Forces, CCB and all types of people who are said to be people who were set out to kill at some point but now we don't hear anything that they did there in the form of their duty which was also to kill in those areas. Now can you help us with that type of situation because to us it sounds very

odd that the Security Branch people there was so much to do there that they also went there and then picked up whoever they wanted and yet the Army Military Intelligence otherwise Special Forces were also there and they were also in charge of those areas. How can we get some light into that situation?

MR NEL: If you refer to operations that were carried out by Special Forces and the CCB, and I don't like to separate the two because the CCB was in fact to my knowledge an integral part of Special Forces, there were numerous operations conducted across the borders of the country and there were numbers of people killed as well. Operations that I had at one stage thought were part of Special Forces later turned out to be special high type of operations carried out by police elements such as Craig Williamson and others internationally.

But yes, there are - surely if you page through the book where Honoris Crux's were awarded to Special Forces operators and others, there are many operations across the border. All the operations that happened, I cannot mention and name all those who were killed but for instance the Lesotho operation, there were many operations into Botswana. I know some of the victims in Botswana that were killed by Special Forces. There were raids into Zimbabwe, I think some of them were admitted by the government and others not. There were a number of operations into Lusaka.

But to be honest with you, the CCB was officially established in November 1988 as a covert structure that was supposed to work non-traceable. It was still getting its blue plans and its act together when the disbandment started late in '89, so it had less than a year of full operations where CCB operated in terms of its non-traceable strategy.

Operations internationally, such as Dulcie September, the incident where Oupa Molekwani was killed in Botswana, Naledi was killed in Botswana. There are operations into Swaziland which were conducted in co-operation with the SAP. The raid into Lesotho where a number of people were killed, those are examples of Special Forces work.

But simultaneously to that, Special Forces also carried out attacks against infrastructural targets. They blew up oil containers and bridges and other strategic military type targets, not always killing people but also blowing up offices and destroying aircraft like the aircraft that was destroyed by the Smiths in Zimbabwe. I think the list of operations can be quite a long list if you put them all together. They are known operations.

MR MAGADLA: I think the operations that we are actually interested in are covert operations, not operations where after they have taken place the Minister goes out on TV to say: "We did it because those people did not listen when we told them to



move away those terrorists who operated from their countries", not that type because that type wasn't that much covert and that type would not have been done by people who would not want it to be known that it was them who did it. The police also did certain things which, for instance they would kill a person and go and make an announcement that this person, they surrounded the house and the people fired from inside the house and the police had no option but to fire back and kill those people. That they did not hide, but a lot of things, the bodies that we are digging, are things that had been hidden.

We are sitting here hopefully waiting for some member of Security Branch, I mean Special Forces or CCB to say to us one day that: "You see, the covert things that we actually did, now you go there and you go there and you'll find bodies, now you go there and you go there, you'll find this and you'll find that", these were the covert operations that we conducted".

Now where you find an institution like the CCB, the Special Forces, having a kind of budget which also in a way could have been mind boggling and the kind of latitude where they could actually do things in a way that would not be accounted for, then you find that because they were disturbed by the fact that at one point they just had to disband, that they actually did nothing.

That can actually be of note, that can actually mean that: "Oh well now the CCB is talking, at least let's go and see what

they did. Let's go and see the bodies, let's go and see what is buried where". That is the kind of thing I'm actually referring to, not the overt things or where some Minister would go and say: "Ja we went to Lesotho because those people did not want to listen".

MR NEL: Ja. I am one of 400 other members of the CCB. The knowledge that was confined to me as a person, projecting it back to my status of being a Major at that stage, a Captain most of the time, and by now the Commission should know that the CCB worked very partitioned, very in cell structures.

I have testified so far about everything that I know of personally and what I became aware of through word of mouth and even sometimes security leaks. I've mentioned that I have no doubt in my mind that Dulcie September was an example of a CCB operation and I mentioned that Anton Lubowsky was an example of a CCB operation, I have mentioned that Biza in Botswana was an example, but sometimes the CCB also operated more overtly, if you want to call it that.

Our operators also planted bombs and they also caused explosions. They were sometimes used in co-operation with bigger Special Forces operations such as the 1986 operation into Mozambique, where CCB operators worked with the normal Special Forces structure.

There are - maybe the Albie Sacks incident was also another example. I know about many things that went wrong. The Letsia operation in Harare where the television set exploded was another example. These things are all in the external domain which the Commission cannot offer me indemnity and amnesty in this regard, so it is a problem for me to elaborate into the specifics of who did what but so far I have answered all the questions that I could.

There are - I have to go and sit down and write these things down but people should not be surprised and should not regard persons coming here telling you that the CCB was in fact an organisation that only carried out a few operations, do not regard them necessarily as liars because the CCB, if it was still operational today, would have been an organisation much more effective.

I have explained to the Commission the problems that were experienced in the CCB, lack of intelligence and that we were dependant on outside help, the fact that we were still establishing blue plans, people had to go and do Small Business Development Corporation courses to qualify them as businessmen so that they can start up businesses to be credible. Those things were still happening in 1988.

The only time when production was really stepped up was when everybody was sent to Namibia to create incidents. I might

not be aware of, I might only be aware of the tip of the iceberg, there might be a lot more. The person who knows about all CCB operations would be Joe Verster and General Joop Joubert but a few of those that I mentioned are examples of CCB work.

MR MAGADLA: Thank you. But you were also saying that some of the things that were discussed about poisoning people are things that, although you have no personal knowledge of, but those were things that at times would be discussed and that you'd eavesdrop and hear that people are talking about these things.

Now what about Robert Sobukwe, the former leader of the PAC? Because we've also heard that some of these leaders who were imprisoned, there were plans to poison them, for instance even our President. Now we have heard or heard Sobukwe in prison, when he came back he was not to be active as a leader because of the illness that he got from prison. What has been said about that?

MR NEL: To be quite frank and honest I have never heard anybody saying anything about Robert Sobukwe. There was speculation about Oliver Tambo. When he had his stroke people were speculating but I think that was pure speculation. I have no knowledge of - what I read in the newspapers about the plan to poison President Mandela, those were the first words I heard about such activities. I have not knowledge of that Sir.

MR MAGADLA: What about Jerry Gwala, the Communist Party leader from KwaZulu Natal?

MR NEL: People hated him enough to kill him, yes. I am not aware of such a project but he was a thorn in the flesh of people who disliked communists.

MR MAGADLA: Any braai celebrations that you know of after his death?

MR NEL: Say again Sir, I could not hear that?

MR MAGADLA: I'm saying, any braai celebrations that you know of after his death, by those people who hated him?

MR NEL: Not specifically but ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Any ...[indistinct]

MR NEL: Things would be mentioned maybe in passing, that it's not necessarily a bad thing but there was not a specific celebration that I am aware of but those who regarded the Communist Party as an enemy did not feel saddened by the event.

MR MAGADLA: You also mentioned that you were also at the prisoners of war camp in Namibia where you dealt with SWAPO prisoners of war. According to your own knowledge, what happened to these people, were they ever released and left to go home or just what happened to them, those prisoners of war that you dealt with? I know you have said that you have a problem with something that happened somewhere outside the country but

well, anyway you had these people and we just wanted to know what happened to them.

MR NEL: The prisoners of war situation, there were two categories or three categories of people being detained in Oshakati. There were those who were prisoners of war, recognised prisoners of war, for instance the captured FAPLA soldiers, those who belonged to the ODP, The Ordinance de Popular de Angola, those were like the home guard or militia of Angola and the Soviets that were captured in 1981. They were awarded prisoner of war status and they were treated accordingly.

They were given visiting rights by the International Red Cross and they were sent to the main POW camp down in Keetmanshoop, Marienthal area called Keikanagap where they were permanent structures and in terms of the International Red Cross standards there was a prisoner of war camp there.

Then we had SWAPO who were not recognised as, the planned soldiers were not recognised as prisoners of war but they were detained under AG9 and AG26, it's different laws that allowed us to detain them for certain periods without trial and we interrogated those people and kept them, those who showed signs of willingness to cooperate with us after their initial month of detention, we kept behind.

Those that we regarded as hard core people committed to their struggle and the political cause, we sent them also to

Keikanagap in the Southern part of Namibia. And then we had a high turnover of suspects, members of the local population, collaborators, so-called SWAPO Chairmen, people who were part of the support structure, the internal support structure, that were brought in for questioning and we had to release them within 30 days.

We had a very high turnover of that. They all administered by the military police who kept records of everybody who came in there and then they were released according to the law. Those who offered to become Askaris, I would say, they were passed onto a structure called Etango, called Komops. There were people under the leadership of Doctor Pask who established, I could say a political organisation called Etango and this is the Ovambo word for rising sun.

They had a facility not very far from the POW camp and with the advantage of hindsight, today I can say they were brainwashed, conditioned, I don't know what to call it. They were put through an extensive programme to clean their minds of all communist influences and they were recruited to become organisers and members of the DTA. That was where a large percentage of the prisoners went.

Another part of them were sent to Special Forces where they became false guerrillas. You should be aware of that system, where Special Forces made use of former SWAPO operatives to

act as if they are still members of SWAPO to lure their old friends into ambushes and kill them.

And then I also had a team of round about 60 former plan members as my intelligence team which we generally referred to as: "eyes", people who would identify others who belonged to plan. I'm sure that in my time as the Commander of the POW camp, if the records are still somewhere, I can account for everybody who came into that gate at that time.

MR MAGADLA: Were you not a member of the CCB at that time?

MR NEL: No. The CCB period came from 1988 onwards, that was in the years 1982, '83, '84, yes, '84.

MR MAGADLA: You were talking about those that did not cooperate were sent to the South, where is that and what happened there?

MR NEL: I saw photos in the newspapers of their release on the day of independence or the day of the elections or shortly, in that same time bracket. some of those well-known to me, some of my best friends like Johnny Angula who once challenged me to a gunfight, he with an AK and I with an R4, we were interesting friends, and Windhoek and Nande.

There were a couple guys who were political commissars who were quite convinced that they would win the war and they were not willing to cooperate with the regime.



MR MAGADLA: What I actually, what I mean is, you had other people co-operating, you had others in between but you had others who were just hard nut and who were not co-operating and you sent them to the South. What happened in the South, did they just go there and wait for whatever or what happened or whether they were, how were they dealt with there in the South?

MR NEL: I was never there myself but the impression that I have is it was something like C Max because the guys that I saw in the newspaper articles in the Namibian newspapers, they had their hair grown somewhere down here and I don't know whether they were in solitary confinement, whether that was something similar to Robben Island but the prison is still there. I know it is still functioning as a prison today.

MR MAGADLA: In the CCB did you have any blacks who - I know they would not have held high ranks or things like that, but blacks who had a notable or noticeable performance as members of the CCB and Special Forces? Do you have any such that you can actually name and say: "Yes, so and so a guy and he is now there and he is now there"?

MR NEL: There were a number of former Special Forces operators. You know I think a larger percentage of the junior ranks, the operators, the guys who were in fact doing a job in Special Forces, are former or were former Zimbabweans and Namibians, people who ran away from their countries or they

were brought along from the Namibian war, those who were Askaris in Namibia came, or those who were used as false guerrillas at 5 Reconnaissance Regiment at Ondangwa, they came back to Phalaborwa and later became part of the CCB as well. There were to my knowledge, a number of black operators, members of Special Forces who also resigned from the Defence Force to become members of the CCB.

There were, the only black people that I had personal contact with and I do not know their real names, there was a guy who used the name David Dladla and a Joseph Mthembu. They were former Zimbabweans and they operated in Lesotho and I met them at a few occasions.

I have no idea what happened to them after they were paid their severance packages ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Who did they report to?

MR NEL: At one stage I was directly responsible for their well-being and for handling. I handled them for intelligence collection ...[indistinct] but before me they worked for a guy, a former Zimbabwean, a white guy, Rory I think his name was but I can't remember his surname and they were also handled by another guy called Ian Strange.

There were a number of other black operators, also Portuguese operators but I do not know them personally. I do not know where they are at this stage because I was not part of

the Special Forces operations side, I was an intelligence officer. I didn't know the operators. Some of them might still be or they might be back in the Defence Force, I won't know but it's possible.

MR MAGADLA: Because the problem is - if I can maybe just tell you a short story. When we started with the Security Branch for instance, Vlakplaas, they would say: "When we went to attack Lesotho in 1985, we were five, it was so and so, so and so, so and so, mentioning all the white members by name and then he would say: "with about", when you ask: "Was there no blacks"?, they say: "Ja, about six black were there". Now who were these blacks? "Oh no, we don't know".

Now you find a situation, when we want to deal with people who were hands on involved in these things you find only white members who according to what we perceive, people who feel that if they ever involved the blacks, those blacks would because of kinds of loyalties they would just spill the beans and just tell us everything.

So the fact that all the people that we talk to or we discuss these matters with seem to be really not very keen to actually give names of these blacks and say: "Look if you want", like now we've been told about yourselves and about other people and then we are one by one getting hold of guys from side and talking to yourselves. Now what about these blacks, how do we get to any

one of them just to find out from them as to what their side is of the story about these things?

MR NEL: The blacks that served in the CCB all came from 5 Special Forces Regiment. They were, according to my opinion, hand picked to become part of Special Forces. I don't think it's a matter of protecting these members, it's a matter of whites not always recalling the names of blacks.

But there's also a code of ethics in Special Forces and specifically in the CCB, that you should not know people by their real names at all. I can tell you that I had contact with David Dladla. I do not know who David Dladla is. I know David Dladla is not his real name. There might be others who might know him, those who were members of 5 Special Forces Regiment.

MR MAGADLA: What about ...[intervention]

MR NEL: I know about a specific black person, the only person that I know of, his real name, is something that I learnt very recently, is - I must remember his surname now. There's a black person staying on a farm with a certain Mr Johan Niemuller - I will remember his surname now ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Is that Johan Niemuller of the Lubowsky thing?

MR NEL: Yes, he's an extreme right-winger or he's somebody involved in very funny right-wing activities these days ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: This Askari stays there with him?

MR NEL: Yes, there is a guy staying with him by the name of Vic Telino(?), a black Portuguese speaking guy. Through my recent investigation into his activities I learnt about such a member and that is the only member of, because Niemuller was also a CCB connected person, that I can connect that specific black person to the CCB.

But the rest of the people that I heard about are all administrative names, it's all payroll names. It is not, those who were involved with 5 Reconnaissance Regiment in Phalaborwa will know their names from historic days working with them before they became CCB members.

I was never a member of Special Forces Unit at Phalaborwa.

I knew some of the guys who were Ovambo speaking who came through the POW camp in Oshakati, that I passed on to Special Forces but whether they became members of the CCB later I cannot vouch for, it's possible.

MR MAGADLA: It never would have occurred to you that maybe some day your life would depend on this guy, that on your identifying him at some point?

MR NEL: There was also this method of protecting everybody, to say: "people shouldn't know your real identity". In the inside group of CCB members that did not work because people knew each other from previous times before the CCB was established.

But in the outer circle people were involved in structures not knowing each other and not knowing each other's real names and I think it worked better in the outside circles because I was the handler of two black people who I honestly can today testify under a polygraph test that I do not know who they are. They were introduced to me by false names and that was maintained. They would never tell me who they really are because maybe they didn't trust me.

MR MAGADLA: Were there times when these people were sent on their own on an operation anywhere?

MR NEL: Yes. There is a specific incident, I think it will be traceable through a bit of research work, of a operator who was arrested in Lusaka. He was still detained by the time when the CCB was disbanded and there was concern about him because government never admitted to him being a member of Special Forces or the government at all.

I was told that this person was working solo, he worked on his own. He was sent on a mission. I - ah, maybe I forget about the one guy. There was a former MK guy, he deserted or he AWOL'd, he ran away from Lusaka and a guy by the name of Danie Faull handed him over to me. I sent him to Botswana ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Mr Nel, is this the same person who a vile or several vials of blood was extracted from ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Ja, ja.

MR KHOISAN: Somebody who ended suffering from full blown aids.

MR NEL: He was suffering from HIV, he was suffering from AIDS.

MR NEL: That is another person who was utilised by my region in the CCB, I was responsible for handling that specific project. I sent him with a Tokorov to Botswana on a single mission to eliminate a guy by the name of Che Ogaro or Geuvera. I believe he - I can't remember the surname, I believe he wounded him and later on was arrested and my assumption was that he would die in prison. He was in an advanced stage of, I think his surname was Ngobeni or something like that but I'm not sure. Maybe somewhere in a notebook his surname will still be.

MR MAGADLA: Was it the guy names Che Geuvera?

MR NEL: His MK name was Che Geuvera, Geuvara?

MR MAGADLA: Ja, ja. And also you've mentioned that you went for training in a place called: "The Koppie" in Pretoria, was that place also called: "Spitzkop"?

MR NEL: Speskop, Special Forces Headquarters was generally referred as Speskop because it was where the CCB headquarters was until 1988 in November. It was also where Special Forces Headquarters was. It was also where Wouter Basson had his

offices at that stage until '88. It was known as Speskop. It is now the headquarters of the Gauteng Command.

I visited the place quite recently. It was quite nostalgic to see it, the place changed so much, from a Special Forces Headquarters and a place where a lot of operations were planned, into a Territorial Force Command where the Chief of Staff now a senior former MK member who I know personally. But that is referred to as Speskop, yes.

MR MAGADLA: Now where you would have heard - certain activists that you, whose activities you had to monitor, do you remember an activist who was known as Flemming?

MR NEL: Flemming, Flemming, Flemming? No, it doesn't ring a bell now.

MR MAGADLA: Derek Flemming.

MR NEL: Derek Flemming?

MR MAGADLA: Mm.

MR NEL: And activist?

MR MAGADLA: Ja. A General Vetkop(?) as also involved and also CCM members were also involved and a lot of other people were involved, Demai, in dealing with this guy.

MR NEL: He was definitely not a member in my region, he was not in Botswana, most probably Zimbabwe. I do not know such a guy or alternatively he was inside the country. I never heard of that name. Flemming, Flemming?



MR MAGADLA: Did you have anything to do with some of the Special Forces members or CCB members in KwaZulu Natal? Do you know of any of the Special Forces members in KwaZulu Natal?

MR NEL: Well I became aware of an operation aimed against a certain person in Natal or there were in fact two - I wasn't sure where Jay Naidoo was residing. I always thought he was in Durban but Jay Naidoo was a target and then another person, was it Ndlovo?, no.

We were discussing him the last time. They asked information about the guy and I gave them a print out. The guys working on Mozambique also had responsibility to look at KwaZulu Natal but I have no specific knowledge other than very good liaison that existed with certain security policemen in Durban. I ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Would you remember who they were?

MR NEL: I want to place the one guy now but ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Taylor for instance?

MR NEL: Taylor, ja, Taylor, that's is and Jack Buchner as well.

Jack Buchner once flew with us to, no, we were supposed to fly to Angola to UNITA from a secret place at Wonderboom Airport.

There was an aviation company there with Dakotas and that is where I met Jack Buchner personally.

I don't know how it was arranged and why he was supposed to go with us to Angola. It was arranged at a very high level and we were waiting for them to fix the aircraft and then it was postponed and then I was withdrawn from the list of people and they went later. And I still, I don't know what the reason was, whether it was just a trip for him to go there and to see what UNITA was doing but there was co-operation between Special Forces and Jack Buchner.

MR MAGADLA: Maybe finally for this time, do you know of any relationship that the CCB or Special Forces had with the IFP?

MR NEL: No. I don't know about - in the CCB period, no. After the CCB was closed down and I was already in the Ciskei I became aware of links between Gene de Kock, Henry van der Westhuizen and others with the IFP or with individuals from the IFP involving weapons and also a certain guy by the name of van Rensburg and Tienie Groenewald and certain right-wingers who had contact with Powell, a guy who was responsible for training Inkatha.

But that was after the CCB was closed down. I'm not aware of any link or any co-operation but it wouldn't surprise me because Inkatha would have been, or elements within Inkatha would have been an ideal vehicle for utilisation by the CCB, to use certain individuals with the motive to kill the ANC because of

the political differences. One could indirectly approach such a person and use them as a hit man.

MR MAGADLA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khoisan?

MR KHOISAN: On the question of, two things, I think we - are we going to go to tea now?

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe this is a convenient stage to take the tea adjournment.

MR KHOISAN: Ja, okay.

CHAIRPERSON: We will break now for tea until a quarter to twelve.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION



CHRISTO NEL: (s.u.o.)

MR KHOISAN: Thanks Mr Chairman.

Mr Nel, at the break we were talking about an incident of a person that was handed over to you and blood was extracted from this person and this person was HIV positive and he ended up, according to your testimony, of having full blown AIDS. What can you tell us about that incident and why was the blood extracted from this person, who extracted the blood etc?

MR NEL: I tried to recall the person's name but he, if I have it correctly it is either Ngobeni or Ngobane or something like that. He is a former MK guy who ran away, he was detained for a while

on charges, detained by the ANC. According to his own story he was detained the so-called RC House, it was referred to as the offices where the Revolutionary Council used to come together.

He managed to escape and he then went to Malawi. I'm not sure how that was arranged and whether he applied for assistance at the Embassy, the South African Embassy. But how I got involved in this, Danie Faull was a CCB member very close to Joe Verster, was involved in the process of getting this guy from Malawi to South Africa and because of my background and skills in the field of interrogation, questioning, they asked me to sit down with this guy and extract all possible information that he might have that could still be relevant for the CCB to use in Lusaka or any other place that operations could be planned on. There was quite a delay.

He stayed in, I think it was in Blantyre for quite a while and he was flown out, that I was told at a later stage by him himself when I questioned him, how he managed to get to South Africa, he was flown out from some isolated runway somewhere with a private aircraft. And by the time when, then he was taken to a farm that belonged to the CCB very close to Pelindaba. He was kept there in detention for a while, while I was questioning him. I went out there on a daily basis for about a week to do the detailed questioning of this person.

According to him he was tested and he was found to be HIV positive and I asked him how does he know it and he explained to me that they had extracted a lot of blood from him and it was excessive amounts of blood. He was not happy about this because he said he was feeling very weak because of the blood that they took from him.

He ended up in hospital. I was only there involved for the period of his questioning until I had compiled a detailed report. Danie Faull was in fact responsible for dealing with this person. He was supposed to be a project or something to that effect of Danie Faull. He ended up in hospital being very sick and I do not have all the details but there was a very interesting, Danie Faull will have to come and explain exactly how this worked.

They actually kidnapped him from the hospital again. He was supposed to go there and come out again but he was taken out of ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Which hospital was he in?

MR NEL: I think it's Baragwanath, I'm not sure. This is from information that was carried over to me third hand or by mouth. He was taken out of the hospital by these people at night but not against his will. What the motive was, I will lie if I tell you how it specifically worked.

But he was taken back to the farm and where I was then pulled in to say I must deal with this guy because his knowledge

on Lusaka and his knowledge of Botswana can help us. He will be willing to do certain things in exchange for AZT treatment, which was a very expensive treatment.

So it was actually a carrot in strict approach that was applied to him to say: "If you want treatment you must first do certain things for us". And then he was handed to me as an operation, I must handle him now to send him back for whatever he can do operationally because it was clear that this guy had very little time left.

He was extremely thin and he was suffering from tuberculosis which was kill him, that was evident. I also always protected myself when I went there, I put on a mask. So going through the whole process of getting authority I approached my head, the Regional Commander which was Dawie Fourie or Heine Muller, where I presented a plan that I would send this guy back because those guys in Botswana didn't know about him now being an Askari. In Lusaka they didn't know and we were working on the assumption that the guys in Botswana would not be notified of him having deserted from the MK.

It was actually a - we had nothing to lose. Send the guy there and send him to do whatever he can do, if fails he was going to die anyway and if it was successful he would be rewarded. He went to Botswana with a, with hand grenades and a Makarov pistol. First of all just to establish an old contact that he had at

Mogolutsane area outside Gaborone and to do a general surveillance to see whether he could re-establish contact with some of his previous contacts because he once came down to Botswana and he infiltrated into the country and went back via that way. He knew certain structures.

He came out, I had meetings with him and he went back again, then there a newspaper article about a shooting incident where he did in fact shoot at certain people wounding this person that I recall as Che Ogara, not Che Geuvara but maybe it was my pronunciation or understanding of the name and he was arrested by the Botswana authorities, he was detained there.

I never made any attempt to find out who he was because there was a clear cut-off between myself and him. He didn't know who I was, he didn't know where to contact me. I had a prior arranged schedule with him that when he comes back I would meet at Johannesburger Hotel at certain scheduled times and if he's not there we will not meet. He didn't know where to contact me, I had arrangements with him.

He didn't come back and after that article and through covert collection that existed in Botswana via the Security Police we found out that he was detained and I never bothered to follow up whether he died or not.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now just a little bit further on the CCB and some of this Chemical and Biological Warfare stuff. The

issue of drugs, we've heard testimony here before us to the effect that people with contacts and connections in the narcotics underworld and the criminal underworld, even nefarious gangsters, were used by the CCB because they were the perfect persons who could assume responsibility for any action done by anybody else, the whole thing that you pointed out about operations pointing to someone else.

The Commission has heard testimony, it's in the Steyn Commission Report and we've heard testimony here in public about hundreds of thousands of mandrax tablets handed to, about 200 000 handed to Doctor Wouter Basson for experimentation purposes. We've also heard and received information from members of the public which points very strongly in the direction that drugs and the use of drugs were part and parcel of the broader strategy to neutralise political communities or just to create disruption, chaos in communities. What can you tell us about this particular matter, the issue of drugs, narcotics, particularly mandrax etc., hard drugs?

MR NEL: Ja. When I was undergoing my induction training or my conversion training to become, to come into the mind frame of CCB thinking in 1988, that was part of the, one of the methods that was explained to us, how to establish non-traceability and how to make use of the so-called mafia of the drug trade for hits



and to get people who are in fact involved in the drug trade as part of your arsenal or one of the arrows in your quiver.

I was always under the impression that Piet Botes is one of the guys who in fact made use of this kind of method and then there was another guy, my Regional Head, Dawie Fourie. What we generally referred to as IB's: "Internationale Boewe", your best cut-off would be to impersonate a mafia type person who would like to get that person knocked off because he is interfering with your own smuggling activities, that would be an effective cut-off to disguise motive.

If I am there as a South African agent going to another person to tell him: "Please kill that person for me", how do I do it? I have to create a new motive if I want to create non-traceability. So it was not forbidden to enter the drug trade and the weapon smuggling trade because it was a trade where these kinds of retaliatory attacks and hits, the mafia type operations, were very common.

I became aware of an operation like that in Swaziland when I was there to meet somebody else that I was dealing with for intelligence collection, that Dawie Fourie handled a very, very, senior drug lord who shuttled between Tanzania and Zambia and Zimbabwe. This guy had an influential syndicate cartel of people under him and he had freedom of movement in that part of

Southern Central Africa. He also had access further North, I do not know to Nigeria or other countries.

This guy was used or his sub-structures were used to carry out certain activities and what I'm telling you now is what I heard from somebody who didn't like Dawie Fourie, who complained that he was involved in illegal activities because allegedly to be able to handle or to keep a profile or to make the person that he was handling believe that he was also in this type of trade, there were allegedly transactions that went on. He was buying from this guy or there were selling transactions going on in the drug side.

I have no firsthand information, I never eye-witnessed any of these things but it was not, you could do that in the CCB, it was, Ferdie Barnard for instance was another example of somebody who would be able to use people in the underworld, on the drug trafficking world to carry out certain hits.

I don't know anything about Wouter Basson's involvement in ecstasy and dealing in mandrax and that kind of transaction, it was actually shocking. I could not at first believe it, I thought he was framed because I never expected the CBW project to involve the smuggling of drugs. For what purpose they would get involved in that I do not know. Maybe to manufacture such drugs to be able to give to certain people who used it as a method of establishing their covert underground links, that's a possibility.

It was shocking to read about it. I do not have detail of such activity.

MR KHOISAN: Okay on this particular thing, did you ever at any time, and you are of course a senior member of the military currently and ever since you came back from Italy, after your run in Namibia you've been in a position, except for the period when you were out in the cold, of trust or relative trust. Now the Mossad worked with the South African Defence Force ...[indistinct] or shall I put it that the South African Defence Force of old had links to the Israeli military, you're aware of that?

MR NEL: I had contact in an overt manner with Israelis, it was not a secret that good co-operation existed in the time when South Africa identified with Israel or they identified with each other's attitudes towards your politics but my first exposure to Israelis was in 1982 up in Angola when we were busy with a cross-border operation. A group of Israelis visited us at the tactical headquarters at Onjiva. They came there to gain practical knowledge or experience of the method of our external operations.

It was a very short visit and I was very junior at the stage and did not understand what it was all about but it was quite interesting to see Israeli officers right at the cold face or the battlefield of our Namibian war.

And then in 1982 while I was doing an informative course to become an officer, an Israeli officer came to speak to us about, he was the Commander of the raiding force at Entebbe(?) or he was one of the commanders, to teach us about their way of leadership and the Israelis are well-known for their approach towards leadership to lead from the front and it was quite an eye-opening lecture.

There were a lot of common ways of thinking between us and them. In the secret or, there were a lot of people nominated for courses and also for covert courses in Israel. Some friends of mine like Roos Terreblanche went there, he was also a CCB member, but he went there before he was a member of the CCB. I'm not sure exactly what that training was all about. I am not aware of any co-operation with Mossad, I think I was too junior at the time to know about such things. It would have been a good secret to keep.

What I did tell you the last time was that we were extensively drilled in the video called: "The Sword of Gideon", which was about Mossad types of operations. All CCB members did undergo that training to understand how that specific group of people worked and individual roles performed by the members involved because it was quite a factual movie. But about any direct links or who the persons were involved, sorry I have to disappoint you there, I don't know.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Let me ask you about a person and you can just confirm for the record whether you've heard this person's name or whether it rings a bell in any way, Meyer Mahoas(?)?

MR NEL: No Sir, I have never heard that name.

MR KHOISAN: Did you ever hear about somebody who was once an advisor to Mobutu Sesuseko who ended up working in South Africa?

MR NEL: No, I have no knowledge of that level of information.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now you worked in the Ciskei.

MR NEL: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And you did some work there and as such you should have had some kind of a background because you also worked intelligence and as such would have had a background in research on what went on before you, probably in the times before you got there and so forth. Did you ever run into a company by the name of The Tamuz Corporation: T-A-M-U-Z?

MR NEL: There was a lot of Israeli interest in the Ciskei before I arrived there. There were in fact a number of seconded Israeli officers who worked in the Ciskei and who were members of the Ciskei Defence Force or advisors to the Ciskei Defence Force in the years, I think it's 1985, '86, '87 up to '89 about or no, I don't think it's up to then, it's '85, '86.

What happened was that South African seconded officers were kicked out of the Ciskei by then Lennox Sebe in '85 because

they were distrusted for their possible involvement with Charles Sebe to overthrow Lennox Sebe's government and all seconded officers of the SADF were kicked out of the Ciskei. Then through, I don't know whose, who played the facilitation role there but Israelis came to Sebe through somebody who introduced them to him.

A person who knows a lot about these things is Colonel Horst Shubersberger, he was there during that period. He was the only white person who survived that cleansing period when Sebe chased the people away and he worked very closely with these Israelis. And they had according to him, and that is what he told me, a lot of ideas of establishing some sort of a home base or a safe haven for them there in the Ciskei.

I do not know what exactly the reasons were why they eventually left but it was also a situation that I think was manoeuvred by the South African Government to create distrust to get them out of there. That is the only link that I can make to Israelis and the Ciskei. I'm not aware of a specific company by that name.

MR KHOISAN: Now this particular thing that you talked about: "they were seconded", in other words it was an arrangement between the Israeli Army, the Israeli Defence Force and the Ciskei Defence Force?

MR NEL: Yes, that is how it was explained to me. That these guys were there even wearing Israeli uniform. They changed the doctrine that the South African Defence Force taught the Ciskeiens to Israeli type of doctrine. They were there as soldiers seconded by the Israeli Government and by agreement. And there were other projects, I'm not 100% sure about the detail. If I recollect it involved aircraft and it involved possible trade links and manufacturing rights and I always suspected they wanted to use Ciskei, like many other countries, for toxic waste dumping and stuff like that. That is the type of activities that I suspected foreign had. When they came to see Gqozo, I know through Palatsolo for instance there was a project that involved millions of foreign investment into the Ciskei but it evolved around toxic waste dumping. I do not know about any such things firsthand but it was suspicions.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. One more question on this, have you ever heard of the name of a company by the name of Medchem Technologies?

MR NEL: Medchem: M-E-C-H-E-M, yes. I know them quite well, they are a well established company.

MR KHOISAN: Can you talk about it, can you discuss with us in what context you know them and how they relate to the subject matter under discussion?

MR NEL: Ja. Medchem now is not what Medchem used to be, Medchem now is a company - if we're talking about the same company now, Medchem now under leadership of people like Doctor Vernon Joint and those involved in the lifting of landmines in Southern Africa, were intensively involved in the '80's in developing technologies, advanced technologies in the field of explosives and then counter-landmine protection like the development of the Buffel, the V shape and all the mine detection capabilities that were developed.

But the co-operation between Medchem and EMLC, now a lot has been said here without mentioning EMLC. As you have explored now the chemical and biological side of things, there's also another angle that needs to be investigated and that is the role of the subsidiary of Armscor called EMLC. I do not know what it stands for.

MR KHOISAN: I think it's the Electronic Magnetic component of Special Forces, it's in fact EMLC, a lot of, from what we've heard and the testimony we heard that basically they deal with the electronic and magnetic aspect of Special Forces work but maybe you can

continue with the scene, developing it please.

MR NEL: Okay. As I, when I came to Special Forces you had a Special Forces Headquarters in the middle, you had EMLC building at the back and you had CCB at the bottom and you had



Wouter Basson and his medical crowd on the one side.

...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Now these are members of the Committee.

MR NEL: I understand. Now I worked in the middle section but the CCB part of it and the EMLC part of it was always no-go areas I can call, for certain people. Only certain people were allowed to visit that place. And they developed specialised capabilities, they developed things that one could conceal, they developed letter bombs, they developed car bombs, all kinds of things that could be used in the covert world. If you wanted to smuggle explosives and weapons through border posts without being detected I would send my vehicle to EMLC and they would rig it and conceal these things already in it and give me a vehicle that can be X-rayed and will be protected.

When I saw those screwdrivers that Wouter Basson and them used, it immediately made a connection to say EMLC developed the screwdrivers and they provided the toxin because they were guys who specialised in making things look like something else, the idea of having a ring with things in it. That would be the co-operation between EMLC and the people from the chemical and biological side.

The chemical and biological side people won't have that expertise to develop the gadgets, the umbrellas and the walking canes, that is the responsibility of EMLC. ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: But was Jan Lourens not an engineer because that's the evidence that came from Jan Lourens?

MR NEL: It might be that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well maybe, what you are saying is that he may have designed, as an Engineer he may have done the design but the actual manufacture may have been done by ...[intervention]

MR NEL: The guys who had all the workshops and who were part of, that was part of the same headquarters.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR NEL: He wouldn't duplicate a capability this side and have it have it ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: No, I get our point, I get your point.

MR NEL: I believe that whenever you wanted something funny done, when you wanted, at one stage I think the PAC brought in a lot of hand grenades, EMLC took it and gyped it to reduce the time delay and the same with the limpets, that was the work of EMLC. They were the electronic and technical specialists and they could develop things.

I am aware of co-operation between Medchem and EMLC in the field of explosives. I referred earlier on about the planning at Arusha, to put a big portrait against the wall which was in fact supposed to be a sheet of explosives like a shrapnel mine. That

would be a joint venture for instance between Medchem and EMLC in my thinking.

Although Doctor Vernon Joint was a specialist advisor to Special Forces and he was a good friend of Special Forces to assist us also in the booby trap techniques and the mine technology that was used by Special Forces. But later on Medchem developed into a company with a civilian profile to use this expertise and apply it in a, I would say in an RDP role, in lifting land mines and repairing damage that they were involved in creating in the past.

MR KHOISAN: More in a reconstructive and development context?

MR NEL: Ja, that is how I understand their role these days.

MR KHOISAN: You see the reason why I want to pursue this thing of Medchem is because I'm interested in for instance two things, the use of - and we have heard testimony to the effect of the role of EMLC, particularly in respect of, in one particular case in regard to the limpet mine that was used to bomb the Early Learning Centre in Cape Town, it came from EMLC. In fact the specific time, the remote device, that instructions came down from EMLC and that is on the record. But what I want to find out from you is, for instance in the Lapsley case, you discussed, you brought it to us that in 1987 Lapsley was a target and then

you named a couple of people like Colonel Hammer, Hekkies van Heerden.

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Now I've given you Wouter Basson's diary and invariably in and around the time that their in-houses or discussions of projects outside the country, there is always this entry: "Bel Hekkies". Now I want to find out from you two things, one, is Hekkies van Heerden connected to EMLC?

MR NEL: That is how I link EMLC and Medchem. Hekkies van Heerden was the technical specialist at Special Forces Headquarters. Whenever you - as I explained, EMLC was almost a no-go area for ordinary Special Forces workers but if you had a request to them you would do it via Hekkies van Heerden.

Now Hekkies van Heerden was a Colonel working directly under the Officer Commanding Special Forces and he was regarded as a specialist in this field, in providing special capabilities via EMLC being the guys who manufactured these things, Hekkies would be the guy whom you would contact. You won't speak to one of the guys working at EMCL directly.

Hekkies van Heerden would then liaise with - that man with the brushhead, what was his name?, a retired Special Forces operator also a Colonel type was in charge of EMLC. I'll remember his name now. He was also the Officer Commanding of 2 Special Forces Regiment, big ears, I can't remember his name.

Hekkies would then liaise with this Colonel but he is a retired Colonel appointed as in charge of EMLC to manufacture these things and then you would get your product back via Hekkies again.

Hekkies would arrange maybe in some instances, that you meet with certain technicians from EMLC, get the product, let them explain to you how it works, what you should do and what you shouldn't do and then hand it over to your operator.

Hekkies van Heerden later became a, after EMLC was closed down because it was also rationalised in the same time frame as when Special Forces was rationalised, it was part of the non-traceable machinery, the covert machinery, it was part of that era that had to be closed down. EMLC was also rationalised, that is what I was told. And Hekkies went to work for Medchem and he later died in an air crash in Angola.

MR KHOISAN: Ja, that is where I want to come to because the issue with Medchem is that - did you, was there any, and you are a Counter Intelligence person, did you ever come across anything in respect of Medchem and its links to the Mossad, probably somebody working as a cut out, a front company something like that?

MR NEL: It is not my responsibility in my present capacity at army level to look at companies like Medchem. I have never come across with Israelis and funny things like that. There are

some things about Medchem that we are investigating now at this stage about their, I don't want to call it theft, it's still to be proven but there roughly about 56 Saracen vehicles that were stolen from ...[indistinct] VRP, the big transport park and was taken to a farm that belongs to Medchem. And because of - it's quite a high profile investigation and a possibility of these Saracen vehicles being earmarked to be provided to right-wing elements, we are currently doing an investigation like that but it is subjudicated, it's quite a sensitive project. But other than that I don't have any information about funny deals with Medchem.

MR KHOISAN: Now about this Project Layer(?) and I don't want to quiz you on areas that are outside the domain of your knowledge or your erstwhile responsibility, but what do you know about Project Layer?

MR NEL: No, the name is not known to me.

MR KHOISAN: Do you know of any project that was a joint venture between the SADF and the Israeli Army, maybe in the field of Chemical and Biological Warfare?

MR NEL: No. There are some project files still with the Defence Force today, and that is also a matter that I think the TRC should investigate ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Let me put a question to you, let me ask you a direct question okay, since we are on project files and we are on the search for information, Mr Nel, is there anything, and I would

remind you that you are under oath, is there anything within the domain of your knowledge, your current knowledge that you specifically know about, about files relating to the CCB or Chemical and Biological Warfare which are being removed, which you have a suspicion are being removed? Is there anything that you can share with this Commission in respect of that?

MR NEL: I wish to put it on record that I could face some problems from certain sectors or certain individuals. In answering this question I put myself in a position where I can run the risk of somebody's retaliation or revenge. In recent weeks I became aware of a number of files that are still in the possession of the SA Army, I don't want to call it the old guard but a certain Colonel Matexas who had links with projects of Wouter Basson is to my knowledge in possession of files or handed over these files for safekeeping elsewhere and I'm not aware exactly where these files are but I'm aware of their existence.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell Matexas?

MR NEL: Say again?

CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell his name?

MR NEL: Matexas, it's: M-A-T-E-X-A-S, Matexas. I have no idea what the project name is but I was told by a fellow Counter Intelligence Officer that these files have some relevance to Chemical and Biological projects. It will be possible for me to find out exactly where they are in my capacity as Counter

Intelligence Officer of the SA Army but to my knowledge a certain General van Deventer is trying to get hold of these files. I lured him into a conversation with him not knowing of my activities in the TRC, where he mentioned that, when I mentioned that such files are with Colonel Matexas he said that they are most probably the originals of specific files which are regarded as missing. He mentioned a project name but I can't place it now, Choice, no, no, not Choice sorry, no.

MR KHOISAN: Let me quickly run you through a couple of projects so that maybe if it rings a bell, just quickly.

MR NEL: Yes, please.

MR KHOISAN: Coast?

MR NEL: Yes, that's the word.

MR KHOISAN: Project Coast?

MR NEL: That's the word, that's the word.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR NEL: He said it's most probably, because I mentioned about the existence of these files, I heard about it and then he said: "It's most probably the originals of Project Coast" and he wanted to know where they were and I said I would find out. And that's - I did not contact Colonel Matexas but I know he is 100% aware where those files are because he wanted to surrender them to somebody, he felt that it might become relevant in this case. It is not necessarily that Matexas is part of a cover-up. I think he was



in possession of these files in his capacity as Chief of Projects but the possibility of a sweeping operation there is very likely.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. I want to continue with this particular line here but I actually wanted to end up maybe talking about some projects, and I don't know if, I just have to consult with my colleagues here to find out what the position is.

Okay, in terms of projects, I just want to take you through and maybe if it rings a bell then maybe you can talk about it, if it doesn't, we'll just go through this fast you know. A project by the name of Abactio(?)?

MR NEL: Never heard of it.

MR KHOISAN: Anamint?

MR NEL: Anamint or Element?

MR KHOISAN: Huh?

MR NEL: Is Anamint or Element?

MR KHOISAN: Okay, it's A-N-A-M-I-N-T.

MR NEL: No, I don't know what it is about. I heard the name somewhere.

MR KHOISAN: Alkmaar: A-L-K-M-A-A-R?

MR NEL: No.

MR KHOISAN: Alfred?

MR NEL: No.

MR KHOISAN: Antagonist?

MR NEL: No.

MR KHOISAN: Article?

MR NEL: Yes, it was a CCB operation.

MR KHOISAN: What was Project Article about?

MR NEL: Let me explain how - I had a list of all the CCB projects. I kept it as a sort of a ransom document because I was unhappy about the amounts of money that was given to people to start up their blue plans, money that was paid as collateral deposits to people and they never repaid it when the CCB closed down. A lot of the names, I used to go through all of them and try to connect it to certain individuals.

I know many of the names of the CCB projects but not necessarily what they were all about. Some of those projects were blue plan projects, some of them were red plan projects. I was concentrating on the blue plan projects because I believed there was corruption going on there.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, maybe let's go to one that you may know about since you also had a relationship at one point to Zimbabwe. Project Direksie?

MR NEL: Ja. If I recall correctly that was an operation to jump the Smiths from prison. It was a very high level project, involved not only the CCB. It was a similar project to one that we had in Botswana to set the two guys free from prison that were arrested in Botswana.

There were two CCB operators arrested in Botswana and we had a project running for quite some time to take those guys out of prison because Foreign Affairs did not want get involved. Special Forces were tasked to look at possibilities of getting those guys out of prison.

That was also the project with the Smiths and Bowden and those others. It was also a situation where all other methods of getting the guys out of prison failed and the legal process, the legal cost was covered by CCB for those guys and I think that ran into millions.

Christo Britz or Wouter Basson, the other one, the young one, he handled part of that but it turned out to be a bugger up with Ferdie Barnard and his involvement with Dermot McQuillan and that is why, I was told why Joe Verster was so angry with Ferdie Barnard for stuffing up that project, I can't find a better English word now, sorry for that one.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. This Project Crawler, do you know what Crawler was about?

MR NEL: Crawler was also Christo Britz. Many of these names were mentioned in the CCB offices because of the financial transactions but not for operational purposes. It' wasn't part of my region, I don't know.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now let me ask you, was there ever any project which involved setting up accounts that could be accessed

by legal representatives where the government set up bank accounts for legal defence of CCB members who got into trouble?

Do you know about anything like that?

MR NEL: When the CCB was closed down - there are two parts to this answer. I just want to answer the latter part of it. When the CCB was in the process of being closed down, Admiral Bakker came to speak to us with General Liebenberg. Admiral Bakker at that stage was the Chief of Finance of the Defence Force and some of the complaints that were raised by the members who were going to be rationalised or laid off was: "What will happen if we run into legal problems later on"? And this was official business but most probably government will deny that this was official business because while the CCB existed legal costs weren't any problem. A project would be set up for that purpose and funds would be channelised to the bank account of the individuals who are in trouble but we had a problem as to how this would be handled in future and Bakker said that a facility would be created to establish such a trust fund for CCB members for legal costs in the future.

To my knowledge that never materialised, it was another hollow promise. It was a bit of a problem for the government to fund legal costs for projects that they didn't want to admit their involvement in. They couldn't channel that type of funds directly

because sometimes even the lawyers were not supposed to know that these funds came from the SADF.

And Jaco Black or Jako Swart, the guy I explained to you last time, he and Joe worked extensively to establish foreign financial facilities, bank accounts, primarily Switzerland but offshore all over. Whenever you had a blue plan you had a capability to channelise funds through and for Direksie there was a specific project to fund those legal costs without it being traceable back to the South African Government. I don't know how it worked. And the same for the guys who were arrested in Botswana, their legal costs were also paid by the CCB via indirect methods.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Thank you Mr. Nel, my colleagues want to proceed. Mr Magadla?

MR MAGADLA: Not that I want to put Mr Khoisan off that line but I just want to piggyback on it. Do you remember or do you recall a person by the name of Theron Scheepers who was arrested by the Lesotho authorities and had also to be rescued from there somehow, whilst we are still on Project Direksie?

MR NEL: No, I have no knowledge of such a person. If that is his real name I wouldn't know him but, no, I am not aware of ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Maybe to assist you, he was a member of NIS and he went to Lesotho, I think maybe before the attack in

1985(?) or before the elections of before the coup that took place there and was arrested in Lesotho by the Lesotho authorities.

MR NEL: No, I am not aware of such a person being detained. I know a lot of things happened in Lesotho at that prior to the coup but I never heard about such a person being detained.

MR MAGADLA: Did you ever come across the name, there is a first name but the surname is Koekemoer? This guy was also a member of Military Intelligence and he had things to do with a project which involved him dealing in these heavy transportation things, these heavy trucks from South Africa to Lusaka.

MR NEL: The only Koekemoer I knew is Kerneels Koekemoer, it was the project name of Korrie Meerholtz.

MR MAGADLA: He also - maybe also to help you, he also was involved in transporting some people, Special Forces people to Botswana in one of the trucks and when he got there he offloaded those people from the trucks but the trucks would have been as if they were delivering big long-haul delivery trucks.

MR NEL: No, as I said, the only Koekemoer that I knew is a guy who died in mysterious circumstances. His real name was Korrie Meerholtz. The only project that I know of with big trucks from Botswana was a petrol tanker that was used to smuggle weapons. The weapons were hung inside the petrol container, and it was a known technique to send containers

through, sealed containers to get stuff through but I am not aware of a Koekemoer guy involved in such business.

The only other person that I know of involved in such business is Theuns Kruger but that was in the CCB times, it's now. He is involved in that type of operation now. I do not know a Koekemoer involved in transportation.

MR MAGADLA: Now the transportation of these weapons, where were they being taken to and what was happening? Whose weapons were they?

MR NEL: Into the front lying States, specifically into the southern parts of Zambia. There was always an intention to get resistance movements set up and at one stage in Region 4 it was part of our strategy to get a resistance movement set up in Zambia. It involved some elements from the copper belt up in the north, unhappy trade unionists and people who approached us for assistance, through indirect channels approached the South African Government and then were passed on to the CCB for assistance to overthrow Kenneth Kaunda but ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Wasn't Chaluba also a part of that particular, the current President of Zambia?

MR NEL: I have no knowledge of his specific involvement but I was not part of the project, Joe Verster himself. It was a high level type of planning and Joe Verster and Dawie Fourie should be more or less the only people who know about it.

I think there were links also to UNITA for channelising arms from South East Angola into Zambia but this is speculation, it was beyond my level of knowledge to be involved in that.

MR MAGADLA: Was Nkomo being used to assist in that situation?

MR NEL: I have no knowledge of that.

MR MAGADLA: Was Mitchell, George Mitchell arrested in the same operation in Lusaka?

MR NEL: No ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: I mean the George Mitchell who is alleged to have at one time lent his ... (indistinct) of a shotgun to Ferdie Barnard to test if it would be, how ideal it would be to use firing from a moving vehicle. Do you remember that story?

MR NEL: The name of George Mitchell I link to Dermot McQuillan, I link to Zimbabwe. I heard in conversations about this person. I have no idea who he is and what his links are with whom. The former Zimbabweans who were members of the CCB might know him better but if hear George Mitchell and I hear Dermot McQuillan, from an intelligence point of view it was always red light flashing for me for the possible involvement in Foreign Intelligence Services, MI6 and other possibilities. I had no knowledge of them.

Later on, while I was in the Ciskei, I had a very long discussion one evening with General Johan Viktor - is it Johan or



what is his first name, General Viktor. He used to be the Vlakplaas Commander and later became the Commissioner of Police in the Ciskei. He had long dealings and wheelings with these people, with George Mitchell and Dermot McQuillan and others. What I know about them is what I heard from him and I always suspected that we had crossed lines. The people used the same people as Military Intelligence or Special Forces.

There was definitely information flowing in different directions and although Joe Verster might have thought that there was a great level of security around an operation like: "Direksie", the same people also had contact with the police and other services.

MR MAGADLA: Did you come across a group called: "The Super ZAPO"?

MR NEL: Never heard of them Sir.

MR MAGADLA: Though it may have been financed by CCB as well?

MR NEL: There were guys in Special Forces who joined Special Forces after the Rhodesian War, those who could not identify with the new government, surely they were part of the opposition.

It was always the potential to establish, there was always the potential to establish a resistance movement via these people and their contacts and their capabilities. I am not aware of such

projects but I won't be surprised that plans to that effect were made.

Any opposition or resistance element in Southern Africa would know where to find support if they needed support and they would be channelised to two possible organisations, either Special Forces or Special Tasks. Special Tasks were in fact, that structure was established to assist resistance movements and that was part of Defence Intelligence and not Special Forces.

MR MAGADLA: Do you know Major Strauss? He was Major Strauss I think in 1989 or so but he could be something else now in Pretoria Military Intelligence.

MR NEL: There was a Strauss, to my knowledge, involved in assisting the Lesotho Liberation Army, the LLA. If I can remember, he was a member of, he's a Colonel.

MR MAGADLA: Yes.

MR NEL: Hennie Strauss. I don't know where he is, he's not in the Defence Force anymore. They were involved in setting up resistance movements.

MR MAGADLA: The Lesotho Liberation Army?

MR NEL: Ja, specifically - I think I can link them to the era when Ron Reid-Daly was still in Transkei as well. They also wanted to set up some kind of a Xhosa resistance movement or some resistance movement there in the Eastern Cape.

MR MAGADLA: Now, the other day when we were here I mentioned the name Edmund James or James Edmund who is a former Zimbabwean, black or coloured. He from there came down to join Special Forces and later he had things to do with the Executive Outcomes. He served under this Mr Strauss but he also says that his other duty, his other task that he was given was to recruit people from Pretoria townships with a pretext that these people are going to MK, to join MK in Botswana.

He took two kombi loads on two separate occasions to some place towards the border or near the border where he handed these people over to certain people but to his knowledge these people were never helped to cross the border but they were killed and buried somewhere in those places, ja, that kind of "netwerk diens" story but these people were murdered, but he says he served directly under this Major Strauss at the time. Could a thing like that take place according to your knowledge of that situation, of those people?

MR NEL: Ja, I cannot link the Strauss that I know to Special Forces, I link him to Special Tasks and Special Tasks as a subsection of Military Intelligence, they were in fact worlds apart from Special Forces and Special Tasks. Special Tasks, I can't see the logic in doing such kinds of things as being part of Special Tasks. The only suchlike incident that I heard of was what I read in a newspaper. I think it was part of the police operations, to

take when Joe Mamasela recruited people and they were killed in that way. I can't place or link anything with Hennie Strauss that I heard of and such operations, I don't know.

MR MAGADLA: But do you remember an occasion when these Zimbabweans who later fled to South Africa who had been what they used to call the Silo Scouts. Now the black ones who were sent back to Zimbabwe one night to stage an attack on some, I think it was an oil storage or something, do you recall such?

MR NEL: As I explained earlier, 5 Special Forces Regiment in Phalaborwa consisted out of Five One Commando, Five Two, Five Three and I think there was also a Five Four Commando. Five One Commando originally was situated in Ondangwa. They made use of former Angolan and former Namibian types of people, people who fled or who were used as false guerrillas in that war. Later on after the war in Namibia stopped those people came back to Phalaborwa.

Then Five Two Commando and Five Three Commando consisted out of people from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and I think Lesotho as well, it was a mixture. It wouldn't be strange to find a lot of former Zimbabweans in Phalaborwa even today, former Namibians in Phalaborwa today and Portuguese.

Some of them were also taken up into Three Two Battalion later on, specifically the Angolans and Namibians but whenever you needed, if you wanted to carry out an operation into

Zimbabwe it wouldn't just be an operation to say: "send them back there one night to go and blow up things", it would be an extensive planning for at least a month and then use these guys as guides because they know the place much better.

They were also trained as Special Forces operators to, you can send them, what normally would happen is you would do phase one of your operation to get the hardware closer to your target. Without getting any operators involved you will support system working, your courier system will take your explosives and other things closer to the target, cache them there and then sending your operators on a specific night to take out those things, do their operations and exfiltrate.

You would send in operators who know the area, who can fit and blend into the area. It wasn't a good thing to use whites, you would use black people who can disguise themselves as local people in case the operation goes wrong tonight they can stay over the next day and carry it out the next morning. That is more or less how - it is part Special Forces style to work that way.

MR MAGADLA: Maybe finally for now and from me, Mielie Prinsloo, you say he was sacked in 1992, why?

MR NEL: Say again Sir?

MR MAGADLA: Mielie Prinsloo.

MR NEL: Mielie Prinsloo?

MR MAGADLA: Mm.

MR NEL: He was my boss in Special Forces while we were at the projects team. He always had this need to have his own little thing going on. There was a lot of rivalry between him and Joe Verster. Mielie Prinsloo was the Chief of Intelligence of Special Forces at the time when I arrived at Special Forces and Joe Verster had the CCB running. Joe Verster always criticised intelligence for giving them history and giving them poor intelligence and it wasn't a very nice relationship between them. When the CCB went totally covert Mielie Prinsloo established what was later called: "clandestine teams".

We had three levels of work. You had overt work that is known to everybody or where the government would claim its involvement and then you had covert work on the other side where the government would never claim its involvement. In the middle of that you would have clandestine work where members from the intelligence, from the Special Forces Regiments who are active serving members of the Defence Force would be used in operations and for a period the government would deny their involvement but later on they would admit it, once the guys who did the operation returned back safely, they would admit their involvement.

Now Mielie Prinsloo to my knowledge got clandestine teams off the ground. He recruited specific individuals from 4 Special Forces Regiment and from 1 Special Forces Regiment to

form little teams and they used to go on Africa safaris and visit Tanzania. Some of the guys actually went straight into Morongoro camp and took photos, acting as if they tourists and others just went into ANC offices and knocked at the door and pretended as if they were lost, just to do reconnaissance.

There was a lot of unhappiness about this other team that developed, Joe Verster wasn't happy about this but Mielie Prinsloo wanted his own thing. When Special Forces, the CCB covert side was closed down and I left, I do not know exactly what happened but when I asked people later on: "Why was Mielie Prinsloo fired after the approach by Steyn"?, they said because he was carrying on with his own little thing and he also had certain links to the right-wing.

He never made any secrets of his right-wing sentiments, he was somebody who did not agree with the change in South Africa, he did not agree with the February 1990 speeches of de Klerk and because of that and his continued involvement in I would say, covert or clandestine type of operations, that was uncovered by Steyn and he was fired.

MR MAGADLA: Now these covert and clandestine actions or whatever for raids into places, where you never ever would have wanted these things to be linked to the Army, now should anything happen to one of the operators, get killed or whatever, how was that thing reported what happened to those people?

MR NEL: I think the best example is the fiasco that happened in Botswana where two guys were arrested ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Which year was that, just let us be clear?

MR NEL: Was it '88 or - there were two guys, one I only know as Spik, he was in Region 1, Botswana region, he worked for Dawie Fourie, and then a young Lieutenant - it was all over the news, they were walking there in Botswana in chains. The government denied any knowledge of these guys. Pik Botha went public in stating they don't know these people, they once belonged to the Defence Force but whatever they were doing was their own business. That created a big problem in the CCB because they guys who used to be very loyal and do these things for "volk and vaderland" said: "No, no, no, it can't work that way, those guys, there should be some diplomatic action to get those guys out of prison because they were doing what they were doing with the authority and orders of the government".

Government kept on denying their involvement until they financed an operation to jump those guys from prison. I don't know what the outcome of that case was but eventually those guys were released. I think at some or other stage it was an agreement, that government admitted that those people were in fact members of the Defence Force.

But for instance, one of our guys in Region 4 who was handled by Ian Strange, Rodney was his administrative name, he



was arrested while doing reconnaissance on the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka and he was detained for quite a while or I don't know whether he's still there. By the time the CCB was closed down he was still in detention. They just kept on paying his salary to his wife through an indirect way, a bank account.

I'm not sure exactly how that worked but they kept their commitment because this guy was a Special Forces operator, he was not just somebody that you hired from the street, he was a full-time member of the Defence Force who also went through the process of resigning with us and he was a black operator and nobody ever admitted his involvement or him being a soldier.

And the method that would happen - if something like that happens a lot of sweeping would take place to destroy all possible links, the method that that guy used to work. For instance, if he had a pager that account would be stopped and if there were post boxes that would ever be used again and you will sever all your ties with this person to stop any possibility that those guys investigating on the other side can trace it back to the South African government.

All our operations had stops built into it, you would ensure that those stops are in place so that it prevents the South African Government from being implicated in such, in a link towards that guy and also to protect him. If he sticks to his cover story they should not be able to trace his links. And in the event of him

spilling the beans there should not be any further damage than just him, you just cut that part off and say right, that is something that needs to be compromised to keep the rest intact.

CHAIRPERSON: I would suggest that this is a convenient time to take the lunch adjournment and we should resume at 2 o'clock.

I believe lunch has been provided for in the usual place.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Magadla?

~~Mr Nel, you are reminded that you are still under oath.~~

CHRISTO NEL: (s.u.o.)

MR MAGADLA: We were talking about this operation you were describing in Botswana and I'm not sure as to how we got to, how we dealt with this one where I suggested there was an occasion where a truck delivered people to Botswana and there was an attack there, people were killed but the person driving this truck is said to have been the Koekemoer that I have mentioned, the Koekemoer that you think may not be the one that you know. But I'm just talking about the incidents, do you remember that one where Special Forces went to attack in Botswana in that kind of truck or vehicle?

MR NEL: There were a number of operations into Botswana by Special Forces and by CCB as well. In the earlier days, I would say prior to 1987 there were a number of operations more

clandestine, not necessarily covert, where ANC houses or transit houses were attacked.

In 1988 there was a specific operation against more than one ANC house in Gaborone. There was a specific operation where a few guys were killed in a house, confirmed MK operators. The guy who was killed there was, the more senior guy of the MK guys who were killed there was called Naledi. He was something like the Transvaal machinery, was a member of the Transvaal machinery. Also in the house was a guy by the name of Dan Hato who managed to escape through the window.

The people who infiltrated for that operation were called by us: "The Production Team". It was a team of about 10 guys who were used for hit and run type of operations. They used to infiltrate as a team, not necessarily all in one vehicle, some of them, they would enter Botswana on different routes on the same night. They normally made use of a farm in the far Western Transvaal near Kopfontein that belonged to the police. That was almost like a joint venture between the CCB and Security Branch who had a farm there halfway between Zeerust and Kopfontein border post and from there they would infiltrate on various routes into Botswana and go and attack the houses and come back the same night.

There were a number of other operations also where a specific, a specific operation was launched against an ANC house

where this so-called Colonel Hammer prepared a minibus to explode next to a house. The intention was to target only that specific house but it ended up flattening I think about two other houses in the area around it as well.

There were operations into Francistown but none of those I can directly link to a truck being used to take a number of people and it would in fact be a high risk operation, to put a number of guys in one truck to go into Botswana but it's not impossible if they thought it was safe and tested before the time, for instance by making use of a container that is sealed. Normally through border posts sealed containers can pass through if you have contacts at the border post.

MR MAGADLA: Now the government of these countries, Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique and Lesotho, would there have been some kind of co-operation between yourselves and some elements of these governments allowing you to have a free run into these countries for your operations? And if there were those elements, to what level did that co-operation reach in terms of, could it have been known only to the lower down elements or could it have been something that even people higher up knew that you people were conducting these operations in those countries?

MR NEL: Sir, I would say in the case of Swaziland there was definitely an agreement between the Swazi police and our own

police and between the South African Defence Force and the Swazi Defence Force. The reason why I say this, to give you an example, in 1987, '86/'87 the SADF had a permanent, Military Intelligence had a permanent presence in Swaziland and we had a permanent interrogation centre outside Mbabane. That was run by a Colonel Dries van Coller and a Commandant Lukas Delpport and Anton Nieuwoudt. That permanent presence there and some of the caravans that were developed for interrogation purposes were parked there outside Mbabane and captured or arrested MK soldiers were taken there by the Swazis and we were given the opportunity to interrogate them there with the Swazi co-operation.

So for such co-operation to exist surely agreements were reached at higher level. I'm not aware of such agreements and on what level but one will, we were travelling freely to Swaziland and we were doing these kinds of interrogations in comfortable circumstances, not very secretive or not worried at all about the Swazis detecting our presence there, they knew about it.

MR MAGADLA: Could it have been a police and army thing that would not have extended to the cabinet perhaps?

MR NEL: It's possible that it was just between military people, a sort of military agreement, military liaison, military co-operation, although I would guess that the Swazi military establishment would fall out of favour with their government if

they did enter into such an agreement without knowing their government in this regard, if their government did not agree.

The South African Police element such as C Section had a total freedom of movement in Swaziland, they were going in there day and night, also Military Intelligence without the slightest bother of being detected or they were never arrested or detained to my knowledge. So Swaziland was a very easy place for intelligence and the police to operate in.

Botswana definitely not. Botswana was - in earlier days prior to 1985 it was easier but at later stages, except for individual co-operation, co-operation with certain individuals in some of the Botswana structures. I cannot talk about formal co-operation or liaison or agreements. I know about a specific person by the name of Herschfeld that had a senior appointment in the Botswana police or security establishment who had regular contact with the police in the Western Transvaal and I had no doubt in my mind that he was either a paid informer or he was part of their co-operation structures but that was on a more covert level.

Lesotho. Lesotho was not an important country for us to work on after 1985/'86 because their government applied pressure on the MK structures not to use Lesotho as a springboard anymore and after the coup specifically it wasn't necessary for us to work in Lesotho because there weren't really serious targets of

importance in that area other than PAC presence and refugees.

So we never really bothered about Lesotho after 1987 again. It was effectively neutralised as a safe place for MK by means of the political activity that was to a large extent controlled by Pretoria.

That is how we regarded Lesotho at that stage. Whenever we found out that ANC people used or MK people would use Lesotho, there would be pressure applied from Pretoria on the government and those people will be denied the opportunity to use Lesotho.

MR MAGADLA: The co-operation in Swaziland, could it have been influenced by fear by the Swazis of the kinds of attacks took place in Lesotho and other places or could there have been payment for instance, bribery, to those people to let the South Africans do as they did, give them a free hand into the country in the manner they did?

MR NEL: Surely all those things that you've mentioned are possible, it calls for speculation for my side to say anything about it. I do not know who those agreements were reached and between who and who and which parties but I have no information to say yes, there were individuals who were bribed or whether it's out of threats or force or whatever the reasons were but co-operation did exist.

MR MAGADLA: This Herschfeld, is he the guy who at one point was Commissioner of police in Botswana?

MR NEL: I believe so yes. He was a senior, and I can't confirm that he was a Commissioner but he had a senior appointment in their police structures.

MR MAGADLA: And in Mozambique for instance, how far did the relationship go with regards co-operation? I'm asking this question maybe because there has been talk that indeed there was the kind of co-operation which went to the extent of some Generals within the police and the army as well.

MR NEL: I am not aware of any such agreements, I think I am out of my league in answering these questions here. Bilateral agreements on government level I'm not aware. That some individuals in the security establishments were in fact paid informers and collaborators of the South African Intelligence Service and Special Forces yes, but formal agreements ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: No, no, not at all formal, I'm referring to elements within the governments, covert things that would have taken place by the South African authorities or the South African Security Forces and those elements within the forces of those countries, especially the, or specifically Mozambique.

MR NEL: Ja. I believe Piet Botes, the Region Commander of Region 2 had contacts like that. A guy who worked for him by the name of Dave Tippet was allegedly involved in bribing officials to get certain favours and to get freedom of movement,



to get business rights going on there. I do not know who these people are but yes, there were always insinuations that you can buy anything in Mozambique if you throw around dollars.

MR MAGADLA: Well there is talk now by some people that during those times when there were the CCBs and others who established front companies in the country and also in other countries, that when the CCB was disbanded and when the liberation movements were unbanned, now those front companies were not returned to the government but were inherited by the people under whose names they were registered and that up to this day some of those front companies are running. For instance if there was a farm, maybe a dairy farm, agricultural farm of some kind that produced whatever they produced and that generated income, that that thing is still going on but the person under whose name it was run did not inherit it as such that it was his own but it then belonged to a group of people who even at this moment are a disgruntled type of people who could be planning whatever they are planning, even up to now, that the income that is generated by those front companies goes into the coffers of these elements.

MR NEL: Ja, I have mentioned earlier today that I had a list of all the so-called blue plan projects which I unfortunately handed back when they demanded all documentation back for my last severance payment but amongst those projects, included amongst

those were private companies that were established by individuals as front companies, you can call it front companies but they were in fact legitimate business that would create a credible cover story for any CCB individual to go around posing as a businessman.

Some people received money from government to establish such companies and others did not. I was one of those who did not receive any money for establishing a blue plan or a company. When the CCB was closed down, it was closed down in a very clumsy way. I think there is documentation to prove what happened there and some guys refused to surrender these assets back to the government which was demanded. It was supposed to be closed down or sold and the money was supposed to be returned the South African Government.

Due to the fact that the South African Government and the Defence Force did not, refused to honour the contracts of CCB members, they refused to do anything regarding the closure or the closing down of these companies and they maintained those companies as a profitable method of earning money for themselves in specific, in their groupings. They grouped together these capabilities.

I believe Joe Verster was quite involved in grouping all these capabilities together and putting together a consortium of some sort, some kind ... [intervention]

MR MAGADLA: That is Joe Verster?

MR NEL: That is Joe Verster yes. He pooled the guys who refused to accept the severance package or the retrenchment package together and he pooled the resources that they were in fact controlling.

I will never be convinced that those guys will do anything again for the previous government and/or any related structures to that previous government because they are the ones who were willing to fight the previous government in Court and everywhere and surely some of the characters involved there might be the type who will hire out services to any, to somebody who would like to do dirty tricks. It's still a possibility.

But I read into their motive, a big financial motive. They were after the money and not out of loyalty towards anything anti-Communist or anti what or anti what. So I will be shocked, I will be surprised if those guys are still involved in anything funny because they were capitalists in my point of view. They got out of the CCB closing down. Most of them ended up millionaires and they don't need to do dirty work anymore, they have the money to look after themselves.

MR MAGADLA: Let me just scratch one little scenario. There has been information that some people were recruited, either by Military Intelligence or by Security Branch as army people and some as police people and then infiltrated into the camps of the

liberation movements and whilst they were there they rose into positions of power in the camps and that these were the people who would be tasking people, who would be selecting people to come back to South Africa on some missions, some operations but that these were the people then who would also inform the Security Forces that a certain group of people is coming through a certain place and through a certain border and what have you and that those people would either be ambushed or they would be arrested or something would happen to them, but at the same time some of those people in the camps working for the South African Government would be in possession of some kinds of poison, to poison some of the cadres within the camps there and also at times would identify or the Security Forces here would be dealing with a certain activist who would then cross the borders to go to wherever and when he gets to those camps those policemen who are there, those informers or police informers would then be alerted that so and so is there and that these people would then cause the arrest of that person and the detention of that person in Quattro or whatever and in the end that person is killed by the ANC. What would your comment to that kind of scenario be?

People say the ANC has killed people in Quattro and nobody is saying anything about it, whereas the people who were identified for detention in Quattro were identified by informers of the Security Forces in South Africa but informers who are there

and who happened to position themselves such that they received and they vet these people.

MR NEL: Let me start from one side answering your question about the fact that people were trained here, policemen, undercover policemen and maybe members of National Intelligence and possibly members of Military Intelligence, recruited from school or junior members, trained as agents and then sent to join MK. Surely in any basic intelligence lecture that would be taught as one of the methods to get into a revolutionary organisation, is by method of infiltrating people.

The method was to my knowledge used by the police service specifically as a method and I think there are examples of Dee Larrington and, what was that other girl who sat in Quattro for a while, Forsyth or what was her surname, I can't remember her name ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Yes, I remember that girl.

MR NEL: They used that method. You need time to do that. You have constant problems with communication. The way CCB operated, CCB was not an intelligence collection organisation, it was an offensive organisation.

So the method that would be applied by the CCB would rather be to recruit existing members in the infrastructure or to bribe or to blackmail existing members in the system, like for instance the situation with Sam Chant in Botswana who set up an

infrastructure to infiltrate PAC guys into the RSA and nine out of ten of those guys were arrested until the police got so angry with the military that they went and killed Sam Chant because they felt that it was, because of the fact that the military intelligence established a system and gave Sam Chant a 4 x 4 vehicle and created avenues for them to infiltrate, that the PAC was revived again or APLA managed to infiltrate again and they wanted that system stopped and I don't think it's any secret who killed Sam Chant.

I am not aware of any long-term projects run by CCB, we didn't have the time to do that, to send guys to the camps and to go and work there. We rather looked at opportunities to poison the food that was sent to the camps by air. There was a company, and I can't remember the name of it now, I spoke about it last time when I was here as well. The opportunity did come up that the meat that was sent to the camps could be poisoned.

We always joked about it and said that DIS or the MK Intelligence Services were more effective than the CCB in killing it's own members. All we needed to do is make people suspect, we had to launch a campaign of disinformation to make people suspect.

MR MAGADLA: Ja.

MR NEL: Now if I can give an example of how I personally did that in Namibia. We arrested a Field Intelligence Officer of

SWAPO and the plan was to expose him to certain sensitive information and then allow him to escape.

A certain file was created with the intention to be disinformation, the file was created to have credible information and photos as if certain very high ranking SWAPO officials were in fact paid agents of the South African Intelligence fraternity.

The member was allowed, by means of a mistake on our side, to be left alone in the conference or in the interrogation room with this file which I used as an aid for interrogation, knowing that he would during a break or during my absence try to look into this file and we did monitor him through one-way glass and we gave him about 20 minutes to browse through the file and two and half weeks later he escaped and thereafter certain senior members of SWAPO were arrested. We linked it directly to the so-called: "Project Charlie", we called it Project Charlie.

Similar types of operations were also launched by the Intelligence community to create the impression through agents that we suspected to be double agents. For instance to give him messages to convey to a certain other agent that we have in a camp who we find difficult to communicate with, knowing that that person would report back to his handlers on the other side that he has in fact identified another agent of the South African Defence Force or the South African Military Intelligence, being so and so, knowing that the paranoia of MK would result, this

will result in that man being arrested, detained and sometimes if they cannot prove his guilt they would even kill him.

It was a method that was called - one of the six methods of disruption which was the aim of the CCB, was discrediting and discrediting operations were aimed at also making people suspect, suspicious and sometimes sending them funny mail in coded fashion hoping that this would be scrutinised or intercepted by DIS, which we learnt that some incoming post was screened by DIS before it was sent to the specific member who it was addressed to.

So you would send funny mail to a person and if DIS would read and analyse that message or that letter, would probably find that this is some sort of coded communication. In many cases to our knowledge it happened that totally innocent people were arrested, detained.

There is one specific case that I can maybe investigate a little bit further. Recently I found out that Johan Niemuller, I mentioned him a few times now, has contact with a member - I unfortunately don't have his name with me here, a former MK member who used to be the Commander of Quattro - I have the name on my files at work, and if that is so, one could put one and two together that if that friendship dates back to old days maybe he was an infiltrated agent who exercised discretion based on instructions from South African and not on the interest of MK



when he sentenced people or tortured people. I have that name back at my office, I don't have it here with me.

Apparently this person's father was also on the island with President Mandela and a well-known friend of President Mandela.

I don't have his particulars but I can give it to the TRC.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask in that context, did you know a person called Tami Zulu also known as TZ, who died in circumstances that raise a lot of suspicion in Zambia?

MR NEL: I learnt about the whole debate around TZ from Henry van der Westhuizen. He had much more intimate knowledge about the suspicions around TZ and the later alleged poisoning of him or the killing of him which, I don't know, I don't want to speculate. Henry said there was maybe a project to make look like an agent and therefore he was killed by MK.

MR KHOISAN: In the context of what you mentioned earlier, have you heard the name Chief Seramane?

MR NEL: Chief?

MR KHOISAN: Seramane.

MR NEL: No, I don't know.

MR KHOISAN: He was also known as Kenneth Mahamba. He was one of the Commanders of Umkhonto weSizwe in Angola.

MR NEL: Kenneth Mahamba. No, it's not the name that I ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: I was just trying to figure - you didn't have Seramane?

MR NEL: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Okay go ahead.

MR NEL: That name what Niemuller mentioned was something like Mkumgulwe or something like that, it has got a number of u's in it but I have it at my office. I unfortunately cannot recall it now.

MR MAGADLA: In KwaZulu Natal, I'm sorry you did say you did not have a lot to do with KwaZulu Natal but we also have some members in KwaZulu Natal who claim to have been members of Military Intelligence but who were operating within the country in the sense that they would carry arms, to transport arms to certain IFP warlords and they go about monitoring movements of certain leaders within COSATU, ANC and Communist Party and some of those people were actually killed but these guys operated from the Natal Command and they mentioned of the people who were in charge of them but I've just forgotten one of the two names of those people that they mentioned but one of the guys whom they mentioned has now retired.

At one point a farmer was killed in KwaZulu Natal he organised a march by people, by whites, to say that the police were doing nothing and the farmers were getting killed. That guy at that time was in the army but when he organised this march he

had left the army. I'm saying, would you then know of a situation where some black Military Intelligence people were used in fuelling violence between political groupings, black political groupings within the country?

MR NEL: No, I was never involved in any such planning. I was not made aware of any such individuals doing this. I was aware of the training of those Inkatha guys up in Caprivi from discussions that we had from people who were involved there and that they were undoubtedly part of a project by Special Tasks to become a UNITA type organisation, a counter revolutionary type of force. Surely Military Intelligence had contact with some of the Inkatha members and they would have used them, not only for intelligence collection but most probably also for attacks on MK or ANC or SDU members.

It was in the interest of the total struggle, the old total onslaught, the total counter-revolution, to fuel the violence between Inkatha and the ANC and specifically the SDU's or Inkatha and the Self Defence Unit structures. There were those who believed that the more mechanisms that were in place to fight against the ANC the better and the effort was in the Eastern Cape to form a counter-revolutionary organisation, the same in Natal, around the Gauteng area at that stage, Witwatersrand, to involve people in struggles against the so-called communist onslaught. It

will part of the strategy, it fits into the strategy that was applied at the time.

MR MAGADLA: Now here's another scenario similar to the one of Quattro. This is where you have a source that is infiltrated into the leadership of an organisation and he is tasked to monitor the movements of a certain person but whilst he is doing that, for some reason by some other people, that person gets arrested or goes and commits something that causes him to be arrested.

Now during the time when he has been arrested he gets sentenced and then he goes to Robben Island. Now your source has lost a job in a way because the person that he was monitoring, and he was getting good information from monitoring this person's movements, now we are told that you would find some way of arresting that source, taking him to Court, he pleads guilty and he doesn't give any trouble and then he goes to Robben Island and he keeps monitoring things now in Robben Island, monitoring that same person right up to the time when the people were unbanned and some people came from prison.

Now we have such people. All I need to know or maybe from yourself is, not only was that kind of thing possible but for you maybe to say: "Indeed it was happening" and if it was happening maybe, you've been so kind because you've been quoting some instances, maybe you can quote one of those instances with regards to Robben Island.

MR NEL: It was a well-known tactic, that you would throw your man in amongst prisoners if you want to know what they're talking after hours, what they're discussing. It was sometimes necessary to arrest your own sources as well to maintain their credibility and sometimes you even had to charge them and hopefully the Judge will not sentence them for life but they must get out again and do their work and they have to pay the price for the purpose of credibility.

Sometimes you will even use a source to compromise another source so that you can establish him on a higher level but I am not aware of any specific project or any person that was used to infiltrate Robben Island. It would be more in the line of a police and an NIS job because that would be a typical information collection campaign.

People who wanted to counter the strategy by means of strategic moves needed that kind of information. We needed more tactical, practical information how to kill people and it is a different level of intelligence collection. In the old system where I came from before I became a member of Special Forces, when I was doing Military Intelligence work or Army Intelligence work, yes that is common practice.

Up in Oshikati I always had this false guerrilla available to lock up with the guys who just came in. We always had this old inmate who is already in the cell by the time when the newcomers

come and he will brush them off and say: "What did you tell those guys inside, what more do you have to tell them, keep quiet about this and about that". Instead of questioning the newcomer, you will call the old guy in who is your guy and he will tell you what that guy knows. That was old interrogation techniques. So yes, you will put people amongst prisoners.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just follow up with a side question? Was it only left to chance that the Judge or the Magistrate or whatever it was, might acquit a person or were there arrangements that were made with the judiciary?

MR NEL: Again in that regard, the military stands a little bit outside the legal process. Once - if I had an informer who ended up in trouble, being arrested for being an accomplice in a certain case I would sometimes, depending on the level of the case, not even liaise with the police.

If I know that the sentence is only going to be a very light sentence, if the guy was just arrested in the presence of others but if it's is a serious case one would go through the process of compromising and go to the police and say: "That guy that was arrested was in fact part of a project of ours, see what you can do, maybe an escape, maybe whisper into the Judge's ear", never to use him as a state witness because once you use him as a State witness it's gone.

Sometimes you would count the odds and say: "Alight, by using him as a State witness we can send six high profile guys to prison" so use him as a State witness and this the end of it and you resettle him with a new identity somewhere else. If the odds are small and there are bigger things to achieve, you would try to postpone it, to prolong the operation by getting the person out of the trouble with the least possibility of damage but it's always a risk if you go to a policeman and whisper in his ear and say: "Help me, I need to help that guy, he's my agent". That is a risk because too many people know about it. One would avoid that.

Sometimes in CCB one would never tell the police that such and such a person are in fact my operatives, rather make a plan to help him escape.

CHAIRPERSON: Just to follow that up. Did you ever use any South Africans for instance, in missions like the South African Free Trade Organisation SAFTO and/or any other placements overseas, black South Africans as collectors of intelligence? I'm reminded here of a person whose name was Vuyani Ngobodo, quite an intellectual chap right from Fort Hare, always was involved in leading strikes and then somehow would be able to get out.

In the Transkei he was involved in a ...[indistinct] he was detained for a period then was released, gave evidence in a particular case, was re-employed and came to Cape Town, was

also involved in a major case, somehow he got off and I think for quite some time now he has been working in the United Nations or at least in New York in SAFTO's offices.

MR NEL: Ja. There were people who were sent into organisations and to join. I was only involved in one such project myself where we infiltrated a person into the anti-apartheid movement. That was quite easy to use whites for that role. I co-handled such a person in Europe, I travelled abroad a few times to see him.

For instance to give a silly example, to damage the ANC reputation or the image of the ANC internationally you would get such a guy. Whenever they're busy with protest action, he will start throwing stones at the police, he will instigate incidents of violence where the London police, the mounted police normally whenever they had horses they were very irritated sometimes and if you take a prodding stick along and you prod those horses it creates chaos in the streets and then the image of the ANC is dented internationally. That was an example of such a project that I know of.

There were people internally, and I don't want to speculate or spread disinformation but sometimes when you all of a sudden see a youth leader, making very radical statements, you would wonder. Those statements are in fact more damaging to the



organisation that the guy belongs to and then nothing happens to the person ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: What about this guy Onetwo Zenzile, since you're talking about that.

MR NEL: Say again?

MR KHOISAN: This guy Onetwo Zenzile, the past President of COSAS, what do you know about his relationship with the Security Forces?

MR NEL: No, I don't know. I want to state an example for instance of Peter Mokaba. At one stage it was widely speculated in the intelligence community, not whether he was an informer but who he was working for and it can be disinformation, it can be a way of discrediting a person but it is an old tactic to try and, if you want to channelise an organisation in a direction you want, take your man and make him the radical and he will become the leader and you can manipulate that organisation and you can even pull the carpet underneath it at the time when it's strategically important.

NIS projects typically, not so offensive in terms of pulling triggers but strategically correctly placed people that can create damage that's even more harmful than killing people. It is an international embarrassment, it's a lot of, somebody who can say at the wrong time at the wrong place completely wrong things.

That I believe is an indication of somebody feeling safe, protected on the one side but part of a project on the other side.

MR MAGADLA: I think you are completely right. I've just got one, not even something that I saw. There was a Security Branch member who at one point used to sit down and write when there was going to be a meeting, a rally. He used to write the speeches that had to be spoken by the person, his source, and he would go there and say whatever vile things he could say about the police and yet he'd be, and that guy was boasting and everybody knew and he was saying he was writing their speeches. So those things did happen.

Maybe just to come to one important thing, would you be aware as to whether that Chant(?) was a source for Military Intelligence or for whoever?

MR NEL: I thought you knew that Sir.

MR MAGADLA: I'm saying, would that, would you be aware of the fact that he, this guy Herschveld knew about that?

MR NEL: Ja. You see there was a very interesting situation there Sir. The PAC in Botswana was - the Western Transvaal police claimed for many years that they controlled the PAC in Botswana. They said that they had manipulated it to such an extent that whenever something moved they knew and I cannot say what controlled the exercise on what level but when I started working on Botswana in 1986, they gave me all the information

about MK activities and specifically Special Operations and a lot of things about the ANC and when we came to PAC they didn't want to give us any information because they said we should not regard any PAC people in Botswana as targets. We must leave the situation and we should not stir the PAC, it was comfortable like that at the time.

And whenever the PAC did something they would always give publicity to the ANC even if APLA infiltrated and did something they would never recognise that, they would publish it in the newspaper as if it was MK. So they were quite happy that they had control over the PAC situation in Botswana.

Then Military Intelligence came in the form of a certain guy by the name of Tony Oosthuizen and he had strong connections with the PAC in Harare. He had a very senior person who shuttled between Dar e salaam and Harare working for him. They needed to extend this communication to this guy in Harare via Botswana because the people in Tanzania tried to infiltrate people but it didn't work because they were not well established in Botswana.

Then Tony Oosthuizen went along who recruited Sam Chant because Sam Chant was not newly recruited into the system, he used to be an old source of the police and then they stopped their operation with him or they put him on the ice. Then Tony Oosthuizen came from the sideline as sort of an intruder into the

Western Transvaal and into Botswana and the police in Botswana, in Western Transvaal hated the idea that somebody who didn't understand the total mechanics now came into the system.

He recruited Sam Chant, gave him a 4 x 4 vehicle and put a lot of money into the project and tasked Chant then to go up and meet certain people up in Zimbabwe to establish this infiltration line of people via Botswana into the RSA.

Now I knew Tony Oosthuizen quite well and by the time I learnt from the police in Western Transvaal about this operation they were angry and they sent a message via me to Tony Oosthuizen that he should come to Zeerust or to Potchefstroom and talk to them because he is now creating a monster, he's going to allow PAC guys to infiltrate, APLA guys to infiltrate, because they will not be able to arrest every group that come in. They would have to let one go, arrest others and they won't be able to take action on the border because then it won't be long before the source will be exposed.

Tony Oosthuizen then arranged with NIS for a surveillance team to let the infiltrating groups come into Soweto into the heartland of South Africa and then surveil them and then arrest them while they are here and not near the border but that thing didn't work, guys got away. The police in the Western Transvaal decided that they are not going to allow this to continue, specifically after the incident at Lichtenburg.

I was present that day when Tony phoned me and he said there was a group of guys coming through Ramatlabane area because Sam Chant went to pick them up and he was going to drop them off near Ramatlabane but the police were deployed at Kopfontein and Ramatlabane and further down to the Brei area and then at Lichtenburg.

And by coincidence, pure coincidence, because the source dropped the guys off and after that he didn't phone again to say where he dropped them and there was chaos because everybody knew there was a group of four guys coming but we didn't know where they were going to be dropped. And then by pure coincidence the guys were trapped in a roadblock at Lichtenburg and they started shooting and I was in fact standing there.

Afterwards when, they didn't know how many guys were in the vehicle, but one of the guys, one of the APLA operators was standing amongst the passengers of the minibus but he had a handgrenade in his pocket and when one of the policemen started to search them he pulled the pin and there numbers of people injured, I think 12 policemen were injured on that incident, it was chaos.

The police in the Western Transvaal were furious about the fact these people were in fact infiltrated by the help of Military Intelligence and it resulted in a number of policemen being injured at a roadblock and people being killed there. There was a

Colonel Vikus Loots who felt that this should be stopped but they could not get Tony Oosthuizen under control, he continued with his operations. The next thing Sam Chant was eliminated and I was led to believe that a police hit squad went there to flatten his house.

At one stage Sam Chant's wife was arrested here near Rustenburg and all the guys who were infiltrated were also arrested. That was already the first problem. Then a number of weapons came through and it was doctored by EMLC, also through that process but it came to an end when I believe, Gene de Kock and went to kill same Chant and his family.

MR KHOISAN: While you are on that Mr Nel, do you know about an operation called: "Operation Pacman"?

MR NEL: No.

MR KHOISAN: Operation Pacman?

MR NEL: Pacman? No.

MR KHOISAN: It was an operation involving Special Forces, NIS, Counter Intelligence, Directorate Counter Intelligence and C Section and it involved the tampering with weapons, surveillance.

So in that regard let me ask you, do you Doret van der Berg?

MR NEL: I heard about her, I don't know her.

MR KHOISAN: She was connected to a privatised Counter Intelligence front company called: "Fisons".

MR NEL: I know that Counter Intelligence still have front companies, I don't know that one.

MR KHOISAN: And Tony Oosthuizen was connected to that particular thing. Tony Oosthuizen in fact is alleged to have run that operation with Doret van der Berg.

MR NEL: You see Sir, I used to get PAC reports from a very high level ... [intervention]

MR KHOISAN: But let me put it to you, because I want to deal with this scenario. The information that we have is that the teams which would comprise DCC which Tony Oosthuizen would be part of, C Section and Directorate Counter Intelligence. Now the person who told us this was on an operation like that and they would do the surveillance, follow the cars into the country until the final drop-off point where the returning guerrillas would be caching the weapons. Then they would bring in the guys from EMLC to do the doctoring of the weapons.

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Now can you discuss what you were talking about in that regard now? Does it make sense to you?

MR NEL: Ja. I thought they used National Intelligence for the surveillance operation because Tony Oosthuizen used to work for National Intelligence and he always referred to the capability of National Intelligence to do surveillance, they had very big teams.

The problem in Military Intelligence, if you try to do a surveillance operation with six or seven cars you always get compromised, you need about 20 cars. You have to leap frog and do all the right things to be able to follow somebody without being detected.

I know Tony had this problem, he did not want to have action taken against infiltrating PAC guys near the border. I was part of the police crowd who actually undermined his operation. I one night sat right through the night at Kopfontein with the police to try and intercept a call between Tony and his source from where these guys were going to be dropped off, so that we can block them at the border.

I used to inform the police in the Western Transvaal about Tony's activities because they wanted to block them before they entered Pretoria, Johannesburg, Soweto area because then the guys just disappeared. And to be honest with you, the police were more "afraid" of APLA operators than MK operators due to the general perception that APLA operators were going to act against whites and they wanted them either not coming into the country or killed or arrested.

So to my knowledge Tony organised an operation to get the guys coming in to arrange where they are dropped off and that's why he later on arranged with Chant so that Chant's wife would be the person bringing them in, so that the surveillance operation



can already start in the Western Transvaal following this vehicle in to the drop off point, then surveil then in a direction where they go to, try and find out where they have a rendezvous and then arrest them later.

It was a high risk plan because the chances of them losing these people in the process of surveillance was very high and that is why the police didn't want to buy into this, they wanted to stop the infiltration far back.

One day I became aware, and it's the first time I've ever told anybody this, the police used me as an informer on my own organisation because Tony worked for Military Intelligence and I was related to the same fraternity but there wasn't effective liaison between the police and Military Intelligence. So whenever I learnt about Tony's operations I alerted the police and they tasked me to find out more about his activities.

So one day, I can't remember the date or even the year, I think it was in '87/'88 I became aware of weapons that were going to be infiltrated into the country and these weapons were brought in to, I don't know, to a certain place where they were cached and then Tony and Flip Steenkamp and I can't remember who the other guy was from DCC, lifted these weapons, brought them to Special Forces Headquarters.

I heard about this from a friend at EMLC and I went to Special Forces Headquarters, it was a Saturday. There was a lot

of weapons there, not necessarily weapons but more specifically handgrenades, some funny stick grenades and a lot of weapons more specifically linked to PAC type. The PAC used a little bit of different weapons than MK.

CHAIRPERSON: Scorpions ...[indistinct]?

MR NEL: Ja, and Scorpions ...[indistinct]. And these things were given to EMLC but they had very little time to work with them, they had to be returned to a place where they were going to be cached. And there were a lot of ideas thrown around there about bending firing pins and changing time delays and how to change the weapon so that it actually becomes dangerous to the user but they could not take the weapons out of the system, they had to do something to it and put it back. And that was an EMLC operation between those members that I mentioned.

MR KHOISAN: While you are on Zeerust, now Trevits had target identification groups and they were work groups and you were part of a work group in Zeerust, am I correct?

MR NEL: Not for Trevits but I was part of a Special Forces liaison group. I liaised extensively with Western Transvaal, both Potchefstroom and Zeerust but not in a committee form. I know that Trevits went around sort of on a roving basis to set sort of sub-committees or sub-structures. That might be what you are referring to.

MR KHOISAN: Ja. You see in terms of that particular thing I just wanted to find out you see, because if I put it to you that somebody or that the view is that there was actually in Zeerust, that there were these specific groups that were broken down by region in terms of target development and it's put that in various parts of the country there were these groups and that they all fed into Trevits. Would that in your view be correct?

MR NEL: Ja. The police, specifically the Security Branch in the Western Transvaal, they were very good at target development. I must say, from all the police structures that I liaised with, the policemen in the Western Transvaal knew what Special Forces wanted. It was seldom necessary for me to develop a target much further.

If they give me a target I can take it like that to Special Forces and it would 99% complete because the co-operation between Special Forces and the Western Transvaal police dated back to the early '80's when they planted explosives under the seat of a car there and blew the people up. They knew that Special Forces were even interested in the name of the dog and how thick the burglar bars are and those sort of things. They would put together a target the way military people would think, because of previous experience.

The guys in the Western Transvaal like Hannes Weerman and Rudi Krouse and Colonel Vikus Loots, they fitted into the

Trevits liaison system, when Trevits was established at a later stage, very easily because Trevits was there to develop targets and they knew how to do it.

MR KHOISAN: Now how was that information - what I'm trying to get to here is that, you see we have this information about Trevits as being this entity, this target processing identification clearing house entity comprising NIS, the Security Police and Military Intelligence and other branches of the Defence Force which is of course on your side like Special Forces. What I'm trying to understand is, how did this thing break down on a regional basis because Trevits was a national structure?

MR NEL: Ja, it was a national structure.

MR KHOISAN: But now how was it sub-divided and how was that traffic of information fed back so that for instance a dossier could be activated?

MR NEL: Ja. The way I understood it, although I never served on the structures of Trevits, the way I understood it is that there was a national list of priorities and each partner of Trevits would then obtain all relevant information from their specific departments and that would be consolidated on Trevits level, almost comparable to the current Nikok structure to say all Defence Force information flows up to the representative of the SADF on Trevits level. Representatives from Trevits will go back and collect the relevant information from, for instance if

we were busy developing a target in Botswana, the SADF liaison person from Trevits would know that the most likely people who can assist him in providing information about targets in Botswana would be the DCC people working on Botswana, the Special Forces people working on Botswana, the Army Command in North West, people who have the capability to collect information and that Trevits representative from the SA Defence Force would collect all the SA Defence Force information.

Similar actions would be taken by the SAPS. The police in the Western Transvaal will feed up the information to, for instance Tom Louw who used to sit on Trevits and when Trevits would come together and say: "What is the status of progress regarding, for instance Lester Damakude" who was a high profile target in Botswana, all that information would be pooled and consolidated into the target dossier.

Parallel to Trevits due to individuals and lack of trust and rules of secrecy and a number of other things, Trevits operated here as a structure that thought it was doing all the work and consolidated everything nationally. Special Forces trampled all those good ideas by liaising directly with the police in the Western Transvaal, getting the information there firsthand, tasking their sources to update it and launch an operation even without consulting Trevits sometimes for reasons of secrecy.

MR KHOISAN: So now you have this problem here. You see in terms of what you, if I understand what you're saying then this information here about say, because Trevits was, if for instance you had to identify 20 targets, five of whom are in Mozambique, three of whom are in transit possibly coming into the country, they may be entering via. say the Kruger National Park or some place, their destination is probably Soweto and this information is processed in Trevits, then how is that brought down to the channel to activate those people, to activate the dossiers?

MR NEL: Sir, I can I ask a minute to go to the toilet, it's quite a long answer this. I'm sitting here on the edge of my seat, please.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.



CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn for about five minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHRISTO NEL: (s.u.o.)

MR MAGADLA: I think Mr Nel, for us it is almost so important to the extent that it's really crucial for us to know exactly who handled this Herschveld guy.

MR NEL: Herschveld?

MR MAGADLA: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Herschveld?

MR MAGADLA: Ja.

MR NEL: The way I understood it, I don't think it was necessarily a situation of handling, it was just a matter of good co-operation without the approval necessary of the Botswana Government. In days prior to my involvement in Botswana, from discussions with the policemen in the Western Transvaal it was clear to me that they knew Herschveld from way back.

They used to have meetings at Lobatsi from time to time for liaison purposes between the Western Transvaal Police and the Botswana Police in order to alert the Botswana Police whenever their country was going to be used as a springboard for operations or whenever there were people arrested who infiltrated through Botswana.

From time to time MK and APLA guys were arrested in Gaborone in Botswana and they were detained in Botswana and it was clear that the policemen in the Western Transvaal had access to information on the police files and they had recent photos of the guys who were detained. The photos that I saw were photos taken while the guys were in prison.

MR MAGADLA: Ja.

MR NEL: I gained the impression that at specific instances some of the policemen in the Western Transvaal even went there to question the guys, posing as if they were from the Botswana police side. In one specific instance, when the Botswana Police arrested Special Operations guys of MK, guys from Zeerust spoke

firsthand of what was said by these guys and what came out of interrogation.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I can tell you one thing, in 1986 four MK operatives were held in Botswana. Three of them were from Umtata and in fact there was a woman with them. One of them was from here in Cape Town. When I got there, because I was instructed to go and appear for them, I was quite amazed that the Transkei security policeman had been there in prison interrogating them ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Interrogating the, ja.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was accompanied by a person who was acting as a prosecutor but was also a policeman in Botswana.

MR NEL: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: That much I know because I have firsthand experience of that. I was quite amazed how it was happening at that level. It was not even, I mean Transkei was a ...[indistinct] but you know, at that level it didn't really matter.

MR NEL: I always - my interpretation of that is that Herschveld and Colonel Vikus Loots were friends. Colonel Vikus Loots was the head of Security Police in the Western Transvaal in the '80's and they spoke of him as if they knew him personally very well. So I never - because they mentioned his name in conversation, I never gained the impression that he was a source or a project. It was just a matter of that they established very good contacts and



links with him and they could extract any kind of information about MK for ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: I may have just misunderstood, I thought you did mention about payment, that they would have paid him as well but if it wasn't that then it's okay.

MR NEL: No.

MR MAGADLA: But the important thing is, where people were abducted from Botswana by the South African Police and sometimes killed, would he have known that it's his friends, Loots and Company who have done so and did nothing himself to alert that government that South African police were doing things in the country, abducting and killing some of the people there?

MR NEL: There were so many raids, some of them don't really qualify as raids but incursions into Botswana that everybody knew. When I started working in Botswana in 1986 it was no secret that we were constantly trying to locate the houses of MK guys and APLA guys and whenever we would find it out go in and do something about it.

It was always as - well, we had firsthand knowledge of how many roadblocks between Lobatsi and Gaborone and Francistown up there and sometimes in the early days the guys would come, the policemen would come and tell us: "there won't be any roadblocks tonight between there and there", as if they know long before the time.

So yes, there was undoubtedly good co-operation and Herschveld knew who was responsible for the raids, undoubtedly because we came then saying, the Security policemen would come to him and liaise with him about ANC and MK activities and it would revolve around houses of people, where they stay and details of such things ...[intervention]

MR MAGADLA: He wouldn't have reported or queried the fact that you were there without diplomatic channels having been alerted?

MR NEL: Ja, I am sure that he, they could have asked for extradition of certain people. Surely they knew that - there were so many raids that were carried out in Botswana, they knew that it was South African specialised troops and elements. It's as if Botswana had a, the Botswana police had a covert alliance with the South African police in Western Transvaal. They made it extremely difficult for MK and APLA to make use of Botswana as a method of infiltration.

MR MAGADLA: What was the relationship if you knew, between Tony Oosthuizen and Herschveld?

MR NEL: I don't know, I have no idea and if there were, the police would have destroyed that relationship if anything like that existed because they were not supporting Tony Oosthuizen's ideas at all. I do not know of any relationship or any co-operation between Tony Oosthuizen and anybody in Botswana.

MR MAGADLA: So in letting things happen as they did, one would maybe justify it in saying that Herschveld's loyalty was more towards the South African police than his own government, in terms of letting things happen that his government did not know were happening with his consent or with his collaboration?

MR NEL: Ja, with somebody else in that position it would have been much more difficult for the South African Forces to operate in Botswana. Maybe by means of his omissions, what he did not do, made it easier for the South Africans to operate there.

MR MAGADLA: Now what about AZAPO, did you have any targets in AZAPO and if not, why? If you did, who were the targets and what were they doing that caused you to target them?

MR NEL: I think, to be quite honest with you today Sir, we focused our attention to such an extent on MK that AZAPO and to a large extent also APLA became of lessor importance. We had inferior knowledge about those structures. Maybe the police can say otherwise, they had informers in PAC and specifically in Botswana there were a number of the guys belonging to the BCMA and structures like that. It was totally infiltrated by the police.

It was never seen as the threat to waste effort on. It was never seen a structure that can pose a threat to national security to such an extent that it will take over the government. We were focused on SACP/MK as our primary responsibility.

MR MAGADLA: If somebody were to suggest that the fact that there was no focus on AZAPO was because AZAPO was a project of some policeman or the Security Force people or Military Intelligence?

MR NEL: If so, it happened before my time because where they originated from and who started it, I'm not even knowledgeable about. I never focused on it. Yes, the police had projects to infiltrate organisations, maybe even to create organisations. I won't say, I won't be surprised if it's published in the newspaper tomorrow. It's possible but I have no, absolutely no knowledge of something like that.

MR MAGADLA: None of you would have said: "Look, we've got all these priorities, we've got ANC, we've got APLA but what about AZAPO? They say they had a military wing" ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Their actions did not manifest in a way that we felt threatened by because wherever we briefed people about the threat, 99% of the time would be spent on ANC, MK and specifically focused on those elements in the SACP because it was the time of the: "Red Bear", it was a communist threat that we were dealing with. That was the music that the leaders wanted to hear, we're fighting communism. We were not fighting black consciousness and other things, we were fighting communism.

That was the buzz word that you had to sound to get authority for operations. It had to be linked to communism.

MR MAGADLA: Now you wouldn't if those policemen in Swaziland that co-operated with the South African Security Forces were bribed or paid for that?

MR NEL: People were generally talking about - if you talk strategy, about the potential to turn the PAC against the ANC, to turn internal factions within the organisation against each other, to rally support around individuals to break the organisation in two.

Our primary focus was to try and split ANC from SACP  
...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Isn't that what Jan Anton, at the time that you were in Ciskei in the last period, the 1992 era, isn't that what guys like Jan Anton Nieuwoudt were busy with in respect of Chris Hani, was to try to do some stuff like that? I believe there's documentation that exists in that respect, maybe you can talk to us a little bit about that.

MR NEL: Maybe I?

MR KHOISAN: In respect of Chris Hani, trying to suggest that they are in contact with people who are putting forth, putting to the front a notion that Hani is trying to make a comeback within MK.

MR NEL: There was constantly an effort to try and alienate the SACP from the ANC, to create, I wouldn't say a rift but a split to get the so-called doves to distance themselves from the hawks.

MR KHOISAN: No, but I'm going further, isn't it at that time that there was a big push to create some very high level recruitment - I mean, we're in 1992, at a very senior level in the ANC particularly in MK structures?

MR NEL: Ja but those people were recruited, they were even recruited before '92. '92 I think, when the armed struggle also stopped from Special Forces side with the seizure of armed struggle in 1990 from the covert structures of the RSA as well. The strategy was more into creating rifts, stirring up people against each other, trying to create a situation that will weaken the power base of the ANC and MK or SACP at the ballot box, to try and swing Winnie and Holomisa out of this scene to a different direction and steer people up against each other.

Disinformation and that kind of thing could, was easy to put into the system because of very high level collaborators that maybe weren't on that level while in exile but they rose to prominence after returning from exile, people who came and all of a sudden occupied positions right at the top of DIS in the President's office, people who could leak the Cabal(?) document or to create the impression that a Cabal existed. That was a very strong topic at the time, 1992/'93, the Cabal. I don't know

whether you are aware of that but Henry van der Westhuizen, Anton Nieuwoudt, actually the whole machinery of DCC was working a situation of creating or confirming that Cabal existed and I don't know how Vula fits into that or how Vula lent credibility to that but it all worked to a scenario that there are elements within the ANC, MK, SACP, that were not necessarily walking the road of negotiations and wanted to have the APC's driving through the streets of Pretoria.

MR KHOISAN: Isn't it that some of those people, very high ranking people, were either compromised or compromised people during Operation Vula at the time that it was busted?

MR NEL: I would agree that it must have happened by means of well-placed informers to expose Vula because as we know Vula was hand picked people, it was not a free for all and those who were in Vula who spilt the beans about Vula to the Security Police and to the military were trusted individuals. The person who can elaborate about the identities of these people, I would suggest it would be Henry van der Westhuizen, he's the best guy to speak to.

MR KHOISAN: And what about Brand Visagie?

MR NEL: I don't know him.

MR KHOISAN: Oh, okay.

MR NEL: Is he a policeman or in the military?

MR KHOISAN: No, he's a former policeman who worked C Section, Natal.

MR NEL: In Natal?

MR KHOISAN: He worked with Hentie Botha, those guys.

MR NEL: Ja, but Henry worked very close with Hentie and those people but Henry focused his attention on DIS and via the people in DIS he managed to expand his coverage on that level because people, I don't know. After their return from exile many people, it was apparently easy to buy people. People who returned now, wanted to start up the good life and they needed money to set themselves up, buy cars and furniture and all that.

People were bought in that time, that was how... [intervention]

MR MAGADLA: Maybe just another scenario. There had been talk that just before the ANC was unbanned, when people were returning, there had been meetings where Security Branch were involved and possibly Military Intelligence, that as soon as these people come back, that is now MK, there would be problems with their joining the army and they would destitute and they would be wanting to fit into society like all the other people who were in the country, they would be but very much in need of means of livelihood, for example money and that the best was to infiltrate them.

Certain people had been trained and made ready to do just that, infiltrating them in the sense and for the purpose that people



would go to them and say: "Look guys, you are trained, you are armed but you haven't got money but we have money for you because we have got plans already ready made because we knew you were coming, we knew we would need only your expertise, your experience and your training. Now here are the plans, there is a bank at such and such a place and we get there, this is how we get there, this is how the set-up is there. We have already liaised or we have already made contact with some people inside and this how", then they would go and hit that bank with the knowledge of the Security Branch or some Military Intelligence people and then they would hit that bank, go to a place where they would be sharing money and then at that point the informer would leave as if he's going to pass water or something and then the police would just come in there, shoot everybody. The money is there, the arms are there, and steal the most of that money for their own projects where they were preparing for the resistance to the elections or the new democracy, to develop those coffers there.

So they say this thing - in fact, after that information had come there was a spate of these kinds of robberies where MK were involved and were killed and all the time, either before they would alight from a kombi at the bank's premises, then the police would just spring up from nowhere and they would all be shot and there would arrests, there'd be all sorts of things there. And it

happened many a time immediately after. There was a spate of that and it went on, it went on, and it stopped. Now can you comment on that situation, on that thing?

MR NEL: I have never - such things are shocking to hear. I have read about such things coming out of the Eugene de Kock trial, about five guys who were killed in a similar type of incident as you described now. It is possible that Askaris set up such scenarios or situations. To my knowledge it was not, it was never a type of operation that for instance the CCB or Special Forces or somebody like that, we had no intentions or any task or anything like that to do, certain operations like that.

What we did contemplate at one stage was that it was sort of an open secret that APLA guys robbed vehicles and banks for fund-raising purposes, it was, according to guys who were arrested, their testimony or they admitted during questioning to that effect, that Askaris got involved in such activities afterwards, knowing that they have the protection of the police now, pretending that such an operation is going to be, is done on the initiative of MK guys or APLA guys but in fact it could be their own initiative. It's now evident that some elements inside Eugene de Kock's grouping did operate that way but military people, I am not aware of any such operations in the military. The CCB also to my knowledge, never gathered funds in that way. Maybe we were fortunate in that sense that the government gave

us the money to carry out operations, we never had to do it in that way.

MR MAGADLA: Because those things did happen in KwaZulu Natal to the extent that recently this man, Siphiso Nkabinda, you will have heard of him, he is talking about some ANC members of the leadership who condoned robberies conducted by their own MK people.

Now we know of one guy who was infiltrated into the ANC as a policeman, into MK abroad, who went to train in Russia, came back and was the link man between the would be robbers and the banks and the police and they did about three jobs or four big jobs with MK guys. And he would go to his handler and say: "We are going to rob such and such a place tomorrow", and they did rob those places and they got killed some of them but he always escaped.

When information about him came that he was the person, he was also killed himself by somebody, we don't know. I'm therefore saying that that one is not only a likelihood that it would have happened, it's something that did happen.

MR NEL: My experience was, if you got involved, anybody who gets involved in a bank robbery, he gets confronted by policemen who are far outside the group of people who used to be involved in countering the ANC. Now you're dealing with normal policemen with a docket who want to solve a case and you're

going to be in for the high-jump because you're going to be treated as a criminal.

Anybody who conducted such operations must either have been a policeman with good police friends to orchestrate something like that for personal gain. And those people I regard as criminals who acted on their own ticket without, that was never part of any strategy that I am aware of and if it was I hope it's exposed someday. But I can't believe that - yes, sometimes your sources would be characters from the lower parts of society and they could be criminals themselves involved in such activities.

MR MAGADLA: Now what I'm saying would be as simple as this, not that there would be other policemen who do not know that such a thing was planned, this would be planned in conjunction with murder and robbery who would be the only ones who would know that there is going to be that robbery, who are the only ones who would be near that scene so that when it happens they are there, they know they are part of that plan.

That was what information told us.

MR NEL: I was shocked to see that that was part of C Section's method of operations. It was to my knowledge never any **modus operandi** of any military structure.

MR KHOISAN: But then you know, that's now the other part of it you see, the Krappies Engelbrecht example, the loss of the - how shall I say, the alleged loss of the Ribeiro docket by Suiker

Britz, the fiasco of an investigation into the incident that is being discussed on the table here which is the Carousel incident, the robbery at the Carousel and a wide range of investigative bungles, including the Guguletu-7 matter, where we have heard testimony in public about just real trashy investigations which would obfuscate the role of for instance Vlakplaas.

And then your own Region 6 which you know, had connections to Murder and Robbery, Brixton Murder and Robbery squad to be quite correct, in terms of the CCB. First I'm putting that picture together. Therefore it is not a big leap. I'm trying to put to you, I'm trying to ask you know, would it be correct to assume that some of these people who were part of these structures could have got involved in some of these freelancing activities, since we are talking about the period of mandate? Because there are allegations for instance of black cash operations.

You say that the CCB was paid for totally by the government but there are allegations of black cash operations. I think allegations specifically involving Pieter Botes in respect of the CCB, ivory smuggling. There are allegations about arms smuggling by CCB fellows in that period. So can you maybe broaden it, develop the point for us? I mean, it's not something that ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Ja, surely in the activities of the CCB a number of illegal activities did take place, smuggling for instance, smuggling, as I explained earlier, in drugs, in ivory, for the purposes of establishing networks but when we deal on the point of bank robberies I find it very difficult to believe that such high risk operations could be conducted internally knowing that the CCB stood outside the direct co-operation with the police services.

I don't over-estimate the capability of the CCB, I'm actually sometimes very embarrassed by its inability or its, the fact that it wasn't such a potent organisation, that they didn't do as many things as what they are suspected of being involved in. But surely, you might have a corrupt individual or you might have somebody with the idea in his mind that could be part of a discrediting operation to say: Alright, let's get, by means of our man who is in a SDU structure or in an MK cell somewhere, get them to organise a bank robbery, get them arrested or killed in the process and it will be on the front page of the newspapers to say: MK caught in the act of stealing, of robbing a bank.

MR MAGADLA: That's just what happened exactly.

MR NEL: That is possible. I am not aware of such operations but it can go through in somebody's ideas of discrediting as a possible type of operation.

MR KHOISAN: Do you know of a furniture company that was a front company that operated in respect of Botswana? I think it was Barn - do you know of any specific furniture company that was used as a front company by Military Intelligence?

MR NEL: No, I'm not aware of such a company.

MR KHOISAN: Have you ever heard of Harmen Furnishers, Verwoerdburg?

MR NEL: Who?

MR KHOISAN: Harmen? No, I have never heard that name before Sir.

MR KHOISAN: And you never heard in that context, Gary Dixon or Allan Sole?

MR NEL: No. What's that first name Sir?

MR KHOISAN: Gary Dixon.

MR NEL: Dixon?

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR NEL: There was a small former Rhodesian guy in the CCB in the Logistics Department, that had the name Dixon. I can't confirm whether it's Harry or Gary or whatever but I just know Dixon, which is not a very common name.

MR KHOISAN: And where was he operating, in which region was he operating?

MR NEL: No, he was a logistic guy, he was the support department. Whenever you needed logistic support then they supplied it.

MR KHOISAN: So that would be a Region 10?

MR NEL: Ja, ja, the head office logistics ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Do you know of any links that Plate Glass might have, do you know of any people who may have worked in Plate Glass using that legitimate cover in Plate Glass as a cover for DMI activities?

MR NEL: Not using Plate Glass, PG Glass as a cover. I'm aware of somebody who worked for that company without the knowledge of his company as a co-operative in Botswana but ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Did you connect with that particular person or company yourself?

MR NEL: No. I am aware of links that were established with a person. He was a South African travelling across the border on a regular basis but I don't know of his involvement. I think he later moved to Everite, he was not with PG Glass anymore.

MR KHOISAN: But he used his connections to PG Glass without their knowledge? PG Glass had no ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Ja, well he was employed by ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: But they had no idea they were employing a DMA operative?



MR NEL: No, no, not to my knowledge.

MR MAGADLA: Just finally, did you know anything about Walus?

MR NEL: No. I read about him in the newspaper. I heard before his arrest, quite some time before his arrest, I drew a possible link between an incident that happened between Eugene de Kock and a foreign national which was claimed to be from Polish background, where they shot at each other. It was outside Pretoria. I can't remember on which road. And then when I later learnt about Walus I thought it was the same person but I later learnt that that other person was in fact German, not Polish. I don't know Walus, I've never heard of him.

MR MAGADLA: Thank you.

MR NEL: There are many guns for hire.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask a few questions? Last time I think you spoke about something which you were following up because part of our mandate is to make recommendations as to how we can prevent abuses of human rights from occurring in the future and that therefore also leads us into knowing what is happening in the present which may be a throwback into the past, so that we can shape the future to be correct place to at and which is why we are going to be calling Lappies Labuschagne quite shortly but partly because some of the things that he is associated with are things that took place in the mandate period

but also because we have had a brief from the Minister of Safety and Security to do some investigations into some of his activities.

Now you talked about something that you were monitoring, "Boerweermag" and it was quite interesting for me against the backdrop of what you had said, to read in the newspapers what had happened Tempe - is it Tembe?, Tempe. I don't know whether you are in a position to talk about that as part of that or whether you'd rather not say anything about it now.

MR NEL: Ja, I just during the break allowed my legal representative to listen to a message on my cellphone that I received from a certain Mr Niemuller.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know him yes, that's the man you mentioned.

MR NEL: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: In connection with that thing.

MR NEL: He is currently involved in a very elaborate right-wing plan and he is undoubtedly linked to what happened at Bloemfontein. I have submitted a lengthy report and a blueprint of his plan to my higher headquarters, General Motau(?). The people who were arrested there were arrested based on intelligence provided by my section and I'm quite proud to say that. The police had no idea what was going on there, they were compiling Nkapla(?) reports until we informed them about this

specific Mr Swanepoel who is a direct link, has a direct link to Niemuller.

CHAIRPERSON: In fact when it happened, I thought about what you had told us and when the arrest took place and the recoveries were made I was quite positive that you may have had something to do with providing the intelligence.

MR NEL: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you had said it well ahead of time, exactly in fact as ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Ja, he's now like somebody jumping - he's waiting for his arrest but he's trying to pull me down with him because we were together in the CCB ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Who's that, Niemuller?

MR NEL: Niemuller. He leaves messages because he knows National Intelligence will be listening to his telephone. He's leaving me messages that he met with the leadership and he needs to meet with me urgently to explain to him certain things, because we called him in a few times for official consultation and then I played a game with him to make friends with him, winking the eye and saying I was also in the CCB you know, and, and, and, and he confided in me a number of things.

When these guys were arrested in Bloemfontein the families of those people phoned him demanding R60 000 for legal aid for those people and they claim that as a direct result of his meeting

that he had in Bloemfontein he incited them to go over into this act. But this is a very wide thing, it covers nationally. It's a matter of time. We're waiting for the thing to build up, to build up to see who the bigger fishes are. He is more or less, on national organisation level those guys are just small regional elements. But I think that is maybe not - that will act as a deterrent for others, hopefully.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja. And this Nkapla thing?

MR NEL: Nkapla has been with us for a long time and there are people who will their necks on a block that Nkapla and others who don't even want to read the papers ... [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: But why do you think Lavisia, I have my own views about Lavisia incidentally. Lavisia was a member of the Security Police in Umtata so I was quite surprised that he became the National Commissioner, but then that's something else, but why do you think he gives credence to that? I mean he's the person who had appointed Lappies incidentally, to go and do that which Suiker Britz was found not to be competent to do. Now you take Suiker Britz away, you put in Lappies, it just doesn't make sense.

MR NEL: Maybe he's a very naive person or he was just a messenger.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, so was General Meiring in the Army.

MR NEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe he was too naive, maybe he?

MR NEL: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't believe that he's ...[intervention]

MR NEL: No, I do not know - what happened was, shortly after the incident the police came to us and they said that they have a high level source, an informer, who was a member of the service brigade and they want to take him from Zerotech(?) where this guy was busy with a course, to take him down to Bloemfontein because he said these weapons were stolen by Nkapla and they know, they're going to get this information.

They gave the guy a cellphone and three days later they were still looking for him. He just needed transport maybe down to Bloemfontein or something ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: And a cellphone.

MR NEL: And a cellphone. Nothing came of it. And based on that they generated this. I find it quite interesting that, I think Nkapla is a creation of somebody, some very creative informer.

CHAIRPERSON: Is Vusi Mbatha also associated with Nkapla?  
The same guy ...[intervention]

MR NEL: Apparently - I never saw, I managed to get hold of the Meiring Report last week for the first time, to see what's in it. It is the link, they say Nkapla is apparently the military wing of the UDM. They link it to Holomisa. You can link it to anything if you have a great imagination Sir, but it comes from all

over, from Western Cape, from Eastern Cape, from Northern Cape, from all over the reports come in, Nkapla, Nkapla, Nkapla.

I think maybe there are some disgruntled individuals who latched onto this name which was the creation of somebody and it was published in the newspaper and those who didn't know what to call themselves, they said: "Okay, we're Nkapla" but it is individuals. There is no organisation, there's no executive committee. I never found a man sitting in front of me stating that: "I am Nkapla for that branch of that organisation", or anything. According to me Nkapla is something that existed on paper.

What I was told by a specific senior member of Military Intelligence is that a person wanted to test his collaborator and he knew this guy was fabricating stories, so he told him: "I hear stories about an organisation called Nkapla working in this township and I hear that this guy and that guy is involved", that informer came back and he reported long reports about Nkapla while handler just created something fictitious to test the guy. They guy failed the test and he fired him but Nkapla existed because the same guy went to report to other guys about this. That is maybe how it started.

CHAIRPERSON: It looks like Vusi Mbatha, it sounds like him. Now you mentioned something like - you said, in the Eastern Cape there was a resistance movement, was this Ilisolomzi?

MR NEL: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Now we have heard reports, in fact we were testing reports or information that suggested that APLA had been infiltrated to a large degree, that in fact the most sensational attacks, St James and that were as a consequence of infiltration either by MI or by police structures and that those targets were selected by those groups of people. And you know the argument was that, if you look at those operations they have the same patterns but what's more it's a matter of hours before these people get arrested, it's as though it was known by the police. In fact one of the victims here in the Heidelberg Inquiry, I will never forget the inquiry, but one of the victims there was making strong the argument that the police (a) didn't seem to have done anything although they seemed to have been able to arrest these people within a short period of time, a matter of hours and he was making the insinuation and suggestion that they must have known about it but they allowed it to happen because they wanted to discredit the PAC.

Now, I don't know whether you are aware of APLA infiltration to that extent, quite apart from what you have mentioned as having been the infiltration of the PAC as such through Sam Chant in Botswana and all that.

MR NEL: I am aware that Military Intelligence and the police had informers on I would say, the highest level in the PAC. When

I was in the Ciskei, Henry van der Westhuizen passed information on to me because I was a bit isolated and I paid them money in Pretoria to pass it on to me and I received reports that really surprised me, that came out of, I would say national executive level meetings where only small groups of people were present and I do not know who those individuals are.

I know that Tony Oosthuizen handled one or two of the people who returned from exile who initially worked very close to Sabelo Pama in Tanzania. I know of - the type of reports that I saw back then, it was in a very close friendship sort of circle around Sabelo Pama that that person reported and later on when that person returned from exile or those persons, I do not know, the information that they passed on was of a very high strategic planning level. It is possible that people in that kind of position could have misled individuals at the bottom, sending them on missions that would be destructive for the PAC. I have no evidence to that effect, it would be better to ask the people that I mentioned now.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, Henry van der Westhuizen? Anton Nieuwoudt, would he know anything about it?

MR NEL: I doubt it.

CHAIRPERSON: Would he have handled anybody within APLA?

MR NEL: No, Tony Oosthuizen was the guy who handled the guys there.



MR KHOISAN: But didn't Jan Anton Nieuwoudt request authorisation to recruit a senior member of the APLA High Command in 1992 and didn't he get authorisation for that?

MR NEL: I don't know Sir.

MR KHOISAN: And didn't he - he was called Special Agent Fox at that time, right? Correct?

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Correct. And he had made his request to Wildscher(?)

MR NEL: Let me put it - while I was down in the Ciskei an old friend of mine, Jimmy Nieuwoudt, came down once or twice. There was also another guy called Franz Smit and there was a funny operation going on and they didn't want me to know but they knew I was going to find out that they were in my area, so they had to come and liaise with me and say: "Hello, howzit, I'm just here to see somebody", but they were there to do other things. From the Security Branch in East London I learnt, because the Security Branch in East London also had very good contacts with PAC people, I learnt that these guys came down from Pretoria to do certain operations with APLA guys and there were specific rumours after the limpet mine in the Wimpy in Queenstown, that this was an operation that was done to give credibility to some of their sources but it was a rumour. I do not

know what the extent of that operation was. It could have been related to APLA operations and misguided APLA operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, talking just again about infiltration.

There have been claims and there have been denials about how IDASA was a front company, really a front for Military Intelligence, how far do you know if this is true or not?

MR NEL: No, if it was, it was a well kept secret. The conservative element in the Security Forces, I wouldn't say, hated IDASA, they did not approve of what IDASA was doing. Surely a lot of rumours developed around: "Die Vrye Weekblad" newspaper as being somebody's front, IDASA as being somebody's front. Whenever there was something in the middle that was doing manipulation work, was channelising people, there was always this suspicion but I've no information to that effect.

MR KHOISAN: No further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Well, Mr Malan and Mr Nel, it just remains for me to say thank you very much for having come. I am quite confident in my own mind that these two days of sharing views and perspectives about what the past was in relation to the sort of work that you have been doing have increased our understanding of what was going on. As you know, in the intelligence world everything is always a shifting mirror, it's very illusive but I think my interests and your interests are now to make sure that we can hopefully have a country in which, perhaps

not us but our children certainly will be able to live with relative safety and in a society where they can find a basis to relate and I think for us in the TRC that is the most important thing. It's not the now and the past, it's the future.

MR NEL: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: So that when we get detractors in the form of sometimes some newspapers that do not want to see that there is a purpose in having this process because an alternative to this process possibly wouldn't have worked as much as this one is hopefully going to work.

So when we do get people like yourselves at a high risk, not only to yourselves but also to your profession and everything else which hangs in the balance because there will be people out there who will take the view that they must gang up against you because you are co-operative and create an impression to those who would sustain your employment, that you are doing what you are doing because you are being true to die, you are not to be trusted and therefore should not be made to secure a future. I would hope that if it is or if it lies with us to make the appropriate recommendations we should bear that in mind and we will do our part.

I remember I said to Rig Verster in a British prison: "If it lies with me to do whatever I have to do I will do it just to your part. He did his part as far as I'm concerned, I did my part. He

is now back in the country. I do not know what he is doing. He has not come to see me longer than I had thought that he would but we have seen other, he came to my office. So all I'm saying is thank you very much for sharing that part of the past that you were part of with us and we would hope that we should be able to reflect some of your thinking, not only in our reports as the Investigative Unit but some of it might find itself into the final report as a statement of the reality of the past. Thank you very much.

MR NEL: Thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: These proceedings are adjourned.

HEARING ADJOURNS

