

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONSECTION 29 HEARINGSIN CAMERA

DATE: 18-05-98

PLACE: CAPE TOWN

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CHAIRPERSON: Ladies and gentlemen we are going to start, we should have started a long time ago. I am sorry about the slight delay. There are logistical problems that are usually associated with the TRC, especially on a Monday morning. But I suppose it is "Blou Maandag" for everybody

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Welcome all of you to this Section 29. It is for me to say I am pleased that Mr Kobus Malan has been able to obtain Mr Christo Nel to come to this Section 29 process. A Section 29 is an inquiry held in terms of Section 29, and which is a process provided for by the Act and it is by its nature an in camera process. And the information that is sought to be gathered in terms of this process is confidential and remains confidential until and unless it is the view of the Commission that it should be made public.

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In the event that this is so, usually in terms of Section 13 the parties who will be affected adversely thereby get an opportunity to make representations. And the finding that is going to be made it is made in circumstances where such

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TRC/WESTERN CAPE

representations have been made, legal representation and such representations having been accorded to the person who needs to make such representations.

However, for the moment the information gathering process is in terms of Section 29 and all the provisions of Section 29 apply. I need to say that all the members of the Commission, that includes the translators and the recorder were all sworn to confidentiality and if there is anyone of the recorder and the translators who has not been sworn in to confidentiality that process should be done as soon as possible. But I am of the view that all of you have been sworn in, in terms of the Act. The provision in Section 29 does say only members of the Commission and their staff ought to be and will be permitted to attend these proceedings. So as we are, it is only those members, including of course the witness and their legal representatives.

The Commission is drawing to an end and in the process of investigating matters which we are mandated to do. We have heard several hearings, both in private and in public. One of the hearings that we have heard have been the Armed Forces Hearings and I must say it has been most disquieting to us, especially in the investigative unit and generally in the Commission to find that there was a disturbing trend that one was able to identify in the manner in which testimonies came. Political leaders, especially political leaders of the past government tended to seek to blame

all that happened in the past on the operatives. People who were doing the work. And it was always our view that those people who were operatives were acting on instructions. But we are astounded when political leaders came here and sought to portray the operatives as having been mavericks, as having been people who have been a few bad apples and as people who were acting on a frolic of their own. I daresay we were finding it extremely difficult in the Commission to believe that men and women who were performing acts which we were able to find evidence of in the State Security Council minutes as having been instructions for ~~them now to be denounced by their political leaders in testimonies~~

before us as having been a few bad apples, is leaving us totally infatuous.

We have also found very amazing when some of the generals who came to give us evidence here have pretended that ~~those acts that took place in which operatives are identified, took~~ place because the operatives were doing things that they ought not to have done or things that they knew they ought not to have done because the attitude of the previous government and the armed forces and the security forces was that people should not ~~commit illegal acts. Again we have found from the testimonies of~~ people like de Kock, that in fact this was sacrificing operatives at the altar of political experience. And it is therefore our view that those persons who were operatives in the security forces and who

are ready and willing to come and give evidence on what they did both inside and outside the country must be commended. Because what underlies the whole spirit and tone of the work of the Commission in their objectives and mission is that truth must be exposed so that via the truth we should be able to reconstruct our society on the basis that we are able to say things that happened should never happen again in the future. And we can only do so if we have a fair idea of what happened. The one thing that one does not want in the investigative unit is going to make sure that those things do not happen, is that operatives were carrying out ~~orders from their seniors, should be sacrificed and should be~~ made the fall guise. We shall not allow that.

And as I understand the position, it is in the spirit as I have indicated that Mr Nel is going to testify today that he is ready and willing. And in fact had been always ready and willing to ~~indicate the extent of his involvement that it may well be that he~~ has not been able to do so thus far. Because of certain considerations which had nothing to do with the exposure of truth and nothing to do with the mission of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

~~And in that background therefore let me just say a few~~ ground rules. We will be meeting hopefully until very early towards the end of the day today. If we go as far as lunch time lunch will be served at one and we will resume at two. There will

be a tea break between eleven and half past eleven. And further than that I would like to consider that these proceedings are now on and subject to what Mr Kobus Malan would like to say as way of preliminary remarks or his client would like to say. I would first ask Mr Malan to put himself on record and then thereafter I would ask Commissioner Rasket to swear your client in before he testifies.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairman I would like to thank you that you reiterated the position that we are in regarding the confidentiality of this Section 29 proceedings. I am here on behalf of Mr Nel, instructed by the State Attorney via the nodal point of the SA Defence Force. We would like to - or the new SA Defence Force. We would like to reiterate our position as we pointed out to Mr Khoisan on an informal basis as well as Mr Magadhla on Friday. That on a legal basis the client was advised not to volunteer information regarding trans-border operations. The necessity for this was borne out of a legal view point and not out of a view that it is not to give his full cooperation with this hearing.

After discussions and to show the trust that both myself and the client have in this Committee we decided to take this Committee in our confidence on the basis that nevertheless that this Committee cannot guarantee amnesty for trans-border operations we will still do so. Merely for the sake to give this

Committee the opportunity to get first hand information. If any information during the course of this day is divulged by my client it is not that he is willing to abandon the privileges attached to his rights. It is merely to assist you in reaching certain view points or clearer information. And it is in that light that we would greatly like to assist you. But it is not in any, for any moment be construed or regarded as an admission to the facts that he will be able to testify. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Malan. I would like merely to say that this panel accepts that disclaimer. In fact it accepts that ~~the testimony that your client will give us in so far as it relates to~~

~~those extra-territorial activities, will not be construed by us as a waver of his rights relevant to whatever might arise in the future.~~

If it does arise. Let me again state like I stated to other operatives who came before us, that from the point of view of

~~this enquiry and from the point of view of the Commission there~~

is no way that evidence that has been collected in the process of this Commission and this country arriving at a fair understanding of the issues, there is no way that, that evidence will be traded with other countries or with other jurisdictions. We are

~~embarking on a process, certainly this unit is embarking on a~~

process of trying to get an understanding of the issues that happened in the mandatory. And as I say I can give my own personal assurance and I am certain that it would be the

Commission's position that none of the information gathered in this process is going to be made available to other jurisdictions. But I say that in addition to my accepting your disclaimer and the indication that whatever is being said by Mr Nel in these proceedings will not have to be construed as a waiver of his rights, all of which are reserved. And I accept that. And without further ado therefore I shall ask Commissioner Rasket to swear Mr Nel in.

HENDRIK CHRISTOFFEL NEL: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khoisan?

~~MR KHOISAN: Yes. Thank you Commissioner and thank you Mr~~

Nel for coming here. Good morning to you. Okay. I trust that all the arrangements that have been made in respect of your stay in Cape Town have been to your satisfaction and that it has been okay. If there are any problems you experience I hope you will indicate to us, okay.

Mr Nel in respect of this particular hearing you have received an invitation, an invitation that this all of 13 questions, all of which are interlinked to a wide range of information that you can see there we are searching for. And since you have come here today to join us to participate in this process I want to give you the opportunity before we go forward with the enquiry to, if you have one, I give you the opportunity to make any prepared

statement or anything that you want to read into the record. We would give you that opportunity now.

MR NEL: Mr Chair, other Commissioners thank you for the opportunity. I have not prepared any specific presentation as such. I came here with an open mind and with all the knowledge that I have to offer to the Commission. I already testified in the hearings in East London about the Bisho massacre where half of my testimony dwelled on the issue around the CCB. I then indicated to Advocate Denzil Potgieter that I would be very willing to come and assist any investigation and to come for follow up hearings at a later stage. Because I felt that only the tip of the iceberg is known and I share that expression by the Chairman about the Indians standing in front of the firing squad at this stage while the chiefs are in fact turning their backs and looking the other way.

~~I am a serving member of the National Defence Force at~~  
this stage. I am a colonel in the intelligence community. And I am proud to be in the National Defence Force. I however feel that my career is hanging on a very thin line because of the fact that I have a history that everything is not known. And therefore there are certain perceptions that we were in fact those mavericks. And that I am a maverick and that I am still involved in some dirty work. Because of the blame being dwindled down onto us. And I grab this opportunity with both hands to come here and explain



certain things. I am concerned that the time is not enough. There are so many things that need to be said. I am not sure what of those things you already know but I would like to tell you everything that I know. I am your witness, you can ask me anything that you want to. I will, I have to ask for advice from my legal representative where I feel that I might implicate people across the borders, but even that without necessarily divulging all the detail and names and places I am willing to give you evidence that can clear certain uncertainties about things. And therefore I want to volunteer and make myself available to any questions that you - even outside the scope of the 13 or 14 questions that were put to me.

But I would like to make something clear. I was a captain in 1988 when I had to resign to join the CCB and I can only offer you information that I can testify under oath about. I cannot testify, unfortunately I cannot tell you everything about the CCB because it was a cell structure. I do not wish to disappoint you by saying I do not know but if I say I do not know it is because I do not know. It is not because I would like to hide something from you. If you treat my information as that at a level of a captain with various higher ranking officers on top of me. But as a captain I knew a lot of things and I am willing to tell you that. Thank you.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Just by way of introduction Mr Nel or would you prefer that we address you as Colonel Nel? Because we may do that as we go along because that is your rank actually. Maybe just so that the panel here can get a quick understanding of your background. Maybe you could sketch us a quick *curriculum vitae*, maybe going through the earlier periods in Namibia up to the time that you were involved in the CCB. And maybe take us through to your stint in Directorate Covert Collection to where you are now. But a quick run through so that we can get into the substantive enquiry and also as a way that ~~for the panel to understand the breadth of your involvement in the~~

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South African Defence Force, the then South African Defence Force and now SANDF.

MR NEL: I have asked for a board for purposes of showing certain things. Structures and things might become blurred if we ~~talk about them in the air. And this might take a while to explain~~ to you exactly but I think it is very important to understand where Chris Nel came from, why he ended up where he ended up in CCB and why this whole argument of mavericks doing their own thing cannot stand further if I explain to you this.

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~~I am just going to move. Can everybody hear me here?~~

There is another mike here, sorry. We were taught  
(...intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Mr Nel could you please switch off the other mike thank you?

MR NEL: I will switch it off. Can you hear me now?

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR NEL: When I joined the South African Defence Force in 1978 I came out of a schooling of the total onslaught already out of school where members from the Defence Force and other people came to visit us at school and taught us these things about an enemy called Communism. I was already prepared about the way people wanted me to be prepared at that stage. And when I joined the SADEF it was because of my own free will. I wanted to

do that. I was committed. My whole family was committed towards that. And out of a 1200 new recruits in Grahamstown, 24 of us were selected after extensive selection to go to the school of infantry. And I felt my self one of a selected few, 24 out of 1200 more or less.

We went to infantry school to the junior leadership training which was regarded as the elite training for young leaders at that stage. Out of my company which was Echo company in 1978 220 odd people did not make that course. Less than half of us made the course. So if you project that back on the initial 24 out of the 1200 only 12 of us made it. And I did not even make it completely because I did not become an officer straight away. They made me an NCO - a non commissioned officer.

Then our company was called to a conference room and we were national servicemen, roughly about 180 of us. And they told us they want the first group of intelligence operatives to come out of this group. They needed us all but some of the guys volunteered to go to special forces and other places. But the majority of us then were sort of under the obligation to go to intelligence because it is what the country expected from you to do. The leadership said we wanted you there. I was proud to be selected again.

We went to Pretoria and on a little "koppie" there we were ~~secretly trained to be intelligence operators. We were thereafter~~  
sent to Namibia straight away because the instructor who came to address us was a certain Major Dan Kersal. And his introductory words will remain with me forever. He said:

~~"This story that people tell you that there is a communist behind every bush is nonsense. There are~~  
in fact two."

Nineteen year old student preparing for operational duty, that is psyching up people to want to go to war.

Anyway I ended up in Oshikati in 1978, in 1979 more or ~~less in May as a corporal. That very same major was promoted to~~  
a lieutenant colonel or a commandant at that stage, Dan Kershof and he became the chief of intelligence in Oshikati. The person that I met there as the officer commanding of sector 10 was a

certain colonel who later became a brigadier Kat Liebenberg. And there I said the names which will come up repetitively further on if you follow the story.

And this was called the so-called Western Front (sketches on board) and there was a structure there with battalions fighting a border against detachments of SWAPO. There was never any doubt in anybody's mind sitting in Oshikati that this was a full blown war. But the only lack in my knowledge and experience was the training in the laws of war. That I knew nothing about but everything about intelligence work and infantry work I knew a lot about. ~~But the law of combat and international law was never~~ taught to me. I had never questioned anybody's mandate to fight a war. It was expected for me to do certain things and I did it loyally.

I soon became a sergeant and at that stage there was Kat Liebenberg as the Officer Commanding. ~~The person that took over~~ from him was Witkop Bardenhorst. I remained there and I became an officer in 1982. At that stage I was playing intelligence operative. I used to work in the processing department. And in 1982 when I became an officer I was placed at the POW camp to do ~~interrogation questioning.~~ Because I knew SWAPO at that stage very well. After working in the processing department for quite a while at that stage.

I at that stage was not permanent force. I was only short term. It was a stepping stone how they managed to get national servicemen into the full time force with a lolly put in front of you of a bonus system of a R1500 a year bonus at that stage was a lot of money. And a lot of us joined the short term service system shortly after that to be converted into the long term service system. But people were selected and there were definite influences on you to say you should join the permanent force, you are the right criteria type of person that we want.

And I was playing for the pavilion. I was part of the system. There were certain rights and certain wrongs and I was doing the right things at that stage. After I became in 1982 in the process of not sure whether I want to join permanent forces or not I first went and studied fine arts. A bit of a contradiction but deep down in me there is an artist and somebody who wanted to be an artist. But my dad was not willing to sponsor me studying something that gays normally do in that perception of people at that stage. I anyway, I left in 1982 in February and I started at Potch University and three months later I could not make it. I had problems to adapt and I went back. Straight back to Oshikati again. I was welcomed with open hands, "Welcome back, we knew you were going to be back." Because there is a certain thing that happens up here that makes young people think differently. They feel responsibility towards their country first of all. And while

there is a war going on how can I sit at home and do nothing? How can I study and do nothing about the problems of the Red Monster going to eat up my country?

After Bardenhorst came a certain general by the name of I J M Joubert, Joop Joubert. I am sure the name is familiar to you. He was Officer Commanding after that. And I served in Oshikati in the POW camp and I became the youngest person to be placed in command of the POW camp. The job was normally that of a major and with the rank of lieutenant they appointed me as the POW camp commander. And in that period I interrogated roughly about two thousand people of the local population and roughly about I would guess four, five hundred captured SWAPO guerillas. We were a handful of people with an overload of work.

I worked very close with the other people who were also up there. The SAP veiligheid and the (...indistinct) guys and Koevoet being the primary part of the war. And there were generals like Sterkhans Dreyer but Skoon, he was a brigadier, I think he was a brigadier at that stage. Specifically in the time of Joubert Skoon and Joubert formed an alliance that was very strong. And in 1985 General Joubert was transferred to the Eastern Front or the Central and Eastern Front in Pretoria where he became the Officer Commanding of Special Forces. But before him Kat Liebenberg. Kat Liebenberg came from Sector 10 to Special Forces. After Kat Liebenberg became the chief of the army Joop Joubert came and

he became the Officer Commanding of Special Forces. There is a little bit of a pattern here. People were moved into places for specific reasons. And at a later stage this person Skoon also came to the C section of the police.

And I received a signal in Oshikati from General Joubert in Pretoria personally addressed to me. A total honour. Asking me 10 reasons why I cannot be transferred with immediate effect to Pretoria. It was in 1986 in February. I discussed it with my Officer Commanding, my senior in charge and he said: "You should regard this as an honour and a career development move."

~~And I accepted it with open arms. He knew me from there because~~

in my last year or two I started up a unique concept which was hatched by him which was called the Intelligence Teams. It, he gave me 4 caspiers and we used the first real concept that we actually copy catted from Koevoet of as<sup>is</sup> Paris. We used SWAPO guys on those vehicles. And because many SWAPO people were roaming around in Northern Namibia in civilian clothes, taking off their uniform we used to go around capturing a lot of those guys at the (...indistinct) shops. And it made this commander look good because I had a team like that. And that was a team that was

~~named after myself called C Nel but in military terms it is called~~

Charlie November. Maybe in recent newspaper reports you saw that name about myself. But it was nothing secret, it was jus my initials. But that person called me to Pretoria and I went.



General Witkop Bardenhorst at that stage became the head of, he was for a while the Chief of operations, Chief of staff operations but he became the Chief of Intelligence. While Kat Liebenberg was Chief of the army and later became Chief of the Defence Force. A person like Jannie Geldenhuys who was sitting in Windhoek here came and he later became Chief of Defence Force. So the Namibian crowd just took over the primary jobs in the fight against MK on this side. But this was the pool of experience that was needed to fight this war. But there was never any conversion from this which I regarded as a war because we

~~were engaging people in platoon strength fighting it out till ten~~  
are dead on each side. And that was a different war. But when I came here and I was briefed by those people here I found it extremely difficult to understand why wasn't there a conversion phase. Why didn't they put me through a phase to make me another soldier? Because here it was war. I was fighting in uniform here. I would never put on civilian clothes here. I was always in uniform. I was fighting a war. I expected this is war as well. I never questioned it. I was still, I then became a captain when I was promoted here.

~~And I was appointed as the first intelligence officer of my~~  
level of experience of operational knowledge at special forces head quarters. And I was told get 10 others like yourself and form the project section to work on targets but now your primary

enemy is MK. And a number of people who used to work here were transferred in by General Joubert on my recommendation to say alright we are forming a project section. It was called projects because all kinds of funny names were given to things to make it look kosher. But in fact that project section was there to develop targets. The task that was given to me and others was to look at everywhere to get to know MK from back to front. And not only MK, the total Tripartite Alliance. Understand it fully and everything that works towards a threat against the State. Physically and psychologically indirectly we should know exactly.

~~MR MALAN: Sorry to interrupt. I just want to reiterate that~~

~~this hearing is in camera. I see somebody at the back and it might be a press man.~~

~~CHAIRPERSON: No he is one of the members of the Commission. He is not a press man. He certainly is.~~

~~MR MALAN: I accept that. Thanks.~~

~~CHAIRPERSON: That man is that man (...indistinct) Mr Daniel.~~

~~MR MALAN: I accept that thank you.~~

~~CHAIRPERSON: No Commissioner Rasket was saying you are quite right. You must protect your client's interest. So do not feel~~

~~you have been a spoil sport. Mr Daniels has had to travel from Durban I am sure that is why he is a bit late.~~

~~MR MALAN: I am sorry Sir.~~

CHAIRPERSON: No it is okay. In fact I should have introduced the members of my panel. But they are as you see them in front of you and as the things indicate. Mr John Daniel we are happy to have you. Mr Nel?

MR NEL: Where I last stopped was that we were then tasked to form a project section under the leadership of a Colonel Chris Prinsloo. He is always, his nickname was Mielie Prinsloo. He was sacked in 1992 by after the Steyn Commission. He was the head of Intelligence at special forces. The top structure of special forces at that stage was General Joop Joubert, then a Brigadier Swart, Blackie Swart who was also late on the commander here,

Swart. There was also Serfontein, who was also a commander here. He also came from this special forces environment. They were the top structure but Mielie Prinsloo was the SSO Intelligence, the Senior Staff Office of Intelligence who had under him a group of about 8 young major, captain, lieutenant type Intelligence officers who were schooled there and in other areas and brought together with the responsibility to create target dossiers.

We were divided into different countries. I was given the responsibility to work on Angola because I had first hand experience of this area and also to work on Botswana. My first kick off was to identify all the training camps of ANC now or MK. Not to work on SWAPO. And I had to work extensively to

get that right. And we will later maybe get into the detail how we planned to attack Vienna Camp and Pango and so. But my responsibility initially was to work here overtly I was still now part of an open system at special forces head quarters. But when special forces was explained to me at that stage I newly arrived at special forces, I knew very little about it. I am not a special forces member. I am an Intelligence man. My training that I received so far was infantry and Intelligence. Nothing special other than that.

So it was explained to me that Intelligence division are ~~sitting somewhere there, somewhere outside this environment.~~

And there was a rift, there was a distrust. And you will pick it up later on as well. Maybe you know about it. Special forces had bad experiences in trusting on the information that was provided to them by defence Intelligence. At that stage it was no called defence Intelligence, by IME - Afdeling Militêre Inligting. Because Wynand du Toit and those guys were captured and some other things went wrong. Targets were not active when it was supposed to be active and so-called lemons. If a military operation goes wrong it is called a lemon.

~~There were a number of lemons as a result of that. And~~  
General Joubert's idea was he wanted his own Intelligence people. He wanted to do it, separate it from Intelligence division because he wants a bigger level of secrecy as well. Because the Victor

Gerhard and other people were there leaking information at that stage. So maybe they had reason to believe that this was not a secure system.

So special forces formed its own little kingdom. And the stronger it became the more threatened defence Intelligence people felt. But there were certain individuals in defence Intelligence who were regarded as friendly stakeholders. People who can be trusted and people who can be co-opted and certain teams that can be formed with individuals but not total structures. We had very close cooperation with a sub-structure of military Intelligence that you correctly referred to now now as DCC. They were the guys capable of providing us with certain information that is not possible for special forces to get.

But I want to get back to this target group, this group of people. What we were and what we were supposed to do. We used to get together once a month to do presentations to very high ranking officials. Then General Liebenberg used to come, General Gleason used to come and I felt very intimidated as this young captain sitting, this is more or less a round table sort of thing with big boards, sliding walls with all the maps and all the photos of the so-called most prominent, most active people who pose a threat to the RSA were put on those boards. They were developed. We developed targets on persons. We developed targets on facilities. In other words the Revolutionary Council in

Lusaka, the so-called RCL's was developed at that stage as a specific target and the houses of certain officials, certain office buildings in Harare, in Botswana they were regarded as targets. And then certain activities, routine activities that takes place, flights that takes place, logistical resupply, that kind of activities were also regarded as opportunity targets.

From 1986 to 1987 we concentrated on external stuff. And then I cannot remember the date, I cannot remember exactly who were present but what I will never forget is that General Liebenberg in person said to us, after doing this total presentation that we worked through the night to get everything

organised and we worked through Botswana and Zimbabwe and all the countries and we plotted the individuals' houses and their photos were there and all the facilities. We had a very, very good picture of what was going on in the so-called Frontline States at that stage. Because we pooled all the information from all other stakeholders and we were the primary client at that stage. If you pulled out a Special Forces ID the rest would serve you because it was regarded as the nodal point of all target related information.

And then we were very disappointed when General Liebenberg said to us: "You missing the point. I do not see any information about the top structure of the SACP. The whites, where are they? The UDF, where are they? We are not working on

the right things because with hindsight I can today say yes, maybe they had another meeting somewhere and when they came to listen to this, this did not fit or did not answer all the questions of the strategy that was determined at that time.

And then a specific person was appointed a Captain Chris Cloete was appointed to work only on whites. Preferably those SACP types and it did not matter where they were, inside or outside the country. It was no restriction any more. It was explained to us there are pipelines. The Botswana machinery might be in Gaborone today but tomorrow they are somewhere in ~~the Western Transvaal. So should we stop our operation at the~~

~~border or should we follow the pipelines through to their courier systems and their safe-houses inside the country? We were tasked then to disregard orders and look at the whole threat wholistically. And after that we had more or less a free for all. To disregard the old perception of we only work externally where the Defence Force was mandated, supposed to work. We then started to work with C Section of the Police intensively. Specifically C2 who did the identification of people and who questioned all the ascaris. And we got most of our more recent information from questioning freshly arrested combatants or MK members,~~  
whatever it is called.

And then we also started working with G Section, which was the Police Intelligence. And they provided some of their best

information to us and also access to their sources and we tasked them to also get updated with the internal situation.

We tapped from whatever possible forces. I was allowed to travel to Europe many times to go and debrief DCC sources. I was never a member of DCC. I was a member of Special Forces and Special Forces Intelligence. And in 1986 I was told when I was explained the structure of Special Forces that there were people sitting in - and I want to put it bluntly as it was put to me: "Mense wat in die gat sit." People sitting in the hole. There was a building in Special Forces and another building further down the mountain but open, known to everybody where Joe Verster's people used to work. Inside the perimeter of Special Forces head quarters, known to every member in the national Defence Force who more or less had something to do with Special Forces. It was not a secret that, that was Joe's people. But you had to have a reason to go there. You do not go there and say: "I am browsing around here." You would be chased away. It was more or less the most secret part of Special Forces.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that Blairney?

MR NEL: No this was at Special Forces head quarters outside Pretoria, outside Voortrekker Hoogte there is a little "koppie" on top of the mountain there is this Special Forces head quarters. Which is today Gauteng Command. The building is still there and the other day when I drove into the gate I could not believe this



is where all the problems started and it is still being used today as a - I do not know. As offices. But that is where Joe Verster had his offices. Open and known to everybody. But they existed for a long time already. And the way it was explained to me is that this is three reconnaissance regiment. People will maybe ask one reconnaissance regiment is in Durban and two rekkie is the citizen force people. Three rekkie does not exist. Four rekkie is here in Cape Town and five rekkie in Phalaborwa. So those who structured forgot that there is something like a three as a number. But that was explained to me as three Reconnaissance Regiment ~~and you should not worry about that because that is the urban~~ capability of Special Forces.

But later on when I developed targets about Botswana. I was instructed by the Commander of Special Forces, General Joubert to go do a specific presentation to Joe Verster about that activity. And that is how I was introduced to Joe Verster and one of his regional officers, called Dawie Fourie, who was sort of the second in command of the Special Forces at that stage. And because I later learned that the operation that they undertook based on that information that I gave them was successful, they approached me again. They said they like my style and so and so. They want me to come and work for them. And there was something arranged between Joe Verster and General Joubert and the next thing I heard was when I was told by General Joubert:

"They want you there at the 'gat.' You must sever your ties here with these people and go and work with Joe." But it was still in the same perimeter. It was still overt. It was still known to everybody. And the instruction that I received from Joe was that there is soon to be major changes in the organisation I must just carry on with my existing work and build up as many, get as many data base information that I can get because they are going to need it at a later stage. I then went and collected most of the information that we had at the target section, I tried to make copies of that to give it to them. Those things that are relevant to

~~Zimbabwe, to Zambia and Botswana and Mozambique. To give it~~

to them. Because they had a lack of information at that stage, a serious problem with Intelligence.

I started working with them in July 1988 and in November 1988 they told me to resign. I personally objected because I was due to be promoted early in 1989, the next year. And for me to resign as a captain I was going to lose certain privileges. I went all the way up to General Joubert who told me: "This an administrative process you resigning, we will promote you. All you interested really is the pay." I agreed yes it is the money, it is not really the rank. And it was a difficult thing for me to let go of my military career because I felt that things were going the right way for me. I was one of the younger up and coming types in my own perception. But I resigned out of this blind loyalty. I will do

it for my country. I will do it for the "saak." I will do it for all those things. I will do it because my seniors want me to. And the total onslaught, the threat was getting too much for us and we needed to do everything possible. I resigned on the promises of a personnel plan and a financial plan that was authorised at the highest level of Defence Force to say: "If something goes wrong here politically and this organisation needs to be closed down you will either get an opportunity to come back into the Defence Force or you will be paid handsomely." And treated in terms of a different contract. I then became a member of the CCB. But in

~~contract it is just stated: "Die organisasie." It did not have a~~  
 name even. It was not registered with the register of companies or anything it was called the CCB just to give it a name.

The name CCB existed already in 1986. But this is where I formally, I was allowed to go to the offices in Pretoria West, very close to Vlakplaas, it is not very far from Vlakplaas. The CCB had its head office there. And I started working there and I was introduced to roughly about 40 other people who were called "Die Binnekring. Die bewustelike binnekring van die BSB." Those who knew about the CCB, who knew that they are members of the Defence Force and they are just used, they are just resigned administratively to become more covert.

Just to come back on that. When I asked General Joubert why should I resign. He said to me: "We going to covert now that

when the government has to deny that they know you, they should be able to do that." Not understanding at that stage how this is going to affect my life after this. Because eventually they did deny that they know me. They did not want anything to do with me and I had to face the brunt of everybody coming to me and saying: "You are a criminal." And I said: "I am a member of the Defence Force," and they say; "The Defence Force say they do not know you." And I had to say yes. Because I resigned. I had no link with them any more.

But anyway. There we started working in, under the leadership of Joe Verster calling himself the managing director.

And I asked who the head of this company was and they said the "Voorsitter," the Chairman of the company is Mr Scholtz whatever his code name was or Koekemoer, but that was in fact General Joubert. He also had a false name. Being a general on the one side he also had a false name on the other side when he signs on behalf of his chairmanship for CCB. Maybe he used his left hand to sign those things. But he was the only serving member of the Defence Force being a member of the CCB as well. Because he was the chairman of the CCB.

And we had, this is how it was explained to me: Die binnekring, which I will explain to you at a later stage. "Die bewustelike buitekring." This is members who know that they are part of a system that is still linked to the SADF. And then you

also might have, just outside this: "Die onbewustelik buitekring." Those guys who might think that they are part of a system that is still doing something for the government but are not sure whether it is national Intelligence or something. But they were told lies and they maybe believed it. But they were not sure. And then there were people totally unconscious, they did not know. And I want to put even a little bit of a wider circle around this and say there were international criminals outside here. People who were usable for the type of work that was planned here, passed down to here and further planned there and executed. (REFERS TO DIAGRAMS)

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The whole idea was to get these people to do the job as non-traceable as possible to anything here to there. That was one of the most difficult things to achieve. And that is why I regard CCB as the biggest waste of money that maybe ever existed. Because the idea was a grand idea but to get this done, eighty percent of our operations were stopped because there were not effective cut offs to stop the risk or to prevent the risk from implicating the State. There were always that possibility that, that guy might know that this guy is a member of that. And a lot of the planning went into getting that guy as totally unconscious as possible when he goes and parks a vehicle next to the ANC offices and leave it there and the next morning it explodes and he does not even know where to get hold of the guy who gave him

the instruction or the key or anything. He just knows that he has got money to do that. That was the ideal.

Later on due to pressure from the top because it was the kicks of a dying horse they said: "Production, production, production. Two jobs a month. Every region must do two jobs a month." Then I realised the guys sitting here who were not supposed to touch the trigger of a gun were starting to do things themselves. And this is how people got arrested in Botswana. Spik, I do not know what his surname was, guys who just went out and did things themselves. That is why I with the privilege of ~~hindsight I can say most probably some, no conscious member of~~ the CCB shot David Webster. It is probably because in the time frame, with the pressure on from top. It was possible that people could do that on their own. Working outside the concept of operations of the CCB.

Our external operations however those that I got involved in, under the leadership of Dawie Fourie, we stuck to this type of operations until 1989. I think it was 1989 when we were all pushed into Namibia, prior to the Namibian election. The whole CCB and all its regions. You must know that the CCB was subdivided into regions. And I worked in region 1 and region 4. I assisted region 7 and region 6. I knew about region 8. These guys, region 8 were, their primary responsibility was Namibia. Region 7 was Zimbabwe. Region 6 was internally in the RSA, the

guys who could not understand this concept they were not trained to understand the military way of thinking and that is why I believe Stal Burger and those guys were exposed at the time when they were exposed. Region 5, interesting region, was international. That was outside Africa. If you say Dulcie September, you say region 5 automatically. If you follow what I am trying to say. Region 4 was Zambia and Tanzania. Region 3 was very quiet, Lesotho, Swaziland. I am not sure. Region 3 was Lesotho. Region 2 was Swaziland and Mozambique. And region 1 was Botswana and they also did Angola over and above.

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CHAIRPERSON: ~~Where is your Zimbabwe? Who did the~~  
regions.

MR NEL: Region 7 is Zimbabwe. But just while you asking that. We had a very interesting situation. There was a guy called Ferdie Barnard, who initially worked here because he was involved in the operation "direksie" and with Lafras <sup>Luitingh</sup> Latten which was Zimbabwe. But because he had all his friends in region 6, he was prostituting across the line here with these guys after hours. And there you have a blur in the structure and it is difficult to detect when, I had contact with this guy but via his contact, via this contact I learnt a lot about the activities of this guy because Ferdie Barnard was doing a lot of things across the line.

Towards the end of 1989 there were indications that politics in the country was going to change. Joe called us

together. Let me just go a little bit back. Just prior to the election in Namibia all the regions were told to do something there. No matter where you worked. And this was a recipe for a disaster. Because people who used to work in Europe now had all of a sudden to do covert work in Namibia. Where it normally takes about five years to get a covert system set up these guys had to do this overnight. And it was not surprising when a kitbag full of limpet mines was found in Northern Namibia with a Special Forces operators golf membership card in it. It was not surprising to see roaming the blocks around Anton Lubowski's house and still the confusion today who shot him. Because it

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could have been anybody from any different region. It could have been anybody from any of these other regions. Because we were all instructed. I was in region 1 and region 4 primarily, we were doing a job in Northern Namibia. We had no interest, we had no knowledge of the area but we had to do it. Because we were told double up your production and you will get production bonus, in Namibia.

Okay, towards the end of 1989 we were told that political changes are coming. It was known that national Intelligence already started negotiations. And Joe then came up with an idea that the organisation's aim should change. It should be something like we should support the political process. And in my mind there was a dual approach. And I might be completely wrong in



this course of speculation from my side. That the Defence Force were continuing with its efforts to hit the ANC to the negotiation table while national Intelligence was playing, the Mutt and Jeff technique was applied here.

And we did not stop our activities until late in 1990 when I would say then it was formally called off and say after de Klerk's speech it was almost impossible to get any authority from anybody to act offensively. But the Stratcoms and those things could have continued. But to kill somebody was out of line with the process of authority. Because we still had to go to if you were here planning an operation you had to go to Joe to get authority for a pre-study. You would do a pre-study under his authority. Then you would come back and say, "Alright we found the following information," and so and so. And then it would go to the Voorsitter. Depending on the level of potential political influence of that activity, it will go to the chief of the National Defence Force and even to the Minister State Security Council. The directive that was used for developing targets and to present targets and to get authority for targets I still have a copy of that. It ends at the State Security Council. If the level of the operation was of such an extent that it will have international influence it will end up all the way up there. I was involved in one such operation, where we were going to attack a base in Angola, ANC camp where it had to

go all the way up. And it was stopped by Pik Botha in person. But the rest of the operations depending on the level of sensitivity could have stopped at Chief of National Defence Force level, could have stopped at the Chairman's level depending on that.

But after 1990 we started with the demobilisation process. And in November 1990 I was given an offer of a package or a offer to come back into the Defence Force. I do not think anybody accepted offers to go back into the Defence Force but what they offered us in terms of retrenchment was not in terms of our contract. Then I was part of a group who took government to court. I was one of three members who acted on behalf of the rest of the group of about 40. To say to the government: "Honour your contract." That I have resigned on this contract and not as a normal member of the Defence Force. We asked for an urgent hearing of the case. I believe it was Judge Botha who threw it out and I was delivered a personal account of R118 000 in legal costs for me to pay. And later on, the next day I went back to the Defence Force and I asked them: "Where must I sign for that other package that you offered me?" And I signed that papers just to get out of this thing because they promised me they are going to expose my name and it was intimidation. Later on I learnt that, that account was sent to the "Takseermeester" and it came back to something like R6 000 and Advocate Willem Burger was scrapped off the role. It was long story but it was part of the

intimidation tactics that was used at that stage to get us who were threatening to expose certain secrets into accepting the package and keeping quiet. We had to hand back all the documents that we had when we volunteered to accept the package. I did so, I gave them all my project files, all the information that I had with me that could have incriminated the government, back to them. That was part of the deal to get rid of the threat that they will expose me in court.

From there I went to Bophutatswana, it was in April 1991. I went to Bophutatswana Defence Force and asked them for work because I was jobless and my wife was in a state of panic. And I had a package of R160 000 in my pocket and that was it. So my wife stayed with my family and I went to Bophutatswana and I never told them that I was in the CCB. And they accepted me and a month later rumour reached Mabatse and I was called in by the Officer Commanding and he asked me: "Were you a member of the CCB?" I said yes and he said: "Well it was not stated in your CV, will you please resign?" And I did that in 24 hours notice to save them that embarrassment. Because they said President Mangope did not want elements like that.

I then went to the Ciskei and this is where a lot of other controversy started again. Because I was a soldier, left school as a soldier and all that I was ever trained for to be was a soldier. And I joined the so-called International Research, IRCIS because

it was a group of people who were accepted by <sup>Gqozo</sup> ~~Dlozo~~. And I think it is about the only leader in this country who would have accepted, maybe Gatsha as well. But Dlozo accepted former CCB members. And it was an opportunity to get employed. So when I arrived there and (...intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What year was this now?

MR NEL: This was in 1991 in May I joined IR. When I arrived there at the first board meeting I saw many familiar faces. There were about 8 or 10 other, not all former CCB but Anton Niewoudt was in charge he was a former member of DKU. But ~~and now today with hindsight I know he was still a serving~~ member of DKU at that stage or DCC. And there was Kassie Kruger, who was a former CCB member. There was Piet Pienaar a former CCB member. Myself and Okkers Swanepoel were former ~~CCB members and ( intervention)~~

CHAIRPERSON: And Gerrie, Gerrie Hugo?

MR NEL: Okay Gerrie was already there. He was serving as, not in IRCIS. He was in the Ciskei Military Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: And where did he come from?

MR NEL: He was also former SADF. He was a former DCC member. He came, he was at that stage already in the Eastern Cape and he resigned from Group A or Eastern Province Command to join the Ciskei Defence Force. But Gerrie was with Military Intelligence, on his own I would say. And IRCIS was

equal to the National Intelligence Service of the Ciskei while Gerrie was with the Military Intelligence Service.

So when I started there and I saw this thing and I heard rumours these guys are maybe doing funny things here. I went through a very big pool of experience going through all these court cases with the government now and I was not a very popular man in Pretoria. So a rumour reached my ear that Anton and them were involved in more than Intelligence work. I, without putting it now in a funny way, I distanced myself in that from them by advising Anton not matter what mandate you have to do this you must accept the implications of that. And I went

and I requested to work at Military Intelligence. That is my comfort zone. I am not a National Intelligence man. Anton then said it is a good thing. He wanted me to work with Military

~~Intelligence because he wanted me to be closer to Gerrie. Because~~  
Gerrie is doing funny things there and I must go see what is going on there. So if they detached me from the Ciskei Intelligence Services to the Ciskei Military Intelligence.

MR KHOISAN: And where was Clive Brink and (...intervention)

MR NEL: Clive Brink was with Anton. Clive Brink is a small fish. He was a sergeant major before he left the SADF. He was a technical man, he could do bugging and that kind of technical skills. He was not a strategic planner or anything of that nature.

But he was very close to Anton. With hindsight I can say that

DCC put these two guys in the Ciskei, the one guy is the thinker, the leader and the other guy is a technical guy to assist him to do their work. Okay.

I then went to work with Gerrie in the Ciskei Defence Force as a detached member from Ciskei Intelligence Service to there. And I testified about these things in detail in Gerrie's court case. I worked with Gerrie for two weeks and I asked him for money that I wanted to recruit a source and he said there is no money. And I went to the Ciskei Defence Force head-quarters where the Chief of Defence Force told me that he received money every now and again, an amount of R50000 was mentioned to me.

I went back to Gerrie and I asked him money again. Long story short after many interactions like that, I asked the Chief of the Ciskei Defence Force, General Uzig if they could do an audit.

~~Because I am moving into an environment where I smell things~~  
that are not so alright because there is a lot of gambling going on and a lot of other things. When the auditors arrived there Gerrie was gone and 5 or 6 days later he made an announcement in the Transkei where he applied for political asylum that we wanted to kill him and we destroyed his evidence and a lot of things. I am under oath and I am putting it to you bluntly. The whole issue around him leaving to Transkei was related to missing funds. And he later pleaded guilty to that effect.

But then the B controversy surrounded us in the Eastern Cape started when Gerrie said the CCB is regrouping in the Eastern Cape and we forming something such like. To a certain extent he was right. Hearsay, Anton and them did do some offensive type of jobs or a job that I heard about. They apparently shot at the house - I do not know who, but members of the IRCIS shot at the house of Smuts <sup>Ngonyama</sup> Ngunjama in Dimbasa. Very unprofessional, very silly. Really it was, it was, they picked a - "hulle het a lat gepluk om hulle self mee te slaan," by getting involved in those things. But it gave Gerrie enough credibility to for General Kat Liebenberg and Wynand Breytenbach, he was a Deputy Minister of Defence at that stage, to fly down to Ngozo and tell him: "Close down the IRCIS it is going to become an embarrassment." I could not understand what influence Pretoria had over Ngozo to do that. But then at the end of June, July 1991

I was jobless again because the organisation that I belonged to was closed down. And I went to the Chief of the Defence Force of the Ciskei and I begged him and I said: "Listen please I swore an oath to myself and to God and everybody else that I will never become involved in anything dirty again. I was in the CCB, Ngozo knows it, I was involved in the Ciskei in absolutely nothing." And he allowed myself and Okkers Swanepoel to remain behind.

Two days before Anton Niewoudt and Clive Brink left, Clive Brink came to me and he gave me a fax machine and he said

he would like to talk to me and after about an half an hour I understood that they wanted me to use this fax machine and record everything about the Ciskei to Pretoria. Which I did for about, till about beginning of 1992. I sent reports through to Pretoria on a very regular basis about what is going on in the Ciskei. I was acting as an unpaid agent I would say for DCC.

CHAIRPERSON: Who were you sending these things to in Pretoria?

MR NEL: There was a certain lady I think her name was Sandra Nolan receiving it on the other side. But later on they sent a guy from P.E. to me by the name of Skellon, I will remember his name now. Terry, Terry Skellon. And I worked via P.E. I would send it through to P.E and they would send it. Because they had an office in P.E., DCC had an office in P.E. To send it through, all the reports through to P.E. from there they would courier it through

From time to time a certain Colonel At Nel and there is a lot of confusion between Chris Nel and At Nel. A certain Colonel At Nel came down to P.E. to see me about the situation in the Ciskei. What Ngozo's strategies were, which direction he is going in, what political line, who is coming to visit him? That kind of things. They wanted to know information of I would say primarily ~~could have a political influence of alliances and non-alliances and~~ things like that, building up towards CODESA now.



And then one evening in mid-1992 a member of DCC arrived at my house to come and collect the fax machine telling me that there is a major enquiry in Pretoria and I am going to be exposed as an agent here and I must say that I never had any contact with them. And he took the fax machine and that was it. I never received any money or I was not ever registered as any agent of DCC. I did this voluntarily. So there is a lot of allegations that I was a member of DCC. I was never a member of DCC. I was their man in the Ciskei, I would say for that period.

After that I severed all ties. At Nel and those guys were ~~fired out of the Defence Force and we can maybe discuss that~~ period in a little bit more detail. In 1993 the whole effort was to survive the period because Ngozo was getting into his dying horse period. He knew, after the Bisho massacre specifically, his ~~political time was getting to an end. And there was extensive~~ pressure on me to get involved in his dirty work. He called me in many times, he sent people to me to test me. Rob Brown came to see me, he did not want to speak in my office, he wanted to speak outside. He wanted to know whether I was willing to fund covert operations of the ADM. Which I all refused. And I refused them ~~very carefully because I was standing the risk of losing my job~~ any moment.

Okkers Swanepoel who was in fact my boss at that stage was fired. He took the brunt of a lot of these things in early

1993. We did not agree with things that were happening in the Ciskei. Because a new company came with the name of Multimedia Services and certain people like General ~~Tinnie~~<sup>Tienie</sup> Groenewald arrived and a certain little maverick by the name of van Rensburg. I cannot remember his name now. But he is very active now in the Freedom Front. They arrived there as the special advisors to Ngozo.

CHAIRPERSON: So is also Tinnie Groenewald in the Freedom Front?

MR NEL: Yes. I want to remember the guys. There were two van Rensburgs. ~~The one is Koos van Rensburg, he is a pilot and his brother, I will remember his name now. They were the primary advisors to Ngozo now. And Okkers Swanepoel advised Ngozo to the contrary that these guys are going to, they were feeding him funny information to make him more radical. To take a more harsher stand also towards the National Party and to break away completely to form, to be a stronger partner in the COSAG alliance. And funny things were happening with money and ministers were fired since those guys moved in those positions. Okkers Swanepoel, the Chief of Intelligence was fired. The DG, Mr Mgadhgi was fired because he refused to sign the cheques for this funny new company.~~

I exposed them to the newspapers. I spoke to Louise Flannigan on a few occasions. I spoke to (...indistinct) and I said

to them: "These guys are inflating their accounts and then they are paid and this money is then diverted back to the ADM. And these things may still be traceable. I think Mr Mgadhgi will testify to that effect. And I felt that my (...intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know at that time that Louise Flannigan had a personal relationship with Gerrie Hugo?

MR NEL: Yes Sir, I knew that very well because I was feeling the brunt of her articles about me every time in the newspaper. And I felt it was Gerrie's initiative to get back at me. And it is still carrying on. There was one about three weeks ago in the Mail and Guardian that implicates me as the guy who wrote the Meiring report and who set up McBride for arrest. So when I read the rest of the story it was all old news. It is all the things that Louise used to write about me with just a new angle. We might come to that part of my current involvement in what

In any case Ngozo came to us and he said he wanted us to train his ADM youth. And it was posing a serious problem to us because this was going to become Inkata. And he had those ideas that he did not trust the police any more. He was not comfortable with what the soldiers were doing. He wanted his own army. He at once stage threatened that he was going to get rid of his whole Defence Force and replace it with the a ADM Defence Force. And myself and the then Chief of the Ciskei Defence Force, General van de Bank we conspired against him. We decided to go ahead

and play this thing along the lines that yes we doing it and the first group were taken back down to Gelumna for training. But in the mean time I exposed all these things in the newspapers. And these things can be verified by the journalists involved. And I even asked them to write my name in the report as the main brain behind it. And those reports are available. Where it said Chris Nel is the instigator of the so-called hit squads in the Ciskei and it is all exposed there with all the detail. So that Ngozo would read these things and he appointed me to investigate the security break and I could not find the person who leaked this information to the newspapers. ~~And I managed to survive such like requests to me~~ only by the skin of my teeth before integration started. I had an intention never to stand in a trial to be accused of doing Ngozo's dirty work. And I think I survived in that sense, only just.

~~Then integration started and by February 1995 I think we~~ were all members of the new National Defence Force where I was given a post as a former homeland officer over and above I was doing personal work for a General Lombard, who was the Chief of Intelligence in the army. But I had a big backlog in courses because I did not do, because of my many years in the covert work I did not do the normal developmental courses of a colonel, what that is supposed to be. I then in <sup>1986</sup> 1986 I went to do a 6 months course Junior Command and Staff Duties course where I came second and then in 1997 the whole year I was on course on

the Senior Commander Staff Duties course where I am very proud to say I came first. And I had the intention to be a soldier.

CHAIRPERSON: Where were these courses held?

MR NEL: The first course was in Luhatla from June to November 1996 and the other one was at Army College in Pretoria, where all. We were now a totally integrated course. I was on course with many former so-called non-statutory force members. It is part of the developmental courses of soldiers, the normal training. And next year I am going on the joint, the last course that I have to do as a soldier.

~~So ever since integration I was, I am sort of eighty percent~~  
busy with training. But I was appointed as the Senior Staff Officer Counter Intelligence at army head quarters. Now army head quarters is understood by some to be the Defence Force but  
~~army head quarters is just one of the four arms of service. And~~  
my responsibility is to collect information about people inside the Defence Force who are not loyal, who are not doing things. And I know my former friends. I know some of them are busy in funny business. I recently exposed some of them as being involved in funny business. I work on all kinds of so-called internal departmental threats but the primary responsibility to focus on  
~~corruption. That is departmental corruption is my primary~~  
responsibility. And I became the acting director of Counter Intelligence for the army on the 21st of April this year now very

recently when, because so many generals are taking packages the colonels are now slowly moving into positions where we have to act on their behalf. And that is where I am currently serving as an acting Director Counter Intelligence for the army.

I want to state it categorically I had nothing at all to do with the drafting of the Meiring report. It was drafted at Defence Intelligence level, which is way beyond me. If I go into their building once in a month on their invitation it is a lot. And there are directorates sitting there doing work unknown to me. And the first thing I read about the Meiring report and about the arrest of McBride was in the newspapers in fact. And then I read that I was

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in fact the guy who did it. It suits, it is a popular thing to say:

"Chris Nel, ex-CCB what is he still doing in the Defence Force? He must be involved in dirty work. He is a master in lying, he is trained to lie." And surely people will believe that I must be involved in something funny. And my intentions since from 1994 is I want to open up my ribs and say: "Come in and look. This is who I am. I just want to be a soldier in the National Defence Force." And in that spirit I am here today and I am willing to tell you anything that I know within the knowledge available. I know it was a long answer sir but.

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CHAIRPERSON: No.

?: It was an hour long answer.

CHAIRPERSON: No it was necessary as you said. We would not begin to understand the things that you will be talking too in much more detail if we did not have this background. I usually sleep in these enquiries. I have been awake all the time. So it bears testimony to the effectiveness of your delivery. Shall we then take tea for the next 15 minutes and then come back.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Let us resume. Mr Khoisan?

~~HENDRIK CHRISTOFFEL NEL (s.u.o.)~~

MR KHOISAN QUESTIONS MR NEL:

MR KHOISAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Thank you Mr Nel for giving us your concise curriculum vitae within an hour and it has certainly been very helpful. And it assists us greatly in understanding you know, where you come from. And how you fit into this system. But nevertheless I will put on the record that during the break I have provided you with about 649 photographs that involve certain acts and operations that are relevant to Namibia. But we will get to that at a certain point.

To be quite sharp and fresh and to be able to focus this enquiry so that we deal with the subject matter as it is laid down in the enquiry and expand it I would like to maybe go quickly to one particular area. And that is what you refer to "Die

organisatie." You are not the first person who comes before us and gives evidence to the effect that this name, this Civil Cooperation Bureau was just sort of plucked out of somewhere and put into the public domain. Because somebody had to tell somebody about something that was going on. Without giving them the substance.

But nevertheless, in 1986 when you received your call based on your production in the Western Front from General Joubert to come over to Pretoria and work with Special Forces before you went to "Die Gat." This hole where Joe Verster had now working. You went there because you had developed your career as an Intelligence person. Was it your understanding that the primary reason that you were being brought to Special Forces was based on your successes in the Western Front?

MR. NEL: Yes. Undoubtedly so Sir. Why I say so, I was awarded the opportunity shortly after I arrived in Pretoria, about 3, 4 months later I was awarded the opportunity to go to Italy for about 6 or 8 weeks on a very special and secretive course. But it was also regarded as a reward. I was picked because I was 7 years up in Namibia and I had extensive experience. The rest of the people who went with me were commandants, the full colonel, a lieutenant colonel and other people. And I was a lieutenant at that stage or maybe I just turned captain to go on this course which included a 2 week holiday. And I regarded that as a



privilege and an honour and a method to say to me; "You are special and thank you for your time up there and we want to specialise you further." And that course in Italy was to train me further in advanced Intelligence techniques. And that will only be awarded to a person who they want to invest in for future development as well.

MR KHOISAN: Okay and when you were being brought to Pretoria by General Joubert who I make the necessary deduction, my view in consultation with others that you were to be brought there, was it stated to you that you were being brought there ~~specifically to work on a new target arena, which would be~~

UmKhonto we Sizwe?

MR NEL: Yes I knew all along that. The war in Namibia was continuing but where I was based and the section that, I received very clear instructions about from Colonel Mielie Prinsloo to help set up was a structure that never existed before. But the need developed somewhere before my arrival the need was discussed and or discovered apparently by General Joubert when he learned that his own Intelligence capability at Special Forces almost did not exist. And he got spoiled up in Namibia. A very accurate, early warning because we had the advantage of electronic early warning. We had the advantage of numerous Intelligence detection capabilities that allowed us to know in advance long before plannings of attack. And so that was lacking at the home

front. Things were happening and people were working reactively. That was the way it was explained to me to get out of the reactive mode of acting after a bomb exploded and we must act pre-emptively by getting to the planning environment, identifying the top 20 people who sit behind the planning and to act against them wherever they are. And that kind of target information did not exist or it was not up to date. And that is why we were then establishing this project section at Special Forces head quarters focusing on the targets as I explained to you.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now when the targets were delineated and when you made your initial presentation as I understand it your presentation involved Umkhonto we Sizwe and as you pointed out to us that you were told to go to the drawing board and redraw this so that it would include other areas like the South African Communist Party, the UDF, etc. Were there specific instructions attached in terms of how you would go about the other target arena?

MR NEL: We had a very generalised definition of enemy. That became more generalised further closer towards 1989, the late 1990's because MK was a direct military enemy in terms in definition of enemy. MK and APLA was regarded as the direct opponent of the SADF. And normally soldiers act against soldiers. But when I arrived in Pretoria that definition of it was not now SADF against plan like in Namibia. It was now SADF

against the total onslaught. It was as if the Defence Force assumed its responsibility as the only saviour of the government. All systems failed internally. Its local government failed because of mass action and other things in the mid-80's. The Defence Force took that responsibility upon itself to act as government, as local government. As running the joint management forums in such a way that they had influence in every aspect that was affected by the threat. And this included that went beyond MK and those SACP members in MK that used to be the narrow approach to say: "These are the people that are orchestrating the threat." ~~Yes those individuals were maybe at the top of planning~~ and in terms of the priority or the so-called top 20 list they were still there. But at the bottom of this list there were organisations now, the UDF, the Tripartite Alliance, the MDM in its totality was regarded as enemy. If I wrote a document and I used a generic term "enemy" it was understood to be the total anti-RSA force. And that is how we were taught on our courses.

And we had a manual, it was called Anti-SA. And we still have it in the National Defence Force today we have an edited version of that. And it is still causing a hell of a lot of problems today when non-statutory people get these things and say: "How can you teach us these things? Because if we look through the page there is still SWAPO and ANC written in here as the enemy." But those manuals were used as almost I could say the

Bible for young officers to understand the enemy. I have access of it. But it would be good for anybody who would like to understand how enemy was defined, to take that Anti-SA book and to see how the Western Front, the Central and the East, the ANC and SWAPO was merged into an external enemy. And then the mass democratic movement is brought in to be the other partner of the alliance and the trade unions and everything is put under one, in one circle as enemy. And you had to study that thing by heart and pass that subject to be able to pass any of your military courses.

MR KHOISAN: And now Mr Nel I would like to refer you to a document that has been put in front of you. It is Annexure 1 of the documents that has been presented to you. It is called "Burgelike samewerking Bureau (BSB) - uifers geheim." It is Annexure 1. And I would like to refer you to a document called "BSB Jaar beplanning 1987." That is CCB Year planning for 1987. Do you have the document in front of you?

MR NEL: I have studied it over the, I have read it a couple of times and I know the content of that. I unfortunately do not have it in front of me but I know what is in that.

MR KHOISAN: Okay maybe then I will just work through the document. This document was written on 7th November 1987. And it basically states that during a team building exercise with the general commanding Special Forces the planning for 1987 was

done as following. And it says in point 3 a. " The CCB orders for 1987: The CCB must through covert operations create maximum disruption of the enemy of the Republic of South Africa inside and outside the country." Do you confirm that?

MR NEL: Yes. At that stage in 1986 I was not a member as such of the CCB yet. I knew about them and but what you read there is not different from the purpose of Special Forces at that time. Special Forces had it as its aim the disruption of the enemy of the State and the difference lies in the word covert. And covert as defined as those operations that the government will never, ever claim responsibility for. CCB had that responsibility different to the rest of Special Forces who were also tasked to disrupt the enemy, defined as I earlier defined it, inside and outside the country. But with the CCB having the mission to do it covertly. In other words never to involve the government or to claim that as a government operation.

MR KHOISAN: Okay and it says further that there in point 4 "enemies of the State and the institutions mentioned above are to be considered enemies of the State. The SACP, the African National Congress. In parentheses those people on the list. The UDF, the PAC, all front organisations, etc, etc" And it says in point 7 that selective operations can be undertaken against countries that are hosting these organisations. Do you confirm that as an actual?

MR NEL: Yes by the time in 1988 when I joined the CCB that document was still valid. It was still, I underwent about 4 weeks induction training to change my way of thinking when I joined the CCB. To change my way of doing things and to become more covert as well. And to establish a blue plan and a red plan. And part of that induction training included most of the elements of that document. I detected one difference there is a part of that document that touches on the definition of the word "disrupt," what disruption meant. We were taught more or less 6 elements of disruption where to kill was always one of them but in 1988 the ~~order of these things they were given sort of priority. And killing~~ was not placed at priority 1 as in that document as in the first type. The emphasis was more placed on disruption by means of indirect means of confusing and getting the enemy to kill itself, to detain itself and to disrupt itself. And physically killing them was placed more or less I think in number 5 or 6. As a last resort, sort of method. But emphasis in 1988 was placed on sowing confusion and distrust between these different organisations. Specifically between the internal and the external component of the defined enemy.

MR KHOISAN: Okay and just for the record I want to read what you just read in. It is under 6 k. of the document "Onwrigting" which is destabilisation or disruption can be viewed as the following: 1. "dood" that is death, 2. "invultreer" infiltration, 3.

"omkoop" that is buying out, 4. "vernutting" <sup>?</sup> -destroy and 5. "komprementeer" - to compromise. So you confirm that, that but you do not confirm the order in which that is written?

MR NEL: It was later changed in 1988 to be better defined. because to "vernuttig" and to "dood" is the same thing. It was defined in different terms and it was put in a specific sequence to prioritise certain type of activities. Because rekkies had their tendency to storm into a country and wanting to blow up everything and to shoot every person that they defined as enemy. And therefore the whole purpose of the CCB was going to be ~~exposed because otherwise we could have closed down the CCB~~ and carried on with the normal regiments that were capable of doing these things. They needed a covert structure that. I will later explain to you in 1988 in November what happened when we presented some of our operation. Maybe I can do it now.

We presented some of our operations in November 1988 to General Witkop Bardenhorst. He was then acting in his capacity as Chief of operations for the South African Defence Force. I later saw that he claims under oath that he only learnt about the existence of this organisation a year later. But I personally presented some targets to him in November 1988. And right at the end we were quite concerned that he was not going to approve some of the operations because it was the so-called "Black Christmas Syndrome" was again propagated in the newspapers and

CCB was called in to do something pre-emptively already in November. Before the Black Christmas infiltrators could come into the country. And we presented targets in Lusaka and Zimbabwe and all over. And there out of the more or less 18 or 20 targets that were presented to him he authorised 12 of them to go ahead. And his closing remarks to a small group of people who included Joe Verster and myself and others who presented it. That he was not going to inform the politicians. He is taking the responsibility of this on himself because there is enough justification in terms of the Black Christmas thing that was hanging around. So in order to allow the politicians to deny it

honestly if they are confronted with them knowing or not knowing about these operations they can honestly say they do not know. As long as and then the qualifier came, as long as these operations are conducted in the way CCB was supposed to do this. In other words it should never point back to the government. And that operations in fact were carried out.

MR KHOISAN: And I think that the correct way they presented it is that "operasies moet nooit terug wys nie." Is that correct.

MR NEL: Taking it one step further. Operations should preferably point to somebody else.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now I just want you to address point 4.2 on the document which is: "ANC spesifiek die gene op die lys." Now you indicated that you have a list, maybe this would be an



appropriate time to present the panel with the list in your possession of people that have been selected as targets?

MR NEL: I wish to explain exactly what I meant. I have a list that was used as evidence in the Webster trial. That is not the list that I generally refer to or that is referred to there. The list that is referred to there it will take about 7 minutes to explain that list. That list had its origin in times prior to my arrival already from Namibia. In 1986 when I arrived there, there was already a list. There was a file in fact kept at Special Forces head quarters called Targets, "Die Teiken Lys." And we took that over when we ~~started off the project section that file was our Bible. We had to~~ update that. We had to get to the real list because the list was not really the right people. The list included the National Executive of the ANC and they wanted more specifics. And we started with all our investigative work and our studies and our questioning of ~~people to get to the real top 20 people that should be disrupted.~~ Which included possibly killing them to get to that effect of total disruption of the enemy. And there was a so-called top 20 list that blanket authority existed for. We ran into the problem that people were on a list and Special Forces operators worked on these people and you would encounter an opportunity in London where you could disrupt Joe Slovo. But you had to come all the way back to Pretoria and ask authority to say: "We want to

disrupt Joe Slovo but he disappeared around a block," and it is 3 days later that you get the authority.

So there were certain presentations, this is hearsay but it was told to me but certain names were put on a list when after we went through this process of identifying the most prominent people, the most effective people also in MK. Not necessarily those with the appointments but those who were having effect. And SACP members who were effective. There was this list of people that the government wanted out of the way. And it was told to us that there is blanket authority for Special Forces to ~~carry out operations against those people wherever they are found~~ as long as the actions against them are taken in terms of non-traceability.

MR KHOISAN: Do you want to maybe give us an example? I think what we looking for here is maybe if you can run down the top 20 if you have the list in front of you, read it to us or maybe as much as your memory will allow? Run it by us?

MR NEL: Alright I was supposed actually to go and sit and write these things down where I had more time but for sure Joe Slovo was either number 1 or 2. Chris Hani, that is why I say either number 1 or 2. Between Chris Hani and Joe Slovo they were always either number 1 or 2. There were Lambert Malloy I can remember and Rashied. The person who is now testifying in Pretoria, Abubaker Ishmael he was in his capacity as Chief of <sup>Moloi</sup>

Special Operations, Chief of Ordinance was very high up on the list. And there were people such as, let me quickly try and, Cassius Make was at one stage on the list. He was the only success ever I think on that top 20 list more or less. There were some politicians as well, people who were not further down the list at the stage when Oliver Tambo was still alive his name was on the list. <sup>Mzwai Puliso</sup> Umzayo Puliso was on the list until he was replaced by the present Deputy Minister of, Joe N/hlan/hla. Joe N/hlan/hla <sup>(Siphwe Nyanda)</sup> was on the list, Gebuza Simponyanya was definitely also there. Joe Modisi, how can I forget. The whose who in the revolutionary council. <sup>ie Kasrils</sup> Ronney Casels definitely he was there.

There was a Revolutionary Council at one stage in 1985, 1986. It was later dissolved, called other names but those are the people who plan most of the activities according to our information of coordinating them politically in the military struggle.

MR KHOISAN: Okay were there anybody inside the country who appeared on that top 20 list? Anybody that you can maybe remember or recall that may have been an effective person inside the country that was considered a target for which blanket authority had to be given?

MR NEL: To my knowledge till 1988 when I left Special Forces head quarters was the last time when I physically worked with that list, there were no internal people on that list. A separate list was compiled for people in the UDF and when that new desk was

opened for so-called whites and senior SACP members, which included people inside the country, UDF figures. I know Jay Naidoo, Cyril Ramaphosa those people were prominently mentioned. I never saw a list with those people specifically on a list. But in region 6, each of these regions that I have depicted here would have received parts of that list. And then the blanket list existed all the time. It was there, the 20 people that were most of them were externally. There was constantly mention made of the need to identify those elements inside the country who were part of the underground structures working in corroboration with the top 20 outside. But I have never seen a list of people, of a blanket authority that were inside the country. But I would suspect that such a list in region 6 would have included the most prominent people of the SACP internally, people from COSATU internally, people such as Jay Naidoo, people such as Jeremy Crow<sup>man</sup>. People such as Mr Boesak, Mr Tutu. Those well known internal figures. There were people that you just placed into a category, no matter which organisation he belonged to. No matter whether he was a member of the Council of Churches or whatever. It was if he was seen walking at a march with a, behind or in front of a red flag and he is prominent and he is giving the government problems and he is difficult to handle and it appears that he is inciting people. He would automatically raise in stature and they say: "Look at his activity and put him on a list."

MR KHOISAN: And so for instance Frank Chikane, Winnie Mandela, etc would be on that list for sure?

MR NEL: Yes definitely and specifically I would say by now it should be known that Winnie Mandela was regarded as a soft target for other methods of disruption. Disinformation, spreading rumours and all kinds of other things because people were infiltrated into her little circle of people around her. It was easy to discredit the ANC via discrediting Winnie Mandela. She was making it easier for people to do their job.

MR KHOISAN: Okay will revisit the Winnie Mandela scenario at ~~another time but I want to deal with point 6 of the document~~

which deals with " Verkorter samevattende gevolgtrekkings." And the point 6. 6 a. is for me something that I wish that you could elucidate or give us some more information on. Which says that: "Koeverte inligtings stelsel moet verbeter word deur middle van ~~die uit kanale beter kanale na afdeling Militêre Inligting,"~~ that is you know Military Intelligence, the Security Police and I assume that would be C Section and National Intelligence.

There is a view that has been presented to this Commission in some circles and that view goes this way. It goes that C Section and the farm that was being run by de Kock and others and the CCB were the ones who were pulling the dirty job and that there is distance from these actions. "Die onwrigting," this disruption by an organisation like the National Intelligence

Service, the former National Intelligence Service. Seeing that you are here before us today could you explain to us the channels of liaison and the channels of communication between these 3 structures and how they related to this structure known as the CCB, also known as "Die Organisasie" and Special Forces?

MR NEL: Maybe I need to go to the, I need to explain it here again. (REFERS TO BOARD) As I explained to you when I arrived at Special Forces head quarters when we had to set up this new project section, we identified the need to work, to also get the product from the Police, also from National Intelligence.

~~Because they had access to other information that we could not,~~  
we did not want to duplicate that. We were in fact, "ons het versamel. Ons het nie in gesamel nie." We collected their information to pool at us. So we had to have interaction. But National Intelligence was always something there, more than an arms length away. ~~It was this super structure going over all other~~  
smaller Intelligence structures. But they had information that was useful to us.

In 1986 when I arrived from Namibia where we were spoiled with the interceptor of radio communication of SWAPO which helped us with most of the early warning that we needed, the question was asked we should find out whether the ANC is also making use. What type of communication do they use? And that what are the capabilities to intercept that? Then when we

furthered that request daily printouts came from National Intelligence to us when we requested electronic information. It was called the "Valk oë" I want to, I do not know are you familiar with this type of information?

All the telex communication that existed between all ANC offices internationally and in the frontline States were intercepted by National Intelligence. And that helped us considerably to keep track of the movement of for instance senior people on the list. If Joe Slovo would fly from Lusaka to London he would make prior arrangements and we would get that from National Intelligence.

~~This was a formal liaison. It was my first exposure to cooperation~~  
between the Special Forces target group and National Intelligence. And this product was a closely protected secret by National Intelligence. And they would not give it to any client. And they gave us specific instructions that this was a privilege that can be denied once security leaks take place. So we treated that very secretive. But it helped us considerably.

At one stage from that information we planned a major operation how to do something about meat that was transported to Angola to the camps. Because we learned how meat was delivered from Botswana and other countries to the camps. So informally by that way yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do with the meat?

MR NEL: No the operation was intended to get into the company or the factory that supplied the meat to do poison operations of that food. That was the intention. It was to my knowledge not carried out.

CHAIRPERSON: There has been stories about diarrhoea or getting to the water of the SWAPO to disrupt the election. Was that carried out or was it also part of this plan?

MR NEL: I am aware of extensive planning to do a lot of these kinds of things, including the fumigation of T-shirts that was supposed to be handed out to even Morogoro Camp of the ANC, ~~donor countries wherever agent could come closer to container~~

loads of clothing that used to be the Mpando, that used to be donated. There were a lot of rumours to this effect. I have no first hand involvement or I cannot tell you all the detail about it. But it was not a secret that whenever such opportunities arrived it was part of disruption. It was always regarded as a method of disruption. This weapon was available to us. We had a doctor at CCB who you could go to and ask him for this kind of assistance and he would then liaise with the laboratory to get these things for you. That was a well kept secret amongst us but it was in fact an open secret. That you do not have to kill somebody by means of a bullet. There are chemical means available.

For a moment I side tracked now. I cannot remember where?



MR KHOISAN: You are on the issue of liaison and communication and how each of these Intelligence agencies and instruments fitted into the broader plan of disruption.

MR NEL: When I arrived at Special Forces, Vlakplaas was just around the corner. It was also in Pretoria West, where Eugene de Kock was. I knew Eugene de Kock. I met him in a very interesting way. He hit me to the ground the first time we met in Oshikati already. But we became friends up there and we worked together up in Namibia. And he was at Vlakplaas and a number of former Koevoet guys who when we worked extensively together

~~in Namibia, those guys most of them were transferred. When the~~  
people realised that the war in Namibia is lost most of those guys were pulled back to the home front. Because things were getting hectic from 1985 onwards here at home. And we used to liaise almost daily with Vlakplaas to get access to askaris, to get background. Because we did not know this new enemy. We had to study it by using friendlier guys. Not by means of interrogation but by means of interview. And thereafter to use C 2 Section with all their identification capability available to them with all the so-called photo album, to know your enemy facially. To know, to get all the Police history and printouts of their past. That was available to us via the cooperation that were established between Brigadier <sup>ch</sup>Szyoon and General Joubert. So extensive liaison with Martin Nordee and the guys at Section C2 and extensive liaison

with C1 or people call it C10, the Vlakplaas guys for purposes of building up a picture of the enemy. And to also get in agreement with them that we understand the threat the same way they understand.

But there was always this problem with National Intelligence. They used to pass on snippets of information or reports to us but they also complained or they had superior input to the State Security Council to cancel some of our operations. Based on arguments that it might threaten the lives of their agents. If we blow up the ANC offices in Harare it would possibly ~~threaten some of their agents. And then operations would be~~ halted because we could not guarantee the safety of so-called agents.

And thereafter I think in 1987, I am not sure when this happened, Trevits was established. Trevits was established specifically for the purpose of coordinating the activities around targets between the different agencies. And Trevits just did not happen itself. Trevits was a structure that needed extensive negotiations between the different structures of the State and it is surely a decision that should have been taken on Tik level or strategic, on the State Security Council level maybe. I am not sure but to get National Intelligence to get a representative in. Because Trevits, you know by now it is Teenrevolusionêre Inligting Taak Span. There all the different guys were there.

There were different parts of the SAP but SADF, that was Military Intelligence and we had, National Intelligence was there, I do not know. Special Forces were the main user of their product. They coordinated the list to ensure that number 3 on the list is not National Intelligence agents. Some compromises did take place in that time. When we presented a list and we knew a guy was very senior and all of a sudden on the final list his name would not appear you make your deductions that National Intelligence or somebody took him off because he is a friendly stakeholder. But that is purely by deduction.

~~But this structure was there to coordinate all target related~~  
information and it was effective in the beginning. Later on personalities and other clashes resulted again in the problem that information was held back and not freely liaised. But the CCB that was sitting somewhere way outside the open structure was only the user via cutoffs. It was such a silly thing really. When I ended up here Joe Verster called me in and he said: "I should sever all ties with the formal structure," for one reason only, if I go and ask this guy to give me information about Joe Nthlanthla, and Joe Nthlanthla is killed tomorrow this guy will say Chris Nel was involved in the killing of Joe Nthlanthla and he would link me to that operation and it will be compromised.

So it became extremely difficult for me to perform the Intelligence function for the CCB. Because I was spoiled in the

old system where you would pick up a telephone, make an arrangement with somebody and say: "I need information about this individual." And he will give it to you and it will be available. Or you will go to the computer and it is there. All this information was available on the data base either of the Police or Military Intelligence and National Intelligence.

So we, Joe was a bit naive to think that we can establish our own Intelligence system starting from a fresh. I kept secret links with guys inside the system. I recruited them now as my co-workers. Silly as it might sound I am a member of the Defence

~~Force but I must recruit and handle another guy inside Special~~  
Forces head quarters to give me access to his information because I do not have access. I cannot go any more to the head quarters and do it myself.

Then we wasted government money by when you need information about Mr X you would put his name amongst 10 others and you will tell the guy: "Please give me information about these guys?" And you will only use ten percent of that, that is relevant to you. And that guy might get the impression that this is your target list but it was still risky. But we tried to build in cutoffs between ourselves and the rest. While Joe Verster believed in reconnaissance. All he needed was an address, a photo, a map for the pinpoint of where that guy stays. From there he would use his regions to go and collect. To do reconnaissance.

So-called pre-study. And that was his ideal. The most secured way. When I came over to the CCB he asked me to bring as much information with me as possible without being detected. And that information served to a large extent as a starting point for reconnaissance. Because all I needed was to say: "This is Lilanda, in this street, next to the green house there is a house belonging to Peter Baroku. And this is the photo and they would go and do a reconnaissance and confirm and come back. We did not need to build up dossiers of old information. They need current and future information.

~~So while the CCB was operational from 1988 onwards the~~  
level of cooperation with the normal open system was very limited. Joe himself had liaison with National Intelligence by means of liaison with certain individuals. Specifically with the Counter, Intelligence Counter Espionage part of it. He came to me a few times and from the information that he gave me was more or less: "Watch out for certain operations, the ZCIO knows about it." Then we would stop it because he had early warning from the Counter Espionage guys from National Intelligence. That is what he told me at one stage. But formal liaison with these structures stopped completely when the CCB went totally underground.

But above the line the organisations that closely interacted with each other was DCC, Special Tasks, which is some times

totally confused with Special Forces. The guys who used to work with Renamo and Unita and the Liberation Army of Lesotho. There was a lot of interaction between these different forces. And that information was made available to Special Forces which had one reconnaissance regiment and 2 rekkie, they were still doing jobs. But those things that needed to be done totally covertly was dribbled down the line here to us.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now I just want to address you to, seeing that you have mentioned the fact that Joe Verster had at one point raised with you that for instance matters in respect of ~~certain targets had been, information had been brought to him for~~

instance from the Counter Espionage people (...indistinct) I would like to (...intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go to that Mr Khoisan, Mr Daniels wanted to follow up a question with a question on some of the issues you have already raised.

MR DANIELS: Sorry just one second. Mr Nel you mentioned this capacity that you had to intercept all telex traffic between ANC operatives. Was that interception effected by satellite?

MR NEL: Yes.

MR DANIELS: ~~Was that a NIS satellite or had they bought time on satellite?~~

MR NEL: I have no technical detail of exactly how that worked. All I saw was it was activated whenever certain words were

broadcasted. Some times we were frustrated when you would only get the last part of a conversation only when the word "UmKhonto" appeared for instance. I am not a technical expert. It is as if a number of key words were punched into a system. Whenever those things were broadcasted. What was that thing? DIA, was the Department of International Affairs of the ANC. There used to be printouts this thick but it was international companies communicating the diameter of certain parts that need to be transported. And it was junk printouts but we used to get. And then there also I think, I do not know whether it is frequencies or names of people, Mendi Msimang and Solly Smith and those people they were always, when those names were on the air we had those printouts.

So it was explained to me as by satellite, telex communication. Only not radio communication. And whether they bought time on a satellite or to my knowledge there were no existing owned satellite capability.

MR KHOISAN: Okay seeing that you mentioned the issue of Trevits and the way I understand it you know I would like to draw your attention to a document that you have in front of you called "Top Secret copy 5 of 8 copies." It is from the general manager Counter Espionage. I do not know if you looked at it. Okay if you have taken a look at this document point 41 and I do not want to read the document into. Maybe you can explain your

own meaning with regard to this document. But point 41 on the document: "The following senior members inter alia served Trevits at various stages from 1986 to 1992. From the SAP; Colonel Jack Buchner, Colonel Bob Beukes, Major Tom Louw, Colonel Karel Victor, Captain Piet Vermeulen, Colonel Hawkins, Captain Chris van Zyl, Colonel Dannie Mulder, Colonel Andrew Beukes, Captain Doep du Preez, Captain Coetzee, Lieutenant Snyman. The following persons in chronological order acted as chairperson from 1986 to 1992: Colonel Jack Buchner, Colonel Beukes, Colonel Karel Victor, Colonel Hawkins, Colonel Dan Mulder, Colonel Andre Beukes.

From the SADF: Captain Koos Smith, Major James Marx, Lieutenant Deon Voster, Captain Roelf Skoeman, Lieutenant Lieb Venter, Lieutenant Heyn Breytenbach, Lieutenant Adries de Jager, Major Benny Gerriker, Commandant Kallie Steyn.

From NIS an appropriate period of secondment specific dates cannot be recalled. Andre Steenkamp, Frans du Preez, Dannie du Plessis, Riaan Roos, Karina Bernadi. NIS management members who knew about Trevits were kept informed with regard to the functioning of the following: Johan Mostert, Maritz Spaarwater, S E D Hofmeyer, J S Claasen, Willem Theron, J H van der Berg, Paul Gom. And NIS representative at Trevits were drawn from division N51. And the following members of divisional management were also supposed to be informed about



Trevits and its functioning: Frik Baarman, Tobie van Rensburg, Gert Sandman, Nel Marais, Johan Engelbrecht, J A S Marais."

Those names that have been mentioned and I know there are many I do not want to confuse you or anything. But I want you to read all those names into the record for the purpose that it will stand. It is a document that comes from NIS their Counter Espionage division. Do you know any of these people? Can you explain to us how they fit into the system? And there is a wide, I mean as you can see the amount of NIS people attached to NIS and people who knew about NIS these are some very senior ~~people and people who have not really appeared before this~~

Commission in any public arena. Can you discuss with this Committee your impressions of some of the people here and also how this system worked in terms of the liaise and the connection between these various people? Because some of these people have actually applied for amnesty in respect of certain acts.

MR NEL: I slotted into a time frame of interaction with them 1986 February, I was away for a while in Italy but 1987 and then November 1988 I resigned and thereafter I continued indirect contact with some of the individuals on a personal basis who ~~knew where I went and who acted for me as agents. if you want~~ to call it that way. In 1986, 1987 if I recall correctly the first of group of people, I visited their offices a few times that is why we were at projects. And I wish to explain projects because it is also

important that to peruse this thing or pursue this whole matter that project section at Special Forces also played a very important role. And the interaction I will explain that little bit in detail.

But there were at that stage, there was a Brigadier Beukes, a SAP guy in charge. And the NIS guy was Dannie du Plessis. Now I had extensive interaction with this specific person also later on. Which I think can little bit shed a light on possible operations of National Intelligence that will prove that they were not so lily white. This person had very intimate knowledge.

~~Specifically about Harare and the so-called whites in Harare. We~~

had a lot of interaction with him because Derek Hanekom and a number of, Father Michael <sup>Lapsley</sup> Lapsy and those were in Harare. Right it appears to be that Harare was a place where whites fitted into the frontline States easier. In Lusaka and so they would stand out. But we used him a lot to get more information. And NIS had a very good system or they had that group of whites in Harare infiltrated very well. They knew a lot about their activities.

And Tom Louw was the representative here from. He is a very soft spoken person you can easily fall asleep if you speak to him. ~~And from the SADF there was a Major James Marx~~ representing the Defence Force there. That is the time frame that I had most of my interaction with them. And that was shortly after it was set up. And they were still sorting out their finger

trouble. But we had different desks at projects. Maybe just for the record I should put them for. We had a Lieutenant Colonel or a Commandant Chris Everts. He was our expert on Lusaka and on Zambia and Tanzania.

And then we had a Major or he was still a captain then, Captain Henry van der Westhuizen should be a name not unfamiliar to you. He was specialising on Swaziland and Mozambique, very closely cooperating with Eugene de Kock. Because the Police regarded Swaziland as their hunting ground, whatever they want to call it. They regarded as their right to operate in Swaziland. And Henry van der Westhuizen latched up with the Vlakplaas crowd extensively. He was a member seconded to projects from Defence Intelligence. Chris Everts was also seconded from Defence Intelligence or from DCC, from Covert Collect.

~~Then we had a Captain Leon Neft. He was an army~~  
Intelligence member like myself. He specialised on Zimbabwe. And then there was a Captain Chris Nel who specialised on Angola and Botswana. Then there was a Lieutenant (...intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Chris Nel that is yourself?

MR NEL: Myself. Then there was a Lieutenant Paul Uschker who worked on Lesotho. He was still learning. They gave him the lower priority area. And then later on when the new priority

came, that was more or less in late 1986 a Captain Chris Cloete was appointed to work on whites, SACP senior guys and internally, internal structures. That was our project section. If I can remember that is all of them. And there were secretaries and people doing ordinary work.

But we liaised with Trevits on an individual basis for our needs. I would liaise with structure about Angola and Botswana and so who all the other guys. We would not go together as a group or, it was an individual liaison basis. So I only know about the parts that I liaised about. And Captain Leon Neft had very, ~~very big interaction with Dannie du Plessis because of their~~ intense involvement in Harare. I could detect that National Intelligence did not have very good cover for instance in Botswana or Zambia or not the same level of external cover than what they had in Zimbabwe.

~~Later on this person while I was at the CCB I kept contact~~ with Dannie du Plessis on a personal liaison basis. He was my contact in National Intelligence. And we lived close, in the same area. And up till today I still do not understand the specific incident. And I wish to put it on record because this is matters that I feel should be known and I do not want to keep it back. He approached me after learning from Henry van der Westhuizen who worked with me which was also a very good friend of his, I think they served in some culture organisation together. It was a

popular thing at that stage to belong to the - what do you call it. The junior organisations, the Broerder Bond. The Rapport ryers. I always suspected that these guys were part of that cultural, they had that cultural interaction or that political interaction, what you want to call it. But this guy approached me and he asked me whether I could organise some chemical substance for him because they had a problem with a double agent in Zimbabwe in Harare. When I later approached Joe Verster about this and I said to him I received a request from du Plessis he wanted a chemical substance. He was initially not very specific whether he needed to ~~kill the person or he just wanted to get the person to sleep. But I~~ wanted to get permission and authority from Joe to carry on. There was always this position of mistrust between us and National Intelligence.

To make a very long story short, Dannie gave me all his specifications what he needed. I detected that they wanted the guy dead but they wanted him to die later. And he was very concerned that it should not be a substance that will make the guy collapse after 15 minutes or while in conversation.

And I played the middle man and that is how I first learned ~~about the chemical capability available to the CCB. Joe gave me~~ permission, he said it was good in the interest. Maybe he liaised with other people on his level. And he later gave me permission to go ahead to liaise with a certain Doctor Frans. Now what

Frans' surname is I do not know. A very tall guy he used to come to the CCB offices dressed in a white sort of overcoat appearing to be either a doctor or a chemist. Other people knows him. He was not unfamiliar in Special Forces. He used to work as a medical sort of assistant to Special Forces. A big guy. This guy arranged these things with somebody outside today with the advantage of hindsight I can say either Wouter Basson or <sup>Wolhar</sup> Lotta Neethling or those guys. And he came back to me with 3 little bottles. And they were different substances. The one was a sleeping, 2 bottles were a sleeping substance and the other one was lethal. ~~With a lot of instructions how after he questioned me~~ a lot about the size of this person and what type of party it is going to be and whatever the case is. I gave him all the details that I gathered from him and I gave this guy the substance. But he was only interested in one bottle. And I kept the other 2 back and I late gave it to Henry van der Westhuizen.

So he explained to me that they have their own little operational wing and they do certain operations themselves. If some of their agents are in danger. That this is in fact an international acceptable thing that people do these things. I believe the Israelis specifically. ~~But that made me believe that~~ they had the operational capability to do certain operations themselves. I had very little exposure to National Intelligence other than that part of Intelligence liaison with Dannie du Plessis.

But they were always regarded as the higher order Intelligence organisation. Our operations were always subjected to final authority where National Intelligence will stamp or not stamp. If that answers your question?

MR KHOISAN: Ja that answers our question over there. Just while we on this, can you give us an idea of point 5.1 division N51 of NIS? What was that? Do you know anything about that?

MR NEL: No I have no idea how they are structured and I know that they have also Counter Intelligence, Counter Espionage and they have Intelligence but the numbers and the figures and the names of these sub-sections I have no knowledge of.

MR KHOISAN: Okay point 7.1 of this document and to summarise it, it says that there are allegations out there that NIS was involved in Trevits and that they are connected to the end users of the product. The product being Intelligence, the end product being that somebody might end up dead or maimed or disrupted. In your view is that a, can that stand? Can it be stated that the ones who were involved in managing the Intelligence system and processing the Intelligence can be disconnected from the end result which would be the killing of the intended target?

MR NEL: I think it is for that exact reason that I applied about a year ago for amnesty. Or I wrote to the nodal point and I asked them that I would like to get legal advice on what is a conspiracy and how my role as an Intelligence officer fitted into a conspiracy

and whether I should apply for amnesty or not. And many Intelligence officers still sitting there lily white and who did exactly the same work as we were doing. And who were acting in support of us, knowing what the end product was all about, do not feel that they had any, in this chain of events they did not play any specific role. Because the operator who physically pulled the trigger is the guy who is going to bear the brunt in the end.

I have a different, totally different approach. There is a specific document in the file that you gave me where there was a meeting between Counter Espionage element of National Intelligence with the so-called group of 30 CCB guys who were litigating, who were refusing to accept their package. Now that meeting took place shortly after I left that group. But if you study that document you will read between the lines that the National Intelligence operatives who had the interaction with Joe Verster and his people were quite concerned that National Intelligence should get its own act together. They should use that document or that interaction that they had with CCB to learn a lot of lessons about their own structures. Because he states there in that document that there is very little difference between the way the CCB structured itself covertly with the way that National Intelligence was structured and working.

And a lot of the activities of National Intelligence will not become known if it is not specifically opened up. I have given you



a starting point maybe to call a specific person and ask him about this. I was concerned that this guy would maybe he did this to trick me into a situation but, after that I never heard about this and I could not link it to anybody's death. But there were definite indications of covert dirty tricks type of operations that National Intelligence was involved in.

So what I am trying to say to you is very little is known about National Intelligence and a lot is known about the CCB for one specific reason. One guy was arrested. His name was Ferdie Barnard. And he exposed the organisation and thereafter it was, ~~there was a board of enquiry. There was an enquiry and that is~~ why it is known what went on. Other government structures and a lot of individuals.

There is a specific person you mentioned his name, Kallie Steyn. I used a lot of his information directly for target purposes. ~~People compiled reports tailor made for operators to kill other people with. And he is today the, I think he is the personal assistant of General Meiring. And nobody ever called those people to come and testify. And because I have a tag on me, I was in the CCB I will maybe testify the next 10 years. I do not mind doing that. But we must look at this thing wholistically. I was a captain. I was acting on instructions of people 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 layers above of me. And they should know 3, 4, 5, 6 times more than what I know. It will be if you want to get to the total picture those people who started the strategy, those people who decided~~

around a table that there should be a list and there should be blanket authority, those people can tell you every little detail. But maybe we should start with the Indians to get to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask in connection with that? When we had the Armed Forces hearings and even earlier than that we met people in the NIS, Spaarwater, Louw and all those people. And as far as NIS is concerned the dominant impression that we left with there was that this was a group of people according to themselves, who did no more than just collecting Intelligence. That they never were party to gross violations of human rights in ~~any sort of form. And that the worse that they did was to engage~~

in dirty tricks operations that destroyed peoples' reputations in so far as they listened to their conversations and their love affairs and all that. But Louw who was leading the discussion and Spaarwater to some extent and the others, created an impression that they were just a group of people who were listening in, getting Intelligence, gathering Intelligence. And that in no way can they be associated with the Commission of any gross violations of human rights.

And even when there was a specific question, I think Mr Magadhla asked that question as to whether information that they collected and passed it on and they passed it on to operatives and they later learned that the targets had been eliminated, can't they accept responsibility and (...indistinct) for those sort of fatalities

of injuries or disruptions, call it what you may. They evaded that question. So I would just like to get your impressions on that. That is the first one.

The second one is Kat Liebenberg, Geldenhuys and even Joep Joubert - accept that Joep Joubert was in problems when we dealt with Ribero. But the general attitude by those generals is that the SADF, especially internally were not involved in gross violations of human rights. They only supported the Police in their operations. Although of course a person like former Commissioner Coetzee distanced himself even from that. But what

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is your impression? Are we getting the truth from the SADF generals when they create the impression that: "No man look internally the Police were the people who were responsible for chasing terrorists inside the country and killing them. We were not involved. That was not our agendas"? So it is two questions in one.

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MR NEL: Ja it is true that the SADF primarily focused its covert operations externally. It is true. But to say that they were not involved internally or they were, that part of their involvement internally is negligibly small, it is something that should be forgotten and. When the system of "die GBS".

MR KHOISAN: The joint management committees.

MR NEL: Correct. When that system started wherever you had commanders who originally started their careers in the Western

Front were in positions of leadership or co-chairmanship. Co-chairmanship was just a rumour in certain instances. Wherever those commanders were appointed in that joint management system the military, let's put it bluntly, took over. It happened in Namibia that in 1973 the Police declared their inability to deal with the border war and then the army came and the Defence Force came and took over.

And ever since then the Police worked in support of the SADF. And that was a mind-set of soldiers that: "I can use the policemen where I need one if we are going to go to court. I need

~~a policeman or two here at my road block, just to be there so that~~

if ever we have to go to court there was somebody to take down statements and to start up a docket." But the Defence Force

said, we bluntly stated it. I was part of that, in that group of people who said that the policemen should go back and be properly trained. They do not know how to deal with this. This is war. It is not police work in, you do not do normal police work

here. That is why Koevoet was also developed into a para-military type of force because the Police realised whatever they were trained for was not enough to solve that kind of problem in the

Western Front. And they came back and Koevoet never existed back at home but there were not any real, there was good cooperation with the policemen that we met up in the northern part of the border. Soweto had a few ex-Koevoet guys or a ex-

SAP security guy, "Veiligheid" people and there we would say cooperation with the Police is fine. But they will always be our servants. We will tell them what to do and they will do it. Or where cooperation works well according to Military definition is where the Police accept that secondary role.

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me just on that. Was that the same as for instance de Kock's outfit? Because I get the impression that de Kock was or he has been projected as having been a law unto himself and he did his own operations and in actual fact he despised some elements of the SADF and did not take kindly to ~~interferences from any one, including the Special Forces.~~

MR NEL: We regarded de Kock as the Special Forces of the Police. There was a lot of jealousy. That started specifically in the time when General Bardenhorst was the commander up in 2 Military area or Sector 10. Because of personal clashes between himself and General Dreyer from the Police, Koevoet, one specific month we cassavat more SADF members from fights between SADF and Koevoet than what we cassavat for injuries in war. Because of the internal fighting that took place between the army and the SADF and Koevoet up in Oshikati. That situation was turned around through mediation after General Joubert took over.

But de Kock was the primary reason for the problems between the SADF and the Police and Koevoet up on the border. And the fact that de Kock had to leave the operational area I

believe was after a fight between his unit and 25 engineer squadron where I think about 12 or 15 people were put on an aeroplane late at night back to one military hospital. That was the origin of the problem round de Kock and forming his own little private kingdom if you want to call it that, becoming an untouchable but becoming a machine that. The biggest guilt of those in charge of them were the omissions of correcting his mistakes. Because everybody knew that half of his unit suffered from post traumatic stress and all those things that resulted in excessive drinking and, and, and. But it was acceptable to leave it ~~to continue because they were using that anger against the enemy~~ of the State.

The same thing happened in Special Forces we had elements that went <sup>"bossies"</sup> ~~that Bossies~~ and people who would act funny but there was never any recognition of that problem. That is an argument for another day. But the position of National Intelligence, the position of the SAP versus the SADF there were no doubts about the different layers. Out in the commandos in the commands, in the territorial areas of the country the army was in charge whenever there was a crisis. The Defence Force would take ~~charge because of our arrogant stance of "we know how to plan,~~ we were taught how to plan. And the Police jump in a van and go and try and solve a problem and they normally end up in an ambush and run away. While the Military have a much more

structured approach and we have the force levels to our capability and we have the resources. " And we assume that superior part and role. And in most areas where former Western Front guys were in charge of commands that was obvious that the army was always controlling the situation.

The information that we used to carry out operations in Special Forces in the CCB was to be honest with you Sir, the CCB had, I am embarrassed to say that there I was Intelligence Officer of the CCB, that the CCB had a very inferior capability to generate its own Intelligence. It was totally dependent on what ~~we could get from elsewhere. Unfortunately I never kept the~~

National Intelligence reports that I had in my files and they were normally the most useful ones. Because they used to pinpoint and answer all the so-called W's -where is this guy staying? What is his photos and his activities? And in which capacity is he serving? In which organisation? They knew the people back to front. And they had the biggest capability also domestically and internationally. And whenever we had problems in Europe, Eban Barno will maybe be able to talk more authorative about this. He was our Intelligence Officer for region 5 in Europe. And that was ~~the domain of National Intelligence. We had very scanty~~ information about Europe and whenever you needed to do something in Europe without the assistance and the knowledge of

*Eben  
Barlow?*

National Intelligence you would be very naive. Because they will provide you with more accurate stuff.

I have no doubt that there was formal liaison between the, at Trevits level things were compiled. You will not necessarily receive a report stating it is National Intelligence but if you will receive a Trevits report will all the input from the different role players in it. And if anybody comes today and say: "I do not know what was intended, what was the intention of this product." Sir he is lying. Because we knew that the purpose of collecting information was to disrupt the enemy of the State.

~~And if you read in that specific document that you referred~~  
to earlier Mr Zinzile about the CCB working in direct support of the objectives of the National Army you will find that the objective of the National Army, objective number 1 out of 4 was to win the war. It was stated in that kind of words. The Army was, in 1988 priority number 1 was to win the war. Which war I do not know today because I know that there was never a declared state of war with the privilege of hindsight. But the psychosis and the whole atmosphere that prevailed was there is a war. And I am an Intelligence Officer in a war. And what do Intelligence officers do in a war? They provide information to kill the enemy to win the war.

And any Intelligence who say: "I am collecting information to put on a data bases to store there forever and ever and ever and make it grow old and then forget about it." And waste



millions of government money to do nothing other than advising the President on strategy - is talking nonsense. There is different layers of Intelligence. There is tactical Intelligence, there is operational Intelligence and there is strategic Intelligence. Tactical and operational Intelligence is used to destroy the enemy. Strategic Intelligence is there to determine policy and National Intelligence were collecting information on all those layers. Not only on strategic level. If that answers your question?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Magadhla would like to follow up with a question.

~~MR MAGADHLA:~~ Thank you Mr Chair Mr Nel or Colonel Nel

you, not only yourself but a lot of other people who have been before us here have spoken about these target lists that have been compiled from time to time but I had hoped that perhaps today we might just get to an area where we were to be saying that of these targets that we had today you have actually mentioned, we have mentioned a list of these targets by name. Now the fact that of all these targets that have, some of whom have been mentioned here today whereas the instruction had been or that the idea had been that they were to disrupted or destroyed, meaning they would have been killed. Now it does not seem any of these people that have been mentioned were killed. What does that indicate? Does it indicate that, that whole idea in actual fact failed?

MR NEL: That is what I am trying to tell people for a long time now and that is part of my own embarrassment. The CCB was officially moving into this kind of strategy in 1988 in November and then we were told to establish ourselves underground and to work specifically on this new method of disruption. But your first step would be to establish your blue plan that would create your freedom of movement for you to do credible covert work inside your blue plan. And then work with your red plan which was the disruption plan inside that. Now any, if you go today and ask the CIA to set up a structure like that they would tell you: "We need ~~about 10 years to come to production level."~~ Because just to get a credible business running and get freedom of movement going you need time.

And by the time when we - were sent on small business development corporation courses to just try think businessmen, we were still busy setting up the structures when the change in politics resulted in the 2nd of February speeches. Surely in the years prior to that the same priorities existed. The same people were regarded as targets. Whatever they could do in Botswana, in Lesotho they did. There were cross border raids. Many cross border raids by Special Forces. But the CCB idea and the concept of CCB operations really only got off the ground in November 1988. And by mid 1989 you will recall that there was this (...indistinct) revolution between PW Botha and FW and the

changes in politics and all the rumours that things are going to change.

So in terms of a covert project it can sometimes take you up to 2 years to get a good informer or a good co-worker close to a target to be able to do a job within this definition of non-traceability. If we wanted to be unprofessional in our external operations surely we could have killed many people by drive by shootings and hit and run. But the South African government would have been the primary suspect of the operations. So why do it in that way? Rather send the Special Forces team in uniform ~~and to go and do that. We did blow up offices. We did send~~ parcel bombs. We did do funny chemical operations but they were never, we were never in a position. Yes surely operators phoned from London and said: "I saw Joe Slovo going into this building. He is going to come out now, now. Do I have the authority to go ahead with the plan? But I have a little bit of a problem with escape and evasion," and so and so and we said: "No stop." The chiefs would just not make a decision at such short notice.

The opportunities were there to do it unprofessionally. The intentions were and the reason why so-called good CCB operators ~~are very grugged today is because why did Joe Verster allow such~~ unprofessional people to work in region 6 to be exposed for being involved in such nonsense that they were involved in? That resulted in the total downfall.

There was no long term strategy. It was like as I mentioned a few times now the last kicks of a dying horse. Put this thing together, try and put something, get something productive within a year or two that is normally taking in any covert international standard covert terms normally would take you 5 years minimum had to produce as the horse was galloping, the foal was born. And it was asking for troubles. So that is the reason why and I am happy today to say that the changes came before this structure could become productive. Because many people would have been killed if this structure was still going on today.

~~MR MAGADHLA:~~ ~~Would this also mean that you would not~~  
 even claim the operation that was carried out by <sup>Walus</sup> ~~Vallusek~~ for instance or would for whom was he carrying out that operation himself? Would it not have been part of this or some kind of one that did not get away?

MR NEL: If I quickly recall successes of the CCB, things that one, there is a feeling in a office if news breaks about a certain operation and the winking of eyes and people know that certain operations were done. The things that I got the impression that CCB operators were involved in such as Dulcie September, such as Anton <sup>Lubowski</sup> ~~Labosky~~, possibly David Webster. But the way Webster was done made me feel that maybe because of the unprofessional behaviour of region 6, it was not supposed to be done in such a

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But after 1991 in March - and this is something that maybe I am too naive to believe certain things and I am not well informed. After 1991 in May a lot of good CCB operators who

were good in the time frame of them supposed to be good, turned out to hate the SA government. Hate in the sense that "I will never do any dirty work for FW de Klerk or anybody related to the National Party or anything like that again." Because you will never, I cannot even recall my own depression and feelings of rejection and things that where we had to go through from sitting right there on top and feeling very special and hand picked down to the ground saying: "Take your pie and waai. Here is a few hundred thousand rand and keep your mouth shut. We are not going to re-employ you even. You will contaminate."

~~So surely in that process of exposing the CCB a lot of~~  
people who maybe prior to that knew nothing about covert operations read about a small detail of how these things are conducted in the newspapers. And it takes 2 guys with 6 brain cells to plan a murder like the one that Walus committed. When that happened I was in the Ciskei. I remember one of my people phoning me the morning and said to me that Chris Hani was killed. And when I learnt about the arrest of the person who was involved shortly after that it, the whole sounded and it had all the colours of a typical right wing operation. Because if you go back in all the type of AWB operations you will find there was an incident a bomb blast and 2 or 3 days later somebody would be arrested. ...(tape ends)

It takes two guys with six brain cells to plan a murder like the one Walus committed. When that happened I was in the

Ciskei and I remember one of my people phoning me the morning and saying to me that Chris Hani was killed. When I learnt about the rest of the persons who were involved shortly after that, the whole thing sounded and it had all the colours, of a typical rightwing operation because if you go back in all the types of AWB operations you will find there was an incident, a bomb blast and two or three days later somebody would be arrested. When I saw the involvement of - okay, let me put it to you bluntly, when I heard that Gay Derby-Lewis and her husband - I once met a lady who was a very good friend of Gay Derby-Lewis, while I was travelling around with <sup>Gqozo</sup> Ghozo in his COSAG Alliance days, those guys were thinking radical at that stage.

Prior to the election the COSAG Alliance and those people involved with <sup>Gatsha</sup> Gatsha and Tienie Groenewald and those, they were thinking along the lines of having their own hit squads and killing certain individuals, which was becoming easier now because the guys were back at home, Chris Hani was going around the streets of Boksburg, so you didn't need a CCB to do an operation like that, anybody could do that and who had the intention to that. I won't believe it if they say FW de Klerk had the intention to do that. If you say his rightwing political parties had the intention, I would believe that and that Janus Walus was part of a Gay Derby-Lewis and Clive Derby-Lewis plot, with the knowledge of possibly others as well, that's sounds correct to me.

And that it was part - what is possible and specifically the death of - who was that Dutch Reformed Church that was shot through the window, Heyns, that type of operation, you would think yes, maybe this is a special forces type or a gun for hire that fell into the hands of somebody who had that motive or that need to get somebody. There are mavericks out there, there are people.

I did an investigation now for three months on a former CCB colleague by the name of Johan Niemoller. He is capable of killing people, his politics are so absurd to the right that I find it difficult to identify with people to say that I was in the same organisation as those people, but they were there and some of them fitted hand in glove, for the type of work that the government wanted them to do.

The biggest danger that we pointed out to the government in 1991 is the way they demobilised CCB. They made enemies for themselves, they made enemies, they let loose a number of maverick types with grudges which eventually created the opportunity for or pool of highly trained expertise for hire.

Fortunately something, and people will differ from me, but fortunately something like Executive Outcomes happened, to grab up a lot of people who were jobless, who were grudging, who would do a lot of things if the right money was going to be paid, took them away somewhere to keep them busy in Angola.



And just to prove to you, some of the guys who would have extreme rightwing politics would now go and fight with the MPLA Government which was portrayed as part of the communist bear against UNITA, loyalty was no longer the issue here. It was more a matter of who can employ me, who can keep me fed, that eventually - so the possibility that some former CCB guys, but so there are guns for hire. If you page through page the: Soldier of Fortune, you can hire them from anywhere, they are available.

MR MAGADLA: You also mentioned that there was a high profile plan of operation that was referred to Pik Botha which he turned down.

MR NEL: Yes, in my time at Special Forces Headquarters as I actually have explained to you, my primary responsibility in the initial 1986 was to develop - the government wanted a target - you will also see there in the:

"Priorities of Targets"

the first priority is:

"Targets met baie koppe"

"koppe" meant people killed, that was always priority one for the government, to attack a high profile target of MK, because they could not manage to do that at <sup>Caxito</sup> ~~Cashito~~ or <sup>Nova Katengue</sup> ~~Novakateng~~, they wanted a base to be attacked.

In 1986 when I arrived at Special Forces headquarters I was given the responsibility to work on Angola specifically to identify

a target with a large concentration of MK soldiers that can be attacked by the SADF and after doing extensive study of all the bases, Kakulama was identified as a possibility of a joint operation between UNITA and 5 Special Forces Regiment. After doing extensive research it was shelved because of distances and logistic.

Then it was decided that <sup>Viana</sup> Vuyana Camp, which is about 30 kilometres east of Luanda, would be attacked and I went all around the country and I had access to all information and I travelled abroad to Portugal and other places to debrief informers

~~and people who came from that area, to update that target. And~~  
today you can blindfold me, I can draw the base and every little thing that is inside it. I worked on it until the level that that target dossier was as thick as this.

~~It was presented at numerous occasions to high ranking~~  
officials up to the level where special forces operators were tasked to go and do a final reconnaissance and to plant flares around the base which were going to be ignited, activated by the airforce when they come in for the strike. That was going to be the very first totally joint operation where the airforce was going to exercise in operational circumstances their midair refuelling capability.

That operation went all the way up, the reconnaissance team went in and they marked the base and everything was 100%

correct and it was delayed and delayed because Pik's initiatives to start negotiating with the Cubans and National Intelligence didn't feel very comfortable with this.

I was sitting in the foyer of General Malan's office with Colonel Prinsloo many times to present this thing and to be on stand-by and eventually to the disappointment of many people and after a lot of money was wasted and used, of naval operations and air force planning and preparations and everything, it was stopped due to political reasons, not because it wasn't possible to carry out the operation but because it would have clashed with political initiatives at that stage. ~~It was the right target at the wrong time.~~

CHAIRPERSON: Let's take lunch now because we would like to resume fairly early. If we could resume at a quarter to two. Lunch will be served in one of the rooms Mr Malan, you and your client are welcome.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we then resume? May I introduce Mrs Mary Burton, one of the Commissioners in the Human Rights Violations Commission. She was not able to be with us in the morning. Miss Glenda Wildschut is not able to be with us this afternoon and so they have swapped. We are taking the evidence of Mr Christo Nel and he is represented by Mr Kobus Malan. Mr

Magadla wants to pursue some of the questioning that he had been doing and we should go ahead.

MR MAGADLA: You were saying Mr Nel, that at the time when you wanted to get your package there were threats that you would be exposed, was it when you did not want to take your package or was it when you wanted to take your package?

MR NEL: What resulted in that dispute between us and government or us and the Defence Force, us being the members of the CCB, in 1988 in November when we were told to resign we were made to believe that there is a plan, a personnel plan authorised at the highest possible level, we understood it was authorised by the Minister of Defence, that we will be treated different to the normal SADF guys in terms of our pension, in terms of our medical and other schemes.

However, when it happened that the CCB closed down we were treated as if we were normal SADF personnel and we were offered an inferior retirement package, inferior versus the package that we were supposed to get in terms of our personnel plan. Some of the members of the CCB accepted the offer that was made to them by the Defence Force in terms of the calculation made on the normal way, how civil servants are treated while a group of, initially it was about 40 CCB members which includes myself, refused to accept that package and we

demanded to be treated in terms of our contracts that we signed with the Defence Force.

And then there's a long story of intimidation and funny clever tactics that were applied by the Defence Force and the legal teams representing them to get us to accept the reduced severance package and eventually those people who continued to litigate were paid a different package, much higher than the normal CCB or the rest of the CCB people were paid.

I was initially in that group of people who wanted to fight for my contract to be honoured but due to the fact that they served me with a legal account of R118,000 and the threat that my furniture will be sold at auction, I accepted the package that they offered me, the reduced package. That is where that situation developed.

One of the methods of threatening CCB members who didn't want to accept the package was that their names would be published in the newspaper and so forth and none of us wanted to be exposed because we were dealing with people in other countries that we supposed not to know our identity and exposing our identities it would open up a can of worms internationally and it would create dangers for ourselves but also for the government.

MR MAGADLA: Well that is just the reason why I'm asking this question because if they pushed you to a point where you were to expose or to reveal that you were members of the CCB or if they

exposed you as such, then you stood a better chance of actually exposing them and exposing the deeds of the government in foreign lands and - I mean they should be the ones who have been really pleading with you to accept the best package that you bargained for instead of doing what they did because you had all this knowledge of things that happened abroad.

MR NEL: In one of the files that was given to us to study over the weekend or to peruse it over the weekend there is a specific report contained in that where a member of National Intelligence went to speak to this group of, let's call them: "rebel CCB members", and that person, unidentified, I couldn't detect who it was, advised his superiors that they should approach the President to point out to him the risks involved in the way these CCB members are treated, were treated at that stage and that their advice, their National Intelligence advice was to pay these people in terms of their contracts and get the matter over and done with because the government only realised what our contracts entailed when they calculated the severance packages that they have proved when our personnel plan was tabled to them in 1988 or prior to that, 1986 already.

They realised that they did not have the money to pay us or it was going to become an absolute embarrassment to the government if it turned out that each one of the CCB members would walk out there as millionaires and they tried to save money

for the government but in the meantime there were enormous other risks that they did not calculate and I think the National Intelligence Report resulted in a settlement between those remaining members and government to get that matter handled and finished.

Whereafter the government came back to those members who were initially, who initially signed the acceptance of the inferior packages and paid an additional amount to each of us, they were in fact a double payment, a second payment in 1993 made to CCB members which was more or less equal to the initial payment. My total payout was in the order of R280 000 which the initial one was in the order of R150, R160 000 for about 15 years service.

MR MAGADLA: You were saying that when you got to the Ciskei you found Anton Niewoudt and Clive Brink being involved in some funny things, could you specify on those?

MR NEL: When I joined the Ciskei Intelligence Service in May 1991, as I said to you earlier Sir, that there a number of former CCB members there, former DCC members as well, and there were two specific individuals who were not involved to my observation, were not involved in intelligence collection only.

And there was a specific evening when things happened in the Ciskei where a lot of rumours were going around the next day - was it during May, maybe June, I can't remember it specifically,

where there were reports in the newspapers of a senior ANC member's house that was attacked in Dimbaza and the next at the IRCIS offices there was a lot of winking eyes and a lot of tired people.

I later learnt from conversations and people's admittance that there was in fact two or three of the IRCIS guys involved in this attack on Smuts Ngonjama's house. That was sort of drive by shooting in a very unprofessional way, people using a car that was traceable back to them and the only thing that might sound covert to that operation was the fact that they used an AK47.

~~This is from hearsay that I obtained later on. And that~~  
made me believe that they were involved in more than just intelligence collection. The primary activity of that organisation was in fact collection of intelligence. There were a number of Ciskeians also involved in that organisation which I cannot point any fingers to as doing anything else than collecting information but that specific incident is what I refer to.

MR MAGADLA: ...[inaudible] that you received in Italy, what kind of training was this?

MR NEL: The training I received in Italy was primarily interrogation, questioning, it was presented by SESMI, that is the Secret Service of Italy. We were only four. It was quite a secret at that stage because I don't think Italy wanted the world to know that they were training South Africans.



We did interview some of their agents that used to serve in Cuba and we did have opportunity to question some of their special forces people. It was mainly in covert collection means as well as questioning people without them knowing that they are being questioned, how to have an interview with somebody in a bar and how to extract information out of somebody unconsciously.

That was what the Italians thought they could teach us in exchange for a lot of information that they needed from us, how to deal with crisis situations with so-called terrorist interrogation, how do you get somebody who just planted a limpet mine to admit to you within that period available to you before the bomb explodes, without using violence, how do we go about it. There was a lot of interaction and there was a lot of informal exchange of information on that course.

MR MAGADLA: Would it have included ways of, maybe updated ways of torturing people or suspects?

MR NEL: No, there were specifically focused away from using third degree interrogation from the Italian side. They were under the impression that we only used third degree methods for tactical interrogation. The course helped a lot to open up relations with them and to make them understand that we are not only using the tactics of hitting lizards to become crocodiles, it was a very intellectual course.

A lot of it that was taught or discussed was in fact the negative effects of third degree interrogation, that you get confessions under pressure that is sometimes negative in the long run and voluntary confessions were the best for us to get. There were a lot of discussions about third degree methods that were used specifically in Southern America, Latin America and those places, things that boiled down to psychological torture but in form of discussion and not in what was officially taught.

MR MAGADLA: You also spoke about Danie du Plessis of NIS and about the chemical that he was after, could you elaborate on that?

MR NEL: To go into a little more detail, the time frame I'm not sure, I'll have to sit down and think but it was in '88 maybe early '89 when I was approached by National Intelligence operator Danie du Plessis for assistance. If I can remember correctly, it was an activity that was initiated through discussion via Henry van der Westhuizen with Danie du Plessis where he learnt about possible assistance that I can give him for chemical substances that they needed.

I met with this guy at Verwoerdburg City just outside Pretoria where we had a long discussion about the possibility of ~~me supplying him with, let's call it poison, because they had a~~ problem with one of their agents being in a dangerous situation where he can be exposed by somebody else's double agent. The

detail of that I cannot recall all of it and the names of people involved but he did tell me in fair amount of detail what their problem entailed.

I did offer to him the assistance of the CCB, that we can do that type of operation but he insisted that they would prefer to clean up their own business and that is where I deducted that NIS has it's own operational capability and they just needed this assistance from me because it was true that we had access to - via a doctor that permanently served in the CCB structures, to chemical, to poison.

~~That is how I then volunteered or I assisted him in getting~~  
that substance from the doctor, which I named earlier as Doctor Franz who worked with us. He didn't work there permanently at the offices but he came there from time to time, you could page him and he would visit the offices. I put to him the requirement in detail and he wanted certain information again about, as I explained earlier, the weight of the person involved and the circumstances, how much drinking was going to take place, whether it's going to be a controlled environment and eating and other stuff.

And then at the second meeting after that I handed over to him a substance in a transparent bottle which was understood by me to be poison that would have a slow effect and kill the man eventually but not instantly. I never received any feedback,

although the doctor asked me to get feedback from the man, if the job was successful or not.

I contacted Danie du Plessis at a later stage to get feedback and he said there is no specific feedback that he can give me because he hasn't got direct access to that operation anymore.

MR MAGADLA: Had you, before then, engaged in this type of thing where you had to handle poisons, hand them over to certain people or administer those poisons to certain people yourself?

MR NEL: There was a specific instance before that. I was dealing with an agent in Zimbabwe and I had all the reason to believe that this agent was double-handled by somebody else and that he was in fact reporting to other masters on the other side.

After long discussions with Joe Verster about this issue, we came to a preliminary plan and said: right, that we cannot stand the risk of continuing with this operation and that we should get rid of this person but there are certain opportunities that we can exploit.

We were not sure whether this was a double-agent operation via the ZCI or by ANC MK so we hatched a plan which included myself, I was part of hatching that plan, to use this guy as, to create an impression with this collaborator that he would in future act as a courier of information between myself and other agents in Zimbabwe.

I then drafted a letter to a senior ANC official in Harare with the postbox address and everything but a very encrypted, encoded letter inside it. This person whom I addressed the letter to was not an agent of mine but it was just fictitious letter that was drawn up. The plan was to give this letter to the chemical people and whoever would handle this letter and open it would be contaminated with something dangerous and something that could kill them.

It was said to me, I can't remember whether it was Doctor Franz himself or whether it was Joe himself, I can't remember, I

~~think it was the doctor, that they can put the "spoor", a small~~  
 little micro substances of a spleen disease on letters, that if you handle that letter and you touch your mouth then after that you will be infected by this "mult siekte".

~~The letter was handed back to me at a later stage in a little~~  
 sealed container, in a plastic bag and the recommendation was that I should not handle it myself but it was properly sealed in all possible corners. That was given to the agent with the intention to deliver it, knowing that somebody was going to open it, handle it, no matter whether it was the ZCIO or whether it was MK  
~~structures or ...[indistinct] people, the intention was to~~  
 contaminate those who were busy with double operations against

us.

I learnt from a small newspaper article that appeared in, I think it was the Zimbabwean newspaper in Bulawayo, that this letter was opened by the ZCIO in Bulawayo and it was detected that it was contaminated. I am of the opinion that the way it was handled created that impression with the agent, that it was contaminated because I was very afraid. They did not in fact open it under - they opened it under suspicious circumstances with the intention to look for something that might be wrong.

I'm sure that if follow-up is done, there should be a case docket somewhere in Bulawayo about a contaminated letter that ended up with them. That is how I learnt about the chemical capability available to the CCB.

MR MAGADLA: Besides the contamination of letters and this liquid stuff, the colourless one, what other methods did you use with regards to the chemical situation?

MR NEL: Other than this I heard, and I can now maybe speculate beyond my personal involvement, many times when you had to go into a planning session disruption was analyzed as possible means - the different elements of disruption were always analyzed. Instead of going in and bombing things and shooting people there was always the question: think outside the square, think of other methods than blood and guts and shooting and so and so and then chemical capabilities or means were always discussed as well.

There was a discussion at one stage between some of us, not in the formal structured way, about the possibility of getting a contaminated consignment of clothes into Tanzania because we knew about a lot of, what I mentioned earlier, the Impandu, the nordic countries in other words were donating large quantities of clothes to MK or ANC camps. It was suggested that we should investigate the possibility of getting access to these clothes being parcelled, while the containers are still open in Europe or Eastern Europe, to get access to that.

It was outside my region to go any further or be further ~~involved in such an operation but the suggestion was and it was~~

mentioned that it's possible that by use of some kind of a fumigation spray or a burning of a tablet of some kind, there's a possibility that you can contaminate clothes by spraying things onto them or getting them exposed to this kind of substance.

People would wear these things, the substance would be observed through the skin and it will eventually result in some illness of some kind or death. That was one of the methods that I heard about. Whether it ever happened I cannot say.

There were many rumours about contaminated water and ~~other things that happened in Namibia while we were busy with~~ the bush war. Whenever you attacked a base and you didn't want ~~the enemy to use it again across the border in Angola there would~~

be poisoning of water. I never saw this happening, I heard this as a rumour but it's possible that it happened.

MR MAGADLA: What about heart seizure when a target was driving?

MR NEL: Ja, again by means of hearsay, speculation and maybe sometime just the ideas exchanged between people, one of the methods of doing a, let's call it the perfect non-traceable job, will be make it look as if it's a natural disease or due to natural causes that somebody died.

It was no secret that we had a need for that kind of thing ~~because it was expected from us to kill people in a way that it~~ would never appear as if we were involved in killing the people ourselves or getting them killed on behalf of the South African Government, so chemical means in that regard, if you can detect that somebody is diabetic or somebody is in fact suffering from a heart disease and it would be possible to replace his tablets with something that could cause his death without any other symptoms, specifically in African countries where the access to laboratories are not that advanced, that was regard as an almost perfect job.

MR MAGADLA: Are you in a position to mention any ~~individuals who would have been specifically in charge of the~~ poisons, whether by means of manufacture or means of storage or ~~people who were handling and in charge of the poisons?~~



MR NEL: As I mentioned, in that regard I was on the operative level involved in - the only link that I had to such capabilities was first all, after scrutiny and final approval by Verster himself, one would have Doctor Franz and I'm sure people will identify him or know him or you might know his details already, he was our link man and I needed and that was a closely guarded secret about anything further up the line.

But when I first arrived as Special Forces headquarters, while I still worked at Special Forces headquarters, if you recall in 1986 when I came from Namibia there was a medical wing in

~~the building of Special Forces, there was a medical wing and the~~  
senior medical person at that stage was Doctor Wouter Lombaard, Wouter Basson, he sat at Special Forces headquarters as the senior medical representative directly in service of, in support of ~~Special Forces and 7 Medial Battalion group and their medical~~ experts and their capabilities were at the disposal of Special Forces via Doctor Basson.

There were a number of people attached to that capability. I can remember a name called, it was a Commandant Chris Blandon who worked with Wouter Basson, he was a trained Rekkie but also a trained doctor. Then later at the Special Forces ~~at CCB the only link that I had to that capability was via Doctor Franz.~~

I can maybe by special effort try to determine who this person really was and he was the link. I always, in my mind I drew a little picture of Doctor Franz, it would go to Doctor Basson and to some laboratory or laboratories that existed and from there back to us. From the chemical operation here with Danie du Plessis I got the impression that they were also experimenting, they were still testing certain substances and they were using us in that regard for testing as well.

I never visited any laboratories. I think very few people were maybe in that position to have direct access to that ~~information but there were laboratories funded by government and~~ this capability made available to us as formal government structures, there's no doubt in my mind that that existed and that chemical operations were not only defensive, they were also offensively applied.

MR MAGADLA: Finally, this Franz, Doctor Franz, was a civilian scientist or was he linked to the Defence Force at the time?

MR NEL: There was no difference between myself as a CCB operator or a resigned SADF officer who joined the CCB and ~~Doctor Franz. He was also in my opinion and from the~~ discussions - he had personal friendships with some of the Special ~~Forces guys in the CCB that made me believe that he worked with~~ Special Forces for years before that. He came to CCB offices

sometimes dressed in a white overcoat and he would have a stethoscope in his car.

It appeared to me that he was a practising doctor somewhere, he was maybe a chemist, or he could have worked somewhere in the medical profession as part of his blue plan, as part of his CCB cover. He was a practising doctor of some kind according to my opinion. I thought he was a practising doctor somewhere but he was also the special medical link to this kind of capabilities for the CCB.

MR MAGADLA: Thank you Mr Nel.

~~CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khoisan?~~

MR KHOISAN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Colonel Nel, if we look at, and just to follow on what Mr Magadla was talking about in respect of the use of Doctor Wouter Basson and other people, Lotia Neethling and other people in their chemical and biological capabilities, to put it at the assistance of the CCB. There are a number of examples that have come up. The most outstanding example or two in 1989, the first case was the attempt to manipulate the medication of the current Minister of Justice, Minister Dullah Omar, Advocate Dullah Omar and then there was also a case of Attorney K E Mlaba in Durban and that has been a document that has been put in front of you under the title:

"Redes vir die elimineering van K E Mlaba"

Now just on those two cases, they're fairly fresh 1989 cases that directly tied to Region 6 and we have actual - if you look in the statement of Slang van Zyl, he specifically mentions that during the discussion of the plan on how to move with respect to Dullah Omar, their meeting with a medical person who is from the Medical Battalion.

Two things, (1) do you know anything about the case of Dullah Omar and the attempt to carry out the plan by poisoning or manipulation of his medication and (2) the matter of Attorney K E Mlaba in Durban?

~~MR NEL. — Regarding my personal involvement with Region 6,~~  
no, I had not knowledge other than the privilege of hindsight, everything that I read. And specifically what was testified by Slang van Zyl, that sounds the most feasible testimony for me knowing how the CCB operated and the fact that these capabilities were available.

Surely the best operation to do with somebody suffering from a heart disease will definitely be such an operation. It would not even be considered to kill him in any other way if this specific opportunity is not exploited.

~~When it comes to the person in Natal, Mlaba, I was asked~~  
by Christo Britz, I think his name - ja, Wouter Basson but the other one not Doctor Wouter Basson, there was another one, I knew him as Christo Britz, he asked me at one stage if I knew a

Doctor Mlaba from Natal and later on I gave him a print-out that was quite an extensive print-out of everything that was available on this person.

It appeared to me that they already knew this person very well and they had somebody close to this person because the comment was that - because the print-out contained old information as well, that sometimes they were making a mockery of the intelligence guys, calling us the "Department of History" because you get all the background of people that is not really relevant to what they need right now.

~~That print-out was a typical example of the "Department of History" producing 1966 and even 1966's information. But yes, I know about the priorities that was made of Doctor Mlaba in Natal and there were efforts to kill him. I wasn't aware of any chemical plan to do that but he was definitely a priority.~~

MR KHOISAN: Let me just draw your attention so that we can actually work through something here, to Annexure 4 of the first bundle of documents that you've got. Now this particular document which is, according to itself and it stands on its own which has been here, is said to have been written on the 4th of ~~March 1989 and during March and April of 1989 there was a lot~~ of - according to evidence that we've heard and also according to certain other records, there was a lot of interaction between the guys and you, the guys from Region 6 and yourself in respect of,

because there was lots of things going on around that time. Now, did you ever see this piece of information, this document? Do you know this document?

MR NEL: I'm not sure which one you're referring to now.

MR KHOISAN: I'm referring you to Annexure 4:

"Redes vir die Elimineering"

There are reasons why I want you to actually look at the documents itself.

MR NEL: Is that the document ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: It's the document in handwriting.

~~MR NEL: Is that the one that was drafted by one of the Region~~

~~2 operators?~~

CHAIRPERSON: Somebody ...[indistinct] NGR. But it's dated the 4th of March 1989.

~~MR NEL: Yes, I have it~~

MR KHOISAN: It's a handwritten document. Without commenting on the handwriting, we're not handwriting experts so the fact that there might be a couple of mistakes over here, but there's a series of plans that are drawn up here in respect of how this person could or may be eliminated.

~~MR NEL: Yes.~~

MR KHOISAN: Two things, (1) Having been somebody that has actually dealt with studies and pre-studies and plans drawn up,

it's a handwritten plan, it's probably a plan that was presented to somebody, did you ever get presented with this plan?

MR NEL: No Sir, this specific document, I have studied it, I can't say I've studied it, I read it over the weekend and it is typical of some of the staff work that was done by CCB operators but I identify the name Shane as a member of Region 2.

MR KHOISAN: What is his real name, on the record please?

MR NEL: No, I do not know his real name, I just know that the person that handled him was Piet Botes who also worked under the name Marius, the guy who became quite controversial at one stage when he broke up his good relations with Joe Verster. But

this was a funny incident, this was a funny project because Region 2 was supposed to work Swaziland, Mozambique and because of this pipeline approach that I explained early in the morning, this was acceptable for members of Region 2, Mozambique, Swaziland, to also address people in Natal because it was part of the pipeline of operations.

It was maybe a bit of an exception because Region 6 was supposed to take over at one or other stage, take over the execution of the operation but I'm not aware of any such handing over and taking over and whether this operation was in fact carried out by Region 6 in the end. But to keep the same apples in the same basket, normally what would happen if I was an operator who picked up good enough information to get close

enough to a certain target I would be, and if I'm in the position to execute the operation I'd present this to Joe and he might give me the authority to go beyond the borders of my region.

My interpretation of this plan is, it is a plan that was hatched by Region 2 because they had direct access to this person and they wanted to use poison as a method which was, it's just another example of poison was always considered as one the options. If you can get close enough to the person to use chemicals or biological means, it was always considered as one of the options.

~~I think it's also presented here as a possible method and~~  
such type of paper work was not out of the ordinary for CCB because we received the instructions that we should not create documents the normal military style, we should make our documents look different and sometimes it wasn't even necessary  
~~to have them all typed.~~

Very seldom you will get anybody's signature on a plan in the CCB. Jack van Staden sometimes signed, that was Joe Verster's other name, but more than that I wouldn't have any signature on my project files higher than that. The rest of they system was by word of mouth and other means. People protected themselves by not signing. But this is a typical type of CCB pre-study.



MR MAGADLA: Maybe you may comment on this Mr Nel. You are saying there are a lot of things that are a little bit strange with this document. For instance as Mlaba was known at that time, he just never shaved. One would have thought if there was this kind surveillance around him and the lot, that if one were to send razor blades and things like that as one of the things that would be poison.

Now I'm saying that from all sources and from maybe personal knowledge of him by myself even, at that time he wasn't shaving.

~~MR NEL: Ja. I do not have intimate knowledge of even the person who was the target as such but you might find that this person Shane is in fact a very junior person himself and whether he had access to the person, to the detail of his personal behaviour and mannerisms and all that I'm not sure.~~

~~If that is in fact the case it's a matter of an option because it is, if you make a plan in the military you normally go through a process which says: what are all the possibilities available to you to kill this person? You might end up with 10. And then you go through a process of eliminating them based on a swot analysis and applying certain staff tests to determine which plan will work and which one will not.~~

This guy in my opinion went through the military planning cycle and he said: If I have to use poison, what possibilities, it

may be his shaving blades, it may be his heart tablets, it may be this maybe that may this and following. The fact that the person had a beard might have made him believe that at some or other time he will shave but he might have been wrong. And it's not necessary that this is the plan, it says:

"Plan A"

So if you say "Plan A" there could be a Plan B,C,D,E and F. And by the time that this is approved they might say: "But plan A is not workable, this man will not shave" and they'll shelve it, they'll throw it away.

~~CHAIRPERSON: In fact it would appear that they had a plan B~~

although they didn't call it plan B because I think on the 3rd page they say:

"Rede vir Elimineering van Mlaba en kantoor"

~~And I don't think they were contemplating poisoning him through~~

blades in the office, so they're exploring all sorts of plans.

Mr Khoisan?

MR KHOISAN: Thank you.

Thanks for that. Who is Boyce, Boyz that's referred to in this document, you don't know that do you? Is that somebody who would have been close to the person or who would have access to the person?

MR NEL: No, I have never seen such a name and it might not be a name. It might be the alternative name of Shane, I'm not sure, I have no idea.

MR KHOISAN: So you did do a print-out of Mlaba and you can confirm on the record that you had been asked as an Intelligence Officer to present information in respect of this intended target?

MR NEL: That is correct. I did not know the person at all, I never worked on him. I wanted to explain to you earlier how I ended up being a jack of all trades for all the regions, Intelligence Officer wise, because they did not have the type of access to the bigger structures and I had that covert link to get information from the data base.

It was actually a well-kept secret, kept away from Joe Verster because he might have fired me if he knew that I had print-outs floating around. My instructions were always to the guys, my regions were 1 and 4 and I worked in Botswana and Zimbabwe and Tanzania primarily and Angola but I felt a pity for the other regions who did not have - before Region 9 was established, Region 9 was the Intelligence Region or the marketing structure, I handled most of their intelligence requirements via my contacts at Defence Intelligence to give me print-outs.

Christo Britz or Wouter Basson asked me on numerous occasions to get print-outs for them or to get more information

for him and this person Mlaba, I don't know how you pronounce it, was one of his requirements together with Jay Naidoo. I managed to get a print-out for him on this person which the agreement was in fact that they should, before giving it to operatives, they should extract the most important information out of the print-out, destroy the print-out and just give the snippets that's really necessary through to the operatives but only to learn later that these guys, maybe they were overworked, they just passed on these print-outs to the next and the next guy and eventually it ended up with operators like Ferdie Barnard and others as well.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now, you did work Region 7 and Region 7 and maybe before we just go through it, I just want to confirm a couple of things with you. Let's quickly run through the regions.

~~Region 1, confirm for me on the record whether it was~~  
 coordinated by Heine Moeller and Charl Naudè, that they were the main operators there?

MR NEL: Prior to 1988 it was Charl Naudè and after 1988 it was Heine Moeller and his real name is Dawie Fourie.

MR KHOISAN: And of course you were a key in Region 1 too, that was your region of operation?

MR NEL: That is correct. In the inner circle of each of the regions you will find a Regional Manager, that was Dawie Fourie, you'll find an Operational Coordinator and an Intelligence Officer,

that is the ideal structure of the internal part. The internal circle of a region is to have an Intelligence Officer, an Operation Coordinator and Regional Manager. The Regional Manager being the senior and then preferably you would also have a lady sometimes or an administrative type for logistics and finance. We had that for Region 1. I was the Intelligence Officer for Region 1, that was Botswana.

MR KHOISAN: And in Region 2, that was coordinated straight up by Pieter Botes?

MR NEL: Pieter Botes was the Operational Coordination, he was not the Regional Manager. He might have been the Regional Manager up to a stage until Corrie Meerholtz came into the organisation and according to my knowledge, Corrie Meerholtz was a much higher ranking officer than Piet Botes who was the coordinator or he was the Regional Manager for Region 2.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Then what was the role of Pete Standton and Heine Moeller in Region 3?

MR NEL: Pete Standton was the only other Intelligence Officer of some kind of stature that I relied a lot upon. He was researcher, he was a jack of all trades, because Lesotho was not a very high profile or a very high priority region, Heine Moeller alias Dawie Fourie or real name Dawie Fourie, was also responsible for Lesotho but for that purpose, for Lesotho I was not his Intelligence Officer.

Pete Standton was his Intelligence Officer for that region but it had the same Regional Manager but it had a different Intelligence Officer. But Pete Standton, he helped me a lot. He was a researcher par excellence and he compiled documents way beyond Region 3. He compiled documents from international level down to Region 6 and I acted as a Post Office of those documents and which I handed out to the other regions.

MR KHOISAN: In respect of Standton's background, particularly with regard to Zimbabwe and his links to Britain, can you discuss that, especially in terms of his links into the international intelligence community?

MR NEL: There were always a lot of suspicions about all the former expatriates, people from Zimbabwe about their possible links to MI6. A lot of that was also malicious rumours that was spread by other people because of professional jealousy and a number of things but Pete Standton, according to my knowledge, was a member of the BSAP, he was a policeman in Zimbabwe. According to my knowledge he was stationed in Bulawayo at a stage and he was later in Harare.

He was also part of the initial structures of the four running organisations, the Delta 40 Barnacle set up which consisted of a number of ex-CCB, ex-Zimbabwe, Rhodesian guys like Alan Trowsdale and Pete Standton and Dave Padburry. Those people were part of the initial structures of the CCB which was name

Barnacle prior to the forming of the CCB. That is what I know about Pete Standton. And his alleged involvement with International Intelligence Agencies I regarded as pure speculation.

MR KHOISAN: Just in terms of Corrie Meerholtz, was he also the person who was overall coordinating Region 4 in your view?

MR NEL: Initially he was but Heine Moeller took over that from him. Heine Moeller was a very capable officer and he was also regarded as the second in command of the CCB. He left the South African Defence Force as a very senior Commandant and he

~~was, according to everybody else, the second in command of the~~

CCB. He coordinated the higher priority regions, Region 4.

Region 4 being Tanzania and Zimbabwe together.

We did not have a separate region for Tanzania. Before him I believe it was coordinated by Corrie Meerholtz but Corrie Meerholtz to my knowledge was responsible for Region 2 by the time that I entered the organisation.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. In terms of Region 5 you have Joe Verster and - if I'm right, you have Joseph Niemoller but you also have there as the Int. Officer, the Intelligence Officer, Eben Barlow.

Two things, can you discuss - because this is the world, you're dealing with Europe, the United States and all of these

other countries, can you discuss the nature of liaison for instance between the CIA, MI6 and this particular structure of the CCB?

MR NEL: There would have been no formal liaison at all. If it was it was via covert liaison, if I could imagine, by recruiting an MI6 cooperative, by recruiting a French Intelligence collaborator. By means of that kind of liaison yes, it would have been allowed but any other liaison between the CCB and any official organisation, anywhere in the world was a total taboo when it comes to official and open liaison.

~~Eben Barlow had very good business contacts internationally and via a first and a second and a third person you could have access to intelligence organisations indirectly but I know Eben operated from, if I remember correctly, Cyprus and maybe Malta and Gibraltar as well but he could have indirect. From his previous experience in DCC where he built up contacts with other intelligence agencies, he might have had informal contacts but nothing would ever have been on behalf of the South African Government. That liaison would have been the responsibility, the sole responsibility of NIS and DCC via our Foreign Military Attaches.~~

MR KHOISAN: So the view is that Joseph Niemoller and Joe Verster both were central to the coordination of Region 5?

MR NEL: Yes. Due to the fact that there was a lot of rumours and unhappiness about Joe's personal involvement in the



operational side of things. He was a high profile person and according to most of the CCB operators he was not supposed to be involved in coordinating the region himself. He however insisted in doing that because of his extensive external financial interests. He and a person by the name of Jacko Black, the most Afrikaans person I ever met in my life, were involved in these things.

CHAIRPERSON: Unfortunately that part did not through.

MR NEL: I say that Joe Verster had a lot offshore financial interest according to rumours that leaked out of our financial

~~section, that they were depositing money abroad and they were~~

setting up, specifically in Switzerland, alternative bank accounts and a person by the name, we called him Jako Swart because he would never pass as Jacko Black as he's a very Afrikaans person,

~~he was the Financial Director of the CCB, a guy promoted beyond~~

~~his capability, they had a lot of offshore interests.~~

CHAIRPERSON: John Daniel?

PROF DANIEL: Just pursuing this European operation base, you mentioned that Eben Barlow may have operated from Cyprus,

~~Malta, Gibraltar, are you aware that the CCB may possibly have had an office in Frankfurt?~~

MR NEL: Funny enough ja, we had -- even for Region 4 we had offices abroad because one of the ways of working into Africa to

get links severed between South Africa and for instance Tanzania, was to make use of Europe as an entry point into Africa.

From Region 4's side we had offices - Dawie Fourie would be able to testify in detail in this regard, we had offices in Germany. We normally used Zurich as an entry point into Europe because it was regarded as the safest and from there to divert onto a next passport. There were offices, some of them high profile businesses as well.

I was told and many people became very angry later on when they learnt that some guys were in fact opening up profitable businesses ashore and yes, I wasn't there but I know about the existence of business in Frankfurt, I know about the existence of business in Zurich, I know about business in Germany that Heine Moeller was - and other reasons also used Europe as an entry point.

I had a guy working personally for me into Tanzania and Zambia, who operated permanently from Milan. He ran his own business there but from there he created the freedom of movement into Africa as a photographer and whatever he was doing. It was not wrong for even Region 2 to have offshore companies and therefore you set up a business with an address to be credible.

PROF DANIEL: Would that Milan based person have been an Italian?

MR NEL: He was an Italian with strong South African ties.

MR KHOISAN: Are you saying he was an Italian South African or?

MR NEL: Alright, the person I'm talking about is somebody who was born from Italian family but born in South Africa, you know Italians are all over the world. He later married an Italian wife and he stayed in Italy and he's a citizen of Italy but he was trained as a Special Force operator. There were people like that and specifically hand picked and selected. Those guys who joined during their National Service with the right profile to go to ~~Special Forces, they were diverted to Special Forces because~~  
~~their nationality and other capabilities made them useful for~~  
special forces.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, while we're on Region 5, at which stage did you get to know that the former editor of Seshaba, Francis ~~Mele and the former ANC representative in Britain, in London,~~  
~~Solly Smith had become agents of the South African regime, the~~  
former South African Government?

MR NEL: I read it in an article from a German publication called Uitersgeheim or something like that. It was news to me and according to me those people were in fact on our target list ~~for Europe. If they were agents of anybody, they were in my~~  
opinion agents of National Intelligence and not of the CCB.

MR KHOISAN: So while we are on Region 5, what was the relationship to other members of the intelligence community, for

instance Cliff Sanders who had a cover of a journalist who was a member of the intelligence community, a senior member, what was your relationship to him in Region 5?

MR NEL: It would be a total surprise to me if that person as such had any relations with the CCB. He fits the profile of a National Intelligence Agent. Developing freedom of movement as a journalist in Africa would be useful to National Intelligence.

There were other examples similar to this, L J Venter and others were also mentioned in the past. I don't think such a person would fit into the profile of a CCB operation.

~~I also read about his alleged involvement as an agent from the same publication which I found surprising and a bit beyond the capabilities of the CCB in the time frame available to us to set up structures and recruit such people.~~

~~MR KHOISAN:~~ Ja, we're not suggesting here that he actually operated as part of the CCB, we're just putting - because you are an intelligence person, we're putting on the, it goes broader because the issue that we're trying to get to, that I want to try to get to and maybe Professor John Daniel would like to also explore this, is because you did mention the issue of Dulcie September and maybe let's focus on Dulcie September and Godfrey Motsepe.

These were two targets of the CCB, one in Belgium and one in Paris, France and the fact is that it is our view that this is one

of the, these are two issued of the CCB needs to provide us with some information in respect of.

From your perspective, from where you sit, how do you see the Dulcie September and the Godfrey Motsepe incident, how were those things ...?

MR NEL: From listening to the way Dulcie September was killed, from getting to know more about the killing of Dulcie September and from the general atmosphere at the CCB head office whenever reference was made to Dulcie September's death, ~~I had never any doubt in my mind that it was a CCB operation.~~

~~You get that body language, you get that shovel the next~~  
day around the office of Joe Verster: "Come and see me tomorrow, I don't have time today, I have more important things to do" and that is the day when the news broke about her death.

~~That kind of atmosphere tells you things happened which~~  
~~has something to do with this organisation. Other than that I had~~  
no factual information about who was involved, how it was arranged, by who at all. I just know that it was a very high priority to set a capability in Europe using offshore people, in other words using a capability maybe linked to the mafia, linked ~~to whatever organisation you want to call it to carry out hits in~~  
Europe.

Joe was concerned that we are not always streetwise, we went through extensive training before going to Europe to get us

streetwise and he was always concerned that our level of expertise was not on the level to really carry out operations in Europe, we should make use of people from that area, staying in that area and who are available to do operations.

CHAIRPERSON: If I could just ask a question on this. If there was - I'm not talking about evidence, I'm just talking about information, that the murder weapon was smuggled from London to Paris in a diplomatic bag, would that be the sort of thing that the CCB would do?

~~MR. NEL:~~ There might be exceptions but I, knowing that Joe was personally involved in Region 5, knowing Joe Verster from working with him and getting hidings from him many times for walking on the thin edge of doing things the wrong way, he always paranoid about security, totally paranoid.

~~He did not trust the intelligence community and then I include even the military intelligence community of the Defence Force. To involve them in his operations it would have entailed maybe, individuals that he would try and get onto his structure and under his control before he would use them. By getting such things arranged via the normal system, if we say a diplomatic bag was used, immediately in my mind National Intelligence maybe police involvement comes to mind but not CCB.~~

CCB would buy a ship, smuggle it themselves and forget about the formal structures because too many people will know

about it that's not supposed to know about it and people that Joe can't trust because he gathered around him people he thought he can trust and what he couldn't control he wouldn't trust.

So if you say to me a weapon was smuggled, maybe it's a built-in cutoffs and disinformation and a lot of other methods or did proper ... [indistinct] of this article to appear to be a normal article carried in a diplomatic bag without anybody knowing what the contents of that is, that's possible maybe. But Joe would have avoided that type of involvement at all costs, specifically with him being in charge of Region 5, he wouldn't do that.

~~CHAIRPERSON: Johan Daniel?~~

PROF DANIEL: The question that we find interesting, I mean you have said on several occasions today that the CCB had limited intelligence capacity, there was a real weakness and it was real problem for you because you couldn't tap in

A decision is made to develop a capacity in Europe to take out high ranking ANC leaders and this is one case where you do pull off a successful operation, now that operation would require extensive intelligence and you don't have it in Europe you're going to have to, in a sense, buy it in. Could it be possible that a private intelligence network was hired to do the job?

MR NEL: My first three, four weeks of induction training in the CCB involved an extensive study of the film called: The Sword of Gideon and it was analyzed bit by bit, minute by minute of

footage. That is based on the Mosat Operation, those who saw the video, it's more or less the way that CCB wanted us to shift our minds away from using the extensive support network that you have available to you, you sometimes have to survive on your own and for purposes of secrecy develop all those cutoffs.

And in this film: The Sword of Gideon this specific Mosat group depends exclusively on the information provided to them by a civilian group called: Le Group, of French Intelligence, private intelligence types so the possibility, it was part of our training to use that kind of capability. It was in fact promoted to approach people in such - as long as you approach people in such a way

that there is a cutoff between you and them, it is in fact promoted to do things in that way. So if there were in fact involvement of a private intelligence agency, a front of some of the other intelligence agencies, it's possible, even collusion with the French

I think is possible.

PROF DANIEL: Well let me try this scenario. We know that the Presidential Guard in the Comores was made up of essentially French mercenaries but former French officers, many of whom had strong rightwing links. We know that one person in particular from that Presidential Guard left the Guard in 1985 and lived in South Africa where he was ...[indistinct] of a steel company but from the files that the French have given us, this man is in and out of Europe, Zurich, Brussels, Paris, Zurich, Brussels, Paris,



isn't it possible in fact that if you're looking for your intelligence private company, you're hiring this ex-Comorian Presidential Guards and they in turn hire some of their colleagues as the trigger pullers?

MR NEL: I worked with a person who was involved in the coup in the Seychelles, or the attempted coup, and I learnt from private discussions about a lot of interaction with French nationals or French types of Foreign Legion people and I would say it would be ludicrous for any South African group to use a South African to kill Dulcie September. I always expected that if this case is

~~exposed that we will find that it's a French Foreign Legion person~~  
or something in that order, something that possibly linked up with the CCB guys who were involved in the Seychelles coup way back then. I can't remember who the French national was who led that

~~thing [intervention]~~

PROF DANIEL: Comores? Bob de Naar.

MR NEL: The Bob Denard thing. There was mention made a few times by people about the old friendships that developed between Recces and members who were involved there. So own deduction, own - it was logic for me, we had the contacts, we can use those people. The Legion is always available, they're almost like mercenaries sometimes. I have no doubt about the links that could have existed between such elements and Region 5.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, do you want to go?

CHAIRPERSON: No, just for the record I was going to say Mr Khoisan.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now I just want to toss out a name and see if it strikes any cord with you, a fellow by the name of Bèrend Matteus van der Klaashorst(?).

MR NEL: Could you perhaps pronounce it again?

MR KHOISAN: No, I just want to find out, if you don't know him - I mean I don't expect that you would but if you do, a chap by the name of van der Klaashorst.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you spell that Mr Khoisan?

~~MR KHOISAN: B-è-R-E-N-D, M-A-T-H-E-U-S, van der Klaashorst.~~

MR NEL: No, I've never heard such a name in my life.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Let me proceed to say that the Motsepe

~~incident, what can you tell us about what occurred there in~~

~~Brussels?~~

MR NEL: No, I have no knowledge at all about that incident.

The only international incident that struck my attention was Dulcie September. I have no knowledge of - other than speculation about Solly Smith and others, I have no knowledge of that specific incident.

MR KHOISAN: Now, being in the intelligence community, providing access, did you have useful channels that you knew about that were being exploited within the ANC? Members - for

instance leadership of COSAS who were moving out of the country and that were digging into the movement outside the country?

MR NEL: It was normal practice, you could get a mole or an agent into an organisation primarily by means of two ways, of getting an existing guy, he specifically goes with weaknesses and buying him or you can get somebody infiltrating. Infiltration and penetration that we had long arguments about what to call the one or the other.

Normally it's a long term investment to use the infiltration method to recruit from school level onwards and the CCB had no time available for that type of operation. You would rather go and do an extensive study on a person who might have extra-marital affairs, who might have a drinking problem, who might have all those possible exploitable weaknesses that you normally use to recruit informers.

I am aware that the police used this method extensively, that they used to school young boys even, there are ridiculous stories about people who first met their informers when he came to work for him in his garden and they long talks and then he said: "Alright, I want you to go and join the organisation and become radical and even become a provocateur and build up profile, get yourself into the structures and then move externally".

Always you had a problem with a person, that you send him to a system, you don't know where he's going to and your communication with such a person is a constant nightmare. If he ends up in Tanzania you have time and distance problems with turn around times sometimes of two, three, four weeks, to get snippets of information through.

Yes, it was used. It was not used to my knowledge to a large extent by CCB because time was not available. Amateurish efforts were made at one stage where people were sent to present themselves as refugees in Botswana. It worked up to Dukwe, after the guys decided to go non-alliant because they were afraid because they were getting scrutinised and the writing down of CV's, they were not properly prepared. There were efforts to do that.

But the way we used to work for instance, without divulging all the detail, in Lesotho we were running the whole ANC operation and to some extent also PAC because we made available to them an office, a telex, a facility that they could use to communicate and all the telephone conversations and everything that happened from that facility was available to us and that was how Bonona Vena(?) and others were arrested in Cape Town, because phone calls were made to Lesotho.

So we tried trained operators close to, in a business profile close to the political organisations to make our business useful to

them and attract them in that way and to offer the facilities in terms of transport and other methods to them in order to mingle and to get closer, to get information about.

MR KHOISAN: That's quite an amazing statement that you're making there, that two areas of ANC operations were actually on remote control I mean, is that firm, clear?

MR NEL: The fact of the matter - ja, let me state the facts in such a way that - I know what I'm saying now can lead to the prosecution of others, we had an operation in Lesotho, we were not very much concerned about Lesotho because we knew what

~~was going on in Lesotho. We all know that the ANC scaled down~~  
 their operations in Lesotho extensively after the 1985 raids that took place but the information that was required for the 1985 raids was collected by Special Forces operators.

~~There was a business or two that operated from Maseru~~  
~~where some of the black Special Forces operators were intimate~~  
 friends with MK members. And you must know that Special Forces consisted out of a lot of former Mozambican, former Lesotho Liberation Army, former Zimbabwean, former Namibian, there were a number of different nationalities in specifically 5 ~~Rekkie, 5 Special Force regiment.~~ I met the operators that worked in Lesotho at that stage and their sole purpose was to set up useful businessman links with MK and to a certain extent APLA as well, PAC people.

If you recall the incident that happened when the Western Cape machinery was opened up and that led to the arrest of Bonona Vena specifically and later on all the others. That whole incident happened due to one phone call, that whole operation was successful in the end due to one phone call.

Bonona infiltrated via Botswana to Cape Town and he had to report his arrival and he eventually reported to Lesotho. The person that he wanted to contact on that side wasn't there and he made arrangements to phone later again and that gave us time to say: "Phone again or give us a phone number where we can phone

~~you back", that was Special Force operators on the other side~~

knowing where he was going to be and Bonona gave them a phone number for a public phone and it took extensive in an hour's time to determine where that telephone booth was and he was arrested

~~right there at the telephone booth. That was an example of maybe~~

~~a successful Special Forces operation because it later on resulted~~

in the arrest of, I think the whole Western Cape machinery.

MR KHOISAN: Ja. And now when we go further here, who is this Bonona, do you his - is that his Sotho name?

CHAIRPERSON: Is he Zwandele Vena who is now in the

~~SANDE?~~

MR NEL: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He was called Bomza.

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Ja. Now in terms of Swaziland, were you aware that Henry van der Westhuizen was running a source by the name of Nanike?

MR NEL: I heard the name Mamiki.

MR KHOISAN: Ja, same difference. But were you aware of the nature of what was going on there?

MR NEL: Yes, I was good friend of Henry, he was part of projects. When he started off here he worked extensively with Eugene de Kock and what helped them a lot was the arrest of September, to get really to the bottom of things in Mozambique

~~and Swaziland but even to get to the arrest of September I believe~~

there were - the easy approach in, when I started working off working on Botswana my first method of breaking into Botswana was not to try and get into the Transvaal machinery and recruit

~~some of their people, I would do an extensive study by means of~~

~~questioning Askaris to determine what is the infrastructure used~~

by MK and APLA when they move through Botswana, where are safe houses, who are their local people who support them.

There was a routine formed by some of the MK structures to always take people to Peter Ntiti and other people in

~~Francistown and from there they take them to Gaborone and~~

certain safe house and there are locals who support and those locals are the easiest entry point to recruit. You would get a infrastructure of sources, what we normally say jokingly: "You

start at the cleaner to end up with the General", you start at the back door, you get the cleaner to work for you and the cleaner will tell you about somebody else who's got certain weaknesses and then you go one step higher and as you go higher you discard the more junior sources.

Now Henry and them used a similar approach in Swaziland. First of all let's see which Swazis are involved in supporting the ANC or MK people if they work in the area, recruit them and then get closer and closer to MK until you get a high level person and you can then get rid of the juniors.

~~Now I was under the impression that Mamiki was one of the so-called ladies who slept with people for information purposes, a local of that area.~~

~~CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it true that she was tasked to sleep with one of two intended targets, namely Paul Dikelede?~~

~~MR NEL: Undoubtedly Paul Dikelede was very high up on the target list for that specific region. Henry van der Westhuizen had nothing to do with the CCB but he continued. When I left them, the project section continued, somebody else replaced me there when I was recruited to the CCB.~~

~~How I know about Henry's operations, while we were sitting in projects, it was a big open plan office, we had a lot of interaction between us because it was ludicrous to think I can only work Botswana and forget the rest, we needed to know~~



everything about everybody's else's work as well regarding targets, to understand the holistic picture.

If somebody moved from Botswana to Swaziland tomorrow, I would hand over my files to Henry about that person. So yes, Paul Dikelede was definitely a target that they worked on and so were many others, Manchek and others are names that just jump to mind. And even the job of Casius Make, people who died there, one of the methods was that such ladies were useful sources if you don't have people inside the structures although some of these ladies were so deeply involved that they sometimes knew more than some of the operators themselves.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. I just want to ask you one more about this, because you did say that Casius Make was on the top 20 hit list, so that would have been a successful operation but carried out by other people. But before we get there, isn't it true that Naneki took sensitive financial information out of the ANC office and she passed that on to, including personnel information from Swaziland and passed that onto the Security Forces and that this also found it's way into the target planning structure?

MR NEL: I cannot recall financial information because it wouldn't have been really relevant for me in CCB to have financial information but ... [intervention]

MR KHOISAN: Let me be very specific, she was one of the people who had access to the files in respect of CEDA, the CEDA

funding the money that had to go to the exiles and stuff and she had access to those files. Isn't it true that she passed those files through to the security forces in respect of target planning?

MR NEL: I'm not sure. All that I can state for the record, I saw very good information coming from Swaziland, coming from Mozambique. What I know, Henry had - by the help of some of his agents he in fact visited the piggery in Mozambique where the weapons were kept and he was somebody who didn't sleep at night if he had a project running.

At a later stage in 1993 when I was in the Ciskei, I ~~recruited him as a source for the Ciskei Intelligence Services~~ because of his access into top structure in the ANC and he gave me information that I was - some months I paid him R12 000 on the value of the information because it came out of the highest ~~structures, it came out of the President's office. He had a lot of~~ current new information but wherever he got his information I'm not 100% sure.

I did stumble across him one day when he was totally embarrassed, well he was busy sitting down with somebody but ~~he later turned it around and said it was just somebody he~~ ~~stumbled across at the airport. He handled high level sources,~~ very high level at a later stage but he started with Oshigumbus, the girls that people sleep with and he ended up ... [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: When you say high level, are you saying high level in terms of people who may be presently in high places in government today?

MR NEL: I can speculate about that yes, Sir, that they must be in high places because the type of documents that was handed over to me, some of them - I might even have some examples here, but before any study document would appear or long before things were officially made known as ANC strategy the people were still hatching plans, he had certain documents in draft form, in discussion form and that kind - and it appeared to me that it

~~came straight out of the offices of National Executive members.~~

But it can be that it's even the cleaner who stole those things, you know the impression that you get is that it is the high level person who provides the information but at least I know of people who should have been personal secretaries to the President and stuff like that.

MR KHOISAN: Without pressing that point and some of that is for another day and in another forum and another structure which might probably develop out this Commission but nevertheless, just quickly before we get to Region 7, Lappies Labauschagne, he's a good friend, he made a very interesting intersection with respect to Henry van der Westhuizen, do you know about that?

MR NEL: No, Lappies according to my knowledge was a member of Vlakplaas, in other words a member of the police. To

my knowledge he was not a member of the Defence Force at any stage or of the CCB but Henry became almost a member of Vlakplaas. I can put it that way, he was - I don't want to talk about old things now but Henry was never in the Western front.

Henry had this problem of inferiority amongst other who were in the Western front and he always wanted to prove himself capable of being in the same league as those who were in the Western front and the more we told him that it's not necessary, he wanted to be friends with Eugene de Kock, he wanted to friends with the Vlakplaas guys and he really became so involved with Gene that at a later stage it was as if he worked for the police.

Even after Vlakplaas was closed down and after he was sacked in 1992, he still continued his relationship with those people. I don't know what the relationship between him and Lappies was. I know in that crowd of people there were personal differences and clicks within a crowd and "I don't like you and you don't like me and we don't talk to each other", that type of things existed.

I do not know anything about him and Lappies and their relationship but that they knew each other very well and they worked together from time to time in Swaziland yes, it's true.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. I don't want to explore that any further.

Now, the persons Kid Bowden, Allen Trowsdale and of course Wouter Jacobus Basson, also known as Christo Britz, also known

by three or four other aliases. What can you tell us about their activities in respect of Region 7?

MR NEL: Okay. ~~Christo Britz and Allen Trowsdale - Kid Bowden~~ is a name I just heard, I never met this guy, I don't know who he is, but Allen Trowsdale I know personally and Christo Britz as well. Allen Trowsdale is an ...[indistinct], he's a drunk. He used to visit all these ex-Rhodesian pubs and he was warned against it and at one stage I was told that he should not be trusted because he is mingling with all kinds of funny characters.

~~Christo Britz later on took over Region 6 but he was~~

~~... [intervention]~~

MR KHOISAN: Region 7.

MR NEL: No, but he later took over Region 6 but he was initially responsible for Region 7 which is Zimbabwe. Primarily ~~his involvement with ex-Rhodesians related around Project Direksie, the project that was earmarked to break the Smiths out~~ of the prison in Zimbabwe because it was a Special Forces operation, it was a high level project. And Allen Trowsdale was also deeply involved there in setting up a capability to free them from prison.

~~Later on, after the big McQuillen debacle, the big problem with exposure, possible exposure of this project to MI6 and ZCIO, a lot of changes took place. I was put under the impression that Allen Trowsdale was fired because he was~~

allegedly part of the break in security and Christo Britz was taken away from Region 7 and put with Region 6 and then Lafras Leiting took over Region 7. That was in '88, I'm not sure about the dates.

By the time I got seriously involved with the CCB, Christo Britz was already primarily responsible for Region 6 because Project Direksie was - I don't know, hanging in the air and put on ice. Allen Trowsdale was, as I explained earlier on, part of the initial group, those guys who stayed on the farm near Broederstroom with Charl Naudè. They were a small group of people who formed the initial Barnacle D40 group and they were primarily ex-Zimbabweans. He had extensive contacts with many people with funny connections and there were also allegations that he had contacts with the Brits, with MI6. That's what I know.

Christo Britz, it's well known that he later moved to become the coordinator of Region 6, the handler of Kalla Botha and Chappie Marè and those guys and that's what I know about them.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now just in terms of Region 7, the person of Father Michael Lapsley appeared on the target list in respect of Region 7, is that correct?

MR NEL: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And who was the person, who were the people who were tasked in respect of making sure that this project was carried out?

MR NEL: I do not know. Even before I became a member of CCB, Father Michael Lapsley was already a well known target of the project section. Whenever Leon Nefdt, who was responsible for Region 7, when he presented his targets to the Generals, Father Michael Lapsley was included in the so-called support infrastructure of the Zimbabwean machinery and part of the ~~political machinery. I can't - later on the term "machinery" fell~~  
~~away and it was called something else, the PMC, I don't know~~  
what the correct terminology was but he was always an integral part of the priority personalities in Zimbabwe in the same category as Derek Hanekom and, I don't know who the others  
~~were.~~

~~There was at one stage a discussion about doing something~~  
to Father Michael Lapsley while I was still working at the project section - that is before I joined the CCB, about the possibility of sending him a parcel, it was discussed. Leon Nefdt in my presence had a discussion with a certain Colonel Hekkie van Heerden. He was known as: "Colonel Hammer" because it was jokingly said that he would use a hammer to kill a fly. The idea of sending a letter never appealed to him, he always wanted at least a Reader's Digest size thing because his attitude was: "You

don't blow somebody's hands off because then he would just become active and use his mouth to destroy you politically and he's got the evidence to do that".

I think that's exactly what happened in the case of Father Michael Lapsley, that he received a parcel that - Colonel Hekkie would have preferred a Reader's Digest size of a parcel bomb and not maybe a letter size. What puzzled me about Father Michael Lapsley was the time frame of when this incident happened and that left a lot of questions in my mind of who should have been involved in that, I'm not sure, it was in 1992, 1993, it was after the CCB was totally disbanded. ...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: It was in 1990.

MR NEL: No.

MR KHOISAN: It was in June 1990 when Father Michael Lapsley was bombed. And you see the reason why I'm putting this to you is because of the fact that the Minutes of the State Security Council and the Minutes of the Cabinet reflect a discussion in respect of how the Executive was viewing the CCB and the view of the Executive at that time, I'm talking before all the hullabaloo, is that the problems are only in one Region. And if my memory serves me correctly, I should just drag it out somewhere, I can find a document but right now I don't have it at my - it's probably in my brain somewhere, but there's a discussion



about plausible deniability at that late stage of the game, this is while the process is going.

This is the - we are at the cuss of the transition, at the very point of changeover. According to the document that I sent you, that we gave you to study, if I read those documents the projects outside the country are still continuing, until such time that a mechanism can be found to facilitate their closure. Because, for instance General Meiring didn't have the authority to fire Joe Verster, that's why Joe Verster told him to go and take a walk, and quite a few other people. I mean it's reflected in the documents and Joe Verster has told us himself, that he told them

that the only person who could fire him or stop what he was doing, who had authority was the Officer Commanding Special Forces. And while that mechanism was being found CCB

projects were ongoing outside the country, Region 6 was brought to a stop. Now Father Michael Lapsley receives his parcel and the view is that that was a continuation of a project that had been started before.

MR NEL: As I said earlier, there was undoubtedly a project on Father Lapsley, that projects dates back as far as 1987 where plans were hatched in the project environment about possibilities because questions were asked, what type of mail would such a person receive and discussions of exploring the possibility of sending him something.

Why this thing - it stuck in my mind that the time frame was not, it was after February 1990 after FW's big speech. After that I am personally not aware of any sanction or any authorization of any offensive CCB operations after February the 2nd, I was never involved in any presentation to anybody to get authority for any operation.

The possibility exists that this could have been something that was delayed in the post, this was something that was carried out in January 1990 and it only occurred later on. But I fully agree with the discussion that would have taken place in the Security Council because if we look at what the task of Witkop Badenhorst was when he was appointed to investigate the CCB, the problem that developed between him and Joe Verster was because Joe Verster's understanding was that they would just come and investigate Region 6 and cut it out and the organisation as such would have continued.

While Badenhorst came and he opened up the organisation, he wanted access to everything and specifically financial files and project files and that created a very big problem. The internal investigation by Krappies Engelbrecht and Witkop Badenhorst, in my mind was a coverup, it was just: "there was a problem with Region 6, let's cut it out and let the organisation continue"

That might have been the initial plan but that totally exploded when the clash between Joe Verster and Witkop

Badenhorst developed because then things started to open up completely and it was decided to eventually close down the CCB.

I believe that the type of damage control that Witkop Badenhorst tried to do by swearing me to silence or getting me into a hotel room and telling me that I should never talk about what I know about Webster, was a definite attempt to do damage control but his investigation ended up in the police jumping over our walls and ramshacking the whole place and confiscating all our documents which eventually ended up in Harmse Commission.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. I know we have very little time, we're going to have another time here but isn't it true that the Harmse Commission from beginning to end was a cover-up?

MR NEL: It was an attempt to do damage control in my opinion, ~~it was an attempt to save the face of P.W. de Klerk in the process~~ of yes, he became aware of this organisation and he became aware of a small rotten element inside it and he closed it down but the intention was not to make the damage uncontrollable or beyond his capability to handle.

~~I always read between the lines that Harmse was not going to go beyond what was already known before the Commission started because the way we were coached to testify, it was not to expose anybody else than those who are already known. It was already a mistake that my name became known at that stage~~

because Joe Verster was very worried that he didn't have total control over me. We were coached not to say anything about Webster, we were sworn to silence that we won't say anything about anything more than what is known to Harmse.

So no matter how hard Harmse tried, there was another group of people who gave us the responsibility to hide NoRobey in Europe for maybe they need to question him about Ribero and there was a lot of "regsveriedeling" or what you call it, undermining of Harmse Commission going on by the Defence Force, by Special Forces, by the CCB itself to limit the damage to what is done.

MR KHOISAN: And I'd like to address you to page 31 of Annexure 1 of the documents that were given to you and it's a letter from the Managing Director of the CCB one, Joe Verster, also at that time known as Jack van Staaden. It is addressed to the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of the Defence Force and the CCB legal team. And in respect of this letter, the tone of this letter is saying that if they don't get the number one, Joe Verster and the CCB are not going to be the fall guys and number two, that if the things come out it's a threat to re-open the Harmse Commission and tell everything.

Now you are an Intelligence Officer and you know what the world eventually knew about Harmse, now how has it taken so long for the corruption that was the Harmse Commission to be

exposed? Why has the fact that the Harmse Commission has been part of lying to the people of South Africa taken so long to come to the fore?

CHAIRPERSON: Before you reply, it appears that Mr Malan your representative wants to say something.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. I would just like to ascertain the page number.

MR KHOISAN: It is page 31 Sir, of this document and in fact if you look at the index of that it goes down to the end, it's under:

"Pieter Johan Verster: Beweringe teen Verster en nommer 11"

MR NEL: For me as an Intelligence Officer it was obvious that the Harmse Commission had no chance at that stage with the government apparatus still in power to manipulate whatever they can to get to anything more than what the government wanted it

to get at because the whole grudge from Joe Verster's side was, was that he was bearing the brunt for somebody, he's acting as a "weerlig afleier", they put all the blame on the CCB to get everybody else to look lily white and then FW can stand up and say: "I've done my bit, I've cut out the cancer and this is now really the people who acted outside the law".

And the impression that Joe Verster was under that this is specifically an effort by National Intelligence but more specifically by the police, knowing that Vlakplaas is still there

around the corner but CCB should take all the attention to give them maybe time to get their own act together, to get control over Gene de Kock.

We found that the lightening was all diverted onto the CCB, unfairly, fairly. But the fact that there was a cover-up will not be difficult I would say, to prove because if you get those people who were involved there in the Harmse Commission and get them to testify again you will most probably be able to prove them guilty of perjury in half an hour's time.

The big thing about the Harmse Commission was to hide the files, to prevent anybody from getting, to have access to the CCB Region 6 files because there was a lot of damage control to be done. Some information was already known and it had to be controlled but a lot of other information was still not known.

~~And Braam Cilliers had to do something with the files to ensure that it won't end up in the hands of the Harmse Commission.~~

And it wasn't Joe Verter's own operation to hide the files, it was, according to instructions that I know of that that was part of the damage control to get from General Webb, to get that file separated from the rest. The CCB files were kept at Special Forces Headquarters, not at the CCB offices, they were kept at Special Forces Headquarters inside military premises.

MR KHOISAN: Filed by Tannie Soekie?

MR NEL: Files by Tannie Soekie.

MR KHOISAN: What is Tannie Soekie's real name?

MR NEL: I think Rautenbach.

MR KHOISAN: Rautenbach, thank you Sir.

MR NEL: And the lady who worked with her was Amanda Strydom, I think so, but her husband is in the Prison Services. They used to courier our files everyday from the CCB offices to the Special Forces Headquarters which was military premises. And the disappearance of the files happened, collusion between the people in the military and the CCB. So without the files Harmse couldn't go any further than the known statements by Ferdie Barnard and Kalla Botha.

And the damage control that had to be done was how to manage the information that was already known to the police at that stage, the information that was provided by Botha and Barnard and not to take this beyond the known facts.

And we were all sent home and to various places and Witkop Badenhorst called myself and Lafras Leiting into a hotel room where he told us that we will never repeat anything that was said about Webster to anybody and any Commission  
[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: And which is? What is that that you had said about Webster, just so that we can get it finally on the record.

MR NEL: I've testified about this in detail in the Webster case after the inquest into his death but in a nutshell it boils down to

the following: I was a very close friend of Lafras Leiting and he came to me with the request that I should seek employment for Barnard with DCC because Joe wanted him fired and the reason for Joe wanting him to be fired was related to Project Direksie where Barnard embarrassed Joe Verster by involving Dermot McQuillen in a high level operation where MI6 eventually infiltrated them. That is how it was told to me.

I then approached Leon Nefdt who at that stage worked for DCC and I asked him whether they would be interested in employing this specific person, Barnard, who came back to me after a while and he said they're looking into this guy's history because somebody knows him as a criminal.

After a while, early in May 1989, Lafras Leiting came to me and we had a conversation in front of the CCB offices and he said to me he's suspecting that those friends of mine tasked Ferdie

Barnard to kill Webster because he is the handler of Ferdie Barnard and Ferdie Barnard is now claiming that he killed Webster.

He wanted me to find out from Leon Nefdt whether they did in fact approach Barnard. I went and had contact with Leon and he said no, they never came near the guy. I then said to Lafras that he should report this to Joe and he was afraid but we eventually went together to see Joe. We told Joe Verster that this is the claim of Barnard. Joe claimed as if he knew nothing,



he wanted to know from me who Webster was and - to make a long story short, we were told that we heard rumours and we shouldn't repeat these rumours to anybody.

But Lafras then later arranged for his brother or his cousin, I think his brother who is an advocate or he's a lawyer or somebody, I don't know, for Barnard to make the same admission in front of this legal representative and this all the latest evidence now in Court.

But I was told by Witkop Badenhorst that this hearsay information and I should never repeat it, it's a lot of nonsense and that's that. And that made me believe, why are these guys so interested in damage control about this case, whoever killed Webster might have had something to do with the CCB.

The only guy who ever claimed that he did it was Barnard.

~~Barnard was also working for Region 6 and he was working for Region 7. Whether he received instruction from Region 6 to do this without the knowledge of Region 7 is a possibility. And Joe was very angry when he learnt that Region 7, Lafras Leiting, now found out about it and he played a game by pretending that he didn't know anything about it. That is my impression about it.~~

~~CHAIRPERSON: John Daniel?~~

PROF DANIEL: Some quick questions. Talking about Lafras Leiting at this Barnard Trial, he described himself as the Production Manager of the CCB, what does that actually mean?

MR NEL: Was that Lafras or ...[intervention]

PROF DANIEL: Lafras.

MR NEL: He was in fact a member of the so-called production team. In our terms production meant disruption, if you were productive the month you managed to disrupt the enemy and sometimes we got production bonuses. When they stepped up our production or our productivity the output per region was supposed to be two jobs per month and if you underachieved they would penalise you by withholding your merit allowance annually.

But if he said he was the Production Manager, it means he was the Operational Manager. But there was also a production team in the CCB. Prior to this total covert work there was a group of well trained Special Forces operators that were authorised to hit into Botswana, Lesotho and maybe Swaziland, ~~not beyond those borders, specifically Botswana~~

~~We sometimes -- because of our good relations with the~~ police in Western Transvaal, you would receive a midnight call that there are now 7 people in a house in Francistown and they are awaiting infiltration, then that production team would, by means of a system of calling each other to get together, mobilise, ~~go do a hit and come back, and that is how those two guys who~~ were arrested at one stage in Botswana, they were members of the so-called production team. They were there on stand-by on a 24 hour basis to do operations at short notice.

PROF DANIEL: And what was Braam Cilliers' job?

MR NEL: Braam was nothing more than a support clerk I can say, according to me he was involved in logistics maybe administration, finance, personnel but he was always roaming around the head office organising support and he was also responsible I think for document security and ensuring that the files are transported safely and the money is transported safely and stuff like that.

PROF DANIEL: So he wouldn't be in a management?

MR NEL: No, he was in support.

PROF DANIEL: Do you want to tell us what his real name is?

MR NEL: I have not idea, I know him as Ene Braam. They called him Ene Braam in the Harmse Commission and that is what I know. I know he was a Lieutenant Colonel in the SA Army ~~before he, he was a Commandant before he left the SA Army and~~ he stayed in Valhalla, that is all I know.

PROF DANIEL: It seems that Joe Verster had quite a temper, that he often fell out? I mean we've been told a story that he got very upset with Pieter Botes at one time and blew up his business as a sort of punishment. Do you want to say anything about the ~~rumours about the death of Corrie Meerholtz?~~

MR NEL: I think the rumours are well known and I can only repeat them. I know that he and Corrie had their own little problems. He left the CCB not in a very friendly way. The

rumour was that there was something happening in the Eastern Transvaal, ...[inaudible] something about smuggling, Kruger National Park, smuggling of weapons to and from Renamo for personal gain or people who were smuggling for their own pocket, that kind of rumours existed where Piet Botes was central to some of them.

When Corrie left it wasn't a nice affair, he didn't leave normally. They wanted him back but he actually arranged it in such a way that the Chairman or the Officer Commanding Special Forces called him back to become the Officer Commanding of 5 Special Forces regiment and he was very happy to leave. His death was very funny, people had a lot of questions about it without any motive. We could never determine, other than Joe, might have had the motive and what this argument was all about.

~~Surely there are people who know more about this argument~~  
and the substance of possible motive. I later on started to believe that there's more in this death than just a normal thing, because there was rumour about another white guy, Special Forces type, who was killed. I can't remember his surname now but Danie Phaal had something to do with it. People were very afraid of what Danie Phaal knew. Danie Phaal was a, I don't know, he had some kind of power over Joe because the farm that we used as a CCB facility belonged to the Phaals, spelt: P-H-A-A-L.

They owned that property and Joe and Danie Phaal were in a joint venture with vehicles, transport, big trucks and Danie Phaal was junior, more or less my age but he was never afraid of Joe. He would challenge him, he would throw arguments back at him while the rest of us were, we knew not to antagonise Joe Verster.

PROF DANIEL: Was Phaal a CCB member?

MR NEL: Ja. Yes, I can't place him in a Region, he was a jack of all trades, he was always around Joe. The rumour was that there's something that happened where somebody was bumped to quiet him down about business deals that went wrong and money

making stuff but Phaal knew about it and this is rumour, it's all rumour.

PROF DANIEL: Where was the farm?

MR NEL: The farm that we used?

PROF DANIEL: Ja.

MR NEL: It was very close, it's in Pretoria West near Vlakplaas.

It's very close to Special Forces Headquarters, there near - what's that Indian area in Pretoria, near Erasmia, near Erasmia is the area.

PROF DANIEL: And what did you use it for?

MR NEL: No, it was primarily used as a - there was a very, very big house on the premises. It was used as offices only and there were storage facilities. At one stage Piet Botes arrived there late

at night with a whole truck full of weapons and they loaded into the storage facilities. It came from Mozambique.

Funny things happened there, you know we used to re-route - I say: "we", the Defence Force used to re-route via Special Tasks, weapons captured in Angola back to give to Renamo. Those same weapons would be smuggled back to the CCB and used by our operators and some of these things were, according to rumour, smuggled to Inkatha and to other organisations as well.

PROF DANIEL: Did you have other farms? We heard for example that Noel Robey lived on a farm somewhere up near the Zimbabwe border, Phalaborwa area.

MR NEL: No, we had a farm in Hazyview, I went there once. The Region 2 operations were launched from there. Some CCB ~~operator or two stayed there, they farmed there. I don't what~~ they did, it was a fruit farm or something, I don't know what exactly they were farming there, I went there at night.

And then there was a farm near Broederstroom, a guy by the name of Booysen stayed there, Jeug Booysen, I saw his photo ~~here. He was the logistic guy. They used to store things there, weapons and other things as well.~~

Then there was a farm up in Katima Molelo which belonged to Noel Robey or it was a project, it was his blue plan. It was a fish farm, I don't know what they -hulle het vis geteel, vis teel

farm. He operated from there. He was with Region 4 working into Zimbabwe, into Zambia from there.

There were other farms as well. There's a farm north of Pretoria, it was called: "Die Skuur". It's near where Walmastal is now.

MR KHOISAN: Near the Pienaars River?

MR NEL: Ja, I do not know the rivers of the area but it is about 40 kilometres north of Pretoria. MI has also got a farm there called Fontana and right next to it the CCB had a farm. I always asked why do they have so many garages, there's parking space for about 50 vehicles there, covered parking and one big house.

But there could be numerous others as well, could have been.

PROF DANIEL: You were talking earlier about some of these attempts to poison people in Zimbabwe. I wonder if you have

~~just ever heard of this incident because we were given a statement~~

by a woman called Connie Braam who was the head of the Dutch Anti-apartheid Movement for many years and later was intimately involved in: "Operation Vula", and she was attending a children's conference in Harare in 1987 and at the end of the conference she

~~was staying at a particular hotel where she found two coats in her cupboard and she assumed that these coats had been left by the~~

previous guests, they were very beautiful coats so she put one on and she became extremely ill and is today dying of cancer. She

has always believed it was a Frank Chikane type operation, therefore possibly a CCB operation.

MR NEL: It sounds typical CCB style. It sounds, not even CCB, it sounds a specialised medical operation. Whenever you had access to somebody's house the options for operations opened up tremendously, even hotel rooms as well, if you had access to personal items of that individual.

The chances specifically for lipstick and that type of thing increases tremendously. So, it sounds correct. There was, to my knowledge, the capability to spray things onto clothes or to soak clothes into things that would be absorbed through the skin, it's possible.

PROF DANIEL: Do you want to pursue on that?

CHAIRPERSON: Not on this particular matter. I just wanted to know because you mentioned the name Danie Phaal, was he to your knowledge ever involved in the use of chemicals of the nature that John has just asked you?

MR NEL: No, I'm not aware of any specific operation that he was involved in, other than a very interesting funny incident. I took over a guy from him, it's a guy who ran away from Lusaka. He was not a very senior MK operator but he ran away to Malawi.

I think he was detained for a while in Lusaka and then he managed to escape and Danie Phaal by means of his project and his contacts, they flew him out from Malawi back into the country



and I was asked by Joe to go and question this guy in detail to get the latest information that he could provide us with about Lusaka only to learn that he was detained for quite a while and his information was almost 2, 3 months old and most of the things that he knew about was already known to us although he tried to impress us with a lot of things.

He was detained, I can't say detained, he was kept for his own safety on a farm at Broederstroom where I got involved with him but he was very sick, he was later tested positive for HIV. And there was this rumour that blood was taken from this person knowing that he's got HIV, more than what was needed for a test.

There was always a rumour of the possibility of using this blood for a possible operation but it was pure speculation, but Danie Phaal was involved in this process. And it was explained ~~to me that they're taking this blood, they already took the blood~~ and then came back again after it was known that he was in an advanced stage of HIV, Aids.

The guy later died in Botswana in prison. He was willing to do an operation and he was sent to Botswana and he was arrested there.

PROF. DANIEL. We've received some testimony about a raid into Swaziland in December the 12th 1986 in which it was said you participated along with Corrie Meerholtz. It was a raid which resulted in the kidnapping of two Swiss nationals and the death of

Shadrack Mapemula and one or two other people. Is that a rumour?

MR NEL: Ja. No, I was not involved, never with any Swiss nationals, the name Mapemula sounds familiar, maybe because there were many, few people with such names. In 1986 - what was the date?

PROF DANIEL: December the 12th.

MR NEL: Where was this, in which country?

PROF DANIEL: Swaziland.

MR NEL: No. I was involved in an operation in more or less that time frame, that involved the landing of - this was prior to my time with the CCB, there was an operation where we were working in projects and we prepared a number of targets in Mozambique and Swaziland. That was a Special Forces raid, it was not a CCB operation. I was in the operation room of Special Forces that night. I was quite an extensive operation because it involved the cooperation between members who were already then in Joe Vertser's organisation, let's call them the CCB, and 4 Special Forces regiment and others, because Dave Tippet was a CCB member, he was going to marry up the guys who were going to be landed by the strike craft coming from the sea and lead them into the target areas, he knew where the targets were. I know that the ANC offices in Maputo were targets, I

think Albe Sacks and others were also targets at that stage  
...[intervention]

PROF DANIEL: Sue Rapkin?

MR NEL: Sue Rapkin, that's right. And there were also targets in Swaziland. Now that operation was coordinated by General Chris Serfontein, Swarttand Serffontein. I sat in the operations room that evening, it was actually my first exposure to Special Forces type of operations because I arrived there in early '86 and that was at the end, if you're talking about that time frame.

Henry van der Westhuizen was the primary provider of most of that information, it was his region. We assisted him in preparing certain maps and so. But that was a SADF operation sanctioned at the highest level because phone calls were made by General Serffontein, he was a Brigadier at that stage, from there ~~in my presence to senior people and later on General Klopper,~~ he's a guy ...[indistinct] they also arrived late at night  
...[intervention]

MR KHOISAN: J A N Klopper?

MR NEL: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

~~CHAIRPERSON~~ He's the gentleman who was given to us as the nodal point by the SANDF and we never really got anywhere with that nodal point ...[indistinct] I must indicate that we have an arrangement that we will stop at four today and it's past four and

it is clear to me from just the interest that you have generated that we will need to call you, but maybe you should deal with the last question that John ...[intervention]

PROF DANIEL: That raid was aborted though, that operation was aborted before they landed in Maputo?

MR NEL: Yes, because the marrying up couldn't take place. Dave Tippet, he later died, people suspected Dave Tippet was arrested or he couldn't get to the marrying up point, there was a lack of communication with Dave. That was a big - they tried to get this thing running but the Swaziland part of the operation continued, whether it was the same night I'm not 100% - ja, it was. But there was police involvement in that operation as well, the Swaziland one. I think Gene de Kock and his people were involved there.

~~PROF DANIEL: De Kock was certainly in Swaziland that night.~~

He claims that he was on a different operation which was aborted as a result of this operation.

MR NEL: Ja, but this was not a CCB operation, this was a 1 Special Forces regiment and I think 4 Special Forces regiment was involved because it was also involving the Navy, it involved the Airforce. It was a total military operation. Such operations that involved other arms of service other than the Army was normally approved up to the highest level, State Security Council level and the President would know about it and sanction it. Yes,

I was there, I was not - I was actually a spectator at the time  
...[intervention]

PROF DANIEL: The operations room is in Pretoria?

MR NEL: It's at Special Forces headquarters.

PROF DANIEL: Okay.

MR NEL: General Gleeson I believe, I think was also there that night. There were quite a number of highranking officials and General Joubert as well.

PROF DANIEL: In fact Henry van der Westhuizen didn't tell us about your involvement, somebody else did but he told us that they had 12 targets in Maputo on that operation including virtually the entire political leadership.

MR NEL: That's right. They went through, we went through a process prior to the operation to try and confirm the targets but

~~Henry, I think Henry himself was also involved in the, he was also~~  
in Swaziland or very close to that operation on the ground. I was just involved in Pretoria from an intelligence point of view, it wasn't my region.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it seems to me that it is clear that when you indicated that you are worried about the time that we have ~~put aside for your testimony, you were correct and in view of the~~ arrangement prior to our commencing these proceedings and your attorney, we wouldn't like to prejudice you from the point of view

of your travel arrangements because I think that is what impels us to have to put these proceedings to an end.

I believe however that there is an indication that you will be available on a date to be arranged and we should therefore adjourn these proceedings to a date to be arranged. The proceedings are adjourned to a date to be arranged, thank you.

HEARING ADJOURNS