

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**INQUIRY - SECTION 29 - 18 NOVEMBER 1996****QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS**

5

GEN PJ COETZEE**ADV GOOSEN:**

Thank you very much Mr Commissioner, General you say at page 6, I am going to pick up on a few items that you mention in your submission at the

10 outset. You say at page 6, paragraph 2.4.

GEN COETZEE:

Page 6 - ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 You referred to the last portion of the paragraph, the South African Police must under no circumstances become involved with other Security organisations and joint operations or ventures.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

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You also indicate later in your submission that - that was the view that you adopted that they should not - not conduct joined operations.

Could you briefly explain why that is the case, why you adopted that attitude.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes with great pleasure sir. The fact is that I felt sir that the South African Police must work within the ambit - within the parameters of what the law of this country allowed them.

I'll give an incident of what I have in mind. And the other
10 organisations especially the South African Defence Force, with a culture and a training and methods and techniques, should not be joined with the police in operations which could bring that - that view of mine that I can only take responsibility for police actions if I control and I am in command.

I'll give you two incidents sir, during my commissionership at one of
15 these joined planning actions it was decided that when there was riots, or when there were riots somewhere, the police on the - should come down much more heavily on the rioters than would normally be the circumstances.

I objected to this on the grounds that according to the law, it was the job of the officer commanding, the police contingent on the spot objectively
20 to evaluate the situation before he could act and utilise his forces in the

increase of the force that he is using, if he was totally in command. If there was an army officer in command or someone else in command then we would be acting illegally. That's one case that - why I felt like that.

The second case sir, that I with respect, with great effort and with
5 great difficulty passed through or passed through Parliament a law in the Police Act and Article under the Police Act which allowed the police to stop vehicles on any public road, it's there in the Police Act sir, on any public road to search that.

Now sir it's obvious that this is not in accordance with the Criminal
10 Procedure and Evidence Act and other enactment's which require from a policeman to at least have a certain state of mind before you can act against the person.

When I eventually discovered that the Army, the South African
Defence Force had taken this - this enactment in the Police Act, and by way
15 of regulations in terms of the Defence Act has taken it into the Defence Act so that they could now also stop vehicles on the road, and inspect it and search the vehicles and so on. I objected very strenuously to the extend that this matter eventually went to - for legal opinion. My opinion being that ours was original enactment's original law. Whereas the regulations which
20 they've adopted into their Act, was subsidiary legislation.

And that way we would have legal confusion about these matters and the legal opinion eventually said man I was quite right in my view about it, so for these and other similar reasons sir I said that policeman should work under their own command otherwise we could not take responsibility for our
5 actions, this is basically the position sir.

I don't think it's necessary to give other ...[indistinct] - what I also advocate say is that I do not know whether this instruction of mine was not perhaps eventually overtaken or to some - in some way confusion occurred when this new situation aroused which I've described.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

How did - you remained as the Commissioner of Police until...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

June 1980...[intervention]

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

June 1987.

GEN COETZEE:

That's right.

ADV GOOSEN:

By July 1987 the National Security Management System was fully operational throughout the country is that correct?

GEN COETZEE:

That's one month after I left.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No - no.

GEN COETZEE:

You said July 1987.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 No I am saying by - by July 1987 - you left in July 1987?

GEN COETZEE:

June.

ADV GOOSEN:

I beg your pardon, June 1987, but by June 1987 the National Security

15 Management System was fully operational throughout the country is that correct?

GEN COETZEE:

Yes sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

That consisted of joined Management Centres that were in place in each of the nine command areas of the South African Defence Force at the time. On each of those joined Management Centres the South African Police were represented and in virtually every instance were represented by the Security

5 Police is that correct?

GEN COETZEE:

That is correct ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, in the joined Management Centre area of jurisdiction in each of those
10 nine areas of jurisdiction, joined operational centres were established, is that correct?

GEN COETZEE:

I don't know sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 There were also joined information centres offered, JIC's the Afrikaans is **gis en gos** would you recall..[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Yes sir, I suppose so, but you must please remember sir that I didn't serve on that level, but it is so, I said that they had different components.

ADV GOOSEN:

And I accept that.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

But this was uniformed throughout the country that in each of the joined Management Centre areas there was - well in Afrikaans it's referred to as a **gis** and a **gos** operational.

GEN COETZEE:

10 That's right - yes no I won't deny that.

ADV GOOSEN:

So they were joined - joined operational centres were functioning by June 1987 in each of the nine commander areas.

GEN COETZEE:

15 That's quite right sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

What was your approach to that level of operation - co-operation?

GEN COETZEE:

My - my approach was sir and I've said it - stated that quite categorically at

20 General staff meetings and to everyone that the police that - that joined

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operations should mean that the Army should do within their line - within their command and their structures and their training what they should do and I've said it here, they should patrol, they should cordon and so on, but the police in their actions, it should be separate, it should be autonomous and it should be that type of action.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes - ...[end of Tape 2, side A...]

GEN COETZEE:

... ambit of the law in other words they should do what policeman should within the line function of the police department.

ADV GOOSEN:

And that would apply I take it to the General policing functions that would be carried out by the police authorised by - by the Police Act.

GEN COETZEE:

15 Yes.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, would it be correct to say that, that apply to overhead operations conducted by the police?

GEN COETZEE:

Overt?

ADV GOOSEN:

Overt.

GEN COETZEE:

5 Well yes, well obviously yes.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, during the course of the first period of the 1990's it was regularly stated
by both politicians as well as by senior military and senior police officers
that the circumstances in South Africa required at points unorthodox
10 methods to combat the threat facing the Republic as well as the employment
of special means to do so.

Do you agree that, that would have been - would have been relatively
standard this course that would have reflected the view of the Security
Forces?

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

No I would not agree that there was an umbrella idea or philosophy that the
Security Forces should all adopt or adapt an adopt a type of procedure which
is different from the procedures that was normally adopted. If you
understand what I mean.

My position was sir and I want with your permission afterwards to read from a speech that I made about this very self same question. There was a debate, an ongoing debate for very many years - long before I was in Security sir, not only in South Africa, but in Algeria, British Ghiana and
5 very many other places where they were combating terrorism. That you cannot do it with the police alone, you must and this was the basis the theoretical basis of the - of this Security Management System.

You must have all the forces in - in society in Government or in the community to combat it. So everyone must in his own particular area of
10 responsibility must do something to combat it. That's unorthodox usually that is not the ordinary line function department for instance of the Department of Education to give preference to a certain particular area where they think there is a particular problem that's been identified.

That would not be the normal thing, it's only when it could have
15 political results - negative results that they would then reschedule their efforts and energies to answer that, that is the thing. That is a situation that had arisen. It is so that everywhere I've seen it and it's been discussed in South Africa not only in Security police level sir or Security level, it was discussed at university level - it was discussed at various institutional levels.
20 It was discussed among politicians, it was discussed in the media, whether a

country that faces an onslaught like that, should not perhaps use unorthodox methods because it's an unorthodox onslaught. It's not an normal criminal onslaught, you must use unorthodox information - mis - misinformation and things like that and the State should answer that onslaught with these
5 methods.

Now sir my attitude throughout this period, and I will read it to you if you want to, in a speech, and in television interviews that I made, I said that my own view is that beholds South Africa to have recourse to the laws of the country. If it's special laws yes, you've got special laws for company law,
10 insolvency laws and you can have special laws. That's right, but it must be within the reheim??, the parameters of the law.

It is true what you say that there was this discussion officers may have made that, professors made it, instructors made it, overseas visitors made it, many made it. That you should have recourse to unorthodox methods, that
15 is so. But I am a projectionist sir and I am on record to say that, that as far as I am concerned, Commissioner of the Police, you must go according to the laws for the country.

ADV GOOSEN:

But in terms of the laws of the country it made provision for a high level of collaboration between the South African Defence Force and the South African Police, why would you have objected to that legal framework?

GEN COETZEE:

5 You say it makes - and law?

ADV GOOSEN:

In terms of the - the legal framework that existed during the course of the 1980's it made provision for extensive collaboration between the police and the military. Why would you have objected to that level of collaboration?

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

What - what legal [indistinct]

ADV GOOSEN:

Well in terms of legislation, the State Security Council was established and both the Defence Act and the Police Act make provision for co-operation
15 between the police and the military.

GEN COETZEE:

Oh! no you mistaken advocate, the Police Act makes provision that in time or the Police Act as it was when I was Commissioner makes provision that in time of war or a national emergency, a portion of the police could be

taken out of the police and placed under the command of the army as long as it was necessary.

The Police Act you can please refer to it again, that's the only provision in the Police Act about co-operation. Now about the State Security Council sir, that sir and that was one of my objections incidentally, the State Security as it was structured was made - provision was made in the Act which constituted the barrow of State Security. That is the Act that makes provision for that.

That Act also says that every - every organisation in South Africa, police, Railways and Harbours police, everyone must furnish our information to National Intelligence - this is what that Act says. There is no word in that Act about co-operating on a physical level between the different organisations. This is what it says sir, there is instituted a State Security Council, it says what Ministers will serve on it, what officials will serve on it, and what it will do, it says what it's function is.

And my objection advocate was that this is not - this whole co-operation which developed along those levels that you've indicated, was not legally provided for. This was my objection sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Did that go right through to the - to the participation of the Security Police within the joined management centres, within each of the command structures of the South African Defence Force.

GEN COETZEE:

5 Yes Sir, I've told you that we had these conferences, the different conferences where the end product was, which was also legal because it's in the law. We could really object because we are always [indistinct] but there it's in the law, that we must provide information.

It's legally required that we should inform especially National Intelligence,
10 but whatever body they constituting, we must provide the information that we have.

ADV GOOSEN:

So do I understand you correct General that you - that you would accept that there was in fact in the manner in which the joined Management Centres
15 functioned, in fact a level of conflict between the police and the military in terms of areas of jurisdiction if you like.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes I've stated that sir, what is more when I appeared before the Commission in the firsts instance, I said that we as Directors Generals, and
20 that included me sir, we objected all of us and at one stage we from the

Works Committee, we went so far as to draw up a document and said that this - this is placing a burden on us, and it creates another line function responsibility and I said sir we were shot down.

You - please you will remember that I said that.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

The...[indistinct]

GEN COETZEE:

I am sorry I am not on...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

10 No how did I am interested in the level of disagreement and for want of a better word, conflict that would have existed then at an operational level between police and the military.

GEN COETZEE:

No I'd think it would be true to say that in some instances, you would find
15 that policeman would very seriously object to some of these joined programmes or projects and so on and everyone within his own line function, you would find that. And other instances they would be more amenable and say yes all right I'll go along with it, **dit is** - I don't think that you'll find that there is a strict dividing line and say that we were at logger
20 heads all the time. It isn't so.

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But there was definitely - definitely sir, from senior police level, especially a disenchantment let me put it that way - a disenchantment that we forced to operate in a system which firstly there is not a real legal basis, there is not a real legal basis and the police complained about it. I
5 complained about it and says where in the law does it say that we must co-operate in this particular structure here.

And they say well it's unofficial - it's a strategy, it's to answer the total onslaught, I've said it in my - my document too. And in some instances we were at logger heads. Naturally we were at logger heads. I, in
10 many instances approached this issue about the roadblocks for instance. Do you think that this was not known at very high level. It was known that Commissioner of Police is very unhappy about this - this issue.

As a matter of fact there was about this particular issue, there was an incident in Northern Natal where the army had a roadblock and something
15 happened there, I think either they killed someone or they shot someone at or something like that and they came to the police and they say now you know what - we jointly in this and I said no that's exactly what I am talking about.

You not legally trained, you don't know when to stop a car and what
20 to search for and what the legal requirements when you search are. And

eventually there was - well I haven't got all the particulars here today, but there was a big problem about it - about that particular episode, it's one of many. And you mentioned that there were instances where - at a - at the level of the joined management centre or station commander level, certain -

5 certain activities or decisions were made which you ultimately countermanded and that, that created the impression that you - that there was a disagreement between the police and the and the military in relation to those operations.

Could you give some instance of what - what you referring to there.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes well I've mentioned those - those incidents also I mean the fact of the matter is that you must remember sir, that you had this - you've mentioned in the nine commands you have this different management centres, all with except for Kimberley I think and one other, all under Army command, in

15 fact under Army command.

And - and your own divisional commissioners are not restful I've said so, they sort of disenchanted with this because they feel it was a waste of time in many respects, it's time consuming in many respects and many of the things - of the ideas of how you should do these things by - by certain

20 actions that they had in mind, which is not illegal actions.

But it was countered to police culture and tradition remembering that police feel sir that we've got the greatest monitor of police action in the country and that is the courts and the laws of the country. Every action by every policeman whether a person is killed, assaulted or whatever, eventually lands in court and this was my other big gripe about it, a policeman lands in court, he's got to go and tell the magistrate or the judge what has happened and in fact the decision to for instance do a certain operation and cordoning a big operation in the morning before the people has got to go to work, that is laid before the door of the police.

Where in fact it was a joined decision there to which we just submitted, this is the type of situation which I objected to, I've said well this is the problem that we've got to go and give explanations in courts and we influenced by discussions which we should only have within the legal parameters of our job and not to be influenced by outside forces, external extraneous circumstances.

ADV GOOSEN:

Okay, I can understand that at the level of overt operations how did the tension then play itself out in relation to covert operations?

GEN COETZEE:

What covert operations?

ADV GOOSEN:

Any number of covert operations conducted by the police or the military during the course of the 1980's.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

But sir I told you I don't know of any covert operations between the military intelligence and the police, whilst I was the Security.

ADV GOOSEN:

No not just the military intelligence, military generally.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

No what military operation are you talking about?

ADV GOOSEN:

Did the police, Security police...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

15 Until 1980.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ever [indistinct] until 1987 when you were Commissioner - prior to you in fact becoming Commissioner the period that you were head of the Security Police - ever conduct covert operations.

GEN COETZEE:

June 1983 - no June 1983.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, ever conduct covert operations?

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

Good - I told - I said to you sir that at that stage the commander of military intelligence was General Van der Westhuizen. And I never got the police involved with any - with any covert operation with military intelligence.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 No - no the question I am asking General is - is slightly different: Can we accept that there were covert operations conducted by the police - separate from the military.

GEN COETZEE:

Covert operations sir, you know we must be very sure of our definitions
15 here, what is a covert operation. If we infiltrate the opposition is that a covert operation?

ADV GOOSEN:

Well you could have any number of covert operations - you can infiltrate the organisation - you can run a front company you can - you can conduct
20 information gathering - exercise like Operation Daisy for example.

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GEN COETZEE:

Is that a covert operation?

ADV GOOSEN:

It would be a covert operation.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

Is that a covert operation?

ADV GOOSEN:

Well you can tell us about Operation Daisy if you wish, but I am giving you instances different types of covert operations - yes.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

But we never conducted that, we conducted it at police level.

ADV GOOSEN:

What I want to know is whether the police ever conducted covert operations of any - of any description that you aware of.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes we - we definitely - very definitely was involved in covert intelligence gathering information sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes any forms of covert operations conducted?

GEN COETZEE:

No physically - not of a physical nature - of a physical nature to kill people or assassinate people of any nation, not under my command at all sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

- 5 No I am not suggesting that an operation necessarily should result in the killing or murdering of a person, but that it should be covert i.e. that it should not be discoverable and that the general public should not be aware of it, that's the questions...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

- 10 Like traps and gold cases sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

I beg your pardon?

GEN COETZEE:

Traps and gold cases?

- 15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Well there can be any number of...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

That's a covert operation.

ADV GOOSEN:

There can be any number of covert operations.

GEN COETZEE:

That's a covert operation.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes we were involved in that type of covert operations.

ADV GOOSEN:

And in relation to - in relation to - in a Security Police - Security Police.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes sir I was involved - I had many operations of an intelligence gathering, nature and afterwards I used those agents in the courts of this country to convict those people.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Any - any other...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

So and that stands as court covert.

GEN COETZEE:

I beg your pardon?

ADV GOOSEN:

Any other form of covert operation conducted by the Security Police?

GEN COETZEE:

I - until I left the South African Security Service in June 1983, the only
5 covert operations that the South African Police or the Security Police was
concerned in that I am aware was, was intelligence, evidence gathering
information projects.

ADV GOOSEN:

And co-operation between the South African Defence Force on covert
10 operations, any co-operation with the South African Defence Force
whatsoever?

GEN COETZEE:

No they - not with the - not with military intelligence sir, I told you already.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 No not with the military intelligence, with the South African Defence Force?

GEN COETZEE:

No not that I am aware of, until I left there, I told you there were no covert
operation discussed between their commander and myself.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Can I just get in there General.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

5 So that I should just understand, now when the so-called Cradock 4 were murdered.

GEN COETZEE:

The so-called?

ADV NTSEBEZA:

10 Cradock 4.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

15 Were killed, you were still - what were you then, were you the Commissioner of Police?

GEN COETZEE:

I was the Commissioner - ja.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

And what do you know of that particular incident?

GEN COETZEE:

What I've said in my affidavit sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Yes, yes I appreciate that, what I am trying to get at is, at the time that it
5 happened did you know that it had anything to do with - with the Army
and/or with the police?

GEN COETZEE:

Sir without trying to being callus I didn't know it happened, I didn't even
know this. Perhaps read in the newspaper, no-one reported to me. So I am -
10 you must please remember sir that as Commissioner of Police, I was
suppose to read through just riot reports something like 500 pages a day.
Something like 500 pages a day sir, a book a day, just riots.

That is except all my other work, criminal, appeals, said I worked
14 - 18 hours a day just to read through it, I didn't know about it sir, unless
15 someone came to me and say listen, either a press man or someone - a
commander of the Security Police, a commander of the CID who is
investigating this, to me with great respect sir, I do not want you to think
that I am callus about deaths of people.

Unless something like that happens, it's just one other death in South
20 Africa.

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ADV NTSEBEZA:

Are you then saying that at no stage was the matter ever discussed with you by General Joffel van der Westhuizen?

GEN COETZEE:

5 I don't know him, I've never met him sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

You've never met him?

GEN COETZEE:

I've never met him as far - not on the basis that I can remember it, he may
10 have been in a committee meeting with me, but not on a personal level. I don't know him.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

And you don't know that there was an involvement in the prosecution of those killings by a joined operation by the South African Police and the
15 South African Defence Force.

GEN COETZEE:

Completely unaware of it sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

General just to come back to the discussion about covert operations, you would presumably describe the ANC London offices that were attacked by way of a bomb blast in March 1982 as a covert operation?

GEN COETZEE:

5 Which one was that?

ADV GOOSEN:

The ANC London bomb blast in March 1982.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Was a covert operation.

GEN COETZEE:

That - that's quite correct.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Covert because you didn't want anyone to know that it had been carried out by the Security Police, correct?

GEN COETZEE:

That's right, but it was done separately by the police sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes and that was not an intelligence gathering operation.

GEN COETZEE:

No that is quite - quite correct.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 That was...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

It was in response I said to the heavy involvement of British subjects in the attack on Voortrekker Hoogte sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Yes, and also to indicate that there were - that there was a price to be paid should the British Government continue to as it were allow the ANC to conduct operations or have an office on it's territory, correct?

GEN COETZEE:

15 I must tell you sir before that and it's available there was a whole operation to find out exactly what the ANC was doing there and it was demonstrated at that stage that they were definitely actively engaged in terrorist against South Africa from that office sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

So in that sense it was an intelligence gathering first, then - yes there was this covert action.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 But it was not a bomb - the bomb attack wasn't an intelligence gathering exercise, there might have been an intelligence gathering prior to that.

GEN COETZEE:

No it was - it was to indicate to the British Government that we've applied too, we've asked for co-operation, we've warned that this is not going - this
10 is a risky venture that you're involved in, and there were discussions sir, I was in some of these discussions, the British Government the officials view was that Britain is traditionally - must give sanctuary to dissidence from other countries political dissidence and so on and we attempted to prove that this - this is not true in this case, this is not ordinary political dissidence,
15 these are physical attacks are being planned from here - from this office, against South Africa and it was demonstrated by this attack on Voortrekker Hoogte.

We gave the particulars sir, and then it was decided that we would demonstrate and it was - I've said it symbolically sir, demonstrate it, it's a
20 dangerous venture this is what the attitude was of the Minister sir. I didn't

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conceive it, it was the Government sir - view. We say that we must demonstrate to them symbolically this is - this is not going to work, this is not - this - you're on dangerous grounds here.

No you can put it in other words, but this is the basic idea.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes, in other words it was decided that - that a covert operation should be conducted, South African agents going into London, hitting...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

South African policeman sir.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Policeman hitting the target.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 And returning.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

It was not - it was not an attack which the South African Government subsequently acknowledged having carried out correct?

20

GEN COETZEE:

I - I - with great respect sir, I don't think one would have needed to be a Sherlock Holmes to know that after these discussions, this happens and only directed against the ANC. Who else in the world sir, would have done it

5 there, they knew we were complaining about this.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

They knew it.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

The South African Government I've said was prepared to risk if these policeman- policeman with salaries, pensions well know, if they were
15 arrested there, that we would have stood up, the Government would have stood up and said yes, those are our men because of this what you've done.

Because our appeals fell on deaf ears, certainly sir - certainly we did it.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, was similar projects, operations conceived in relation to Zimbabwe - in relation to Zambia - in relation to any other front line state?

GEN COETZEE:

No I - not by the police. This is the only one we complained and it seems to
5 me but I am not - not on record Mr Chairperson I don't know, I must say,
but that no other organisation had the operatives to do it, and that's why they
said the police must do it and that's why we objected.

And I've said already that by the demarcation of - of geographical
borders we were not suppose to do a job there, like that. This is not our
10 function, policeman - we always maintain should be working - should work
within the borders of the country.

ADV GOOSEN:

Okay, and was that in any way - in any way co-ordinated with the South
African Defence Force?

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

Which one?

ADV GOOSEN:

The London attack.

GEN COETZEE:

I have no idea sir. I told you that Mr Goosen went directly to the Minister, he chose the operatives, he did the all the - he did the operational planning.

ADV GOOSEN:

Did the people who were - who were decorated were they all Security
5 Policeman?

GEN COETZEE:

They were all policeman ja, as far as I remember they were all policeman
after 15 years I really can't tell you the identity of every on. I never spoke to
them about it, I've told you who the leader was and I know Mr Williamson
10 went.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, are you aware of any similar attacks that were carried out in Belgium or
any other European country?

GEN COETZEE:

15 None at all by the South African Police sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

You're aware of whether similar attacks such as that might have been
carried out by the South African Defence Force in any European country?

GEN COETZEE:

No idea sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

The - that was one covert operation, the ANC London bomb blast, which was not an intelligence gathering exercise. Are you aware of any other

5 covert operations which are not intelligence gathering exercises conducted by the Security Police.

GEN COETZEE:

Until June 1983.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

When I commanded them sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes or - or that you may have become aware of as Commissioner of Police

15 subsequent to your transfer.

GEN COETZEE:

No not by the police sir, not extraterritorial, I don't know that.

ADV GOOSEN:

Inside the country.

GEN COETZEE:

Not - neither.

ADV GOOSEN:

In your long and distinguish career as a - as a policeman then do I take it
5 apart from various intelligence gathering exercise of which you have
knowledge as the ANC London bomb blast.

GEN COETZEE:

Sir I've got knowledge of very many - very many operations of an
intelligence covert of covert intelligence nature, very many sir. I've
10 conducted many myself.

ADV GOOSEN:

No I am talking about those that are not intelligence gathering as the primary
objective.

GEN COETZEE:

15 No I know, I am unaware of any covert operation inside the Country and
until this stage that I was transferred from the Security Branch, that was
conducted against the other people or the opponents of the State.

ADV GOOSEN:

Okay, now you indicated that when you were Commissioner of Police you
20 obviously had a very substantial amount of work to do each day and you

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worked very long hours and that, that you offered as a reason why you may not have become aware of certain specific instances.

Your work load as head of the Security Police would have been perhaps a little bit less but no doubt a very substantial workload as well.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

I commanded 3,000 men sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Correct, what was the function then of the so-called Sanhedrin meetings that occurred on a weekly basis?

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Oh! yes I've told you sir that we had at police headquarters a different desk I was when I was transferred I served on the South African Communist Party desk. So my job there for that first period of 1979 was to read through all the documents of the SACP which we got hold of to see what their aims, their strategy, their plans were.

15

I had to find out who the people were that was concerned with the SACP, what joined ventured they planned with the ANC. What they planned in the world about and a broader planning capacity and so on. And at a meeting for instance of the Sanhedrin I would stand up and say well this

20

is the position at this stage with the South African Communist Party, they

are for instance supporting Vietnam in this project. They support as well I can give examples of that, we've had a lady here, in South Africa, she was arrested under certain circumstances and now she has become Radio Hanoi Hannah. She's got knowledge of South African Affairs, she is broadcasting
5 against anti American propaganda from North Vietnam. This is the type of thing that I would - this would then with all the different desks would be combined in an intelligence review or a document that's published and that's given to the Minister and it's given to the different Security Branches because they not able to monitor all the - what we considered all the anti
10 South African organisations throughout the world.

Some information we'd get from outside sources and as you know in an intelligence gathering there is a saying that 90% of your information you get from the open press. So we'd collect and collate and that - this into a document, and this is what we were discussing there.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

And it would presumably also be a function of the Sanhedrin meetings to discuss what action should be taken on the intelligence that would - that was gathered.

GEN COETZEE:

No we'd say we arrested, we'd say we've arrested now an ANC terrorist in such and such an area. He is making a statement, here is a statement and we'd read out the saylian??? points from the statement there.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 And if...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

So that - it's information that we providing that we collating and that we providing for the people outside so that they - they not able - they not capable they haven't got the capacity to do all these things. So this is the
10 centre where we join all this information and we provide it again for - to our police, not only the Security Police, also the ordinary police.

In many cases we'd say listen we expect problems in this particular area, divisional commissioner, this is the information that we have. So it's not re this information sort of restructured and then to do covert actions
15 about it and say it and say it - that's what we doing, it's not that, you must do within your line functions quite legally what you can do.

You must gather information, you must submit the information, you must quite likely recommend that a person be restricted to his house or what - this is all the things that you could do legally. Many things or you can

investigate an offence there, you can take it to the public prosecutor and all these things. This is what you could do legally.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, would you agree that you would have adopted a view that the provisions of the Internal Security Act were not - didn't provide you with sufficient mechanisms to enable you to act decisively in certain circumstances.

GEN COETZEE:

I disagree with that completely sir and I want you to allow me to read you what my view was about this. I said sir at a lecture the CR Swart lecture that I gave at the University of Bloemfontein and if you will allow me to - it's two short passages. I say sir:

We are the servants of the law in order that we may be free, quoting Cicero.

15 And then I say:

Die skoonste vraag van die demokrasie is nie geleë in die strukturering van die Staat se Wetgewende organe in die mespunt balansering van selfs verskanste belange om ekonomiese etniese of maatskaplike domininasie uit te skakel nie.

Ja selfs nie in die handves van regte nie, individueel of groeps gemanifesteer nie. Maar in die spontane onderwerping aan die wet van alle landsburgers.

Because subjection to the law is not incompatible with moral freedom
5 and human dignity. Sir and I don't want to take too much time, but then I say at the end sir and this is long before this was decant and things I said:

There are those - **daar is diegene wat beweer dat 'n demokratiese Staat nie oor die verdedigingsmeganismes beskik...**

And this is what you saying sir.

10 **Om hom suksesvol teen 'n marksistiese aanslag te verweer nie, en dat so 'n teiken Staat wat die prooi van so 'n aanslag geword het, noodgedwonge verplig word om sy politieke stelsel te vereng, totdat dit uiteindelik ontwikkel in 'n tipe gesag Staat.**

That is what you saying that the laws are not sufficient and I say:

15 **Ek is nie hierdie mening toegedaan nie, myns insiens word 'n marksistiese aanslag die beste afgeslaan as die Staat aan die een kant onverbitterlik ingevolge toepaslike wetgewing.**

Dis wat ek sê:

Teen revolusionêre optree en aan die ander kant 'n politieke ekonomiese en maatskaplike modus vivendi soek wat die aanslag sal inhibeer.

That's what I said then and that's what I say now sir.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

But General when did you make that speech?

GEN COETZEE:

1987 sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 1987?

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

That was after two national states of emergency had been declared, correct?

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes sir and that's when I retired prematurely sir..

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes the fact of the matter is that between 1985 and 1987 when you - when
you

retired the State was forced to adopt drastic measures by instituting a national state of emergency on two - two occasions.

GEN COETZEE:

That's right sir in terms of the law.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes in terms of the law, law which changed from one state of emergency to the next not so?

GEN COETZEE:

I didn't change the law sir.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No that's I accept that you didn't change the law.

GEN COETZEE:

That is - please - please don't - I didn't change the law it was all in terms of the law, good, bad or in difference sir, it was the law.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Will you accept the fact that there was that - over that period as the conflict in South Africa intensified, that the response of the State was to grant ever wider powers to the police and other elements of the Security Forces in order to facilitate the combating of the - of those - those organisations that

20 were rallied against the State.

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GEN COETZEE:

Please sir you must ask those questions from the politicians involved.

ADV GOOSEN:

No but it's as a matter of a fact.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

I don't make laws, I don't recommend laws, I don't vote for laws, and I don't promulgate laws sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes but as a matter of fact General your...[intervention]

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

For me now - with respect Mr Chairperson to expect from me here after through other organs, other organs which I am not associated with the Government and it's wisdom decide that they going to change and chop this particular law to make provision for that and this and that, that's not my
15 affairs sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

No well then can I ask you directly at this stage, in 1984, prior to the first limited state of emergency which was declared in 1985 for the first time, did you hold the view in 1987 when you retired that the legal provisions

available on the statute book in 1984 would have been sufficient to combat the - the onslaught against the Republic.

GEN COETZEE:

Sir I do not want to mislead this Committee, I want to give a simple answer,

5 I retired when it was threatened that a new state of emergency was immanent it was reported in the press sir. That's - I leave it at sir please.

ADV GOOSEN:

Is that the reason that you retired?

GEN COETZEE:

10 No sir, I - it was reported in the press I opposed it, there were very many and interlocking reasons why I retired which I do not think concern this, but I said it was reported I did oppose it, I felt it was unnecessary at that stage and I retired, took early retirement.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 1986 on the 12th of June the first state of emergency was declared.

GEN COETZEE:

This I didn't know, I can't remember that sir, I am accepting your word for it.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, you then retired in June of 1987?

GEN COETZEE:

That's right sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Prior to the declarations, the third state of emergency.

GEN COETZEE:

That's correct sir as far as I remember.

ADV GOOSEN:

Was one of the reasons you retired because you objected to the fact that a
10 state of emergency would be declared?

GEN COETZEE:

Yes the idea was muted and I said that I am opposed to that, I felt that with
normal - the normal laws of common law, that was also an ongoing debate I
can tell you in South Africa whether we should charge people in terms of the
15 Internal Security Act or whether we should charge them in terms of
common law, for sedition and high treason very interestingly Mr Kentridge
wrote a document which I presented to the Rabie Commission.

I personally in my evidence and I said I am of the opinion that we
should try as far as possible to charge people in terms of common law
20 provisions. This was my - this was my known point of view sir.

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I quoted that very eminent present member of the Constitutional Court Mr [indistinct] at the end of the Rabie Commission I handed that in and I said this is the position.

So it is not what I - I want to disabuse your mind advocate is that suddenly on a certainly on a certain day, I stood up and says now **tot hier toe en nie verder nie** if I may be able to remark in Afrikaans sir.

This is not the position, my attitude was generally well known and that I would propagate it throughout this period that this was my - if you look at the evidence sir which I suppose you've got to access to at the Rabie Commission, when there was this two conflicting ideas and this - before this Commission whether the best way to combat this type of situation was by what you would use as a term not necessary illegal, but not legal means.

And my attitude was throughout that we in South Africa behoves that we should go for the courts, people should be taken to the courts, they should be able to defend themselves in an open court. This is my attitude sir, I gave that evidence and I've stood by that view until I retired and I gave it to a lot of students and it was reported in the press widely.

So you mustn't get the impression that on a certain date like an catalyst I stood and says this is the position now. It was throughout my - my

career, my point of view sir, and I've given evidence in courts sir in this country more than I think that - just about every other policeman.

ADV GOOSEN:

So General for you throughout your career as a police officer in particularly
5 when you held senior positions, head of Security Police, subsequently
Commissioner of Police, you would have adopted the attitude that illegal
actions by members of the police, that those illegal actions were not only
counter productive, but would be entirely out of keeping with the function of
the police.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

That would be I think you formulated correctly sir, I would say that if I
became aware that policeman in their duties acted illegally, I would give
instructions that they be prosecuted before the courts sir. I did it with
operatives of Vlakplaas, I didn't - I didn't hide them, I didn't say now listen
15 wait - wait there, here is a covert action we can't have this man appear in
court, he could stand in court and tell his story, whatever story he wanted to
tell.

There was an case and I can give you these incidents not infinitum ad
noisome sir. There was a case of a man, a white man Van As, constable
20 Van As or sergeant Van As who shot a detainee in Soweto sir through the
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head and the detainee was killed. This man's story of what had happened and he was alone, this is not impossible, how this man grabbed him and there was a fight going on and eventually a shot was fired and this detainee was killed.

5 This Van As's father was a captain of the police, and he came to me and he says how can you convict my son, how can you send my son for trial - have this investigated, when you send a young chap like this to interrogate a more senior guy, a guy that's radically committed to a certain cause of action. Eventually sir I went to Mr Klaus von Leerus the Attorney General
10 in Witwatersrand, Van As was prosecuted and got ten years sir.

I had the officer commanding, that Security Branch transfer and his promotion was in jeopardy - was kept back in fact because I said how - this is what this captain, this father, this bereaved - this father who has not got a son in prison for ten years, this is what he tells me.

15 When Coetzee was busy with his little things, when I discovered that the officer commanding - the Gold and Diamond Branch was committing merely a technical offence, merely a technical offence, I could have said as well what about it, I had him prosecuted before court in Kimberley and thrown out of the police force sir. ... **end of Tape 2, Side B...** the Minister
20 that I may have been there, I don't remember quite of group of people.

I've also given medals to about 5,000 or 10,000 policeman in my own life, I can't remember them sir, I can't deny it, to say if they get a medal from me or if I was there, I shook their hand, that's possible. But I don't know Eugene de Kock at all sir.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No - no I am not suggesting you do General, what I am saying is that you were Commissioner of the Police until June of 1987.

GEN COETZEE:

That's right.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Eugene de Kock took over command of Vlakplaas C1C became C-10 in 1985, so for a period of approximately two years whilst he was engaged in a number of illegal actions, of which we now know, that he would have known that his Commissioner you, if that had ever come to your attention he

15 would have - that would have been the end of him.

GEN COETZEE:

No - not...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

He would have known that.

GEN COETZEE:

Not at all sir, and the same way as it never came to my attention that at the Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad there was a colonel something that - who shot up an narcotics man that they suspected until the evidence was
5 presented to me and the man was charged.

I was in charge of 50,000 policeman as Commissioner sir, unless a matter was reported to me or his officer has reported it to me, I wouldn't know who is serving where. There are a branch at police headquarters who transfers policeman, every month hundreds, every year thousands. I don't
10 know who's there, what they working and what they doing.

General the point I am making is simply this, throughout your career you would have been known in the police as a person who requires that his subordinates honour the law.

GEN COETZEE:

15 That's right.

ADV GOOSEN:

And that they - that they act within the ambit of the law not so.

GEN COETZEE:

That - that quite right.

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ADV GOOSEN:

And that was your reputation that you had.

GEN COETZEE:

That's quite correct and that's well known sir.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Absolutely - fine. And any policeman who - or woman who had come across you or had heard of you would also have known that fact about you presumably.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Yes that's right.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

I don't say that every youngster in the police knows exactly what the -

15 because...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

No I accept that.

GEN COETZEE:

Because the fact is advocate that you must remember that policeman are

20 trained, I needn't go to every young policeman and say listen you must keep

within the ambit of the law, I did it, and I got that particular speech one of them I got, where I spoke to Indian policeman and I stressed that fact over and over and over again in my speech.

So I did it, but policeman are trained and the curriculum is there for everyone to see what they have trained in.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

Once they're out they under command of a sergeant and a warrant officer and a lieutenant that's more trained in the law, they know that for every incident that they concerned in, they likely to land in court and they got to give an explanation before a magistrate or a justice.

There is an inspectorate in the police to see that these laws and these regulations are kept so it's not necessary for me to go individually to 50,000 policeman and say listen you know, you must make sure here that you are - you do it at your - your level and that's where it's known. It was known through my own career, my own police career and it was a long and protected one sir and I do not want to boast 42 years.

Never accused of having assaulted a prisoner, never accused of having abused a prisoner, never accused of having lied to a court of law. So

everyone could see me as an example and may I say sir, that many policeman has come to me, good solid policeman and say General you were you our role model.

So that's what I am saying and I stand by this sir.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes no - no and I accept that absolutely. But from what we now know about both the operations of Dirk Coetzee and some of the people that were at Vlakplaas with him and what we know about the activities of Eugene de Kock and those people that were based at Vlakplaas and operated with him,
10 that they engaged in a very large number of illegal actions.

They committed murder, they abducted people, tortured people, and otherwise assaulted people, that we know as having been established by a court of law in the trial of Eugene de Kock at least. All of that would have been carried out by members of the Security Police from what you've
15 indicated totally without your knowledge and without your understanding.

GEN COETZEE:

No what I've indicated as far - now let's get to Eugene de Kock, you'll find that the thrust of the allegations against him concern things which happened in '88, '89 - it's here, '90, '91, '92 and so on, long after I've left the police
20 sir.

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ADV GOOSEN:

All right well what I - let's look at some of the - let's look at some of the -
some of the instances in which Dirk Coetzee confesses his involvement.

GEN COETZEE:

5 Ahh, ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

The murder of Griffiths [indistinct] for example, do you - I mean not -
leaving aside now whether you accept an you clearly don't his implication
of you in any particular matter. Leave that aside for the moment, do you
10 accept that he - on his own version, he confesses to having been involved in
the murder of Griffiths [indistinct] do you think that he is telling the truth or
not telling the truth?

GEN COETZEE:

I have got no idea sir, but as it's demonstrated here by the documents and
15 you haven't seen the Annexure yes I suppose.

ADV GOOSEN:

No I have.

GEN COETZEE:

My own view sir and I've said it time and time again that Coetzee has
20 embarked on a criminal career long before he came to Vlakplaas. I got

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evidence of that, I can prove it to you sir, whilst he was still a commander at a Border Post when he was investigated for diamond smuggling and illegal - what is it Portuguese - smuggling into their - and it was also [indistinct] illustrated when - when during the Harms Commission it appeared that he had a chap out of Lesotho that was a diamond dealer. He had him inveigled out of the country and shot up by his people - you know - all nothing by the police.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

My idea is sir I - that in the process of his own criminal career sir in the process intertwined in the locking with that, he also got involved with - with these things like for instance perhaps killing Mr Msenga.

Let me just read this to you sir, this is what the magistrate says after a prominent Pretoria clinical psychologist gives evidence. He says Coetzee says **hy word impulsief en aggressief**, I do not weight up the odds, this is what Coetzee said. **Hy word onverantwoordelik, kan nie worry nie, vat die hele skrum saam met my** - I become a man on the spur of the moment. He says I've already broken into places and I've shot at people which I should not have done. I have written letters which left me in a predicament

and I think, I think that I've been ordered by my superiors to do that, I don't take responsibility for an irrational man like that sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

No absolutely - no that's precisely the point. There you have a person who goes on a folic of his own, his own criminal actions. And engages in any number of those sorts of actions. It's your position that a policeman who commits and illegal act, an offence, criminal offence, should if that comes to the knowledge of his superior officers, if it came to your knowledge, should be made to account for that criminal act, correct?

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Most definitely advocate.

ADV GOOSEN:

Absolute.

GEN COETZEE:

15 But let me just...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

Now can I then ask you General...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Don't confuse the issue, the fact is sir that Coetzee was under my command for one year.

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ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

One year - 1981, at the end of that year, all I knew - all I knew at the end of
5 that year that he had committed that was wrong, that he was involved in - in
this abduction of this one man, this Indian guy from Swaziland which I felt
aggrieved about as I've said.

ADV GOOSEN:

It's Joe Jele yes.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Secondly that on the road from Lesotho to Pretoria he was involved in a
shoot out with ordinary black innocent motorist whom he accused of - of
being driving under the influence, that's all I knew.

His commanders, I am not in touch with Dirk Coetzee, I don't speak
15 to him, I am not commanding him directly, all I know is that his
commanders says at the end of that year - this man is - General this is an
undisciplined man, you know about how you've been rushing up and down,
and what do I do, I say transfer him - transfer him away - they say he is not a
bad guy he's got attitude.

When he doesn't want to go, I says well release him to normal police activities. That is the normal - the absolute normal activity. The moment they apart sir, when I discovered that he was in this other big conspiracy sir, I reported it, I had all the evidence gathered and I reported that to the State
5 Attorney because, as I've said it was a legally complex issue and I suspended him from duty, I did it. I didn't say man whoo - we must protect this man at all cost.

ADV GOOSEN:

Absolutely not.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

I knew he would be aggrieved, since then he is being - he is being waging a campaign against me because I am the instrument that's destroyed his career and the police.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Absolutely not, I mean you wouldn't take responsibility for a person who commits any number of illegal actions such as the one's that you've just described and that's the position that you've adopted.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, and similarly if a police - policeman had to on a frolic of his own, commit some other offence, Dirk Coetzee on a frolic of his own participates in the murder of Griffiths Msenga, you don't take responsibility for that
5 because he is on a frolic of his own, correct?

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

And you wouldn't take responsibility for a person in similar circumstances
10 who commit some other offence, Eugene de Kock or any other person you might have.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja exactly - exactly - there is another dimension to that sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Could I then ask you - yes...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

And that is the only thing and that is when a Minister in terms of the Government and in circumstances which I thought also was very valid said that listen we are - we must do a symbolic act there, that is the only thing
20 that I didn't conceive.

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ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

Which I couldn't stop without terminating my career just there and then.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

And which I allowed policeman outside the country to do a symbolic act.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

That is the only case that I am aware of where policeman has done something which is not illegal or which is not legal and I objected to that.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Yes no - no I accept that sir. Well General can I ask you this question on what basis would you wish to take collective responsibility for the disappearance of the PEBCO 3, the so-called Zero handgranade instances where persons were killed on attacks on the homes of members of the South African Police.

The death of Brian Ngulunga.

The death of Moses Nthelang.

The death of Bheki Mlangeni.

The death of Japie Maponya.

5 The death of 9 ANC members in Kwandabele in 1988.

The death of 9 ANC members in Bophuthatswana in 1988.

The death of Piet Ntuli in Kwandabele in 1986.

Should I read this list, I am reading from the Wagner letter, your attorneys letter to the Commission.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Ja very easy sir, very easy.

ADV GOOSEN:

On [indistinct] would you take collective responsibility.

GEN COETZEE:

15 Ja very easy sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Before you go onto that, let me just follow up some of the inquiry that you had started with. I - I heard you say that according to you the law was quite adequate to deal with the situation.

GEN COETZEE:

I didn't say that sir, I said special legislation, I propagated special legislation
sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

5 Okay let - that's why I think I need to be clarified.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Now what sort of special legislation were you thinking would be adequate to
10 deal with the situation in the country at the time that you were head of
Security Police and when you were Commissioner of Police.

GEN COETZEE:

Thank you sir, I went sir and that's on record to the Rabie Commission and
that's where I gave evidence sir under oath and I said what type of
15 legislation I think would be required, after I've given an
overview...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

Now was that the legislation that would be required to deal with the
[indistinct] Security situation?

GEN COETZEE:

That is right it - it encompassed the whole situation sir, the terrorist threat, the upsurges of unrest in the country, there was a new offences created and so on, which I didn't do, the advocates and the attorneys who said that sir.

5 **ADV NTSEBEZA:**

Yes I accept that view no because you seemed to be thinking that or to be submitting that the law such as it was, was - could have been adequate to deal with the situation.

But I want to look at it from the other end, and I think my question to
10 you is what was for instance, insufficient in the provisions of the then
Terrorism Act insofar as it dealt with detainees, Section 6 of that Act which
provided for indefinite detention, in [indistinct] detention, where a person
had no access to anything basically any - no lawyer, no friend, no family and
for [indistinct] length of time and you know for purposes of interrogation
15 and making the person give replies and to the satisfaction of virtually the
person who were questioning him.

Now how inadequate was that piece of legislation?

GEN COETZEE:

Sir with great respect as a Chairperson you've asked me a questions which requires not a simple yes or no or comment on a differ, so I must again answer by a long question sir.

The Terrorism Act which made provision for the detention of people
5 for purposes of interrogation until sir, they've required to the satisfaction of the Commissioner the questions posed to them, that's what the law says sir. So an actual remedy to short cut the whole situation, the answer lied in their own hands.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

10 Yes, right...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

And sir, the answer lied in that hands because many of them - many of them made statements running into hundreds of pages. That is why sir...[intervention]

15 **ADV NTSEBEZA:**

Ja let me look at the...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

No but sir the position was that here you have sir and this is the evidence that I gave, here you have a situation where the origin of the conspiracy is

situated outside the country, so you cannot as a policeman go and arrest Mr X here and say well what have you decided to do here.

The whole conspiracy as far as the terrorist attacks are concerned which is demonstrated by I think very aptly by the Voortrekker Hoogte
5 incident, is outside the country.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

H'm.

GEN COETZEE:

So you can't get to the source at all.

10 **ADV NTSEBEZA:**

Ja General I quite appreciate what you are trying, but what I am trying to get at is the question of whether now or at the time, you did foresee that, that sort of law and I appreciate that you not the author thereof, but that sort of law made it possible for large scale human rights abuses by the police.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

What I could do sir I did, and I don't know if you're going to summons General Geldenhuys, but when I came back and I saw that draft legislation I said that in the police General, Mr Commissioner my boss, we must issue a directive - a special force order which is in existence sir and please - you

must please get it, which will entail exactly - exactly minutely how detainees should be treated sir.

When I was directly in command I...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

5 General I appreciate that, I mean you could have given any number of directions...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

But sir, this is...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

10 Just on an objective, I mean Parish Motlatse died and you - and you - [indistinct] and it doesn't serve the purposes of the sort of abuses that took place that Adam van As was later prosecuted and convicted. He was - I mean Parish Motlatse was not the first person to have died in those circumstances.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

No.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Biko had died before him and a number of other people had died in detention and it was not because there wasn't - there were no directives, but
20 what I am asking you, isn't it so that when once people there denied access

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for any length of time, to legal representation, to visit by friends, to visit by family, that, that laid a ground - breathing ground for abuses to take place.

GEN COETZEE:

Any police action Mr Chairperson, any police action my experience after 42
5 years, any police action, criminal work, narcotics work, any work, can lead especially the allegations around the Immorality Act, that, that leads to problems in the police.

Any police action can sir if you don't treat people, if you don't train them well, if you haven't got the correct type of person to train, recruits to
10 train, if you haven't got the correct discipline - if you haven't got the correct inspectorate, any type of thing sir can lead to abuses sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

It was...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

15 The fact is sir, that when it was within my power - when it was within my power, I took steps to safeguard the situation, one...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

General you could not have had the power to police the entire country with that sort of law, with a law which says a person can be taken into detention

and be questioned, without that person being known by friends and family as to the place of detention as to the time of detention.

I mean it was the sort of draconian legislation...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

5 It was draconian legislation sir.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes, quite right...[intervention]

10 **ADV NTSEBEZA:**

Now what I am asking you as a person who was in charge and you know I am asking this against the background of the fact that you seem to take this view that as long as it was within the law, then - then you were acting and that was why you were different from the other people.

15 I am just asking you now, just looking objectively that sort of legislation and you have just given us an indication of how Parish Motlatse died.

GEN COETZEE:

What?

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Parish Motlatse who was killed by Van As, Adam van As.

GEN COETZEE:

Oh yes, I don't - I don't remember his name - sorry.

5 **ADV NTSEBEZA:**

Yes, now that is a situation that was not the first of it's kind, I - all I am asking you now since you are testifying and are giving the view that the - as long as things were done within the law you were quite happy.

Isn't now an examination of that law or I'll put the same question
10 differently, didn't it occur to you at that time - at that time, especially with all those deaths in detention whether people were suppose to have hanged themselves or whatever, didn't it occur to you that you how ever well intentioned you would have been as the Commissioner of Police did not have the capacity to make sure that people are not abused in detention and
15 therefore there was something wrong with the legislation.

GEN COETZEE:

Mr Chairperson I am very sorry not to agree with you, firstly sir, I said special legislation, special legislation if you make it against companies or insolvency's you make special legislation to need the particular
20 requirements there on that level.

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Here we were confronted with people coming into the country under false names, false flags, armed with - with - in a strategy which entailed the first group coming in choosing a target, leaving the country, second group coming in, putting a firearms into a hidden place, leaving the country and a
5 third group only attacking.

False identity documents, false driving licences, completely another person, a legend - a legend with the instructions not to go back to his place of origin, he must be identified. The conspiracy is outside the country, two ways to combat it, physical identification hence Vlakplaas.

10 Secondly sir interrogation, interrogation.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

However form it might take, physical interrogation as well.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja, now sir it is true and I have invented this sir, there is a book written by a
15 professor - University of Wits University, which poses the question describing the model dilemma that people are sometimes in where they supposedly arrest in Israel two Arab saboteurs who admits placing in Jerusalem bombs who would explode any moment killing thousands of people and they are according to the law only entitled to say what is your
20 name and address. That's a moral dilemma.

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ADV NTSEBEZA:

Do I understand you - General do I understand you to be saying in those special circumstances where under the use of physical violence to such information.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes surely - sir surely there are thousands of detainees - thousands of interrogators who never has put a foot wrong. I do not want to quote you, I don't want to sound callus about anyone who died in detention. I am sorry that, that happened in that sense I am sorry that ever a detainee if he says he

10 was assaulted, that should not have happened.

I took steps when I was...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Now what I would like to understand General are you saying because of the special circumstances the special legislation was such that even
15 interrogation of a third degree type could have been justified.

GEN COETZEE:

No - no I didn't say that sir, interrogation intensive interrogation sir - interrogation not by physically assaulting a person because that brings to the fore information which is not truthful and which is not the truth.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Now it brings me back to the question that I asked where there was now evidence that some people get into detention, the case of Nzuli for instance I am talking about 1976. He gets into detention 24 hours after that he is dead.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

Who - who is that sir?

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Nzuli - a certain Nzuli who died in 1976 in Durban.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Ja well I...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

He was taken into detention 24 hours, he was dead, he had physical features, Steve Biko, I mean you can count any number of people.

GEN COETZEE:

15 Sir I must...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

It was quite clear that people were being assaulted and were being tortured in detention and it was possible because of the sort of legislation - special legislation that Rabie said must be strengthened.

GEN COETZEE:

And there...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Hence your evidence as well.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

Sir there were also directives sir, which we can bring directives issued to these terrorist and I am sorry to call them that, I've got not particular spitefulness about this, which instructed them in their training exactly how to respond to - to interrogation. Exactly how to anger the people
10 interrogating them, exactly how to try to be evasive, exactly and this was the word, rather commit the ultimate deed for yourself then betray the course sir.

That is why Mr Slovo writes this traitor is eliminated, this is why Nkosi is eliminated sir. This was the situation sir, I am not operating functioning in a normal nice normal where everyone is friendly and
15 everyone is law abiding, this is a situation where people has described it as war. I...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

And is it your evidence that in a war situation no rules...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

No - no - I don't say that sir. I say it is a serious situation sir, a serious situation where lives of innocent people, many innocent people are at stake sir. I say - I say that should be legislation providing for special procedures.

I say from my point of view although it is true what you say, that
5 physically perhaps it's impossible for me as one man to go on a crusade to every policeman who is interrogating who...[intervention]

ADV NTSEBEZA:

And it was clear you couldn't have done that.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Ja so - so I can do it by way of example no allegation that I've ever killed or abused a man or a woman. I can do it by way of instruction, I can do it by way of lectures. I can do it by way of giving them the knowledge, listen this is what the other people are learning, this is what they educating them to do.

And I can give you examples sir if it's necessary of agents that's
15 penetrated that came and said we have instructions to magnify these things.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

H'm anyway...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Then I don't want to come Mr Chairman and say to you for instance,
20 investigations of this nature or allegations of this nature has also been

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levelled against the British in Northern Island, against the Japanese when they controlled riots and problems there.

Any police force, I don't say this is a uniform???, any police force that's combating this type of thing, you must know that you are a campaign
5 is waged against you. Chairman let's be realistic, do you think that people will say the South African Government is illegitimate, but what a nice police force these people have. Sir this [indistinct] against one another.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Any way you were - you were in the process of responding to the question
10 by...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

All right.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Advocate Goosen.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Thank you very much Mr Chairperson, could I - could I...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Ag I am sorry could you just - I've got difficulty hearing you from...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

No difficulty at all, General I am going to put my question on hold I am going to come back to that in a minute but can I just pick up on something that the Chairperson has dealt with.

5 You said now a moment or so ago that we not dealing with the normal situation where we dealing everyone is nice towards one another and we talking about a law abiding - you know everyone is law abiding.

GEN COETZEE:

We are not functioning at that...[intervention]

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No functioning that - in essence people describing it as being in a situation of war.

GEN COETZEE:

I beg your pardon.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Where people are describing it as being in a situation of war, you know you not talking about a normal - a normal situation. Now you are also saying that the - the instructions that people would have received trained ANC Gorillas would have received in coming back and should they be in
20 detention is also to exacerbate this situation.

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GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, in many circumstances it's the sort of situation where - where given the
5 fact that the conspiracy is outside of the country, that is very difficult to
identify people who were involved in the conspiracy. That it's extremely
difficult to apply normal policing methods as it were to combat the situation
that in is in. You would agree that, that would be the...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

10 More or less but I can't say that every aspect - every component is
completely - I'd enlarge on that, but more or less sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes - yes you would agree with the view I would take it that...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

15 It was an intensive dangerous situation.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes - yes and I want to just quote very briefly a person just to indicate to
you a view that was expressed which you may agree with, or may not agree
with. It reads that - therefore the only real answer is secret operations

against the enemy using many of the secret operational methods devised by the communist revolutionaries themselves.

Would you agree with that approach?

GEN COETZEE:

5 No.

ADV GOOSEN:

Not at all.

GEN COETZEE:

10 No - no I can't say that I - I wouldn't say that the State by itself could not use strategies which was also abnormal, for instance sir I served - I didn't mention it here, it's got nothing to do with Human Rights violation, I served on a anti boycott committee South Africa was being boycotted as you know there was embargo on trade with South Africa.

15 I served on a committee where we devised ways to circumvent this embargo's that is - that is steps that you take to circumvent the enemy getting a hold or the opposition I don't use this word enemy because it always looks like a physical thing. The political opponents has got certain strategies, this was a strategy by them. The have propagated it.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

They've propounded it.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

To - an South Africa response by means by creating an organisation to circumvent this trade embargo.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Yes and in certain circumstances...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

That's a secret thing.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Ja and certain circumstances you would employ very similar tactics to those that are employed against you in order to as it were turn them against the people that are employing them against - against us.

GEN COETZEE:

Depending upon what those methods are sir and now you've got to describe to me what you think the strategies of the communist party was in the world.

20 I've just read a few days ago sir in the new Readers Digest that the people

that Hitler killed, paled or pales insignificant to the people that the communist has killed, a 100-million they identified sir.

So are you asking me now that is a strategy that the communist employ, would I respond with the same type of thing.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No certainly not but the view that the only real answer is secret operations against the enemy using many of the secret operational methods devised by the communist revolutionaries themselves, he would have been - that would have been said by your protégé - Major Craig Williamson.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

Craig Williamson, sir that is the way that he would perhaps express it in circumstances and a time factor or a time frame or in a type of conversation that he feels is relevant.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

For me really would be indulging in conjecture just to come up and say yes every secret - secret activity that the communist party has ever employed and strategy and strategyme??? - I think we should do it back to them.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

This is what I would say.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Before we get back to the original question that I asked General just the one aspect that you indicated the moral dilemma that a person who was faced with having to question another person who had information that may result in the death of a very large number of people.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

I did sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes and you were asked the question but you dealt with some - you didn't deal with it directly, would - would you regard that as - as an excuse for the
15 conduct of physical...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Not at all, what I am trying to - sorry...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

Physical interrogation or a torture to get that information from a person.

GEN COETZEE:

No I am trying to indicate to you sir that policeman even in ordinary criminal work are many times faced with this moral dilemma. I was faced many times in ordinary criminal work - in ordinary criminal work, faced
5 with this dilemma must I detain a person, must I by detaining him force him to talk to get the Exhibits, or must release him.

That's a moral dilemma not it becomes bigger in a case which this professor describes, there he is confronted with a situation do I force this information out of him, by whatever means is available or must I allow
10 20 thousand people to die.

ADV GOOSEN:

But I take it from...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

This is a - I say that this is perhaps to some people is this a moral dilemma
15 some would answer it this way because morals and moral decisions would obviously differ, you can only as far as it's possible within your means, go and by training - by choosing the right people, senior people you can by example can you say this is the way that it should be done.

I am just trying to explain that policeman are confronted with moral
20 dilemmas.

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ADV GOOSEN:

No absolutely they are, and your indication thus far is that you would always answer the moral dilemma by adherence to the law.

GEN COETZEE:

5 By?

ADV GOOSEN:

Adherence to the law.

GEN COETZEE:

I think it's sufficient, but I...[intervention]

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No - no what I am saying is you would always answer the moral dilemma by adherence to the law.

GEN COETZEE:

And as...[intervention]

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

For you a moral dilemma would never really arise.

GEN COETZEE:

No sir in the same way sir, and the same way advocate as our roman Dutch law says that above justice - above justice - above the truth in a case lies the

20 whole moral concept of the law, that is what our law teaches sir.

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Even - even if we know someone is guilty but on technical ground, the technical ground which is involved through a long process, he becomes, he is found not guilty but we must protect that bigger concept of justice.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 That - that's precisely the point I am making general.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja this is what I said, I said that as behoves what claims - claims I said sir, what claims to be a Christian state, you cannot have recourse to the same methods that other people are using against you sir I said it time and time
10 again in speeches on television and I...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

Absolutely that's the - that's precisely the point we in agreement, it would mean that in the circumstances where you are confronted with that difficult moral choices as to whether to breach the law in order to protect the law if
15 you like, you would always not breach the law.

GEN COETZEE:

My attitude is sir, I've lost many criminal cases because I didn't breach the law. I believe that above - and this is what I say here sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, no I accept that.

GEN COETZEE:

I - this is what I say, I say that...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Even if it would mean that you might loose the war and loose the country.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja - yes sir, yes quite - quite right, this is what I said there, it's not up to the police, they can fight with special legislation, that's necessary.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

But it's up to the Government to change the economic, political and social conditions in the country, to try and avoid that, that revolutionary upsearch that dialectical leap, this is what I said sir.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Okay, then General on what basis do you take collective responsibility.

GEN COETZEE:

Ahh that's easy sir - very easy sir. I do not think sir that you expect from me to give a definition of the proscription of collective responsibility, the

closest example that I can give you is the collective responsibility that you have in Cabinet.

Sir you're not listening.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 I am listening.

GEN COETZEE:

The collective responsibility...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

Do you want me to repeat what you said?

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

I beg your pardon?

ADV GOOSEN:

Do you want me to repeat what you said.

GEN COETZEE:

15 The collective responsibility that you have in Cabinet, that - does not imply a legalistic - you're responsible for what happened before you were there. It doesn't imply that it - you legally responsible for the servants of your colleague in Cabinet. But it means sir that you sitting in a advisory capacity in a capacity where you listen, where you have knowledge where you know
20 what is described about this situation, the - by commission and by omission

it's described to you and you say yes in this situation - in this situation I together with my colleagues, we collectively responsible, perhaps I should have done more, perhaps I should have taken another step. It doesn't matter, the fact is I am collectively responsible for this people, perhaps I wasn't a good leader. Perhaps I didn't articulate well, that's all besides the point.

The fact is I was one of the people in that capacity during my term of office - now you've mentioned the things long after I was gone, now obviously I can't take collective responsibility for that even, but that is the collective responsibility, it's not a legalistic concept to say that I am now taken responsible for a man that in 1991, that this - just this little sir, as I take responsibility for policeman outside, that went on a narcotics spree or whatever other illegal acts they were concerned and sir they were very many in 50,000 policeman amongst them and different branches. Many of them.

I don't go and say well you know I am in a sort of a conspiracy with you and we got a meeting of minds and I am going to stand up with you and so on, they know that it's not so. That is collective responsibility sir, our Cabinet and the western democracy state collective responsibility for their - the actions of their Government, that's what I mean sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

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In all circumstances and the incidents mentioned in the letter from your attorney, the Wagner letter, you would not have had knowledge, prior knowledge of those - of those offences.

GEN COETZEE:

5 No sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Not at all.

GEN COETZEE:

Just as little as I say I have got knowledge of offences committed by other
10 policeman in different circumstances which is not committed by Security
Branch or so on.

By for instance sir, for instance sir a riot control, that officer
commanding there may have misjudged the situation, he may have taken
steps which was not absolutely according to the law sir, but he did it in
15 circumstances where he thought he was acting in good faith. I am not
talking about **per se** offences, criminal deeds like some of those things that
you referred to.

I take responsibility for that, I should have trained him better, I should
have given him better equipment, I - instead of shambock, I should have
20 given him a water canner, I should have given him more rubber bullets or I

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should have asked for more money from Minister of Finance because I was under financial strains and I did that from begging I look like I am.

This is the fact, that is collective responsibility, I was the leader, how can I say I am eliminating myself from this whole affair. That would be
5 dishonest sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Even though we talking about actions which are plainly illegal and which don't...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

10 But I've answered that sir - I've answered that.

ADV GOOSEN:

You've answered that.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes sir, I said that 50,000 thousand policeman - if you think that I can
15 legalistically take responsibility for what 50,000 policeman with everyone - one informer which makes it 100,000 or two informers 150,000 I can take personal responsibility legal responsibility for the actions of every one of them, that is impossible, that's physically impossible.

ADV GOOSEN:

No I am not suggesting you take legal responsibility.

GEN COETZEE:

I say with the leaders sir - with the leaders, with the Commissioners, ranging from the first one, Bobby Palmer to the last one that's in charge now, he
5 must take collective responsibility for what happened in the police, good or bad.

Who can we put the blame on, we can't say put it on the army ... **end of Tape 3, Side A...**

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Do you know General the type of people who were recruited and who were employed by the Vlakplaas - at the Vlakplaas unit? Are you able to indicate or do you know what their background is, what their policing background is at all.

GEN COETZEE:

15 I wasn't sir, concerned with the recruitment of anyone not anyone of those people, not anyone, not one single one. When - what I could do when this matter was discussed at police headquarters I said that the so-called groupspans??? if you want to call them that, should be commanded by knowledgeable and senior policeman.

People basically officers has been through many courses legal courses and knows exactly what the legal position is in that case about **adjutant provocateur** you're an advocate you know what that means about inveigling people and there are conspiracies and all those things, they people that's worked and in that category. I didn't sent - we didn't say we going to sent out into South Africa at random for returned - return terrorist and they can do what they like. That's why they were placed under this position, in this situation, further more we directed that this group leader should go to the officer commanding a security branch that's there, you've seen it I suppose, report there and say I am here, I am going to deploy my men to look for returned terrorist and they did that and they arrested people.

I remember one time in a cinema whilst a film was going on and that officer usually a colonel, experienced officer is now in charge of this group in his area.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

And he must say listen I think this man would be - this is a good place to keep observation and this and that and so on or they forgather at this market or this and that deployment. He must - he musts do that, this is the directive,

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this is the directive given to the officer in charge - officer in charge, commissioned officer in charge, of the group and this is the directive given to the branch commander where he is suppose to work.

Now sir, obviously there were senior officers, I've mentioned their
5 names, it was there work to liaise with the outside branches, have you - have you questioned a returned man, has one of them given witness - evidence for us in a court of law and that way contaminating himself.

Can we bring him to a central point, is he prepared to work for us and so on, that would have happened, I personally was never ever concerned
10 with a single once recruitment or interrogation or advise that he should be transferred that was done by the branch.

Because you must realise sir, you the Commissioner, or the officer commanding Security, you've got a second in charge, then you got brigadier
Schoon but on the same level throughout the country you got about 300
15 people that you commanding, it's not a direct line. You must understand that my command is like a pyramid, one second in command and then spreading - so you mustn't get the impression that I am involved now in the activities, the physical - the activities of groups I mean they must recruit their own people, they must - they officers, they people that's got to do this.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ja and these groups were they generally housed on facilities like - like a farm like Vlakplaas?

GEN COETZEE:

- 5 Only - what happened Mr Chairperson is that you must realise that the position was that the incidents which indebted that a person would be prepared to work for us or for the South African Police happened all over the country.

ADV GOOSEN:

- 10 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

- Is that right, so you couldn't duplicate and it wouldn't be cost effective to duplicate places like that throughout in Durban and Pietermaritzburg and Dundee and so on. So that's why the directive went out originally from my predecessor before it was formally as I've said in 1979 already, that please at
15 a conference I suppose, please when cases like that - where you are sure that a man is now inclined and prepared to assist against his former colleagues, for instance that his statement identifies a 100 or 200 people that he has been with in a certain camp, what the type of - of training was that they - where

they from and if we can physically and what their aliases would be and so on.

We said well it's impossible to duplicate this throughout South Africa we must have a central place to bring this people to from where we can or
5 this desk can command them. That is why we went to the Minister informally developed and so on and then eventually when it seemed that it would have to carry on for quite a while, I said well now we must issue direct directives which is an ordinary thing if it's and **ad hoc** job still you - you tell it to the officer commanding and he knows it.

10 But you see now this thing is now developing on a more permanent basis, give directives policeman must have directives. Every where that I have ever worked in a new type of category, I had a directive, this is your job, and you know that, this is what you suppose to do, you don't go outside the parameters of that because then you take your own - your own career
15 into - place your own career in jeopardy. But that is why it was a once off the only one place that we did that.

ADV GOOSEN:

But we know that there was a similar - similar farm that was established in Durban.

GEN COETZEE:

No - no-no - no I am completely unaware of anything like that.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

And in East London?

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

I beg your pardon?

ADV NTSEBEZA:

And in East London was there or was there not a similar farm?

GEN COETZEE:

10 No - the - as far as I am concerned sir and this is why the directive went out from headquarters to say that you - this is the understanding and I think this people will appear before you at some stage. The understanding was that they will all - that type of operation would happen from police headquarters, from headquarters which is also a strange thing, because usually police
15 headquarters is not in command with operational projects.

I mean you only in overall command. So this is a project that's directly under a desk - a desk in - at police headquarters because it's got to be centralised and there is no money. Remember I said about the money in my time, what was available. There was no money available to buy farms
20 all over the country.

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So if someone else had established a similar thing they did it not in my time and not with the authority or my authority or with money that I made available.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 General if one takes - if you had to operate purely on the basis of centralisation in other words say that the turned gorillas is called the Askari's because that's the sort of popular term that's been used. But if one had to centrally locate centrally all of the turned Askari's that the Security Police were able to recruit then one would expect that at Vlakplaas by the 10 late '80's - it's now after you had left, but by the late '80's there would be a very large number of Askari's based at Vlakplaas.

GEN COETZEE:

If you read through this one thing of mine sir, when it started shortly after it started at 100.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes, and that was in - that was in 1980/81.

GEN COETZEE:

And I mean - ja - no it had - no 1979.

ADV GOOSEN:

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Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

Before I formalised it that they said they had this group, this desk, said they've already, they already employing a 100 of this - of this people.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

In groups under different officers.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 And if Vlakplaas operations then continued the same sort of operations that you've described and continued through until 1993 when it was eventually closed but let's take it even up to 1989, over a period of 10 years, one would have expected a very substantial number of people to be - to be housed at Vlakplaas.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

That is going - no sir that is going about it quantitatively only, you must go about it qualitatively perhaps it would decrease depending upon your needs and what you got available. You must remember that...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

No but you - one of the reasons, one of the motivations for housing them there and that occurs also in the affidavit that you made available too but wasn't used by the Harms Commission.

GEN COETZEE:

5 Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Is there was also a Security consideration and these are people who's lives were at risk.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Yes.

ADV GOOSEN:

And for that reason they need to be protected and their usefulness...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

15 Quite right sir - ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes so one would have expected in the total number of people that would have - maybe not all remaining at Vlakplaas but certainly would have passed through at some point and very large numbers would have been housed at

20 Vlakplaas.

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GEN COETZEE:

No - no not at all advocate - there are - were many other means employed to safeguard the lives of this people. Not necessary because his life is now in jeopardy.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No - no I accept that there might have been other mechanisms...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

To bring him to Vlakplaas so that he is now in a fighting situation, many of
10 them felt that their lives were not in danger, many of them you must remember you - with respect sir, you all legal people. In a court case - in a court case, you would decide or the prosecuting authority would decide perhaps you got 20 or 30 witnesses, to use 1 or 2 or 3 and there is cases proved why carry on with the other 27 who's made statements.

15 And many of them would go back into the community and says I would never have testified and they feel safe and they disappear in community. Others felt their lives are not in jeopardy, others says I am not prepared to work for you although I made a statement here, under what I consider to be duress, I am not prepared to work against my old colleagues.

So you got all these issues on the table before you decide, so basically you got to judge on the basis of quality, you got to judge on the basis of the origin of this man what happened why does he emerge out of a court case, was he arrested as a single person and there was no court case, but he is prepared to co-operate and there were cases like that sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

Some people came and reported to police stations I am a trained terrorist, but I am unhappy in Zambia I am back here now, what can I do, there was such cases. So there - from many sources you could choose, but depending upon your real needs, it doesn't mean that your real needs are expanding all the time I am referring sir to the terrorist there, I don't know what after I left there what they thought they were going to use some of this people where they said the terrorist threat was expanding or intensifying or so, I can't comment on that, talking about whilst I was there.

ADV GOOSEN:

H'm so whilst you were there, you were not aware of any similar basis - similar to Vlakplaas operating anywhere else in the country.

GEN COETZEE:

No, although I've said there sir, remember I said in my - it was not a strategy that was certainly identified by the police as - it - since in South Africa we had the first acts of sabotage in 1961 16th of December 1961. And after -
5 with questioning and remember there were acts of sabotage on that particular night and some people were arrested.

And they were questioned some offer their co-operation immediately, they frightened when they arrested, that's a normal thing.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Ja, but you were...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Since then we've discovered that one of the ways or one of the sure ways or the only ways which is not something that happened only in the Security it happens all over, Gold and Diamond branch or wherever I've worked.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

You'll discover that one of the ways to identify to have witnesses to have a person physically identify a man, that is the surest way, that is the way that

you do it in court. That is the only way that you can do it, you have a witness.

And from then on they would - you would for instance have - for instance the man that I've mentioned here that was killed on the orders of
5 Mr Joe Slovo. He was never at Vlakplaas, he gave evidence in the open, he stayed in his house, he was well known and he was killed.

So various others, some felt this way, some felt - there is a personal angle to it, there was a functional angle to it, there was a real need to it, so to think that there is a single pattern that these people were identified and then
10 handled and then structured, that is not so, depending upon many circumstances.

ADV GOOSEN:

But we do know that they were employed right across the country in their activities.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

They were...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

In the process of identification and conducting operations.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes sir, quite right sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

5 The position was that if there were acts of sabotage in a certain area, sabotage acts in a certain area, then one of the strategies employed was that, that officer commanding would phone the officers in charge and I've mentioned their names, a Baker and a Van Rensburg and I don't know [indistinct] Victor and so on.

10 And there were junior officers also, it was a big staff, would phone them and say you know we've had a spate of sabotage acts here now in Durban, East London, or where ever and please we really stuck we don't get any information would you please sent us also your - you've [indistinct] the term, the Askari's down to mingle with the people and see if they can see
15 some of their colleagues here.

And in that way they were - they were deployed throughout the country but it doesn't mean they stay there permanently.

ADV GOOSEN:

No.

GEN COETZEE:

After a while they don't - no success or so on and they go back.

ADV GOOSEN:

And whilst they would be - whilst they would be conducting an operation

5 let's say in a place like East London, trying to infiltrate into the community
and Umdanzani to see if they could identify people that were
previously...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Just walk around sir, just observation.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes, observation.

GEN COETZEE:

And they not concerned to be **adjunct provocateur** to infiltrate there and -
in organisations.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

No - no I am not suggesting that...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

To just walk around and see if they see their ex colleagues.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

And betray them.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 And they would be, they would operate from a particular - they would operate from a particular area, they would operate either from the Security Police offices in East London or would they operate from a facility that would be made available to them.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Sir that would depend upon what is - what they arranged amongst themselves.

ADV GOOSEN:

Okay, during - during 1987 and through to well the Commission ended around about in 1990, you were appointed to the Tri Partheid Commission
15 based in East London is that right?

GEN COETZEE:

Yes that's right.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes, and that Tri Partheid Commission was concerned with Joined Security between the Ciskei and the Transkei and South Africa given intentions that they were.

GEN COETZEE:

5 No - no - no - we had to make sure sir, I had to make peace between the Transkei and the Ciskei.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

10 I had to make sure sir that the Transkei did not attack the Ciskei and alternatively that the Ciskei did not attack the Transkei. This I did with the co-operation of two senior representatives from those two countries sitting there.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

And at the same time, the other part of our job was to see if we cannot get investments - investments, the economic investments because of the deprived economic situation in those areas and the so-called border areas.

That was a job it was a Foreign Affairs job, I had nothing to do with any Security man, or Security organisations. We had as a matter of fact sir I have all the minutes - all the minutes of every meeting that, that Tri Partheid Commission of which I was chairman, ever held and you're welcome to it.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

There was never a.....[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

10 How regularly did it meet?

GEN COETZEE:

I think about twice a month, that's why I said when I was not full time employed there they sent me to do other jobs.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

Foreign Affairs.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ja, in that period whilst you were based in East London you didn't become aware of the - of the operation of a unit similar to the one based at Vlakplaas.

GEN COETZEE:

5 No, I had no contact with the Security Police sir, I was working for Foreign Affairs.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

10 My immediate chief was Mr Venter of the Africa desk at - in Pretoria and the second in charge was a Dr Sharp, he is still there and there was not - all the issues concerned the allegations of the one country against the other country and the - the steps that they were taking against one another, overtly and covertly.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Were you required to try to understand both those overt and covert activities that were conducted the one to the other.

GEN COETZEE:

Oh - oh yes sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

In the process of that did you...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

It was covert activities by the Transkei and against the Ciskei and by the
5 Ciskei against the Transkei, it was reported to me, I confronted their
representatives with it and said this - these are the allegations - it was
reported by them.

They would say the Ciskei representative would say that our
intelligence organisation of which was a General that went to prison
10 afterwards, he reports he is our intelligence man, he reports and our
President, our life President, reports that they've got information that the
Transkei is on the verge of misring??? a bit battalion who at such and such a
stage will move over and occupy our country in a similar way this is that
type of thing that they would say.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

But I wouldn't - I wouldn't - I mean the South African intelligence would
have nothing to do with this or the South African Police, this is all
20 emanating from situations within that country.

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ADV GOOSEN:

Ja.

GEN COETZEE:

The allegations.

5 **ADV GOOSEN:**

You were posted there immediately after the abort of a coo attempt in which there was an attack on Lenox Sebe's residence is that right?

GEN COETZEE:

No I think it was a reasonable period after that, it was or - after that - it was
10 after that subsequent to that, quite a period lapsed during which period Mr
Pik Botha went to - went to President Lenox Sebe and Mr George Matinziba
and he spoke to them which I know now - I only know when I took up the
brief, that these - there have been these discussions and I was informed this
people is now prepared to lie down the battle axe or lay down the battle axe
15 and you must oversee this - the implementation of this Tri Partheid - non
aggression treaty.

ADV GOOSEN:

In that position did you ever become aware of the fact that the South African
Defence Force was implicated in the attempted coo against Lenox Sebe.

GEN COETZEE:

There were very many allegations you remember when I got there, it was already a thing of the past, it was about a year ago that it had happened. So when I got there, there were very many allegations from both sides, from
5 both sides what they've done and there were continuous allegations that this was continuing in some form or the other.

Now Mr Chairman if it's necessary, I can give incidents where they did do it, both countries, did do it as far as my information went from affidavits and statements that I was able to obtain. So they were still at
10 logger heads and my job was to get them to disengage this was my job. The fact that the one representative would say yes - yes - yes - the Transkei one for instance would say yes but the position in the Ciskei is in fact so and so and so and they mustering these forces and they spying in our country and this is what they doing and so on and the counter allegations are [indistinct]
15 this is the type of thing that I had to solve, it was problem solving.

ADV GOOSEN:

Ja...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

But I didn't do it by the utilisation of South African forces at all sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

No I am not suggesting you did by the utilisation of South African forces the question was whether you'd become aware of the fact that the South African Defence Force had been implicated or was implicated.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

I heard there were allegations...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

Were allegations okay.

GEN COETZEE:

10 There were allegations of both sides and of all them being implicated and I think that if you - if you really investigate that really investigate that properly you'll find that it was a family fute??? between the Sebe's and the Matanzima's.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

And this is a report I must say Mr Chairman I am quite prepared I've got all those reports.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

Perhaps when the advocate come to me about this other thing...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Operation Daisy.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja I can give it to them and he can read through it and see exactly what the allegations were and what steps I took which I reported to Foreign Affairs sir.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Yes, - yes I am not going to take that much further at this stage General just to indicate to you that the abortive coo on Lenox Sebe which occurred in January 1987 when the attack was launched on Sebe's residence...[intervention]

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

Yes I took up the position about in July/August ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes was in fact an SADF operation called Operation Catson.

GEN COETZEE:

I've seen the - my good friend Mr Bantu Holomisa making those allegations, he's made it to me sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

I - when I saw him, he said to me you - this is the position and he described how he felt about it sir, because I had to see both him - first Ms George Matanzima then I had to see Stella Sicauc?? to try and solve this situation, then I had to see General Bantu Holomisa on the other side I had to see
10 several times General - the life President of the Ciskei Lenox Sebe who at that stage threatened to throw 80,000 Ciskeians or Transkeians out of the Ciskei and I had to solve it. He said they don't want them there, they're illegal in my country and they must leave immediately.

This is the type of problem that I had to solve sir.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Thank you very much - Mr Chairperson with your permission Mr Chusckelson is assisting me, but he wants to address some questions in relation to a different subject at this stage - are you ready - okay.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

General if I can take you back a little bit, I would like to discuss a little bit your relationship with Craig Williamson. My understanding of this is that Mr Williamson was initially recruited somewhere in the early '70's around about 1971, and that he was going to undertake a BA Degree at Wits University and while he was doing that he would be reporting on student activities to the Security Branch, is that correct?

GEN COETZEE:

Mr Chairperson I must say that I haven't been notified that I would be questioned about Operation Daisy which was a very long - very involved - very complex one and as I say it was - it was concerned with intelligence gathering only, it was never concerned with an operation to physically attack people or anything of that nature, but I am prepared to answer that as long as you know sir that I am not prepared and I haven't researched it at all.

It may be correct he was a policeman, he was a policeman, he left the police, I knew his father, and his - at some meeting I was the chief of Security in Johannesburg, the officer in commanding there, no at that stage it was just an ordinary officer there, with - with the - my desk was the communist party desk.

And at some stage I met his father who told me that his son was in the police but he had left, and was at Wits University he was now a student.

And I asked him could I see your son, and he introduced me or he was introduced to me or he came to me and I took him back into the police. He was reattested??? into the police.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

5 General I'll be quite brief on this skipping a number of years at some stage Mr Williamson in about 1977 leaves the country and takes up a post at the IUEF in Geneva there are a sequence events in late '79 - early '80 where his cover mail may not have been compromised.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Ja.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

During that period will it be correct to say that you were handling Mr Williamson?

GEN COETZEE:

15 Yes quite correct.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

Okay, I don't really want to go into all the details of that, but would it be correct to say that money which was channelled from the IUEF was used to buy the farm Daisy?

GEN COETZEE:

The position was this sir, after Mr Williamson took up I think the second in charge of the IUF in Switzerland, a budget of the IUF was forwarded which detailed the money to be spend in South Africa on the activities of the IUF.

5 Have you got that?

MR CHUSCKELSON:

Yes.

GEN COETZEE:

So we had a main budget indicating what portion was allocated for South
10 Africa. At the same time, indicating what ventures the IUF wanted to undertake in South Africa. For instance we want to give R10,-thousand in cash to mister - the President of Namibia, Sam Njoma's mother. Will you please go and hand it over, many such - many such assignments - ventures identified you understand that.

15 So we had to create a grass root level an organisation which consisted of national intelligence because the police was not concerned to work outside, suppose to work outside the country. National intelligence and the Security Police. We created separate from the police headquarters or national intelligence headquarters an office where they set about 6 or 10
20 people on a permanent basis you understand.

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And they were supposed as far as the IUF was concerned to be Graig Williamson's organisation of South Africa, to be running these assignments like give this, do that, there are very interesting things out of that, why I said that it also again involves people that I would rather remain at this stage and
5 it's not just threatening it's exactly the same picture.

In Parliament today about some of these things that's happened there.

But these concerned money that came, and that was allocated for the assignment of the IUF in South Africa and sir we had every year to prepare a budget and to say this is what we did with the money that we've received
10 from you, exactly this is what we did with it.

For instance I've said about, I've mentioned this one assignment we sending someone with R10-thousand we couldn't sent a policeman out there. A policeman to Mr Sam Njoma's mother who is entitled to disbursements from either the Secret Fund or disbursements from ordinary
15 open account - what is it day allowances or staying in a hotel.

So we had to sent an undercover agent who uses a car that was rented from Avis for instance, who stays over in a hotel and pays what's expected from the money of the IUF. So he must everything to make this whole thing look real and this is - this is the position. This is what happened there.

After two years sir, Mr Craig Williamson reported to me that there was great misuse of money at IEUF headquarters which incidentally I employed to destroy them. There was great misuse, but what did I do sir.

I say that he should insist in a nice manner that the books of the IUF should be audited by a responsible - a responsible firm of auditors and this is exactly what happened and this is what brought to light in - in Switzerland, the fact that there was gambling, womanising and spending a lot of money in an unauthorised way.

That is - that is the stick sir that I used when I eventually confronted the director to say I've got this information, there is the auditors, auditors report and this was the situation that broke them.

But sir for instance you asked about Daisy farm, the directive from IUF which we got everyday reports like that from Craig Williamson was that we should rent a farm, we should rent a farm for the purpose of harbouring prospective terrorist there, which to us was very important if we could - if this was to be done then we knew who they were

So before they took the escape route out of South Africa, this should be a hidden place and so on and they allocated something like R1-thousand or

R2-thousand per month for the renting of this place. And they came to me and I went to this particular office where this 10 officers - 8 or 10 officers sat and they say well we got now this - this thing to do what do you suggest.

And there was a senior man from National Intelligence also there
5 because we attended conferences to oversee this whole operation. And I said but you know it's much to risky an operation every month to go and pay - to go and pay R2-thousand interest of what - the rent to an owner of a farm who shouldn't know who you are. He should know who he is dealing with, he - the first thing he'd say man if you don't pay, where do I phone
10 you and he finds out but you sergeant Schoombie.

So I said no-no this is not going to work, we must purchase this place outright and they said but how are we going to do it, and I said all right I'll make a plan. And by using a fictitious name in Johannesburg to a firm of attorneys with whom I had 5 - 6 years ago had some business dealings,
15 about registering about a property I went and I said well you know we want - it's a cash buy and we want to buy this property and it's Mr John Davis who wants to buy it and so and she said to me ag I don't want to digress sir, she said but you look very familiar, who are you. I said oh! no I've never seen you sir, lady - madam I've never seen you.

And I registered it in the name of Mr John Davis, so it was now in fact bought on a cash basis and the day that I left the police sir, could have said oh! well it's easy Mr John Davis is now selling it, and giving it as a present to Mr Johan Coetzee. I didn't do that, I said IUF has disappeared, who's
5 now the owner of it, we don't know - the police say they don't use it now longer, let's give it to the State and I signed the document and it was handled by a firm of attorneys and it was returned to the State.

And sir peculiar thing is that people who didn't know about it and got this present said but no they want they this - to Mr John Davis, to come and
10 thank him very gracefully for this nice present. So that - does not look to me sir, like misusing funds or abusing or committing a corruption it looks to me sir that if I acted very responsibly and...[intervention]

MR CHUSCKELSON:

That was not suggested General.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

Oh! I am just saying that sir.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

General after Mr Williamson returns in 1980.

GEN COETZEE:

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I presume he went through a process of debriefing with you.

GEN COETZEE:

I - I fetched him sir.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

5 Yes, the position was an agent of National Intelligence by the name of Mr
Given had started making statements in - in newspapers about his own
activities on behalf of National Intelligence.

He was also employed at Wits University. He knew about Craig
Williamson, not factually but he had a good idea that Craig Williamson was
10 in fact working for the Security Branch, thank you sir.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

And...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

And I - I - you know the communication was very difficult and I went
15 overseas and I met Craig Williamson who's wife at that stage was studying
to become a doctor at University of Geneva or Geneva I don't know what
the real pronunciation is. And after a long interview with him - it became
clear to me that we could not - we could not continue with that operation. It
was a pity as far as we were concerned.

And it was decided that he and his wife would come back. Now he is back in South Africa. He is a man with wide experience that's why I said in '81 when they wanted someone obviously I would have suggested him. He is not that briefed because throughout the period that he worked, he submitted - he submitted statements we knew exactly what he was doing. And some of his ventures sir, I mean - that's why I said you'd need three days with us, some of the things that he's done, and the ventures that he was concerned in throughout the world sir, throughout the world, ranging from Northern Island to the Southern [indistinct] in South America.

So we knew what he was doing, I particularly met him on two or three occasions overseas, I knew exactly what and he was reporting back in minute fashion exactly what was going on. And we distributed this information by re-routing it and so on to different intelligence organisations in the world.

It was not kept for ourselves, so yes he was - he was not debriefed because we knew what he had done, I knew what he had done, he is now under the command of colonel Goosen at police headquarters no longer under mine direct command I've moved up in ranks. And he uses them on the death that is still concerned with this, he is an experienced infiltrate - he is an experienced man and the last time that I heard of Mr Craig Williamson

at that stage, is that he was giving lectures to Security Branch policemen how it should be done.

How do you infiltrate, how do you infiltrate agents. That was his expertise.

5 **MR CHUSCKELSON:**

General Daisy was being used a training facility at some stage is that correct, the farm.

GEN COETZEE:

For Security - for - for this type they were called up as far as I remember, 10 now that is not I am talking about '82 - '80 they were called up and they were taken to this facility and they were lectured by - well different people. But *inter alia* by Craig Williamson.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

You said that the farm was never used for any covert activity.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

Not whilst I was there sir.

MR CHUSCKELSON:

Would it surprise you - would it surprise you to learn that - that we have been informed that Daisy was used as a meeting place before the London 20 bomb blast.

GEN COETZEE:

No I won't - I think that, that - it would be natural that the - Craig Williamson know that this place was bought, he - Goosen and he is in charge of this operation now. I wouldn't know, I've said it - and I wouldn't
5 know where they meeting, I suppose they could meet any place, any police facility, police college Hammanskraal, anywhere, that they decided to do that, would seem to me to be a natural thing. But I don't know about it, I never went there, let me put it this way, I never went there, I never briefed them there, I never part took in this briefings.

10 **MR CHUSCKELSON:**

Thank you General, that's all for the moment.

GEN COETZEE:

Thank you sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Thank you very much General - General on a different - different track all together, could I refer you to page 50 of your - of your submission, that's the - one of the paragraphs that is out of sequence, it's the one dealing with the Maputo raid.

You refer there to a target identification planning committee.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

Is that the same committee that you referred to in an earlier paragraph when
5 you are - where you mention TREWITS you said that you don't know that -
that appellation but you refer to a target committee.

GEN COETZEE:

Ja - ja.

ADV GOOSEN:

10 Is that the same committee?

GEN COETZEE:

Yes the position was sir I mentioned here that in this document which the
Commissioner of Police and which is termed and which I came across now
for the first time which is termed the Mandela Discussion or Dialogue, there
15 is mention that the police say that they had a committee which was termed
TREWITS which was suppose to do target planning.

And all that I wanted to draw your attention to if you read through
that document, and you come across that term, I never knew that term, until
I left - unaware that these - what I turned the Botswana and Maputo and
20 Lesotho raids, that there was a co-ordinated planning.

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ADV GOOSEN:

Okay.

GEN COETZEE:

And there was a planning committee and I said it was an **ad hoc** thing at that
5 stage and I suppose - I suppose out of that grew what was afterwards termed
or what they term now, a TREWITS commission.

ADV GOOSEN:

TREWITS.

GEN COETZEE:

10 Ja ... end of Tape 3, Side B...

ADV GOOSEN:

Committee that...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

At that stage ja.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

Just to clarify it, you mention in an earlier paragraph the **ad hoc** target
identification committee, is that - are you referring here to the same when in
- on page 50 you refer to the target identification planning committee - it's
the same structure.

GEN COETZEE:

That's the same exactly sir, and say that in my time there wasn't a permanent this is a point that I want to bring out.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 All right - all right now...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

There wasn't a permanent target planning that set everyday and said we going to do this, we going to do that and so, this is when as I am concerned where there was authority for a particular venture I would say - I would say
10 to the Security Chief man you must assist, you must give the information which is our duty - which is legally required from us and they would go and sit as far as I am concerned they would go and sit jointly together, the pilots, the reccee commanders whoever they would go and sit jointly together and they would plan it.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

So I take it there were - there were one or two or three of three or four instances in which this **ad hoc** committee was convened to deal with certain matters that you were aware of.

GEN COETZEE:

Well I was aware with this.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes and in relation to what types of matter was it convened?

GEN COETZEE:

5 Was it what sir?

ADV GOOSEN:

Convened.

GEN COETZEE:

Well about this - I remember that at one of these it may have been the
10 Lesotho one, it may have been that they convened it, the - as far as I
recommend - recollect sir, please Mr Chairperson as far as I recollect, the
targets, the targets - the personalities and the basis in Maseru was identified
by the police - by the police, they are the people who had to give the
information, house no so and so and street no so and so and this is the
15 position as far as I remember.

The job of going in as I've said in terms of the understanding or not
the understanding the broad directive by the Government we - the police
should not go and do things like that was done by the Army, utilising what
forces they wanted to.

In my own case my job was that as soon as you're informed that the Army has moved in you've got to inform the Government of Lesotho what our intentions were I don't need to say that again. So there was joined planning, obviously the police and - must have given the information the
5 houses, photo's or whatever the position was, must have given it to - to the Army so there was joined planning, that was a joined committee.

ADV GOOSEN:

Do you have any knowledge as to whether of any of the - any police actually participated in the raid at all.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

No I'd be surprised if it's so, because I said at a particular place and I was phoned by an Army commander he knew where I was and he approached me telephonically and he said General Coetzee we now moving in, and I got in touch with Minister Malapo who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
15 whom I knew he was the brother of the chief of Security of Lesotho and I informed him and I could see the moment that I informed him, I could see there was already fighting in the fighting going on in the lower part of Lesotho.

ADV GOOSEN:

All right but the - in Lesotho it's an overt raid, I mean the - the - the Lesotho Government is aware of who's conducting the raid.

GEN COETZEE:

5 Oh we told them - I don't know what they did, I said they were very upset and they said they taking certain steps about it and so on.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes were you aware of any covert cross border actions in which Security Police or other policeman might have been involved.

10 **GEN COETZEE:**

No I didn't ever authorise but that doesn't mean sir that they would not perhaps have done it on their own, I mean that is what policeman many times do I remember I can tell you in the case of Swaziland for instance.

In the case of Swaziland I negotiated many times with the Swami
15 Commissioner of Police about the presence in that country of trained terrorist, I did it also in Lesotho, I did it also in Botswana. And at one stage we even decided that because of the incursions from Swaziland into the Transvaal, we would change the border between the two countries. To make the place where the border is, situated more accessible or advantages

for South African forces to lie and wait for people coming over with weapons and groups and so on.

And this is - this was in a document I heard they accepted this and we accepted that this portion of sovereignty is now ours. Now you would
5 deploy, you'd get information that tonight now there would come a group of 20 people armed over the border and you would deploy your forces this side and there would be a fire fight and after a month or two or three then you hear rumours but what we in fact did we moved 600 yards over the border there was a better position there to do that.

10 If you confront them they say no-no General is not enough it's not so, so there could have been occasions especially in the case of Swaziland where they went over.

There is another example now I believe General Van der Merwe has spoken about that, if you're an operative illegal operative in another man's
15 country or you there and they knew all the Security guys and suddenly you meet face to face in Swaziland, Lesotho or wherever, there is likely to be a fight, likely to enter into a gun fight, or it is possible that it will happen.

So I cannot give you examples of all these things that could have happened but the fact is the authorised one's which I authorised and it was
20 organised are these ones.

ADV GOOSEN:

Okay, General in 1986 - no 1985 I beg your pardon the instances in Duduza and Kwatema on the East Rand where a number of people were killed in - as a result of handgranade explosions, is the incident about what General Johan

5 van der Merwe testified at the Amnesty Committee - you aware of it.

GEN COETZEE:

Yes I am aware of it sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

You aware of that, you aware of the testimony that he gave that there was an

10 instruction in regard to that...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

I've seen it on the press it was widely reported sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Were you in any way aware of or involved in that matter.

15 **GEN COETZEE:**

No sir, except I've said so here that General Van der Merwe who was at that stage I don't know from when I've said you know how they followed it up

one another there after General Schutte - I - you know I don't know. I mean

I couldn't keep track of thousands of policemen and officers being

20 transferred and so on.

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But t that stage the last portion of my Commissionership he was definitely in Security, so that is '85 or '86.

ADV GOOSEN:

Yes.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

He says as far as I recollected he submitted to the Minister a memorandum about this proposed action which went through my office and I say yes it's quite possible and sir, it's quite possible. But what I must say to you sir, I know Mr Le Grange and I know the one occasion stress again that he gave
10 what I considered to be an illegal order and unlikely he was, and that's why I consider - as far as I am concerned he wouldn't have given it himself without recourse to collective responsibility somewhere.

But this memorandum that came through my office, it's not necessary that I must see him it's a big office with many staff officers - may
15 staff officers at the end product at the Minister so yes it could have come through me, he could have done many things with that.

He could have decided I am consulting the State attorney whether this is legal or not. He could have consulted his own, he had three advocates there in the Security module of his, he would have called them and said
20 listen let me - this is the situation. Here is the report, how do you feel about

this - is this - would this be legal that if people throw live handgranades at policemen, that the defence mechanism that I have is one of private defence, and I am going to order that, that thing explodes, I go along with it.

Or he could have called me in and says General what do you say,
5 what do you recommend, he didn't do that. He could have says well wait a bit, wait a bit but on the document before him, I am sure that Mr La Grange would have taken a legal decision, that was his way. What is more sir, what
10 you must realise is that stage, he made statements in Parliament and outside Parliament in which he stated an [indistinct] that if people throw bombs at the police they would be eliminated. So that would be his mindset it would not be strange from him.

ADV GOOSEN:

An operation of that nature would surely be covert, would it not?

GEN COETZEE:

15 It's a normal police operation sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Normal police operation that the police would take responsibility for?

GEN COETZEE:

Yes, oh! yes sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Did the police take responsibility for the death of the eight people on the day after this occurred.

GEN COETZEE:

5 This was - it was legal, it was legal sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

On what basis was it legal General.

GEN COETZEE:

On the basis - say for instance there - there is say for instance there is a case
10 that it's reported, I don't know remember now I don't say it was exactly the
same way. But here is a report coming from a commander of the Security
Branch and he says I haven't spoken particularly to General Van der Merwe
about it, I am just now surmising what could have happened he says that
people left people in an organisation wants to go and kill policeman. That's
15 what they have in mind, kill policeman.

And they are going to use handgrandes or whatever which they think
the origin is of ANC. And there is no way that you can arrest them
remember the Van Wyk case, there is no way that you can arrests them,
there is no way that you can stop them. I have got - I don't know what legal
20 people will decide about that, his advisors decided but I think that quite

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probably in those circumstances the Minister decided this is quite legal and yes go ahead. He didn't consult me, but this is the situation.

What I do know sir...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Do you not find it - do you not find it strange...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

What I do know sir, what I must [indistinct] ...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

That you were not consulted about it, this was - that's in essence the - the
10 line of communication, the line of command in essence was directly from
head of Security Police...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

To the Minister.

ADV GOOSEN:

15 Through to the Minister.

GEN COETZEE:

If you suggesting sir that the Minister would give an okay for an illegal act, we would - we knew mos we knew I mean the people would know that if this happens there would be bodies, there would be an explosion, there may

be alive people who would say what the position is would be investigated...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

General do you know any of the details of that operations.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

No .

ADV GOOSEN:

Do you know that the survivors seven of the survivors were charged by the police having been supplied with the weapons were charged with illegal possession of firearms after that occasion.

10

GEN COETZEE:

I don't know I told you sir that I don't know I am - I say I am in the rehelme??? of conjecture now what could have come to the Minister through my office.

15 What I can say sir if there was a slightest suspicion that this man that they identifying as the source was a tipe of **adjutant provocateur** if that was identified I would have said no.

Because then obviously or that he was a policeman an infiltrator a police infiltrator I would have said no.

ADV GOOSEN:

How would they - just let's run with this for a minute, the police - how would the police have supplied these people with doctored handgranade if not **adjunct provocateur**.

5 **GEN COETZEE:**

How do you mean - no but I mean now if there is an - a source he is a member of this organisation, surely he is not an outsider that comes from out of the blue with weapons for them. He is in the conspiracy with that.

10 **ADV GOOSEN:**

In the particular - in this particular instance the - the facts of the matter is that the person that supplied the - supplied the handgranade was a Security Police operative based at Vlakplaas namely Joe Mamasela.

GEN COETZEE:

15 Yes but I don't know that, that's what I say sir that as far as I am concerned and the Minister is concerned there comes a memorandum that a source I don't - I remember the document is not before us so we are really debating possibilities and probabilities, but I am saying from my knowledge and my experience of Mr La Grange is that he was very legalistic type of person.

20 There must - if he had known or I had known that an operative of the police

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- a man that is a **adjunct provocateur** was doing this, I would have stopped it immediately just there, I says no well this is nonsense so the memorandum either and General Van der Merwe should explain it what type of memorandum how does he remember it, he signed it to the Minister, he
5 signs there from me to the Minister.

And sir it's easy for me to say well the Minister knew about it, he is dead what would [indistinct] well it isn't true, it's just not true. So the man must have said...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

10 But would it have been normal for - to have to obtain the Minister's approval for an operation of that type?

GEN COETZEE:

I - I think sir that if you foresee the possible ramifications if you're outside, you a policeman in charge of or you concerned with this, if you see the
15 ramifications foresee it that here people may die or they may not die and they'll be available to give evidence and to give information to the press and so on you will make sure that your legal steps as far as your superiors are concerned, are in order, I would say that.

ADV GOOSEN:

And you would in fact also ensure that you follow the proper line of command, I mean you would - your office would presumably be - be consulted by your junior officer.

GEN COETZEE:

5 No - no it doesn't work that way, all heads of departments sir, all heads there were about twenty heads of departments in the different sections [indistinct] were entitled about various matters to submit a memorandum to the Minister whatever subject, there were many - many subjects to get his guidance, and if he could do many things with it.

10 He could go to his colleague in Justice, he could go to Cabinet, he could take it to the State Security Council. He could call me in and consult me and say you give me an advisory opinion. He could have consulted his legal advisors around him. He could have gone completely solo on it and says I decided I've warned them that this is going to happen. I don't know
15 what he did, all I - all I can say to you I wasn't consulted, for a recommendation which was unnecessary. I wasn't consulted, I wasn't asked, I don't know the details and I say to you sir that literally hundreds of memoranda went through my office to the Minister every day.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

I don't know I just was wanting to - no - no it's not on the questions on [indistinct] any further, I just want to know what sort of - are there arrangements that you have reached with the...[intervention]

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Mr Chairperson I am in fact I am just checking with my colleague here as to whether we've covered the things that we wanted to address at this stage. And in fact we've completed what we would wish to - the questions we would want to put to - to the General now.

It may be - it's unlikely at this point - obviously there are issues that
10 we haven't studied the detail of your submission there may be things that we would wish to speak to you about in future but we can then make those arrangements on a different basis at some stage. But certainly...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

15 Oh! no problem Mr Chairman.

ADV GOOSEN:

We - we are happy to conclude at this point thank you Mr Chairperson - thank you very much General.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

So I would be surprised why - if that was something - the policeman would have accompanied them then it was unauthorised I mean I don't know anything about it.

ADV GOOSEN:

5 Now the - the cross border incidences that you referred to here are as it were they overt, I mean you know the South African Defence Force raids Maputo, you in contact with Maputo Government official to say they moving in...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

10 No Lesotho sir.

ADV GOOSEN:

Well Lesotho - also with the Maputo raid, similarly.

GEN COETZEE:

No - no I didn't say that, I said the Air Force went in.

15 **ADV GOOSEN:**

All right I beg your pardon...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

The Air Force went in because they couldn't sent overland for 80 or 100 kilometres and Army [indistinct]

Well certainly there - there may be also questions that I might want to put when I have looked at the Annexures at the fullest extend, I think it remains for - for me and Ms Burton to thank you for having come. And for having endeavoured to give as full and as meaningful an explanation as possible to
5 all the questions that have been put.

It's been a long day, you haven't had the have the benefit of our General by way of tea and things like that, but I suppose it was because of strictures of time. We thank you very much together with your attorney an on that basis and subject to your consent to us recalling you, should the need
10 arise...[intervention]

GEN COETZEE:

Should the sir what?

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Should the need arise for us to recall you these proceedings remain
15 adjourned.

GEN COETZEE:

Thank you sir and may I say also very brief - I am very appreciative especially to your co chair lady she never asked me one question which I appreciate very much and the two legal gentleman there at the other side, I
20 hope they going to visit me about the Daisy, I'll think you'll find Graaff

Reinet very interesting and you - one day you won't need - read about Daisy
in my autobiography so you can have it first hand version of it.

ADV NTSEBEZA:

Well the proceedings are adjourned.

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