RealTime Transcriptions

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

# **COMMISSION OF INQUIRY**

## MARIKANA

**BEFORE TRIBUNAL** 

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

## HELD ON

DAY 297 11 NOVEMBER 2014

PAGES 39072 TO 39238



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1	[PROCEEDINGS ON 11 NOVEMBER 2014]	1	looks at the damages that one has to pay in terms of loss
2	[09:09] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. I	2	is 200 000. The proposition is that because we are going
3	understand, well Mr Ramphele you're continuing, but I	3	to lose two billion we have a very reasonable consideration
4	received a request before we started, which is one of the	4	that says we can forego 200 000 and we can forego actually
5	reasons why we're coming now, to give you an extension of	5	a number of 200 000s because otherwise we'll lose two
6	an extra 10 minutes because there's a point that you hadn't	6	billion, and I'm saying it cannot be a consideration that
7	begun to deal with earlier which you think you should, you	7	is justified to risk a right to life. So even with the
8	have to deal with, and I indicated that I'd give you those	8	propositions that have been put forward, Lonmin would still
9	10 minutes. Please, no more than that.	9	not be justified to risk the right to life and I mean most
10	MR RAMPHELE: Thank you, Chair. Thank	10	recently we've had the most - as an example, the most, what
11	you very much. Chair, we're still responding to the issue	11	one can call a world calamity in the form of Ebola, and we
12	of the duty of care of the employer and the proposition	12	know how it's resolved; you quarantine it. If the 3000
13	that has been put forward by Lonmin that in these	13	strikers were as dangerous as that then there was a
14	circumstances the principal enunciated in this case should	14	possibility to actually just quarantine the problem and I
15	not apply and we say that in relation to this case what the	15	think the issue of taking the right to life as opposed to
16	court held, and that is you, Chair, you said what is	16	isolating the problem was actually not considered.
17	important – and you referred to an Afrikaans judgment,	17	CHAIRPERSON: I don't know that it's
18	Minister van Polisie v Ewels – what you considered	18	right in approaching this matter to consider that there
19	important "is die regsoortuiging van die gemeenskap, wat	19	would be 3000 strikers, that according to the evidence is
20	die gemeenskap verlang dat die late as onregmatig beskou."	20	something that had never happened. You know 3000 strikers
21	My trying to translate that would be that you're looking at	21	armed, dangerous mood, according to the evidence that had
22	the legal conviction of the public and what they yearn for,	22	never happened before and they argue that it was not
23	that the omission be regarded as unlawful. So in these	23	reasonably foreseeable, but prima facie I think you're on
24	circumstances I think that if one takes that into account,	24	stronger ground when you say that if the Lonmin board was
25	but not only that, after 1994 we operate in a	25	faced with a business decision, do we accede to the request
20	but not only that, after 1774 we operate in a	20	accu with a business decision, do we accede to the request
	Page 39073		
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1		1	Page 39075 from our security people to provide them with an armoured
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2	constitutional State where the right to life if has to be limited consciously one has to say does the limitation of		from our security people to provide them with an armoured vehicle and equipment which will protect their lives in
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1	Page 39076 the strikers, managed to get out with a soft-skin vehicle	1	Page 39078 CHAIRPERSON: Is that not so?
1	and then tried to go back in to rescue Mabelane and Fundi,	2	MR RAMPHELE: Okay, thank you, Chair.
2	now this time with an armoured vehicle, and there's	2	The first issue is, and that is it relates to the duty of
4	evidence before the Commission that he tried to leave the	4	the employer. Does the employer send an employee that is
5	armoured vehicle. The strikers attacked him and because he	5	not trained to a situation that Mabelane was sent into?
6	managed to go back into the armoured vehicle his life was	6	And if one looks at this Media24 case, that if one
7	saved. So that proposition I agree with that the decision	7	considers even international principles of law, like for
8	not to purchase armoured vehicle is a decision that was	8	instance I think in my argument I may have mentioned some
9	actually putting a lot of vulnerability on the security	9	of the practices where especially you have that UN will
10	establishment, and armoured vehicle if purchased would have	10	send their own staff to very dangerous situations and
11	made a difference, and in this particular case the company	11	because of the dangerous situations there is an
12	did not take reasonable steps to heed the call for armoured	12	international principle that is accepted that it is the
13	vehicle.	13	employer's duty to investigate the danger of the situation
14	CHAIRPERSON: In the light of the request	14	in which they send their employee. It is not the
15	they'd received from their own security people, which was	15	employee's obligation. It is the employer's obligation to
16	motivated, they can't be heard to say that injuries to or	16	investigate the degree of danger into which they send their
17	even death of their security people was not reasonably	17	employee, and –
18	foreseeable when they made the decision they made.	18	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, wasn't the
19	MR RAMPHELE: Yes. Thank you, Chair.	19	evidence that Lonmin said to their security people don't
20	Now there is another issue that Lonmin raises and that is	20	endanger your own lives. You must obviously do what you
21	the issue of Mr Mabelane. Again this issue is an issue	21	have to do, but don't do so in a manner which endangers
22	that the family is very concerned about because it is an	22	your own life. Wasn't that the evidence?
23	issue where Lonmin is saying Mabelane was actually wrong	23	MR RAMPHELE: They may have said that,
24	and that's why he died. Now firstly we have a situation	24	but we also have to consider exactly when that was said.
25	where Mabelane is not here to respond to that. The facts	25	That was said a day or two before the 12th of August and
1	Page 39077	1	Page 39079 this was said as some form of training, according to Mr
1	that we have is that Mabelane received training of three	1	this was said as some form of training, according to Mr
2	that we have is that Mabelane received training of three months of about 19 courses and in the 19 courses there was	2	this was said as some form of training, according to Mr Sinclair, under cross-examination by Advocate Pillay.
2 3	that we have is that Mabelane received training of three months of about 19 courses and in the 19 courses there was crowd management. That is the formal training he received.		this was said as some form of training, according to Mr
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Page 39080 1 employer test, especially if the danger that is being 2 posed, or the right that is at stake is the right to life. 2 the last point. 1 MR RAMPHELE: But 2 the last point.	Page 39082 Chair, I have to make
	II, make it in one
4 CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, I don't 4 minute. You submitted written he	
5 understand that submission. You say you don't judge it by 5 will read again. Make the point, j	
6 the standards of a reasonable man because there's a danger 6 one or two sentences and then I'r	
7 of death. 7 stop.	in anala you ve got to
	n Chair, please don't
9 CHAIRPERSON: But surely the reasonable 9 interrupt my one minute.	
	re are other people – I
11 he would be more vigilant, take more trouble to ensure that 11 haven't started your one minute y	
	chair, I was going to press
	II take this under
17 case talks about the standard that one judges the employer 17 punishment.	illions is a test of
	ikana is a test of
19 confined to just the reasonable test. It is confined to 19 constitutional values of the countril 20 the right at atala is the right.	-
20 the right at stake, and if the right at stake is the right 20 a situation where you have a com	-
21 to life and you knowingly put your employee in a situation 21 confined to a very small area. We	
22 of that nature, then we don't judge the employee. And I've 22 says that you have about 28 000	
23 mentioned the, actually it even, I think case laws in 23 very small space. This massacre	-
24 Europe and in other international jurisdictions have held 24 that are in the small space. Some	
25 that, that not the employee is judged. The duty rests with 25 thereof is what happened in the f	irst inspection in loco.
Page 39081	Page 39083
1 the employer. The employer must investigate the extent of 1 If you look at our submissions w	ve propose a restoration
2 the danger. When an employer sends an employee into a 2 fund because this is a Commission	on that has to also look at
3 dangerous situation then it is the employer, not the 3 restoration and that restoration	must be and this is
4 employee that is judged, it is the employer that is judged. 4 practise in Lonmin, Mrs Langa's	child may actually go back
5 So the employer does not say to the employee take care of 5 and work where the father used	to work or one of the
6 yourself and send them into a dangerous situation where 6 striker's child may also do the sa	ame. The question is if
7 their lives may be lost and then say in response well, he 7 we leave the situation as is don'	t we perpetuate the gap
8 was supposed to act reasonably; he didn't. I said he said 8 that has been there between the	e families and the request
9 run away; he didn't. That is not the test. The test is 9 for consideration and recommen	ndation of a restoration fund
10 when you send the employee out, did you take reasonable 10 is to have all the stakeholders tr	ying to contribute to a
11 steps? And in this particular case with all the 11 situation where this unfortunate	incident does not leave
12 facilities, the equipment, the technology that Lonmin had, 12 communities in Marikana having	this between them, the
13 with all the intelligence, with realisation of the danger, 13 divisions between them. So we	believe that if say all the
14 did they actually take reasonable care to make sure that 14 stakeholders including Lonmin a	nd trade unions can
15Mabelane's life was not in danger?15contribute not only a fund, but a	a process of restoring
16Chair, I will move on to two last points –16relations between families becau	use I am going to be – I've
17 CHAIRPERSON: I'm afraid you won't be 17 spoken to my clients on the issu	e of – because life has
18able to because your time is up.I gave you 10 minutes18been lost and our constitutional	values say that we must
19 initially, I gave you an extra 10 –19 try and have communities that li	ive together including with
20 MR RAMPHELE: But you have been 20 the employer, including the unio	ons because that is what
21 interrupting me, Chair.   21 plural – that difficult English wor	rd, but that is what
22 CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, but I didn't 22 different views how they should	co-exist in a
23 interrupt you, 1 put questions to you so that you could 23 constitutional democracy togeth	er. And we believe that if
24 answer the difficulties that I had, prima facie24 that fund is created then we will	I be able to go beyond this
25 difficulties – 25 Commission with some sort of ce	onfidence that we will not
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1	Page 39084 have another Marikana. And my families in the spirit of	1	Page 39086 on the basis of accomplice liability. Commencing then,
2	ubuntu would also - because we've not done that and I think	2	Chair, Commissioners, with AMCU.
2	Mr Mpofu has actually done that and Mr Mathunjwa has done	3	CHAIRPERSON: Before you carry on, I'm
4	that, we pass our condolences to those families that have	4	afraid the problem we had yesterday has recurred. There
5	lost their loved ones. We know that the strikers some of	5	are some headphones that are on too loud and we can hear
6	them were involved in the killing our own families, but	6	the voice all the time and it's very disturbing. Please
7	-	7	they must be turned off because alternatively the person
	we're saying that the law should take its course, we all	8	
8	agree to that, the police must investigate, but beyond that	0 9	concerned who's got them must ensure that they're not
9	these families have to live together. And the Commission		audible generally in the chamber because it's very
10	is an opportunity to make sure that that happens. So that	10	difficult to follow what Ms Barnes has to say if there's
11	is where we then believe that maybe if the Chair doesn't	11	another voice going on in the background. I can still hear
12	want to give us one more minute we'll leave it.	12	it. Is there anyone who hasn't got his or her earphones on
13	CHAIRPERSON: I've given you	13	which is what we can hear? Or is it just a question of the
14	substantially more than one more minute, but the point you	14	volume being turned up too loudly? I think we'll adjourn
15	made was a point of substance, I'm glad you made it. Thank	15	for a couple of minutes so the problem can be sorted out.
16	you very much. Ms Barnes.	16	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]
17	MS BARNES: Yes thank you. Chair,	17	[09:43] MS BARNES: Yes, thank you very much.
18	Commissioners, my learned friend, Mr Gotz and I will be	18	Chair, Commissioners, when this Commission commenced a
19	sharing the arguments on behalf of AMCU. I will be	19	little over two years ago now, AMCU was the villain in this
20	addressing issues relating to AMCU and Lonmin and Mr Gotz	20	story. We heard that AMCU was the militant new union that
21	will address you on issues related to NUM and the police.	21	was engaged in a violent turf war with NUM at AMCU. We
22	We will each address you for about an hour and then we will	22	heard that while it refused to admit it, AMCU was in fact
23	hand over to Mr Ntsebeza who will present the argument on	23	behind the protected strike. We were told that the strike
24	behalf of the families. Chair and Commissioners, we have	24 25	reeks of AMCU's involvement by Mr Russo-Bello of Lonmin.
25	prepared a document which records some of our key oral	25	Mr Mokwena told General Mbombo, the Provincial Commissioner
	Page 39085		Page 39087
1	submissions which we would like to hand up after our	1	of the North West Province that Lonmin could prove that
2	argument.	2	AMCU was in fact behind the strike. All of this has been
3	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you that will be very	3	shown to be false.
4	helpful.	4	CHAIRPERSON: We never got that tape
5	MS BARNES: If I might then give you a	5	recording that was to be the proof. That's never been
6	road map of what I intend to have in my oral address. I	6	explained to us either.
7	will begin with AMCU and I will begin by making some	7	MS BARNES: Indeed. It never
8	introductory remarks about AMCU's conduct generally in the	8	materialised.
9	week of the 9th to the 16th of August 2012. Thereafter I	9	CHAIRPERSON: In fact you were entitled
10	will deal with what appears to be the only remaining	10	to remind us.
11	allegation of any materiality against AMCU and that is the	11	MS BARNES: Indeed, it's never
12	allegation that AMCU was seeking to exploit the situation	12	materialised and of course Mr Mokwena readily admitted that
13	at Marikana in order to get bargaining rights at Lonmin.	13	he'd never in fact heard it himself. We haven't heard
14	Finally then in relation to AMCU I will deal with a new	14	evidence from anybody who actually did hear it. We submit
15	submission which has emerged in the heads of argument of	15	that whether it was ever in fact in existence is
16	our learned friend, Mr Gumbi to the effect that AMCU is	16	questionable. The evidence that has been led in this
17	liable in law for damages caused by its members during the	17	Commission has established, we submit, that there's no
18	strike. That then deals with AMCU I will then move on to	18	basis for any suggestion that AMCU was behind either the
19	make some submissions in relation to Lonmin, there I will	19	demand for R12 500 or the unprotected strike or the
20	make submissions on Lonmin's claim that the striker's	20	violence that followed it, and we note Chair and
21	demand for R12 500 was not negotiable and then finally I	21	Commissioners –
22	will address you on the basis for our submission that	22	CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to interrupt
23	there's a prima facie case or prima facie grounds for	23	you unduly, but am I correct in saying it was never put to
24	finding that Lonmin is criminally responsible for the	24	Mr Mathunjwa when he gave evidence, by anybody that AMCU
25	deaths and injuries committed by SAPS on the 16th of August	25	was responsible for what had happened?
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1	MS BARNES: That is quite correct, Chair.	1	the structures, which was an additional problem, and we can
2	CHAIRPERSON: That's obviously quite an	2	submit – we submit that there can be no doubt that AMCU was
3	important fact in itself, is it not?	3	in those circumstances entitled to propose a meeting to
4	MS BARNES: It is indeed. And the	4	discuss the problem which involved its members. That's
5	allegations in fact, in fact there were rumours and there	5	what it then did on the very first day that the strike
6	was a lot of reportage in the media to the effect that AMCU	6	commenced. That proposal of course fell on deaf ears.
7	was in fact behind the strike, but that the allegations	7	AMCU then made the same proposal for a meeting of all
8	came from Lonmin rather belatedly. We dealt with that in	8	relevant stakeholders to discuss the matter five times
9	our heads of argument. The direct allegations, as you	9	during the week of the 9th to the 16th of August. We submit
10	correctly point out Chair, were not put to Mr Mathunjwa but	10	that those calls should have been responded to with greater
11	appeared in detail for the first time in Mr Mokwena's	11	and greater urgency as people started dying. Instead, they
12	supplementary statement and it appears that he was – that	12	fell on deaf ears.
13	arose as a result of the transcript of the conversation	13	If we can look at other steps taken by AMCU
14	between him and General Mbombo in which those allegations	14	during that week. On Monday the 13th of August Lonmin asked
15	have been made and so because the transcript surfaced it	15	for AMCU's intervention and here we make the point and it's
16	appeared that it was not necessary to repeat – to deal with	16	really the flipside of Lonmin's submission that a number of
17	the matter and make the allegations in any supplementary	17	actions taken by AMCU were inappropriate or unacceptable
18	statement. But he of course retracted all allegations that	18	because they didn't have the right to bargain wages at
19	AMCU had been behind the strike. And we note, Chair and	19 20	Lonmin. AMCU didn't say well, no we know our members are
20 21	Commissioners, that the evidence leaders come to the same	20 21	involved in the strike, hear that there's been violence and
21	conclusion in their heads of argument and to the effect that AMCU is not behind the strike. They say in paragraph	21	deaths, but no, the strikes over wages. We don't have the right to bargain wages and so no, we won't. We won't come
22	1.2.5.4 on page 668 of their heads of argument.	22	and intervene. And in fact we submit that had they done so
23 24	Now we submit that the evidence that has been led	23 24	it would have been cynical position to have adopted. It
24 25	in the Commission has established that far from being the	24 25	would have reflected poor leadership and they may well have
25		20	would have reliected poor leadership and they may well have
	Page 39089		Page 39091
1	villain in this story, the response of AMCU's leadership to	1	been open to criticism that they hadn't used their best
2	the crisis that unfolded in Marikana during that week was	2	endeavours in relation to the matter. But of course they
3	responsible and constructive, and I need to address you	3	didn't do that. They readily agreed to intervene and Mr
4	briefly on that submission. As soon as the unprotected	4	Mathunjwa immediately sent his general secretary and the
5	strike commenced Mr Mathunjwa proposed a meeting between	5	national organiser to Lonmin on that Monday morning. We
6	the recognised unions at Lonmin and Lonmin management in	6	know that they met with the strikers, they met with Lonmin
7	order to discuss the problem. Now Lonmin say in its heads	7	management, and we know that in the meeting with Lonmin
8	of argument that AMCU was not entitled to do this because	8	management AMCU denounced the violence that was happening
9	AMCU was not entitled to bargain wages at Lonmin and	9	at the mine.
10	therefore by proposing this meeting, Lonmin was in fact	10	The following day on the Tuesday the 14th of
11	trying to exploit the situation –	11	August AMCU publicly denounced the violence that was
12	CHAIRPERSON: You mean AMCU.	12	happening at Marikana. And then the following day on
13	MS BARNES: - AMCU was trying to exploit	13	Wednesday, the 15th of August, Mr Mathunjwa responded
14	the situation, thank you, Chair. Now with the greatest of	14	positively to Mr Gwala's invitation to participate in the
15	respect there's no merit in this submission. We must	15	debate, SAFM debate, in which Mr Gwala quite correctly and
16	remember that although AMCU didn't have the right to	16 17	commendably was concerned that a solution, some sort of
17	bargain wages at Lonmin it had a majority of members at one	17 19	solution be found for what was now clearly a crisis, and
18	of Lonmin's mines and it had a whole host of rights at	18 10	during that debate Mr Mathunjwa proposed that all the
19 20	those mines. It had offices there. It had shop stewards. It had the right to hold mass meetings. It had the right	19 20	stakeholders meet and then go to the koppie and address the strikers. And we stress that it was Mr Mathunjwa, if one
20	to raise grievances and it had permanent representatives on	20 21	reads the transcript, it was Mr Mathunjwa that made that
21	a whole host of Lonmin forums and committees. And so we	21	proposal for the first time. It was not in fact Mr Gwala.
22	now had a situation where AMCU members were involved in	22	We deal with this matter in some detail on page 41 and 42
24	this unprotected strike. It was an unprotected strike	24	of our heads of argument. Now the proposal that the
_	which was itself a problem. It was also a strike outside	25	stakeholders all meet to discuss the problem was – this was
25			
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1	Page 39092	1	Page 39094
1	in fact the fourth time that Mr Mathunjwa had made that	1	establishment of a forum outside of the collective
2	proposal in this week. Mr Mathunjwa then made good on his promise to	2 3	bargaining structures on which the workers were themselves represented at which AMCU had a seat. The Chair put this
3		4	to my learned friend, Mr Burger, yesterday and his response
4	address the strikers on the koppie on the 15th of August	4 5	to that was, "well that was established in the context of
5	2012 and then of course he did so again twice on the		
6	following day, the 16th of August. And there it's important	6 7	an entirely new ball game. 34 people had now died." Why,
7	to emphasise that he did so in exceedingly difficult	-	we ask, and this is the critical question to which Lonmin
8	circumstances for three reasons. When he went to address	8	has provided no answer, why did the death of 10 people not
9	the strikers on the koppie for the first time on the 16th of	9	constitute a new ball game? So we submit that quite simply
10	August he did so despite the fact that the undertaking he had sought from Lonmin earlier that morning had not been	10	had Mr Mathunjwa's proposal for the establishment of a
11 12		11 12	central forum been accepted by Lonmin as it should have
	given, and I am going to get into that in some detail in a		been, the massacre would have been averted. In summary
13	moment. So that was the first thing. The second was that	13	then, Chair and Commissioners, on this point we submit that the response of AMCU's leadership to the crisis at Marikana
14	he went to address the strikers despite the fact that he	14 15	
15	had to tell them that Lonmin's commitment that he'd		during that week was responsible and constructive, and that
16	received the day before that they would engage with the strikers' grievance if they return to work was now no	16 17	AMCU ought to be acknowledged for this. Now many of the allegations that were initially
17 18	longer. They'd effectively reneged on that commitment.	18	made against AMCU have been retracted or have been shown to
10	And he also went to the koppie on that occasion, on the 16th	19	be false. We note in this regard that the police do not
20	of August without any police escort. So despite all of	20	appear to persist with their allegation that Mr Mathunjwa
20	that he went to the koppie. It's clear from the transcript	20	gave an undertaking on the 15th of August to the police that
22	that he attempted to persuade the strikers to put down	22	the strikers would lay down their arms and return to work
23	their weapons, end the strike and go back to work. We know	23	at 9 o'clock the next morning. They certainly do not
23	then that he attempted to communicate with Lonmin and there	24	persist with this in their heads of argument. We note that
25	was important feedback that he needed to give Lonmin at	25	the evidence leaders find, correctly in our submission, and
20		20	
	Page 39093		Page 39095
1	$$\ensuremath{Page}\xspace$ Page 39093 that stage, and I am going to get to that aspect in a	1	Page 39095 I quote "there are no facts to support the assertion by
1 2		1 2	<u> </u>
	that stage, and I am going to get to that aspect in a		I quote "there are no facts to support the assertion by
2	that stage, and I am going to get to that aspect in a little detail later on. Lonmin refused to receive the	2	I quote "there are no facts to support the assertion by SAPS that Mr Mathunjwa gave an undertaking that the
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1	Page 39096	1	Page 39098
1	no basis to hold AMCU morally or legally responsible and they note that the evidence clearly suggests that	-	meeting held at Lonmin's LPD offices on the morning of the 16th of August. Now we have two answers to that. The first
2 3		2 3	-
	irrespective of the reasons for doing so, Mr Mathunjwa did		is that while it's true that Mr Mathunjwa's statement does
4	everything in his power to convince the workers to disarm	4	not deal with this in any detail, what must be remembered
5	and return to work. But we submit, with respect, that the	5	that this wasn't in fact a formal meeting. This was in
6	evidence leaders' conclusion that AMCU was attempting to	6	fact a – this all happened in the foyer of the LPD offices
7	exploit the situation is wrong, and I will attempt to	7	where, and it was recorded by Mr Kwadi but it was people
8	demonstrate that now.	8	sitting around in a foyer and having this discussion in
9	CHAIRPERSON: There's another point you	9	that context. Chair and Commissioners will recall that
10	must deal with as well, and that was whether Mr Mathunjwa's	10	when I cross-examined Mr Seedat on this, he was adamant
11	evidence initially as to why he only went to the koppie at	11	that he hadn't walked into a meeting but in fact he had. I
12	12 o'clock. What happened, what was the reason for the	12	was clear from the transcript. So this was not a formal
13	delay was, whether that evidence was truthful. Because you	13	meeting. It was a discussion between the parties. We
14	remember, the evidence was that for some reason that's not	14	point out that Mr Mathunjwa's statement does not, nor could
15	very clear to me, despite the fact that the transcript has	15	it be expected to record the full detail of every informal
16	been made available, the transcript of the discussion was	16	discussion that happened between the relevant parties
17	made available, he hadn't read it beforehand before he gave	17	during that week. So that's the first point.
18	evidence and it was only when he was confronted in cross-	18	The second point and the more fundamental point
19	examination with the transcript that other facts came to	19	is that we submit that Mr Mathunjwa does not, if one looks
20	light. That's an aspect you have to deal with as well.	20	at the evidence holistically he does not contradict himself
21	But of course the main point you make is that – twofold,	21	in this regard. So what he is adamant about is that he was
22	one is he wasn't – your argument is he wasn't asking for	22	not seeing bargaining rights for AMCU at Lonmin in the
23	bargaining rights, merely a presence, a right to	23	formal sense and we've pointed out in our heads of argumen
24	participate in the ad hoc forum. I think that's the first	24	that as a matter of law those could not be simply conferred
25	point you make, is it? And the other one is, whatever else	25	on him by Lonmin. And yet he gave clear evidence in that
	Page 39097		Page 39099
1	Page 39097 there is, is to his undying credit what he did at half past	1	Page 39099 regard. He said, "I know how that works. I know that they
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	there is, is to his undying credit what he did at half past three when he went on his bended knees and pleaded with them to leave the koppie. No one else did that.		regard. He said, "I know how that works. I know that they
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	Page 39100		Page 39102
1	evidence leaders failed to appreciate significantly, or	1	contended that there's any merit in this argument, and we
2	sufficiently the difference between seeking bargaining	2	submit that once they fall away there is no basis for the
3	rights and seeking to be part of a negotiated solution at	3	allegation.
4	Lonmin, and the evidence leaders make the following	4	If I might then deal briefly with the new
5	submission in their heads of argument, they say that – and	5	submission that appears in the heads of argument on behalf
6	it's important that I read it - they say, "We submit that	6	of our learned friend Mr Gumbi on behalf of Mr Lepaaku and
7	in view of the fact that AMCU did not challenge Mr Seedat's	7	Mr Baloyi. They make the submissions in paragraphs 106.13
8	evidence that one of the issues touched on during the brief	8	to 106.14 of their heads and they basically say that AMCU
9	discussion between him and Mr Mathunjwa was bargaining, the	9	and NUM are liable at law for the damage caused by their
10	Commission ought to make a finding that bargaining was	10	members during the strike, and we simply make the point
11	discussed that day."	11	here that first – they refer to quite a lot of case law in
12	Now we submit with respect that that's not	12	support of that and they start with the Constitutional
13	correct in the sense that Mr Seedat was indeed challenged	13	Court case of SATAWU versus Jarvis, which I think Mr Gumbi
14	on that in cross-examination. So the reference there is	14	referred to in his oral argument the other day. Now that
15	day 293, page 38379, line 25 to 38380, line 14, and I'm	15	of course is not applicable. That was a case in which
16	cross-examining Mr Seedat and I put it to him in terms	16	SATAWU had in fact arranged the gathering, and in fact all
17	that, I refer to the words that Mr Seedat uses, which were	17	the further cases that, the same difficulty arises in
18	"Give me a place at the bargaining table and I will get the	18	respect of all the further cases that they rely on.
19	workers off the koppie," and then I say, "Mr Mathunjwa has	19	They're all cases in which the union has in fact arranged
20	testified in the Commission that he did not use those words	20	the gathering, or has called the strike. That was not the
21	to you. Do you understand that?" and Mr Seedat says, "I	21	case here and so those cases cannot apply. So they don't
22	wasn't there but if he said it, yes okay." So that Mr	22	lay any basis in the body of their heads for their
23	Mathunjwa said that to Mr Seedat was clearly challenged in	23	submissions in this regard, but in any event, the case law
24	cross-examination.	24	that they rely on is inapplicable. So we submit that
25	It was put to Mr Seedat in his cross-examination	25	there's no merit in that.
	Page 39101		Page 39103
1	that in the informal discussion that he'd walked into,	1	COMMISSIONER TOKOTA: In fact in this
2	that in the informal discussion that he'd walked into, which he hadn't realised at the time, but two minutes	2	COMMISSIONER TOKOTA: In fact in this particular case the unions have distanced themselves from
2 3	that in the informal discussion that he'd walked into, which he hadn't realised at the time, but two minutes earlier, as appears from the transcript, Mr Mathunjwa had	2 3	COMMISSIONER TOKOTA: In fact in this particular case the unions have distanced themselves from the strike. So they were in no way involved. Instead they
2 3 4	that in the informal discussion that he'd walked into, which he hadn't realised at the time, but two minutes earlier, as appears from the transcript, Mr Mathunjwa had confirmed in his conversation with Mr Kwadi that what he	2 3 4	COMMISSIONER TOKOTA: In fact in this particular case the unions have distanced themselves from the strike. So they were in no way involved. Instead they were trying what they could do in order to avert the
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1	Page 39104 to make some submissions briefly in relation to Lonmin.	1	Page 39106
1 2	Lonmin spent a great deal of its argument yesterday seeking	1	take it you're going to deal with that? MS BARNES: Yes, Chair, we would submit
3	to justify its decision not to engage with the strikers.	2	that, you know, it wasn't a normal situation. It was a
4	Now we submit that it had a duty to engage by virtue of the	4	crisis. It required, it was an extraordinary situation
5	protocol, as Mr Burger termed it, and we've set out our	5	that required extraordinary action and that had to be
6	reasons for this, for our submission in this regard in	6	engagement in the circumstances. That's the one answer is
7	detail in our heads of argument. I'm not going to repeat	7	because it wasn't a normal situation, the normal rules and
8	them here, but we submit that even if that is wrong, that	8	procedures were no longer applicable. Something different
9	it acquired a duty to engage at the very latest by the 15th	9	had to be done and the obvious thing was for everybody to
10	of August when SAPS implored it to engage because 10 people	10	sit down and talk. The second answer is that that's what
11	had died and it was necessary in order to avert further	11	ultimately was done. Ultimately there was a structured
12	bloodshed, and that is essentially what General Mpembe says	12	engagement and that's how the problem was ultimately
13	in the meeting of the afternoon of the 15th of August. At	13	resolved, and I think, Chair, you pointed out yesterday
14	the very latest by that stage Lonmin had a duty to engage	14	that that didn't result in the collapse of collective
15	in our submission.	15	bargaining systems or –
16	CHAIRPERSON: Remember Mr Burger posed	16	CHAIRPERSON: To be fair, Mr Burger
17	the question, what was the source of the obligation to	17	replied, saying that was done under the shadow of, I'm not
18	negotiate, and I asked him for his submission, the question	18	sure whether he said 34 or 44, but under the shadow of a
19	whether the source was not a request from the police when	19	great tragedy which shocked the world, not just South
20	they were invited there to restore law and order. The	20	Africa, and you can understand people's attitude being
21	police say in order to do our job you must help us by	21	changed. I think that was his answer. I don't know how
22	negotiating, at least talking - perhaps negotiating is the	22	you deal with that.
23	wrong word, we'll fight about what that word means, but at	23	MS BARNES: Yes, of course our answer to
24	least talking to the strikers, and of course he didn't	24	that, Chair, is that 10 people had already died by the 15th
25	accept that proposition, but you say that it's a correct	25	and that was sufficient reason to engage in an
	Page 39105		Page 39107
1	proposition?	1	extraordinary process of engagement.
2	proposition? MS BARNES: Indeed, Chair. I mean one	2	extraordinary process of engagement. Chair and Commissioners, we submit thought that
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1	Page 39108	1	Page 391
1	sort of thing. So I'm not sure it's fair to say that	1	facie I have a difficulty and you understand it's my duty
2	Lonmin deliberately spread misinformation – I say	2	to put my difficulties to you.
3	deliberately spread misinformation that AMCU were behind	3	MS BARNES: Of course. Chair, the second
4	the strike and that it was because of the rivalry between	4	answer is, we deal with this in our heads of argument in
5	AMCU and NUM. I think, I mean it may be that I'm	5	some detail. We deal with what we call a campaign of
6	overlooking important factors which you'll obviously put to	6	misinformation by Lonmin in detail in our heads of argume
7	me, but –	7	and we draw the inference that because there's absolutely
8	MS BARNES: Chair, if I –	8	no evidence and none has ever been suggested of either
9	CHAIRPERSON: I wasn't aware of any	9	AMCU's involvement or of the cause of the strike being
10	evidence which indicated that Lonmin didn't believe it at	10	rivalry between the two unions, that the misinformation wa
11	the time. There is of course that bit about the recording	11	deliberate. There's been no answer to those allegations in
12	that they claimed to have which we never saw. I'm not sure	12	our heads either in replying heads from Lonmin or in oral
13	there's anything else, but anyway, but if there are other	13	argument. So the allegations we've made in that regard a
14	factors that you've got that are relevant in that then	14	unanswered by Lonmin. We simply make that point.
15	obviously you must give us.	15	Then Chair and Commissioners, Lonmin also spent
16	MS BARNES: Chair, two responses to that.	16	great deal of its argument contending that the -
17	The one is that, I mean during our cross-examination of the	17	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, can I just put a
18	Lonmin witnesses we went through the reasons why the strike	18	further point to you which flows from a point made to me
19	happened. I mean we went through the facts relating to	19	my colleague. The evidence as far as I recall seems to
20	Impala, the facts relating to RDOs at Lonmin being	20	indicate that the trouble, if one can call it that, started
21	underpaid, and I mean it's clear a story is told about how	21	at Impala and there certainly was rivalry between NUM an
22	the strike at Lonmin happened. Those facts were all	22	AMCU. NUM was seen to be ineffective and distracted
23	readily conceded to by in particular Mr Da Costa and Mr	23	perhaps by other concerns, not pushing the interests of th
24	Mokwena. They understood those facts and they were aware	24	workers as fully as they should have done. Whether that
25	of them at the time and they conceded that they were very	25	perception is correct isn't relevant for our purposes. And
2	concerned that because of what had happened at Impala the same thing could happen at Lonmin. There was never any	2	AMCU was certainly gaining ground there, and then now the was known to the people at Lonmin. Now if you then get a demand for a dramatically increased remuneration and the
3	suggestion by either of them that the true cause of the	3	demand for a dramatically increased remuneration and the
4	strike was somehow as a result of rivalry between the two	4	suspicion is that AMCU have got something to do with it,
5	unions. So there's never been any evidence to that effect	5	(a), because of what happened at Impala, and (b), because
6	from Lonmin, and ja, I mean in relation to the allegation	6	of the identity of some at least of the people who went to
7	that AMCU was behind the strike, I mean that we've dealt	7	see Mr Da Costa, it's not difficult to understand how
8	with earlier this morning. Again there's no evidence.	8	Lonmin could have come to suspect that what had played of
9	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, there was also	9	at Impala was being repeated at Lonmin. It was quite clear
10	some evidence as far as I can recall from Mr Da Costa to	10	I think that Lonmin was faced with a situation where AMCU
11	say that though the people at Karee said they were acting	11	was gaining ground. They gained ground dramatically at
	outside the confines of union activity, and though the	12	
12 13	people involved at Karee were both members of AMCU and	12 13	at Karee. If AMCU were gaining ground, NUM were on the
13 14	people involved at Karee were both members of AMCU and members of NUM, there was a suggestion that the	12 13 14	at Karee. If AMCU were gaining ground, NUM were on the retreat, there was obviously a campaign by AMCU, nothing
13 14 15	people involved at Karee were both members of AMCU and members of NUM, there was a suggestion that the representatives who came to see him, I think I'm correct in	12 13 14 15	at Karee. If AMCU were gaining ground, NUM were on the retreat, there was obviously a campaign by AMCU, nothing wrong with that, to get a situation where they have
13 14 15 16	people involved at Karee were both members of AMCU and members of NUM, there was a suggestion that the representatives who came to see him, I think I'm correct in saying were AMCU members and there was at least two of	12 13 14 15 16	at Karee. If AMCU were gaining ground, NUM were on the retreat, there was obviously a campaign by AMCU, nothing wrong with that, to get a situation where they have majority support and all the benefits that would flow from
13 14 15 16 17	people involved at Karee were both members of AMCU and members of NUM, there was a suggestion that the representatives who came to see him, I think I'm correct in saying were AMCU members and there was at least two of them. So there was a sort of insinuation perhaps, or a	12 13 14 15 16 17	at Karee. If AMCU were gaining ground, NUM were on the retreat, there was obviously a campaign by AMCU, nothing wrong with that, to get a situation where they have majority support and all the benefits that would flow from that. Now regard being had to those factors can one say
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		1	
1	Page 39112	1	Page 39114
1	honestly believe that. Whether it was reasonable, whether	1 2	CHAIRPERSON: That wasn't a very good
2 3	they had evidence to support the suspicion, those are different questions, but you see you've made quite a	2	answer. MS BARNES: That's the extent of the
4	serious allegation against Lonmin that they came up with	4	explanation for their suspicion. We submit that there is
5	these incorrect statements knowing them to be false.	5	none. What one also sees, Chair and Commissioners, is that
6	That's the point that I'm putting to you.	6	Lonmin in fact – they in fact attributed much of the
7	MS BARNES: Chair, I mean clearly	7	violence and even deaths to union rivalry. I mean we see
8	there's –	8	that in media statements that they issued. That
9	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: I'm sorry, before	9	information was then obviously handed over to the police.
10	you answer the question, can I just add to that, isn't	10	We see the same thing in exhibit L. We've referred to that
11	there evidence that the inter-union rivalry was very marked	11	in some detail in our heads of argument. One also sees in
12	after the dismissal and re-employment of thousands of	12	a speech given by Mr Farmer, he in fact attributes the 34
13	employees? Isn't that where –	13	deaths on the 16th of August 2012 to union rivalry in a
14	CHAIRPERSON: [Microphone off, inaudible]	14	speech that he gave just before his resignation. We submit
15	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Yes, at Karee.	15	that there's no basis for that. Can I move onto to my next
16	MS BARNES: Yes, of course there was	16	point?
17	union rivalry. We accept that. What we don't accept is	17	CHAIRPERSON: [Microphone off,
18	that there's any evidence that that was the cause of the	18	inaudible].
19	strike and if Lonmin believed that that –	19	MS BARNES: So the next point we want to
20	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, the question	20	make deals with the contention by Lonmin that the demand
21	doesn't relate to that. You know, with respect, you must	21	was non-negotiable and there we just want to make the point
22	answer –	22	that Lonmin haven't dealt at all with Mr Mathunjwa's
23	MS BARNES: But I think I'm getting to	23	uncontested evidence that when he spoke to the strikers on
24	the answer –	24	the 16th of August they in fact said to him and if I can
25	CHAIRPERSON: You must answer the	25	quote "They were aware that management might not have
	Page 39113		Page 39115
1	question that was put, not the question - I'm not being	1	R12 500 from the start, but that perhaps such a position
2	question that was put, not the question – I'm not being unkind. I mean I understand I'm being difficult really.	2	R12 500 from the start, but that perhaps such a position could be achieved through a process and over some time."
2 3	question that was put, not the question – I'm not being unkind. I mean I understand I'm being difficult really. It's the way, it's mores mea, but the point is not whether	2 3	R12 500 from the start, but that perhaps such a position could be achieved through a process and over some time." So that's in Mr Mathunjwa's statement, he repeats that in
2 3 4	question that was put, not the question – I'm not being unkind. I mean I understand I'm being difficult really. It's the way, it's mores mea, but the point is not whether there was evidence, the question is whether one can find	2 3 4	R12 500 from the start, but that perhaps such a position could be achieved through a process and over some time." So that's in Mr Mathunjwa's statement, he repeats that in his evidence here. And of course that's the feedback, it
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Page 39116 have realised that they wouldn't have to come up with 12 500 immediately, there was chance that the strikers would settle for less then we have to look at – but on the other hand they say what was the point of negotiating, it would have been an exercise in futility because they were resolute 12 500 or nothing and they couldn't come up with 12 500. That's part of their answer so one has to look at it from that point of view as well if one wants to evaluate the answer they put up. Isn't that correct? The answer – the correct one is yes it has to look at it what the answer is to further questions is something you'll deal with I take it. MS BARNES: Yes, yes, Chair. We simply want to make the point that whatever the strikers' position may have been before the 16th, it's not entirely clear in our submission from the evidence, but even if it was for	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Page 39118 the meeting between General Mbombo and Mr Mokwena, what you see there are three things. First of all you see an agreement that a hard line is going to be taken in relation to the strikers, and Mr Mokwena conceded this in answer to questions from Mr Chaskalson. So it was agreed between the two that a hard line would be taken, in other words there would be no negotiation with the strikers. The second thing one sees is that a police operation will be launched. It's a question of when. At that stage it was due to be launched on the Wednesday, and the third thing one sees is that despite, those two things are agreed upon essentially despite the fact that it is foreseen that there may be bloodshed. It's clear, General Mbombo says so in terms. So we submit then even if the term "collusion" is perhaps overstating the position, we submit it's not if one
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	the sake of argument resolute before then, then at the very least it had softened by the 16th and that was an opportunity for – further opportunity for engagement. CHAIRPERSON: Somebody, I think it may have been Mr Ramaphosa, but somebody certainly said that experience shows that in industrial negotiations, strikes and things of that sort strikers always draw a line or pretend to draw a line in the sand. But the problem is normally solved somewhere east or west of the line and not	<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	looks at the transcript and one looks at those three key issues upon which agreement was reached. Then in any event we submit that if one were to use the term "cooperation" instead of collusion one would still have a basis for accomplice liability. It's clear that SAPS and Lonmin cooperated with a view to launching the police operation and it's clear that they did so despite foreseeing that harm may result, and this is critical. So we know that both General Mbombo and General Mpembe foresaw harm and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Page 39117 on the line. MS BARNES: It's certainly not – CHAIRPERSON: Was it Mr Ramaphosa who said that? Someone said that. MS BARNES: It may have been. It's certainly not a reason not to negotiate in our submission. CHAIRPERSON: Ms Barnes, it's now half past ten, when it's convenient for you would you let me know and we'll take the adjournment? MS BARNES: This is a convenient time, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: 15 minutes. [COMMISSION ADJOURNES COMMISSION RESUMES] [10:47] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Ms Barnes. MS BARNES: Yes, thank you, Chair. If I might then make my final point and this relates to, I'd just like to elaborate on the basis on which we say that Lonmin, there may be criminal liability for Lonmin on an accomplice basis. We say in our heads of argument that Lonmin colluded with the police to break the strike and we don't use that term lightly. We don't use the term "colluded" lightly, It is considered. It means to come to	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Page 39119 indeed bloodshed and communicated this in the meetings to Mr Mokwena and the other Lonmin persons who were present. But what's also important to stress is that Mr Jamieson himself foresaw injury and possibly death arising as a result of the police operation, and we refer to the evidence in that regard at page 183 of our heads of argument where it of course arises out of Mr Jamieson's email, and this is as early as Tuesday the 14th of August 2012 where he says, "Although we are glad about the police operation there's always the worry that it goes wrong." And then he's cross-examined on that and it's put to him that based on that he foresaw the possibility that something could go wrong and that there might be injuries and possibly even deaths as a consequence of the police operation, and he says – I'm just reading – CHAIRPERSON: The passage is quoted at page 183 of your heads. MS BARNES: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: Where Mr Jamieson says, Mr Gotz puts to him the quotation, "Although we were glad about the police operation there is always the worry that it goes wrong." He asked him about that, and then he suggested they foresaw something going wrong and injuries
25	a secret understanding for a harmful purpose. We submit that if one looks at the transcript of	24 25	and possibly deaths. Jamieson says, "Yes, well what Mark had said on the phone was, you know, we have to be worried

1	Page 39120 here that this is, you know, maybe 2 or 3000 people who	1	Page 39122 the Lonmin people to realise that that would happen and
2	were armed. We've got a lot of police on site who are also	2	could it ever have been – let me put it this way; you
	armed, and whilst there's a plan in place that the police		
3		3	understand this is a prima facie point I'm putting to you
4	have, which is the police's call, it's not ours, that	4	to get your assistance, but was it reasonably foreseeable
5	sounds like a situation where things might go wrong where	5	on the part of the Lonmin people that the police would
6	you've got an angry group of people who are armed and one	6	impose a deadline the night before without even knowing
7	or other group of people who are intent on taking the arms	7	what the details of the plan were, whether the plan that
8	off them." It's clearly a situation that has the potential	8	was, really could be implemented on the Thursday in
9	to go wrong, but you would think that the police had	9	circumstances which they knew about, that in the result the
10	covered those eventualities. Now the plan that's been	10	police would have to knock together a plan with all the
11	talked about is the encirclement plan because that's clear	11	defects to which the evidence leaders have referred on the
12	from what the Provincial Commissioner said to discuss the	12	Thursday? Was it something which one can say that the
13	plan, remember there was, they used the wrong word in the	13	Lonmin people should have reasonable have foreseen that
14	original transcript, it's encirclement is agreed now to be	14	sort of thing might happen?
15	the correct term. But there was also the letter that Mr	15	MS BARNES: Chair, no, not that they
16	Ramaphosa got from the representative of his company on the	16	would have reasonably have foreseen what happened with
17	executive where she spoke about the police having a, ${\ensuremath{I}}$	17	regard to the NMF meeting, certainly not, but can I give
18	think she used the word "corral" if I remember correctly,	18	two answers; the first is that it's -
19	but certainly she was clearly talking about the same plan.	19	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, before you
20	So what the Lonmin people knew about was a plan, which was	20	answer, just let me finish. Remember what I put to you was
21	the so-called encirclement plan which was designed by the	21	it appears from the evidence that Lonmin knew about the
22	police to be as – I think I'm accurately summarising it –	22	first plan. They knew not necessarily the details, but
23	to be as risk-free as it was possible in the circumstances.	23	they knew there was a plan that had been worked out, this
24	They certainly don't appear to have had any inkling that	24	"corralling plan" I think is the way how it was described
25	that plan would be abandoned because it couldn't be	25	in the email that Mr Ramaphosa got. It's the encirclement
	Page 39121		Page 39123
1	Page 39121 implemented because of the decision made on the Wednesday	1	Page 39123 plan. So they knew the details of that. If that was a
1 2	5	1 2	<u> </u>
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## Marikana Commission of Inquiry

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1	Page 39124		Page 39126
1	point we submit is that both General Mpembe and General	1	presence we still have Mr Twala being killed. Now it's
2	Mbombo said there may well be blood. You need to talk.	2	probably a fair inference even without having regard to
3	That's what Mpembe said on Wednesday afternoon. You need	3	what Mr X said, that Mr Twala was killed because he was
4	to talk, otherwise there may be blood, and Mbombo said the	4	suspected of being a police informant and there may well
5	same thing to Mr Mokwena on Tuesday, and Lonmin still	5	have been – again we've got no basis for saying this is
6	refused to talk. So they must have been aware, with	6	correct or incorrect, but it's probably a fair assumption
7	respect, that the police operation, the details of which	7	that there might have been a few more informers on the
8	they couldn't have been certain of, carried a risk of	8	koppie, people from whom the police handlers were getting
9	bloodshed. The two generals told them that.	9	their information. So there was still an ongoing
10	CHAIRPERSON: Well, Mpembe's statement –	10	possibility that even if the strikers weren't killing other
11	sorry, yes, Mpembe's statement you rely on made to Zokwana	11	people, there might have been further Twala type deaths
12	was made in the context of not implementing the	12	after the Tuesday. Isn't that true?
13	encirclement plan, but talking about disarming a man on the	13	MS BARNES: Chair, yes, but it's
14	koppie who is armed with an axe and you've got a rifle.	14	difficult to understand what acting in a more pointed way
15	But certainly the passage in the transcript of the	15	could have referred to, given that there was now a big
16	conversation between General Mbombo and Mr Mokwena does	16	police presence, that the situation had been brought under
17	appear to support you.	17	control as far as it could, so we submit that the use of
18	MS BARNES: I'm really referring to the	18	that term in that context is highly questionable. That's
19	transcript of the meeting that was held on Wednesday	19	as far as we take it, but for that reason we say that Mr
20	afternoon that General Mpembe chaired and there's in fact,	20	Ramaphosa should be included in the list of people that are
21	I think there is, I think the appropriate, or the	21	investigated in relation to this issue.
22	applicable passage is in fact in our heads - I'll find it	22	We'd like to say in conclusion that we support
23	in a moment – where he specifically, he calls upon the	23	what the Legal Resources Centre has said on this issue, we
24	parties to talk in order to avoid further bloodshed. So it	24	align ourselves with their submissions, and we refer
25	must have been clear that if the matter couldn't be	25	specifically to page 174 and 175 of their heads where they
		1	
	Page 30125		Page 30127
1	Page 39125 resolved through negotiations and if the police operation	1	Page 39127 list the Lonmin executives that they say should be
1 2		1 2	
	resolved through negotiations and if the police operation		list the Lonmin executives that they say should be
2	resolved through negotiations and if the police operation had to be resorted to, there was a risk of bloodshed. I'll	2	list the Lonmin executives that they say should be investigated in this regard. We would add Mr Ramaphosa to
2 3	resolved through negotiations and if the police operation had to be resorted to, there was a risk of bloodshed. I'll find that passage in a moment, Chair.	2 3	list the Lonmin executives that they say should be investigated in this regard. We would add Mr Ramaphosa to that list for the reasons I've given, and then of course
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	Page 39128		Page 39130
1	MS BARNES: With respect, no. He says	1	relating to the police action, particularly at scene 1 on
	ere is this kind of plan where 3000 armed people on a	2	the 16th of August 2012.
	ppie who don't want to be disarmed and the police trying	3	[11:07] And I would like to present my submissions under
	disarm them has the potential to go wrong. So he does	4	four themes. The first theme is what we refer to as NUM's
	resee the risk of something going wrong in our	5	responsibility during the week of the 9th to the 16th of
	bmission.	6	August and what I'd like to address there is the allegation
7	COMMISSIONER TOKOTA: Mr Ramaphosa was	7	that - I beg your pardon 9 to 16 August 2012 and what I'd
	estioned quite a lot about the more pointed way. You	8	like to address there is the question of whether or not NUM
	ink we should reject his explanation to that?	9	can be considered to be blameless as it were because of the
10	MS BARNES: Commissioner Tokota, we	10	fact that there was no mandate that it had as a union to
	bmit that his explanation is difficult to understand in	11	take up the RDOs issue. The second theme that I'd like to
	lation to the timing of the more pointed way and for that	12	address are particular issues relating to the 11th of
	ason we say it's questionable, and his explanation is	13	August. Very little airtime has been given to those events
	satisfactory because of when he said it. If he'd used	14	during the proceedings thus far and I fear, with respect,
	e same words a few days earlier the situation might be	15	there are certain issues that need to be or facts that need
	ferent, but he was asking for additional more pointed	16	to be corrected in relation to the events of the 11th of
	tion at a time when the situation had been brought under ntrol. That we submit is worrying.	17 18	August. And what I'm referring to there in particular is what happens when the crowd of strikers reaches the NUM
19	COMMISSIONER TOKOTA: Ja, but the	10	office and there's the shooting by the NUM officials. My
	cidents of death occurred on Thursday. Would you say he	20	third theme, as I've indicated, is turning to SAPS and its
	d foreseen that in the light of the fact that he was	20	conduct particularly in relation to the 16th of August and
	ranging a meeting for a Friday?	22	my fourth theme is really to sweep up a couple of
23	MS BARNES: Chair, we simply say that he	23	additional residual issues and I'd like to deal with two
	ould be investigated together with the other Lonmin	24	matters there. One is a submission by NUM in relation to
	ecutives on this issue because he did of course act in	25	the policy of centralised bargaining and the final issue is
	Page 39129		Page 39131
	capacity as a Lonmin director.	1	again a submission by NUM in relation to how one must view
2	s capacity as a Lonmin director. If I might just refer finally, Chair and	2	again a submission by NUM in relation to how one must view the composition of the strikers on the 16th of August at the
2 3 Co	s capacity as a Lonmin director. If I might just refer finally, Chair and mmissioner, to – it's on page 46 of our heads and this is	2 3	again a submission by NUM in relation to how one must view the composition of the strikers on the 16th of August at the koppie. Can I preface my remarks and my address by making
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1	Page 39132	1	Page 39134
1	as well as the evidence leaders' argument is that because	1	agreement was a fundamentally incorrect one. And the
2 3	of the fact that the workers at an early stage had rejected	2 3	reason for that of course was that the two year wage
4	NUM's involvement in the raising of the demand and in those	4	agreement could be varied by agreement – CHAIRPERSON: I don't see you quoting the
4 5	circumstances NUM had no mandate to take the demand up. This meant that NUM was effectively entitled to remain	4 5	relevant passage in your heads at this point and maybe it
	completely uninvolved and must be found by this Commission,		
6		6 7	will be elsewhere, but the passage in the heads said that
7	as it were, blameless for the subsequent events. Chair,	8	every demand that was raised that's not dealt with in the
8	with respect to the evidence leaders and my learned friends	9	agreement is regarded as having been settled. And it then went on to say that accordingly it's not possible for the
9	for the NUM, we do not agree that NUM cannot be faulted	9 10	
10 11	because it had no mandate from the RDOs. And we		employees to engage in strike action in support of such
12	respectfully submit that in fact a large portion of the responsibility for what happened must be attributed to the	11 12	demands. But it was made quite clear by Mr Zokwana, not
13	fact that NUM took an incorrect and largely indefensible	12	that we suspect that we needed his assistance, but in fact
14			it was welcome all the same, that that didn't prevent the union from going back to the employer and saying look here
15	position in key meetings just prior to the commencement of the strike. And may I refer the Commissioners in that	14 15	we know we can't strike, but we have got the right to
16	regard to page 112 of our heads of argument where we cite a	16	engage you on the matter. The agreement can even be
17	witness statement, a paragraph in the witness statement of	17	amended, there have been precedents in the past where
18	Mr Setelele which is exhibit YY1, paragraph 4. What Mr	18	points of that kind arose, there was a dramatic increase on
19	Setelele says and I'd like to emphasise certain portions of	19	one occasion in the inflation rate and the inflationary
20	this paragraph is that the issue of this demand by the RDOs	20	increase was way out of line with the actual inflation.
21	was discussed at various meetings by the NUM branches in	21	Newman went back to the employer and the employer accepted
22	Lonmin and NUM's position was consistently put forward in	22	the point as a sound one and amended the agreement. So
23	these meetings, namely, that the wages of the RDOs was	23	there was no reason why NUM couldn't have gone to Lonmin
24	covered in the two year collective agreement that had been	24	and said look here we know you wouldn't accept the RDOs
25	concluded. But it was a breach of this agreement for the	25	demand at the time, but things have changed. Look what
	-		
	Page 39133		Page 39135
1	RDOs to raise fresh demands during the term of that	1	happened at Impala, look at what happened at Amplats.
2	agreement and NUM was opposed to an unprotected strike.	2	MR GOTZ: Yes indeed, Chair.
^	Now, Commissioners, during the course of Mr Setelele's		
3		3	CHAIRPERSON: And the fact – again this
4	cross-examination the Chairperson established, through his	3 4	CHAIRPERSON: And the fact – again this is something I shall have to put to Mr Tip, but it's not
	cross-examination the Chairperson established, through his own cross-examination, very effectively, two fundamental		CHAIRPERSON: And the fact – again this is something I shall have to put to Mr Tip, but it's not entirely realistic to say they didn't raise it because they
4 5 6	cross-examination the Chairperson established, through his own cross-examination, very effectively, two fundamental points.	4	CHAIRPERSON: And the fact – again this is something I shall have to put to Mr Tip, but it's not entirely realistic to say they didn't raise it because they didn't have a mandate. If they'd realised that it wouldn't
4 5 6 7	cross-examination the Chairperson established, through his own cross-examination, very effectively, two fundamental points. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Gotz, I was going to get	4 5 6 7	CHAIRPERSON: And the fact – again this is something I shall have to put to Mr Tip, but it's not entirely realistic to say they didn't raise it because they didn't have a mandate. If they'd realised that it wouldn't be a breach of the agreement, if they also realised that
4 5 6 7 8	cross-examination the Chairperson established, through his own cross-examination, very effectively, two fundamental points. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Gotz, I was going to get some praise from Mr Ramphele, but I didn't get it because I	4 5 6 7 8	CHAIRPERSON: And the fact – again this is something I shall have to put to Mr Tip, but it's not entirely realistic to say they didn't raise it because they didn't have a mandate. If they'd realised that it wouldn't be a breach of the agreement, if they also realised that they had the monopoly of bargaining rights in respect of
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		1	
1	Page 39136 Chair, for Mr Zokwana's statements are that miners were	1	Page 39138 the RDOs would be taken up by the NUM. And with this
2	aware that changes could be made to the agreement. That	2	concept –
3	can be found on day 46, at page 5027 of the transcript and	3	CHAIRPERSON: - go further than that, by
4	it's lines 10 to 23 and an easy reference for this is also	4	the only union which had negotiating rights in respect of
5	NUM's heads of argument at paragraph 157.	5	increases in the mining. Because of the structure of the
6	CHAIRPERSON: What page are you reading?	6	agreement between or the content rather of the agreement
7	MR GOTZ: Sorry, Chair, I'm giving you	7	between NUM and Lonmin NUM had a monopoly from the
8	the references for the point that my made about Zokwana,	8	employees of negotiating rights and if they didn't choose
9	I'm not sure that they are in our heads –	9	to exercise them there was no-one who had the power under
10	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Tip gets [inaudible]	10	the various collective agreements to do that. Isn't that
11	NUM. I want to say that your heads I must say I find very	11	right? I'm sorry that takes the submission further than
12	helpful. They address most of the pertinent passages in	12	you want to take it, but prima facie it seems to be
13	the record for us. With regard being had to the fact that	13	correct.
14	there can be something like 40 000 pages at the end, any	14	MR GOTZ: Indeed, Chair, what we say is
14	help in the labyrinth that we get from counsel is	15	that indeed created a responsibility not only to its own
16	gratefully received. And certainly you've given us a lot	16	members, but of course to all of the RDOs at Lonmin because
17	of help for which it's appropriate for me to thank you.	17	it alone had the right to bargain on their behalf and of
18	MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair. Chair, just	18	course AMCU did not have the bargaining rights. And Chair,
19	to emphasise the point that NUM, of course, was at the time	19	in addition –
20	fully aware of the fact that the RDOs were underpaid and	20	CHAIRPERSON: It's not only that, even
20	indeed at the conclusion of the 2011 wage negotiations was	20	the non-unionised workers didn't have those rights either,
22	so concerned about the failure to achieve a differential	22	isn't that so?
22	increase for the Lonmin RDOs that it warned that the	23	MR GOTZ: Indeed, Chair and we would say
24	situation was a ticking time bomb. That factor, coupled	24	finally that this constituted a failure to properly
25	with the fact that the wage could in these sorts of	25	represent the interests of the RDOs in circumstances where
20		20	
	Page 39137		Page 39139
1	Page 39137 circumstances be varied by agreement, we submit those are	1	Page 39139 they knew that the situation was a ticking time bomb. Now,
1 2		1 2	•
	circumstances be varied by agreement, we submit those are		they knew that the situation was a ticking time bomb. Now,
2	circumstances be varied by agreement, we submit those are two undisputed facts which must be seen in or must form the	2	they knew that the situation was a ticking time bomb. Now, Chair, that finding –
2 3	circumstances be varied by agreement, we submit those are two undisputed facts which must be seen in or must form the backdrop of evaluating the impact of NUM's position that	2 3	they knew that the situation was a ticking time bomb. Now, Chair, that finding – CHAIRPERSON: So all you're asking us
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1	Page 39140 probabilities. Chair, we do not make the submission that	1	Page 39142 [11:26] So it was topic for discussion yet it did nothing
1 2	that leads to any form of delictual or criminal	2	to facilitate the obtaining of $a - did nothing to$
3	responsibility on the part of NUM. It's a simply a	3	facilitate obtaining a mandate from the RDOs.
4	submission that under the terms of reference it must bear	4	CHAIRPERSON: To be fair the problem
5	the responsibility for its failure to properly represent	5	appears to be that they misunderstood or misinterpreted the
6	the RDOs under those circumstances. Chair, may then I turn	6	terms of the agreement. So they thought the door was
7	to -	7	closed. They thought there was nothing they could do.
8	MR TOKOTA SC: Sorry, Mr Gotz, do I	8	That's why they said, there's nothing we can do, we must
9	understand, I just want to clear up my mind, do I	9	wait until the agreement expires and take it up again then.
10	understand you to be saying that NUM should have taken it	10	So their mistake or failure or omission or whatever the
11	upon itself to do the negotiations on behalf of the RDOs	11	appropriate word is, was apparently brought about by a
12	for this 12 500?	12	failure to interpret their agreement correctly, and that
13	MR GOTZ: Mr Tokota, I put it no,	13	would be corrected.
14	Commissioner Tokota, I put it no higher than this, if NUM	14	MR GOTZ: Yes Chair, with this gloss, I
15	had not articulated this position at a meeting and instead	15	would with respect submit that misunderstanding was a
16	adopted the position which we submit it ought to, that	16	negligent one, in circumstance where even Mr Zokwana says
17	these were extraordinary circumstances, prior to the strike	17	that the NUM officials and indeed the NUM membership is
18	having started in which RDOs were underpaid. And then in	18	aware that these agreements can be varied and indeed have
19	which circumstances where they had been told expressly that	19	been varied in the past. The position Mr Setelele says was
20	the RDOs were heading for an unprotected strike what it	20	articulated and taken by the NUM officials at Lonmin,
21	ought to have done under those circumstances was said to	21	mistaken as it may be, was nevertheless a one that was
22	the RDOs but we can in fact take your cause up and have a	22	borne of negligence, if not gross negligence, with respect
23	variation, possibly a negotiation with Lonmin with a view	23	Chair.
24	to varying the two year wage agreement. And it's failure	24	Chair, may I then turn to my second theme which
25	to do that, it's principled -	25	is a range of submissions in relation to the 11th of August
1	Page 39141	1	Page 39143
1	CHAIRPERSON: It's not as simple as that.	1	and there are really four topics under that theme. The
2	CHAIRPERSON: It's not as simple as that. NUM have said and I think it's quite clear from evidence,	2	and there are really four topics under that theme. The first topic that I want to address briefly is the issue of
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2 3 4	CHAIRPERSON: It's not as simple as that. NUM have said and I think it's quite clear from evidence, they only act on mandates from their members. So you'd have to further with the submission, I'm not saying it	2 3 4	and there are really four topics under that theme. The first topic that I want to address briefly is the issue of the time of the incident. The Chairperson, during a debate with my learned friend Ms Pillay on the first day of
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	Page 39144		Page 39146
1	hospital. Let me indicate again that that is in relation	1	information will be entirely in accordance with your
2	to an entry for 09:03 on the morning of the 11th of August.	2	submissions.
3	The first piece of evidence is indeed the Lonmin log book	3	MR GOTZ: Indeed Chair. Might I mention
4	which has a variety of entries which indicate that the	4	that what I am dealing with is the objective evidence which
5	attack or the incident occurred prior to 9am. On the 11th	5	supports the proposition that it happened before 9 a.m.
6	of August on exhibit EEEE19A there's an entry for 9am which	6	And this is the first of five pieces of evidence that I
7	says that Frans Mabalini reports a person shot at Wonderkop	7	will refer to.
8	Hostel. There's an entry for 09:08 which says that Frans	8	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but it's all subject
9	reports a person being shot inside the hostel next to the	9	to the possible problem that there were entries made in the
10	Shagan offices. And then there's an entry for 09:36 which	10	Lonmin occurrence book after the event, that the time was
11	talks about medics transporting one patient to the Andrew	11	incorrectly recorded. It may be correctly recorded but
12	Saffy Hospital with one gunshot wound in the lower back.	12	there's a problem. But the AVL records will indicate one
		12	
13	Those entries, Chair, undoubtedly relate to the times when		hopes with great accuracy. You see one of our problems is,
14	Lonmin Security personnel found the two victims of the NUM	14	Mr Mabuyakhulu in a passage to the evidence which you
15	shooting, and as I have indicated those bodies or those	15	quoted at the top of page 123, says "on the 11th at 9
16	people were found at 9 a.m. and 09:08 respectively.	16	o'clock we met at Wonderkop and we exchanged views. It was
17	CHAIRPERSON: The entries in the	17	then decided that we should approach" – so there is
18	occurrence book?	18	evidence the other way apart from the evidence – there's
19	MR GOTZ: In the Lonmin logbook, yes.	19	evidence the other way that he approached the office was
20	CHAIRPERSON: It's Lonmin occurrence	20	followed on a meeting at Wonderkop, I think reading the
21	book.	21	statement where the matter was discussed, so there's
22	MR GOTZ: Although –	22	evidence on either side of the line, but hopefully the AVL
23	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it occurred to me, I	23	material which Mr Bham is going to give us, get us, will
24	just put something to you –	24	put the matter beyond dispute.
25	MR GOTZ: Yes?	25	MR GOTZ: Indeed Chair. May I mention
	Page 39145		Page 39147
1	Page 39145 CHAIRPERSON: - it occurs to me there is	1	Page 39147 the evidence, it is evidence which is outside of the Lonmin
1 2		1 2	5
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## Marikana Commission of Inquiry

1	Page 39148	1	Page 39150
1	Chair, that the – that Brigadier Calitz testified that in,	1	firearm, and went outside to confront the strikers. The
2	when he arrived he received an email which he then	2	stated reason for that Chair, is – was in order to protect
3	forwarded onto the NATJOC which was described – which had	3	their property. Chair, let me emphasise that of course the
4	described the situation at the time and in paragraph 27 of	4	offices themselves were not owned by the NUM. They were
5	his witness statement he quotes that email which he	5	offices that were provided by Lonmin. We do accept though
6	forwarded on and he records that the incident occurred at	6	that it may have contained contents belonging to NUM inter
7	08:30 a.m. in his witness statement. And then finally,	7	alia files which would obviously be property –
8	Chair, there is the objective evidence of the video camera	8	CHAIRPERSON: It contained the records of
9	218 which is a taxi rank dome camera which is exhibit X1	9	the branch.
10	and the time on that camera Chair, records the time as the	10	MR GOTZ: Yes indeed.
11	group of NUM members are seen returning to their offices	11	CHAIRPERSON: And those records,
12	after the incident. The time is recorded at 09:34 but it's	12	presumably part of the ongoing operations of the Union
13	important to note that Mr Dirk Botes gave evidence that he	13	would have been important.
14	had checked the variances between the times of the various	14	MR GOTZ: Chair, the essential question
15	CCTV cameras and had found that the variance between camera	15	is given the fact that the stated intent was to go out to
16	218 and actual time was 26 minutes. In other words, that	16	confront the strikers with a view to protecting the
17	this camera was running 26 minutes ahead of time. So what	17	property, what are the legal principles that are at play in
18	we can conclude from that is that the time when the NUM	18	these sort of circumstances? And we've referred in our
19	officials returned to their offices after the incident was	19	heads of argument as has my learned friends, our learned
20	at 09:08 and Chair, that's what we would submit is five	20	friends for NUM to the Van Wyk case where it is emphasised
21	independent sources of evidence which would corroborate the	21	that taking action which could potentially lead to the
22 23	indications in the Lonmin log book that the incident	22 23	deaths of other people in defence of property is only
23 24	actually did take place before 9am notwithstanding what		justified in very exceptional circumstances and we've set
24 25	some of the witnesses that have testified may have put the time at. And Chair, we says that this is a matter of some	24 25	out the principles. In the Van Wyk case it was found that those were exceptional circumstances but inter alia because
20		23	mose were exceptional circumstances but inter and because
	Page 39149		Page 39151
1	importance largely because of the suspicion that the	1	of the fact that a clear warning had been given that if the
2	strikers armed themselves inter alia with pangas from Mr	2	person who sought to invade the property committed to their
3	Cassim's shop which as you know, only opened at 9am prior	3	intended course, there was a firearm on the other side of
4	to the march to the NUM offices. We submitted in our heads	4	the door which could have lethal consequences if they
5	of argument that we submitted that in fact the arming of	5	pursued that action. And that establishes the principle
6	the strikers with inter alia dangerous weapons such as	6	Chair, that in these circumstances this sort of conduct is
7	pangas was in fact a response to what they perceived as	7	exceptional and at the very least, what one is expected of
8	having been an attack on them as a consequence of the –	8	the person who is acting in defence of the property must
9	following the march.	9	take clear steps to indicate that essentially lethal
10	Chair, let me deal briefly with some of the	10	consequences might result, and the Van Wyk case goes as far
11	issues relating to the actual incident. We know from the	11	as to suggest that the invader must be told or informed in
12	evidence that approximately 2 to 3 000 people marked	12	some way that there is a lethal weapon in the possession of
13	towards the offices. We know also that there was a rumour	13	the party.
14		14	CHAIRPERSON: And of course, the facts of
14	that was started and we've set out in our heads of argument		
15	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we	15	that case were very special. I am not sure that the
	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where	15 16	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general
15	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be	15	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk
15 16 17 18	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be very reluctant to find with certainty that the rumour was	15 16 17 18	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk case was a case of spring gun. The shopkeeper was troubled
15 16 17	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be very reluctant to find with certainty that the rumour was in fact true. A rumour was started that the – that they	15 16 17 18 19	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk case was a case of spring gun. The shopkeeper was troubled with all sorts of, with burglaries and so forth. He had
15 16 17 18 19 20	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be very reluctant to find with certainty that the rumour was in fact true. A rumour was started that the – that they were on their way to the NUM offices with a violent intent,	15 16 17 18 19 20	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk case was a case of spring gun. The shopkeeper was troubled with all sorts of, with burglaries and so forth. He had set up the spring gun in his shop so if anyone came in, the
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be very reluctant to find with certainty that the rumour was in fact true. A rumour was started that the – that they were on their way to the NUM offices with a violent intent, that being to burn the offices down. Chair, what's also	15 16 17 18 19 20 21	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk case was a case of spring gun. The shopkeeper was troubled with all sorts of, with burglaries and so forth. He had set up the spring gun in his shop so if anyone came in, the spring would be activated and the gun would go off. So he
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be very reluctant to find with certainty that the rumour was in fact true. A rumour was started that the – that they were on their way to the NUM offices with a violent intent, that being to burn the offices down. Chair, what's also clear from the evidence is that upon receiving this	<ol> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> </ol>	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk case was a case of spring gun. The shopkeeper was troubled with all sorts of, with burglaries and so forth. He had set up the spring gun in his shop so if anyone came in, the spring would be activated and the gun would go off. So he had ample time to give a warning, in fact the suggestion
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<ol> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	the evidence that this was effectively a rumour, and we make the submission that being a rumour from which – where the source cannot be identified, this Commission will be very reluctant to find with certainty that the rumour was in fact true. A rumour was started that the – that they were on their way to the NUM offices with a violent intent, that being to burn the offices down. Chair, what's also clear from the evidence is that upon receiving this information from the Lonmin security guards, the 30 or so	<ol> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> </ol>	principle you are relying on now is necessarily of general application for every situation. You remember the Van Wyk case was a case of spring gun. The shopkeeper was troubled with all sorts of, with burglaries and so forth. He had set up the spring gun in his shop so if anyone came in, the spring would be activated and the gun would go off. So he had ample time to give a warning, in fact the suggestion was he did but problems about the language of the warning

1	Page 39152	1	Page 39154
1	his property, that he may be entitled to protect himself or	1	themselves were all that could have been done by way of a
2	rather, protect his property without giving a warning if	2	warning. There could have been a shouted warning as well.
3	there wasn't reasonable time to do so, if his right to	3	MR GOTZ: Indeed. Indeed, Chair, and
4	protect the property is one which is sufficiently important	4	this must of course, we have also referred in our heads of
5	to trump the rights of the assailant, potential thieves,	5	argument to the evidence that in fact what the two Lonmin
6	robbers. So the passage in Van Wyk's case which requires	6	security guards witnessed was in their words NUM officials
7	an adequate warning may well be based on the facts of that	7	pouncing on the strikers, coupled with the evidence of Mr
8	case with the spring gun set up long in advance. But of	8	Gegeleza which we submit is indicative of his state of mind
9	course I am not sure we want to go down that avenue for the	9	at the relevant time. But he was at that point not quite
10	purposes of this Commission because as far as I can recall	10	certain whether a fight would in fact ensue and we've
11	the evidence was that the relevant shots were fired when	11	referred to those passages in our heads of argument.
12	the strikers were about 30 metres away from the offices, so	12	CHAIRPERSON: There's also an entry
13	they would have had as I see it prima facie, what Mr Tip's	13	somewhere which indicates that those Lonmin security
14	going to say, the NUM people had the opportunity to fire	14	officers mightn't have been quite as candid about their own
15	warning shots perhaps one or two, and it may well be that	15	involvement at that stage as one would have hoped, and
16	once the strikers had seen the NUM people weren't going to	16	there's a suggestion, and maybe no more than that, that
17	abandon the office, they were going to stand there and	17	they may also have been involved in something. So one has
18	defend it, and they were armed with firearms waving	18	to treat their evidence with a fair degree of caution also,
19	firearms, they might well have decided that discretion was	19	but anyway, it seems that the essential facts which you
20	the better course of valour and to have departed. So I am	20	require for your argument I would have thought capable of
21	not sure we've got to go down that route but what I am	21	being established without going into those other byways and
22	saying to you is the proposition you state here in	22	side alleys which might cause difficulty if more closely
23	paragraph 26.8 may not a statement of general application,	23	calibrated factual findings were required.
24	but you more or less imply that in the way you phrase that	24	MR GOTZ: Yes, indeed. Chair, may I make
25	paragraph you red.	25	two final points on this very quickly. It is notable,
25		25	
	Page 39153		Page 39155
1	5		
	MR GOTZ: Yes indeed, Chair, and we would	1	Chair, that we have to rely on the evidence of Mr Gegeleza
2	submit that the principle that emerges from the Van Wyk	1 2	Chair, that we have to rely on the evidence of Mr Gegeleza in this regard who neither pulled the trigger in the
2 3		_	
	submit that the principle that emerges from the Van Wyk	2	in this regard who neither pulled the trigger in the
3	submit that the principle that emerges from the Van Wyk case, that taking action in defence of property which could	2 3	in this regard who neither pulled the trigger in the circumstances, was in fact some distance away from the
3 4	submit that the principle that emerges from the Van Wyk case, that taking action in defence of property which could potentially lead to loss of life is only justified in	2 3 4	in this regard who neither pulled the trigger in the circumstances, was in fact some distance away from the person who pulled the trigger, and indeed who testified at
3 4 5	submit that the principle that emerges from the Van Wyk case, that taking action in defence of property which could potentially lead to loss of life is only justified in exceptional circumstances is of general application and that my learned friends for the NUM have correctly referred	2 3 4 5	in this regard who neither pulled the trigger in the circumstances, was in fact some distance away from the person who pulled the trigger, and indeed who testified at the relevant time that he was not certain that a fight would ensue. What we do not have either in the form of a
3 4 5 6	submit that the principle that emerges from the Van Wyk case, that taking action in defence of property which could potentially lead to loss of life is only justified in exceptional circumstances is of general application and that my learned friends for the NUM have correctly referred to the Walters case which is a Constitutional Court	2 3 4 5 6	in this regard who neither pulled the trigger in the circumstances, was in fact some distance away from the person who pulled the trigger, and indeed who testified at the relevant time that he was not certain that a fight would ensue. What we do not have either in the form of a witness statement and certainly not in the form of oral
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	Page 39156		Page 39158
1	were –	1	[12:11] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Mr
2	CHAIRPERSON: Remember I wouldn't allow	2	Gotz.
3	the witnesses to mention the person's name. They did know	3	MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair. Chair, just
4	who it was, but I rightly or wrongly thought it a matter	4	to indicate that I hope to be done in approximately 20
5	the police can investigate in due course. I didn't think	5	minutes, just for the sake of those people who -
6	it would be sensible in the circumstances to insist upon	6	CHAIRPERSON: While we're busy with that,
7	that answer being given. So that may well be a reason why	7	Mr Ntsebeza came to see me, he's looking very worried about
8	we haven't got a statement, but the point you make of	8	the fact that what we, the question of time, what we did
9	course is correct that whatever the reason was, the fact	9	was we allocated the whole day to you and the families to
10	that the shooter didn't come forward and explain the	10	divide up among yourselves and the purpose of the hearing
11	circumstances of the shooting does hamper to some extent	11	of course is for main points to be highlighted and really
12	the work of the Commission. But I would have thought that	12	for questions to be put by the Commissioners to counsel so
13	in the light of the submissions you made we can probably	13	that they can deal with them. That's the purpose of it.
14	make the findings that have to be made for the present	14	The main argument is the written argument and that's, and
15	purposes despite that, but that's a matter we have to look	15	you obviously appreciated that, that's why you and indeed
16	at later.	16	the families have submitted very full and helpful
17	MR GOTZ: Indeed, Chair. The final point	17	arguments. But there is concern on the part of Mr Ntsebeza
18	is this, is that there is really no dispute that what	18	that his time is being eaten into and of course this
19	happened subsequently is that the NUM officials then	19	Commission's capacity to sit comes to an end at the end of,
20	pursued the fleeing strikers through the gap known as "Stop	20	on Friday. So the reason I raise this is that if necessary
21	Nonsense" and as Mr Mabuyakhulu says in his evidence in an	21	<ul> <li>perhaps you must tell me now, perhaps I must ask Mr</li> </ul>
22	uncontested piece of evidence, he was severely assaulted	22	Ntsebeza. You've got 20 minutes, you say, that you want.
23	and lost consciousness, and we set out in our heads of	23	Mr Ntsebeza, do you want me to adjourn at lunchtime until
24	argument the authorities which indicate that that sort of	24	half past 1, at least it will give you an extra quarter of
25	subsequent pursuit is not something that can fall under the	25	an hour?
	Dago 20157		
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1	more dangerous weapons. And Chair, that is significant	1	Chair, then may I turn to issues relating to
2	because we submit that one aspect with respect that has	2	SAPS, and here I intend to be relatively brief. We really
3	been overlooked is that the law relating to the carrying of	3	seek to address one, or two contentions, contentious issues
4	dangerous weapons has in fact recently undergone a slight	4	in relation to what occurred at scene 1 on the 16th of
5	evolution. The Gatherings Act, the Regulation of	5	August 2012.
6	Gatherings Act now provides in section 8(4) that no	6	We do say that the facts in relation to scene 1,
7	participant of a gathering may have in his or her	7	the factual, what actually happened is largely at this
8	possession any dangerous weapon as defined in the Dangerous	8	point well established, if not common cause, and we in our
9	Weapons Act, and that is made a criminal offence.	9	heads of argument have not sought to refer extensively to
10	But that amendment to section 8, or that	10	the evidence in relation to that issues, but we merely do
11	provision of section 8(4) of the Regulation of Gatherings	11	point out that we align ourselves with the factual
12	Act was not in fact in force at the time. At the relevant	12	submissions that are made in relation to, in the heads of
13	time the provision of the Regulation of Gatherings Act read	13	argument of the families, the South African Human Rights
14	somewhat differently and I'll read it to the Commissioners.	14	Commission, the injured and arrested persons, and of course
15	It said, "Participants at a gathering shall abide by any	15	the evidence leaders.
16	law in respect of the carrying of dangerous weapons." So	16	But there is one aspect where we do part company
17	unlike the current position which makes it a prohibition,	17	with the evidence leaders and that is the issue of whether
18	the provision merely said "shall abide by any law," and	18	the alignment of the Nyalas at scene 1 was a product of
19	therefore what one needs to do is to look elsewhere, to	19	intention on the part of any person, or as we understand
20	effectively the Dangerous Weapons Act of 1968, in order to	20	the evidence leaders to be submitting, it was the
21	determine what the position is, and as we – well, we will	21	unfortunate consequence of disorder in the conduct of SAPS
22	provide this note for you afterwards, but as we indicate	22	and not as a consequence of any intention, and we do with
23	there in the 1968 act the relevant provision says that,	23	respect disagree with that submission on behalf of the
24	"Any person who is in possession of any dangerous weapon	24	evidence leaders.
25	commits an offence unless he is able to prove that he at no	25	Can I highlight this point, Chair; the evidence
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1	time had any intention of using such weapon or object for	1	leaders have characterised the argument that is being made
1 2	time had any intention of using such weapon or object for any unlawful purpose."	1 2	leaders have characterised the argument that is being made on behalf of the families, they don't mention AMCU, but
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## Marikana Commission of Inquiry

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1	Page 39164	1	Page 39166 MR GOTZ: Chair, what we say –
1	he heard on the radio was that Brigadier Calitz was giving orders. Eventually he says that those orders were to	2	CHAIRPERSON: Can we make a finding on
2	engage, but in the course of that he refers to the evidence	2	that?
4	of – he refers to hearing on the radio Brigadier Calitz	4	MR GOTZ: Chair, it must be borne in mind
5	giving an order for the Nyalas to come into some form of	5	that these sort of things are effectively what SAPS does on
6	formation and that evidence is then corroborated – perhaps	6	a day-to-day basis, these sort of things are the product of
7	I can give you the reference for that –	7	training exercises. Nyalas are placed in a particular
8	CHAIRPERSON: You're quoting from	8	formation in order to direct protesters in a particular
9	paragraph 41.11 of your heads –	9	direction and we illustrated that with reference to the POP
10	MR GOTZ: Yes, indeed.	10	training manuals in relation to block. So what we submit
11	CHAIRPERSON: - at page 188.	11	is that when Brigadier Calitz says block, when he gives
12	MR GOTZ: Indeed, and then of course Mr	12	orders that they must move up into a particular formation
13	Botes when I cross-examined him gave confirmation of that.	13	the end result, that crescent that one has seen in various
14	I put it to him directly, "Did you hear Brigadier Calitz	14	diagrams, the simple submission is that is a product of
15	giving orders for the Nyalas to come into formation?" and	15	Brigadier Calitz directing and ordering the Nyalas to move
16	he accepted that he had heard that. His only point of	16	into that position.
17	disagreement with Brigadier Calitz was that he hadn't heard	17	CHAIRPERSON: I must confess I read it
18	Papa signs being used but had actually heard Brigadier	18	the other way and I have serious concerns about it. I
19	Calitz referring to drivers and commanders by name. So	19	don't know what the answer is. I thought the order he gave
20	both Lieutenant-Colonel Scott and Mr Botes testified that	20	was block and I couldn't, and if that had been done and
21	they heard Brigadier Calitz giving the orders for the	21	there had been a block we wouldn't have had the problems we
22	Nyalas to come into some form of formation, and given the	22	had and I couldn't understand, and I still don't quite
23	timing of when those orders were given we submit that the	23	understand why there wasn't a, the Nyalas weren't put in a
24	conclusion is inescapable that Brigadier Calitz was at the	24	block formation which would have prevented the front group
25	relevant time directing the Nyalas to move forward and come	25	of the strikers from advancing to their deaths.
1	Page 39165	1	Page 39167
1	into a particular formation.	1	MR GOTZ: Well, Chair, but it –
2	into a particular formation. There one has the answer to the question of	2	MR GOTZ: Well, Chair, but it – CHAIRPERSON: So I just put that to you
2 3	into a particular formation. There one has the answer to the question of whether or not the channelling was the product of any form	2 3	MR GOTZ: Well, Chair, but it – CHAIRPERSON: So I just put that to you so you understand where I'm coming from.
2 3 4	into a particular formation. There one has the answer to the question of whether or not the channelling was the product of any form of intention on the part of Brigadier Calitz, and we submit	2 3 4	MR GOTZ: Well, Chair, but it – CHAIRPERSON: So I just put that to you so you understand where I'm coming from. MR GOTZ: Yes.
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		1	
1	Page 39168 strikers in a particular direction and we submit that that	1	Page 39170 2 they, with respect, have not difficulty ascribing the
2	was the type of block that was put in place. Essentially	2	injuries and the deaths that occurred at scene 2 to what
3	Brigadier Calitz recognising that his own POP members were	3	they refer to as a paramilitary operation with the aim of
4	probably ill equipped to deal with a group of armed	4	annihilating those who were perceived as the enemy. And
5	striking workers decided that the best people to deal with	5	Chair, we do say if one is making those sort of comments in
6	the strikers to do the dangerous work of arresting them,	6	relation to scene 2 it is not particularly difficult to
7	disarming and arresting them, were the TRT, and so he	7	come to the same conclusion in relation to scene 1. What
8	engineered – quite cleverly we would submit – a block known	8	is it a paramilitary operation with the aim of annihilating
9	as, well as he described it, a perfect block which had the	9	those who were perceived as the enemy at scene 2, but one
9 10	effect of channelling the strikers down towards the TRT for	10	
10	-	11	cannot ascribe the same characterisation, this being a paramilitary operation with a similar intention to scene 1.
12	them to be disarmed by the TRT, with the tragic consequences.	12	It doesn't become a paramilitary operation after scene 1.
12	•	12	If it's a paramilitary operation, with respect, Chair, it's
	Chair, we do know that the TRT were the special		
14	units that would perform two roles. The one role was to	14	a paramilitary operation from the outset. It may not have
15	protect the POP in circumstances where something went	15	been with the aim of annihilating those who were perceived
16	wrong, but the other role, which was equally important	16	as the enemy until scene 2, but at the very least if the
17	according to the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, was	17	evidence leaders are correct that this was such an
18 19	the responsibility in his words to carry out the task of	18	operation at scene 2 you can ascribe some form of intention
	disarming and arresting of belligerent strikers, and he	19	on the part of Brigadier Calitz who was ultimately in
20 21	makes that point in his witness statement HHH20, paragraph	20	control of that paramilitary operation. So, Chair, we do
	8.29. So the role of disarming and arresting, as he put	21	make the submission that this was a product of intention
22	it, belligerent strikers was always to be done by the TRT	22	and you should ultimately find under those circumstances
23	and so it's not particularly difficult to understand what	23 24	that SAPS acted with at least dolus eventualis in relation
24 25	Brigadier Calitz was attempting to accomplish by setting up the Nyalas in a particular way which would first of all	24 25	to what happened at scene 1. Chair, there's one further aspect which I might just mention which I don't address
25		25	aspect which i might just mention which i don't address
	Page 39169		Page 39171
1	Page 39169 channel them towards the TRT and then ultimately for the	1	Page 39171 because my learned friends for the injured and arrested are
1 2		1 2	•
	channel them towards the TRT and then ultimately for the		because my learned friends for the injured and arrested are
2	channel them towards the TRT and then ultimately for the TRT we would submit in his conception of the implementation	2	because my learned friends for the injured and arrested are going to deal with is that we do differ somewhat from the
2 3	channel them towards the TRT and then ultimately for the TRT we would submit in his conception of the implementation of the plan would effectively then be responsible for the	2 3	because my learned friends for the injured and arrested are going to deal with is that we do differ somewhat from the approach that various parties have taken for the correct
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		I	
	Page 39172		Page 39174
1	was supposed to be dealt with in the phase 2 proceedings	1	that information will certainly be given intensive
2	and we submit that it should not in fact be a	2	attention and consideration when our report is drafted. I
3	recommendation that is made. Ultimately it's a NUM policy,	3	want to thank you and your colleagues for all the work that
4	one which -	4	was done which will help us, as I said, quite considerably.
5	CHAIRPERSON: It's a NUM policy, it's not	5	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
6	an AMCU policy, AMCU was opposed to it, as I understand it	6	May I also on behalf of my clients and those who instruct
7	and there are arguments either way. The smaller mine	7	me thank you, Mr Chairman and your Commissioners for the
8	owners don't like it because they might be forced into	8	undertaking that you are making. As you well realise there
9	doing things which are all right for the bigger miners, but	9	are 37 families or families of 37 mineworkers who were
10	not for smaller miners. On the other hand there are	10	killed between the 13th and the 16th and family of each of
11	arguments that it seems to work quite well in the coal and	11	whom is keen to know whether there was any lawfulness in
12	gold sections, but your point is that we can't really, on	12	the killing of their loved ones let alone justification for
13	the material before us, give a definitive opinion and we	13	those killings.
14	should refrain. Am I right?	14	CHAIRPERSON: The same points apply, of
15	MR GOTZ: Indeed. Chair, there's one	15	course, to the families of the other seven.
16	final issue which I should just mention is that there are	16	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed.
17	submissions in NUM's heads of argument in relation to the	17	CHAIRPERSON: We'll also deal with them
18	composition of the strikers on the day, on the 16th of	18	as well.
19	August. We in fact prepared heads of argument about a	19	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed, Mr Chair, I can
20	month ago on this question and we will make that available	20	only speak for those that I'm acting, but I share the
21	to you. The simple point is we don't agree with the	21	sentiment. The families of the police, the families of
22	submissions that are made in relation to the composition of	22	security people. Mr Chair, for housekeeping purposes I
23	the strikers either in NUM's heads of argument or in the	23	will indicate the material that we want to rely on, but
24	phase 2 preliminary report that the vast majority of	24	just so that it is known where we stand with respect to the
25	strikers on the koppie were AMCU members. And we made	25	submissions made by the evidence leaders relative to
	Page 39173		Page 39175
1	submissions in writing earlier, but those don't seem to	1	whether it was a function of chaos at scene 1 that the
2	have been made available as yet to all the parties.	2	mineworkers were channelled to what the evidence leaders
3	CHAIRPERSON: I look forward to receiving		
4		3	themselves call a fuselage of TRT firing. We have dealt
	those, thank you.	3 4	themselves call a fuselage of TRT firing. We have dealt with this topic very extensively and may I just refer you
5	those, thank you. MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair and apologies		
5 6		4	with this topic very extensively and may I just refer you
	MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair and apologies	4 5	with this topic very extensively and may I just refer you to it, I'm not going to go there. In our replying heads in
6	MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair and apologies for going over time. Those are our submissions.	4 5 6	with this topic very extensively and may I just refer you to it, I'm not going to go there. In our replying heads in paragraphs 31 to 33 we articulate why it is so that what
6 7	MR GOTZ: Thank you, Chair and apologies for going over time. Those are our submissions. CHAIRPERSON: The apologies are really	4 5 6 7	with this topic very extensively and may I just refer you to it, I'm not going to go there. In our replying heads in paragraphs 31 to 33 we articulate why it is so that what happened in the channelling, the perfected block was in
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1	Page 39176 International to thank them for this submissions which we	1	Page 39178 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chair.
2	received. It's only one document that we got which is a	2	Chairman, Commissioners Hemraj and Tokota at the beginning
3	very helpful document and we also got a document from Mr	3	of this Commission we did mention by name and I think we
4	David Bruce. I requested that the material of this kind we	4	are going to do so today albeit fleetingly who it is whom
5	got should be communicated to all participants of the	5	we represent. It is important because in the hustle and
6	Commission. So they'll know what we've got and deal with	6	bustle of argument sometimes it will become statistics. We
7	it as they wish. But the Amnesty International document, I	7	talk about 37 people whom you represent. There were three
8	think – unless you've got something else as well, but we've	8	who died on the 13th and those are Thembelakhe Mati, Sammy
9	got an Amnesty International report and as I've said the	9	Jokanisi, Pumzile Sokanyile. Their relatives are here,
10	letter has already been drafted, the secretary is in the	10	whether they are brothers or sisters, fathers or mothers,
11	process of sending it to Amnesty International to thank	11	nephews, nieces or just members of their extended families.
12	them and also to Mr Bruce for his contribution.	12	And the difference between everybody else here is that our
13	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Mr Chair, if you have	13	people, those relatives, those families are keen to know
14	them then it is in fact – it is indeed our pleasure that	14	what, at the end of the day, it is that is going to be
15	you should have them because I think they will go a long	15	found as to why their loved ones were killed. Because it
16	way to assisting the Commission in its work. Then we also	16	is not a contest that they were killed, the issues is
17	would like to hand up to yourselves a schedule of fresh,	17	whether they were killed lawfully or unlawfully. And in
18	this is traditional markings from exhibit KKK10 which is an	18	the two years that they have sitting here and listening to
19	exhibit which was compiled by the South African Police	19	the evidence that was read, that was led, analysed, they
20	Service itself relevant to the post-mortem on the people	20	are keen to know in what way it can be said that those who
21	who had died. And we'll want to make an analysis of what	21	were killed by the police and that is also not something
22	that says and what it means and what the Commission should	22	that is in issue except that at one stage the Commissioner
23	have regard thereto. Also like the [inaudible] of AMCU we	23	of Police was called in to question as to whether it was by
24	will hand up a copy of the oral notes that we prepared in	24	the police or not, but it's settled now that those families
25	support of this evidence which we'll go –	25	whom we represent were killed by the police. Whether they
1	Page 39177	1	Page 39179
1	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, that will also	1	were killed with any lawfulness, justification and we'll
2	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, that will also be very helpful.	2	were killed with any lawfulness, justification and we'll argue at the end of it all that each and every one, all the
2 3	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, that will also be very helpful. MR NTSEBEZA SC: For those areas that I	2 3	were killed with any lawfulness, justification and we'll argue at the end of it all that each and every one, all the three I've mentioned and each of every one of the 33 I will
2 3 4	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, that will also be very helpful. MR NTSEBEZA SC: For those areas that I will not have reached because of time constraints I'm sure	2 3 4	were killed with any lawfulness, justification and we'll argue at the end of it all that each and every one, all the three I've mentioned and each of every one of the 33 I will mention were killed unlawfully. And we'll set out why we
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		115510	on or inquiry Preton
	Page 39180		Page 39182
1	back to the discovery of gold in 1886 –	1	Magidiwana captures this that if you are a migrant worker
2	CHAIRPERSON: Diamonds, 1870.	2	you are going to pass that legacy forever. Your own
3	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Well, diamonds, but our	3	children and your children's children will continue to work
4	submission, given where we are talking about, will be there	4	in the conditions under which – and why is this so in a
5	was an intensification of the use of migrant labour after	5	democracy?
6	the discovery of gold in the Reef in 1886. In fact, as we	6	Mr Chairman, Commissioners, it may well be that
7	put it to Cyril Ramaphosa when he was testifying, it was	7	it is not different from what the author of a book entitled
8	the Glen Grey Act passed by the Cape Parliament in 1894	8	"Learning to trust democracy" which was published in 1999,
9	that created what was euphemistically called reserves which	9	the author is Michael Rueben. He says what we now have in
10	Deputy President Ramaphosa was, aimed to agree with me was	10	the new South Africa, and that he said 10 years ago in
11	indeed a euphemism for these places being in fact	11	1999, that inexorably the new South Africa has been heading
12	reservoirs for cheap labour. That's what they were.	12	towards an escalation of socioeconomic stratification. He
13	The Glen Grey Act wanted to end the independence	13	says that the new socioeconomic stratification will not be
14	of the peasant small scale farmer. He was going to have to	14	along the traditional lines of the white ruling class
15	be forced to come to the mining areas, to the Reef as a	15	versus the African underclass. He predicted that it will
16	labourer. The conditions when they came here, and this is	16	assume the new profile of an African white upper class
17	now something that would have featured, Mr Chairman, in	17	dominating the bloated State apparatus and the business
18	phase 2 of your work, but we never got to that, but you	18	sector versus a largely African underclass consisting of
19	have evidence particularly from the Deputy President who	19	those who are not rewarded with a government job for their
20	agreed that this was a system which was abhorrent. Those	20	participation in the struggle and those who are
21	who came here and became mineworkers were kept in compounds	21	unemployable because they lack qualifications. Mr Chair,
22	which were a little better, if at all, then prisons. They	22	in the profiles of those who died and the families whom we
23	were not permitted to live with their families. They lived	23	represent it may well be that what Michael Rueben says
24	in the most dehumanising circumstances, and we can	24	about them being the African underclass, that this is who
25	understand that this was at the beginning of, or at the end	25	they are.
1	Page 39181 of the 19th century, but as you saw in your inspection in	1	Page 39183 But even so, Mr Chairman, even so the question
2	loco, Mr Chairman, those conditions have barely changed.	2	remains; in a democracy founded on the values of equality,
3	The places in which the mineworkers are kept, save for	3	freedom, human dignity, a democracy informed by the values
4	those that have been cosmetically altered into so-called	4	of Ubuntu, how does it happen that a labour dispute
5	family units, but the majority of the places that you	5	escalates to a point where in that very week 44 human lives
6	visited and saw are still compounds. People who are	6	are taken, 34 in one day? What is the function of a police
7	mineworkers stay there without any family. They are still	7	service in a democracy founded on those values? How does
8	dehumanised, and the question you must ask yourself is why	8	it deal with what it perceives to be unlawfulness or
9	does this happen in a democracy; why are we still having a	9	lawlessness? These are the answers that these families are
10	perpetuation of this kind of conditions of service and	10	expecting the Commission to assist them with because they
11	living for mineworkers?	11	were devastated by the events that form part of your
12	Mr Burger yesterday was man enough, Mr Chair, to	12	inquiry.
13	admit that the appalling conditions under which mineworkers	13	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza, is this an
14	still live in the mines are inexcusable. I think that's	14	appropriate stage for us to take the lunch adjournment
15	the word he used, and we say so, we agree with him fully	15	until half past 1?
16	there. We're saying these are not the conditions that you	16	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
17	would expect ordinary human beings to have lived in, and	17	CHAIRPERSON: Until half past 1, then you
18	again we say it is important to contextualise who these	18	can continue with your arguments. Half an hour.
19	people are, who are these mineworkers. We are talking	19	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thanks, Mr Chairman.
20	about people who by reason of the low wages that they were	20	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]
21	getting could never earn enough other than just to sustain	21	[13:33] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Mr
22	them and to have a little bit to support their families	22	Ntsebeza?
23	with whom they were not staying, but that condition would	23	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
24	be perpetuated.	24	Mr Chairman, what we want to say is this, it's all very
25	In fact in one of the clips that we will show	25	well for all the parties to say we are dealing with a
A	RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE		

1	Page 39184 violent crowd of people and a group of people who had a	1	Page 39186
1	propensity for violence which is what at the beginning of	1 2	indicates that some senior official, senior officer foresaw
2	these proceedings the mine workers and the strikers were	2	the possibility at least of serious fire battle involving – MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.
3	referred to as. Even if we assumed just for question of		CHAIRPERSON: Substantial amount of
4		4	
5	argument, Mr Chairman, that this is so, what the families	5	bullets and so on.
6	are interested to know is whether it is the expectation of	6	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, thank you, Mr
7	a democracy that law enforcement agencies might also use	7	Chairman, and of course four mortuary vans are ordered.
8	savage if not worse methods to deal with those whom they	8	Now the evidence that we'll draw your attention to shows
9	regard as savage and we are making the submission that	9	that most if not all of the people were killed, were killed
10	there has to b a difference. It's not only that they are	10	by high velocity R5 rifle gunfire. Now in our heads of
11	law enforcement agents, they are law enforcement agents in	11	argument, I think in paragraphs, if I could get there Mr
12	a democracy. That is when, when it was put to Mr Mthethwa	12	Chairman. In paragraph 334, in fact from 335 Warrant
13	and the Deputy Minister whether they can imagine anything –	13	Officer Wessels testifies as to what effect an R5 rifle
14 15	CHAIRPERSON: You mean – MR NTSEBEZA SC: Deputy President I'm	14	has. He's been asked my intention is just to get an
15	1 5	15	unequivocal statement from you, if is possible, he agrees
16	sorry, Deputy President Ramaphosa, whether they can recall	16	with me that when once you bring R1 rifles and R5 rifles to
17 18	in living memory anything of this scale of what happened on the 16th. All of them agreed. It is the kind of happening	17 18	a scene you are likely to incur fatalities because those
			are lethal weapons intended to kill. Warrant Officer
19 20	that reminded them of Sharpeville, of Langa of Boipatong	19 20	Wessels says "I will agree with you later and you yourself,
20	and all those events in our dark history in the past that were referred to as massacres and almost 20 years into our	20	Mr Chairman take it up and you say sorry to interrupt you isn't the expression assault rifles, have you ever come
22	democracy we had a massacre on that scale and therefore	22	across that expression assault rifle, Warrant Officer
23	there lies the question and at the end of these	22	Wessel assault rifle is the correct. Now are R4 and R5s
24	proceedings, Mr Chairman, I'll try and demonstrate that it	23	assault rifles, Wessels they confirm, they conform to the
25	cannot be done in the name of democracy. That there needed	25	description of an assault rifle. Chairperson, you are then
		20	
	Page 39185		Page 39187
1	Page 39185 to be more equivocation either for Minister Mthethwa or	1	Page 39187 on the battle field, you use them on the battlefield to
1 2		1 2	
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2	to be more equivocation either for Minister Mthethwa or Deputy President Ramaphosa. The fact that what happened	2	on the battle field, you use them on the battlefield to kill the enemy don't you, that is correct". We'll be
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1	Page 39188 rifles. Especially at close range and then they will ask	1	Page 39190 settlements, that much is even testified to by Colonel
2	was there no other way. I'm assuming at this stage that it	2	Vermaak and our submission is that the subsequent discharge
2	is accepted that the police had reason to believe that they	2	of teargas and stun grenades by the SAPS was thus without
4	were being attacked, that they were protecting themselves.	4	reason, unprovoked and unnecessary and it is in our
4 5	The question the people would want to know was this the way	4 5	submission this unprovoked attack by means of tear gas and
	and Mr Chair, as you then proceed [inaudible] things.		stun grenades which caused the confrontation between the
6 7	First of all there will be argument which I think my	6 7	SAPS and the strikers and the deaths that ensued and we
8	learned friend Mr Mpofu will be making with respect to the	8	make the submission that on that basis the SAPS must be
9	principles of putative self defence which is product of a	9	held liable for all the deaths that occurred on that day.
10	joint effort made by our legal team, the legal teams of	10	Where one can spend a little more detail is with the aid of
11	LRC, SHRC, on AMCU, I'm not properly advised, Mr Chair,	11	this new post mortem report which I referred to. Mr
12	but, so there is that, I believe that it was handed up and	12	Chairman you'll know that Mr Jokanisi's the striker who was
13	if it wasn't at least there was an –	13	shot and killed on the same field when the main
14	CHAIRPERSON: But I take it we're going	14	confrontation took place, all be it from a distance from
15	to be getting it in due course.	15	it. We have made the submission that he was unlawfully
16	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed.	16	killed by the SAPS. They have not provided any
17	CHAIRPERSON: Looking forward to hearing	17	justification or any explanation regarding the
18	it and it seems quite a powerful combination of people	18	circumstances in which Mr Jokanisi was killed, in fact they
19	involved in preparing it. So all the more reason to read	19	simply argue based on the alleged proximity of Mr
20	it with eager anticipation.	20	Jokanisi's body to that of Warrant Officer Lepaaku that is
21	MR NTSEBEZA SC: But if I may just say	21	fair to infer that his death must have been the result of
22	this, Mr Chair, we want to address you on a couple of	22	police response to an attack on the police by him or his
23	things. The first one is what is the standard of proof	23	fellow strikers.
24	that you should adopt in determining the lawfulness or	24	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza, I take it we'd
25	otherwise of the killings. Insofar as you have heard	25	better mark these exhibits that you're handing in?
	Page 39189		Page 39191
1	extensive argument from the SHRC on this point which we're	1	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Mr Chair.
1 2	extensive argument from the SHRC on this point which we're endorsing namely that the onus is on the police service to	1 2	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Mr Chair. CHAIRPERSON: We did have a document
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		1	
	Page 39192		Page 39194
	the nearest by means of an explanation that we get is that	1	you must find that he was shot and killed unlawfully.
	they draw an inference that his death must have been a	2	There seems to be a persistence on the part of the SAPS
3	result of police spawns an attack on the police by him or	3	that Mr Mati died from a stab wound because that's what
4	his fellow strikers.	4	seems to appear in their heads of –
5	[13:53] So they do not even allege that Mr Jokanisi was	5	CHAIRPERSON: I think that point is no
	involved in the attack on Warrant Officer Lepaaku. They	6	longer being persisted in. Initially it looked like it.
7	make the assumption that he is or one of the strikers was	7	As far as I understand it, it is now common cause, if I am
8	and we submit that it is clearly not sufficient to	8	incorrect, I will be corrected.
9	discharge their burden of justifying his killing. We	9	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Mr Chair but in
	therefore call upon the Commission to find that on this	10	paragraph 136.5 –
11	basis alone the failure to justify the killing of Mr	11	CHAIRPERSON: I see, I am advised that I
12	Jokanisi amounts to them having killed him unlawfully. But	12	am wrong, we haven't yet got a response from the first
13	originally the contention is that by the SAPS and the	13	pathologist, who said it was a stab wound. So I was wrong
14	evidence leaders that Mr Jokanisi's body was found close to	14	in thinking that it's now accepted that it was a -
15	that of Mr, of Warrant Officer Lepaaku, is manifestly	15	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Mr Chair. As I say
16	inconsistent with the objective evidence. The objective	16	-
17	evidence is that he was found 80 to 100 metres from Warrant	17	CHAIRPERSON: But let's see if Mr Semenya
18	Officer Lepaaku, 150 metres from Warrant Officer Monene.	18	can help us. Mr Semenya are you able to help us in that?
19	And the post-mortems in addition –	19	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, no we are not
20	CHAIRPERSON: I seem to recall when the	20	conceding, it's not common cause that it was a shot wound.
21	copies of the statement were first produced we did say that	21	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wesley is looking after
22	we thought that the pathologist who did the original post-	22	that part of the case. Mr Wesley, can you help us? We
23	mortem should be given a copy and asked to comment. I take	23	have the statement of Mr Semenya, they are not conceding it
24	it the comments from the original pathologist has not yet	24	wasn't a stab wound.
25	been received, is that correct? The way we will deal with	25	MR WESLEY: Mr Chair, we will have to
1	Page 39193		Page 39195
	it I think is this way to save time. When we get those	1	follow up with the pathologist. There is no further report
	it, I think is this way to save time. When we get those	1	follow up with the pathologist. There is no further report
2	reports, we will make sure they are circulated and any	2	that says anything new. I am not sure how we will -
2 3	reports, we will make sure they are circulated and any counsel who have comments they wish to make, will obviously	2 3	that says anything new. I am not sure how we will - CHAIRPERSON: Now what I suggested is,
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1	Page 39196 that concession, so it's a matter we have to -	1	Page 39198 killed Mr Mati. Now Mr Sokanyile is the striker whom you
1 2	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Well, I can only make	2	know, Mr Chairman, who was shot across the river. There's
2	the submissions, Mr Chair, but I don't know whether these –	2	been a lot of debate about his fate. The objective
4	it seems therefore it is going to be still a contested area	4	evidence in our view is sufficient for you to find that he
			-
5	but Dr Naidoo's post-mortem report concludes that the	5	was shot and killed by SAPS members. The only reasonable
6	features are in his opinion confidently that of a gunshot	6	inference that can be drawn from these objective facts is
7	wound through the thigh not a stab wound he says so in so	7	that he was shot and killed execution style from the other
8	many words. And in many of them when the family made its	8	side of the river and our full argument as you will have
9	presentation to the Commission, Mr Mati's cousin	9	known and you have acknowledged Mr Chair, is contained in
10	specifically is the concern that it was alleged that Mr	10	paragraph 71 to 111 of our heads of argument and we would
11	Mati was stabbed as opposed to having been shot and insofar	11	really ask you, Mr Commissioner and Commissioners to have
12	as the Chair of course correctly considered now by the	12	regard to those heads of argument and arguments remain
13	Chair, that he had told Mr Mati's cousin that this should	13	there. We will not repeat them in full. All we want to
14	no longer be an issue, pretty much the same way as the	14	say to summarise our position contained there, 1) there has
15	Chair has said was indicating as much to me. It is clear	15	been no attempt to justify Mr Sokanyile's death in any way
16	that even though at that time that impression was not	16	at all by the SAPS, and on that basis alone we submit they
17	corrected by counsel for SAPS because when the Chair said	17	must be found to have acted unlawfully in killing him.
18	that that is no longer an issue, whoever was present on	18	Further, the objective evidence clearly shows that Mr
19	that day did not contradict the Chair in this regard and	19	Sokanyile was shot and killed unlawfully in the following
20	that's the impression under which we had been labouring.	20	ways. He was short 620 metres aware from the other side of
21	We would suggest that to the extent that that was a tacit	21	the river or from the main confrontation. And then the
22	concession they should be bound by that concession. And it	22	distance was 74,4 metres away from the other side of the
23	also appears from Lonmin's case book regarding the death of	23	river. He was clearly fleeing whenever he was shot. He
24	Mr Mati that he was shot by members of the SAPS whilst	24	was killed by an R5 bullet to the head. The new PM report
25	fleeing from the scene of the main confrontation. Blou	25	by Dr Naidoo states that the entrance wound was the wound
	Page 39197		Page 39199
1	Page 39197 confirmed this in his evidence - to deal with the	1	Page 39199 to the back of his head and the exit wound was the wound to
1 2		1 2	5
	confirmed this in his evidence - to deal with the		to the back of his head and the exit wound was the wound to
2	confirmed this in his evidence - to deal with the suggestion that Mr Mati was shot by one of his fellow	2	to the back of his head and the exit wound was the wound to his cheek. The previous one had actually reversed these
2 3	confirmed this in his evidence - to deal with the suggestion that Mr Mati was shot by one of his fellow strikers. Again this proposition, Mr Chair, is	2 3	to the back of his head and the exit wound was the wound to his cheek. The previous one had actually reversed these findings. But either way, he was shot in the head by an
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		I	
1	Page 39200	1	Page 39202
1	paragraph 77 to 79. The evidence leaders have argued that	1	matter be investigated further. The cases where the
2	this submission is undermined by the fact that the families	2 3	potential accused is a member of the police service the investigation will presumably be done by IPID. In the case
3	did not cross-examine Colonel Botha in relation to when Mr		
4	Sokanyile's body was found. First of all, I don't think –	4	of other persons the investigation will be done by the SAPS
5	we have dealt with this submission fully in our heads in	5	and we would then, and this was put to us, we would then
6	reply, and that would be paragraphs 23 to 24, because we	6	recommend that in the light of the investigations, the
7	made the point there that Colonel Botha had not even	7	material that is before us and the extra material that is
8 9	testified or, ja, Vermaak had not even been – did not even	8 9	obtained in any, by any further investigation, the Provincial DPP should then consider whether it is
	testify at that time that Colonel Botha gave his evidence	9 10	
10 11	and in any event Colonel Botha does not contradict what he	11	appropriate to prosecute. I don't see how we can make a
12	says. We say the evidence leaders have argued that these submissions undermined by the fact that the families did	12	recommendation that something must be investigated and someone must be prosecuted because we don't know what the
12	not cross-examine Colonel Botha in relation to. With	12	result of the investigation would be. So the –
13	respect, the evidence leaders overlooked the fact that the	14	MR NTSEBEZA SC: No, I said that, Mr
14	families placement of where Mr Sokanyile's body was found	15	Chairman.
16	is consistent with that of Colonel Botha, across the river	16	CHAIRPERSON: No, I think that your 112
17	and directly in line with the cartridges that were found on	17	should be, paragraph 112 –
18	the scene. Colonel Vermaak's version on the other hand	18	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Should be modified.
19	placed Mr Sokanyile's body approximately 60 to 65 metres	19	CHAIRPERSON: - should be modified in the
20	from the position identified by the families and Colonel	20	light -
21	Botha. Put simply, Colonel Vermaak got it wrong, there was	21	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Well, I mean that
22	no necessity to cross-examine Colonel Botha on the issue.	22	would –
23	In any event Colonel Vermaak had not yet given his	23	CHAIRPERSON: The Human Rights Commission
24	evidence. So there can be no question of undermining	24	gave us a very helpful section in their heads dealing with
25	anything.	25	the proper approach by a commission of this kind dealing
	Page 39201		Page 39203
1	We therefore request your good selves too make	1	with allegations of criminal conduct.
2	We therefore request your good selves too make the findings and recommendations that are set in paragraph	2	with allegations of criminal conduct. MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, well then Mr Chair,
2 3	We therefore request your good selves too make the findings and recommendations that are set in paragraph 1.10 of our heads. These are the recommendations, Mr	2 3	with allegations of criminal conduct. MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, well then Mr Chair, the following, Mguye, Yende, Sekgweleya, Mogale, Rikhotso,
2 3 4	We therefore request your good selves too make the findings and recommendations that are set in paragraph 1.10 of our heads. These are the recommendations, Mr Chair. We submit that Mr Mati, Mr Jokanisi and Mr	2 3 4	with allegations of criminal conduct. MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, well then Mr Chair, the following, Mguye, Yende, Sekgweleya, Mogale, Rikhotso, they all should be investigated on the basis that you have
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1	Page 39204 Now the second, or the further submissions I want	1	Page 39206 B, people get channelled towards a waiting TRT line which
2	to make are with respect to scene 1. Again Mr Chair,	2	has been aligned. Now what was foreseeable to him when in
3	there's been an extensive debate around these issues and my	3	fact people are lined up in a way, or are channelled in a
4	sense is that we have, you have been given a fair amount of	4	way that would expose them to TRT fire, people whom he knew
5	material to deal with by all the parties. We merely would	5	were armed with lethal weapons?
6	like to reiterate that insofar as we talk about a trap in	6	So we can't say there was a direct intention, but
7	scene 1 it is to the extent that that term is used in	7	what we cannot accept is that it was a function of a
8	exhibit KKK49, and to the extent that whatever it is that	8	haphazard slapdash work by those who operated the plan. If
9	Mr Gotz on behalf of AMCU has admitted, I mean has	9	it was foreseeable and he reconciled himself with that
10	submitted with regard thereto, we align ourselves –	10	possibility, then we are not able to say that he did not
11	CHAIRPERSON: He didn't go as far as to	11	act unlawfully in the manner in which he gave his command.
12	suggest it was a trap. What he contended was that	12	We say even if the version of the police service
13	Brigadier Calitz's intention in getting the Nyalas to park	13	were to be accepted, it is clear that the killings at the
14	themselves in the formation that we see on some of the	14	kraal were unlawful because the force that the SAPS used
15	exhibits was to channel the strikers down -	15	was entirely disproportionate to any threat that they faced
16	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.	16	or thought they faced. We have made the argument time and
17	CHAIRPERSON: - down the passage towards	17	again that one R5 bullet – and we are supported here by the
18	the TRT, but he didn't necessarily intend that they should	18	SAPS's own expert – if one of the bullets from the R5 had
19	be mowed down by the TRT as they came into sight. In other	19	been directed at the lower limbs it would have stopped
20	words they weren't being channelled towards a firing squad.	20	them. We know that the evidence that is set out in our, I
21	Mr Gotz in fact said in his submission that it may well be	21	mean the evidence for this submission as I indicated is set
22	that Brigadier Calitz simply intended that the TRT people	22	out in our heads of argument and I read it to you, Mr Chair
23	should do the disarming and dispersing of these people. I	23	and Commissioners, and yet when we – and I will merely
24	think that's an accurate summary of his submission. Is	24	mention them, Mr Chair, because you have made it clear to
25	that right, Mr Gotz?	25	us that you are on the strength of what we have detailed in
	Page 39205		Page 39207
1	MR GOTZ: Yes, Chair, indeed. We do use	1	our heads of argument, you have paid particular attention
2	the term "trap" in our heads of argument, although I didn't	2	to what we say. All the people who were shot, Mr Monesa,
3	use it specifically today.	3	Mr Noki, all of them, and I'll just mention their names
4	CHAIRPERSON: But you explained what you	4	without giving the details of where on the bodies they were
5	maant		
5	meant –	5	hit, though in my presentation at the end of my argument
6	MR GOTZ: Yes.	5 6	hit, though in my presentation at the end of my argument I'll try and illustrate this, but the one thing that we are
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		1	
1	Page 39208	1	Page 39210 things that were used as justification becomes, when the
2	a gunshot wound to his chest and abdomen, even Jijase.	2	scale becomes smaller and smaller.
3		2	Now there were those victims who were shot behind
4	was also shot in the upper body and there's agreement	4	
5		5	and away from the kraal. These victims are Mr Nqongophele, Mr Mtshazi and Mr Gwelani. Now Mr Chair, I think there's
6	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	6	been a lot of debate about that before us. We can only say that we are quite amazed that the submission is even made
7		7	
8		8	in the circumstances of these deaths. The temerity to
9		9	submit that these three were clearly among the group of
10		10	strikers who were attacking the police or could reasonably
11	5	11	have been believed were among were meaning to attack them,
12		12	there could not have been any innocent individual amongst
13		13	the group, they all made common cause with Mr Noki's
14		14	leadership and utterances that they were to kill the
15		15	police, now this is what is contained in paragraph 178 of
16		16	the SAPS's heads. We submit in that regard that there is
17	5	17	no evidence absolutely to support this proposition. It has
18	5	18	no base, it has no merit. We would like to submit that
19	51	19	this is a desperate and last minute attempt by the SAPS to
20		20	escape, or to avoid an inescapable conclusion that the
21	Chair and one of the – I'm not so sure who, but it was	21	strikers never posed any threat to the TRT line both in
22	5.	22	terms of the distance where they are found and that their
23		23	deaths were therefore clearly unlawful. It is clear from
24	5	24	the objective evidence that they were killed unlawfully.
25	assuming that there was a justification for firing within	25	[14:33] Mr Mtshazi Nqongophele was shot 100 to 150 metres
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	Daga 20200		Dago 20211
1	Page 39209 those first three seconds.	1	Page 39211 away from the TRT line. Mr Gwelani was shot 250 metres
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		T	
1	Page 39212 first aid methods we know it. You don't have to get a	1	Page 39214 fatal shots because we know the – I take it only 17 people
2	degree. You don't have to be trained in any course. If a	2	fired fatal shots or possibly even less than 17 because
3	person is bleeding you try to stop the bleeding between the	3	there may have been some who fired more than one fatal
4	heart and where the wound is. You don't have to be	4	shot.
5	qualified to do this. And I cannot be persuaded to accept	5	Now, of course if you are correct in your
6	that trained police officers do not have that rudimentary	6	submissions in relation to the planners, Brigadier Calitz
7	training. But we see more at the scene. Some of them, you	7	giving order where there would be a generalised order which
8	know, kick in the face or trample on people who are injured	8	you say was accompanied by the foresight of possible death,
9	and there's that spectacle of the man who is writhing with	9	the recklessness as to whether at death would ensue, and
10	pain who dies – Ntenetya. Ntenetya dies a horrible death.	10	then of course one doesn't have to prove a direct
11	In fact when his family see how he dies they get reduced to	11	connection between a particular death and the person you
12	painful tears because he dies in circumstances where people	12	say would be the potential accused. And there if you are
13	are milling around. Whether or not he would have died in	13	correct in your submissions a charge of murder would be the
14	any event is a separate issue. What we see there is this	14	appropriate charge to consider, but in relation to the
15	callousness, this absolute disregard for people who have	15	matter dealt with in paragraph 4.13.6 I take it you'll
16	been injured.	16	accept the problem that I mentioned to you in relation to
17	And again I will ask the question is this what we	17	murder. I was proposing to take tea at quarter to three.
18	expect in a democracy? That was not a warzone, but even in	18	Would it be convenient for you if we took the adjournment
19	war the Geneva Conventions make provision for the	19	now? You could then consider the point I've put to you,
20	treatment, treatment of those who get injured in a	20	discuss it with your juniors and give us the benefit of the
21	battlefield. The standards that were adopted at scene one	21	inputs thereafter.
22	are far below what you would expect of any civilised	22	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed, Mr Chair.
23	society, let alone a constitutional democracy.	23	CHAIRPERSON: 15 minutes.
24	respectfully request you, Mr Chairman and Commissioners	24	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]
25	Tokota and Hemraj, to be persuaded by the recommendations	25	[15:01] CHAIRPERSON: The commission resumes. Mr
		1	
1	Page 39213	1	Page 39215
1	which we make in paragraphs 412, 414 of our heads and on	1	Ntsebeza, are you now able to deal with the point that
2	which we make in paragraphs 412, 414 of our heads and on the same basis as before where we recommend or we make	2	Ntsebeza, are you now able to deal with the point that arose before the adjournment?
2 3	which we make in paragraphs 412, 414 of our heads and on the same basis as before where we recommend or we make submissions for recommendation for prosecution. We do the	2 3	Ntsebeza, are you now able to deal with the point that arose before the adjournment? MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Mr Chair. Mr
2 3 4	which we make in paragraphs 412, 414 of our heads and on the same basis as before where we recommend or we make submissions for recommendation for prosecution. We do the same thing. Yes, what we set out there, Mr Chair, is not	2 3 4	Ntsebeza, are you now able to deal with the point that arose before the adjournment? MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Mr Chair. Mr Chair, there seems to be a view which I will put to you as
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		I	
	Page 39216		Page 39218
1	must be taken to have acted in common purpose. I know it's	1	demonstrate why the objective evidence does not bear out
2	not a doctrine which is endearing itself to the chairman.	2	the self-defence agitated for by the SAPS. Now, we also do
3	It may well conjure up the past in trials that your chair,	3	the same relevant to Xalabile and Pato. You will find
4	your, the chair has been dealing with in Upington and all	4	those in paragraphs 456 to 477 of our heads. Now, in
5	related places where the doctrine of common purpose was	5	respect to Mpumza we canvass in paragraphs 569 to 604 of
6	very discredited, the Upington 20 but whatever the number	6	our heads. And Mkhonjwa we deal with in paragraphs 558 to
7	was, but it is still part of our law, Mr Chair, and it is	7	568.
8	one on the basis of which a prima facie view can be formed	8	Now, there are of course other victims who were
9	by you sufficient for you to refer the matter for further	9	killed at scene two and those are Mr Mangcotywa, Mr Liau,
10	investigation. So those are our submissions. Rather than	10	victims D and E respectively, Mr Mosebetsane, victim G, Mr
11	not do anything we would recommend that you should in line	11	Mabiya, victim H, Mr Nokamba, victim I, Mr Samphendu,
12	with our recommendations recommend.	12	victim J, Mr Ngxande, victim K, Mr Gadlela, victim L,
13	CHAIRPERSON: - then is that I presume	13	Mr Pato, victim M, Mr Talabile, victim O, Mr Mohai, Mr
14	amounts to this that there's a prima facie case that all	14	Sagalala, Sogalala and Mr Ntsoele. Now, relative to those
15	the shooters who were in the front line of the TRT who	15	no account has been given of the circumstances under which
16	fired had a common purpose or were parties to a common	16	they were shot. In their opening statement the police
17	purpose to kill some at least of the strikers who were	17	service appeared to concede as well as Mr De Rover it also
18	approaching them, that even if you can't say that shooter	18	appears that these were caught in the crossfire between the
19	one shot deceased one doesn't matter. If shooter one was	19	various SAPS units at scene two and our submission is that
20	party to a common purpose with shooters two to 60 and the	20	for the first time in their heads the SAPS justifies the
21	people who were killed were killed by one or other of	21	killings of these victims in the killing zone on the basis
22	shooters one to 60 then on the common purpose basis they	22	of statements of SAPS members.
23	all can be convicted of murder of all the people who were	23	Now, there are two other victims, Mr Sagalala –
24	killed at the entrance to the channel next to the kraal at	24	now, the statements that have been provided to justify the
25	scene one. That's your case, not your case, that your	25	killings provide no justification at all for the killings
		1	
	Dage 30217		Dage 30210
1	Page 39217 submission.	1	Page 39219 so they had nothing really. The other two victims is Mr
1 2	-	1 2	Page 39219 so they had nothing really. The other two victims is Mr Galala or Segalala and Mr Ntsoele who are believed to have
	submission.	-	so they had nothing really. The other two victims is Mr
2	submission. MR NTSEBEZA SC: That's the submission,	2	so they had nothing really. The other two victims is Mr Galala or Segalala and Mr Ntsoele who are believed to have
2 3	submission. MR NTSEBEZA SC: That's the submission, Mr Chair. Now, Mr Chair, honourable commissioners, we	2	so they had nothing really. The other two victims is Mr Galala or Segalala and Mr Ntsoele who are believed to have been shot at scene two and to have died later in hospital.
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2to actually read it to us. That's being looked after2CHAIRPERSON:You say including.3anyway.3MR NTSEBEZA SC:Yes.4MR NTSEBEZA SC:Chair and Commissioners,4CHAIRPERSON:And I don't think you've5we would like to make the following submissions as to what5mentioned what you're saying in paragraph 610.1 that in6the conclusion should be. The first one is that the6addition to Brigadier Calitz -7commanders of the police service must be found to have had7MR NTSEBEZA SC:The commanders in the8ample opportunity to halt the operation after scene one.8JOCCOM -9That much also is said by their own expert and we would9CHAIRPERSON:- whose name is mentioned10urge that you should find it was grossly negligent in the10there, the commanders in the JOCCOM you say should also11circumstances for that not to have happened and that the11be -12SAPS should be held consequently to have been liable for12MR NTSEBEZA SC:Yes.13the killings at scene two on that basis alone. It's an13CHAIRPERSON:- investigated to see14operation that ought not to have taken place at all.14whether they could be prosecuted for failing to halt the15The second submission is that there was no attack15Indeed, Mr Chair.16by the strikers on the members of the SAPS in scene two.16MR NTSEBEZA SC:Indeed, Mr Chair.17	2	Page 39220		Page 39222
3       anyway.       3       MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.         4       MR NTSEBEZA SC: Chair and Commissioners, we would like to make the following submissions as to what the commanders of the police service must be found to have had ample opportunity to halt the operation after scene on.       5       member operation the police service must be found to have had ample opportunity to halt the operation after scene on.       7       MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.       The commanders in the Bounders in the Bounders in the Bounders in the Bounders in the JOCCOM -         7       That much also is said by their own expert and we would in urge that you should find it was grossly negligent in the increments of the SAPS should be held consequently to have been liable for the second submission is that there was no attack to be the strkers on the members of the SAPS in some two.       7       CHAIRPERSON: - investigated to see         12       SAPS should be held consequently to have been liable for the strikers on the members of the SAPS in some two.       16       the killings at scene two on that basis alone. It's an the policit of the policit that 1       16       whether they could be prosecuted for failing to halt the 10 operation after scene 1.         13       ChAIRPERSON:       - investigated to see       17       Before I go to consider Lonmin – I've lost my file. Mr         14       operation that ought of defence because they and deserting on, munout of time before I've made the point, what I wanted       17       Before I go to consider Lonmin – I've lost my file. Mr         15       outhery was disproportionaby bel		to make sure we're familiar with the contents of the heads	1	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Including.
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2         area         2         area           3         inaudible) on Lommin and can 1 quickly go through those.         3         MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed, Mr Chair.           4         CHAIRFERSON: Page 414 of your heads,         5         and F. beginning of paragraph 611. Is that right?         3         MR NTSEBEZA SC: The Chair. They allocated an           7         Submit that, I mean the families are very. they are quite         5         exhibit number: it's 222238.1 -           8         Units SEEZA SC: Vos. Yos. Yos. Yos. Yos. Yos. Yos. Yos. Y	1		1	-
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4       CHARPERSON:       Page 410 your heads,         5       part F, beginning of paragraph 611. Is that right?       So whith rumber; it's ZZZ30.1 -         7       submit that, I mean the families are way; they are quite unique adopted towards their families, or towards those       Thime is short and we want to -         9       Wa shou clobudy live were serving under them. Our       Time is short and we want to -         11       submitsion is that Lomin should be held civily and one has a context -       Time is short and we want to -         12       ones. In particular we submit that Lomin should SAPS to be aready be to be 20 four heads of argument in this thermon.       Time is short one what is actual we down the short of the therrogatories. Mr Chair, the same added up this moring - I mean this afternon.         13       break the families inderrogatories. Mr Chair, the same added up this moring - I mean this afternon.         14       We also refer to the interrogatories. Mr Chair, the same set the same added up this moring - I mean this afternon.         15       break the families dispute the same set the families dispute the same set the families would and the graph and the same set the families would not to built on undertaking that tormin should assist them to put food on the table for their families.         2       that was that the families to be an undertaking that same set of the same set the families.         3       would assist them to put food on the table for their families.         4       My 2014 weas that the fam				
5       part F, beginning of paragraph 611. Is that right?       5       exhibit number; it's ZZZ38.1 -         6       MR RTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Yes, Ye, Kr Chair, We       7       16 to us in writing 'you don't mind, comorrow morning.         8       unhappy about obviously the employer, the conduct that the employer adopted towards their families; or towards their amilies; or towards their amilies; or towards their of the families if the canonic the time available.       8       Time is short and we want to -         9       who died which they were serving under them. Our       11       submitsion is that Lommin should book do with SAPS to ones, In particular we submit that Lommin wanted SAPS to ones a context -       10       CHAIRPERSON:       MR NTSEBEZA SC: Wes.         10       achieve this, and we rejo on what is set out in the the accuration to what is set out in the therrogatories, we got a many marks the following. Firstly the families diquid to the award and employment for only one family member wands.       11       Take paragraph 10 for example, ad paragraph 20, the answer 19 is yes. You know. Sow exaud the the 21 interrogatories are unders, there's and study the 22 without any tourdards that the families diquid to the secon completing these houses.       12       Take paragraph 10 for example, ad paragraph 20, the answer 19 is yes. You know. Sow exaud the secon the 22 without any tour and the response that was a fordide on the 91 hof 24.       13       Take paragraph 20, the answer 10 is you know. Sow exaud the the 22 without any tour any tour any one wante the families.       14       14       14       14       14 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><th></th><td></td></t<>				
6         MIR NTSEBEZA SC:         Yes: Yes, Yes, Mr Chair. We         6         CHAIRPERSON:         Sorry, perhaps you can give           7         submit that, I mean the families are very, they are quite         7         It to us in writing if you don't mind, tomoreaw coming.           9         employer adopted towards their families, or towards those         7         It to us in writing if you don't mind, tomoreaw coming.           10         submission is that Lonmin should be held civily and         1         Time is should be. Mr NtSbezza Sc:         Yes.           11         submission is that Lonmin should be held civily and         11         squacez everything into the time available. But thank you.           12         ones. In particular we submit that Lonmin world SAPS to         14         and has a context -           15         backieve this, and we refer to the interrogatories. Mr Chair,         18         We also refer to the interrogatories, Mr Chair,           16         paragraph 10 to 628 of our haads of argument in this         16         I nuclease were astemitted to Lonmin and the response that wes           17         that we handed up this morning - I mean this afternoon.         16         I nuclease were astemitted to Lonmin and the response that wes           18         we also refer to the interrogatories and live sympary of the casces than asymes the uther asserts.         1 meregradares aswell, pleases, but the tagain can be				
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13       ones. In particular we submit that Lommin wanted SAPS to         14       break the strike and lobbied and colluded with SAPS to         15       achieve this, and we rely on what is set out in the         16       paragraph 610 to 628 of our heads of argument in this         17       regard.         18       We also refer to the interrogatories, Mr Chair,         19       that we handed up this morning – I mean this afternoon.         10       Those were submitted to Lommin and the response that was         21       those were submitted to Lommin and the response that was         21       those we make the following. Firstly the families dispute         21       that the only undertaking that was provided on the Path of 0.         22       those was to find employment for only one family member         24       advertaking that the families: word low do not no ta bia for 0 only one family member         25       Secondly we submit that Lommin should assist         4       families.         5       Secondly we submit that lommin should assist         6       responses to the families' interrogatories. you haven't answerd them, we haven't -         4       families.         9       Thirdy Lommin has delayed unduly in upholding         10       undertaking to ensure that one family         <		-		
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ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE				
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1	Page 39228	1	Page 39230
1	can be attended to. Let's not waste your remaining time on	1	it discloses that two of the dead people had fresh
2 3	that point. It can be sorted out. MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed, Chair. That	2 3	scarification marks, six had fresh traditional healer marks, 11 had traditional marks, and 12 had no marks. Now
4	will be attended to, Chair. Now we have recommendations	4	only eight of the dead on the 16th had fresh muti marks. Of
4 5	set out at paragraphs 49.2 and 49.3 of our replying heads	5	the eight with fresh marks three died at scene 1. Now
6	of argument, which we'd like to draw attention to. In the	6	Nqongophele was killed approximately 90 metres away with
7	recommendations in our reply heads, Mr Chair, are that you	7	injuries that suggests that he died where he was shot and
8	should find that Lonmin is liable to compensate the	8	therefore was not part of any alleged attack. Now this
9	dependents of the deceased for loss of support, and that	9	leaves only two miners with fresh markings in scene 1. So
10	you should find that the senior executives of Lonmin can on	10	insofar as there would be an argument that the marks were
11	a prima facie basis be investigated further and depending	11	indicative of muti having been applied to these people,
12	on the investigation that they can prima facie be charged	12	with whatever effect it is argued that achieved, it seems
13	as accomplices to any such crimes as may have been	13	to us on the basis only, on the basis of this analysis.
14	committed by the SAPS on the 16th of August that resulted in	14	[15:41] There would be no way to account for the other 15
15	the deaths of 34 strikers, and I'm sure Mr Mpofu will make	15	people other than the two who were found with fresh marks
16	also the recommendation –	16	to explain whether or not they acted as a consequence of
17	CHAIRPERSON: No, I see that in as far as	17	muti. And I say this also bearing in mind what Professor
18	Lonmin is concerned it appears from paragraph 611 of your	18	Lamla seems to have given his expert opinion on, on the
19	heads that the families submit Lonmin's responsible for the	19	relevance otherwise of what the muti was supposed to
20	deaths of their loved ones and you go on to say in 612,	20	achieve. There would also be Magidiwana who was being
21	"Lonmin's responsibility is set out in full in AMCU's heads	21	cross-examined by Mr Ngalwana who was to consent to a
22	of argument and we make common cause of these submissions	22	medical examination to establish whether he had muti
23	and don't consider it necessary to repeat them." So we've	23	markings from August 2012 when there was a big argument as
24	already heard that from AMCU. Then you go on to make the	24	to whether you can age the markings. Now on page 6374,
25	point at 613 and following that Lonmin wanted SAPS to break	25	line 18 the Chair seems to explain that there are three
1	Page 39229	1	Page 39231
1	the strike –	1	possibilities. One, is that the doctors may say they can't
2	the strike – MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.	2	possibilities. One, is that the doctors may say they can't say what age the mark is. Secondly, they could say they
2 3	the strike – MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: - and lobbied and colluded,	2	possibilities. One, is that the doctors may say they can't say what age the mark is. Secondly, they could say they were more recent than December 2011 and probably done about
2 3 4	the strike – MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: - and lobbied and colluded, as you put it, with SAPS to achieve this. You then set out	2 3 4	possibilities. One, is that the doctors may say they can't say what age the mark is. Secondly, they could say they were more recent than December 2011 and probably done about August 2012. Thirdly, they could say it could be that they
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## Marikana Commission of Inquiry

		1	
1	Page 39232 which could be relied upon for what was perceived to be the	1	Page 39234 shot was capable of killing a person as it did on this day
2	conduct of the mineworkers, much less can it be relied upon	2	250 metres away. Now in the case of Gwelani, it's like
3	as an indication that the mineworkers as a result of the	2	somebody in my team says in order for us to have a sense of
4	muti decided to attack the police. Our position is that	4	scaling, 250 metres is the length of two and a half rugby
5	there's not been any attack that has been shown to have	5	fields, soccer, regulated soccer fields. So if you can
6	existed even subjectively, but if one accepts that the	6	imagine one soccer field, a second soccer field and a half
7	police may have believed that they were being attacked	7	of a soccer field and at that range Gwelani was shot dead,
		7 8	one single shot to the head.
8 9	particularly in scene 1 they clearly cannot link what they perceived as an attack to the application of muti. Now, Mr	0 9	CHAIRPERSON: I'm getting a bit worried,
			0 0
10	Chair, I will definitely now need a warning to be given for	10	Mr Ntsebeza about the time. How long are these pictures
11	my final submission which will be –	11	going to take? You haven't got much time left, so anyway
12	CHAIRPERSON: Can you perhaps the warning	12	I'm just warning you.
13	yourself in Xhosa?	13	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Well it's about – I
14	MR NTSEBEZA SC: [Vernacular].	14	don't know how they are going to be, it's not long, it's
15	CHAIRPERSON: Well one person I think	15	just four slides.
16	left and there's another lady going.	16	CHAIRPERSON: There's not a problem then.
17	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.	17	You've got five minutes I'm told. All right, four slides
18	CHAIRPERSON: Two ladies.	18	with over a minute per slide, okay.
19	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Can we put up the	19	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Put up – that's slide 1.
20	presentation that has been indicated to? Forget about the	20	Go back please.
21	- for now. Now, Mr Chairman, before we go to these	21	CHAIRPERSON: That's Mr Tukusa, I think
22	graphics our submission is the following. The gravamen of	22	it reads killer bullet, one high velocity bullet to the
23	what we perceive to be the justification for those who were	23	head. I take it he was 42 years old isn't it?
24	killed seems to be that the police acted in self defence.	24	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.
25	Now we have contested that, we have argued that on a wide	25	CHAIRPERSON: That's what the meaning of
	De m. 20222		D
1	Page 39233 range of reasons it cannot be so. We have also submitted	1	Page 39235 the 42 at the first line is.
2	that if we accept our proposition that the use of lethal	2	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Next one please.
3	force, the use of violence by a gangster should be	3	CHAIRPERSON: This one is Mr Jijase, aged
4	different to the use of similar force if it is used by a	4	26 killer bullet, one high velocity bullet to the head.
5	law enforcement agency because the responsibilities of	5	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Next one.
6	these two entities are different. Then it must be accepted	6	CHAIRPERSON: This one is Mr Pato, aged
7	that in a society where certain foundational values have	7	35. Killer bullet, one high velocity bullet to the neck.
8	been cherished, in a society where there has been a	8	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Next one.
9	conscious effort since the dawn of democracy to even change	9	CHAIRPERSON: You'll have to pronounce
10	the manner in which our police service is trained. Then	10	that for me.
11	there is a lot that is expected by these families in the	11	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Ndongophele.
12	way in which the police service will react even to a	12	CHAIRPERSON: How do you pronounce it?
13	perceived threat because their duty even in the face of	13	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Ndongophele.
14	danger to themselves, to other human beings, threat to	14	CHAIRPERSON: Ndongophele, aged 31.
15	property even theirs is to make sure that what they do in	15	Killer bullet, one high velocity bullet to the head. Then
16	defence of property, of themselves or of others can never	16	the next reads what about Mr Noki?
17	be so disproportionate as to defeat any understanding as to	17	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.
18	why it could have been done. Because they are law	18	CHAIRPERSON: There's a picture of him in
19	enforcement agencies, what we had on the 16th was not a	19	his green blanket and then we have a sketch of the various
20	warfare between gangsters, it was a tense situation where	20	injuries to the head.
21	there were striking mineworkers armed with assegais and	20	MR NTSEBEZA SC: No.
22	pangas. To date we have only seen one revolver in scene 1	22	CHAIRPERSON: Injuries to his body, the
23	that can be attributed to the mineworkers, pistol. On the	23	wounds.
24	other hand we have a line of specialised forces, you now	23	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now that, there's a
25	know that the weapons they carried on the day one single	25	number of bullet wounds in Mr Noki. The man in the green
A	RCHIVE FOR LUSIICE		

1	Page 39236 blanket after he had been shot at less than 30 metres away	1	Page 39238
1	2	1	We'll now adjourn until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning when Mr
2	with R5 rifles. That was the nature of his body. CHAIRPERSON: Now we have 14 high	2	Mpofu will have a turn and he will address us on behalf of
3	5	3	the injured and arrested persons, followed by Mr Tip.
4	velocity bullets.	4	[COMMISSION ADJOURNED]
5	MR NTSEBEZA SC: That was Mr Noki.	5	
6	CHAIRPERSON: That's Mr Noki 2, head and	6	
7	neck. 3, front left lower leg. Left thigh, elbow, right	7	
8	buttock, back right thigh, back right calf, left lower leg,	8	
9	rear lower leg, right thigh.	9	
10	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now that's his head, Mr	10	
11	Chairman.	11	
12	CHAIRPERSON: Yes his head is depicted	12	
13	lying it looks like on the green blanket with a number of	13	•
14	frightening looking wounds on his face.	14	
15	MR NTSEBEZA SC: That is the head that	15	
16	had been reduced to that state in less than a minute from	16	
17	the head and the smiling face which you saw before he was	17	
18	killed. What we ask is this, can this all have been in aid	18	
19	of self defence? Whether it is putative, whether it's in	19	
20	defence, you know, Mr Chair, to state the obvious –	20	
21	CHAIRPERSON: We go back to a picture of	21	
22	him smiling in his green blanket in front of the koppie.	22	
23	MR NTSEBEZA SC: To state the obvious we	23	
24	all live in this country and we all rely on the police	24	•
25	service for our security and protection and whenever I have	25	•
	Page 39237		
1	got threats to my property and my life and I have reason to		
2	call the police service to come and deal with the threat.		
3	And let's assume for once that the threat was against each		
4	one of us and the members of the police service perceived		
5	that they had a duty to defend us against the perceived		
6	threat. I want us to do a soul searching and find out		
7	whether if the threat is 30 metres away the only way an		
8	officer of the SAPS would find that to deal with that		
9	threat and the threat is a spear and an assegai it is to		
10	blow half of the face of that perceived threat in the way		
11	in which these photographs have shown you. One single shot		
12	a person's face is shattered to smithereens.		
13	[16:01] Is that, what can be justified on any basis in a		
14	democratic constitutional State. I have no doubt that even		
15	if it was in my personal safety defence, even if a member		
16	of the SAPS was acting in my interest, I would never find		
17	it was justified for them to use high velocity firepower to		
18	remove a perceived threat 30 metres away in that fashion,		
19	not in my name. It should not be in our name as a society.		
20	It should not be in the name of this Commission that this		
21	Commission has sanctioned the disfigurement of persons in		
22	that fashion. It should never be in the name of our		
23	democracy, not in the name of the Constitution. It just		
24	should not happen. Those are our submissions, Mr Chair.		
25	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Ntsebeza.		
A	RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE		

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