RealTime Transcriptions

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 128 5 SEPTEMBER 2013 PAGES 13326 TO 13520



© REALTIME TRANSCRIPTIONS

64 10th Avenue, Highlands North, Johannesburg P O Box 721, Highlands North, 2037 Tel: 011-440-3647 Fax: 011-440-9119 Cell: 083 273-5335 E-mail: realtime@pixie.co.za Web Address: http://mysite.mweb.co.za/residents/pak06278



	Page 13326		Page 13328
1	[PROCEEDINGS ON 5 SEPTEMBER 2013]	1	identify each document –
2	[09:45] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.	2	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, I see.
3	Sorry that we're not starting at the time that I had	3	MR SEMENYA SC: About that document which
4	announced but we had housekeeping matters to attend to	4	is FFF18, it's an exhibit already, it was commissioned on
5	before we could start. Mr Semenya, are you leading the	5	the 18th of October 2012, is that right?
6	next witness?	6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
7	MR SEMENYA SC: With the leave of the	7	MR SEMENYA SC: Your signature on the
8	Chair and Commissioners, yes.	8	page before last appears with a date on top being the 4th of
9	CHAIRPERSON: Leave granted.	9	September 2012, do you see that?
10	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, can we have	10	COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct, yes.
11	Colonel Scott stand up and take an oath?	11	MR SEMENYA SC: Are you able to explain
12	CHAIRPERSON: Duncan George Scott.	12	that?
13	CHAIRPERSON: If you could use that -	13	COLONEL SCOTT: This statement was
14	what are your full names, Duncan. Are you prepared to take	14	completed on that date by the 4th of September and it was
15	the oath, will that be binding on your conscience –	15	commissioned in Rustenburg with a pretty lady at the
16	MR SEMENYA SC: Maybe if Mr Scott could	16	advocates' offices there on the 18th of October.
17	have his mike on.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. The next document
18	CHAIRPERSON: Shall we start again?	18	you will find in the bundle of documents you have is marked
19	Record your full names.	19	GGG39, do you see that?
20	COLONEL SCOTT: Duncan George Scott, sir.	20	COLONEL SCOTT: I see it.
21	CHAIRPERSON: If I ask you to take an	21	MR SEMENYA SC: That too is a document
22	oath will that be binding on your conscience?	22	you, an affidavit you deposed to in November 2012, is that
23	COLONEL SCOTT: That would be, sir.	23	right?
24	CHAIRPERSON: Do you swear that the	24	CHAIRPERSON: I must tell you my copy
25	evidence you will give before this Commission will be the	25	isn't an affidavit because it's unsigned and unattested.
			-
	Page 13327		Page 13329
1	truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Please	1	MR SEMENYA SC: Alright, we'll get –
2	raise your right hand and say I swear, so help me God.	2	CHAIRPERSON: He can solve the problem by
3	COLONEL SCOTT: I swear so to God.	3	confirming under oath that the contents are correct. As a
4	CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated. Yes, Mr	4	fact, as a fact our one isn't signed or attested.
5	Semenya?	5	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Barring any
6	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: d.s.s.	6	typographical errors that may appear in that statement, is
7	EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA: Colonel, with	7	that your statement?
8	the permission of the Chair, I will be putting leading	8	COLONEL SCOTT: It is my statement.
9	questions to you, except in areas where the answers to	9	MR SEMENYA SC: And do you confirm its
10	those questions are not in a written form in any of the	10	contents to be true?
11	documents that you are going to deal with, okay. You have	11	COLONEL SCOTT: There's only one small
12	before you a set of documents, one of which is marked	12	discrepancy I find in paragraph 2.
13	FFF18. Do you see that document?	13	MR SEMENYA SC: Well, we'll get to those,
14	COLONEL SCOTT: I've got it.	14	yes.
15	MR SEMENYA SC: That document is the	15	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.
16	first of the statements you made with regard to the	16	MR SEMENYA SC: Barring those, this is a
17	Marikana matter, is that right?	17	true account of facts that fell within your knowledge, is
10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	18	that right?
18	CLIAIDDEDCONL. Una corruite interrunt you	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct.
19	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you,		MR SEMENYA SC: The other document that
19 20	Mr Semenya, I see this bundle we've been given, for which I	20	
19 20 21	Mr Semenya, I see this bundle we've been given, for which I wish to thank you, contains FFF18, GGG39, HHH20 and then it	21	then follows is a document marked HHH20, do you have that
19 20 21 22	Mr Semenya, I see this bundle we've been given, for which I wish to thank you, contains FFF18, GGG39, HHH20 and then it looks like an extra statement, which isn't an exhibit yet,	21 22	then follows is a document marked HHH20, do you have that in front of you?
19 20 21 22 23	Mr Semenya, I see this bundle we've been given, for which I wish to thank you, contains FFF18, GGG39, HHH20 and then it looks like an extra statement, which isn't an exhibit yet, by Colonel Visser. Should we not give it an exhibit letter	21 22 23	then follows is a document marked HHH20, do you have that in front of you? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
 19 20 21 22 23 24 	Mr Semenya, I see this bundle we've been given, for which I wish to thank you, contains FFF18, GGG39, HHH20 and then it looks like an extra statement, which isn't an exhibit yet, by Colonel Visser. Should we not give it an exhibit letter now so that –	21 22 23 24	then follows is a document marked HHH20, do you have that in front of you? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, let me correct what
 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	Mr Semenya, I see this bundle we've been given, for which I wish to thank you, contains FFF18, GGG39, HHH20 and then it looks like an extra statement, which isn't an exhibit yet, by Colonel Visser. Should we not give it an exhibit letter	21 22 23	then follows is a document marked HHH20, do you have that in front of you? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.

	Page 13330		Page 13332
1	duly signed and attested on the 19th of November and then	1	CHAIRPERSON: Oh sorry, you're quite
2	behind it we have what looks like a copy of the same	2	right. JJJ1 and JJJ2. Perhaps I should just – well,
3	document, I haven't compared the two but that's the one I	3	perhaps you can describe them for me, Mr Semenya.
4	looked at the end of and that is undated and unsigned but	4	MR SEMENYA SC: These documents, Chair,
5	it's the same document, obviously it was just inserted in	5	appear as item number 5 on the list of documents my learned
6	the file by mistake. So if that's correct then we have a	6	colleague Chaskalson will be dealing with. They will be
7	duly signed and attested GGG39.	7	item 5 on that list.
8	MR SEMENYA SC: I'm grateful to you,	8	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the first appears to
9	Chair. The document now, Colonel, that you're dealing with	9	be a digital image dated the 1st, dated the 25th of January
10	is marked HHH20. Do you have that?	10	2013 appearing on the Google Earth site and the second one
11	COLONEL SCOTT: yes.	11	is also a Google image of the same date. I don't know
12	MR SEMENYA SC: It too has in the	12	whether we can describe them in any greater detail than
13	tramlines written on it, "Consolidated statement of Duncan	13	that. The one seems to be a different –
14	Scott."	14	MR SEMENYA SC: If we can use the
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	15	elevation that appears there, Chair.
16	MR SEMENYA SC: That document bears your	16	CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
17	signature on page 148 of 150, is that right?	17	MR SEMENYA SC: The one would be 1149,
18	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	18	the other one will be 1145.
19	MR SEMENYA SC: And dated the 10th July	19	CHAIRPERSON: Yes. JJJ1 is the elevation
20	2013.	20	1145 metres and JJJ2 is the elevation 1114 – sorry, 1149
20	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	20	metres.
21		22	
	MR SEMENYA SC: The other document you		,
23	have has no exhibit number but it is a further statement –	23	document, Colonel, you have before you is a statement of Colonel Visser.
24 25	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, Mr Semenya, that	24	
25	one hasn't got an attestation certificate. It's signed on	25	CHAIRPERSON: Shall we make that JJJ3?
	Page 13331		Page 13333
1	Page 13331 148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the	1	Page 13333 MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will
1 2	-	1 2	-
	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the		MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will
2	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there.	2	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your
2	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not –	2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your
2 3 4	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do
2 3 4 5	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana?	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that?
2 3 4 5 6	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do.	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before
2 3 4 5 6 7	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:The attestation is not –do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I do. Barring again typos, itis a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. LONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. LONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. LONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. LONEL SCOTT:Ken LYes. LONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. LONEL SCOTT:Ken LYes. LONEL SCOTT:Ken L </td <td>2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td> <td>MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2.</td>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there.MR SEMENYA SC:The attestation is not –do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana?COLONEL SCOTT:Ves, I do. MR SEMENYA SC:Barring again typos, itis a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. LCHAIRPERSON:CHAIRPERSON:He – ja, that's alright.And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there.MR SEMENYA SC:The attestation is not –do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC:Barring again typos, itis a true account of the facts as you know them?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. CHAIRPERSON:Yes. He – ja, that's alright.And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there.MR SEMENYA SC:The attestation is not –do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana?The attestation is not –COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I do. Barring again typos, itis a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. CHAIRPERSON:CHAIRPERSON:He – ja, that's alright.And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:The attestation is not –do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Barring again typos, itis a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. CHAIRPERSON:He – ja, that's alright.And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we haveColonel Visser.MR SEMENYA SC:Well, yes, yes, Chair.The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair? CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we can now	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you. Colonel, can
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair? CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we can now move on to J, can we? H was the letter which was reserved	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you. Colonel, can I then ask you to go back to your supplementary statement –
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair? CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we can now move on to J, can we? H was the letter which was reserved for General Mpembe so these will be J1 and 2. Sorry, what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you. Colonel, can I then ask you to go back to your supplementary statement – COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr Semenya, this is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair? CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we can now move on to J, can we? H was the letter which was reserved for General Mpembe so these will be J1 and 2. Sorry, what I said wasn't recorded. For Colonel Scott we could use the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you. Colonel, can I then ask you to go back to your supplementary statement – COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr Semenya, this is a further statement of Colonel Visser. You're not putting
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair? CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we can now move on to J, can we? H was the letter which was reserved for General Mpembe so these will be J1 and 2. Sorry, what I said wasn't recorded. For Colonel Scott we could use the letter J. So these two documents can be J1 and J2.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you. Colonel, can I then ask you to go back to your supplementary statement – COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr Semenya, this is a further statement of Colonel Visser. You're not putting the first statement in?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	148 but on my copy 149 is blank. Now perhaps the attestation certificate should be there. MR SEMENYA SC: The attestation is not – do you confirm HHH to be your consolidated statement of the events in Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. MR SEMENYA SC: Barring again typos, it is a true account of the facts as you know them? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: He – ja, that's alright. And then there are two, what appear to be two annexures which are, look like Google photographs and then we have Colonel Visser. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, yes, yes, Chair. The two Google maps, we will refer to them in the course of your evidence but may we have them marked the next exhibit, Chair? CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we can now move on to J, can we? H was the letter which was reserved for General Mpembe so these will be J1 and 2. Sorry, what I said wasn't recorded. For Colonel Scott we could use the letter J. So these two documents can be J1 and J2. MR SEMENYA SC: I'm indebted to you,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. That will be marked JJJ3. The last document before you is a confirmatory affidavit relevant to JJJ3 which is your confirmatory affidavit of contents contained in JJJ3. Do you have that? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't have that before me but I know I've signed that. CHAIRPERSON: I see there's a one page document at the end of the file which would then be – shall we make it JJJ3.1 and JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: So the main affidavit which is the 30 page affidavit, is JJJ3.1 and the one page affidavit – that is, that's dated the 3rd September – and the one page affidavit which is by this witness, which will be JJJ3.2, that's an affidavit deposed to by the witness on the 4th of September and that's JJJ3.2. MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you. Colonel, can I then ask you to go back to your supplementary statement – COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr Semenya, this is a further statement of Colonel Visser. You're not putting the first statement in? MR SEMENYA SC: Madam Commissioner –

	Page 13334		Page 13336
1	you'd want us to apply our minds to, or not?	1	training in the STF selection course 14 in 1993.
2	CHAIRPERSON: In fact in paragraph 2 of	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
3	JJJ3.1 there's a reference to two earlier affidavits made	3	CHAIRPERSON: May I enquire whether
4	by Colonel Visser, one on the 16th of May 2013 and the other	4	copies of this statement from which you are now leading
5	on the 30th of July. I don't know whether you're going to	5	have been made available to the media? Obviously you're
6	put them in or not but -	6	going to deal with the highlights now but you may well
7	MR SEMENYA SC: No, Chair.	7	think it important that the media should have the complete
8	CHAIRPERSON: - they are referred to	8	copy so that they can report extra bits that are not dealt
9	here.	9	with in your highlighted section if they consider it
10	MR SEMENYA SC: The only relevance of	10	relevant.
11	Colonel Visser's further affidavit which appears here,	11	MR SEMENYA SC: I'll make sure that
12	merely deals with the compilation of what we call exhibit L	12	happens, Chair. As you say, you were one of the 16 who
13	to which this witness was a co-author. The other two	13	succeeded in that course of a group of 310 candidates that
14	statements are not relevant to him.	14	were there, is that right?
15	CHAIRPERSON: I see, thank you.	15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
16	MR SEMENYA SC: The consolidated	16	MR SEMENYA SC: This was in 1993.
17	statement HHH20, can I invite you to go to that document?	17	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
18	Do you have it?	18	MR SEMENYA SC: And you completed the
19	COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there.	19	mandatory advanced courses and you were deployed
20	MR SEMENYA SC: Just so that we	20	operationally over two years in 1995 as well, is that
21	understand the context of the various affidavits you	21	right?
22	deposed to, can I draw your attention to paragraph 52.20	22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
23	appearing on page 147 of 149. Are you there?	23	MR SEMENYA SC: And it was early in your
24	COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there.	24	STF career that you, the unit management earmarked you as a
25	MR SEMENYA SC: Can you read out what you	25	potential training instructor, is that right?
	D 10007		5
1	Page 13335 say to us there?	1	Page 13337 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
1	say to us there?		COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
1 2 3	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My	1 2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as an
2	say to us there?	2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban
2 3	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: By 1996 you trained as an instructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban phase leader, is that right?
2 3 4	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident,	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
2 3 4 5	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and	2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?
2 3 4 5 6	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident,	2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader is
2 3 4 5 6 7	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which	2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in this
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: By 1996 you trained as an instructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban phase leader, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: A phase leader is somebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in this case, the urban field forward, is in control of that field
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: By 1996 you trained as an instructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban phase leader, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: A phase leader is somebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in this case, the urban field forward, is in control of that field within the STF environment and has to manage the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement."	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phase
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: By 1996 you trained as an instructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban phase leader, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: A phase leader is somebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in this case, the urban field forward, is in control of that field within the STF environment and has to manage the instruction and the training given in that field. MR SEMENYA SC: And what did you have to do with the methodologies adopted by the urban phase leaders?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: By 1996 you trained as an instructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban phase leader, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: A phase leader is somebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in this case, the urban field forward, is in control of that field within the STF environment and has to manage the instruction and the training given in that field. MR SEMENYA SC: And what did you have to do with the methodologies adopted by the urban phase leaders? COLONEL SCOTT: At the time that I took
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister units
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister unitsinternationally as well as nationally and I had taken best
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: There under section 1 of B you deal with your career experience, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister unitsinternationally as well as nationally and I had taken bestpractices and started enhancing and applying new strategies
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: There under section 1 of B you deal with your career experience, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister unitsinternationally as well as nationally and I had taken bestpractices and started enhancing and applying new strategiesin training, which eventually were becoming adopted by our
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: There under section 1 of B you deal with your career experience, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: By 1996 you trained as an instructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urban phase leader, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: A phase leader is somebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in this case, the urban field forward, is in control of that field within the STF environment and has to manage the instruction and the training given in that field. MR SEMENYA SC: And what did you have to do with the methodologies adopted by the urban phase leaders? COLONEL SCOTT: At the time that I took it over I had started cross-training with sister units internationally as well as nationally and I had taken best practices and started enhancing and applying new strategies in training, which eventually were becoming adopted by our division training as best practices.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: There under section 1 of B you deal with your career experience, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: With you matriculating in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister unitsinternationally as well as nationally and I had taken bestpractices and started enhancing and applying new strategiesin training, which eventually were becoming adopted by ourdivision training as best practices.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was in 2007 that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: There under section 1 of B you deal with your career experience, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: With you matriculating in 1986 at Randfontein High School and being drafted in the national service in '87 and '88, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister unitsinternationally as well as nationally and I had taken bestpractices and started enhancing and applying new strategiesin training, which eventually were becoming adopted by ourdivision training as best practices.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was in 2007 thatyou were tasked to be the STF section head, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	say to us there? COLONEL SCOTT: It reads as follows, "My statement provides my experience of the days at Marikana to the best of my recollection. I cannot account for all my time spent at Marikana or every conversation or incident, but I've spent much time reflecting on the days and recalling the events, conversations and thoughts which formed my decisions and suggestions over the days. What I have portrayed in my statement is what I can account for. I say this, "understanding I have much time in dealing with the police's presentation and realising that hindsight is a danger which I have consciously tried to avoid in preparation of this statement." MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Colonel, can we now go back to deal with section B. You will find that appearing on page 2 of the statement HHH20. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: There under section 1 of B you deal with your career experience, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: With you matriculating in 1986 at Randfontein High School and being drafted in the national service in '87 and '88, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:By 1996 you trained as aninstructor for STF and in 1998 you were appointed STF urbanphase leader, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?COLONEL SCOTT:A phase leader issomebody that becomes a field leader that takes, in thiscase, the urban field forward, is in control of that fieldwithin the STF environment and has to manage theinstruction and the training given in that field.MR SEMENYA SC:And what did you have todo with the methodologies adopted by the urban phaseleaders?COLONEL SCOTT:At the time that I tookit over I had started cross-training with sister unitsinternationally as well as nationally and I had taken bestpractices and started enhancing and applying new strategiesin training, which eventually were becoming adopted by ourdivision training as best practices.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was in 2007 thatyou were tasked to be the STF section head, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:No.

	Page 13338		Page 13340
1	COLONEL SCOTT: I was tasked in 2007 to	1	MR SEMENYA SC: Your leadership positions
2	represent the unit at a planning of an inter-departmental	2	you held are also dealt with in paragraph 5.10 going
3	operation.	3	forward, is that right?
4	MR SEMENYA SC: And that was code-named	4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
5	Air Wolf.	5	MR SEMENYA SC: That's where you tell us
6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	6	you played a leading role in planning, organising and co-
7	MR SEMENYA SC: What did you do there?	7	ordinating multi-disciplinary operations where high risk
8	COLONEL SCOTT: It was a dual operation	8	units were integrated, is that right?
9	and I was in charge of the planning thereof, the organising	9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
10	and the deploying of the forces in that operation. It was	10	MR SEMENYA SC: You also tell us about
11	in preparation for the football World Cup as well as to	11	Operation Air Wolf to which you made earlier reference, is
12	combat certain crime taking place on the borderline of	12	that right?
13	South Africa.	13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
14	MR SEMENYA SC: And against paragraph 5.5	14	MR SEMENYA SC: And under paragraph
15	you tell us what happened on the completion of the	15	5.10.3 you deal with various roles that you occupied and
16	operation Air Wolf and what instructions you got from the	16	painted it Greenpoint operational shield 1, operation
17	Deputy National Commissioner Pruis, is that right?	17	shield 2 and operation shield 3.
18	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	18	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
19	MR SEMENYA SC: You also deal with things	19	[10:04] MR SEMENYA SC: So too, you deal with the
20	that you did relevant to the 2010 FIFA World Cup that was	20	matters of the FIFA World Cup again. Under that paragraph
21	hosted in this country, is that right?	21	you also include in it Operation Squeeze, the criminals
22	COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.	22	that happened in Soshanguve, Pretoria, is that right?
23	MR SEMENYA SC: Against paragraph 5.6 you	23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
24	tell us the responsibilities you had in 2007, is that	24	MR SEMENYA SC: You also deal in the line
25	right?	25	of your experience with what happened with the African
1	Page 13339	1	Page 13341
1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	1	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea.
2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point you	2	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,	2 3	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And at that point you held various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier, up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is that	2 3 4	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And at that point you held various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier, up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is that right?	2 3 4 5	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban.
2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-	2 3 4 5 6	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacant	2 3 4 5 6 7	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier, up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacant post of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into that position.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eight	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Waritzburg SAP Community	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:Are we at paragraph	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:Are we at paragraph5.9.1? Yes, one year and eight	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:Are we at paragraph5.9.1? Yes, one year and eight months.MR SEMENYA SC:And some three months'	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: STF weapon face leader
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:Are we at paragraph5.9.1? Yes, one year and eight months.MR SEMENYA SC:And some three months'experience in the public order policing based at unit 2,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: STF weapon face leader for one course, right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:Are we at paragraph5.9.1? Yes, one year and eight months.MR SEMENYA SC:And some three months'experience in the public order policing based at unit 2,Diepkloof, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: STF weapon face leader for one course, right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And at that point youheld various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier,up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is thatright?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I was a Lieutenant-Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacantpost of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into thatposition.MR SEMENYA SC:Oh yes, thank you. Yourpolicing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 andpage 6 of that document, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had a year and eightmonths policing experience in Maritzburg SAP CommunityService Centre, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:Are we at paragraph5.9.1? Yes, one year and eight months.MR SEMENYA SC:And some three months'experience in the public order policing based at unit 2,Diepkloof, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: STF weapon face leader for one course, right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you cite various
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And at that point you held various things, both as a Colonel, later as Brigadier, up until you are the full Colonel you are today, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: No, I was a Lieutenant- Colonel and I completed the job description of the vacant post of the Colonel and was promoted, after time, into that position. MR SEMENYA SC: Oh yes, thank you. Your policing experience you describe against paragraph 5.9 and page 6 of that document, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You had a year and eight months policing experience in Maritzburg SAP Community Service Centre, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Are we at paragraph 5.9.1? Yes, one year and eight months. MR SEMENYA SC: And some three months' experience in the public order policing based at unit 2, Diepkloof, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And 20 years' experience,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Union Summit that was in Equatorial Guinea. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You deal also too in your course of experience with the conference of parties that was Cops 17, held in Durban. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: In your experience, Colonel, you have undergone various training as an STF urban instructor for 14 courses during the period 96 to 2009, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: As an STF urban based leader to which you testified earlier, you did 12 courses there during 1998 and 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: - instructor 2004 to 2009. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: STF weapon face leader for one course, right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you cite various other training that you received during the course of your

1	Page 13342	1	Page 13344
1	MR SEMENYA SC: You have also – you also	1	addressing conflictive situations where the police are
2	deal against paragraph 5.12 with various initiatives to	2	called in and you need to resolve it through dialogue,
3	introduce systems aimed at streamlining problematic areas.	3	that's the short nutshell of it.
4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. The next page, at
5	MR SEMENYA SC: Those you table quite at	5	13 you deal with the external local providers, you deal
6	some length throughout page 9 to 10, as well as the top of	6	with those in quite some detail, is that right?
7	page 11, is that right?	7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
8	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	8	MR SEMENYA SC: And on page 14, you deal
9	MR SEMENYA SC: Your qualifications are	9	with various commendations and awards you have received in
10	that of a matric as you told us in 1986, your national	10	the course of your career.
11	diploma in policing that you got cum laude in 1997, am I	11	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
12	right?	12	MR SEMENYA SC: But may we make special
13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	13	mention of the third bullet on the top of page 14, you tell
14	MR SEMENYA SC: Then you have the BTech	14	us you were in the USA and what was happening there?
15	degree in policing which you did at Pretoria Technikon in	15	COLONEL SCOTT: The protective
16	2003.	16	intelligence investigation course.
17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes.
18	MR SEMENYA SC: You enumerate a whole	18	COLONEL SCOTT: That was a course that
19	number of courses that you did over the period of your	19	was presented in South Africa by a United States
20	career with the South African Police Service. Those you	20	delegation, and that deals with the gaining of
21	tabulate against paragraph 5.13.2. Is that right?	21	intelligence, the analysing of intelligence and then the
22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	22	acting upon that intelligence, or the verifying of it, to
23	MR SEMENYA SC: And we may mention that	23	give it over to the operational side to act upon.
24	in relation to the operational commanders training, the OCT	24	MR SEMENYA SC: And the next bullet?
25	in 2002, following the recommendation of the Goldstone	25	COLONEL SCOTT: The next bullet is the
	Page 13343		Page 13345
1	Commission, you came out as a best student when dealing	1	tactical commanders course which is the training of leaders
2	with the focus on training, which was to re-orientate the	2	over the crisis response teams which was a course on page
3	police service in the proper public order policing.	3	13, last bullet where we see the USA crisis response team
4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. If I can	4	training. The course in 2001 included one week of team
5	just make mention to 5.13.2, the second bullet, internal	5	leader training. The United States later developed its own
6	stability course 1992, the course is a dual course, dealing	6	course in team leader, which we see as the fourth bullet on
7	with internal stability and combined POP training. It was	7	14, page 14, which it was dedicated to training the leaders
8	not a complete six weeks POP training. There were two		
	not a complete six weeks for training. There were two	8	over the operational members on the ground.
9	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course.	8 9	over the operational members on the ground. MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you
9 10			
	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course.	9	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you
10	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did	9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders.
10 11	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training?	9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South
10 11 12	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at	9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the
10 11 12 13	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had	9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes.
10 11 12 13 14	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the	9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders?
10 11 12 13 14 15	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations.	9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course.MR SEMENYA SC:Just in summary, what didthat entail, that POP training?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That POP training was atthe basic level of the front man on the ground, and it hadto deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, theformations.CHAIRPERSON:So, do we change this	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?"	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?" COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task force, is that right?
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?" COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And the one bullet before</pre>	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task force, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?" COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And the one bullet before last, that deals specifically with hostage negotiators</pre>	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task force, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Those are dealt with on
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?" COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And the one bullet before last, that deals specifically with hostage negotiators course, is that right?</pre>	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task force, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Those are dealt with on page 15 of your statement.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	<pre>weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?" COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And the one bullet before last, that deals specifically with hostage negotiators course, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.</pre>	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task force, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Those are dealt with on page 15 of your statement. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	weeks dedicated to POP training in that course. MR SEMENYA SC: Just in summary, what did that entail, that POP training? COLONEL SCOTT: That POP training was at the basic level of the front man on the ground, and it had to deal with the tactical options employed by POPs, the formations. CHAIRPERSON: So, do we change this bullet to read, "internal stability course 1992, a six week course (two weeks POP)?" COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And the one bullet before last, that deals specifically with hostage negotiators course, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: What did that entail?	 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	MR SEMENYA SC: So that is where you train the commanders. COLONEL SCOTT: This is not the - a South African course, this was just a course we attended with the United States, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: For the commanders? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, there are various commendations you have received over the period, both academic and others which you received in the special task force, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Those are dealt with on page 15 of your statement. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There are milestones you

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

	D 1004/		Dama 10040
1	Page 13346 right?	1	Page 13348 paragraph 6.2 that at that time, you were not aware of the
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2	ongoing strike action at Lonmin Mine?
3	MR SEMENYA SC: Section C now begins to	3	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I wasn't.
4	deal with the events at Marikana, can we get to those?	4	MR SEMENYA SC: And you thought this to
5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	5	be just one of the STF operations about which Brigadier
6	MR SEMENYA SC: "On Monday, the 13th, you	6	Fritz was talking to you about?
7	tell us that you received a phone call from Brigadier	7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. He had
8	Fritz, that is 13th of August 2012, is that right?	8	mentioned that the suspects had run to a mountain and my
9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	9	understanding at that time, it was the Magaliesburg
10	MR SEMENYA SC: What does Brigadier Fritz	10	Mountains, interpreting the mountain as a true mountain in
11	say to you?	11	the English sense, and that we had to conduct a follow up
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Brigadier Fritz basically	12	operation to track literally the spoor of the perpetrators
13	told me that there was an incident at Marikana, that I	13	and attempt to arrest them.
14	needed to report there. General Annandale was awaiting me.	14	MR SEMENYA SC: And on your way to
15	I needed to assist in the planning and co-ordination of an	15	Marikana you called Major-General Annandale, did you not?
16	operation in apprehending suspects that had attacked police	16	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
17	members that day.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: What did you say to him?
18	MR SEMENYA SC: And who is Brigadier	18	COLONEL SCOTT: I mentioned to him that
19	Fritz?	19	we were en route and he assisted me with directions to get
20	COLONEL SCOTT: Brigadier Fritz is the,	20	to the JOC area at the Lonmin Mine.
21	at that time he was the section head of the special task	21	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you say on
22	force, that's the commander, overall commander of the	22	your way there, what did you do while travelling to
23	special task force.	23	Pretoria?
24	MR SEMENYA SC: That is the commander	24	COLONEL SCOTT: En route, as is customary
25	under whom you –	25	with a call out responsive operation, we would start with
1	Page 13347 COLONEL SCOTT: Under whom I report	1	Page 13349 the appreciation process immediately and start formulating
2	directly to, yes.	2	strategy, understanding that time is of essence and one
3	MR SEMENYA SC: Right. So the	3	needs to hit the ground running sometimes. So you wouldn't
4	information from Brigadier Fritz is that you should go to	4	wait necessarily until you get to the scene, but you'd
5	Marikana, report to Major-General Annandale, do you do	5	start with your planning procedure already en route.
6	that?	6	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you earlier
7	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	7	say, from the information you received Brigadier Fritz, you
8	MR SEMENYA SC: Does he give you some	8	really thought that the mountain he is referring to was the
9	information why you should be going there?	9	Magaliesburg Mountain.
10	COLONEL SCOTT: Brigadier Fritz or?	10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
11	MR SEMENYA SC: That is Brigadier Fritz.	11	MR SEMENYA SC: And you thought the group
12	COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, he	12	of people after whom you had to track, would be a group of
			how many more or loss?
13	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in	13	how many more or less?
13 14		13 14	COLONEL SCOTT: I estimated about ten,
	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in		-
14	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we	14	COLONEL SCOTT: I estimated about ten,
14 15	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in	14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: I estimated about ten, being told that it was two policemen that had at that time
14 15 16	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told	14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT: I estimated about ten, being told that it was two policemen that had at that time died. That was about the size of the group at most that I thought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that at
14 15 16 17	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as	14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT: I estimated about ten, being told that it was two policemen that had at that time died. That was about the size of the group at most that I thought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that at that time you were beginning to conceptualise an operation
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as you say?	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT: I estimated about ten, being told that it was two policemen that had at that time died. That was about the size of the group at most that I thought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that at that time you were beginning to conceptualise an operation deployment of various units.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as you say? COLONEL SCOTT: At that stage, it was	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:I estimated about ten,being told that it was two policemen that had at that timedied.that was about the size of the group at most that Ithought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that atthat time you were beginning to conceptualise an operationdeployment of various units.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as you say? COLONEL SCOTT: At that stage, it was very, there wasn't much. I had just been told that	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:I estimated about ten,being told that it was two policemen that had at that timedied.That was about the size of the group at most that Ithought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that atthat time you were beginning to conceptualise an operationdeployment of various units.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:In your mind, at that
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as you say? COLONEL SCOTT: At that stage, it was very, there wasn't much. I had just been told that policemen had been hacked and had died, so that there were	 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	COLONEL SCOTT:I estimated about ten,being told that it was two policemen that had at that timedied.That was about the size of the group at most that Ithought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that atthat time you were beginning to conceptualise an operationdeployment of various units.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:In your mind, at thattime, as your statement says, you had had in mind an STF
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as you say? COLONEL SCOTT: At that stage, it was very, there wasn't much. I had just been told that policemen had been hacked and had died, so that there were pangas and that type of dangerous weapon involved.	 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	COLONEL SCOTT:I estimated about ten,being told that it was two policemen that had at that timedied.That was about the size of the group at most that Ithought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that atthat time you were beginning to conceptualise an operationdeployment of various units.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:In your mind, at thattime, as your statement says, you had had in mind an STFled operation with the assistance of the NIU, the TRT and
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	mentioned that policemen had been killed in an incident in Marikana. The information was very minimal and that we were required as the special task force to go and assist in apprehending the suspects who had escaped from the police thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: What were the facts told to you about that around the killing of the policemen as you say? COLONEL SCOTT: At that stage, it was very, there wasn't much. I had just been told that policemen had been hacked and had died, so that there were	 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	COLONEL SCOTT:I estimated about ten,being told that it was two policemen that had at that timedied.That was about the size of the group at most that Ithought we would have to pursue and attempt to arrest.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that atthat time you were beginning to conceptualise an operationdeployment of various units.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:In your mind, at thattime, as your statement says, you had had in mind an STF

1	Page 13350	1	Page 13352
1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you had in mind to	1	COLONEL SCOTT: Mr Sinclair assisted me
2	,	2	in orientating me to the environment as I myself didn't
3	the deployment of the SAAF helicopters, is that right?	3	quite know where I was. It was dark. We looked firstly on
4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	4	the mine maps and then I took him to a Google map, and we
5	MR SEMENYA SC: And had in mind that they	5	plotted specifically where we were, plotted where he said
6	will do with the helicopters an aerial command platform.	6	that the miners had been coming together, or the strikers.
7	COLONEL SCOTT: That being the police	7	He showed me as well where, and explained to me at that
8	helicopter, yes.	8	time that there had been two fatalities on the Sunday with
9	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You tell us under	9	the mine security. We plotted that position and then he
10	paragraph 6.4 as you say, what was going on in your mind on	10	showed me the approximate positions of where the police had
11	your way to Marikana.	11	been attacked earlier that day and I plotted that as well,
12	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	12	on the Google map.
13	MR SEMENYA SC: On arrival at the Lonmin	13	MR SEMENYA SC: Regarding the size of the
14	Mine, you then go and meet with Major-General Annandale.	14	problem, were you briefed, having come, understanding that
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	15	you are just going to be dealing with a group of ten?
16	MR SEMENYA SC: What does he tell you?	16	COLONEL SCOTT: No, at this stage, the
17	COLONEL SCOTT: Major-General Annandale	17	number was told to me as an approximate crowd of about
18	at that time briefed me more properly as to the situation	18	3 000 people.
19	and this is when it started occurring to me that the	19	MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us against
20	information I had received was insufficient to have made	20	paragraph 6.6 that you now realised that the situation was
21	the right strategy, as we see in the previous paragraph.	21	different from what you had initially understood, is that
22	MR SEMENYA SC: The Commission knows by	22	right?
23	the time you arrive at Marikana, this is now the Monday,	23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
24	the 13th, what time more or less was that?	24	MR SEMENYA SC: And you then, after the
25	COLONEL SCOTT: It was approximately	25	briefing you received from both General Annandale and Mr
	Page 13351		Page 13353
1	19:30, half past seven in the evening. Half past seven to	1	Sinclair, you then start to do what you call an
2	eight o'clock.	2	appreciation process.
3	MR SEMENYA SC: And as you know, by the		
		3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
4	time you arrived there had been ten fatalities already.	3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:What does that entail?
4 5	time you arrived there had been ten fatalities already. COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now,		
		4	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail?
5	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now,	4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was
5 6	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes.	4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information
5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events	4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and
5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National	4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which
5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come.	4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to
5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that	4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy,
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana?	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an	4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he?	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National Commissioner, am I right?
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he? COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, I was	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National Commissioner, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he? COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, I was introduced to Mr Sinclair at the lapa which later became	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that from
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he? COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, I was introduced to Mr Sinclair at the lapa which later became the JOC, by General Annandale, and I understood him to have	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National Commissioner, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that from that time onward, all inputs were being absorbed. Who are
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he? COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, I was introduced to Mr Sinclair at the lapa which later became the JOC, by General Annandale, and I understood him to have a high position in the security of the mine.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National Commissioner, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that from that time onward, all inputs were being absorbed. Who are you referring to? Absorbed by who, by yourself?
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he? COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, I was introduced to Mr Sinclair at the lapa which later became the JOC, by General Annandale, and I understood him to have a high position in the security of the mine. MR SEMENYA SC: What does Mr Sinclair	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National Commissioner, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that from that time onward, all inputs were being absorbed. Who are you referring to? Absorbed by who, by yourself? COLONEL SCOTT: Referring to myself, yes.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that now, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Because of the events unfolding there, it was anticipated that the National Commissioner, General Phiyega was going to come. COLONEL SCOTT: I was informed, yes, that she was on route. MR SEMENYA SC: And what were you asked to do in relation to her arrival and coming to Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: I was asked to set up an orientation where we would brief her as to the location of where we were, and give a brief description of where the attacks took place. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us you were also introduced to Mr Graham Sinclair, who is he? COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, I was introduced to Mr Sinclair at the lapa which later became the JOC, by General Annandale, and I understood him to have a high position in the security of the mine.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: Similar to what I was doing en route, it's the gathering of as much information as possible, the filtering of that information and structuring it into certain classification groups, which eventually speaks to your plan. So it assists you to structure a plan properly, assists you to make strategy, which you will implement into your plan, etcetera. It's supposed to bear the full gathering of information and assessing of the information. MR SEMENYA SC: And that you do with the assistance of your Google Earth Satellite map as you tell us, placing various icons where would be the koppie, where would be the miners, where would be the various areas of importance that you are going to use to brief the National Commissioner, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that from that time onward, all inputs were being absorbed. Who are you referring to? Absorbed by who, by yourself?

1 the moulding of an operational concept and what does that 1 the situation was. 2 entail? 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 3 COLONEL SCOTT: The concept for the 3 MR SEMENYA SC: When the National 4 operation is the solution in a broad statement. So one 5 meeting, is that right? 6 6 understand what the problem is, where the problem is, what 6 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 7 your resources, now you would best deal with the problem, the 9 particular concerns which the National Commissioner had 9 solution thereto. the statual concept 9 particular concerns which the National Commissioner had 10 which you brief. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 11 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 11 something in place in order to deal with the situation 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 14 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 15 MR SEMENYA SC: By 'information' you are 16 National Commissioner was	2 3 4 5 6 7	the moulding of an operational concept and what does that entail? COLONEL SCOTT: The concept for the	2	
2 entail? 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 3 COLONEL SCOTT: The concept for the operation is the solution in a broad statement. So one is needs to start moving in that direction, once you 3 MR SEMENVA SC: When the problem is, what 6 understand what the problem is, where the problem is, what 6 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 7 your resources are, and then you would best deal with the problem, the solution therafter need to operationalis with more 1 9 particular concerns which the National Commissioner had would need to operationalis with more 1 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 11 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner waround 20:15. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 12 opration of the stational commissioner was just an orientation briefing. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: National Commissioner any operation concepts, 20 13 not brief at that time on any operation concepts, 21 10 Free resond about that lack of intelligence, its lack of 21 21 formulated. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: Th was the general lack 22 23 the the Provincial Commissioner, Andru Mest, and so was 25 to the Provincial Commissioner, Andru Mestand whore 23 11 Inderstational plan put in place	2 3 4 5 6 7	entail? COLONEL SCOTT: The concept for the	2	
3 COLONEL SCOTT: The concept for the 4 operation is the solution in a broad statement. So one 5 needs to start moving in third direction, once you 6 understand what the problem is, what 7 your resources are, and then you would establish from you 8 resources, how you would best deal with the problem, is, 8 resources, how you would best deal with the problem. Is 9 solution thereto. That becomes an operational concept 10 which you thereafter need to operational comptisioner had 9 solution thereto. That becomes an operational comptisioner who was 11 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 12 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 14 expected, as you fell us, to arrive around 20:15. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 16 National Commissioner way just an orientation briefing, 16 National Commissioner any operation concepts, 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 21 formulated. 16 National Commissioner any operation concepts, 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 21 formulated. 17 (10:24) COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. 21 formulated. 21 formulated. 22 for the Provincial Commissioner, and you reliu was 23 that the National Commissioner, and you reliu was 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 26 to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 27 the colonel SCOTT: That's correct. 28 MR SEMENYA SC: Maly ou also as yther 39 MR SEMENYA SC: Maly ou also as yther 40 the sector as people who come from that area or what? 41 the continanders deployed that day. 1 10 understood that there was conditions to that strike but who 41 understood that there was conditions to that strike but who 41 understood that there. Have were and the delegation 41 the ware other commanders that were in Marikana who were 41 t	3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT: The concept for the		
4 operation is the solution in a broad statement. So one 5 needs to start moving in that direction, once you understand what the proteilem is, where there is the proteilem is, that right? COLONEL SCOTT: I the proteilem i	4 5 6 7	r	- 3	MR SEMENYA SC: When the National
5 needs to start moving in that direction, once you 5 meeting, is that right? 6 understand what the problem is, whare the problem, ihe 7 MR SEMEWXA SC: Do you recall any 7 resources, how you would best deal with the problem, the 9 particular concerns which the National Commissioner had 9 which you therafter need to operational comptilise with more 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 10 which you would best deal with the problem, the 3 out to me, was she was concerned on the lack of information 12 MR SEMEWXA SC: Yes, and then you due that 10 out to me, was she was concerned on the lack of information 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing. 11 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 16 National Commissioner arrived there in company operation concepts, 10 In the then Autonal Commissioner, Baurty operation concepts, 20 eccurea. They were still in the process of being 11 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that inght? 21 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that inght? 12 COLONEL SCOTT: The sto particular concers of boild with, terear, the was a oritera answere to it and the elegation?	5 6 7			
6 understand what the problem is, what 6 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 7 your resources are, and then you would establish from your 7 MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall any 8 exported, how you would best deal with the problem, the 9 altuiton thereto. That's correct. 10 which you thereafter need to operational see with more 15 COLONEL SCOTT: What seecond session? 12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you do that 10 Uto me, was she was concerned on the is thation. 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was and she said that, you know, to plan properly, or to put 14 copperded, asyou tell us, a variced, us, nowing that there 16 NR SEMENYA SC: By information' you are 16 National Commissioner, North West, and you tell us 16 Intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 11 to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 10 Intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 12 Intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 12 Intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 13 ther then Provincial Commissioner, North West, and yow	6 7	•		-
7 your resources are, and then you would establish from your 7 MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall any 8 resources, how you would best deal with the problem, the 8 9 solution thereto. That becomes an operational concept 9 10 which you thereafter need to operationalise with more 9 11 specific information which you brief. 10 12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you do that 11 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 14 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 15 MR SEMENYA SC: Wes, and then you do that 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 16 referring to what? 17 although working dually already on, knowing that there 16 referring to what? 18 mould need to be an operational plan put in place, she was 18 MR SEMENYA SC: What in particular was 12 formulated. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, it's lack of 16 referring to what? 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To what seement hat was the area or what? 12 formulated. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, when questonos were poseed at whore 22 </td <td>7</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	7			
8 resources, how you would best deal with the problem, the 9 aparticular concerns which the National Commissioner had 9 solution thereto. That becomes an operational concept 9 during that second session? 10 which you thereafter need to operational ise with more 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you do that 11 out to me, was she was concerned on the lack of information on the situation 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 14 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 15 MR SEMENYA SC: By "information" you are 16 National Commissioner who was 14 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 17 although working dually already on, knowing that there 16 MR SEMENYA SC: What in particular was 19 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 16 Intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 21 formulated. 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 23 that the National Commissioner, North West, and sow was 16 columet sore of why was happening, what was				
9 solution thereto. That becomes an operational concept 9 during that second session? 10 which you thereafter need to operationalise with more 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you do that 12 and she said that, you know, to plan properly, or to put 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 13 something in place in order to deal with the situation 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 15 GOLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing, 17 (10:24) COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, it's lack of 17 athough working dually already on, knowing that there 18 MR SEMENVA SC: What in particular was 18 would need to be an operational plan put in place, she was 10 intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 19 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 19 she concerned about that lack of intelligence, it's lack of 10 tectotra. They were still in the process of being 17 COLONEL SCOTT: It was the general lack 21 formulated. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 23 3 that the National Commissioner, North West,	8	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
10 which you thereafter need to operationalise with more 10 COLONEL SCOTT: What specifically stands 11 specific information which you brief. 10 up on the second on the lack of information 12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you do that 11 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 11 something in place in order to deal with the situation 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 11 Something in place in order to deal with the situation 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 16 16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing, 16 referring to what? 17 17 although working dually already on, knowing that there 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, it's lack of 18 would need to be an operational plan put in place, she was 18 MR SEMENYA SC: What in particular was 21 formulated. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, it's lack of 22 matchereal table and commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 20 intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 23 thet then National Commissioner, Soureet. 18 <		-		
11 specific information which you brief. 11 out to me, was she was concerned on the lack of informatio 12 MR SEMENVA SC: Yes, and then you do that and she said that, you know, to plan properly, or to put 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was and she said that, you know, to plan properly, or to put 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 14 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 15 MR SEMENVA SC: By "information" you are 16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing. 11 out to me, was she was concerned on the lack of information 17 although working dually already on, knowing that there mR SEMENVA SC: By "information" you are 16 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 10 COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, it's lack of 21 formulated. COLONEL SCOTT: There was the general lack of intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 23 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? rege 13355 Page 13355 1 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? understood that there was conditions to that strike but why				
12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you do that 12 and she said that, you know, to plan properly, or to put 13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 12 and she said that, you know, to plan properly, or to put 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 14 something in place in order to deal with the situation 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 16 MR SEMENYA SC: By 'information' you are 16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing, 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. 18 would need to be an operation concepts, 16 mR SEMENYA SC: Was in particular was 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 20 intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 21 formulated. 20 intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 21 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? 2 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? 1 2 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 Were other commanders that were in Marikana who were 5 3 MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 1 understood that t				1 5
13 to prepare to brief the National Commissioner who was 13 something in place in order to deal with the situation 14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 14 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 15 MR SEMENYA SC: By "information" you are 18 would need to be an operation alp lan put in place, she was 16 referring to what? 17 aithough working dually already on, knowing that there 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. 18 would need to be an operational plan put in place, she was 19 she concerned about that lack of intelligence, it's lack of 21 formulated. 20 intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 23 that the National Commissioner arrived there in company of 24 the exact reasons for why was happening, what was 25 too the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 14 the exact casons for why was happening, what was not on there was a strike, we 2 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that there 3 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that thee				
14 expected, as you tell us, to arrive around 20:15. 14 effectively we needed more information on the situation. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 15 MR SEMENYA SC: By 'information' you are 16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing, 16 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. 18 would need to be an operation alp ap ut in place, she was 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. 19 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 16 referring to what? 17 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: It was the general lack 21 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 23 that the National Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 24 the the norvincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 happening, we understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 24 the violence towards the police, etcetera, that was not that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 24 MR SEMENYA SC: Mas it evident that time. 3		-		
15 COLONEL SCOTT: The briefing to the 15 MR SEMENYA SC: By "information" you are 16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing, 16 referring to what? 17 17 although working dually already on, knowing that there 16 referring to what? 17 10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. 18 18 would need to be an operational plan put in place, she was 19 she concerned about that lack of intelligence, it's lack of 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 20 intelligence relating to what? 21 formulated. 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 23 23 that the National Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 24 the exact reasons for why was happening, what was 25 to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 happening, we understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 3 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 3 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that the 4 were other comm				0
16 National Commissioner was just an orientation briefing, 16 referring to what? 17 although working dually already on, knowing that there MR SEMENYA SC: What in particular was 19 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 17 [10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence, it's lack of 21 formulated. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: It was the general lack 22 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, acuteng. There was there 24 24 the the National Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 1 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? 1 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 7 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that the 3 MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 9 Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 4 were other commanders that were in damisener and the delegation MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that the? 5 present in that briefing. 5 prepertarors are people who come from that area or what? 6 COLONEL SCOTT: Int's correct, they were				-
17although working dually already on, knowing that there would need to be an operational plan put in place, she was not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 21 formulated.17[10:24] COLONEL SCOTT: To intelligence. What in particular was she concerned about that lack of intelligence, it's lack of 20 intelligence relating to what?22MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 23 that the National Commissioner arrived there in company of 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 25 too the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was20intelligence, when questions were posed at who're 23 dealing with, etcetera, there was no clear answer to it and 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was25too the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was2526COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 31understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 22COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 4MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 414were other commanders that were in Marikana who were 5mR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 916COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 4MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 919Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 10MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 9110MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 11COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the 13111COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the 1413<				
18 would need to be an operational plan put in place, she was 18 MR SEMENYA SC: What in particular was 19 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 18 MR SEMENYA SC: What in particular was 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 10 intelligence relating to what? 21 formulated. 20 intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 22 MR SEMENVA SC: Yes. And you tell us 20 of intelligence, when questions were posed at whore 23 that the National Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 20 intelligence, when questions to that strike but whore 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 happening, we understood that there was a strike, we 25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 3 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 4 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that the 3 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that the 4 were other commanders deployed that day on the ground. 8 faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to s				
19 not briefed at that time on any operation concepts, 19 she concerned about that lack of intelligence, it's lack of 20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 20 intelligence relating to what? 21 formulated. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: It was the general lack 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 21 collophilic commissioner arrived there in company of 23 that the National Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 23 dealing with, etcetera, there was no clear answer to it and 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 happening, we understood that there was a strike, we 25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 1 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 3 understood that time. 4 were other commanders that were in Marikana who were 5 prepartators are people who come from that area or what? 5 present in that briefing. 6 COLONEL SCOTT: No, at that time, I know 6 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 6 COLONEL SCOTT: No, at that time, I know <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>				
20 etcetera. They were still in the process of being 20 intelligence relating to what? 21 formulated. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: It was the general lack 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us 22 of intelligence, when questions were posed at who're 23 that the National Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 24 the then Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 24 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? 1 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 2 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 2 understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 3 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 MR SEMENYA SC: Was it evident that the 4 were other commanders that were in Marikana who were 5 prepetrators are people who come from that area or what? 6 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 7 the word is being used often, it, they were seen as 8 MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 8 faceless. If was unknom or uncertain as to specificall			19	
21formulated.21COLONEL SCOTT:It was the general lack22MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. And you tell us21COLONEL SCOTT:It was the general lack23that the National Commissioner arrived there in company of24the then Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there25to to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was251there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right?22COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.3MR SEMENYA SC:And you also say there4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were55present in that briefing.16COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.78MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation111COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the12National Commissioner and the actual briefing as to what114occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that1315were on the ground that day.1416MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?	20		20	intelligence relating to what?
23that the National Commissioner arrived there in company of 2423dealing with, etcetera, there was no clear answer to it and 2424the then Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there 2523dealing with, etcetera, there was no clear answer to it and 2425to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was24the exact reasons for why was happening, what was 2526Dealer answer to it and 2424the exact reasons for why was happening, what was 2527COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 31understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 22COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 43understood at that time. 44MR SEMENYA SC: May ualso say there 53understood at that time.6COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 76COLONEL SCOTT: No, at that time, I know 77the commanders deployed that day on the ground. 88faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically 99Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 1010MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 1111COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the 13131314occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that 1414MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 1115were on the ground that day.14MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 1116MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 1716MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 1616MR SEMENYA S	21		21	
24the then Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there too the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was24the exact reasons for why was happening, what was happening, we understood that there was a strike, we25to the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so wasPage 133551there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right?Page 133552COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.understood that there was conditions to that strike but why 23MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say thereunderstood at that time.4were other commanders that were in Marikana who wereunderstood at that time.5present in that briefing.6COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were77the commanders deployed that day on the ground.8MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing?9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.10MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what14OCLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.15were on the ground that day.16MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?	22	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you tell us	22	of intelligence, when questions were posed at who're
25 too the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was 25 happening, we understood that there was a strike, we Page 13355 1 there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right? 2 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 3 MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say there 4 were other commanders that were in Marikana who were 5 5 present in that briefing. 6 6 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they were 7 the commanders deployed that day on the ground. 8 8 MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 9 Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 7 10 there? 1 11 COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the 12 National Commissioner to where we were and to where the 10 13 incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what 14 OCLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 15 were on the ground that day. 13 16 MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 17 National Commissioner and her delegation,	23	that the National Commissioner arrived there in company of	23	dealing with, etcetera, there was no clear answer to it and
Page 13355Page 133551there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right?12COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.3MR SEMENYA SC:And you also say there4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were35present in that briefing.36COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.78MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation910there?1011COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the1313incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what1314MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.1316MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?	24	the then Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng. There was there	24	the exact reasons for why was happening, what was
1there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right?1understood that there was conditions to that strike but why2COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.2the violence towards the police, etcetera, that was not3MR SEMENYA SC:And you also say there3understood at that time.4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were4MR SEMENYA SC:Was it evident that the5present in that briefing.5perpetrators are people who come from that area or what?6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as88MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during th	25	too the Provincial Commissioner, North West, and so was	25	happening, we understood that there was a strike, we
1there General Mpembe and General Naidoo. Is that right?1understood that there was conditions to that strike but why2COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.2the violence towards the police, etcetera, that was not3MR SEMENYA SC:And you also say there3understood at that time.4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were4MR SEMENYA SC:Was it evident that the5present in that briefing.5perpetrators are people who come from that area or what?6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting				
2COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.2the violence towards the police, etcetera, that was not3MR SEMENYA SC:And you also say there3understood at that time.4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were4MR SEMENYA SC:Was it evident that the5present in that briefing.5perpetrators are people who come from that area or what?6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.1010there?10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentatio				Page 13357
3MR SEMENYA SC:And you also say there3understood at that time.4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were5present in that briefing.4MR SEMENYA SC:Was it evident that the5present in that briefing.5perpetrators are people who come from that area or what?6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is1212National Commissioner to where we were and to where the13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC				,
4were other commanders that were in Marikana who were4MR SEMENYA SC:Was it evident that the5present in that briefing.5perpetrators are people who come from that area or what?6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.1010there?10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the12that right?13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?1818to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>				
5present in that briefing.5perpetrators are people who come from that area or what?6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.10there?10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the12that right?13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
6COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they were6COLONEL SCOTT:No, at that time, I know7the commanders deployed that day on the ground.7the word is being used often, it, they were seen as8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.10there?10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the12that right?13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were				
 7 the commanders deployed that day on the ground. 8 MR SEMENYA SC: Did you do the briefing? 9 Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 10 there? 11 COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the 12 National Commissioner to where we were and to where the 13 incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what 14 occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that 14 MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 15 tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in 16 MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 17 National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC 18 to go and meet with mine management, is that right? 7 the word is being used often, it, they were seen as 7 the word is being used often, it, they were seen as 7 the word is being used often, it, they were seen as 7 the word is being used often, it, they were seen as 8 faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically 9 who they were. 10 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 15 tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in 16 the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that 17 originated during that meeting? 18 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, when they were 				
8MR SEMENYA SC:Did you do the briefing?8faceless. It was unknown or uncertain as to specifically9Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation9who they were.1010there?10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the11cOLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were		5		
 9 Did you brief the National Commissioner and the delegation 10 there? 11 COLONEL SCOTT: I simply orientated the 12 National Commissioner to where we were and to where the 13 incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what 14 occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that 15 were on the ground that day. 16 MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 17 National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC 18 to go and meet with mine management, is that right? 9 who they were. 10 MR SEMENYA SC: Vertical Vertical				
10there?10MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the1617National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
11COLONEL SCOTT:I simply orientated the11say that they would have left the meeting around 23:00, is12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the12that right?13incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were				-
12National Commissioner to where we were and to where the incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that were on the ground that day.12that right?14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that were on the ground that day.13COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:That's correct.16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC 1816Colonel Scott:That's correct.18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were				
 13 incident had taken place and the actual briefing as to what 14 occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 15 were on the ground that day. 16 MR SEMENYA SC: After the briefing of the 17 National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC 18 to go and meet with mine management, is that right? 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and you continue to 15 tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in 16 the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that 17 originated during that meeting? 18 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, when they were 				
14occurred was drawn out of the operational commanders that14MR SEMENYA SC:Okay and you continue to15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were				-
15were on the ground that day.15tell us about this strategic guidance that you captured in16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were				
16MR SEMENYA SC:After the briefing of the16the briefing presentation to the commanders, you said that17National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC17originated during that meeting?18to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were				, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
 17 National Commissioner and her delegation, they left the JOC 18 to go and meet with mine management, is that right? 18 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, when they were 				
18 to go and meet with mine management, is that right?18COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, when they were		C C		
				5
20 MR SEMENYA SC: You remained behind and 20 that meeting, they were discussing how to deal with the				-
21 started building an outline of the operation Platinum 21 situation or how the police should go forward the following		/ di / 12012 54 / A		
22 presentation and gained more information on the Marikana 22 day. I would be looking at what the strategic guidelines	- 33	() () () () () () () () () ()		
23 environment. 23 were in order to capture that, to stick to that.		la l		
24 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 24 MR SEMENYA SC: What were the ideas -				
	25	MR SEMENYA SC: And what the history of	25	must happen going forward?
20 must happen going to ward:	A	RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE		

	Page 13358		Page 13360
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Well the proposal I made	1	COLONEL SCOTT: That if, you know through
2	while in that, and that's what I recall clearly was stating	2	looking at the media sources and the news, etcetera and
3	that should the police choose to go into a tactical option	3	through the experiences where we have been, that you would
4	the next day, to disperse crowds, etcetera that if there	4	find if there was violence directed towards the police to
5	was a confrontation that possibly the public and the media	5	this level its normally when protesters or strikers or
6	may interpret that as being a retaliation on the police	6	whoever they may be have issues with the state itself. But
7	because of the deaths the previous day and I said that	7	when it comes to service delivery or labour related that
8	reasoning that we needed to look at dialogue having	8	the police is normally the third party and the violence is
9	understood through having negotiation background that we	9	normally directed towards infrastructure or towards others
10	should give opportunity through dialogue to educate the	10	and not towards the police.
11	strikers top the illegality of their actions first, request	11	MR SEMENYA SC: And that is what you
12	them through dialogue to first lay down weapons or to	12	describe at the bottom of that paragraph on page 21.
13	disperse before eventually moving anywhere close to what we	13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right and when I'm
14	would presume to be tactical options.	14	referring to violence here I'm not talking about the normal
15	MR SEMENYA SC: It was your perception	15	throwing of stones, etcetera, I'm talking about the level
16	that the emotions were high on all sides was it not?	16	of violence of choosing to attack and kill police officers.
17	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: What also informed your
18	MR SEMENYA SC: And that a tactical	18	reasoning at the time, you articulate in paragraph 6.13
19	option at that time was ill-advised?	19	where you say, "the killing of police officials," it was
20	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	20	your view, "that the strikers had crossed a barrier where
21	MR SEMENYA SC: Your suggestion, proposal	21	they would with greater ease take decision to confront the
22	that this be commenced with negotiating a solution with the	22	police again should the police be required to resolve the
23	strikers was it embraced?	23	situation tactically."
24	COLONEL SCOTT: It was listened to and	24	COLONEL SCOTT: It was my view at the
25	the National Commissioner came back to it in her summary	25	time, yes.
	Page 13359		Page 13361
1	Page 13359 and said that she believes that's the pathway we should	1	Page 13361 MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for
1 2	8	1 2	
	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should		MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for
2	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement?	2	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my
2 3	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their
2 3 4	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that
2 3 4 5 6 7	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of vour statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of vur statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC:What was the basis forthat view?COLONEL SCOTT:I guess just human naturebecause having killed police officers were, myunderstanding at that time were trying to carry out theirduty, should they be confronted again logic tells me thatifif they should try to confront the strikers again that thepossibility existed because police officers had been killedalready that they may resort to the same type of violenceagain.MR SEMENYA SC:What was the informationthat you had in relation to the weapons that were inpossession by the strikers?COLONEL SCOTT:I was told that it was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC:What was the basis forthat view?COLONEL SCOTT:I guess just human naturebecause having killed police officers were, myunderstanding at that time were trying to carry out theirduty, should they be confronted again logic tells me thatifif they should try to confront the strikers again that thepossibility existed because police officers had been killedalready that they may resort to the same type of violenceagain.MR SEMENYA SC:What was the informationthat you had in relation to the weapons that were inpossession by the strikers?COLONEL SCOTT:I was told that it waspangas and spears which was involved in the incident on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police The specific officer
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police officers that had been attacked got to understand that from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the conflict incident," it should read, right, "earlier in the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police officers that had been attacked got to understand that from there that they had access now to firearms as well.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the conflict incident," it should read, right, "earlier in the day which had tragic results you formed the view this group	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC:What was the basis forthat view?COLONEL SCOTT:I guess just human naturebecause having killed police officers were, myunderstanding at that time were trying to carry out theirduty, should they be confronted again logic tells me thatif they should try to confront the strikers again that thepossibility existed because police officers had been killedalready that they may resort to the same type of violenceagain.MR SEMENYA SC:What was the informationthat you had in relation to the weapons that were inpossession by the strikers?COLONEL SCOTT:I was told that it waspangas and spears which was involved in the incident onMonday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafterand obviously hearing what had happened and the policeofficers that had been attacked got to understand that fromthere that they had access now to firearms as well.MR SEMENYA SC:And then you tell us
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the conflict incident," it should read, right, "earlier in the day which had tragic results you formed the view this group of strikers had taken their level of willingness to achieve	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police officers that had been attacked got to understand that from there that they had access now to firearms as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you tell us against paragraph 6.14, "that after the briefing of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the conflict incident," it should read, right, "earlier in the day which had tragic results you formed the view this group of strikers had taken their level of willingness to achieve their goals to levels beyond what the police had previously	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police officers that had been attacked got to understand that from there that they had access now to firearms as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you tell us against paragraph 6.14, "that after the briefing of the National Commissioner was concluded you continued to obtain
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the conflict incident," it should read, right, "earlier in the day which had tragic results you formed the view this group of strikers had taken their level of willingness to achieve their goals to levels beyond what the police had previously experienced in labour and service delivery unrest."	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police officers that had been attacked got to understand that from there that they had access now to firearms as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you tell us against paragraph 6.14, "that after the briefing of the National Commissioner was concluded you continued to obtain more information on the situation as is required to provide
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and said that she believes that's the pathway we should follow as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's what you tell us against paragraph 6.11 of your statement? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: That to diffuse the situation a dialogue must be initiated and that police negotiators should be brought onto the scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that this was based on your own experience in STF operations? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and in the courses I had done which deal with scenarios beyond what the special taskforce deals with. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Against paragraph 6.12 you say, "after hearing the briefing given to the National Commissioner by the commanders involved in the conflict incident," it should read, right, "earlier in the day which had tragic results you formed the view this group of strikers had taken their level of willingness to achieve their goals to levels beyond what the police had previously	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: What was the basis for that view? COLONEL SCOTT: I guess just human nature because having killed police officers were, my understanding at that time were trying to carry out their duty, should they be confronted again logic tells me that if they should try to confront the strikers again that the possibility existed because police officers had been killed already that they may resort to the same type of violence again. MR SEMENYA SC: What was the information that you had in relation to the weapons that were in possession by the strikers? COLONEL SCOTT: I was told that it was pangas and spears which was involved in the incident on Monday but that when speaking with Mr Sinclair thereafter and obviously hearing what had happened and the police officers that had been attacked got to understand that from there that they had access now to firearms as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you tell us against paragraph 6.14, "that after the briefing of the National Commissioner was concluded you continued to obtain

	Page 13362		Page 13364
1	MR SEMENYA SC: And thereby you mean?	1	attention.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: What I started doing,	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
3	we've got different areas we need to gain information in	3	MR SEMENYA SC: You concluded that that
4	and one of them is what are the resources available in	4	needed to be approached with a strategy to allow the
5	order to make the determination to fill a gap if there were	5	strikers to be made aware of that unlawfulness, what do you
6	resources needed to be acquired. At that time I was	6	mean by that?
7	obtaining what resources were available to be utilised to	7	COLONEL SCOTT: The unlawfulness is the,
8 9	deal with the situation, from the security side. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you do a new	8	as we know the constitution states that you have the right
	5	9 10	to protest but you cannot do so armed and having understood
10 11	appreciation given a new scenario now unfolding before you? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	10	that the strikers were armed and of the history of the violence which was now being made known to me at that time
12	MR SEMENYA SC: And what do you do with	12	it was obvious that the, there was an illegal element to
12	that?	13	this.
14	COLONEL SCOTT: Well appreciation as we	14	MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you think it
15	know it, we talk about four Ms and a T and when we looked	15	necessary that they be made aware of the fact that their
16	at the strategic inputs that were given at the meetings we	16	conduct was contravening the law.
17	start utilising those to make a mission, which is a guiding	17	COLONEL SCOTT: Once again we've seen
18	statement and so we start looking for those strategic	18	many times in South Africa that there's a grey area when it
19	guidelines to form a mission. We then look at the next one	19	comes to what is a dangerous weapon and what is a
20	which it's just an acronym which we call menace and that is	20	traditional weapon and I sometimes think that the strikers
21	normally the opponent or the destabiliser, be it an event	21	themselves are not aware of what is illegal when they are
22	or be it people and we have to analyse who they are, what	22	truly carrying illegal weapons. I think they would know
23	they're doing, what their modus operandi is, how they're	23	that stolen firearm is illegal but not necessarily that a
24	armed if they are armed, etcetera. We then, the next M	24	panga or a spear may be illegal but seen as traditional.
25	would be the milieu, French word for environment and we	25	So to enlighten them to these facts so that they understood
1	Page 13363	1	Page 13365
1	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we	1	where the police stood with regard to the situation.
2	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources	2	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then
2 3	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order	2 3	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the
2 3 4	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in	2 3 4	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner
2 3 4 5	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time	2 3 4 5	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators?
2 3 4 5 6	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in.	2 3 4 5 6	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that	2 3 4 5 6 7	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC:Okay, and you thencontinue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:And you say in paragraph
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the	2 3 4 5 6	where the police stood with regard to the situation.MR SEMENYA SC:Okay, and you thencontinue to say that you begin to take into account thesuggestion that you made to the National Commissionerearlier, that is of using the police negotiators?COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say in paragraph6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that
2 3 4 5 6 7	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	where the police stood with regard to the situation.MR SEMENYA SC:Okay, and you thencontinue to say that you begin to take into account thesuggestion that you made to the National Commissionerearlier, that is of using the police negotiators?COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say in paragraph6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	where the police stood with regard to the situation.MR SEMENYA SC:Okay, and you thencontinue to say that you begin to take into account thesuggestion that you made to the National Commissionerearlier, that is of using the police negotiators?COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say in paragraph6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are thatamongst the strikers there were murder suspects also whopolice needed to apprehend and illegal firearms whichneeded to be retrieved, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And you also tell us that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given to understand the layout of the geography there? COLONEL SCOTT: To a limited degree, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And this comes from the history as you obtained with conflicts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given to understand the layout of the geography there? COLONEL SCOTT: To a limited degree, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that in your analysis of the strikers they were contravening the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And this comes from the history as you obtained with conflicts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	look at the environment we found ourselves in and the we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given to understand the layout of the geography there? COLONEL SCOTT: To a limited degree, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that in your analysis of the strikers they were contravening the law by gathering to protest but this time with weapons?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And this comes from the history as you obtained with conflicts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. It is important
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given to understand the layout of the geography there? COLONEL SCOTT: To a limited degree, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that in your analysis of the strikers they were contravening the law by gathering to protest but this time with weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And this comes from the history as you obtained with conflicts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. It is important that we deal with these things so that we can appreciate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given to understand the layout of the geography there? COLONEL SCOTT: To a limited degree, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that in your analysis of the strikers they were contravening the law by gathering to protest but this time with weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You saw that as a large-	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And this comes from the history as you obtained with conflicts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. It is important that we deal with these things so that we can appreciate what is it that you thought you were planning for, Colonel,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	look at the environment we found ourselves in and then we look at the means and the means refers to the resources available from the tactical or the policing side in order to work in that environment, deal with that opponents in accordance with the mission and the T stands for the time frame that we have to do it in. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. With all of that you continue against paragraph 6.16 you deal with the consultation, the information that is gathered particularly information given to you by General Annandale as well as Mr Sinclair, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You are now given the recent history of the strike in the Rustenburg area and the violence that was experienced up to that point. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And so too you are given to understand the layout of the geography there? COLONEL SCOTT: To a limited degree, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that in your analysis of the strikers they were contravening the law by gathering to protest but this time with weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	where the police stood with regard to the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, and you then continue to say that you begin to take into account the suggestion that you made to the National Commissioner earlier, that is of using the police negotiators? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say in paragraph 6.19 there was also the issue that probabilities are that amongst the strikers there were murder suspects also who police needed to apprehend and illegal firearms which needed to be retrieved, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also tell us that notwithstanding the attention the police had to direct towards combating of violent crime there was also sporadically occurring violence around Marikana? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And this comes from the history as you obtained with conflicts on Saturday, Sunday and Monday? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. It is important that we deal with these things so that we can appreciate

	Page 13366		Page 13368
1	that the mountain was actually a koppie and that the	1	members would need a protective element, in essence your
2	suspects were part of a much larger group of reportedly	2	reasoning was that if tactical units were deployed in
3	militant strikers with estimates being given to be around 3	3	support to protect the POP members they would with
4	000 people you realised that the initial operational	4	reassurance focus their attention of the public order
5	strategy that you had conceptualised on route to Marikana	5	policing tactics.
6	would no longer be an option and that the situation	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
7	required a different approach, is that right?	7	MR SEMENYA SC: Stated simply it was your
, 8	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	8	view that with the benefit of the tactical units being
9	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that approach	_	present during a POP operation the POP members would do
	is one that should and required to be led by public order	10	their work with greater assurance?
10			-
11	policing.	11	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if
12	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	12	there were dangerous situations or arrests that needed to
13	MR SEMENYA SC: They were to play the	13	be made of dangerous individuals that the POPs could rely
14	leading role?	14	on the better trained tactical members beyond them to deal
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	15	with those situations.
16	MR SEMENYA SC: And why is that so?	16	MR SEMENYA SC: And as you said at the
17	COLONEL SCOTT: I believe that obviously	17	bottom of the page, if the police needed to use the POP
18	the size of the group automatically starts taking it	18	members to resolve the situation tactically they would be
19	towards public order policing. It's difficult at this time	19	able to stand information with more confidence to apply any
20	as well, with the limited information and not relying now	20	defensive or offensive of tactical options required of
21	on hindsight but at that time the group of 3 000 was seen	21	them.
22	as being the striking group. I was not aware yet that	22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
23	there was a militant group. But I knew that there was no	23	MR SEMENYA SC: And they would do that
24	way that the tactical units themselves would be able to	24	with a better knowing that they have immediate support if
25	move towards a group like that. We needed to first deal	25	required.
	5 1		
	Page 13367		Page 13369
1	Page 13367 with that on a public order basis and then the strategies	1	Page 13369 COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
1 2	5	1 2	
	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies		COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical	2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for a
2 3	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units.	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: If we may stop here for a little while. The tactical units you had in mind would be?
2 3 4	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at the
2 3 4 5	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if	2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special
2 3 4 5 6	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: If we may stop here for a little while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT: The, starting at the lower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF.
2 3 4 5 6 7	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes.	2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level or offensive operations is still	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategies
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles ofsupport.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level or offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons interved for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added element of the tactical units employed in various roles of support.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	with that on a public order basis and then the strategiesthereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tacticalunits.MR SEMENYA SC:And your assessment ofthe situation was that POP members would be in danger ifthey needed to confront the strikers with a tacticaloption, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say because thePOP members highest level of offensive operations is stillcarried out with less than lethal force thus having the POPmembers primary weapons intended for non lethalapplication, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:There you really aresaying that POP members would have, apart from their side	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles ofsupport.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role did
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	with that on a public order basis and then the strategiesthereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tacticalINTERSTITEMR SEMENYA SC:And your assessment ofthe situation was that POP members would be in danger ifthey needed to confront the strikers with a tacticaloption, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say because thePOP members highest level of offensive operations is stillcarried out with less than lethal force thus having the POPmembers primary weapons interded for non lethalapplication, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:There you really aresaying that POP members would have, apart from their sidearm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added element of the tactical units employed in various roles of support.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role did you have in mind for the TRT?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	with that on a public order basis and then the strategiesthereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tacticalunits.MR SEMENYA SC:And your assessment ofthe situation was that POP members would be in danger ifthey needed to confront the strikers with a tacticaloption, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say because thePOP members highest level of offensive operations is stillcarried out with less than lethal force thus having the POPmembers primary weapons intended for non lethalapplication, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:There you really aresaying that POP members would have, apart from their sidearm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stungrenades, they would have water cannons and they would have	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added element of the tactical units employed in various roles of support.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role did you have in mind for the TRT?COLONEL SCOTT:Well the TRT was there as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles ofsupport.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role didyou have in mind for the TRT?COLONEL SCOTT:Well the TRT was there asI say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous for
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added element of the tactical units employed in various roles of support.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role did you have in mind for the TRT?COLONEL SCOTT:Well the TRT was there as I say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous for public order policing members to deal with, that they could
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Or rubber rounds in this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while.The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles ofsupport.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role didyou have in mind for the TRT?COLONEL SCOTT:Well the TRT was there asI say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous forpublic order policing members to deal with, that they couldwithdraw into safe havens which I planned to be the Nyalas
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Or rubber rounds in this instance?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: If we may stop here for a little while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT: The, starting at the lower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF. MR SEMENYA SC: And as you say you reasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added element of the tactical units employed in various roles of support. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: What supporting role did you have in mind for the TRT? COLONEL SCOTT: Well the TRT was there as I say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous for public order policing members to deal with, that they could withdraw into safe havens which I planned to be the Nyalas which would permit the TRT members at that time to move
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Or rubber rounds in this instance? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles ofsupport.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role didyou have in mind for the TRT?COLONEL SCOTT:Well the TRT was there asI say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous forpublic order policing members to deal with, that they couldwithdraw into safe havens which I planned to be the Nyalaswhich would permit the TRT members at that time to moveforward to make arrests and not have to put members with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Or rubber rounds in this instance? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say to us	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: If we may stop here for a little while. The tactical units you had in mind would be? COLONEL SCOTT: The, starting at the lower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT, the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the Special Taskforce, STF. MR SEMENYA SC: And as you say you reasoned that POP would need to play leading role and be the first line of contact with the strikers thus the operational concept would need to embrace the strategies utilised in public order operations but with an added element of the tactical units employed in various roles of support. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: What supporting role did you have in mind for the TRT? COLONEL SCOTT: Well the TRT was there as I say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous for public order policing members to deal with, that they could withdraw into safe havens which I planned to be the Nyalas which would permit the TRT members at that time to move
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	with that on a public order basis and then the strategies thereafter actually spoke to how to utilise the tactical units. MR SEMENYA SC: And your assessment of the situation was that POP members would be in danger if they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical option, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That was my view, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say because the POP members highest level of offensive operations is still carried out with less than lethal force thus having the POP members primary weapons intended for non lethal application, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: There you really are saying that POP members would have, apart from their side arm, they would have your teargas, they would have the stun grenades, they would have water cannons and they would have the ultimate offensive weapon rubber bullets? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Or rubber rounds in this instance? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:If we may stop here for alittle while. The tactical units you had in mind would be?COLONEL SCOTT:The, starting at thelower end the Tactical Response Teams, known as the TRT,the National Intervention Unit, the NIU and the SpecialTaskforce, STF.MR SEMENYA SC:And as you say youreasoned that POP would need to play leading role and bethe first line of contact with the strikers thus theoperational concept would need to embrace the strategiesutilised in public order operations but with an addedelement of the tactical units employed in various roles ofsupport.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:What supporting role didyou have in mind for the TRT?COLONEL SCOTT:Well the TRT was there asI say, if the situation became acceptably to dangerous forpublic order policing members to deal with, that they couldwithdraw into safe havens which I planned to be the Nyalaswhich would permit the TRT members at that time to moveforward to make arrests and not have to put members with

Page 13370	Page 13	372
1 MR SEMENYA SC: And for the NIU?	1 threat rather than confronting the authority represented in	
2 COLONEL SCOTT: A similar role and for	2 the show of force they are physically able to see." This	
3 the STF a similar, that's dealing with the crowd as such at	3 is the show of force dissuasion tactic you say you describe	
4 the koppie, although there were secondary roles as well for	4 that as?	
5 all those units when it came to further phases but at this	5 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many	
6 stage I wasn't thinking yet necessarily the sequential	6 times a suspect or a perpetrator may sum up his opportun	itv
7 phases although they were part of the mindset already. I	7 to take on a police official and if you can show them a	ity
8 knew there would need to be high risk arrests made where	 8 show of force or an overwhelming show of force from you 	
-	0	
9 the firearms would be in possession of those that took them	9 side, reason tends to return and they tend to back down	
10 from the deceased miners and police members.	10 through possibly intimidation or what we like to say is we	
11 MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that the	11 dissuade them from action against the police.	
12 plan you were conceiving it would have to be one that was a	12 MR SEMENYA SC: This is part of what	
13 hybrid similar to plans used on other major events, is that	13 would later be part of your plan about the impact of police	
14 right?	14 numbers in any environment of this kind.	
15 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	15 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	
16 MR SEMENYA SC: But you tell us that with	16 MR SEMENYA SC: Past experience, what	
17 this the emphasis was also on bringing the ongoing violence	17 would a large number of police presence cause as a reacti	on
18 and the destruction of property to an end.	18 to such a situation?	
19 COLONEL SCOTT: Sorry, can you just	19 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, past experience	
20 repeat that.	20 dealing in specialised environments or very high risk	
21 MR SEMENYA SC: Against paragraph 6.24	21 environments, one has to assess your opponent again. If	we
22 you tell us that there was also an added emphasis to this	22 were dealing with somebody who was suicidal or possibly	
hybrid operation that was also to try and bring to fold the	23 somebody dealing with martyrdom in a terrorist situation,	
24 ongoing violence and the destruction to property.	24 you wouldn't want to necessarily have a show of force, bu	t
25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	25 when you're dealing with people that have a desire to live	
25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	25 when you're dealing with people that have a desire to live	
25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Page 1337	25 when you're dealing with people that have a desire to live Page 13	373
		373
Page 1337	Page 13	373
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is	
Page 1337 ⁷ 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty?	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to	/ a
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many	/ a
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time	/ a
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is	/ a
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find.	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give	/ a
Page 1337 ⁷ 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the	/ a 25
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that	/ a 25
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official 9 arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up.	/ a 25
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official 9 arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking 10 aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that	/ a 25
Page 1337 ⁷ 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official 9 arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking 10 aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort 11 unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force 12 that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse,	/ a 25
Page 1337 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official 9 arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking 10 aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort 11 unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force 12 that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to 13 bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that 12 does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, 13 what is the next step?	/ a 25
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to	/ a 25
Page 1337 ⁷ 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official 9 arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking 10 aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort 11 unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force 12 that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to 13 bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force 14 level down in order to retain or to move back to the 15 dialogue level.	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that 12 does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, 13 what is the next step? 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to 15 always have a contingency action, a standby action, a	/ a 25
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that 12 does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, 13 what is the next step? 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to 15 always have a contingency action, a standby action, a 16 tactical option available. We know that we're in a police	/ a ?s m
Page 1337 ⁷ 1 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of 2 the police members while they carry out their duty? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with 4 the limited knowledge and the limited information given one 5 is working on basic policing principles which are generic 6 throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. 7 [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what 8 COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official 9 arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking 10 aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort 11 unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force 12 that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to 13 bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force 14 level down in order to retain or to move back to the 15 dialogue level. 16 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe 17 those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that 12 does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, 13 what is the next step? 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to 15 always have a contingency action, a standby action, a 16 tactical option available. We know that we're in a police 17 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 17 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 17 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 17 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 18 colonel service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 19 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 10 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 11 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 12 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 13 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 14 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 15 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 16 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 17 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 18 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 19 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow action 10 service action act	/ a ?s m
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right?	Page 13 1 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is 2 when you could bring in a show of force to help them to 3 reason again and this has worked for us in the past many 4 time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time 5 that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is 6 there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give 7 up, knowing that he has now either got to take the 8 opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that 9 he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi 10 and many times they simply give up. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that 12 does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, 13 what is the next step? 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to 15 always have a contingency action, a standby action, a 16 tactical option available. We know that we're in a police 17 service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac 18 to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to	y a es m
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to always have a contingency action, a standby action, a tactical option available. We know that we're in a police service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to apprehend those that have committed certain acts becau	y a es m cts se
Page 1337 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say that,	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to always have a contingency action, a standby action, a tactical option available. We know that we're in a police service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to apprehend those that have committed certain acts becau they need to be brought through the system as is expect	y a es m cts se
Page 1337 MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say that, "Depending on the situation, when dealing with persons when	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to always have a contingency action, a standby action, a tactical option available. We know that we're in a police service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to apprehend those that have committed certain acts becau they need to be brought through the system as is expect of the police service.	y a es m cts se
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say that, "Depending on the situation, when dealing with persons who have contravened the law and have a desire to escape or	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to always have a contingency action, a standby action, a tactical option available. We know that we're in a police service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to apprehend those that have committed certain acts becau they need to be brought through the system as is expect of the police service. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say there would	y a ss m tts se ed
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say that, "Depending on the situation, when dealing with persons who have contravened the law and have a desire to escape or fight, the police are to provide a show of force to help	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to always have a contingency action, a standby action, a tactical option available. We know that we're in a police service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to apprehend those that have committed certain acts becau they need to be brought through the system as is expect of the police service. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say there would then, depending on the situation, be a force continuum t	y a es m tts se ed
Page 1337 ⁷ MR SEMENYA SC: And also the safety of the police members while they carry out their duty? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At this time with the limited knowledge and the limited information given one is working on basic policing principles which are generic throughout the police in pretty much any situation we find. [10:44] MR SEMENYA SC: And those would be what COLONEL SCOTT: That any police official arriving at any situation which is conflictive or looking aggressive, would always use dialogue as a first resort unless of course he is immediately challenged with a force that he needs to respond to proportionately in order to bring it back down, whereby he would bring his own force level down in order to retain or to move back to the dialogue level. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And you describe those as the use of dialogue in the first instance, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say that, "Depending on the situation, when dealing with persons who have contravened the law and have a desire to escape or	Page 13 and you can see that they're not reasoning well, this is when you could bring in a show of force to help them to reason again and this has worked for us in the past many time. When my unit has arrived on scene, there are time that the negotiators would make mention that our unit is there and the perpetrator at that time would simply give up, knowing that he has now either got to take the opportunity to hand himself over or, if his desire is that he would need to confront the unit coming in to arrest hi and many times they simply give up. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you say if that does not dissuade the crowd and a situation gets worse, what is the next step? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you would need to always have a contingency action, a standby action, a tactical option available. We know that we're in a police service, we work inside the country and we can't allow ac to go – I don't want to say punished, but we need to apprehend those that have committed certain acts becau they need to be brought through the system as is expect of the police service. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say there would	y a es m tts se ed

		l I	
1	Page 13374 COLONEL SCOTT: Even when we go tactical,	1	Page 13376 try to get too close which is the normal force continuum
2	and I speak on behalf of the task force or any other police	2	which you would expect of them.
3	officer, he would confront the opponent firstly with verbal	3	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And it was your
4	commands, unless of course he enters and he gets shot at or	4	reasoning, you tell us, that POP would provide the first
5	he approaches and he gets shot at immediately, you would	5	line of policing in the initial operational strategy to
6	need to then defend your life, for instance, but in essence	6	restore order to the area, due to the size of the crowd and
7	a police officer has got principles of going forward with	7	with the ability to apply non-lethal force to restore
8	the force continuum. So he needs to assess the level of	8	order.
8 9		9	
	force coming towards him and he would meet it at that same	10	5
10 11	level to try to de-escalate the force down to lower levels and as the force de-escalates, so he de-escalates his level	10	• • •
12			would happen with a large crowd of people when a verbal
12	of force, which needs to be proportionate at all times, but when we come in we have the mindset of starting at verbal,	12 13	warning is given to disperse? COLONEL SCOTT: From the observations
14	verbal command.		
14	MR SEMENYA SC: What would come next	14	I've had, the limited experience in POPs at that time, which also I did deal with, with crowds and marchers and
	after the verbal command?	15	
16 17	COLONEL SCOTT: If I speak on behalf of	16	protesters but from where, sitting back in major events, et
		17	cetera, when verbal warnings are issued and the police have
18 19	our unit, we start with verbal command but we actually go on - before that we would have a visual presence. So	18 19	taken up a line, the crowd generally starts dispersing. They understand where the police are at and they understand
20	normally you would see the presence of a tactical officer	20	what's possibly next to come and most times the crowd
20	and understand that they are well-trained, they are well-	20	simply disperses on its own or moves away to another
22	equipped and that would be your opponent should you choose	22	environment.
22	to want confrontation. But when the members do need to	22	MR SEMENYA SC: And during that time, as
23	confront then we start with loud and aggressive verbal	23	you say, that logic would prevail to those who are seeking
24	commands to intimidate the opponent into giving up and	24	no confrontation and would disperse by themselves.
20	commands to intimidate the opponent into giving up and	20	no controlitation and would disperse by memories.
	Page 13375		Page 13377
1	Page 13375 surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and	1	Page 13377 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
1 2		1 2	s
	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and		COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training	2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell us
2 3	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: On page 27 you tell us that you remained aware that a tactical option would need
2 3 4	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry,	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.
2 3 4 5	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated.	2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.
2 3 4 5 6	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order	2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that you
2 3 4 5 6 7	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should only
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike has
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction by
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave and eventually escalate through the levels. And I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. At that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave and eventually escalate through the levels. And I understand there are documents which do speak to the order	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. At thattime we didn't know what the actions or the movements of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave and eventually escalate through the levels. And I understand there are documents which do speak to the order of that but in understanding Marikana and as we'll see	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. At thattime we didn't know what the actions or the movements ofthe group would be.In hindsight we know that the group
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave and eventually escalate through the levels. And I understand there are documents which do speak to the order of that but in understanding Marikana and as we'll see later in the statement, I chose to recommend the water	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. At thattime we didn't know what the actions or the movements ofthe group would be. In hindsight we know that the groupstayed at the koppie no. At that time on that Monday night
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave and eventually escalate through the levels. And I understand there are documents which do speak to the order of that but in understanding Marikana and as we'll see later in the statement, I chose to recommend the water cannons being utilised first, the reason for that being the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. At thattime we didn't know what the actions or the movements ofthe group would be. In hindsight we know that the groupstayed at the koppie no. At that time on that Monday nightwe had no idea what the group would be doing the next day
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	surrendering. Moving from that, we're trained in – and this is, most police officers have some degree of training in unarmed combat or self-defence and from there one can move to the less lethal options which even ourselves carry, which are Taser weapons, pepper spray to disorientate or to gain the advantage and from that one would move to multiple take-downs once a member has been disorientated. MR SEMENYA SC: And in public order policing environment, what would be the force continuum there? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the public order one would also expect that dialogue would be given beforehand, understanding that in public order you are dealing with crowds and we know that not all crowds have the same intention, that there could be bystanders, onlookers, others with other agendas. So you give the verbal instruction to allow those that don't want to be part, to leave and thereafter you would start again with your lowest level of force to try to get people to leave and eventually escalate through the levels. And I understand there are documents which do speak to the order of that but in understanding Marikana and as we'll see later in the statement, I chose to recommend the water	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On page 27 you tell usthat you remained aware that a tactical option would needto be planned for as well, should that situation get there.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And you tell us that youwere, however, mindful that any tactical option by POPcould be met with the same response as was experienced onMonday the 13th.COLONEL SCOTT:That was my view at thattime, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that the - maybe aconfrontation that mimics what happened on that Monday.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You also tell us that therationale was based on the precept that police should onlymove to an offensive POP tactical option if the strike hasescalated, a threat of violence and destruction bymobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right. At thattime we didn't know what the actions or the movements ofthe group would be. In hindsight we know that the groupstayed at the koppie no. At that time on that Monday night

	Deres 12270		Derra 10000
1	Page 13378 towards certain mine infrastructure. I was aware at this	1	Page 13380 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2	time as well that the mine infrastructure was being	2	MR SEMENYA SC: And the instruction by
3	targeted, as in the K4 shaft on the Sunday night.	3	Brigadier Calitz to both you and Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi
4	MR SEMENYA SC: And the damage to the	4	was that you must start now conceptualising an operational
5	vehicles, et cetera.	5	strategy to deal with the situation.
6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
7	MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that the	7	MR SEMENYA SC: Would this be a
8	other alternative which could dictate the police action	8	convenient stage, Chair?
9	would be if all other options to resolve the situation	9	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well. We'll take
10	without force were exhausted and there was no other means	10	the tea adjournment at this stage for quarter of an hour.
11	to restore order to the area but to bring the strikers back	11	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]
12	in line with the legal requirements for a lawful protest.	12	[11:29] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.
13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	13	Colonel, you're still under oath. Mr Semenya?
14	MR SEMENYA SC: And there you're simply	14	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair.
14	stating that there was ultimately going to be a need to	15	CHAIRPERSON: I take it you want to
	restore law and order.	16	proceed with the evidence-in-chief.
16		17	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair.
17 18	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we - the situation was such that it was unacceptable due to the illegality of	17	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: s.u.o.
		19	
19	the situation and dialogue would be first but ultimately		EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA (CONTD):
20	any plan that was going to be presented needed to have	20 21	Colonel, we had just deal with the instruction of Brigadier
21	ultimately the tactical option also included because one		Calitz that you and Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi must sit down
22	could not simply make a plan where dialogue was the end	22	and draw a plan and you knew, as you recall or as you
23	result, should the strikers at that stage refuse the	23	recall there was going to be a JOCCOM meeting at 6 o'clock
24	dialogue, because we didn't even know whether they would	24	in the morning.
25	negotiate with the police, that obviously there needed to	25	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes sir, that's how I had
	Page 13379		Demo 10001
			Page 13381
1	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've	1	Page 13381 it.
1 2		1 2	-
	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've		it.
2	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move	2	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph
2 3	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to	2 3	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28.
2 3 4	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order	2 3 4	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair.
2 3 4 5	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline.	2 3 4 5	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right?
2 3 4 5 6	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided	2 3 4 5 6	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of	2 3 4 5 6 7	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public order policing with sharp point ammunition.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you say other police officers. Who else was there?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public order policing with sharp point ammunition. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And it was during	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you say other police officers. Who else was there? COLONEL SCOTT: It's as you've said. Mr
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public order policing with sharp point ammunition. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And it was during the early hours of Tuesday morning that you were introduced	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you say other police officers. Who else was there? COLONEL SCOTT: It's as you've said. Mr Sinclair was there, he was assisting us with information
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public order policing with sharp point ammunition. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And it was during the early hours of Tuesday morning that you were introduced to Brigadier Calitz. Brigadier Calitz introduced you to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you say other police officers. Who else was there? COLONEL SCOTT: It's as you've said. Mr Sinclair was there, he was assisting us with information that we needed. Colonel Merafi who I'd been introduced to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public order policing with sharp point ammunition. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And it was during the early hours of Tuesday morning that you were introduced to Brigadier Calitz. Brigadier Calitz introduced you to Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you say other police officers. Who else was there? COLONEL SCOTT: It's as you've said. Mr Sinclair was there, he was assisting us with information that we needed. Colonel Merafi who I'd been introduced to and I'm not sure of the others but he had two members with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	be steps, as we know, in the force continuum as I've mentioned in the principles of the policing, to then move to a show of force and then possibly at the end have to disperse the crowd or deal with the crowd with public order policing as the frontline. MR SEMENYA SC: And therefore you decided to have in your plan a contingency plan for the safety of the POP members. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And to have the protection of the tactical units in assisting the POP action, if employed. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think one must understand that the public order policing is just that, it's public order policing and it is done with non-lethal force. The tactical forces that were positioned were there to deal with high risk arrests, et cetera, not to do public order policing with sharp point ammunition. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And it was during the early hours of Tuesday morning that you were introduced to Brigadier Calitz. Brigadier Calitz introduced you to Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	it. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you're at paragraph 6.30 of the statement, page 28. MR SEMENYA SC: That is correct, Chair. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you arranged with Mr Sinclair to print a large copy of a satellite photo of the area where the koppie was located and you gathered around the table in the JOC to discuss the options that are available to the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It was a room just adjacent or just off the JOC room itself. MR SEMENYA SC: Alright. COLONEL SCOTT: Adjoining room. MR SEMENYA SC: So in company you have Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi, you've got Mr Sinclair and you say other police officers. Who else was there? COLONEL SCOTT: It's as you've said. Mr Sinclair was there, he was assisting us with information that we needed. Colonel Merafi who I'd been introduced to and I'm not sure of the others but he had two members with him that he'd brought with him.

	Page 13382		Page 13384
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	1	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
2	MR SEMENYA SC: Starting with a problem	2	MR SEMENYA SC: Can you tell us what that
3	solving process.	3	is?
4	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	4	COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure if at this
5	MR SEMENYA SC: This, you say, means that	5	stage it would be good to go to the actual map so that I
6	you analyse what the problem is, you identify possible	6	can show an orientation on that map as I speak to –
7	solutions, you review the concept and you decide on the co-	7	CHAIRPERSON: You must do what you
8	ordinating instructions. What does that entail?	8	consider best to enable you to convey to us what you -
9	COLONEL SCOTT: Co-ordinating	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
10	instructions are simply instructions where we would give	10	CHAIRPERSON: - what you what to tell us.
11	the operational concept structure. It's not the specific	11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I had a similar map
12	briefing, it's just more directed towards the time line of	12	and it'll come up on screen –
13	when we would expect to do things and in what sequence we	13	CHAIRPERSON: Aren't these maps already
14	would expect to do those things.	14	exhibits - I'm told I turned my machine off by mistake. If
15	MR SEMENYA SC: Like backing backwards,	15	this map is already an exhibit please give us the exhibit
16	if you know you're going to do an operation at this time,	16	number. If it isn't, tell me that and then we can give it
17	what should happen before that time, et cetera.	17	an exhibit number and describe it for the record.
18	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. It's a	18	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, to my
19	reverse time line.	19	knowledge it's not. It is included in your bundles. I
20	MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that Mr	20	think it's –
21	Sinclair was present during some of the planning that you	21	MR MAHLANGU: There's the Google maps.
22	were doing, providing you with information which the	22	COLONEL SCOTT: - to get one today.
23	security at the time had.	23	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, we're going to be
24	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. He was actually	24	referring to item 5, as we described it, and it is –
25	very helpful to us. I think without him being there we	25	CHAIRPERSON: So it'll be JJJ4 and how
	Page 13383		Page 13385
1	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as	1	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that
2	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of	2	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached
2 3	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm	2 3	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked
2 3 4	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they	2 3 4	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described
2 3 4 5	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were.	2 3 4 5	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one
2 3 4 5 6	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the	2 3 4 5 6	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation
2 3 4 5 6 7	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved	2 3 4 5 6 7	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time aswell when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit ofinformation regarding who, at that stage who – I'mpresuming who he thought the strikers were, how many theywere, what their movements were.MR SEMENYA SC:And part of theinformation given to you is that some of the strikers movedaway from the koppie at night and returned in the morning.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:But also that there wassome small part of strikers, small group, rather, ofstrikers who spent the night at the koppie.COLONEL SCOTT:That's the informationreceived, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:And that in the morning	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time aswell when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit ofinformation regarding who, at that stage who – I'mpresuming who he thought the strikers were, how many theywere, what their movements were.MR SEMENYA SC:And part of theinformation given to you is that some of the strikers movedaway from the koppie at night and returned in the morning.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:But also that there wassome small part of strikers, small group, rather, ofstrikers who spent the night at the koppie.COLONEL SCOTT:That's the informationreceived, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And that in the morningmany strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I recall him 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures there.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I recall him specifically showing me that when we went out for a later	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures there. CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you're going to –
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I recall him specifically showing me that when we went out for a later orientation and he showed me where the Wonderkop mine</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures there. CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you're going to – Mr Chaskalson, do you want to say something?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I recall him specifically showing me that when we went out for a later orientation and he showed me where the Wonderkop mine hostels were and orientated me as to the Nkaneng settlement 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures there. CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you're going to – Mr Chaskalson, do you want to say something? MR CHASKALSON SC: Mr Chairperson, we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I recall him specifically showing me that when we went out for a later orientation and he showed me where the Wonderkop mine hostels were and orientated me as to the Nkaneng settlement and then showed me what the path of the miners were, or the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures there. CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you're going to – Mr Chaskalson, do you want to say something? MR CHASKALSON SC: Mr Chairperson, we contemplated the same problem in relation to our exhibits
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 would have really struggled. He gave us, at that time as well when we went into that planning circle, quite a bit of information regarding who, at that stage who – I'm presuming who he thought the strikers were, how many they were, what their movements were. MR SEMENYA SC: And part of the information given to you is that some of the strikers moved away from the koppie at night and returned in the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: But also that there was some small part of strikers, small group, rather, of strikers who spent the night at the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: That's the information received, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And that in the morning many strikers would then move through Nkaneng settlement, back to the koppie. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I recall him specifically showing me that when we went out for a later orientation and he showed me where the Wonderkop mine hostels were and orientated me as to the Nkaneng settlement and then showed me what the path of the miners were, or the strikers. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	does one describe it? Well, you can describe it so that people can find it. Are these the two Google maps attached to your statement – oh, I see. We haven't – we've marked those already. We've marked them already and we described them by the elevations, as far as I recall. The first one is JJJ3 point – JJJ1 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is a Google Earth image, elevation 1149 metres. Which are you referring to first? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I'm going to go into the actual programme itself, Google Earth. I printed those out as hard copies obviously but in the programme I can better show you. That's why I gave you an aerial view as well as a closer view of the actual document that I'll speak to now. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: It won't go further than that. It'll basically show you what you have as pictures there. CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you're going to – Mr Chaskalson, do you want to say something? MR CHASKALSON SC: Mr Chairperson, we contemplated the same problem in relation to our exhibits and I would respectfully suggest that we should give the

	Page 13386		Page 13388
1	the electronic file than on the hard copies.	1	have would simply, would be at about, I think round about
2	CHAIRPERSON: Okay, so we will have JJJ4	2	looking something to that -
3	and that'll be – how do you describe the file? Google	3	CHAIRPERSON: 45 is – JJJ1 is the
4	Earth file, how does one describe the file?	4	elevation 1145 metres and JJJ2 is elevation 1149. Now
5	COLONEL SCOTT: The name is	5	those are the two that you printed out for us which are
6	"Opsplatinum.kmz."	6	annexed to your affidavit, so which one are we looking at
7	CHAIRPERSON: Opsplatinum.kmz. Is that	7	now, JJJ1 or 2?
8	the description? Alright, so we have that exhibit then,	8	COLONEL SCOTT: I'll speak first to the
9	JJJ4, Google Earth file Opsplatinum.kmz.	9	wide angle.
10	COLONEL SCOTT: I know it may be brought	10	MR CHASKALSON SC: Mr Chairperson, I'm
11	up later, Chairperson, and I'm not that acquainted with	11	sorry to interrupt at this stage but it may become relevant
12	all, how to check the validity of IT documents, I think, as	12	later on and I do need to raise an issue now, which is that
13	well as maybe the evidence leaders and their people but I	13	what is being shown on the screen is not in fact
14	do understand that the date modified speaks to when the	14	Opsplatinum.kmz in the form in which it was saved at 5:46
15	file was created.	15	because what Colonel Scott has done – and I'm not
16	CHAIRPERSON: Alright, so you want me	16	suggesting there's anything untoward about this but the
17	then to add to the description of the exhibit, Google Earth	17	version that was saved – how Google Earth works is you have
18	file Opsplatinum.kmz and in brackets, date modified	18	a key which has a series of icons which will then be
19	2012.08.14 05:46AM. You agree, Mr Chaskalson, that's a	19	plotted onto the aerial photograph and you can, by
20	necessary part of the description of the exhibit?	20	adjusting the key on the left, which Colonel Scott is now
21	MR CHASKALSON SC: We do agree that it's	21	calling up, you can identify which icons you want to
22	not necessarily a necessary part but Colonel Scott's	22	display at any given time. I wonder, Colonel, if you can
23	description of what signifies is correct, that is when it	23	just click one of the icons to show how it will go away
24	was saved, according to the clock on his computer.	24	when you remove it, so the T for the target. Now all of,
25	CHAIRPERSON: Well, if anyone has to read	25	on the version of the file that was saved at 5:46AM, all of
	Page 13387		Page 13389
1	Page 13387 this record later, to the extent of looking at the	1	Page 13389 the – the key was complete but not all of the items were
1 2	-	1 2	
	this record later, to the extent of looking at the		the - the key was complete but not all of the items were
2	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of	2	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called
2 3	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found	2 3	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a
2 3 4	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy	2 3 4	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were
2 3 4 5	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to	2 3 4 5	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later
2 3 4 5 6	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know	2 3 4 5 6	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now.
2 3 4 5 6 7	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one	2 3 4 5 6 7	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference. Shall we proceed? We've now zoomed in on an image which we can see which in fact is – is that the picture that you copied for us?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see. CHAIRPERSON: Well, would you are to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference. Shall we proceed? We've now zoomed in on an image which we can see which in fact is – is that the picture that you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see. CHAIRPERSON: Well, would you are to describe for us, for the purposes of the record, what we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference. Shall we proceed? We've now zoomed in on an image which we can see which in fact is – is that the picture that you copied for us? COLONEL SCOTT: That's the picture you have.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see. CHAIRPERSON: Well, would you are to describe for us, for the purposes of the record, what we are now looking at, at the moment so that that problem falls away? MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, you're looking
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference. Shall we proceed? We've now zoomed in on an image which we can see which in fact is – is that the picture that you copied for us? COLONEL SCOTT: That's the picture you have. CHAIRPERSON: Or one of the pictures you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see. CHAIRPERSON: Well, would you are to describe for us, for the purposes of the record, what we are now looking at, at the moment so that that problem falls away? MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, you're looking at one of two things. We could describe it in one of two
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference. Shall we proceed? We've now zoomed in on an image which we can see which in fact is – is that the picture that you copied for us? COLONEL SCOTT: That's the picture you have. CHAIRPERSON: Or one of the pictures you copied. Which one is it?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see. CHAIRPERSON: Well, would you are to describe for us, for the purposes of the record, what we are now looking at, at the moment so that that problem falls away? MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, you're looking at one of two things. We could describe it in one of two ways, either one could say it is the file Opsplatinum2.kmz
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	this record later, to the extent of looking at the exhibits, we've got enough on record now by way of description of the exhibit for the exhibit to be found without any difficulty, which is the exercise we're busy with. It's now already a conflict of testimony as to whether modified means created or saved. I don't know whether we have to resolve that dispute now but he said one thing, you said another, Mr Chaskalson. MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, for the purposes of the evidence-in-chief we intend to convey no more than the fact that this document as at that date was in existence. There may very well be some debate but at least what is not in debate, debatable, is that the document was in existence on Colonel Scott's computer at that date. CHAIRPERSON: And time, yes. Well, I take it that's a satisfactory resolution of the difference. Shall we proceed? We've now zoomed in on an image which we can see which in fact is – is that the picture that you copied for us? COLONEL SCOTT: That's the picture you have. CHAIRPERSON: Or one of the pictures you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the – the key was complete but not all of the items were marked for display. On another file called Opsplatinum.kmz, I think Opsplatinum2 which was saved a little later, about 15 minutes later, all of the icons were marked for display. It may become relevant at a later stage. I just do want to make that distinction now. CHAIRPERSON: All I'm concerned with at the moment is that we describe the exhibits which have been put in so that when we read the record later and when subsequent people read the record, it'll be apparent what exactly is being talked about at the moment. That's my only concern. MR CHASKALSON SC: That's precisely my point, Mr Chairperson, is what you're looking at on the screen is not what someone who subsequently calls up the file, the electronic file Opsplatinum.kmz in the form that it was saved at 15:46 will see. CHAIRPERSON: Well, would you are to describe for us, for the purposes of the record, what we are now looking at, at the moment so that that problem falls away? MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, you're looking at one of two things. We could describe it in one of two

		r	
	Page 13390		Page 13392
1	Opsplatinum.kmz in which all icons have been highlighted on		looking at, at which time, then I think there won't be a
2	the satellite photo. Now that wasn't the form in which	2	problem, at least for the moment.
3	Opsplatinum.kmz was saved at 15:46. I'm not suggesting	3	COLONEL SCOTT: Right. In essence, I'm
4	that anything will turn on this particular example but it	4	not trying to give the full planning briefing. It's just
5	may become relevant at a later stage when we're dealing	5	speaking to the strategy still which was derived with
6	with Google Earth plans and what was visible and what	6	Colonel Merafi and two others at that meeting that evening
7	wasn't visible.	7	and what was critical there was when Mr Sinclair spoke to
8	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand. Do you	8	us and said, but not the whole 3 000 remains at the koppie
9	understand my sole concern is that later when the record is	9	overnight. The majority of them move away and there's only
10	read, those who read it must be able to follow what exactly	10	a core group which do remain and this gave rise to an
11	has been said there.	11	opportunistic plan or strategy, if one would, that anyone –
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: I wonder if we, if I	12	and my reasoning at that time was, anybody staying at the
13	could suggest possibly a methodology for - well, a way of	13	koppie, and I know that night was cold, it was close to
14	resolving this problem. If Colonel Scott could re – un-	14	zero degrees, had to be staying there for a very good
15	save Opsplatinum.kmz and call it up in the form that it was	15	reason and had to be possibly part of the core grouping and
16	saved, which in fact Colonel Scott has just done that.	16	possibly the grouping that, as we saw, was the smaller
17	COLONEL SCOTT: But if I can give clarity	17	grouping that had attacked the police earlier that day.
18	-	18	It was at this time as well when speaking about
19	CHAIRPERSON: Am I correct in thinking	19	the grouping and what would happen to the strikers with Mr
20	that one has got to read kmz and kmz2, which are the two	20	Sinclair that he also mentioned to us in the line of, as
21	images that are relevant, we've got to read them together	21	far as my recollection can go, that the Karee hostel was
22	and if one compares one with the other, one then can follow	22	predominantly an AMCU grouping of men that would stay there
23	the point that's being made. Is that correct?	23	and that, explaining to us further about the Wonderkop side
24	MR CHASKALSON SC: It is for the purposes	24	which he'd mentioned where the miners' security had died
25	of describing what one sees, Mr Chairman, but I don't want	25	earlier was predominantly a more NUM dominated area. Thus
1			
1	Page 13391	1	Page 13393
1	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed	1	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to
2	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were.	2	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this
2 3	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that.	2 3	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that
2 3 4	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible	2 3 4	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning
2 3 4 5	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that	2 3 4 5	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that
2 3 4 5 6	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So	2 3 4 5 6	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee,
2 3 4 5 6 7	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just	2 3 4 5 6 7	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later you can click on that format when you want to move to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up, specifically knowing that if they come from a hostel, mine
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later you can click on that format when you want to move to showing them the operational concept and all the icons fall	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up, specifically knowing that if they come from a hostel, mine security could have identified them. And with that and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later you can click on that format when you want to move to showing them the operational concept and all the icons fall into place later in your presentation where you now brief	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up, specifically knowing that if they come from a hostel, mine security could have identified them. And with that and knowing the conditions of the weather it was, as I say I say I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later you can click on that format when you want to move to showing them the operational concept and all the icons fall	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up, specifically knowing that if they come from a hostel, mine security could have identified them. And with that and knowing the conditions of the weather it was, as I say I was out and about at that time, it was really cold, so to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later you can click on that format when you want to move to showing them the operational concept and all the icons fall into place later in your presentation where you now brief them as to the actual operation and what you want them to do.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up, specifically knowing that if they come from a hostel, mine security could have identified them. And with that and knowing the conditions of the weather it was, as I say I was out and about at that time, it was really cold, so to be staying out on the mountain or the koppie you needed to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to suggest that the icons that Colonel Scott displayed first up weren't on the file, they were. CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I understand that. All we're concerned with is producing an intelligible record, that's all I'm concerned with and if we do it that way the record will be sufficiently intelligible. So Colonel, you understand the problem that I have, I just want it to produce an intelligible record, that's one of my responsibilities. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: If you would help me to do that you'll earn my gratitude. COLONEL SCOTT: I'll quite simply explain why it is as it is. When we start with a briefing of a plan, you don't put the whole operational concept up. Part of the background to a plan is you first orientate the people that you are briefing to the environment that they're in, thus it is saved in that format and then later you can click on that format when you want to move to showing them the operational concept and all the icons fall into place later in your presentation where you now brief them as to the actual operation and what you want them to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the conflict on the Saturday when the grouping tried to march through to go to the NUM offices. So with this background and this understanding now, understanding that the people on the koppie – and I simply give my reasoning at that time – that they possibly came from Karee, that they did not necessarily want to return to Karee, understanding that - and at this same time I understood that the group that the police tried to apprehend on the Monday were actually on their way from Karee to the koppie. Later I learned that they'd actually come from the koppie, going in that direction and were trying to return. And my, as I say, part of what we do when we plan is we're taught to think like our opponents and then to try to counter what our opponents would be doing and thinking like the opponents, knowing that the police had had conflict with them earlier that day, not wanting them to return – I would not want to return to my place of residence knowing that the police could have operations ready to pick me up, specifically knowing that if they come from a hostel, mine security could have identified them. And with that and knowing the conditions of the weather it was, as I say I was out and about at that time, it was really cold, so to

1	Page 13394 a core group, it's possibly a group that was involved in	1	Page 13396 CHAIRPERSON: Make no promises that you
2	attacking the police and if we could simply isolate that	2	can't keep, carry on.
3	group and prevent others from arriving to reinforce them or	3	MR CHASKALSON SC: I can envisage a great
4	to assist them, that it would work.	4	deal of difficulty in keeping the record intelligible
5	We were also told at this time, Mr Sinclair	5	because there's going to be a great deal of questioning in
6	mentioned to us that their intelligence sources said that	6	relation to Google Earth plans and my submission would be
7	there were possibly about 2 000 supporters, would be on	7	that we adopt one of two methodologies. The one might be
8	their way from the Mooinooi area the next morning to come	8	each icon on a Google Earth plan has properties which can
9	and join the gathering at the koppie and this explains why	9	be identified which gives its coordinates. So if Colonel
10	I have an early warning team there. If I just – I just	10	Scott for instance goes to one of those road blocks, any
11	want to see if I can put the roads in place. This was just	11	one and right clicks his mouse and goes down to properties
12	off the N $-$ I'm not sure what the N, what highway it is,	12	we'll have exact coordinates and they might be identified
13	it's one of the national roads and at one of the first	13	that way.
14	intersections an early warning team just to say whether	14	CHAIRPERSON: The other one?
15	there were people coming in and it gives rise – and I'm	15	MR CHASKALSON SC: The other one would be
16	moving from the outside in now, to why there would be a	16	use the hardcopy and for Colonel Scott to circle the road
17	roadblock there and a roadblock here on the two roads which	17	block and say it's at, and mark it A and then speak to it
18	would be, that I could see which were coming into the	18	as A but I think we need a consistent methodology because
19	koppie. It could stop buses –	19	there will be a lot of questioning around these documents.
20	[11:49] MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, Colonel, I'm	20	CHAIRPERSON: Colonel, it's your evidence
21	sorry to interrupt again. Mr Chairperson, with your	21	which of those two methods would you prefer?
22	concern about an orderly record I think it may at this	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Sir, I thinks it's
23	point be appropriate to mark –	23	probably going to be easier to mark the hardcopies, because
24	CHAIRPERSON: I was at the point of	24	to have to put into exhibit all these lat longs is –
25	saying something about it, it's not good saying a roadblock	25	CHAIRPERSON: Well we will see on the
	Page 13395		Page 13397
1	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a	1	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind
2	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us	1 2	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you
	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've		screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right.
2 3 4	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would	2	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what
2 3 4 5	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image.	2 3	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day
2 3 4 5 6	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read	2 3 4 5 6	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's
2 3 4 5 6 7	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently.	2 3 4 5 6 7	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the east of the koppie, the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the west of the koppie on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed for us and then in the description you give refer to that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the east of the koppie, the first road block being towards the west of the koppie on the same road and that was to stop any mass busses, taxi	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed for us and then in the description you give refer to that and if there's something you have to add because it's not
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the east of the koppie on the same road and that was to stop any mass busses, taxi whatever means of transport would be coming because I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed for us and then in the description you give refer to that and if there's something you have to add because it's not covered put it in by pen and just say what you've done and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the east of the koppie, the first road block being towards the west of the koppie on the same road and that was to stop any mass busses, taxi whatever means of transport would be coming because I assumed and I think correctly that they would not walk that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed for us and then in the description you give refer to that and if there's something you have to add because it's not covered put it in by pen and just say what you've done and then at the end of the day we'll get your hardcopy with the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the east of the koppie on the same road and that was to stop any mass busses, taxi whatever means of transport would be coming because I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed for us and then in the description you give refer to that and if there's something you have to add because it's not covered put it in by pen and just say what you've done and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	here and a roadblock there, here a roadblock there a roadblock everywhere a roadblock. That doesn't help us when we read the record later. So I understand you've shown us a roadblock but I would be grateful if you would give a short description as to where it is on the image. So the, what you say will be understood by those who read it subsequently. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. There was an early warning team of police members positioned possibly a kilometre or two north of the N1 highway, on the road leading to Mooinooi. We had a roadblock set up which was going to be at Marikana town, at the T-junction in the town which would have a road travelling towards the east, towards the power station and where the koppie is ultimately located and then we had a second road block on an incoming road, the same road which would lead to Marikana town but this time just past the BMR smelter towards the, this is towards the east of the koppie, the first road block being towards the west of the koppie on the same road and that was to stop any mass busses, taxi whatever means of transport would be coming because I assumed and I think correctly that they would not walk that distance to get to the koppie.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	screen what you're talking about. So if you'd be kind enough to mark on your copy the record, we'll trust, you don't have to show us every time to make sure it's right. If you mark on your copy of the record by indicating what it is that you're marking and then at the end of the day you can hand it in and that can be photostatted but that's probably the sensible way to do it, isn't it. COLONEL SCOTT: Can I request possibly that the legal team, I don't have a hardcopy with me. So if they can mark what I'm showing. Okay so the road block, if we can start at the early warning group as the letter A. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you Colonel. You say you haven't got the hardcopies yourself. I'll give you mine. Now Advocate Pingla points out to me that if one looks at JJJ1 one can see a roadblock marked and one can see an early warning marked. The only one that isn't marked is the second one, the second roadblock. So bear in mind what you've got on the copy that you printed for us and then in the description you give refer to that and if there's something you have to add because it's not covered put it in by pen and just say what you've done and then at the end of the day we'll get your hardcopy with the markings and it will be part of the record.

_			
	Page 13398		Page 13400
1	to the roadblock to the west, I'll mark that as B. If we	1	positioned what is termed the FHA, it's demarcated on the
2	speak to the roadblock which is just south of the koppie	2	map and that was the forward holding area. So that the
3	but east on the road, I'll mark that as C and then zooming	3	detectives, the forensic services and the cantor, the
4	in to the north was also what I termed a stopper group, in	4	lorries would not be there until called forward in order to
5	case, I couldn't make out whether the pathway that was	5	continue with the loading or the processing of evidence or
6	there was a dirt road or just a pathway and so there was a	6	people. What is shown as an I is in fact –
7	stopper group to the north and that will be D. In essence	7	CHAIRPERSON: For those transcribing the
8	now the concept for this operational strategy was going to	8	record by I, you mean the letter I.
9	be that as I mentioned we would want to isolate those that	9	COLONEL SCOTT: The letter I is actually
10	were on the koppie. In doing so we would utilise the razor	10	signifying observation post and the observation post that
11	wire with the public order police Nyalas to do that. That	11	you see here has got two vehicles with it, one in green,
12	part of the operation I foresaw, as you can see there are	12	one in red. The green depicts the special taskforce and
13	two colours on the screen, there's an orange line and a	13	the red depicts the national intervention unit. These two
14	blue line and that the razor wire would be deployed from	14	were to go to the letter I which is positioned on koppie 3
15	two directions in order to speed it up. This was to be a	15	as we know it and they were to go to koppie 3, they were to
16	first light operation to in essence give us the element of	16	establish a reaction team behind what I could see from the
17	surprise when moving in and that whoever was at the koppie	17	Google satellite picture I thought it to be some form of a
18	would be unprepared or unknowledgeable about what our	18	small koppie as well and they were to be out of sight. A
19	possible tactics may be. Half of the razor wire would move	19	small team from the special task force was to move in
20	to the right on the orange line from the southern side to	20	forward and was to first they would have moved out before
21	the north and the other half would drive in and deploy	21	the rest and they would have had eyes on, as we say onto
22	from, on the blue line from the north towards the south. A	22	koppie 1 where we assumed that the strikers were and they
23	small exit area which is depicted in pink and we can mark	23	would literally have given the information of what was
24	that as Echo or E was to be where we would on the opposite	24	going on while the rest of the police assets were moving
25	side as you can see to the Nkaneng area where, is where we	25	into their positions.
20		20	
	Page 13399		Page 13401
1	Page 13399 would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come	1	Page 13401 They had a dual purpose, the national
1 2		1 2	-
	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come		They had a dual purpose, the national
2	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there	2	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there
2 3	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or	2 3	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the
2 3 4	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point,	2 3 4	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening
2 3 4 5	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that	2 3 4 5	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that
2 3 4 5 6	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we	2 3 4 5 6	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and
2 3 4 5 6 7	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the	2 3 4 5 6 7	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	<pre>would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes.</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	<pre>would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	<pre>would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors?</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	<pre>would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	<pre>would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the detectives who would actually deal with the processing of any evidence as well as the processing of the strikers as	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area. CHAIRPERSON: You say this area? COLONEL SCOTT: This area being through –
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the detectives who would actually deal with the processing of any evidence as well as the processing of the strikers as they comes through. So in essence that part of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area. CHAIRPERSON: You say this area? COLONEL SCOTT: This area being through – CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps mark it on your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the detectives who would actually deal with the processing of any evidence as well as the processing of the strikers as they comes through. So in essence that part of the operation which later becomes significant of stage 4 or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area. CHAIRPERSON: You say this area? COLONEL SCOTT: This area being through – CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps mark it on your hardcopy then we all know what it is.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the detectives who would actually deal with the processing of any evidence as well as the processing of the strikers as they comes through. So in essence that part of the operation which later becomes significant of stage 4 or phase 4 is planned for the area called E. During the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area. CHAIRPERSON: You say this area? COLONEL SCOTT: This area being through – CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps mark it on your hardcopy then we all know what it is. COLONEL SCOTT: It was a general
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the detectives who would actually deal with the processing of any evidence as well as the processing of the strikers as they comes through. So in essence that part of the operation which later becomes significant of stage 4 or phase 4 is planned for the area called E. During the moving in and first encircling and setting out of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area. CHAIRPERSON: You say this area? COLONEL SCOTT: This area being through – CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps mark it on your hardcopy then we all know what it is. COLONEL SCOTT: It was a general direction but it was from the Nkaneng settlement into –
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	would bring out the strikers as we requested them to come out in an orderly fashion. They would be processed there in that purple area and weapons either left inside or brought with them would be taken from them. At this point, at the same echo point you can see the two vehicles that are standing there. That signifies, I'm not sure if we want to give those a number or not, they're already at the Echo or the area marked E, that signified the police transportation trucks that the strikers that have been at this stage apprehended would be loaded into, would be taken to a processing area to be interviewed. CHAIRPERSON: Are these, I think they call them cantors. COLONEL SCOTT: Cantors yes. CHAIRPERSON: So these would be two cantors? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. At that same point there would also be the forensic services as well as the detectives who would actually deal with the processing of any evidence as well as the processing of the strikers as they comes through. So in essence that part of the operation which later becomes significant of stage 4 or phase 4 is planned for the area called E. During the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	They had a dual purpose, the national intervention unit and the special task force vehicles there as a reaction team would respond when requested by the operational commander if there were now life threatening situations which were occurring with police members, that they had better skills to move into to help in those, and that was in case the filtering line or the situation at the koppie became to dangerous. If I can just go in a closer we see figures marked in yellow of what would be almost police figures on the Google Earth map. They are positioned inside the Nkaneng settlement and those I was what I was envisioning to be crime intelligence agents or operatives. Either police members themselves or their members that they had recruited and I had positioned them there for the reason that Mr Sinclair had mentioned to me that people had been moving from around the Nkaneng area coming through and they actually, they approached the koppie through this area. CHAIRPERSON: You say this area? COLONEL SCOTT: This area being through – CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps mark it on your hardcopy then we all know what it is. COLONEL SCOTT: It was a general

	Page 13402		Page 13404
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.	1	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
2	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry to interrupt you.	2	CHAIRPERSON: What you were trying to
3	You can mark the general direction on the hard copy.	3	convey to us and a way of ensuring that those who read the
4	You've indicated to us on the screen but if you can mark it	4	record subsequently will be able to follow so we can carry
5	on the hardcopy then it will be permanently recorded.	5	on now.
6	COLONEL SCOTT: Alright. What I would	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.
7	say then it's the red line area that is running through the	7	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: May I just enquire,
8	Nkaneng settlement. There's a red line, although it does	8	the encircling of the koppie was only in respect of the
9	extend over the veld towards the south, but the red line	9	core group that remained overnight?
10	that's running through the Nkaneng settlement is the area	10	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
11	that the strikers would come out to the koppie during the	11	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Thank you.
12	day time.	12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, as I say this was
13	CHAIRPERSON: I think you also indicated	13	to, because we initially we didn't plan, we were actually
14	where you anticipated they would leave the red line and	14	going into to plan for a 3 000 group and how to deal with
15	march, and go towards the koppie, I think perhaps if you	15	that, how we would approach it on the Tuesday and when we
16	can draw that on your hardcopy for us.	16	did get the information from Mr Sinclair that most of them
17	COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not understanding,	17	leave overnight and there's only a core group which remains
18	Chairperson. The?	18	we see that as an opportunity to say well lets deal with
19	CHAIRPERSON: You've indicated as I	19	the core group. Let's try and apprehend them and prevent
20	thought earlier, where you anticipated the strikers would	20	others from coming through and that's where you see the
21	move from Nkaneng.	21	yellow line, the prevention line is what we call a
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.	22	filtering line which was made up of public order policing
23	CHAIRPERSON: To the koppie, I thought	23	and TRT members. Initially these TRT members would just
24 25	you indicated a spot between the, it's really the second	24 25	assist the Public Order Policing in the deployment of the
25	and the third car which are to be seen in close proximity	20	wire, the razor wire and then move towards the filtering
	Page 13403		Page 13405
1	Page 13403 to the orange line, that's moving from the left.	1	Page 13405 line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well,
1 2	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.	1 2	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we
	to the orange line, that's moving from the left.		line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well,
2	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say	2	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the
2 3	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in	23	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we
2 3 4	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark	2 3 4	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may
2 3 4 5 6 7	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in	2 3 4 5	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind.	2 3 4 5 6	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me this is Wonderkop Hostel, there's the Nkaneng settlement,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway. CHAIRPERSON: I assume by armed I take it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me this is Wonderkop Hostel, there's the Nkaneng settlement, that's where the koppie is and, as I say, it was a general	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway. CHAIRPERSON: I assume by armed I take it you mean armed with dangerous weapons?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me this is Wonderkop Hostel, there's the Nkaneng settlement, that's where the koppie is and, as I say, it was a general direction which was given which helped to lead to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway. CHAIRPERSON: I assume by armed I take it you mean armed with dangerous weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me this is Wonderkop Hostel, there's the Nkaneng settlement, that's where the koppie is and, as I say, it was a general direction which was given which helped to lead to the building of this strategy further into the Google map just	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway. CHAIRPERSON: I assume by armed I take it you mean armed with dangerous weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: So if someone with a stick
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me this is Wonderkop Hostel, there's the Nkaneng settlement, that's where the koppie is and, as I say, it was a general direction which was given which helped to lead to the building of this strategy further into the Google map just before 6am.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway. CHAIRPERSON: I assume by armed I take it you mean armed with dangerous weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: So if someone with a stick came past you let him through, someone came past with a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to the orange line, that's moving from the left. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. CHAIRPERSON: There's a figure between the second car and the third car, I understood you to say that was where you thought some of the people might come in on the way to the koppie. If I'm correct then you can mark that on your hardcopy, if I'm mark please what you had in mind. COLONEL SCOTT: Okay it was, as I had it, Chair, at this stage it was very vague, a very wide, there was no specific point which was pointed out to say that's where they come through, It was just said they move from deeper in the Nkaneng settlement, they walk through it and they walk through it onto the koppie. As I say at this time and this was later clarified when Mr Sinclair took me out to orientate me and we stood at the forward holding area where he had actually established his own security checkpoints and that's the point where he would show me this is Wonderkop Hostel, there's the Nkaneng settlement, that's where the koppie is and, as I say, it was a general direction which was given which helped to lead to the building of this strategy further into the Google map just	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	line. Now the reasoning behind the filtering line as well, as well as what was, we didn't go into in depth what we would do necessarily if they refused to come out of the razor wire. We just saw, put a barrier up between the police and the protestors, we didn't want conflict, we didn't want to from a human line which we thought may become something that, would be considered to be attacked. So the razor wire, put it up and then dialogue with those inside to get reason, to get them to exit through the area we marked as E, the processing area to get into the trucks, hand in their weapons, etcetera. The filtering line as well would be tasked to, I wouldn't say necessarily prevent people, but prevent armed people from approaching and anybody that was armed and even their job was going to be to also engage in dialogue with people that were approaching, explaining again the illegality of armed protesting, etcetera, requesting them to return or to back away while this operation was underway. CHAIRPERSON: I assume by armed I take it you mean armed with dangerous weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: So if someone with a stick

	Page 13406		Page 13408
1	CHAIRPERSON: You wouldn't let him	1	MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us as you
2	through unless he surrendered his –	2	did about the forward holding area and that the purpose of
3	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	3	this as a plan would have been to have a rapid deployment
4	CHAIRPERSON: His panga or his assegai.	4	so that you're able to catch the would be strikers, armed
5	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	5	strikers unawares or unprepared?
6	CHAIRPERSON: Am I understanding you	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in essence it was
7	correctly?	7	just to isolate what we believed to be the leadership or
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. As I say it, and I	8	the core group and then from there to deal just with them
9	don't want to go into detail known now or thought out now,	9	and not necessarily a larger group numbering up to 3 000
10	but that is pretty much we didn't go into the extreme	10	odd.
11	depths of really looking deeply into, once we've done this	11	MR SEMENYA SC: At the bottom of page 32
12	where would it lead us, one of three paths, they would	12	you say against paragraph 6.38 after recapping the
13	either sit, they would either come out or they may even	13	operational concept with Lieutenant Colonel Merafe and the
14	decide to attack. Those options were not looked at as yet.	14	other POP members they agreed on the approach and you said
15	It was 2 o'clock in the morning as I said we came up with	15	you would capture it into a presentation for the 6 o'clock
16	the basic strategy as you see it there and it was to be	16	JOCCOM briefing.
17	presented to the JOCCOM for further comment and way forward	17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
18	after this was delivered to them that morning, the Tuesday	18	MR SEMENYA SC: And the meeting adjourned
19	morning.	19	at that time of the morning but Mr Sinclair then drove you
20	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, Colonel, what you	20	to the BMR Smelter where he had a security detail posted
21	have just described tells us that there was a idea to	21	there, am I right?
22	encircle a small group of people on the koppie as a	22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
23	possible solution to the problem?	23	MR SEMENYA SC: What does that mean?
24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	24	[12:08] COLONEL SCOTT: He was orientating me, he
25	thought if we could apprehend the leadership or the core	25	took me in his vehicle and drove me around just to show me,
	Page 13407		Page 13409
1	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to	1	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very
2	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything.	2	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me
2 3	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us	2 3	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now
2 3 4	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page	2 3 4	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite
2 3 4 5	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement	2 3 4 5	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time
2 3 4 5 6	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6	2 3 4 5 6	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously.
2 3 4 5 6 7	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting.	2 3 4 5 6 7	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would be coming from Mooinooi area to the south of Marikana,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances were done giving you what information?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would be coming from Mooinooi area to the south of Marikana, that's what you have just been dealing with now.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances were done giving you what information? COLONEL SCOTT: That was to, for me to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would be coming from Mooinooi area to the south of Marikana, that's what you have just been dealing with now. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances were done giving you what information? COLONEL SCOTT: That was to, for me to ascertain more precisely how many people were at the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would be coming from Mooinooi area to the south of Marikana, that's what you have just been dealing with now. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And how you conceived	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances were done giving you what information? COLONEL SCOTT: That was to, for me to ascertain more precisely how many people were at the koppie. The idea was to get a better idea because
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would be coming from Mooinooi area to the south of Marikana, that's what you have just been dealing with now. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And how you conceived positioning the various units as your evidence reveals,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances were done giving you what information? COLONEL SCOTT: That was to, for me to ascertain more precisely how many people were at the koppie. The idea was to get a better idea because obviously it would impact the plan if we were expecting
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	militant group at that time that it may bring an end to everything. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell that to us as appears on your statement from paragraph 6.33 on page 29. You also continued to describe how that encirclement was to happen and how the briefing would be done at the 6 o'clock morning JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue in your document to describe exactly what you were telling us, what would be the role of the STF, that of the NIU. You will see as you continue on your statement you also describe the cantors and their role in paragraph 6.36.4 and the movements of the various other units. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: As you tell us, Mr Sinclair had also warned you that he had information about those people you describe, the 2 000 odd people who would be coming from Mooinooi area to the south of Marikana, that's what you have just been dealing with now. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And how you conceived	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	as I said I arrived at the mine in dark. I was very unaware, I had never been to the mine before, so he took me to drive me to show me exactly where it was and I had now the concept in my mind from the Google Earth Satellite photograph, but still that is a photograph taken some time up to a year or two previously. MR SEMENYA SC: So he takes it to the koppie at a safe distance, cautions against getting too closer and it was during that time that you are getting the orientation of what is at the koppie and surrounds. Is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Mr Sinclair then says, as you tell us, during that orientation, that they can offer the Project Coin helicopter to do a reconnaissance flight early in the morning, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And those reconnaissances were done giving you what information? COLONEL SCOTT: That was to, for me to ascertain more precisely how many people were at the koppie. The idea was to get a better idea because

1	Page 13410 koppie.	1	Page 13412 10 persons who were on the koppie.
2	MR SEMENYA SC: Right. You wake up at	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That was the report we
3	04:30, just a few hours after you entered there, and you	3	received, yes.
4	return to the briefing room where you start building the	4	MR SEMENYA SC: You were not part of the
5	presentation for the operational concept, is that right?	5	reconnaissance team throughout?
6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	6	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I was working on the
7	MR SEMENYA SC: You arranged again a	7	presentation.
8	Google Earth Satellite map with icons to display as you	8	MR SEMENYA SC: But there was a second
9	were walking us through with this presentation, am I right?	9	reconnaissance flight that brought back the information
10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	10	much later, around 06:30 that there were about 15 to 20
11	MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to	11	persons on the koppie.
12	build a power point presentation to cover all the major	12	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. By then,
13	aspects, what is the situation, what the mission is, the	13	it was just – the sun wasn't up, but it was light enough to
14	execution, admin and logistics and commanding signals.	14	now see.
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	15	MR SEMENYA SC: And you considered that
16	MR SEMENYA SC: On paragraph 7.2 you say	16	favourable to implement your concept which was devised, I
17	you started formatting a presentation that Monday evening,	17	think the word should read, with Lieutenant-Colonel Merafe
18	during the time and while the senior police officers were	18	is that right?
19	in a meeting with the mine management, correct?	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
20	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	20	MR SEMENYA SC: In the morning, six
21	MR SEMENYA SC: And to save time in	21	o'clock you were under the impression that JOCCOM was
22	building the presentation, you used the design from a	22	supposed to meet that time and that you had to do a
23	previous briefing you had built for Operation Rhino,	23	briefing at that time. Is that right?
24	correct?	24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
25	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	25	MR SEMENYA SC: But so you tell us, that
	Page 13411		Page 13413
1	MR SEMENYA SC: Now Operation Rhino was	1	due to lack of availability of some of the role-players you
2	also an operation in which you were involved which included	2	were expecting to brief, you delayed the presentation and
3	the use of various units working in unison. Is that right?	3	in the meantime, you upgraded the presentation thinking the
4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	4	role-players had only left Lonmin Mine premises after
5	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say, this	5	midnight and had far to travel. Is that right?
6	explains why the planning presentation for Operation	6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. I was
7	Platinum have some of the Operation Rhino slides at the end	7	expecting them to arrive any time after six, six onwards.
8	of the document. I think we will deal with this a little	8	MR SEMENYA SC: But you were also
9	later in much greater detail when we compare what was on	9	informed that there would be additional personnel or
10	the Google map, what was on the presentation and at what	10	members who would come to assist with that operation. Is
11	time those came to be. Is that okay, Colonel?	11	that right?
12	COLONEL SCOTT: It's fine. As I say,	12	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
13	this is to the best of my recollection of how I can work I	13	MR SEMENYA SC: Most of them were not
14 15	out. I know I used the Operation Rhino previous slide	14 15	there at that time for the six o'clock morning operation,
15 16	show, because I format my own slides when I make the	15	is that right?
16	presentations. I don't use the standard one that you find in the programme itself but to the best of my recollection	16 17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: At the bottom of the
17 18	in the programme itself but to the best of my recollection this is how I did it.	17	page, you tell us that you concluded then that the
10	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Then around 05:30	18	envisioned concept to deploy the police members in
		1 17	
19	5	20	encircling the konnie and torming a tiltering line. Was no
19 20	in the morning you arranged a helicopter reconnaissance	20 21	encircling the koppie and forming a filtering line, was no
19 20 21	in the morning you arranged a helicopter reconnaissance flight to seek confirmation of the numbers of people who'd	21	longer an option. Why was that the case?
19 20 21 22	in the morning you arranged a helicopter reconnaissance flight to seek confirmation of the numbers of people who'd have been on the koppie. Is that right?	21 22	longer an option. Why was that the case? COLONEL SCOTT: We sent out a
19 20 21 22 23	in the morning you arranged a helicopter reconnaissance flight to seek confirmation of the numbers of people who'd have been on the koppie. 1s that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	21 22 23	longer an option. Why was that the case? COLONEL SCOTT: We sent out a reconnaissance flight again sporadically, and the feedback
19 20 21 22	in the morning you arranged a helicopter reconnaissance flight to seek confirmation of the numbers of people who'd have been on the koppie. Is that right?	21 22	longer an option. Why was that the case? COLONEL SCOTT: We sent out a

Page 13414Page 134161to us that the group is back at the strength of about 3 0002and at that stage, I realised that the ability to deploy13with a surprise to just surround those that would be at the4get there as well.4koppie, the smaller group, is no longer going to work.5MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. During the morning5MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. During the morning6COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after7that you had sent out for observation post that they cange6COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after7that you had sent out for observation post that they cange8to – what we now know to the koppie 3. Correct?89COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.9from the left, encircle the small group –10MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to10COLONEL SCOTT: Yes?11tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that12where you think you are going to do the sector policing13COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said14COLONEL SCOTT: Yes?14there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity.15MR SEMENYA SC: and that they also16reported that some of the strikers were moving through10COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector17COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.18patrols. There was no dialogue. It was simple interaction19vou reverted to addressing the challenges you had21mointeraction at this time with the patrols, with the23did you do then?23MR SEMENY
3 with a surprise to just surround those that would be at the kopple, the smaller group, is no longer going to work. 3 planning is one of patrolling the area and engaging the 4 strikers with a view to speak them out these arms they are 5 carrying. 5 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. During the morning is one of patrolling the area and engaging the 4 strikers with a view to speak them out these arms they are 5 carrying. 7 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. During the morning is one of patrolling the area and engaging the 4 strikers with a view to speak them out these arms they are 5 carrying. 8 to - what we now know to the koppie 3. Correct? 9 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 10 MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to 10 11 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 15 MR SEMENYA SC: And that they also 16 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 17 koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Given this information 20 wold move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Given this information 20 wold chares and balague, there was no dialogue, there was no interaction at this time with the patro
4 koppie, the smaller group, is no longer going to work. 5 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. During the morning 6 you also received feedback from STF reconnaissance team 5 COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after 7 that you had sent out for observation post that they cange 6 COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after 7 that you had sent out for observation post that they cange 6 COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after 7 that you had sent out for observation post was not suited. 7 the sector policing? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 11 tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that 11 MR SEMENYA SC: - you are now at a point 12 operating as an observation post was not suited. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 16 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Goid you reverted to addressing the challenges you had 10 no int
5 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. During the morning 5 carrying. 6 you also received feedback from STF reconnaissance team 6 COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after 7 that you had sent out for observation post that they can go 8 to - what we now know to the koppie 3. Correct? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: No, you are moving now 9 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 9 for the left, encircle the small group – 10 MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 11 tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that 12 where you think you are going to do the sector policing 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 13 patrolling – 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 15 MR SEMENYA SC: - and using dialogue as a 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 16 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 18 patrols. There was no dialogue. It was simple interaction 18 would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 with community members to understand the atmosp
6 you also received feedback from STF reconnaissance team 6 COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking now after 7 that you had sent out for observation post that they cang go 7 the sector policing? 8 to - what we now know to the koppie 3. Correct? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: No, you are moving now 9 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 9 from the left, encircle the small group – 10 MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 11 MR SEMENYA SC: - you are now at a point 12 where you think you are going to do the sector policing 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 13 patrolling – 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 15 MR SEMENYA SC: And that they also 15 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 17 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 18 would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 19 would move between koppie 1 <
7 that you had sent out for observation post that they can go 7 the sector policing? 8 to – what we now know to the koppie 3. Correct? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: No, you are moving now 9 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 9 from the left, encircle the small group – 10 MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 11 tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that 11 MR SEMENYA SC: - you are now at a point 12 operating as an observation post was not suited. 11 MR SEMENYA SC: - you are mow at a point 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 15 MR SEMENYA SC: - and using dialogue as a 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 16 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 18 would move between koppie 1 and at times some would have - 17 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Given this information 21 you reverted to addressing the challenges you had 23 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, what I am trying to
8 to – what we now know to the kopple 3. Correct? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: No, you are moving now 9 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 9 from the left, encircle the small group – 10 MR SEMENYA SC: But they came back to 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 11 tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 11 MR SEMENYA SC: - you are now at a point 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 15 MR SEMENYA SC: And that they also 15 MR SEMENYA SC: - and using dialogue as a 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 17 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 18 would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Given this information 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 21 you reverted to addressing the challenges you had 21 identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What 23 Instruct the previous 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, what I am trying to
9COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.9from the left, encircle the small group –10MR SEMENYA SC:But they came back to10COLONEL SCOTT:Yes?11tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that11MR SEMENYA SC:- you are now at a point12operating as an observation post was not suited.12where you think you are going to do the sector policing13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they said13patrolling –14there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity.14COLONEL SCOTT:Yes?15MR SEMENYA SC:And that they also15MR SEMENYA SC:- and using dialogue as a16reported that some of the strikers were moving through16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.17COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.18patrollis of view. But there was no dialogue. It was simple interaction19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21strikers at the koppie.22idd you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started25
10MR SEMENYA SC: tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that operating as an observation post was not suited.10COLONEL SCOTT: ves?Yes?11MR SEMENYA SC: operating as an observation post was not suited.12where you think you are going to do the sector policing13COLONEL SCOTT: marked that some of the strikers were moving through14COLONEL SCOTT: ves?Yes?15MR SEMENYA SC: means of the strikers were moving through16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.16reported that some of the strikers were moving through16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.17kopple 3 to get to kopple 1 and at times some would have- COLONEL SCOTT:17COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and with community members to understand the atmosphere and their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the 2223MR SEMENYA SC: GUONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we couldn't implement that initial strategy I started24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have 251understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had a nobody in the field. Knowing how I feit the previous 3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to 41COLONEL SCOTT: 4Yes.2MR SEMENYA SC: couldn't implement the wore the koppie was, how to 41COLONEL SCOTT: 4Yes.1Understanding tha
11 tell you that the terrain and the feasibility of that 11 MR SEMENYA SC: - you are now at a point 12 operating as an observation post was not suited. 12 where you think you are going to do the sector policing 13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 13 patrolling – 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 15 MR SEMENYA SC: And that they also 16 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 16 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 17 koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and at times some would have - 17 COLONEL SCOTT: No. not during the sector 18 would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Given this information 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 21 you reverted to addressing the challenges you had 10 incitration at this time with the patrols, with the 22 colLONEL SCOTT: Once I saw that we 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, what I am trying to
12operating as an observation post was not suited.12where you think you are going to do the sector policing13COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct, they said13patrolling –14there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity.14COLONEL SCOTT:Yes?15MR SEMENYA SC:And that they also15MR SEMENYA SC:- and using dialogue as a16reported that some of the strikers were moving through16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.17koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and at times some would have -17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What22strikers at the koppie.23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25been a tactical operation as you used the word.25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started25MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied
13 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they said 13 patrolling – 14 there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes? 15 MR SEMENYA SC: And that they also 15 MR SEMENYA SC: - and using dialogue as a 16 reported that some of the strikers were moving through 16 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 18 means of trying to disarm those who are armed. 18 would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 COLONEL SCOTT: No, not during the sector 18 would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods. 19 with community members to understand the atmosphere and 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Given this information 20 their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was 21 you reverted to addressing the challenges you had 21 no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the 22 identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What 22 strikers at the koppie. 23 did you do then? 23 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, what I am trying to 24
14there's a lot of movement in that very vicinity.14COLONEL SCOTT:Yes?15MR SEMENYA SC:And that they also16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.16reported that some of the strikers were moving through16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.17koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and at times some would have17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.19COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21ion interaction at this time with the patrols, with the23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25setablish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started24COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.1understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach.5MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've em
15MR SEMENYA SC:And that they also15MR SEMENYA SC:- and using dialogue as a16reported that some of the strikers were moving through16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.17koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and at times some would have –17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started25been a tactical operation as you used the word.25nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tac
16reported that some of the strikers were moving through koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and at times some would have - 1816means of trying to disarm those who are armed.17koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.16means of trying to disarm those who are armed.18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information10with community members to understand the atmosphere and21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25Secoludn't implement that initial strategy I started24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25robody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous3NR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach.3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
17koppie 3 to get to koppie 1 and at times some would have –17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.17COLONEL SCOTT:No, not during the sector19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.18patrols. There was no dialogue. It was simple interaction20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
18would move between koppie 1 and 3 for short periods.18patrols. There was no dialogue. It was simple interaction19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What22strikers at the koppie.23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I startedPage 134151COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.1understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.2night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going3which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.5
19COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.19with community members to understand the atmosphere and20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What22strikers at the koppie.23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I startedPage 134151COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.1understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
20MR SEMENYA SC:Given this information20their points of view. But there was no dialogue, there was21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What23did you do then?23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started25been a tactical operation as you used the word.7understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.3which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going55which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
21you reverted to addressing the challenges you had21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What21no interaction at this time with the patrols, with the23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I startedPage 134151COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.1understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.Page 134171understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
22identified by re-evaluating the situation. Correct? What22strikers at the koppie.23did you do then?23MR SEMENYA SC:Yes, what I am trying to24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have25couldn't implement that initial strategy I started25been a tactical operation as you used the word.Page 134151understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
 23 did you do then? 24 COLONEL SCOTT: Once I saw that we 25 couldn't implement that initial strategy I started 23 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, what I am trying to 24 establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have 25 been a tactical operation as you used the word. Page 13415 1 understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had 2 nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous 3 night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to 4 geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach. 23 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, what I am trying to 24 establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have 25 been a tactical operation as you used the word. Page 13415 1 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 2 MR SEMENYA SC: But that gets abandoned. 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 4 MR SEMENYA SC: You no longer going 5 tactical with your second stage of thinking.
24COLONEL SCOTT:Once I saw that we 2524establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have 2525couldn't implement that initial strategy I started24establish, Colonel, is the encircling operation would have 2526been a tactical operation as you used the word.2527Page 13415128Page 1341529nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous a night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to13COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach35which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.4
25 couldn't implement that initial strategy I started 25 been a tactical operation as you used the word. Page 13415 1 understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had 1 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 2 nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous 2 MR SEMENYA SC: But that gets abandoned. 3 night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 4 geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach. 4 MR SEMENYA SC: You no longer going 5 which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach. 5 tactical with your second stage of thinking.
Page 13415 Page 13415 1 understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had 1 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 2 nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous 2 MR SEMENYA SC: But that gets abandoned. 3 night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to 3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 4 geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach 4 MR SEMENYA SC: You no longer going 5 which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach. 5 tactical with your second stage of thinking.
1understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
1understanding that the police forces were arriving. We had1COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.2nobody in the field. Knowing how I felt the previous2MR SEMENYA SC:But that gets abandoned.3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
3night, not knowing where the koppie was, how to3COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
4geographically orientate myself, I relied on an approach4MR SEMENYA SC:You no longer going5which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach.5tactical with your second stage of thinking.
5 which I've employed before, it's a sector patrol approach. 5 tactical with your second stage of thinking.
6 So Lisplit the environment around the konnie into four 6 COLONEL SCOTT: Ves
7 different sectors. At this stage, I approached General 7 MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us against
8 Mpembe, I asked him if we could deploy the police members 8 paragraph 7.8 that you developed another interim
9 who were there to go and patrol, so that we could put the 9 operational concept, that is now of using these patrols for
10 newly arrived forces with some of the forces who had been 10 multiple purposes, is that right?
11 working in the area already, and they would move into the 11 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That was
12 four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12 the sector policing patrol strategy
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the14just been addressing now for us?
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the14just been addressing now for us?15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the14just been addressing now for us?15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.16MR SEMENYA SC:And you say the patrol
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the14just been addressing now for us?15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC:And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the14just been addressing now for us?15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC:And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18envisioned where to place what I was calling the police18brief, using computer based satellite photos, that you had
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the14just been addressing now for us?15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC:And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18envisioned where to place what I was calling the police18brief, using computer based satellite photos, that you had19neutral area, due to my information at that time of the19developed. You realised that the newly arrived police
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC: The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the13MR SEMENYA SC: The one that you have15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC: And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18neutral area, due to my information at that time of the19developed. You realised that the newly arrived police20Wonderkop hostels being an area where conflict has resulted20members needed to be orientated and integrated into the
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC: The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the13MR SEMENYA SC: The one that you have15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC: And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18envisioned where to place what I was calling the police18brief, using computer based satellite photos, that you had19neutral area, due to my information at that time of the19developed. You realised that the newly arrived police20and that the NUM offices were behind those still. The21respective forces in the area already.
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC:And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18envisioned where to place what I was calling the police18brief, using computer based satellite photos, that you had19neutral area, due to my information at that time of the19developed. You realised that the newly arrived police21and that the NUM offices were behind those still. The21colLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.22COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC: The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the13MR SEMENYA SC: The one that you have15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC: And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18envisioned where to place what I was calling the police18brief, using computer based satellite photos, that you had19neutral area, due to my information at that time of the19developed. You realised that the newly arrived police21and that the NUM offices were behind those still. The21respective forces in the area already.22police would then place themselves between the striker22COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.23group and those targets which I anticipated. So I needed23MR SEMENYA SC: You would be having
12four different sectors to patrol and to orientate12the sector policing patrol strategy13themselves. I also needed information at this time, which13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have14I didn't have and that was, amongst others, just what the13MR SEMENYA SC:The one that you have15attitude of the people in the environment were, not15COLONEL SCOTT:That is correct.16necessarily the strikers but the rest of the people that16MR SEMENYA SC:And you say the patrol17they would encounter on route. I needed to know, I already17strategy would have the police group that was too large to18envisioned where to place what I was calling the police18brief, using computer based satellite photos, that you had19neutral area, due to my information at that time of the19developed. You realised that the newly arrived police21and that the NUM offices were behind those still. The21colLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.22COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.

	Page 13418		Page 13420
1	orientate those that were arriving from outside.	1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2	MR SEMENYA SC: "We also have a grid in a
3	MR SEMENYA SC: At the bottom, you say	3	exhibit L," that shows how you were planning to have the
4	that would have also been an advantage to give you presence	4	patrol happen, is that right?
5	in the area to prevent acts of intimidation, violence and	5	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, it's
6	destruction of property.	6	slide 64 speaks to the sector patrol explanation, and slide
7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	7	65 shows the gridded map. The maps that I would hand out
8	MR SEMENYA SC: There was a task on this	8	to the commanders would all be gridded because of the air
9	number of members of the police to gather intelligence.	9	operation and because of the scale of the environments, so
10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	10	that it was a quick reference method that members could
11	MR SEMENYA SC: To map out the approach	11	remember to certain areas, whether the helicopter could
12	routes which the strikers would use.	12	speak down to the people on the ground or the people on the
13	COLONEL SCOTT: It was more to map out	13	ground speak to the helicopter, you couldn't simply point
14	the routes that we would be looking at. At this time, the	14	to a tree or a bush or a pole, nobody would know where you
15	strikers, the majority of them to my understanding, were at	15	were. So it's a grid method where one would simply say,
16	the koppie already. I just wanted to know how we would get	16	for instance on this grid, the koppie unfortunately falls
17	there –	17	in the middle but it's on the, we can say Echo 5, E5, and
18	MR SEMENYA SC: But also -	18	that would be the eastern side of the koppie, and that's
19	COLONEL SCOTT: - which route to use.	19	how we would refer to.
20	MR SEMENYA SC: But also to secure at	20	MR SEMENYA SC: So that when you
21	that neutral area from –	21	communicate with various units you'd use the horizontal
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	22	line, well it meets with the vertical one and those people
23	MR SEMENYA SC: - which you'd operate.	23	would know that command is addressed to them.
24	You deal further down and say you requested information on	24	COLONEL SCOTT: In concert, yes, although
25	the atmosphere around the area, and the attitude of the	25	we would speak to the block that they fall into.
-			
	Dago 12/10		Page 12421
1	Page 13419 local population towards the police presence.	1	Page 13421 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC
1 2			=
	local population towards the police presence.	1	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC
2	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	1 2	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in
2 3	local population towards the police presence.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Why did you do this?	1 2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at
2 3 4	local population towards the police presence.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Why did you do this?COLONEL SCOTT:It's important to know	1 2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police
2 3 4 5	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that	1 2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a
2 3 4 5 6	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the	1 2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency.
2 3 4 5 6 7	local population towards the police presence.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Why did you do this?COLONEL SCOTT:It's important to knowwhat the community is feeling towards the police at thattime, specifically in my view after what happened on theMonday.So that's why to engage just with normal members	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're,	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Wpembe at the JOC, you say	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Mpembe at the JOC, you say against paragraph 7.11, "there were some of the commanders	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that they deployed shortly thereafter and continued to work on –
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Mpembe at the JOC, you say against paragraph 7.11, "there were some of the commanders present there as well."	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that they deployed shortly thereafter and continued to work on – and you continued to work on a more permanent operational
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Mpembe at the JOC, you say against paragraph 7.11, "there were some of the commanders present there as well." COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that they deployed shortly thereafter and continued to work on – and you continued to work on a more permanent operational structure there, with the guiding principles and the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Mpembe at the JOC, you say against paragraph 7.11, "there were some of the commanders present there as well." COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: "Who were briefed on the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that they deployed shortly thereafter and continued to work on – and you continued to work on a more permanent operational structure there, with the guiding principles and the mission, a strategy would provide the foundation for the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Mpembe at the JOC, you say against paragraph 7.11, "there were some of the commanders present there as well." COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: Who were briefed on the sector patrol approach" and then you divided them into	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that they deployed shortly thereafter and continued to work on – and you continued to work on a more permanent operational structure there, with the guiding principles and the mission, a strategy would provide the foundation for the operational concept for deployment and would be approved by
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	local population towards the police presence. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Why did you do this? COLONEL SCOTT: It's important to know what the community is feeling towards the police at that time, specifically in my view after what happened on the Monday. So that's why to engage just with normal members of the community, because this also, thinking from a tactical point of view now, when we do deploy to the neutral area, we've got to consider whether there's a danger so to say to our rear at the same time, when we're, everybody facing the group of strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. It was around eighth o'clock to nine when you speak with Major-General Mpembe, you introduce the idea of patrols and you get his approval. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And now the mid-morning of that day, with Major-General Mpembe at the JOC, you say against paragraph 7.11, "there were some of the commanders present there as well." COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: "Who were briefed on the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. There was a JOC meeting as you describe, the POP members would travel in Nyalas with a minimum of three in convoy, accompanied by at least three soft skinned vehicles carrying tactical police members from the TLT or the NIU in support of them as a contingency. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: This also was a show of force strategy in relation to the operation as you contemplated it. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was on that already. It worked in both directions. We needed POPs to be with tactical forces and we needed tactical forces to be with POPs. We didn't want tactical forces to be without POPs in case they may be caught inside Nkaneng Township by a group of protesters cut off, and they had no ways of actually breaking out with non-lethal application of tactics. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say that they deployed shortly thereafter and continued to work on – and you continued to work on a more permanent operational structure there, with the guiding principles and the mission, a strategy would provide the foundation for the

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

Pretoria

	Page 13422		Page 13424
1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	1	position in those areas that I was requesting, for
2	MR SEMENYA SC: And throughout that	2	information. And thus from that we could understand that
3	morning, you continued to work on a longer term strategy.	3	the lack of intelligence coming through was a similar
4	You improved the appreciation of the environment, using the	4	reason.
5	Google Earth satellite photos and the orientation that you	5	MR SEMENYA SC: And then you also you
6	obtained from Mr Sinclair and incorporated the background	6	addressed what are called co-ordinating instructions, the
7	information you had during and over the course of the	7	operational strategy in its sequence. What do you mean by
8	night. Is that right?	8	that?
9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Again the co-ordinating
10	MR SEMENYA SC: And you continue and say,	10	instructions, as I said, is just the sequencing of the
11	the synopsis of the strategic guidelines and expectations	11	strategy and at that time after – I knew that we'd put
12	you had appreciated the previous evening, in the meeting	12	police members out into the field with the patrol sector
13	with the police senior officers was as follows. The SAPS	13	policing but that was not going to deal with the issue. We
14	will enter dialogue with the protesters, giving an	14	needed to get there to start dialogue with them and
15	opportunity for non-technical resolution. Is that right?	15	obviously dialogue is not a plan on its own. You need
16	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	16	something in case we arrive and dialogue is unsuccessful or
17	MR SEMENYA SC: Then the SAPS members	17	they refuse point blank to speak with the police, thus a
18	will protect life and property should the need arise by	18	show of force and if a show of force is unsuccessful, to
19	responding proportionally to such force.	19	prohibit or attacks or aggression towards the police, that
20	COLONEL SCOTT: Correct.	20	there would need to be a tactical option and so these
21	MR SEMENYA SC: They were to exercise	21	things flowed logically to me. Thereafter if there's a
22	caution to protect their members without provoking	22	tactical option there would need to be a processing of a
23	aggression from the protesters.	23	possible crime scene or evidence or of arrested persons,
24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	24	information would be gathered from that, the specialised
25	MR SEMENYA SC: And as a result of this,	25	units would go out to follow up on that information, being
	Page 13423		Page 13425
1	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a	1	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial
2	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin	2	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this
2 3	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying	2 3	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as
2 3 4	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the	2 3 4	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to
2 3 4 5	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of	2 3 4 5	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to
2 3 4 5 6	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved	2 3 4 5 6	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the
2 3 4 5 6 7	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest.	2 3 4 5 6 7	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: I12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there Imitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I was discussing about the positioning of the yellow figures	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but it's not to say that a stage 5 could not be implemented
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I was discussing about the positioning of the yellow figures on the screen, he mentioned to me that it was close to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but it's not to say that a stage 5 could not be implemented earlier or a stage 6 could be implemented earlier, if
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I was discussing about the positioning of the yellow figures on the screen, he mentioned to me that it was close to impossible to get his intelligence gatherers to recruit	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but it's not to say that a stage 5 could not be implemented earlier or a stage 6 could be implemented earlier, if intelligence services come with viable information and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I was discussing about the positioning of the yellow figures on the screen, he mentioned to me that it was close to impossible to get his intelligence gatherers to recruit informers or to go into the area themselves. Going in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but it's not to say that a stage 5 could not be implemented earlier or a stage 6 could be implemented earlier, if intelligence services come with viable information and that's why the NIU and task force were also brought into
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I was discussing about the positioning of the yellow figures on the screen, he mentioned to me that it was close to impossible to get his intelligence gatherers to recruit informers or to go into the area themselves. Going in would mean almost certain vulnerability to themselves and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but it's not to say that a stage 5 could not be implemented earlier or a stage 6 could be implemented earlier, if intelligence services come with viable information and that's why the NIU and task force were also brought into the area because they could go and work on that information
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the mission for the operation was then tabled to be that a combined SAPS force will restore stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of force isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and identify suspects involved in the unrest. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And we know we have that mission as part of exhibit SSS3. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. [12:28] MR SEMENYA SC: You continued, appreciating the situation with a little time and the intelligence that was available to you. Why were there limitations in relation to intelligence gathering? COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding, and is spoke with Brigadier Engelbrecht that morning, he was one of the members who was there at 6 o'clock when I was discussing about the positioning of the yellow figures on the screen, he mentioned to me that it was close to impossible to get his intelligence gatherers to recruit informers or to go into the area themselves. Going in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	a stage 5, and obviously in line with the Provincial Commissioner's instructions to disarm the people in this area that were walking with these traditional weapons as was found in the OB, to go to the hostels thereafter and to confiscate as many of the dangerous weapons as we could to – and that was the vision to bring back stability to the area. MR SEMENYA SC: Those six sequential phases are the ones that are also depicted or indicated in exhibit L, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. As I say, they would follow on chronologically, culminating in the cordon and search to retrieve weapons that may be in the places where the strikers were resident. COLONEL SCOTT: It was envisioned that on that Tuesday chronologically and sequentially they would follow each other. It made sense in that direction but it's not to say that a stage 5 could not be implemented earlier or a stage 6 could be implemented earlier, if intelligence services come with viable information and that's why the NIU and task force were also brought into

1	Page 13426 stage 6 was also there and it was always also an option	1	Page 13428 MR SEMENYA SC: And as you do on page 42
2	because we didn't know from day-to-day what the strikers	2	of your statement, you describe what phase 1 would have
3	would be doing. We didn't know that they would be back at	3	entailed and the purpose why you would have taken that
	the koppie on the Wednesday. So as I say, those were all	4	phase into account, i.e. to seek a peaceful disarmament
4		5	and dispersion resolution.
5	sequentially placed but obviously could be, specifically	6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
6	stages 5 and 6, could be utilised at any time as the police	7	MR SEMENYA SC: Correct?
7	would require it to be done. MR SEMENYA SC: And to tell us that	8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
8		0 9	
9	General Annandale was there, you were reporting to him and		MR SEMENYA SC: And you explain exactly
10	that you were not privy to some of the things because the	10	how the POP members in the armoured vehicles would have had
11	generals would have their own meetings at times and you	11	to respond and how the other TRT members would be
12	would be working separately from them.	12	positioned approximately 100 metres to the rear east, as
13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	13	you describe it.
14	MR SEMENYA SC: And this included	14	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
15	meetings which the generals attended with mine management	15	MR SEMENYA SC: And the role of the TRT
16	to which you were not necessarily a party.	16	members would be to assist their colleagues should the
17	COLONEL SCOTT: I think that's more what	17	strikers threaten the lives of the POP members to the point
18	I'm referring to. I know that they went to a meeting with	18	where they could not escape or were forced to exit their
19	mine management on the Monday night. I didn't visibly see	19	armoured vehicles because of, for instance, the vehicles
20	them go off and have a meeting together but I did	20	being set alight.
21	understand that because General Naidoo was deployed in the	21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, as well
22	field and General Mpembe would be busy with strategic	22	as to, so to say, guard the rear flank from any approaches
23	negotiations with the presidents of the unions, things like	23	from the eastern side.
24	that, that General Annandale would sporadically brief them	24	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you continue to
25	in an informal fashion on one side when he had the ability	25	say that you also had a reserve group comprising of
	Page 13427		Page 13429
1	or the chance to.	1	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers.
1 2	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11	1 2	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the		additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Where would the reserve
2 3 4	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases.	2 3 4	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation?
2 3	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as	2 3	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Where would the reservegroup be positioned in relation to the operation?COLONEL SCOTT:They would be positioned
2 3 4 5 6	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They	2 3 4	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Where would the reservegroup be positioned in relation to the operation?COLONEL SCOTT:They would be positionedat the forward holding area.As the name stipulates, it is
2 3 4 5 6 7	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried	2 3 4 5	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Where would the reservegroup be positioned in relation to the operation?COLONEL SCOTT:They would be positionedat the forward holding area.As the name stipulates, it isan area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces,et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the strategy and proposed that we called the full JOCCOM	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to drive away but you would need to call in reserve forces as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the strategy and proposed that we called the full JOCCOM meeting together and that we brief the commanders and that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to drive away but you would need to call in reserve forces as rapidly as you could to assist.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the strategy and proposed that we called the full JOCCOM meeting together and that we brief the commanders and that we can get the commanders to brief their own members and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to drive away but you would need to call in reserve forces as rapidly as you could to assist. MR SEMENYA SC: And what was going to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the strategy and proposed that we called the full JOCCOM meeting together and that we brief their own members and that we can start moving out to deploy a phase 1, that we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to drive away but you would need to call in reserve forces as rapidly as you could to assist. MR SEMENYA SC: And what was going to be the role of the helicopters?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the strategy and proposed that we called the full JOCCOM meeting together and that we brief their own members and that we can start moving out to deploy a phase 1, that we can start with the negotiations and the monitoring of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to drive away but you would need to call in reserve forces as rapidly as you could to assist. MR SEMENYA SC: And what was going to be the role of the helicopters? COLONEL SCOTT: And of course – sorry,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	or the chance to. MR SEMENYA SC: And it is around 11 o'clock that you would then give General Annandale the briefing of the various phases. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I've tried as accurately as possible to put the time frames in. They could be slightly out, I'm unsure but as I say I've tried to sequence it from how I recall it throughout the day. MR SEMENYA SC: But the briefing that you also gave to General Annandale is really in broad terms, there is no particular detail that is given for each phase, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: You're correct. I basically just told him the strategy as I explained it a moment ago. There was no direct detail as to how. MR SEMENYA SC: And you discussed it with Major-General Annandale, what was his attitude to that as a proposal at that time? COLONEL SCOTT: He was receptive to the strategy and proposed that we called the full JOCCOM meeting together and that we brief their own members and that we can start moving out to deploy a phase 1, that we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	additional POP armoured vehicles with barbed wire trailers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Where would the reserve group be positioned in relation to the operation? COLONEL SCOTT: They would be positioned at the forward holding area. As the name stipulates, it is an area for holding your reserves, your contingency forces, et cetera, which is closer to the front but it's not at the front. So that is a forward holding area and our reserve forces, the barbed wire or the razor wire vehicles with their trailers would be positioned there as well. MR SEMENYA SC: And the thinking of placing some of the POP members in the forward holding areas, what was the thinking behind that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the forward holding area is also positioned closer because of a response, so if there was an issue with regard to the phase 1 deployment and they moved into place and suddenly they became overwhelmed, obviously the first tactic would be to try to drive away but you would need to call in reserve forces as rapidly as you could to assist. MR SEMENYA SC: And what was going to be the role of the helicopters?

	Page 13430		Page 13432
1	holding area, again we didn't know what the crowd was going	1	tactical forces that were there. And of course the
2	to do. We didn't know if they were planning to mobilise as	2	evidence, at the same time the forensic services to deal
3	a group, et cetera. Thus the razor wire was placed at	3	with any evidence on scene.
4	forward holding area because I started at the same time	4	MR SEMENYA SC: And the helicopters would
5	exploring further possible targets of infrastructure at the	5	help also to feed in information that is obtained in their
6	mine so that we could deploy there and put up a barrier of	6	aerial overview of the area.
7	razor wire in case we saw that the crowd was going to	7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
8	mobilise in that direction. Thus those reserve forces as	8	MR SEMENYA SC: The idea of the plan was
9	well - or if parts of the crowd moved off again.	9	also that they would provide you with photos and footages
10	The helicopter of course the same as the strategy	10	of what was happening below.
11	I had when I was driving in, to be utilised as a command	11	COLONEL SCOTT: As best as possible and
12	platform if an operation was going to be launched but in	12	Colonel Vermaak used his initiative, he started taking
13	the interim our helicopter would be utilised to provide us	13	Blackberry photographs and forwarding them back to the JOC
14	with aerial footage and general feedback to give us what we	14	for us so that we could get real-time pictures of what was
15	call situation reports from the air, because they would be	15	going on.
16	able to see much more than the ground forces would be able	16	MR SEMENYA SC: And in the plan, what was
17	to see.	17	the role for the Oryx?
18	MR SEMENYA SC: And as part of the	18	COLONEL SCOTT: The Oryx would be
19	reserve group that was to be positioned at the forward	10	utilised, I considered that there could be what I call the
20	holding area you would have various disciplines, your	20	wayward incidents where something could be occurring off
21	emergency medical services, your fire brigade, your crime	21	where the major operation could take place, if there was
22	scene and investigation experts, etcetera.	22	any form of operation or conflict. So the Oryx was simply
23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	23	there, that we would have a standby team that could be, as
24	MR SEMENYA SC: What would be the purpose	24	we called it, on an aerial platform that could be located
25	for that?	25	to areas where anybody that was in trouble, be it media
			······································
	Page 13431		Page 13433
1	Page 13431 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans	1	Page 13433 personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to
1 2		1 2	0
	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans		personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun	2	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire,	2 3	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know	2 3 4	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have	2 3 4 5	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which
2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with	2 3 4 5 6	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board.
2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements	2 3 4 5 6 7	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be using the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the koppie if you wanted them to.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That's why the detectives and the forensic services were also	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the koppie if you wanted them to. COLONEL SCOTT: It was, I anticipated
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That's why the detectives and the forensic services were also placed at the forward holding area, that we had people on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the koppie if you wanted them to. COLONEL SCOTT: It was, I anticipated that if the group wanted to – as I say, the closest what I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That's why the detectives and the forensic services were also placed at the forward holding area, that we had people on immediate standby to deal with any arrested persons and not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the koppie if you wanted them to. COLONEL SCOTT: It was, I anticipated that if the group wanted to – as I say, the closest what I presumed to be targets for the strikers were to the backs
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That's why the detectives and the forensic services were also	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the koppie if you wanted them to. COLONEL SCOTT: It was, I anticipated
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I draft plans those are always standard to have there. We know the stun grenades can cause fire and one wouldn't want a veld fire, for that matter, where people become entrapped. We know that if there is conflict of any sort that you need to have medical personnel close at hand so that they can deal with whoever gets injured or wounded. So these are elements which are, as we would say, standard operating procedures to have part of any plan, to be your emergency services but you'd never place them close to where any conflict could be. They are people that we consider soft in the operation and you would want to have them in a protected environment, only to come forward under the, once the operational commander starts declaring certain areas safe and they can be escorted and allowed to work without their own lives being at risk. MR SEMENYA SC: And where there are acts, criminal acts happening, those arrested would be processed and evidence would be gathered and you'd be using the detectives to manage the crime scene, as it were. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. That's why the detectives and the forensic services were also placed at the forward holding area, that we had people on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	personnel, innocent civilians that may be trying to go to work or miners, police officials that were isolated in certain areas – we really didn't know what to expect when we went to the front so that was just a contingency plan that would be directed then by the police helicopter which would have the command on board. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. You also detail what was conceived to be phase 2, i.e. escalating the levels of force by bringing some of those members from the forward holding areas, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The purpose would be, as you call it, the show of force, an attempt at dissuading the crowds into appreciating that there is more than they can handle. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And you tell us that phase 2 was only to be initialised or started when the threat level against the police increased or it became evident the strikers would not want to move away from the koppie if you wanted them to. COLONEL SCOTT: It was, I anticipated that if the group wanted to – as I say, the closest what I

1	Page 13434 the NUM offices, et cetera. So if the group en masse	1	Page 13436 unsuccessful and a show of force had failed to deter
2	decided to mobilise in that direction, this was one of the	2	further lawlessness.
3	reasons then to bring forward your reserves and to put up a	3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and I
4	show of force to try to dissuade any mass march action in	4	think the key words there are the predetermined, deliberate
5	that direction.	5	tactical action from the police side, and if there was
	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Phase 2 also		action during phase 2 it would have been simply a
6		6	
7	contemplated you prepositioning the various Nyalas with	7	contingency action where the police would have to,
8	barbed wire.	8	according to standard operating procedures, respond to what
9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	9	is occurring. Stage 3, however, is where the police have
10	MR SEMENYA SC: What would be the purpose	10	decided that nothing is working, for instance, and we need
11	of using that barbed wire in phase 2?	11	to employ a tactical option in order to resolve the
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, it was a	12	situation.
13	contingency plan in essence to form a barrier between the	13	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you detail at the
14	police, the neutral area and the strikers. So if it became	14	bottom at page 46 of your statement the stage 3 concept
15	that evident that the operational commander determined that	15	still of encircling a small group of those who would
16	he needed something, because either through information	16	resist, am I correct?
17	intelligence, words from the media that there was an	17	COLONEL SCOTT: What I've done, due to
18	imminent march about to occur or that they wanted to maybe	18	the time restraints and maybe the lack of information at
19	advance on the police, that they could deploy that wire to	19	the time, is I'd simply taken the initial plan which we've
20	form a barrier. However, that is why phase 2 spoke to only	20	discussed on screen and I'd made that the phase 3. As I
21	pre-positioning and not deploying the wire because it was	21	said, it's a deliberate action and I foresaw on the Tuesday
22	simply a matter of a show of force.	22	that if we didn't come right with negotiation, because the
23	Thus also the pre-positioning in certain, with a	23	forces were now there, because there was a structured
24	certain distance between the Nyalas so that in phase 2 that	24	JOCCOM, we could brief properly and carry out the same plan
25	wire could be deployed simultaneously because it would need	25	on the Wednesday morning just to encircle again the smaller
1	Page 13435 to be a rapid deployment of the wire in order to form the		Page 13437
1		1	group. Thus the productormined deliberate testical police
1 2		1	group. Thus the predetermined, deliberate tactical police
2	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily	2	operation in order to resolve the situation.
3	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched	2 3	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe
3 4	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or	2 3 4	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do
3 4 5	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching	2 3 4 5	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there?
3 4 5 6	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire	2 3 4 5 6	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the
3 4 5 6 7	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that	2 3 4 5 6 7	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the
3 4 5 6 7 8	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander.	2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision	2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are trained to make plans there and then. They're trained even
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the show of force to help dissuade any confrontation with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are trained to make plans there and then. They're trained even to go to certain structures without knowing what it looks
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the show of force to help dissuade any confrontation with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are trained to make plans there and then. They're trained even to go to certain structures without knowing what it looks like, et cetera and it's standard operating procedure for
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the show of force to help dissuade any confrontation with the strikers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are trained to make plans there and then. They're trained even to go to certain structures without knowing what it looks like, et cetera and it's standard operating procedure for them, if they've got the ability and the time to do a
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the show of force to help dissuade any confrontation with the strikers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are trained to make plans there and then. They're trained even to go to certain structures without knowing what it looks like, et cetera and it's standard operating procedure for them, if they've got the ability and the time to do a reconnaissance to gain information they'll do that and make
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	barrier but we didn't want to deploy the wire unnecessarily because if the crowd didn't do anything and maybe marched off somewhere, we needed the wire to go and barricade or isolate possible targets that they could be marching towards, for instance cordoning off the streets with wire around the NUM office if the crowd decided to move in that direction around the police. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you detail further what would be the scenario should the strikers get violent with the members during phase 2 that it would be deployed at the instruction of the operational commander. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You also made provision in phase 2 for the air reaction team from the STF, where they were positioned in a staging area. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the show of force to help dissuade any confrontation with the strikers. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: They too would add to the show of force to help dissuade any confrontation with the strikers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	operation in order to resolve the situation. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you describe phase 4 at the bottom of your statement, page 47. What do you say there? COLONEL SCOTT: That was simply the processing again, as we know it, with the detectives, the crime scene management, et cetera and again there's no plan necessary for them, they work according to their standard operating procedures in how they know how to process arrestees as well as the evidence that they would receive. MR SEMENYA SC: So would be the case in relation to phase 5 and 6, that required no detail because that would be part of what are standard operational practices of the police. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Many of these units would, when receiving the information, they are trained to make plans there and then. They're trained even to go to certain structures without knowing what it looks like, et cetera and it's standard operating procedure for them, if they've got the ability and the time to do a reconnaissance to gain information they'll do that and make a plan, but it's impossible here. That's what we consider

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

Pretoria

	Page 13438		Page 13440
1	operational environment.	1	order policing would be, where the tactical teams would be,
2	[12:48] MR SEMENYA SC: And obviously the later	2	et cetera. And after that you deal with, as the Commission
3	phases would be employed with the benefit of information	3	talks about housekeeping, you would deal with more your
4	obtained from those who were arrested, that would be	4	administration, et cetera, your signals, the channels for
5	additional intelligence used to successfully plan for the	5	the radios and your command structure. So the Tuesday was
6	later phases.	6	the only day that I did get to give the full, as we call
7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	7	it, the SMEAC briefing.
8	MR SEMENYA SC: Of course you deal with	8	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and what the plans
9	this in paragraph 7.22, you say, "Due to the lack of time	9	do not show would be the verbal articulation you would give
10	available to place a product before the commanders to	10	during the briefing to the various members.
11	empower them to deploy as a co-ordinated force, the need	11	COLONEL SCOTT: It's similar to what we
12	for simplicity to ensure clarity was a major	12	experienced earlier. What simply would be now, in hard
12		12	
	consideration." You'd recall that the – maybe before we		evidence would be a picture similar to that and maybe with
14	get there, the plans as they appear at that stage, they do	14	a couple of slides, but the amount of verbal input that
15	not have the detail in relation to what would happen,	15	goes with that whilst briefing your audience is tenfold of
16	correct?	16	what you see.
17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: It is at 2 o'clock,
18	MR SEMENYA SC: When the briefing gets	18	thereabouts, where you now give the first structured JOCCOM
19	done, though, with the Google map and the PowerPoint	19	this briefing, am I correct?
20	presentation, how was that briefing done to bring everybody	20	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
21	on board?	21	MR SEMENYA SC: And the POP commanders in
22	COLONEL SCOTT: I think maybe this is	22	particular, were they there?
23	why, or through experience and instruction and speaking to	23	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, the POP commanders –
24	groups, I understand that if you've got to do something	24	all commanders were called back from the sector patrol
25	quickly and rapidly you'll best speak through pictures and	25	plan. We left the forces out with their, obviously you've
		-	
	Dage 13/30		Page 13//1
1	Page 13439 people will understand pictures with, as we see on the	1	Page 13441 got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in
1	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the	1 2	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in
2	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to	-	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring
	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short	2	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were
2 3 4	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would	2 3 4	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all
2 3 4 5	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would	2 3 4 5	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that
2 3 4 5 6	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is,	2 3 4 5 6	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday.
2 3 4 5 6 7	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where	2 3 4 5 6 7	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission to them. So everybody understands the guiding statement	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall a precise
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission to them. So everybody understands the guiding statement for this operation is the mission and that's what we aim to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall a precise time but it was pretty in depth. It was at least an hour,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission to them. So everybody understands the guiding statement for this operation is the mission and that's what we aim to achieve. The operational concept which I would deal with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall a precise time but it was pretty in depth. It was at least an hour, hour and a half.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission to them. So everybody understands the guiding statement for this operation is the mission and that's what we aim to achieve. The operational concept which I would deal with would be similar to what you see on screen now and that's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall a precise time but it was pretty in depth. It was at least an hour, hour and a half. MR SEMENYA SC: And at paragraph 7.26,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission to them. So everybody understands the guiding statement for this operation is the mission and that's what we aim to achieve. The operational concept which I would deal with would be similar to what you see on screen now and that's where I would speak to them according to the positioning of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall a precise time but it was pretty in depth. It was at least an hour, hour and a half. MR SEMENYA SC: And at paragraph 7.26, page 50, you say "Due to my arrival in an ongoing situation
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	people will understand pictures with, as we see on the screen, and understand their positions, whereas if I had to put up a Word document and try to speak to that, in a short period of time that would not be sufficient. You would find, due to language issues, et cetera, that people would not understand fully and what I was saying there is, besides the time constraints, any operational plan where you have the time is to be in the verified operational plan format which is accepted by the police but in this situation there was insufficient time to put that together. There was insufficient knowledge of even the resources that we had, insufficient intelligence to do that properly. So the best to do was to put the strategy down in a PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation still speaks to what we call SMEAC, we still go over the situation, we discuss the background and all the relevant information there to orientate the audience to what the situation is, where they are and then we go into the risks and from there we'll move into what our mission is and we give our mission to them. So everybody understands the guiding statement for this operation is the mission and that's what we aim to achieve. The operational concept which I would deal with would be similar to what you see on screen now and that's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	got what we would call team leaders or deputy commanders in the field, you leave them with the forces and you bring back the commanders for briefing. All commanders were requested to come in and the JOCCOM was held with all commanders present, the commanders that were there on that Tuesday. MR SEMENYA SC: And all were fully briefed. COLONEL SCOTT: All were fully briefed according to the strategy, according to the PowerPoint presentation. What you would see on the screen, the Google Earth, is normally a hyperlink to the presentation. I would normally put a little Google Earth icon into the corner of one of the slides which I would click on and it hyperlinks it to this programme, that comes up and I speak to this programme and then eventually go back to the presentation and continue again. MR SEMENYA SC: How long did this briefing take place? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall a precise time but it was pretty in depth. It was at least an hour, hour and a half. MR SEMENYA SC: And at paragraph 7.26,

	Page 13442		Page 13444
1	at that time, I had chosen to build a PowerPoint	1	MR SEMENYA SC: And that is why your
2	presentation covering the principles expected in a plan."	2	JOCCOM sessions would then become important, to collate the
3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	3	information from various units and integrate whatever
4	MR SEMENYA SC: That deals with you doing	4	information you have for the plan.
5	the briefing of the various commanders, correct?	5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	6	MR SEMENYA SC: At about 14:30, you tell
7	MR SEMENYA SC: And this is how most of	7	us, when the briefing meeting with the commanders at the
8	the briefings would happen?	8	JOCCOM concluded, the members deployed in the field were
9	COLONEL SCOTT: As I said, on the Tuesday	9	called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by
10	I briefed the full SMEAC plan. I would still brief in	10	their respective commanders. The reorganising of the full
11	similar fashion on Wednesday and on Thursday but to a	11	deployment took place at the rear staging area under the
12	lesser degree. I didn't speak to many of the other	12	control of Brigadier Calitz. So the sense is that after
13	environments due to members in the JOCCOM themselves	13	the commanders had obtained their own briefing, they would
14	speaking to the intelligence, et cetera.	14	then go down to do the briefing of the units to which they
15	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and you tell us that	15	were in command.
16	Major-General Annandale would chair this JOCCOM meeting and	16	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
17	you would do the PowerPoint presentations?	17	MR SEMENYA SC: Would this be a
18	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	18	convenient stage, Mr Chair?
19	MR SEMENYA SC: With regard to phase 1	19	CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we'll take the
20	and in contrast with, say, phase 6, which of the two did	20	lunch adjournment now and hope to reassemble at about
21	you give a detailed briefing in relation to the operation?	21	quarter to two.
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Again due to, I didn't	22	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]
23	want to, what we call fire-hose, the fire-hose effect, the	23	[13:44] CHAIRPERSON: This commission resumes.
24	commanders. They had to deploy as quickly as we could to	24	Colonel, you're still under oath. Mr Semenya, do you want
25	get them back out to effectively deploy on phase 1. If I	25	to move onto your next point?
	Page 13443		Page 13445
1	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not	1	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had
2	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd	2	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the
	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other	_	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52
2 3 4	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there?
2 3 4 5	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there.
2 3 4 5 6	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the
2 3 4 5 6 7	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether they would be there the next day. We didn't know whether	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you say.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether they would be there the next day. We didn't know whether they would make plans and mobilise elsewhere or what they	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you say. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether they would be there the next day. We didn't know whether they would make plans and mobilise elsewhere or what they would be doing overnight. So it's one thing sitting now	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you say. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you post the NIU
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether they would be there the next day. We didn't know whether they would make plans and mobilise elsewhere or what they would be doing overnight. So it's one thing sitting now with the hindsight of what did occur, but at that time we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you say. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you post the NIU to protect three key points to the east of that strikers,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether they would be there the next day. We didn't know whether they would make plans and mobilise elsewhere or what they would be doing overnight. So it's one thing sitting now with the hindsight of what did occur, but at that time we had no idea what they would be doing from hour to hour or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you say. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you post the NIU to protect three key points to the east of that strikers, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	had gone into detail, and I myself at that time had not gone into too much detail on the rest of the phases. I'd also concentrated mainly on phase 1 and I'd named the other phases with a strategy behind them, as I spoke earlier to phase 3 being the initial plan from that morning, but I concentrated with the commanders on phase 1 and what we expected of phase 1 and in essence just named the other phases so that they had the understanding of where the strategy was being driven towards, should phase 1 obviously not succeed, that these were the rest of the sequential steps that we would follow but no detail in any of those steps was given. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the operational plan needed to be highly flexible at this time and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, we were – as I say, we were unsure of the actions of the strikers. We didn't know what their response would be to us on arrival. That's why there was a stage or a phase 2. We didn't know whether they would be there the next day. We didn't know whether they would make plans and mobilise elsewhere or what they would be doing overnight. So it's one thing sitting now with the hindsight of what did occur, but at that time we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair. We had just finished, Colonel, dealing with the 1430 after the JOCCOM concluded, you see there at the top of the page 52 paragraph 7.29. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I'm there. MR SEMENYA SC: You say there that the members deployed in the field were called back from their sector patrols to be briefed by the respective commanders. The reorganising of the full deployment took place at the rear staging area under the control of Brigadier Calitz. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You continue to say about 16:00 the phase 1 deployment departed from the rear staging area at the JOC and took their positions at the forward holding areas where the monitoring and negotiation group moving forward to occupy the ground to the east of the koppie between the closest target being the NUM offices, police station, Wonderkop hostels, Andrew Saffy Hospital and this area became the neutral area for the police, you say. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you post the NIU to protect three key points to the east of that strikers,

	Page 13446		Page 13448
1	posted them to my knowledge, it wasn't part of the planning	1	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes.
2	I had. But I know that was done. It was an input from	2	COLONEL SCOTT: It was also to say one of
3	somebody else, it wasn't part of what I had suggested.	3	the last acts of the day, if I could put it that way,
4	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say the top of	4	that's was being talked about over the radio.
5	page 53, with the knowledge of the destruction of property	5	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and until the 16th
6	and through gaining more history of where the attacks which	6	there were no incidents of violence reported to the JOC
7	had happened over the weekend you started to map the	7	until the events of the 16th, this was the last known
8	facilities which had been targeted around the mine.	8	violence –
9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	9	COLONEL SCOTT: To my knowledge that was
10	MR SEMENYA SC: And this means that you	10	the last violence that I was aware of, yes until the 16th.
11	had specific points that you thought would be negative	11	MR SEMENYA SC: And you deal of course
12	attraction points, correct?	12	with the fact that there was various shifts that were
13	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I first started	13	intended to make sure that the entire area is under
14	mapping what had already been attacked and on the Wednesday when Mr Dirk Botes was introduced to us I sat with him and	14	observation 24/7.
15		15	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was obviously
16 17	we mapped what were possible points that could be considered targets if destruction of property was to	16	the dayshift which was working according to the strategy
18	continue.	17	and then there was the nightshift who had their own
10	MR SEMENYA SC: And it was around that	18 19	strategy that they were providing a police presence in the area through the normal patrols.
20	time that you are now told or information is placed before	20	MR SEMENYA SC: And also feeding in
20	you that there is a smaller militant group who were tightly	20	information which they thought relevant in relation to the
22	packed together and marching up and down in front of the	22	happenings of the day?
22	police monitoring line chanting and waving weapons.	22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
23	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was after the	23	MR SEMENYA SC: It is at that point that
25	phase 1 deployment was in place and that was the feedback	25	you are advised about a group of people performing what
		20	you are advised about a group of people performing what
	Page 13447		Page 13449
1	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC.	1	appeared to be rituals of some kind?
2	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about	2	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came
2 3	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're	2 3	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the
2 3 4	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon?	2 3 4	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking
2 3 4 5	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to
2 3 4 5 6	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday	2 3 4 5 6	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed.
2 3 4 5 6 7	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been	2 3 4 5 6 7	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	appeared to be rituals of some kind?COLONEL SCOTT:Ja, that information camethrough on the radio when the police deployed into thephase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talkingabout men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing toget dressed.MR SEMENYA SC:Yes.COLONEL SCOTT:But if I'm, no it may behindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that thehelicopter had also picked up these things were going on.MR SEMENYA SC:The information comingthrough as well was that the negotiations with the strikersare going well, that's what you received from the JOC whereyou were?When the people, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your information that the police took care of that problem and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had been doing, etcetera, saying that they had made contact and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your information that the police took care of that problem and addressed that crime scene, is that right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had been doing, etcetera, saying that they had made contact and they had undertaken to meet the next morning and he said
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your information that the police took care of that problem and addressed that crime scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. To my understanding	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had been doing, etcetera, saying that they had made contact and they had undertaken to meet the next morning and he said that it seemed to have gone well and that they were looking
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your information that the police took care of that problem and addressed that crime scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. To my understanding and listening to the radio in the JOC the police units	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had been doing, etcetera, saying that they had made contact and they had undertaken to meet the next morning and he said that it seemed to have gone well and that they were looking forward to meeting the next morning with the strikers to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your information that the police took care of that problem and addressed that crime scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. To my understanding and listening to the radio in the JOC the police units deployed actually moved out and went to deal with that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had been doing, etcetera, saying that they had made contact and they had undertaken to meet the next morning and he said that it seemed to have gone well and that they were looking forward to meeting the next morning with the strikers to continue with dialogue.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that was coming through on the radio into the JOC. CHAIRPERSON: You've gone onto talk about something that happened on the Wednesday but what you're now describing took place on the Tuesday afternoon? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: It is on that Tuesday when you get information regarding a worker who has been fatally wounded? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, initially the media were reporting and as far as I know to our media liaison officer that a body had been discovered and we heard that the media had found the location but the police were still trying to find the location and the police helicopter started the search and as far as I know the body was located somewhere mid afternoon to the south of koppie 1, about a 100 metres to the south of koppie 1. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was your information that the police took care of that problem and addressed that crime scene, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. To my understanding and listening to the radio in the JOC the police units deployed actually moved out and went to deal with that crime scene. After the initial information coming through	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	appeared to be rituals of some kind? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that information came through on the radio when the police deployed into the phase 1, on arrival you could hear that they were talking about men that were unclothed and seemed to be rushing to get dressed. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: But if I'm, no it may be hindsight so I don't want to maybe, but I know that the helicopter had also picked up these things were going on. MR SEMENYA SC: The information coming through as well was that the negotiations with the strikers are going well, that's what you received from the JOC where you were? COLONEL SCOTT: When the people, the police members returned for the evening debrief I recall Colonel Macintosh in, being allowed to give what he had been doing, etcetera, saying that they had made contact and they had undertaken to meet the next morning and he said that it seemed to have gone well and that they were looking forward to meeting the next morning with the strikers to continue with dialogue. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and we know that the

1	Page 13450	1	Page 13452
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, well if it's the	1	force towards the west and my concern was that if a group
2	initial plan –	2	of 3 000 stood up to march that they could in essence move
3	MR SEMENYA SC: That's the Tuesday	3	to the road and block the police and we would have a very
4 5	morning.	4	far distance to have to get around them to move to beat
5	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the Tuesday morning	5	them to any mine infrastructure. Thus the suggestion that
6	plan which I had reserved for a possible tactical option	6	we create a second forward holding area to the west for
7	for Wednesday morning, in light of the negotiators coming	7	that very reason.
8	back and saying that it is going well and it seems that	8	MR SEMENYA SC: And you describe that in
9 10	there is a possibility to resolve this through dialogue	9	paragraph 8.2 with one correction though the third sentence
10	obviously I didn't at that stage want to interfere with	10	should read while seeking more information on the situation
11	saying we need to go to the tactical option now, knowing	11 12	you had during the Tuesday. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
12	that the next morning the dialogue would continue again		
13	between the police and the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: So the idea was not to	13	MR SEMENYA SC: As opposed to during the
14 15		14	
15 16	proceed with that plan either on the Wednesday?	15	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.
	COLONEL SCOTT: No, the decision was	16	MR SEMENYA SC: Been made aware of an
17 10	taken that they'd continue with the phase 1.	17	event at the K4 shaft on the previous Sunday night and the
18 10	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and to say against	18	location of a shaft to the west of the koppie. Is that
19 20	paragraph 7.37 after the evening JOCCOM meeting Major-	19 20	right?
20 21	General Annandale asked you to have the planning	20 21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: You then continue to say
21	presentation ready to peruse the next morning before the 6	21	at around 5:45 you met with Major-General Annandale and
22	o'clock JOCCOM meeting. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in essence it was	22	brought him up to speed about the need to create another
23 24	just be ready to brief again. We were aware that forces	23	forward area.
24 25	from around the country may still be incoming and we'd	24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
20	from dround the county may still be meening and we d	20	
	Page 13451		Page 13453
1	still need to be briefed on what the operational strategy	1	MR SEMENYA SC: To which he agreed?
2	was.	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
3	MR SEMENYA SC: And before that JOCCOM	3	MR SEMENYA SC: It is at 6 o'clock at the
4	now this is the Wednesday or the 15th of August you recall	4	JOCCOM when General Annandale again as routine would have
5	considering the tactical options in more detail after	5	it, presided over the proceedings there.
6	understanding the situation better from the information	6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
7	gained through the police deployment on Tuesday.	7	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that the, you
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	8	remember being present in those meetings, various
9	MR SEMENYA SC: You are now aware of a	9	disciplines, there will be the Major-Generals Mpembe,
10	smaller militant group of strikers and that the	10	Naidoo, Brigadier Calitz and Pretorius from the Northwest,
11	negotiations were going to continue, meaning the strikers	11	visible policing cluster commander, crime intelligence,
12	would be present in a larger group as witnessed during the	12	detective, police negotiators, POP, various senior
13	phase 1 deployment the previous day.	13	commanders, TRT commanders and commanders TF commander, K9
1 1/1		14	commanders, LCRC commander, mobile operations commander,
14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	16	mounted unit commander, air wing, various support
15	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore	15 16	mounted unit commander, air wing, various support
15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and	16	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance
15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that?	16 17	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel,
15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same	16 17 18	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a
15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same reasoning we had forward holding area 1, which became	16 17 18 19	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a representative from the Lonmin mine security.
15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same reasoning we had forward holding area 1, which became forward holding area 1, the initial only one was to have a	16 17 18 19 20	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a representative from the Lonmin mine security. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I thinks, most were
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same reasoning we had forward holding area 1, which became forward holding area 1, the initial only one was to have a reserve force there in case of the mobilisation of the	16 17 18 19 20 21	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a representative from the Lonmin mine security. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I thinks, most were present from the beginning of the JOCCOM, certain role-
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same reasoning we had forward holding area 1, which became forward holding area 1, the initial only one was to have a reserve force there in case of the mobilisation of the group. During the course of the Tuesday in mapping where	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a representative from the Lonmin mine security. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I thinks, most were present from the beginning of the JOCCOM, certain role- players arrived late due to, the Air wing for instance due
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same reasoning we had forward holding area 1, which became forward holding area 1, the initial only one was to have a reserve force there in case of the mobilisation of the group. During the course of the Tuesday in mapping where the incidents had happened and I had seen that some of	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a representative from the Lonmin mine security. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I thinks, most were present from the beginning of the JOCCOM, certain role- players arrived late due to, the Air wing for instance due to only being able to fly once the, it was light enough to
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC: Your analysis therefore you realised the need for a second forward holding area and why was that? COLONEL SCOTT: It made, as for the same reasoning we had forward holding area 1, which became forward holding area 1, the initial only one was to have a reserve force there in case of the mobilisation of the group. During the course of the Tuesday in mapping where	 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	commanders for radio technical, finance and supply, finance supply chain management and other ad hoc support personnel, there was also the SAA representative and so to a representative from the Lonmin mine security. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I thinks, most were present from the beginning of the JOCCOM, certain role- players arrived late due to, the Air wing for instance due

	Page 13454		Page 13456
1	the mounted unit would have to for matter fetch their	1	operational strategy that's where it ended. Of course the,
2	horses first and they would receive permission to attend or	2	sorry but part of that is also coordinating structures and
3	to arrive a little late.	3	I don't recall what the slide was called but it was
4	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say on the	4	basically the sequence of movement, who would be going to
5	morning of Wednesday you did not give the full presentation	5	what area as well.
6	starting with the situation, etcetera.	6	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say with this
7	COLONEL SCOTT: No, it was no longer with	7	presentation the difference was the inclusion now of
8	the JOCCOM running, the basic layout would be to assess who	8	forward holding area 2?
9	had arrived and General Annandale would basically do a roll	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, now it included
10	call and every commander present would explain who he was,	10	forward holding area 2.
11	what unit he represented and how many assets he had brought	11	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say there were
12	with him and this would be tabulated for the day on a	12	senior POP commanders there?
13	flipchart and after that it would generally move to has	13	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there were two new
14	anything happened over night. What is the intelligence, is	14	arrivals that I've had dealing with before. So I know them
15	there any intelligence where the intelligence community was	15	and I was aware that they had arrived and one of them was
16	given the opportunity to give their briefing. So many of	16	given the command of forward holding area 2.
17	what I would normally have presented in a plan was now	17	MR SEMENYA SC: That is now Brigadier
18	being presented through the roll players of the JOC sitting	18	Woodman?
19	there and my role became simply that of show the strategy	19	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct but at
20	again, phase 1 strategy. So I was limited to just those	20	this time he was representing the same post as Brigadier
21	slides which I was dealing with now.	21	Calitz, he was the Gauteng head of operational response
22	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay and as you tell us	22	services.
23	Major-General Annandale would reflect on what has happened	23	MR SEMENYA SC: And you point out that
24	in the past days and bringing everybody up to speed and	24	the Brigadier though, Brigadier Woodman was not present on
25	Lieutenant Colonel Macintosh and Brigadier Calitz spoke to	25	the 16th?
1	Page 13455 the meeting to provide background on the events of the		Page 13457
		-	
2		1	COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude
2	previous day?	2	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude
2 3 4	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.	2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and
3 4	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the
3 4 5	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right?	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions?
3 4	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now
3 4 5 6	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little
3 4 5 6 7	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be
3 4 5 6 7 8	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major-	2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested vurte show him the deployment	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested you to show him the deployment strategy, am I right?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested vur to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested vu to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the actual allocating of roles and functions.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: Nith that update Major- General Annandale requested vur to show him the deployment strategy, am Lright? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to space to the phase 1	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the actual allocating of roles and functions. MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Annandale?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested yu to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to explain the phase 1 deployment in a much more detail.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the actual allocating of roles and tunctions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yos, I just simply spoke
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested vu to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to explain the phase 1 deployment in a much more detail. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, I can recall on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC:In there you also alludeto the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity andthen briefly cover the rest of the phases in thecoordinating instructions?COLONEL SCOTT:This is so, obviously nowwith more time on hand I had more time to look a littledeeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore beable to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in caseit was necessary to be implemented.MR SEMENYA SC:You do tell us that afteryou explained the operational concept Major-GeneralAnnandale assigned the available resources to theirrespective roles and functions.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I didn't do theactual allocating of roles and turctions.MR SEMENYA SC:Major-General Annandale?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I just simply spoketo the units and where they would go but the locating of
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested you to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to explain the phase 1 deployment in a much more detail. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, I can recall on Wednesday I would still go back to the mission and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the actual allocating of roles and tunctions. MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Annandale? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I just simply spoke to the units and where they would go but the locating of the personnel to the positions and so on was done through
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested you to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to explain the phase 1 deployment in a much more detail. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, I can recall on Wednesday I would still go back to the mission and literally start from the mission, just to, because I know	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the actual allocating of roles and functions. MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Annandale? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I just simply spoke to the units and where they would go but the locating of the personnel to the positions and so on was done through General Annandale.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested vu to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to explain the phase 1 deployment in a much more detail. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, I can recall on Wednesday I would still go back to the mission and literally start from the mission, just to, because I know there were new people there, just to orientate them and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC:In there you also alludeto the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity andthen briefly cover the rest of the phases in thecoordinating instructions?COLONEL SCOTT:This is so, obviously nowwith more time on hand I had more time to look a littledeeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore beable to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in caseit was necessary to be implemented.MR SEMENYA SC:You do tell us that afteryou explained the operational concept Major-GeneralAnnandale assigned the available resources to theirrespective roles and functions.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I didn't do theactual allocating of roles and turctions.MR SEMENYA SC:Major-General Annandale?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, I just simply spoketo the units and where they would go but the locating ofthe personnel to the positions and so on was done throughGeneral Annandale.MR SEMENYA SC:And what do you say in
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	previous day? COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht covered the intelligence threat analysis, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: And there was feedback from the crime scene of the murdered male Mr Twala which was given by the LCRC representative and the detective. Correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR SEMENYA SC: With that update Major- General Annandale requested you to show him the deployment strategy, am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And then you used the Google Earth map satellite to explain the phase 1 deployment in a much more detail. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, I can recall on Wednesday I would still go back to the mission and literally start from the mission, just to, because I know there were new people there, just to orientate them and then run through the next courle of slides which dealt with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: In there you also allude to the deployment of phase 2 to provide more clarity and then briefly cover the rest of the phases in the coordinating instructions? COLONEL SCOTT: This is so, obviously now with more time on hand I had more time to look a little deeper into the actual sequence phases and therefore be able to brief just a little bit better on a phase 2 in case it was necessary to be implemented. MR SEMENYA SC: You do tell us that after you explained the operational concept Major-General Annandale assigned the available resources to their respective roles and functions. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I didn't do the actual allocating of roles and tunctions. MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Annandale? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I just simply spoke to the units and where they would go but the locating of the personnel to the positions and so on was done through General Annandale. MR SEMENYA SC: And what do you say in paragraph 8.22 relevant to Lieutenant Colonel Merafe?

		1	
1	Page 13458	1	Page 13460 away and brief their sections before Brigadier Calitz would
1	the opportunity and literally by pointing out of each person to any input or any objections, etcetera, Colonel	1	take over to take them to the front.
2	Merafe raised an objection that he was unsure of what he	2	[14:04] MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you recall it
4	was to brief his members on and General Annandale cleared	4	being mentioned that morning just at the JOCCOM before the
4 5	that, he said well at this stage there is, because a POPs	4 5	main force deployment, that there were cattle moving around
	commander in essence would want to know which one of the	6	in the vicinity of the koppie?
6		7	5
7	tactical options is he to prepare his people for reply and		5
8	General Annandale put in a piece with we're on a standby at	8 9	that triggered a memory not too long ago that somebody
9	this stage, it's monitoring and negotiation so you need to		mentioned and in just trying to clarify that it was
10 11	just be in a standby at this stage and if necessary and if	10	mentioned to me by another colleague that they think it was
12	we do escalate at any stage you'll be informed thereafter. MR SEMENYA SC: So there were	11 12	the observation post. But we definitely heard inside the
			JOC that there are cattle around the koppies and that tied
13	opportunities for commanders to interrogate the plan as the	13	in with something the helicopter was reporting at the time
14	briefing went on?	14	that the people seem to be more spread out than normal.
15	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there were. MR SEMENYA SC: And those of the new	15	They weren't just on the koppies, they were around the
16		16	grass areas as well, and they were seated. And we actually
17 18	arrivals would also be given their call signs, you say? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. All new	17	wondered at that time whether wasn't a leak in our intelligence or our information inside the JOC that was
10	arrivals that held command positions were allocated a call	18 19	getting back out to the miners and that they knew that
20		20	
20	sign. MR SEMENYA SC: Regarding communication,	20	there was a possible strategy of encirclement at some stage. And I remember this pertinently, because we thought
22	you had what on plan in relation to that?	22	that they would use the cattle to rush them maybe at the
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Regarding communication,	22	barbed wire or the razor wire and then follow out
23	I had set up the communication on, and the command and	23	afterwards, or just sitting so broadened that we wouldn't
24	control for that matter on the Tuesday already and briefed	24	be able to actually encircle them for that matter.
20	control for that matter on the ruesday already and briefed	20	be able to detailing encircle them for that matter.
	Page 13459		Page 13461
1	Page 13459 it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical	1	Page 13461 But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in
1 2		1 2	о С
	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical		But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in
2	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I	2	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan
2 3	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of	2 3	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was
2 3 4	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication	2 3 4	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people.
2 3 4 5	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were	2 3 4 5	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after
2 3 4 5 6	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now	2 3 4 5 6	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an
2 3 4 5 6 7	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and	2 3 4 5 6 7	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would actually wait and when the commanders came out one of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up there in the night in the cold. There was no food and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would actually wait and when the commanders came out one of the generals, 1 think it was General Mpembe, I wasn't actually	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up there in the night in the cold. There was no food and water and the police would have to provide a security
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would actually wait and when the commanders came out one of the generals, 1 think it was General Mpembe, 1 wasn't actually at those, 1 would remain in the JOC, but 1 did go out to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up there in the night in the cold. There was no food and water and the police would have to provide a security presence and it would become a nightmare, and due to these
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would actually wait and when the commanders came out one of the generals, 1 think it was General Mpembe, I wasn't actually at those, I would remain in the JOC, but I did go out to glance at just the set up and so on, but not attend, would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up there in the night in the cold. There was no food and water and the police would have to provide a security presence and it would become a nightmare, and due to these issues and others it was decided we need an alternative
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would actually wait and when the commanders came out one of the generals, 1 think it was General Mpembe, I wasn't actually at those, I would remain in the JOC, but I did go out to glance at just the set up and so on, but not attend, would take the parade and they would do the normal parade as the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up there in the night in the cold. There was no food and water and the police would have to provide a security presence and it would become a nightmare, and due to these issues and others it was decided we need an alternative phase 3 if we're going to deal with a larger grouping
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	it initially as it was but thereafter the radio technical person from the province was now available at the JOC so I didn't speak to that any longer. It was now a matter of there were issues raised about the lack of communication from the forward area on the Tuesday that they were struggling and obviously the availability of radios was now also sorted out. There was a little radio shack if one could, it was like a caravan that was established just outside the JOC and all commanders had to go past there and sign out a radio. So that radio checks could be done when they went to their vehicles before departing from the rear staging area and that was actually part of the coordinating instructions was to do radio checks first, ensure everybody had radios per vehicle, per commander before deploying. MR SEMENYA SC: And at the end of the JOCCOM meeting the commanders returned to their members who had formed the parade there. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was a parade that was set up during the JOCCOM meeting and they would actually wait and when the commanders came out one of the generals, 1 think it was General Mpembe, I wasn't actually at those, I would remain in the JOC, but I did go out to glance at just the set up and so on, but not attend, would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	But at that stage, stage 3 or phase 3 was not in consideration even, it was still just the initial plan although it had the naming of encirclement, but it was never intended anyway to try to encircle 3,000 people. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And you say after the benefit of that information you began to consider an alternative plan to the current opportunistic unsettling concept? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, in the discussions which arose from the – General Annandale actually called a small little informal meeting around the JOCCOM table and amongst other things that were raised there it was said but if we try to encircle a group at the koppie during daylight hours like this now it's possible they could simply just stand up and move away and the police will have encircled a rock and they would be standing 400 meters to the side, and then that led to further discussions on the human rights issues with regard to if we did encircle then and they remained put and refused to come out, they could end up there in the night in the cold. There was no food and water and the police would have to provide a security presence and it would become a nightmare, and due to these issues and others it was decided we need an alternative

Pretoria

	Page 13462		Page 13464
1	And it was discussed there already that obviously	1	same group that was now showing militant behaviour in front
2	knowing now that there's a smaller more militant group than	2	of the larger crowd at the koppie and with all my rationale
3	others that we're going to need to look at some strategy	3	up till that point, I knew that this group could pose a
4	where we give the opportunity for those to go that don't	4	problem if they need to be approached again after what
5	want to be part of this, if the police goes to a tactical	5	happened on Monday we could possibly expect a similar
6	option, which means you give the opportunity instead of	6	result. So obviously I had to keep that in mind.
7	just encircling everybody, we would allow a dispersion type	7	CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a short
8	action, which led to disperse - rather go to smaller	8	adjournment at this stage for five minutes.
9	disorganised groups to try and encircle those with the	9	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]
			-
10	police and disarm them.	10	[14:13] CHAIRPERSON: The commission resumes.
11	MR SEMENYA SC: But you say at this stage	11	Colonel, you're still under oath. Mr Semenya, I take you
12	there was still hope that the dialogue might just resolve	12	it you want to now move onto your next point.
13	the impasse?	13	MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you, Chair, and,
14	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was. At this	14	Colonel, according to plan the consideration was that once
15	stage and even till Thursday morning, I was still	15	the strikers who rejected the verbal instruction to
16	optimistic that dialogue was going to win the day. That's	16	disperse were physically dispersed by the POP members the
17	why phase 3 was not really discussed any more in depth	17	belligerent ones would be disorganised and the police would
18	thereafter once that basic concept had been seen that what	18	be able to identify smaller manageable groups to disarm and
19	we had in place wasn't going to work and that we did need	19	arrest the person who would be having the dangerous
20	another one and again it was just laid out a strategic	20	weapons.
21	level that we would need to, as I say, disperse first,	21	COLONEL SCOTT: This was the ideal
22	giving verbal and those that don't want to be part of it	22	scenario, this is what we hoped for, yes.
23	would leave to the smaller disorganised groups to approach	23	MR SEMENYA SC: And how were these to be
24	only those.	24	disorganised as you put it in your statement.
25	MR SEMENYA SC: And when you considered	25	COLONEL SCOTT: Well with –
	Page 13463		Page 13465
1	Page 13463 how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous	1	Page 13465 MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group.
1 2	6	1 2	-
	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous		MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group.
2	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering	2	MR SEMENYA SC:The belligerent group.COLONEL SCOTT:The belligerent group,
2 3	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7?	2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs
2 3 4	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being
2 3 4 5	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC:The belligerent group.COLONEL SCOTT:The belligerent group,for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPsdispersion action.With the force continuum verbally beingwarned and obviously starting then as we see later with
2 3 4 5 6	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC:The belligerent group.COLONEL SCOTT:The belligerent group,for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPsdispersion action. With the force continuum verbally beingwarned and obviously starting then as we see later withwater cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer
2 3 4 5 6 7	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC:The belligerent group.COLONEL SCOTT:The belligerent group,for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPsdispersion action. With the force continuum verbally beingwarned and obviously starting then as we see later withwater cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closertowards them.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say this promptedMajor-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were still wary about this militant smaller group even in your	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time obviously as was my task, I'm there to strategise to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were still wary about this militant smaller group even in your strategy to deal with the bigger group?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time obviously as was my task, I'm there to strategise to continually assess and to see how we can better as we go
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were still wary about this militant smaller group even in your strategy to deal with the bigger group? COLONEL SCOTT: I was. One can't hide	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time obviously as was my task, I'm there to strategise to continually assess and to see how we can better as we go along. I looked at bringing in what we call immediate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were still wary about this militant smaller group even in your strategy to deal with the bigger group? COLONEL SCOTT: I was. One can't hide the incident that happened on Monday and it was – maybe	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time obviously as was my task, I'm there to strategise to continually assess and to see how we can better as we go along. I looked at bringing in what we call immediate reaction areas for the specialised forces to move towards,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were still wary about this militant smaller group even in your strategy to deal with the bigger group? COLONEL SCOTT: I was. One can't hide the incident that happened on Monday and it was – maybe it's just, it's my view, but it became clearer to me – I'm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time obviously as was my task, I'm there to strategise to continually assess and to see how we can better as we go along. I looked at bringing in what we call immediate reaction areas for the specialised forces to move towards, during a phase 2 now, so that they could again be closer to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	how to now plan to disarm the strikers who had dangerous weapons, you then went to introduce in the plan a filtering process that you deal with at paragraph 8.1.7? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that's what I was speaking about. That's in essence not trying to take a tactical option against a full group of 3,000, because, as I said, after the Tuesday when the police arrived and we could see that there was a more militant grouping and that there were the others, it's not to say that we didn't consider. Any tactical option had to be planned for whoever was there, but one has to consider that the first part of a tactical option is a warning and in warning you are already allowing those that don't want to be part of a police response toward them to leave, and that was kind of the filtering that I'm speaking about there, is to give the opportunity before any police action takes place to allow those to go that don't want to be part. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you were still wary about this militant smaller group even in your strategy to deal with the bigger group? COLONEL SCOTT: I was. One can't hide the incident that happened on Monday and it was – maybe	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: The belligerent group. COLONEL SCOTT: The belligerent group, for that matter whoever did remain would face a POPs dispersion action. With the force continuum verbally being warned and obviously starting then as we see later with water cannons and progressively with the POPs moving closer towards them. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say this prompted Major-General Annandale to engage in a discussion on phase 3 with the other JOCCOM role-players being present there? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I can't recall, there were JOC, yes, it was a, it wasn't a formalised meeting but the JOCCOM role-players that needed to be present in any way in the JOC were also present during that. MR SEMENYA SC: And you say you clarified certain finer points concerning the deployment of phase 2? COLONEL SCOTT: At the same time obviously as was my task, I'm there to strategise to continually assess and to see how we can better as we go along. I looked at bringing in what we call immediate reaction areas for the specialised forces to move towards,

	Page 13466		Page 13468
1	well as the NIU?	1	COLONEL SCOTT: Again it was to, well the
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2	detail of that was discussed on the Thursday but it was, it
3	MR SEMENYA SC: You wanted them to be	3	was just envisioned that we would close off the police
4	able to respond as speedily as circumstances required?	4	area, the neutral area, make it a safe area so that any
5	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	5	action would not result in people fleeing in all directions
6	MR SEMENYA SC: And the helicopter, the	6	and coming between the police lines and possibly where the
7	Oryx, what was the plan there?	7	media were or if we had chosen to move any of the emergency
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Well during phase 2,	8	services into the now safe area or neutral area to become a
9	during phase 1 the Oryx was predominantly static on the	9	safe area. So closing it off with razor wire, although it
10	ground but in phase 2, being a show of force it was ideal	10	was envisioned as well not just to close it off for the
11	to have it airborne so that with the Oryx seen in the air	11	police, it was also envisioned initially to close it off to
12	it again gives a show of force and dissuasion towards the	12	prevent any movement into the Nkaneng settlement for
13	strikers for any violent action.	13	various reasons there as well. The police having to move
14	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you tell us that	14	in between the shacks was not ideal with, you know
15 16	your discussion with General Annandale this time has resulted in you abandoning entirely the encirclement	15	belligerent militant strikers now utilising innocent people
16	strategy?	16 17	inside there as collateral or you know, it just becomes
17 18	COLONEL SCOTT: It was at this time	17	more difficult for the police to have to operate in those circumstances and we were also worried about groups like
10	because as we moved on, part of the success, key points for	19	this moving into those settlements with the knowledge of
20	success for the early morning encirclement was the element	20	what happens with xenophobia and if there were any spaza
21	of surprise and as the police were deploying longer and	21	shops and the like that possibly the actions of the police
22	being there on more consecutive days so the element of	22	could cause emotions to rise and anybody that was not part
23	surprise was obviously diminishing because they were aware	23	of the striking group could become targeted as was
24	of by this time of what assets we had.	24	knowledgeable now from the Monday with seemingly somebody
25	MR SEMENYA SC: And it dawned on you that	25	that had been attacked going through one of those
	-		
	Page 13467		Page 13469
1	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the	1	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera
2	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles.	2	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of
2 3	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned	2 3	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action.
2 3 4	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider,	2 3 4	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the
2 3 4 5	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of	2 3 4 5	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not?
2 3 4 5 6	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards	2 3 4 5 6	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did.
2 3 4 5 6 7	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had	2 3 4 5 6 7	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in
2 3 4 5 6 7	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had	2 3 4 5 6 7	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the Lonmin mine representative offered to assist but I wasn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you tell us
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the Lonmin mine representative offered to assist but I wasn't party to any of those discussions.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you tell us the dispersal action needed to be away from the police line
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the Lonmin mine representative offered to assist but I wasn't party to any of those discussions. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Then an	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you tell us the dispersal action needed to be away from the police line which would be protected by the razor wire, that's how the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the Lonmin mine representative offered to assist but I wasn't party to any of those discussions. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Then an alternative suggestion was considered namely to use a POP	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you tell us the dispersal action needed to be away from the police line which would be protected by the razor wire, that's how the plan had contemplated it to unfold, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the Lonmin mine representative offered to assist but I wasn't party to any of those discussions. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Then an alternative suggestion was considered namely to use a POP action to disperse the strikers into smaller disorganised	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you tell us the dispersal action needed to be away from the police line which would be protected by the razor wire, that's how the plan had contemplated it to unfold, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, because if one would
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	the strategy might be frustrated by various conduct of the protesters in the circles. COLONEL SCOTT: Again as I mentioned earlier that the fact that they were sitting wider, etcetera made us wonder whether we didn't have a leak of our own information and strategies from the JOC towards them and we needed to, we thought that possibly they had reasoned or found out that we had envisioned an encirclement. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you say for good reasons that strategy could only be feasible, that is of an encircling the people at the koppie for an early morning deployment only and not for a group as large as they were around the 3 000 mark. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. We were also, I recall it, one, at one of the JOCCOM meetings its either the Wednesday or it could have been mentioned, ja I think it was the Wednesday that there was in any case insufficient razor wire at that time and I do know that the Lonmin mine representative offered to assist but I wasn't party to any of those discussions. MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Then an alternative suggestion was considered namely to use a POP	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	settlements and as I say again these spaza shops, etcetera become targeted by emotional or angry strikers because of police action. MR SEMENYA SC: And this made the settlement a negative attraction area, did it not? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes it did. MR SEMENYA SC: And it was also considered, you tell us that the strikers could scatter in that area and it would make the police operations very complicated both for the resistance as well as for the police? COLONEL SCOTT: It's one of the, the public order policing in their tactical options is very structured. Working in sections and so on and the moment you start moving between informal settlements like that where the roads, etcetera, the infrastructure is not as prominent as you would find in a normal urbanised area it becomes very difficult for them to have to operate in those conditions. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and as you tell us the dispersal action needed to be away from the police line which would be protected by the razor wire, that's how the plan had contemplated it to unfold, is that right?

	Page 13470		Page 13472
1	the warning could leave. Those that remained would need to	1	the strategy.
2	be dispersed and part of the dispersion was therefore then	2	MR SEMENYA SC: And the dispersion
3	to push them into an open area where was no infrastructure	3	strategy would enable the police to deal with more
4	so that in line with what our strategic guidelines were to	4	manageable disorganised groups?
5	disarm we would be able to approach groups that were maybe	5	COLONEL SCOTT: That was the envisioned
6	trying to regroup and go up to those, isolate them and	6	end state yes.
7	disarm the belligerent protestors within that group,	7	MR SEMENYA SC: And how was the group, I
8	smaller groups.	8	asked earlier to be disorganised as you use the word?
9	MR SEMENYA SC: And within the plan was	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Well even if you stand
10	factored how the strikers could move so that they get	10	together, it's difficult to do so when you've got a water
11	channelled in a way that does not cause a stampede,	11	cannon spraying down on you, it's difficult to remain in a
12	etcetera?	12	group because people will start scattering, the force of
13	COLONEL SCOTT: That was also considered.	13	the water will assist in the scattering of people although
14	Again that towards the west it was a large open area and	14	it doesn't cause serious damage or harm to the human being,
15	thus the POP dispersion action was going to be a driving	15	to my knowledge so with that happening that was why it was
16	action coming from the north and swinging and pushing	16	envisioned that the water cannons would play a big role.
17	towards the west, to the open ground.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and then you again
18	MR SEMENYA SC: And that driving would	18	reiterate how the stages would unfold. At paragraph 8.29
19	also be done sensitive to the, sensitive to the property of	19	you say after discussion on phase 2 and 3 as was your role
20	the mine, strategic property assets of the mine?	20	you started to reason the finer points of the phases. You
21	COLONEL SCOTT: Well this is why we also	21	consider the risk and the risk mitigating options with your
22	didn't want the protestors going towards the east because	22	force continuum inasmuch as should a POP tactical action be
23	of that would be the closer mine infrastructure that again,	23	necessary it would need to include the tactical units in a
24	and in reflecting on the same thing we experienced that on	24	secondary phase. What do you mean by secondary phase?
25	the 16th, on that evening, that after the police action,	25	COLONEL SCOTT: Obviously in a dispersal
	Page 13471		Page 13473
1	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our	1	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group
2	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to	2	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they
	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit.		action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once
2 3 4	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then	2 3 4	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action.
2 3 4 5	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would	2 3 4 5	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the
2 3 4 5 6	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie?	2 3 4 5 6	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going
2 3 4 5 6 7	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support of them.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high risk arrest to have these tactical units therefore going
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support of them.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high risk arrest to have these tactical units therefore going forward to do the high risk arrests of belligerent
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support of them. MR SEMENYA SC: Although phase 3 was not discussed in detail the plan envisaged to arrest	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high risk arrest to have these tactical units therefore going forward to do the high risk arrests of belligerent strikers.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support of them. MR SEMENYA SC: Although phase 3 was not discussed in detail the plan envisaged to arrest perpetrators who refused to disarm by dispersing them into	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high risk arrest to have these tactical units therefore going forward to do the high risk arrests of belligerent strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and during the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support of them. MR SEMENYA SC: Although phase 3 was not discussed in detail the plan envisaged to arrest perpetrators who refused to disarm by dispersing them into smaller groups, isolating individuals or group and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high risk arrest to have these tactical units therefore going forward to do the high risk arrests of belligerent strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and during the course of the day you had assistance of Mr Dirk Botes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	mine infrastructure was targeted. So analysis or our assessment was correct that that's what we wanted to prohibit. MR SEMENYA SC: So what was then considered to constitute a positive attraction point would be to drive the strikers to the west of the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Away from Nkaneng, as well as away from the strategic mine assets? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct and if one understands our logic and our thinking at that stage may not have covered all bases but what we did was that again a dispersion starts with a verbal warning and that those that wanted to leave we anticipated would leave and would not be part of it. So it's only those that would remain and we anticipated that the militant group would possibly be those that would be remaining, would be the ones that we need to deal with, possibly with others that had - maybe in support of them. MR SEMENYA SC: Although phase 3 was not discussed in detail the plan envisaged to arrest perpetrators who refused to disarm by dispersing them into	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	action I had to anticipate again what the militant group may do and there were three options in my view. One, they may start approaching the public order policing line once the public order policing line tried the dispersal action. Two, that they were going to possibly move up onto the koppie which I thought was what was more than likely going to happen, they would hide between the rocks of koppies 2 and 1 so that the water cannons or the POP dispersal line had no effect on them and three, that they would be moved to the open areas where they would have been dispersed into smaller groups where hopefully we would be able to deal with them. But to deal with the second issue where they went to the higher ground that was where the tactical forces would be lined up behind the public order dispersion line and obviously because it's a close quarter environment, its moving on rocks, between rocks, on trees, it's not somewhere where the POPs can operate optimally and the POPs members are lesser trained in this type of high risk arrest to have these tactical units therefore going forward to do the high risk arrests of belligerent strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and during the

1	Page 13474 the Google map to reflect the mine infrastructure which	1	Page 13476 the strikers would want to be left alone on the koppie
2	could become targets of the unrest, is that right?	2	overnight, is that correct?
			-
3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	3	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, we were asked to
4	MR SEMENYA SC: It was late Wednesday	4	leave them alone, that they wanted to consult amongst each
5	afternoon when Major-General Annandale asked you to arrange	5	other to determine their way forward.
6	a security detail with transport for the NUM and the AMCU	6	MR SEMENYA SC: And of course the
7	presidents who would be going to the koppie to address the	7	arrangement was that nothing would be done that evening to
8	strikers.	8	them?
9	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, I was	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that, the closest
10	asked to put together a small strategy just to get them	10	that the police would come to the koppie would be to
11	there and to keep them safe which entailed the special task	11	forward holding area 1.
12	force escorting them in separate vehicles. Having a Nyala	12	MR SEMENYA SC: The idea was to give that
13	from the front return to where the TRT were positioned and	13	conflict 3 resolution of the problem a chance?
14	then take the groupings forward one at a time to address	14	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
15	the strikers inside the Nyala.	15	MR SEMENYA SC: But you still felt that
16	MR SEMENYA SC: That is the plan that you	16	you needed to be vigilant regarding a possibility that the
17	put in place for the interface with the strikers?	17	miners do not, I mean the strikers do not disarm as was
18	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	18	promised?
19	MR SEMENYA SC: And the presidents of	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. One has to cover
20	both NUM and AMCU, correct?	20	all options and that is the optimistic side as well as the
21	COLONEL SCOTT: Correct.	21	pessimistic side of what could occur.
22	MR SEMENYA SC: You got a later feedback	22	MR SEMENYA SC: And then on Thursday
23	that evening was that the strikers had shunned the	23	morning at 6 o'clock JOCCOM reconvened you say on page 73,
24	president of NUM and more accepted the AMCU president in	24	is that right?
25	their encounters?	25	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
		1	
			Dogo 12/77
1	Page 13475 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the	1	Page 13477 MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would
1 2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the	1 2	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would
	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the feedback in the JOC that evening.		MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less?
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the feedback in the JOC that evening. MR SEMENYA SC: And that night there was,	2	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think
2	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that there	2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down of	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think
2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the feedback in the JOC that evening. MR SEMENYA SC: And that night there was, as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that there had been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down of the weapons?	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major-
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM it	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more Uess? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the
2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikers	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings before	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC:How would, how long wouldJOCCOM meetings last more or less?COLONEL SCOTT:Some mornings, I thinkthe average would be about almost two hours, some morning Ithink we sat for two and a half hours.MR SEMENYA SC:You say as usual Major-General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct theroll call to ascertain what resources were available, asituation report was given, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:The crime intelligencerepresentative reported that the situation was tense and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremely	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weapons	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I 've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environments	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC:How would, how long wouldJOCCOM meetings last more or less?COLONEL SCOTT:Some mornings, I thinkthe average would be about almost two hours, some morning Ithink we sat for two and a half hours.MR SEMENYA SC:You say as usual Major-General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct theroll call to ascertain what resources were available, asituation report was given, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:The crime intelligencerepresentative reported that the situation was tense andthat some strikers had already arrived at the koppie witharms, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:The trime intelligence
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weaponsare very personalised towards the men with their culture	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weaponsare very personalised towards the men with their cultureand to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC:How would, how long wouldJOCCOM meetings last more or less?COLONEL SCOTT:Some mornings, I thinkthe average would be about almost two hours, some morning Ithink we sat for two and a half hours.MR SEMENYA SC:You say as usual Major-General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct theroll call to ascertain what resources were available, asituation report was given, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:The crime intelligencerepresentative reported that the situation was tense andthat some strikers had already arrived at the koppie witharms, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:General Annandale thenspoke to phase 2 and 3 deplowment concepts briefly before
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weaponsare very personalised towards the men with their cultureand to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite orpromote emotional responses which are uncalled for and to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC:How would, how long wouldJOCCOM meetings last more or less?COLONEL SCOTT:Some mornings, I thinkthe average would be about almost two hours, some morning Ithink we sat for two and a half hours.MR SEMENYA SC:You say as usual Major-General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct theroll call to ascertain what resources were available, asituation report was given, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:The crime intelligencerepresentative reported that the situation was tense andthat some strikers had already arrived at the koppie witharms, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:General Annandale thenspoke to phase 2 and 3 deployment concepts briefly beforerequesting you to give a deployment overview?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I 've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weaponsare very personalised towards the men with their cultureand to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite orpromote emotional responses which are uncalled for and tome it didn't sound right that they would undertake to come	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: General Annandale then spoke to phase 2 and 3 deployment concepts briefly before requesting you to give a deployment overview? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weaponsare very personalised towards the men with their cultureand to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite orpromote emotional responses which are uncalled for and tome it didn't sound right that they would undertake to cometo the koppie to lay down their weapons, if they were going	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: General Annandale then spoke to phase 2 and 3 deployment concepts briefly before requesting you to give a deployment overview? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Did you give the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the feedback in the JOC that evening. MR SEMENYA SC: And that night there was, as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that there had been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down of the weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: I was, in the JOCCOM it was said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikers had undertaken to lay down their weapons. MR SEMENYA SC: You say though that that struck you as a little strange and why that? COLONEL SCOTT: I've had dealings before where we've had to operate in areas which are extremely rural and I know where, and not just in those environments but others to, but I know that normally traditional weapons are very personalised towards the men with their culture and to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite or promote emotional responses which are uncalled for and to me it didn't sound right that they would undertake to come to the koppie to lay down their weapons, if they were going to come to the koppie they would come unarmed and rather leave the weapons at their place of residence for that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: General Annandale then spoke to phase 2 and 3 deployment concepts briefly before requesting you to give a deployment overview? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Did you give the overview?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes, that was thefeedback in the JOC that evening.MR SEMENYA SC:And that night there was,as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that therehad been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down ofthe weapons?COLONEL SCOTT:I was, in the JOCCOM itwas said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikershad undertaken to lay down their weapons.MR SEMENYA SC:You say though that thatstruck you as a little strange and why that?COLONEL SCOTT:I've had dealings beforewhere we've had to operate in areas which are extremelyrural and I know where, and not just in those environmentsbut others to, but I know that normally traditional weaponsare very personalised towards the men with their cultureand to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite orpromote emotional responses which are uncalled for and tome it didn't sound right that they would undertake to cometo the koppie to lay down their weapons, if they were goingto come to the koppie they would come unarmed and rather	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: General Annandale then spoke to phase 2 and 3 deployment concepts briefly before requesting you to give a deployment overview? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Did you give the overview? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I did. What I had
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was the feedback in the JOC that evening. MR SEMENYA SC: And that night there was, as you tell us discussion of the way forward and that there had been a commitment, so to speak about the laying down of the weapons? COLONEL SCOTT: I was, in the JOCCOM it was said that by 9 o'clock the next day that the strikers had undertaken to lay down their weapons. MR SEMENYA SC: You say though that that struck you as a little strange and why that? COLONEL SCOTT: I've had dealings before where we've had to operate in areas which are extremely rural and I know where, and not just in those environments but others to, but I know that normally traditional weapons are very personalised towards the men with their culture and to attempt to take them away, etcetera can excite or promote emotional responses which are uncalled for and to me it didn't sound right that they would undertake to come to the koppie to lay down their weapons, if they were going to come to the koppie they would come unarmed and rather leave the weapons at their place of residence for that matter. So I was suspicious about what I was hearing.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: How would, how long would JOCCOM meetings last more or less? COLONEL SCOTT: Some mornings, I think the average would be about almost two hours, some morning I think we sat for two and a half hours. MR SEMENYA SC: You say as usual Major- General Annandale opened to the JOCCOM meeting conduct the roll call to ascertain what resources were available, a situation report was given, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: The crime intelligence representative reported that the situation was tense and that some strikers had already arrived at the koppie with arms, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: General Annandale then spoke to phase 2 and 3 deployment concepts briefly before requesting you to give a deployment overview? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: Did you give the overview? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I did. What I had learnt from the Wednesday was that speaking to slides that

		1	
1	Page 13478	1	Page 13480
1	Thursday I chose to speak more directly to the pictorial	1	MR SEMENYA SC: That is now the cordon
2	slides which is specifically the layout on the Google	2	and search one.
3	Earth.	3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
4	MR SEMENYA SC: And this was also given	4	MR SEMENYA SC: Why was it done at that
5	to the commanders that were there.	5	time?
6	COLONEL SCOTT: There was handouts given	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, again, normally
7	on each day to the commanders of the aerial photography	7	it's a detailed plan that needs to be drafted if you're
8	with the grids on it, yes, or the satellite pictures with	8	going to do a cordon and search operation of a hostel. A
9	grids on it.	9	cordon and search operation would be dictated, time and
10	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, you also again deal	10	place, by SAPS, so we should have the ability then to put a
11	with, during that JOCCOM meeting with greater detail in	11	more detailed plan in place. So even if the plan was going
12	relation to phase 2?	12	to be executed at a later time, it still needed to have
13	[14:33] COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Again it was	13	something that could be accepted and approved before being
14	expanded on because it was the, phase 1 in essence now	14	implemented. And this of course is not as easy as it
15	ceased, although to deploy into phase 2 you needed to	15	sounds because one needs to draw in those with the
16	deploy phase 1 essentially and all we did was we lay it on	16	knowledge from the mine and get the plans of the layouts of
17	top of phase 1 the phase 2 which was the inclusion of the	17	the hostels and to understand who is staying where, et
18	razor wire and essentially if a phase 2 was called for in	18	cetera. So there's a lot of intelligence and information
19	the duration of the day because of threat, we would bring	19	that needs to go into that planning process as well.
20	forward a lot of reserve forces. It was, however, decided	20	MR SEMENYA SC: But in the interim that
21	still on that Thursday morning o go forward with the phase	21	was arranged and, as you call it, the section 13(7) search
22	2, place the razor wire, but some of the reserve forces	22	warrant was prepared for signing off by the Provincial
23	were still remaining at forward holding areas 1 and 2.	23	Commissioner.
24 25	Again we were uncertain of the plans or the mobility of what the strikers would do –	24 25	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. I created a basic slide show to show the concept of that
25		25	created a basic slide show to show the concept of that
	Page 13479		Page 13481
1	MR SEMENYA SC: Movements, yes.	1	operation which would suffice for the Provincial
2	COLONEL SCOTT: The movements, yes.	2	Commissioner therefore to give the approval for the section
3	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, but as you told us	3	13(7).
4	earlier, phase 2 also just contemplated the Nyalas with the	4	MR SEMENYA SC: In paragraph 10 you then
5	razor wire being prepositioned but not deployed.	5	deal with the AMCU president's transportation, do you see
6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	6	that?
7	MR SEMENYA SC: You then cleared with	7	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
8	Major-General Annandale, that is now when the deployment of	8	MR SEMENYA SC: At the bottom of page 77.
9	the STF, the NIU from the forward holding area 1 to the	9	You say around 12 o'clock you were requested by Major-
10	newly created immediate reaction area that lay south to the	10	General Annandale to look for a vehicle which could
11	power station.	11	transport AMCU president and his delegation to the koppie.
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, sir. I considered	12	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
13	the concept on the Wednesday. I suggested and got the	13	MR SEMENYA SC: That you did.
14	approval for the implementation thereof on the Thursday and	14	COLONEL SCOTT: I looked for a vehicle
15	the forces were then tasked accordingly to go to those	15	and there were vehicles standing there but they were the
16	positions.	16	special task force vehicles which were utilised on the
17	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. Now, of course we	17	Wednesday. However, at this stage the special task force
18	have touched on this about how the plan was contemplated,	18	members had all deployed forward. On the Wednesday we
19	how the plan was to be implemented, and I now wish to draw	19	actually had a task force team on standby with the military
20	your attention to what we have against paragraph 9.5 on	20	Oryx helicopter, so the keys for the vehicles were there.
21	page 77. You say after the JOCCOM you assisted Brigadier	21	On the Thursday the NIU members that stayed back for the
22	Fritz and Brigadier Silwane who had been tasked by General	22	Oryx helicopter, should it arrive, and we'd sent the task
	h frances frances		
23	Annandale on the Wednesday to start a planning process with	23	force forward so I didn't have access to their keys and by
24	Annandale on the Wednesday to start a planning process with regard to phase 6.	23 24	the time I could try and find a vehicle Mr Mathunjwa had
24 25	Annandale on the Wednesday to start a planning process with		

	Page 13482		Page 13484
1	MR SEMENYA SC: And you also deal with	1	expecting and hoping for a resolution simply through
2	the report made to you by Captain – well, to the JOC, by	2	dialogue.
3	Captain Adriao.	3	MR SEMENYA SC: And with that reality in
4	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Captain Adriao	4	your mind, what did you do?
5	reported to the JOC that the attitude of the strikers had	5	COLONEL SCOTT: At some stage we were
6	changed and that members of the media, it was said to him	6	asked how we were going to go about this and I asked them
7	that they were now starting to fear, they could feel there	7	if I could make a recommendation just to show more in
8	was a different atmosphere and they were actually fearing	8	detail what was considered for phase 3, to which I was
9	for their safety and had started moving backwards towards	9	given the floor and I explained on a Google map again - it
10	the police line.	10	was the Google map that was used for the phase 2 in the
11	MR SEMENYA SC: Was the information	11	morning, I put that up – how I thought it should take place
12	around this time there at the JOC that the undertaking,	12	with the POP's dispersion action, et cetera. Well,
13	promise by the strikers to disarm had or had not	13	starting off obviously with the razor wire being pulled and
14	materialised?	14	then the POP's dispersion action, et cetera. It was asked
15	COLONEL SCOTT: Are we talking about the	15	in the JOCCOM at that stage whether that was acceptable,
16	time –	16	there was no objection to it and I was asked them to go and
17	MR SEMENYA SC: When you get this	17	brief the forces out at forward holding area 1, that it
18	information from –	18	shouldn't be done over the radio because we were aware that
19	MR SEMENYA SC: Well, by the time Captain	19	a police radio had been stolen and somewhere on the Tuesday
20	Adriao gave his information, the 9 o'clock time period had	20	or the Wednesday there was reports that somebody was using
21	come and gone and it was evident now, I think this was late	21	the police radio, which was clearly not police language or
22	morning, that the koppie was full again and those that were	22	radio speech procedures - so to go to forward holding area
23	there had come with either traditional weapons or with	23	1. I think Brigadier Pretorius assisted me there with
24	dangerous weapons, sharp edged dangerous weapons.	24	getting all the commanders to understand they needed to
25	MR SEMENYA SC: Okay. And that	25	report to forward holding area, over the radio, and then I
		1	
	Page 13483		Page 13485
1	Page 13483 disarmament did not happen.	1	Page 13485 started working on the Google picture which I had displayed
1 2	-	1 2	5
	disarmament did not happen.		started working on the Google picture which I had displayed
2	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No.	2	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this
2 3	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is	2 3	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the
2 3 4	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct?	2 3 4	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this
2 3 4 5	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct?	2 3 4 5	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign
2 3 4 5 6	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting whith was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there?	2 3 4 5 6	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was
2 3 4 5 6 7	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting whith was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General	2 3 4 5 6 7	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting whith was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting whith was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would have conveyed the message that a decision had been taken?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when the stage 3 operation would commence?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would have conveyed the message that a decision had been taken? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't, I can only	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when the stage 3 operation would commence? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. General Annandale
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would have conveyed the message that a decision had been taken? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't, I can only recall General Annandale chaired the meeting. I'm not too	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when the stage 3 operation would commence? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. General Annandale did say he wanted it to commence by 15:30.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would have conveyed the message that a decision had been taken? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't, I can only recall General Annandale chaired the meeting. I'm not too certain about the other persons who spoke or who said what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when the stage 3 operation would commence? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. General Annandale did say he wanted it to commence by 15:30. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And when you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would have conveyed the message that a decision had been taken? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't, I can only recall General Annandale chaired the meeting. I'm not too certain about the other persons who spoke or who said what but I knew quite soon after being seated, I'm not sure if	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when the stage 3 operation would commence? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. General Annandale did say he wanted it to commence by 15:30. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And when you arrived at forward holding area 1, that's around 14:30 you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	disarmament did not happen. COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR SEMENYA SC: And around 13:30 there is another JOCCOM meeting which was called, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct? MR SEMENYA SC: What happened there? COLONEL SCOTT: I was called by General Annandale. I remember I was just outside the JOCCOM at that time and told that we need to come in, that there's a special JOCCOM meeting going to take place. It was mainly brigadiers, generals, the JOCCOM members that would be there throughout the day and we were told inside the JOC that the decision had been taken to go towards the phase 3, that we needed to use the police tactical option to resolve the situation because dialogue had failed and that the threat had been escalated from the strikers. MR SEMENYA SC: Do you recall who would have conveyed the message that a decision had been taken? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't, I can only recall General Annandale chaired the meeting. I'm not too certain about the other persons who spoke or who said what but I knew quite soon after being seated, I'm not sure if it was him or if someone else, but I know we were said we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	started working on the Google picture which I had displayed as the stage 2, just to move the icons on it to now show better what was meant by the stage 3 because during the course of the morning one of the Nyalas, Nyala 6 with this razor wire, had moved position. So I tried to just realign everything before going out to show the commanders what was going on, and then we left, Brigadier Pretorius and myself. I do remember that after that stage where I was working on my computer, that General Annandale and a couple of others had started a checklist on a flip chart, white board, they were writing down what should be remembered and what needs to be considered before any tactical action gets taken place, but I don't recall, I didn't have input into that and when I was finished with my fixing up of the Google map we literally got into the vehicle and went because time was pressing at that stage. MR SEMENYA SC: Was it then known when the stage 3 operation would commence? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. General Annandale did say he wanted it to commence by 15:30. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. And when you arrived at forward holding area 1, that's around 14:30 you say?

		T	
	Page 13486		Page 13488
1	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes and how long did that	1	between the police and the strikers – in other words, to
2	briefing last?	2	use water cannons first if those had hadn't dispersed by
3	COLONEL SCOTT: It's difficult to say but	3	verbal warning are still there, to utilise that first to
4	it was at least half an hour, possibly a little more	4	try to get them to move, so we didn't have to have people
5	because I know we reported back to the JOC sometime after 3	5	on people situations.
6	o'clock and the drive to forward holding area is possibly	6	The public order policing personnel would be
7	only about five, seven minutes.	7	outside of their vehicles, they would be positioned between
8	MR SEMENYA SC: And please tell us what	8	their vehicles and I mentioned that their vehicles would
9	you say as the second sentence of paragraph 13.1, page 81?	9	now be their safe havens, they would retreat into them if
10	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I can recall on the	10	they were approached by the militant group but otherwise
11	way thinking that I've got very little time and just	11	they would be out. And with water cannons, if that wasn't
12	contemplating how I was going to deliver what I needed to	12	creating the desired effect one would go over to teargas
13	do and I brought myself back to how we would normally do	13	which would be next far-reaching, less than lethal choice
14	this and that was just to follow the SMEAC concept and just	14	to cause discomfort, to get the strikers to move.
15	to tell them the situation. So when all were gathered I	15	Obviously moving closer with the dispersion line and
16	climbed into one of the Mercedes Vito vehicles just to get	16	something that does create a bit of a shock factor is your
17	a little bit of shade so that I could put the computer up	17	stun grenades, so when you get closer and within throwing
18	and all the commanders stood around and I explained to them	18	distance, stun grenades could be thrown. And then last
19	the situation, which was that we've been told to go to a	19	resort would have been the rubber, the use of rubber to try
20	phase 3, that the threat has elevated and that the	20	to get the strikers to move.
21	resolution through dialogue seems to have failed. And then	21	Knowing that the police dispersion line could
22	I went on to just give the basic outline of who had to do	22	then swing through, if there were strikers that ran onto
23	what now and what I had done is, this is where the phases	23	the high areas or hid between the rocks, that was the
24	became stages because en route there I was working through	24	tactical response team who would be positioned 100 metres
25	my mind how better to carry it over and I knew I had to	25	back and that distance was also important because I didn't
	Dago 12/07		Dago 12490
1	Page 13487 break it down into steps for the members and when you work	1	Page 13489 want them so close to the public order policing line so
1 2	break it down into steps for the members and when you work	1 2	Page 13489 want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order
			want them so close to the public order policing line so
2	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages	2	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order
2 3	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you	2 3	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence.
2 3 4	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially	2 3 4	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give
2 3 4 5	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it	2 3 4 5	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through
2 3 4 5 6	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the	2 3 4 5 6	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with
2 3 4 5 6 7	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the	2 3 4 5 6 7	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well-	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle flank would move in the same direction to the south and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order. And then as I say, one of the issues I raised
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle flank would move in the same direction to the south and swing between the two koppies and then the right flank would swing towards the right side of koppie 2 and that would be the dispersion action by POPS. When they had to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order. And then as I say, one of the issues I raised there was, there's a dry river bed and through other
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle flank would move in the same direction to the south and swing between the two koppies and then the right flank would swing towards the right side of koppie 2 and that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order. And then as I say, one of the issues I raised there was, there's a dry river bed and through other operations that I've participated in, we always try to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle flank would move in the same direction to the south and swing between the two koppies and then the right flank would swing towards the right side of koppie 2 and that would be the dispersion action by POPS. When they had to physically move obviously there would be the force continuum which I also covered just in principle with them	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order. And then as I say, one of the issues I raised there was, there's a dry river bed and through other operations that I've participated in, we always try to reorganise as quickly as possible after we've done something tactical because forces, actions become dictated by your opponent and if he moves left, some of your forces
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle flank would move in the same direction to the south and swing between the two koppies and then the right flank would swing towards the right side of koppie 2 and that would be the dispersion action by POPS. When they had to physically move obviously there would be the force continuum which I also covered just in principle with them because it had slightly changed from what one would be used	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order. And then as I say, one of the issues I raised there was, there's a dry river bed and through other operations that I've participated in, we always try to reorganise as quickly as possible after we've done something tactical because forces, actions become dictated by your opponent and if he moves left, some of your forces go left. So I created the river bed as a reorganise line
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	break it down into steps for the members and when you work with phases and you need to elevate, you elevate to stages which means your old phases for now become stages and you now have a phase within a stage and that's where initially the first mentioning of stages came into play. So it became stage 3 and I said to them phase 1 would be the department of the razor wire as we know it and after the department of the razor wire – I didn't tell Brigadier Calitz specifically, I mean he's a brigadier, he's a well- experienced POPS man, it wasn't my place to tell him when to give the warning but I told him that we needed to go over to the dispersion action and the way that it would happen was that we would take out the POPS members to the northern side of the razor wire and that they would have to form three channels, in essence, and the far left flank would move around, down the razor wire and then swing to the right and around the bottom of koppie 1. The middle flank would move in the same direction to the south and swing between the two koppies and then the right flank would swing towards the right side of koppie 2 and that would be the dispersion action by POPS. When they had to physically move obviously there would be the force continuum which I also covered just in principle with them	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	want them so close to the public order policing line so that the strikers, if they did approach the public order policing, would be immediately upon a TRT line, in essence. It would give the TRT time to consider response, to give verbal warning, to utilise stun grenades, to go through their own force continuum before having to deal with whatever was approaching them. But in essence their job was to sweep through koppie 2 so that they would go between the rocks and find people that were hiding or people that were waiting in possible ambush and make the necessary arrests or apprehend those people. Similarly, the special task force and the NIU had the same role but they would be going to the larger koppie 1 where I mostly anticipated that the belligerent group was going to go to. I thought that they would go there, they would go onto the top of that where they would be out of the public order. And then as I say, one of the issues I raised there was, there's a dry river bed and through other operations that I've participated in, we always try to reorganise as quickly as possible after we've done something tactical because forces, actions become dictated by your opponent and if he moves left, some of your forces

		I	
	Page 13490		Page 13492
1	and now assess what the strikers were doing that had been	1	horses who would simply maintain the order behind what had
2	dispersed out into the field and then from there, the	2	been taken by the police on horseback, also being able to
3	operational commander with other commanders would make	3	mobilise quickly via horse to certain environments if there
4	judgment calls to say there's a group there and again go	4	were certain acts of violence going on, that the helicopter
5	out as a structured smaller operation towards that group to	5	possibly got diverted elsewhere, that they could get there
6	go and encircle and disarm smaller groups like that, but	6	rapidly with horseback. Again, not to be utilised in the
7	that's where the, that's in essence where – and I spoke	7	POP action however.
8	there now to the razor wire being phase 1 of stage 3, the	8	[14:53] We see to the left is a small settlement which is
9	dispersal action being phase 2 of stage 3 and after the	9	ringed with a red square, I was concerned about that and
10	reorganise, the follow-up action of the encircling of	10	the police assets that were positioned at forward holding
11	smaller disorganised groups and disarming and arresting	11	area 2 were tasked to go to that environment and to perform
12	being phase 3 of stage 3, to them.	12	a filtering line in the direction of where the dispersed
13	MR SEMENYA SC: Can I ask you to look at	13	strikers may be, for the same reason for Nkaneng
14	slide 81 of exhibit L?	14	settlement, we were worried about that settlement that
15	COLONEL SCOTT: Slide 81?	15	highly emotional or angered strikers may end up running
16	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, 8-1, 81. Are you	16	through that for that matter and causing destruction as
17	able to speak relative to what we have at slide 81 there?	17	they went through.
18	COLONEL SCOTT: This slide was created at	18	So forward holding area 2's members were
19	Roots though, this is not the slide that I briefed them on	19	positioned to protect that little settlement and then, I'm
20	but for the sake of the Commission to better orientate them	20	not necessarily going according to sequence now, I'm just
21	to –	21	discussing the slide and then we can obviously see the
22	MR SEMENYA SC: We say that later when we	22	razor wire which is shown there in the yellow, it still
23	deal with exhibit L and the statement of Colonel Visser. I	23	seems to be on the, this one still seems to be on the page
24	just want us to understand what you had in mind would, in	24	2 line however. But we can see the blue line of police
25	terms of your plan –	25	vehicles and on this slide I actually took the time to find
	Page 13491		Page 13493
1	Page 13491 COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.	1	Page 13493 out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put
1 2	-	1 2	6
	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.		out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put
2	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.	2	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what.
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forward	2 3	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially were	2 3 4	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was General	2 3 4 5	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one
2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the dog	2 3 4 5 6	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that
2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,	2 3 4 5 6 7	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlers	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance. Their primary role was going to be to search	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, et	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance. Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, etcetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, etcetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through.Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with their	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, etcetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through.Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with theirdogs but they could still be utilised in an environment in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, etcetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through.Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with theirdogs but they could still be utilised in an environment ina high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tacticalforces and a belligerent protester who didn't want tosubmit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, etcetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through.Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with theirdogs but they could still be utilised in an environment ina high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tacticalforces and a belligerent protester who didn't want tosubmit, to send – there's other tactics as well which Idon't particularly want to speak to through the media	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line. And then we have got the orange, which shows the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:Ja.MR SEMENYA SC:- be the case.COLONEL SCOTT:If we start at forwardholding area 1, those forces that were there initially wereto move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was GeneralNaidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the doghandlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him,the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera.And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlersfor instance.Their primary role was going to be to searchthe rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that hadbeen put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, etcetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through.Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with theirdogs but they could still be utilised in an environment ina high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tacticalforces and a belligerent protester who didn't want tosubmit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: - be the case. COLONEL SCOTT: If we start at forward holding area 1, those forces that were there initially were to move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was General Naidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the dog handlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him, the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera. And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlers for instance. Their primary role was going to be to search the rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that had been put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, et cetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through. Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with their dogs but they could still be utilised in an environment in a high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tactical forces and a belligerent protester who didn't want to submit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I don't particularly want to speak to through the media exposing it and they would become null and void thereafter but it's well known that a K9 or a dog can be utilised to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line. And then we have got the orange, which shows the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: - be the case. COLONEL SCOTT: If we start at forward holding area 1, those forces that were there initially were to move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was General Naidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the dog handlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him, the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera. And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlers for instance. Their primary role was going to be to search the rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that had been put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, et cetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through. Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with their dogs but they could still be utilised in an environment in a high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tactical forces and a belligerent protester who didn't want to submit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I don't particularly want to speak to through the media exposing it and they would become null and void thereafter but it's well known that a K9 or a dog can be utilised to tackle somebody that's posing a threat to, of that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line. And then we have got the orange, which shows the TRT line behind POP's and then of course the NIU and the special task force line behind that. That's on, that's that slide as we see it there.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: - be the case. COLONEL SCOTT: If we start at forward holding area 1, those forces that were there initially were to move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was General Naidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the dog handlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him, the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera. And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlers for instance. Their primary role was going to be to search the rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that had been put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, et cetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through. Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with their dogs but they could still be utilised in an environment in a high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tactical forces and a belligerent protester who didn't want to submit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I don't particularly want to speak to through the media exposing it and they would become null and void thereafter but it's well known that a K9 or a dog can be utilised to tackle somebody that's posing a threat to, of that magnitude. So that was their role.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line. And then we have got the orange, which shows the TRT line behind POP's and then of course the NIU and the special task force line behind that. That's on, that's that slide as we see it there. MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, may we, would it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: - be the case. COLONEL SCOTT: If we start at forward holding area 1, those forces that were there initially were to move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was General Naidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the dog handlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him, the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera. And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlers for instance. Their primary role was going to be to search the rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that had been put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, et cetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through. Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with their dogs but they could still be utilised in an environment in a high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tactical forces and a belligerent protester who didn't want to submit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I don't particularly want to speak to through the media exposing it and they would become null and void thereafter but it's well known that a K9 or a dog can be utilised to tackle somebody that's posing a threat to, of that magnitude. So that was their role. The mounted unit that was going to forward	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line. And then we have got the orange, which shows the TRT line behind POP's and then of course the NIU and the special task force line behind that. That's on, that's that slide as we see it there.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. MR SEMENYA SC: - be the case. COLONEL SCOTT: If we start at forward holding area 1, those forces that were there initially were to move to immediate reaction area 1 and that was General Naidoo and with him we kept back the canines, the dog handlers, we kept back the mounted unit personnel with him, the emergency services, the medical, the fire, etcetera. And there was dual planning, in essence, for dog handlers for instance. Their primary role was going to be to search the rocks in the area for possibly hidden firearms that had been put into the crevices or hidden under bushes, et cetera, after the whole POPS action had swept through. Canine was never to be part of the POPS action with their dogs but they could still be utilised in an environment in a high risk arrest where we had a standoff with tactical forces and a belligerent protester who didn't want to submit, to send – there's other tactics as well which I don't particularly want to speak to through the media exposing it and they would become null and void thereafter but it's well known that a K9 or a dog can be utilised to tackle somebody that's posing a threat to, of that magnitude. So that was their role.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 34 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	out who was where and try to as accurately as I could, put in who the proper call sign was with what. There was only one water cannon at the time when I left to brief, when I arrived at forward holding area 2 a second water cannon arrived and I had only planned one water cannon into the actual fast dispersion line and that was to be in the middle of the group, and when the second one arrived I didn't know where else, I thought we would keep it behind in the police safe area so that they could essentially spray from the razor wire line onto the militant group which was on the other side of the fence, and keep them from trying to break through on the razor wire. Because we know that there are weak points between the vehicle itself and the gap that the trailer has got, that people can come flooding through there. So essentially I wanted that water cannon to stay there, to spray back anybody that tried to come through those gaps in the razor wire line. And then we have got the orange, which shows the TRT line behind POP's and then of course the NIU and the special task force line behind that. That's on, that's that slide as we see it there. MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, may we, would it

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

Pretoria

1	Page 13494	1	Page 13496
1	CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly, we will take	1	strategy with POP's in the front and your TRT and your NIU,
2	the tea adjournment at this stage.	2	STF behind and then to move forward on that after the
3	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]	3	verbal warnings had expired, and they would swing on the
4	[15:16] CHAIRPERSON: The commission resumes.	4	blue arrows as you can see them.
5	When we were about to recommence, we received a message	5	There was a left, middle and a right flank and as
6	asking us to wait for a while until the relevant video or	6	you can see the flanks had to push through with that motion
7	slide had been found. I take it, the slide now being	7	in order to get the strikers to move towards the west.
8	exhibited, is this what was being looked for Mr Semenya?	8	Then we have got, what's not too visible now, I'm not sure
9	MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed, Chair.	9	how to show it to you, but there is a small blue arrow
10	CHAIRPERSON: You are still under oath,	10	which is on the right flank. The tip of the arrow is
11	Colonel. Mr Semenya?	11	almost on a very faint indentation line which is actually a
12	MR SEMENYA SC: Colonel, we have up in	12	dry riverbed, and it's on that line that I explained was
13	the screen there slide 181, what message does that convey?	13	the - that's where more or less where all the arrows are
14	COLONEL SCOTT: What you see on screen	14	pointing towards, that is where the reorganisation, stop
15	is, to the best of my recollection I must state as well,	15	and reorganise line would be, reassess your situation, look
16	because as I say that day was, but it's what I have shown	16	at what your opponents have done and then reorganise and
17	to the people at forward holding area 1, and to the best of	17	push forward with phase 3, which was then to encircle your
18	my recollection, it's the same slide as well or the same	18	smaller disorganised groups, disarm, arrest and the
19	Google picture that was then put into a slide. I may be	19	processing would then start thereafter, and then you can
20	incorrect in that but this is what I could find, and I know	20	just see the icons showing the forward holding area 2
21	that this comes from that time period. But I know that I	21	personnel down to the bottom on that side which I had moved
22	did work on the forward holding area 2 slide to better	22	there as well, it's the informal settlement.
23	tweak it for the presentation at the front. The inserts	23	MR SEMENYA SC: And if we show slide 229,
24 25	that you see in the white blocks and the blue arrows, were	24 25	that would give us more or less an idea of what you say is
25	what I inserted afterwards after briefing the members at	25	the indentation of the riverbed.
	Page 13495		Page 13497
1	the front, to more accurately depict the briefing that was	1	COLONEL SCOTT: Slide 229?
2	given to them, and what you can see there is the red icon	2	MR SEMENYA SC: 229, yes. Is that the
3	vehicles along the orange line, and those are Nyalas 1 to 6	3	one on the screen?
4	and those Nyalas are the razor wire Nyalas.	4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, yes
5	Now their duty was to deploy the phase 1 of stage	5	that's correct. That's maybe a little bit to the left but
6	3 and that was to put the razor wire in place which would	6	you can see just in front of the white vehicles that have
7	create the safe zone and would assist with channelling the	7	stopped there, there's a natural feature in the terrain
8	strikers towards the west to the open fields.	8	which causes the armoured vehicles to have to slow down, to
9	We used the power station as a natural barrier,	9	come almost to, well it has to come to a halt and negotiate
10	the fence line was the power station to start the razor	10	the river bed, and that was seen as the stop and reorganise
11	wire deployment there so as to, again cause the strikers to	11	line, yes.
12	move towards the open fields to the west. You can see the	12	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, you call it that
13	blue line of vehicles towards the north and we have got an	13	reorganisation point, what was to be reorganised there
14	arrow which has got first line POP pointing towards that	14	according to plan?
15	and then we have got a, the green vehicles with the red	15	COLONEL SCOTT: Again after the
16	sort of police icons, and that is showing the TRT, NIU and	16	dispersion has taken place, it's difficult to say what the
17	STF line initially. Although those were briefed to be	17	actions of the strikers would have been, understanding and
18	separate, it's difficult to make all of that happen in a	18	hoping that many of them would have moved towards the west.
19	short time period. Google Earth has its own challenges	19	That the public order policing forces that have pushed
20	about how together you can put icons, etcetera before they	20	through to stop at that point, would now have the tactical
21	really overlapping. So it's not in proportion to obviously	21	forces behind them clearing koppies 2 that we can see there
22	what has to be shown, but it was the best that could be	22	and koppie 1, and at that time the operational commander
		23	would then take decisions on how further to continue with
23	done, and phase 2 was then to regroup and push forward to		
24	employ POP's dispersion strategy, to in other words go	24	the operation, assessing the movements of where the
24 25			

1	MR SEMENYA SC:	Page 13498 So beginning -	1	cannon would do?	Page 13500
2		le was supposed to?	2	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
3	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's the briefing.	3	MR SEMENYA SC:	And what the POP members
4		le was supposed to do that?	4	should do once they are thre	
5	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.	5	their Nyalas if they must?	
6	MR SEMENYA SC:	That's how the plan	6	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.
7	contemplated to unfold, is that	•	7	MR SEMENYA SC:	As their safe havens, and
8	COLONEL SCOTT:	That is how I	8	how the TRT would then for	
9	contemplated the plan to unfol		9	group.	
10	MR SEMENYA SC:	Yes, and you articulate	10	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
11	that beginning paragraph 13.8,	•	11	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you explained what
12	to plan, there would have been	•	12	was to be the case in relation	
13	COLONEL SCOTT:	13.8?	13	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.
14	MR SEMENYA SC:	On page 83, yes.	14	MR SEMENYA SC:	You had in mind what the
15	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes, there would have,	15		ibed them in paragraph 13.16,
16	yes.		16	page 88?	ibed them in paragraph 13.10,
17	MR SEMENYA SC:	And that would be after	17	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes, that's correct.
18	the deployment of the wire, the		18	MR SEMENYA SC:	What the K9's and their
19	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes, it would be given	19	role and their responsibilities	
20	after the deployment of the wir	•	20	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.
20	left that to the commander.		20	MR SEMENYA SC:	And so are the other
22	MR SEMENYA SC:	And there would be a time	22	elements to which you referr	
22	by the commander given to the		22	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.
23	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes, that's standard	23 24	MR SEMENYA SC:	You also explained the
24 25	operating procedure, according		24 25	force continuum?	Tou also explained the
20	operating procedure, according		20		
		Page 13499			Page 13501
1	etcetera, there would be a reaso	onable time given for them	1	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
2	to able to move off.		2	MR SEMENYA SC:	The rules of engagement?
3	MR SEMENYA SC:	The plan contemplated the	3	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.
4	majority of the strikers to disper	rse on their own?	4	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you then summarised
5	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.	5	what the whole briefing is to t	he entire commanders there?
6	MR SEMENYA SC:	It did also contemplate a	6	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.
7	small militant group refusing to	do so?	7	MR SEMENYA SC:	It was around 15:15 when
8	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.	8	you then go back to the JOC,	am I right?
9	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you did in the	9	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.
10	briefing mention the question al	bout where the POP line	10	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you now tried to deal
11	should be?		11	with what you experienced in	the JOC between that time and
12	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.	12	the events that followed subse	equently. Correct? At 15:15
13	MR SEMENYA SC:	And what should happen to	13	you started updating the slide	in the presentation, is that
14	those take refuge on the higher	ground and between the	14	right?	
15	rocks and crevices?		15	COLONEL SCOTT:	To the best of my
16	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right.	16	recollection yes, coming back	to reflect what I had shown
17	MR SEMENYA SC:	And how those groups were	17	better, what I had just briefed	I.
			10	MR SEMENYA SC:	And the information that
18	to be disorganised as you earlie	r used the term?	18		
18 19	to be disorganised as you earlie	r used the term? That's right.	18 19	you were getting from the rac	lio, correct?
	to be disorganised as you earlier COLONEL SCOTT:			you were getting from the rac COLONEL SCOTT:	lio, correct? Updating the slide and
19	to be disorganised as you earlier COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right. And in paragraph 13 you	19		
19 20	to be disorganised as you earlie COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	That's right. And in paragraph 13 you of what you were telling	19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:	
19 20 21	to be disorganised as you earlied COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: continued to give us an account	That's right. And in paragraph 13 you of what you were telling	19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT: the information?	Updating the slide and Paragraph 18, you
19 20 21 22	to be disorganised as you earlied COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: continued to give us an account the commanders there. You sho picture of the area.	That's right. And in paragraph 13 you of what you were telling	19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: the information? MR SEMENYA SC:	Updating the slide and Paragraph 18, you
 19 20 21 22 23 	to be disorganised as you earlied COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: continued to give us an account the commanders there. You sho picture of the area. COLONEL SCOTT:	That's right. And in paragraph 13 you of what you were telling owed them a geographical	19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: the information? MR SEMENYA SC: mentioned the radio commun	Updating the slide and Paragraph 18, you ication there. Ja, I was listening to

1	Page 13502 MR SEMENYA SC: That's right, in the JOC.	1	Page 13504 like the scenario, the scenario you had forecast with the
	-		-
2		2	protestors taking up position to shoot at the police line? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I anticipated that
3	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, and you mentioned	3	
4	the fact that the CCTV monitors of Lonmin was not giving	4 5	could be a possibility.
5	you quite clear pictures given the distance.		MR SEMENYA SC: That was the mental
6	COLONEL SCOTT: No, there was an issue	6	picture that was created in your mind.
7	with the sun which was shining into the lenses. It could	7	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
8	be seen very vaguely and was also quite a distance off, so	8	MR SEMENYA SC: And you heard a broadcast
9	I chose not to actually try to watch there because we stood	9	on the Protea Coin helicopter video footage, which was the
10	next to the radio to listen.	10	coordination from Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak and Brigadier
11	MR SEMENYA SC: And for that you	11	Calitz also giving instruction over the radio?
12	stationed yourself, you positioned yourself next to the	12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, and I referred to it
13	police radio based in the JOC and to try and piece together	13	here because it similar to what one would hear on that
14	information as it was coming through?	14	Protea Coin helicopter what we have heard there, is what I
15	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	15	was hearing in the JOC at the same time.
16	MR SEMENYA SC: And at paragraph 19 you	16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say that there
17	say "after Brigadier Calitz had initiated the operation,	17 18	was about four minutes where the radio systems appeared
18	some minutes later you heard the intensity increase in the		jammed, why do you say that, that they were jammed?
19	radio communication between Brigadier Calitz calling from	19 20	COLONEL SCOTT: I remember being
20	Papa1, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that is correct.	20	frustrated, sometimes it happens in police communications
21	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that is correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that he was	21	that somebody pushed their talk button by mistake and maybe
22		22 23	sits on a radio or something and nobody can speak. But there was a time period for at least four minutes during
23	repeatedly calling the water cannons to come forward and	23 24	the operation where no one, you could hear somebody was
24 25	engage? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	24 25	keying a radio and there was no communication, nobody could
20	COLONEL SCOTT. Tes.	23	Reying a radio and there was no communication, hobody could
	Page 13503		Page 13505
1	MR SEMENYA SC: And after the action		
		1	talk at all.
2	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier	2	MR SEMENYA SC: And then you recall late
3	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness	2	MR SEMENYA SC: And then you recall late in the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthrie
3 4	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well?	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: And then you recall late in the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthrie calling on the radio and saying cease fire, at least twice
3 4 5	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: And then you recall late in the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthrie calling on the radio and saying cease fire, at least twice you say?
3 4 5 6	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: And then you recall late in the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthrie calling on the radio and saying cease fire, at least twice you say? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
3 4 5 6 7	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1?	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying cease fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, you
3 4 5 6 7 8	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amount
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he ut it, you did not consider
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons, you did consider that it
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providir situational awareness from the police helicopter as will? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to zon, which you could see	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded like
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieutenant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons, you did consider that itmay be reference to injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	<pre>which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providiry situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providir situational awareness from the police helicopter as wil? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heard
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providiry situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were around 20?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heard
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	<pre>which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providiur situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from choprer 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were arbots the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes.</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colent Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shooting incidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providiry situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were ar the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he perference to injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you hearda POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shoottisincidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe any
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providir situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from choper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were arbors? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation to us provided were arbors?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shootIncidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe anyof persons lying down?Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe any
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	<pre>which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providius situational awareness from the police helicopter as versional awareness from the police helicopter as versional awareness from the started providius correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from choper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had version and the server?</pre>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shootij incidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe anyof those?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I did not observe it,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were at the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had given earlier?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shootin the situation, the shootin the situation, the shootin the semeny A SC:You did not observe anyof those?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I did not observe it,no.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were at the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had given earlier? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And there is a point at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shoott?You did not observe anyof those?You did not observe it, You did not observe it, No, I did not observe it, No, I did not observe it, No.MR SEMENYA SC:Noy of course now you are
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providius situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were at the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had given earlier? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And there is a point at which you hear a voice saying there was a person with a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieut=nant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shooting incidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe anyof those?Vou did not observe it, no.MR SEMENYA SC:No, I did not observe it, no.MR SEMENYA SC:Now of course now you areMR SEMENYA SC:Now of course now you are
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providius situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were at the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had given earlier? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And there is a point at which you hear a voice saying there was a person with a long rifle standing on top of the rock?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall lateIn the operation, hearing Lieut=vant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons lying down", as he put it, you did consider that itmay be reference to injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shoot=presons?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe anyof those?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I did not observe it,no.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Now of course now you arefamiliar with the evidence of about twith the evidence of antily
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providing situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were at the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had given earlier? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And there is a point at which you hear a voice saying there was a person with a long rifle standing on top of the high rock? COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieuterant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying cease fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colorel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shooting incidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe anyof those?No, I did not observe it,no.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Now of course now you arefamiliar with the evidence of about what actuallytranspired there, correct?Yes.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	which was mainly coordinated by the voice of Brigadier Calitz, Vermaak started providius situational awareness from the police helicopter as well? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: And that's the information coming from chopper 1? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak reports over the radio that he could see persons lying down and counted up to around 20, which you could see from the air? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR SEMENYA SC: This is the information you received whilst you were at the JOC? COLONEL SCOTT: That's what I heard, yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And you continued to hear as you tell us of reorganisation which you presumed was in line with the briefing you had given earlier? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: And there is a point at which you hear a voice saying there was a person with a long rifle standing on top of the rock?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC:And then you recall latein the operation, hearing Lieuterant-Colonel Guthriecalling on the radio and saying case fire, at least twiceyou say?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:Again paragraph 19.8, yousay you heard "Lieutenant-Colorel Vermaak count the amountof persons lying down", as he put it, you did not considerthat these may be injured persons, you did consider that itmay be reference to injured persons from what sounded likea POP action, is that right?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But then later you heardabout the situation, the shootirg incidents?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:You did not observe anyof those?COLONEL SCOTT:No, I did not observe it,no.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Now of course now you arefamiliar with the evidence of about what actuallytranspired there, correct?

1	avidance that the group of stril	Page 13506	1	COLONEL SCOTT:	Page 13508 That's correct.
1 2	evidence that the group of stril strikers approached the police	•	1 2	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you used other
2	barbed wire was being unfurled	•	2	sources of information as well	•
4	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes, these are, this is	4	were handed in by Lieutenant	
5	information that came through		4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.
6	came back to the JOC.		6	MR SEMENYA SC:	And after the standard
7	MR SEMENYA SC:	That's right, and you	7		he National Commissioner, the
8		information subsequently with	8	brief information note was ma	
9	you being at being at Roots ab		9	communication centre at arou	
10	COLONEL SCOTT:	Say that again, I'm	10	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
11	sorry.	oug that again, thi	11	MR SEMENYA SC:	You then also deal with
12	MR SEMENYA SC:	With information later.	12	the media presentation that w	
13	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes?	13	Commissioner.	
14	MR SEMENYA SC:	You now know or what is	14	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
15	being told happened immediate		15	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you tell us that
16	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.	16	during the night of the 16th a	-
17	MR SEMENYA SC:	The strikers are said to	17		andale to create a presentation
18	have approached the police lin		18	3 3	r to brief the media during the
19	COLONEL SCOTT:	I now know that, yes.	19	morning of August the 17th, o	
20	MR SEMENYA SC:	And you now know with the	20	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
21	information given to us what is	•	21	[15:35] MR SEMENYA SC:	And as you tell us at
22	at various stages?		22	about 8 o'clock that Friday mo	•
23	COLONEL SCOTT:	Yes.	23	presentation which was comp	
24	MR SEMENYA SC:	Were those things	24	video clips regarding the ever	nts and the build-up to the
25	happening in line with how you	had planned the operation as	25	incident of the 16th.	
		Page 13507			Page 13509
1	you had being giving it to us r	now?	1	COLONEL SCOTT:	That's correct.
2	ACLONEL COOTT				
	COLONEL SCOTT:	No.	2	MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner
3	MR SEMENYA SC:	No. Around you able to speak	2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be	The National Commissioner
3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness?	2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right?	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that
3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT:	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight,	2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct.
3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight,	2 3 4 5 6	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe
3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no.	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to,	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th
3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC:	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct.
3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there?	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT:	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal	2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President.	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT:	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events e 16th where you assisted in	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: of the evening of Thursday the	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events e 16th where you assisted in helping to scribe a letter to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with Yes and it was the first seeing videos when they were
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: of the evening of Thursday the gathering the information and	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events e 16th where you assisted in helping to scribe a letter to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provide the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with Yes and it was the first seeing videos when they were
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: of the evening of Thursday the gathering the information and the President, regarding the e	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events e 16th where you assisted in helping to scribe a letter to vents.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC: time you tell us that you were made available on the 17th of	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with Yes and it was the first seeing videos when they were
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: of the evening of Thursday the gathering the information and the President, regarding the e COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: inputs from many sources, inc	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events e 16th where you assisted in helping to scribe a letter to vents. That's correct. To do that you received cluding Brigadier Pretorius,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC: time you tell us that you were made available on the 17th of media briefing. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with Yes and it was the first seeing videos when they were f August for inclusion in the That's correct. And it was about 10 or 11
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: of the evening of Thursday the gathering the information and the President, regarding the e COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: inputs from many sources, incoregarding the history and the	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events e 16th where you assisted in helping to scribe a letter to vents. That's correct. To do that you received cluding Brigadier Pretorius, steps of the violence and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC: time you tell us that you were made available on the 17th of media briefing. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: time SEMENYA SC: time you tell us that you were made available on the 17th of media briefing. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: there that morning when you	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with Yes and it was the first seeing videos when they were August for inclusion in the That's correct. And it was about 10 or 11 assisted with the presentation
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	MR SEMENYA SC: around those matters, which y COLONEL SCOTT: which I don't think is right, so no. MR SEMENYA SC: you, no let me put that off. C at the events post the 16th of 96. Are you there? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: firstly with the information not for the President. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: of the evening of Thursday the gathering the information and the President, regarding the e COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: inputs from many sources, inc	No. Around you able to speak you did not witness? Only through hindsight, no I wouldn't be able to, Would you or wouldn't an I invite you then to look August? You have it at page I'm there. Okay, there you deal te that was to be prepared That's correct. You describe the events te 16th where you assisted in helping to scribe a letter to vents. That's correct. To do that you received cluding Brigadier Pretorius, steps of the violence and monitoring the media footage?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR SEMENYA SC: requested that presentation be morning, is that right? COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: would then be speaking on the with the video footage as well COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: specialist that presentation wa COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC: Major-General Mpembe provid the video to be included in the COLONEL SCOTT: the 13th. MR SEMENYA SC: time you tell us that you were made available on the 17th of media briefing. COLONEL SCOTT: MR SEMENYA SC:	The National Commissioner e run for the media later that That's correct. And Major-General Mpembe e role of the events of the 13th That's correct. With the help of an IT as put together. That's right. And you tell us that led the input on the sections of e clip and that was done. That's right, to do with Yes and it was the first seeing videos when they were August for inclusion in the That's correct. And it was about 10 or 11 assisted with the presentation

	Page 13510		Page 13512
1	briefing.	1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2	MR SEMENYA SC: Your account of events at
3	MR SEMENYA SC: Regarding the	3	Roots was that you were tasked by General Annandale to
4	presentation to the President, it was the date of the 18th	4	prepare a presentation on the events at Marikana for the
5	and 19th, you were requested to give separate presentations	5	Commission of Inquiry, this is the Commission, correct?
6	to the President, the visiting appointed inter-ministerial	6	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
7	committee, is that right?	7	MR SEMENYA SC: You also recall there
8	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	8	were work sessions, being about reconstructing the
9	MR SEMENYA SC: And the North-West	9	incidents with different commanders and key role players
10	Provincial Government portfolio committee on the events in	10	grouped per geographical incident.
11	Marikana.	11	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
12	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	12	MR SEMENYA SC: And you also say that
13	MR SEMENYA SC: The presentation you gave	13	there were members who were sent to different breakaway
14	included what you had shown to the media but included more	14	areas to compile their version, they would then report back
15	input with slides representing oral information now, is	15	to Colonel Visser of the North-West Province for
16	that right?	16	assimilation.
17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
18	MR SEMENYA SC: But before the Commission	18	MR SEMENYA SC: And you were also
19	was announced you started updating the planning slide show	19	assisting in the compilation of that presentation for the
20	for inclusion in these presentations to better reflect what	20	Commission.
21	was said on the days before and on the 16th of August, you	21	COLONEL SCOTT: yes.
22	tell us.	22	MR SEMENYA SC: You say you worked in
23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	23	unison with Colonel Visser and you assisted him in
24	MR SEMENYA SC: And you deal then later	24	gathering much of the historic information and
25	with the visit to Marikana by Mr Malema.	25	consolidating the information from the breakaway groups.
	Page 13511		Page 13513
1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
1 2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangements	1 2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason for
	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.		COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for the
2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangements	2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting a
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for the
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikana	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at mainting stability and putting	2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audience
2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikana	2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.
2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at mainting stability and putting	2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tell
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sector	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards.what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make survey	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, visible	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their comments
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards.was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at mainting stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, visiblepolicing.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the sure the week after the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikana
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikanaas the police would represent hem.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You were part of what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikanaas the police would represent them.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. There were, I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:You were part of what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikanaas the police would represent them.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. There were, Ithink, more than one working documents in getting to this
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.You were part of whathappened at Roots.You were part of whatCOLONEL SCOTT:I was, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikanaas the police would represent them.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. There were, Ithink, more than one working documents in getting to thisend of Roots National Commissioner briefing. They could
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You were part of whathappened at Roots.You were say that after	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikanaas the police would represent them.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. There were, Ithink, more than one working documents in getting to thisend of Roots National Commissioner briefing. They couldalso possibly have been so but this was the accepted one at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	COLONEL SCOTT:That's right.MR SEMENYA SC:And what arrangementswere done in relation to that visit, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But beyond that period,around the 18th and onwards, what was happening in Marikanareally was an attempt at maintaining stability and puttingpolice presence there, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And it was more sectorpolicing strategy and make sure that the situation is keptunder control.That's right, visiblepolicing.MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:Yes. You deal with thatagainst paragraph 30 and the activity the week after theMarikana incident.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You were part of whathappened at Roots.I was, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:I was, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:And you say that afterdemobilising from the Marikana on the 24th, you were called	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You say the reason forbeing involved in compiling the presentation for theCommission was because you had started drafting apresentation on the Friday, 17th, with the first audiencebeing the media at the Lonmin Game Farm auditorium.COLONEL SCOTT:MR SEMENYA SC:On 6 September you tellus, Colonel, that you and Colonel Visser presented thepolice presentation to the National Commissioner.COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:You had presented it aday before to members who were at Roots for their commentsand inputs.COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR SEMENYA SC:And that became, as youcall it, the first official draft of the events at Marikanaas the police would represent them.COLONEL SCOTT:Yes. There were, Ithink, more than one working documents in getting to thisend of Roots National Commissioner briefing. They couldalso possibly have been so but this was the accepted one atthe end of Roots.

	Page 13514		Page 13516
1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	1	correct?
2	MR SEMENYA SC: And you say due to the	2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
3	volume of information that was available, the photographs,	3	MR SEMENYA SC: And you describe in
4	the open source media video clips, et cetera, you and	4	paragraph 33 the discrepancies that you noticed in relation
5	Colonel Visser had to look at all those and to upgrade the	5	to where the weapons were and where those weapons appear
6	presentation as and when this information came to hand.	6	different on other photographs, is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, there was	7	
8	still information that was coming in after Roots, thus we	8 9	MR SEMENYA SC: What did you do in relation to that matter?
9 10	had to continue looking and assessing that information on whether or not it could assist in the presentation to the	9 10	COLONEL SCOTT: We were at Rustenburg,
11	Commission to better colour in the picture of what happened	10	sitting working at the Commission there and I noticed two
12	that day.	12	sets of photographs that were of the same bodies but one
13	MR SEMENYA SC: So there was much of the	13	had weapons and one didn't, and called Colonel Visser over
14	discretion that you and Colonel Visser used to compile the	14	to come and view it and we decided we had to go to make
15	presentation with a view to best capture what would have	15	this aware to the senior police management of what we'd
16	transpired.	16	found, which we did.
17	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	17	MR SEMENYA SC: And that was raised, as
18	MR SEMENYA SC: There is material now	18	you say, with the legal team representing the SAPS in this
19	given to the Commission but which was not part of a video	19	Commission.
20	exhibit L.	20	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	21	MR SEMENYA SC: Of course we know and the
22	MR SEMENYA SC: But all of that	22	evidence later about what would have happened in relation
23	information was kept, the video clips were also kept, is	23	to that matter by Regardia Munis, Munu.
24	that correct?	24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's General Munu.
25	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	25	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes.
	Page 13515		Page 13517
1	Page 13515 MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not	1	Page 13517 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
1 2		1 2	-
	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not		COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
2	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that	2	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you deal
2 3	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission.	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions,
2 3 4	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Under section 4 you deal with the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?
2 3 4 5	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking	2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Under section 4 you deal with the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS.	2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as
2 3 4 5 6 7	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that	2 3 4 5 6 7	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?Section 4 you dealCOLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though? COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though? COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes. MR SEMENYA SC:MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though? COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm not from the province and I was initially sent back to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies for a way forward to resolve the situation. And this also
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm not from the province and I was initially sent back to unit. So the continuation of the preparation of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies for a way forward to resolve the situation. And this also being important because the role of the tactical units
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm not from the province and I was initially sent back to unit. So the continuation of the preparation of the presentation initially continued underway without some of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence.COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies for a way forward to resolve the situation. And this also being important because the role of the tactical units which were brought in, in essence again needed somebody
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm not from the province and I was initially sent back to unit. So the continuation of the preparation of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there.The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies for a way forward to resolve the situation. And this also being important because the role of the tactical units which were brought in, in essence again needed somebody that understood their capacity or their capability in order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm not from the province and I was initially sent back to unit. So the continuation of the preparation of the presentation initially continued underway without some of my inputs and later I was brought back in to assist again.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though? COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there. The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies for a way forward to resolve the situation. And this also being important because the role of the tactical units which were brought in, in essence again needed somebody that understood their capacity or their capability in order to place them into correct environments and into correct
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR SEMENYA SC: To this point you are not aware of any video material that you would have seen that has not been presented to the Commission. COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not sure of what all has been presented to the Commission. I think there is video material outside of what exists in exhibit L. MR SEMENYA SC: No – no, I'm not talking about exhibit L, I'm talking the hard drive of the SAPS. COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, the hard drive that we have of the SAPS, that was purchased at Roots and at Roots everything was transferred onto the hard drive at that time and then thereafter, anything that was again gathered or brought in was then put onto that as well as far as – to my knowledge, although it was not in my control any longer. CHAIRPERSON: In whose control was it? COLONEL SCOTT: It was Colonel Visser and Brigadier Pretorius, were made the nodal points because I'm not from the province and I was initially sent back to unit. So the continuation of the preparation of the presentation initially continued underway without some of my inputs and later I was brought back in to assist again. MR SEMENYA SC: And Colonel, it was you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR SEMENYA SC:Under section 4 you dealwith the rationale behind planning and suggestions, correct?COLONEL SCOTT:COLONEL SCOTT:Correct.MR SEMENYA SC:But there were also someconcerns raised during the hearing of, in this Commission relating to the appropriateness or otherwise of having, as it was said, an STF trained person being the one leading the drawing of the plan. You heard that evidence. COLONEL SCOTT:I've heard that, yes.MR SEMENYA SC:What do you say was yourrole in relation to that planning, though?COLONEL SCOTT:I was not functioning as a trained STF member there.The skills which I've obtained over years in multi-disciplinary operations was what was required, as well as being a strategist to analyse situations and then to best apply or to suggest strategies for a way forward to resolve the situation. And this also being important because the role of the tactical units which were brought in, in essence again needed somebody that understood their capacity or their capability in order

	Page 13518		Page 13520
1	conceived it and as it was communicated throughout the	1	morning that you thought you would need a day and a bit.
2	various briefings, did it have any use of sharp point	2	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, Chair.
3	ammunition?	3	CHAIRPERSON: And you've made a lot of
4	COLONEL SCOTT: No. It was the skills of	4	progress, so it seems appropriate for us to take the
5	the tactical members. At no time do we plan to use sharp	5	adjournment at this stage. We're not sitting to hear your
6	point ammunition. It was the skills of those members to	6	evidence tomorrow, we're going to have the postponement
7	deal with threatening persons in high risk arrests that was	7	application, as you've probably heard. So your evidence
8	required and that goes beyond simply the protesters at the	8	will stand down while we consider the postponement
9	koppie. We're looking towards the arrests made at houses	9	application.
10	thereafter, et cetera, on intelligence-driven information	10	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.
11	as well.	11	CHAIRPERSON: We will now adjourn until 9
12	MR SEMENYA SC: That plan, how much of	12	o'clock tomorrow morning.
13	input was made by persons with public order policing	13	[COMMISSION ADJOURNED]
14	experience?	14	
15	COLONEL SCOTT: I had Colonel Merafi and	15	
16	two others with me on the Tuesday night and thereafter in	16	
17	the briefings and the JOCCOMs, as I said, General Annandale	17	
18	gave all personnel an opportunity to comment and	18	
19	realistically –	19	
20	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry to interrupt, wasn't	20	
21	Merafi with you on the Monday night/Tuesday morning?	21	
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	22	
23	CHAIRPERSON: You said Tuesday night.	23	
24	COLONEL SCOTT: Sorry, yes. Tuesday	24	
25	early morning –	25	
	Page 13519		
1	Page 13519 CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday		
1 2			
	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday		
2	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning.		
2 3	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in		
2 3 4	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would		
2 3 4 5	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing		
2 3 4 5 6	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I		
2 3 4 5 6 7	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hope		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations?		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hope		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hopeto resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to,through dialogue, bring about resolution.That's why wehad so much emphasis on that and the degree that even		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hopeto resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to,through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hopeto resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to,through dialogue, bring about resolution.That's why wehad so much emphasis on that and the degree that even		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hopeto resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to,through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why wehad so much emphasis on that and the degree that evensenior police officers went to, to bring in outside partiesto negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-ColonelMcIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations? COLONEL SCOTT: It was, most of our hope to resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to, through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we had so much emphasis on that and the degree that even senior police officers went to, to bring in outside parties to negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it was really centred to resolve this through the dialogue and		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	CHAIRPERSON:Monday night into Tuesdayearly morning.COLONEL SCOTT:That's right, yes. So inessence – and I took, I was not proposing what we wouldcall standard operating procedures, I was simply proposingstrategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that Ifelt it should be dealt with and the principles, inessence, that it should be dealt with.MR SEMENYA SC:What weight in thestrategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed onnegotiations?COLONEL SCOTT:It was, most of our hopeto resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to,through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why wehad so much emphasis on that and the degree that evensenior police officers went to, to bring in outside partiesto negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-ColonelMcIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations? COLONEL SCOTT: It was, most of our hope to resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to, through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we had so much emphasis on that and the degree that even senior police officers went to, to bring in outside parties to negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it was really centred to resolve this through the dialogue and not have to go near a tactical option, considering what had happened on the Monday.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations? COLONEL SCOTT: It was, most of our hope to resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to, through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we had so much emphasis on that and the degree that even senior police officers went to, to bring in outside parties to negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it was really centred to resolve this through the dialogue and not have to go near a tactical option, considering what had		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations? COLONEL SCOTT: It was, most of our hope to resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to, through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we had so much emphasis on that and the degree that even senior police officers went to, to bring in outside parties to negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it was really centred to resolve this through the dialogue and not have to go near a tactical option, considering what had happened on the Monday.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations? COLONEL SCOTT: It was, most of our hope to resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to, through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we had so much emphasis on that and the degree that even senior police officers went to, to bring in outside parties to negotiate, direct negotiations with General Mpembe, it was really centred to resolve this through the dialogue and not have to go near a tactical option, considering what had happened on the Monday. MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, can I propose we		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	CHAIRPERSON: Monday night into Tuesday early morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right, yes. So in essence – and I took, I was not proposing what we would call standard operating procedures, I was simply proposing strategy when I was proposing, that was the weight that I felt it should be dealt with and the principles, in essence, that it should be dealt with. MR SEMENYA SC: What weight in the strategy to resolve the impasse in Marikana was placed on negotiations? COLONEL SCOTT: It was, most of our hope to resolve the situation was placed in the dialogue – to, through dialogue, bring about resolution. That's why we had so much emphasis on that and the degree that even senior police officers went to, to bring in outside parties to negotiate, direct negotiations with Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, strategic negotiations with General Mpembe, it was really centred to resolve this through the dialogue and not have to go near a tactical option, considering what had happened on the Monday. MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, can I propose we break here? I would be now tidying up what remains.		

				Page
A	13448:3 13492:4	13453:1	answers 13327:9	13479:14 13481:2
abandoned 13417:2	actual 13355:13	aim 13439:21	anticipate 13473:1	13508:7
abandoning 13466:16	13384:5 13385:10,13	aimed 13342:3	anticipated 13351:8	approved 13421:24
	13391:22 13457:8,16	air 13338:5,16	13402:14,20	13480:13
ability 13376:7 13414:2	13493:6	13340:11 13420:8	13415:23 13433:22	approximate 13352:10
13426:25 13437:21	ad 13453:17	13430:15 13435:15	13471:14,16	13352:17
13480:10	add 13386:17 13397:20	13453:15,22	13489:14 13504:3	approximately
able 13328:11	13435:18	13466:11 13503:12	anybody 13392:12	13350:25 13428:12
13366:24 13368:19	added 13369:12	airborne 13466:11	13405:14 13409:25	areas 13327:9 13342:3
13372:2 13390:10	13370:22	alight 13428:20	13432:25 13468:22	13353:17 13362:3
13404:4 13408:4				
13417:25 13430:16	additional 13413:9	alleged 13506:21	13493:17	13420:11 13424:1
13430:16 13453:23	13429:1 13438:5	allocated 13458:19	anyway 13461:4	13429:14 13431:14
13457:9 13460:25	address 13474:7,14	allocating 13457:16	apart 13367:16	13432:25 13433:3,10
13464:18 13466:4	addressed 13420:23	allow 13364:4	apparent 13389:10	13445:15 13460:16
13470:5 13473:11	13424:6 13447:19	13373:17 13375:17	appear 13329:6	13465:22 13473:10
13490:17 13492:2	addressing 13344:1	13462:7 13463:16	13331:11 13332:5	13475:13 13478:23
13499:2 13507:3,6	13414:21 13417:14	allowed 13431:15	13345:25 13389:25	13488:23 13512:14
aborted 13449:24	adjacent 13381:13	13449:17	13438:14 13516:5	Aren't 13384:13
Abreu 13507:25	Adjoining 13381:15	allowing 13463:13	appeared 13449:1	arm 13367:17
	adjourn 13520:11	allude 13457:2	13504:17	armed 13362:24,24
absorbed 13353:22,23	adjourned 13408:18	alright 13329:1	appearing 13332:10	13364:9,10 13405:13
academic 13345:18	13520:13	13331:10 13381:14	13334:23 13335:16	13405:14,16,19,20
acceptable 13484:15	adjournment 13380:10	13386:8,16 13402:6	appears 13328:8	13408:4 13416:16
acceptably 13369:19	•			
accepted 13439:9	13444:20 13464:8	alternative 13378:8	13332:8,15 13334:11	armoured 13428:10,19
13474:24 13480:13	13494:2 13520:5	13461:7,23 13467:23	13407:4	13429:1 13497:8
13513:22	ADJOURNS 13380:11	ambush 13489:10	application 13367:13	arms 13416:4 13477:14
access 13361:19	13444:22 13464:9	AMCU 13392:22	13421:17 13520:7,9	arose 13461:10
13481:23	13494:3	13474:6,20,24	apply 13334:1	arrange 13474:5
accompanied 13421:3	adjusting 13388:20	13481:5,11	13368:19 13376:7	arranged 13381:7
account 13329:17	admin 13410:14	ammunition 13379:18	13517:18	13410:7 13411:20
13331:8 13335:4,9	administration	13518:3,6	applying 13337:18	13480:21
13365:3 13428:4	13440:4	amount 13440:14	appointed 13337:3	arrangement 13476:7
	adopt 13396:7	13505:8 13513:25	13510:6	arrangements 13511:2
13499:21 13512:2	adopted 13337:13,19	analyse 13362:22	appreciate 13365:23	arrest 13348:13
accurately 13427:6	Adriao 13482:3,4,20	13382:6 13517:17	appreciated 13422:12	13349:17 13373:9
13493:1 13495:1	advance 13434:19	analysing 13344:21	appreciating 13423:13	13425:25 13464:19
achieve 13359:21	advanced 13434.19	analysing 13344.21 analysis 13363:21	13433:14	
13439:22		e		13471:21 13473:19
acquainted 13386:11	advantage 13375:6	13451:15 13455:5	appreciation 13349:1	13491:16 13496:18
acquired 13362:6	13418:4	13471:1	13353:2 13362:10,14	arrested 13424:23
acronym 13362:20	advised 13448:25	Andrew 13445:18	13422:4	13431:18,24 13438:4
act 13344:23	Advocate 13397:14	angered 13492:15	apprehend 13365:10	arrestees 13437:11
acting 13344:22	advocates 13328:16	angle 13388:9	13373:19 13393:8	arresting 13490:11
action 13348:2	aerial 13350:6	angry 13469:2	13404:19 13406:25	arrests 13368:12
13363:25 13372:11	13385:13 13388:19	Annandale 13346:14	13489:11	13369:23 13370:8
13373:15,15 13378:8	13430:14 13432:6,24	13347:5 13348:15	apprehended 13399:10	13379:17 13473:20
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	13478:7	13350:14,17	apprehending	13489:11 13518:7,9
13379:12 13434:4	affidavit 13328:22,25	13351:22 13352:25	13346:16 13347:16	arrival 13350:13
13436:5,6,7,21	13333:3,4,12,13,14	13363:10 13426:9,24	approach 13366:7,9	13351:13 13441:24
13462:8 13463:16	13333:15,16	13427:3,10,17	13404:15 13408:14	13443:18 13449:4
13465:4 13466:13	13334:11 13388:6			arrivals 13456:14
13467:24 13468:5		13442:16 13445:25	13415:4,5 13418:11	
13469:3,21 13470:15	affidavits 13334:3,21	13450:20 13452:22	13419:24 13462:23	13458:17,19
13470:16,25	Africa 13338:13	13453:4 13454:9,23	13470:5 13489:2	arrive 13350:23
13472:22 13473:1,4	13344:19 13364:18	13455:13 13457:13	approached 13364:4	13354:14 13413:7
13484:12,14	African 13340:25	13457:17,21,25	13401:17 13415:7	13424:16 13454:3
13485:12 13487:12	13342:20 13345:12	13458:4,8 13461:10	13464:4 13488:10	13481:22
13487:21 13490:9,10	afternoon 13447:4,15	13465:9 13466:15	13506:2,18	arrived 13351:4
13491:13,14 13492:7	13474:5	13474:5 13477:7,16	approaches 13374:5	13354:23 13373:4
13503:1 13505:12	agendas 13375:16	13479:8,23 13481:10	13428:22	13409:1 13415:10
actions 13358:11	agents 13401:12	13483:8,20 13485:9	approaching 13405:13	13417:19 13453:22
	aggression 13422:23	13485:19 13508:17	13405:16 13473:3	13454:9 13456:15
13377:21 13441:25	13424:19	13512:3 13518:17	13489:7	13463:7 13477:13
13443:17 13468:21	aggressive 13371:10	annexed 13388:6	appropriate 13394:23	13485:22 13493:4,5,
13489:22 13497:17			13520:4	
activity 13511:16	13374:24	annexures 13331:11		arriving 13371:9
acts 13373:17,19	ago 13427:15 13460:8	announced 13326:4	appropriateness	13394:3 13415:1
13418:5 13431:17,18	agree 13386:19,21	13510:19	13517:8	13418:1
	110100 1	100		
	agreed 13408:14	answer 13356:23	approval 13419:16	arrow 13495:14

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

Pretoria

				Page 2
13496:9,10	attend 13326:4 13454:2	13486:5,13 13488:25	13514:15 13517:18	13419:23 13441:8,9
arrows 13494:24	13459:23	13491:6,7 13493:17	better 13368:14,24	13442:10 13444:9
13496:4,13	attended 13345:12	13501:8,16 13506:6	13371:24 13385:12	13445:8 13451:1
articulate 13360:18	13426:15	13512:14 13515:19	13401:6 13409:22	13458:25 13490:19
13498:10	attention 13334:22	13515:22	13451:6 13455:25	13495:17 13501:17
articulation 13440:9	13364:1 13365:14	background 13358:9	13457:9 13465:20	briefing 13352:25
ascertain 13409:21	13368:4 13479:20	13391:16 13393:3	13485:3 13486:25	13354:15,16 13355:5
13477:8	attestation 13330:25	13422:6 13439:16	13490:20 13494:22	13355:8,13,16
asked 13351:12,14	13331:2,3	13455:1	13501:17 13510:20	13357:16 13359:17
13415:8 13450:20	attested 13329:4	backing 13382:15	13514:11	13361:21 13382:12
13472:8 13474:5,10	13330:1,7	backs 13433:24	beyond 13359:14,22	13391:14,17 13392:4
13476:3 13484:6,6,14	attitude 13415:15	backwards 13382:15	13368:14 13511:5	13407:6 13408:16
13484:16	13418:25 13427:17	13482:9	13518:8	13410:4,23 13412:23
asking 13494:6	13482:5	barbed 13429:1,10	big 13472:16	13427:4,9 13438:18
aspects 13410:13	attraction 13446:12	13434:8,11 13460:23	bigger 13463:20	13438:20 13440:7,10
assegai 13405:24	13469:5 13471:5	13506:3	binding 13326:15,22	13440:15,19 13441:3
13406:4	audience 13439:17	barricade 13435:4	bit 13383:2 13457:9	13440.13,19 13441.3
assess 13372:21	13440:15 13477:25	barrier 13360:20	13486:17 13488:16	
				13444:7,13,14
13374:8 13454:8	13513:5	13405:4 13430:6	13497:5 13520:1	13454:16 13458:14
13465:20 13490:1	auditorium 13513:6	13434:13,20 13435:2	bits 13336:8 13357:19	13486:2 13494:25
assessing 13353:13	August 13346:8	13495:9	Blackberry 13432:13	13495:1 13498:3
13497:24 13514:9	13423:3 13451:4	Barring 13329:5,16	blank 13331:1	13499:10 13501:5
assessment 13367:4	13507:10 13508:16	13331:7	13424:17	13503:19 13509:21
13471:2	13508:19 13509:20	based 13339:20	block 13395:15,19	13510:1 13513:21
assets 13400:24	13510:21 13511:24	13341:12 13359:12	13396:17 13397:10	briefings 13442:8
13454:11 13466:24	authority 13372:1	13377:16 13417:18	13420:25 13452:3	13518:2,17
13470:20 13471:9	automatically	13502:13	blocks 13396:10	briefly 13457:4
13492:10 13500:15	13366:18	bases 13471:12	13494:24	13477:17
assigned 13457:13	availability 13413:1	basic 13343:13 13371:5	blue 13398:14,22	brigade 13430:21
assimilation 13512:16	13459:6	13406:16 13454:8	13492:24 13494:24	brigadier 13339:3
assist 13346:15	available 13336:5	13462:18 13480:25	13495:13 13496:4,9	13346:7,10,12,18,20
13347:15 13394:4	13362:4,7 13363:3	13486:22	BMR 13395:17	13347:4,10,11
13404:24 13413:10	13373:16 13381:11	basically 13346:12	13408:20	13348:5 13349:7
13428:16 13429:21	13423:14 13438:10	13385:17 13427:14	board 13433:6	13379:21,21 13380:3
13467:20 13472:13	13457:13 13459:2	13454:9 13456:4	13438:21 13485:10	13380:20 13423:17
13495:7 13514:10	13477:8 13509:20	basis 13361:1 13367:1	bodies 13516:12	13444:12 13445:10
13515:22	13514:3	bear 13353:12	body 13447:11,14	13453:10 13454:25
assistance 13349:24	average 13477:4	13397:18	13477:25	13455:4 13456:17,20
13353:15 13473:23	avoid 13335:12	bears 13330:16	borderline 13338:12	13456:24,24 13460:1
assisted 13348:19	awaiting 13346:14	beat 13452:4	Botes 13446:15	13479:21,22
13352:1 13479:21	awards 13344:9	becoming 13337:19	13473:23	13484:23 13485:7
13484:23 13507:18	aware 13348:1 13364:5	bed 13489:19,24	bottom 13360:12	13487:8,9 13502:17
13509:24 13512:23	13364:15,21	13497:10	13368:17 13408:11	13502:19 13503:2
assisting 13379:11	13366:22 13377:3	began 13461:6	13413:17 13418:3	13504:10 13507:23
13381:20 13512:19	13378:1 13448:10	beginning 13349:19	13436:14 13437:4	13515:18
assists 13353:9,10	13450:24 13451:9	13453:21 13498:1,11	13481:8 13487:17	brigadiers 13483:11
assume 13405:19	13452:16 13456:15	begins 13346:3	13496:21	bring 13370:23
assumed 13395:22	13466:23 13484:18	behalf 13374:2,17	brackets 13386:18	13371:13,13 13373:2
13400:22	13515:2 13516:15	behaviour 13464:1	break 13487:1	13378:11 13399:1
assurance 13368:10	awareness 13503:3	believe 13366:17	13493:12 13519:23	13407:1 13425:6
atmosphere 13416:19	awareness 15505.5	believed 13408:7	breakaway 13512:13	13434:3 13438:20
13418:25 13482:8	B	believes 13359:1	13512:25	13441:2 13478:19
attached 13385:2			breaking 13421:17	13519:14,16
attack 13360:16	B 13335:15,19 13398:1 back 13333:19	belligerent 13464:17 13465:1,2 13468:15	brief 13351:15,16	bringing 13370:17
13406:14	13335:15 13358:25	13470:7 13473:20	13353:18 13354:11	13433:9 13454:24
attacked 13346:16		13470:713473:20		13455:21 13465:21
	13371:13,14 13372:9		13354:13 13355:9	
13352:11 13361:18	13376:16 13378:11	benefit 13368:8	13391:21 13413:2	broad 13354:4
13392:17 13405:7	13383:17 13397:24	13438:3 13461:6	13417:18 13426:24	13427:10
13446:14 13468:25	13405:17 13412:9	best 13335:4 13337:17	13427:21,22	broadcast 13504:8
attacking 13394:2		13337:20 13343:1	13436:24 13442:10	broadened 13460:24
	13414:1,10 13425:6	100 - 1 0 1000		hmomodet 12250.0
attacks 13351:17	13425:25 13426:3	13354:8 13384:8	13450:24 13457:9	brought 13359:8
attacks 13351:17 13424:19 13446:6	13425:25 13426:3 13432:13 13440:24	13395:25 13411:13	13458:4 13460:1	13373:20 13381:23
attacks 13351:17 13424:19 13446:6 attempt 13348:13	13425:25 13426:3 13432:13 13440:24 13441:3,16 13442:25	13395:25 13411:13 13411:17 13432:11	13458:4 13460:1 13484:17 13493:4	13373:20 13381:23 13386:10 13399:4
attacks 13351:17 13424:19 13446:6 attempt 13348:13 13349:17 13433:13	13425:25 13426:3 13432:13 13440:24 13441:3,16 13442:25 13444:9 13445:7	13395:25 13411:13 13411:17 13432:11 13438:25 13439:13	13458:4 13460:1 13484:17 13493:4 13508:8,18	13373:20 13381:23 13386:10 13399:4 13412:9 13425:22
attacks 13351:17 13424:19 13446:6 attempt 13348:13 13349:17 13433:13 13475:17 13511:7	13425:25 13426:3 13432:13 13440:24 13441:3,16 13442:25 13444:9 13445:7 13450:8 13455:20	13395:25 13411:13 13411:17 13432:11 13438:25 13439:13 13494:15,17	13458:4 13460:1 13484:17 13493:4 13508:8,18 briefed 13350:18	13373:20 13381:23 13386:10 13399:4
attacks 13351:17 13424:19 13446:6 attempt 13348:13 13349:17 13433:13	13425:25 13426:3 13432:13 13440:24 13441:3,16 13442:25 13444:9 13445:7	13395:25 13411:13 13411:17 13432:11 13438:25 13439:13	13458:4 13460:1 13484:17 13493:4 13508:8,18	13373:20 13381:23 13386:10 13399:4 13412:9 13425:22

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

				Page 3
13515:22 13517:21	13472:16 13473:8	13437:8,20 13439:5	clarified 13403:15	13482:23 13483:9
BTech 13342:14	13488:2,11 13502:23	13440:2,4 13442:14	13465:16	13493:15,17 13497:9
build 13410:12 13442:1	cantor 13400:3	13480:18 13484:12	clarify 13460:9	13497:9 13502:23
building 13355:21	cantors 13399:13,14,16	13484:14 13491:13	clarity 13390:17	13516:14
13403:22 13410:4,22	13407:13	13514:4 13518:10	13438:12 13457:3	comes 13360:7
build-up 13508:24	can't 13373:17 13396:2	chain 13453:17	classification 13353:8	13364:19 13365:18
built 13410:23	13463:21 13465:11	chair 13326:8,10	clear 13356:23	13399:21 13441:15
bullet 13343:5,17,20	capability 13517:22	13327:8 13330:9	13391:25 13502:5	13494:21
13344:13,24,25	capacity 13517:22	13331:14,17,24,25	cleared 13458:4	coming 13351:13
13345:3,6	Captain 13482:2,3,4,19	13332:4,15 13333:1	13479:7	13352:6 13373:9
bullets 13367:19	13507:25	13333:11 13334:7	clearer 13463:23	13374:9 13394:15,18
bundle 13327:20	capture 13357:23	13336:12 13380:8,14	clearing 13497:21	13395:21 13401:17
13328:18	13408:15 13514:15	13380:17 13381:4	clearly 13358:2	13404:20 13407:19
bundles 13384:19	captured 13357:15	13384:23 13387:9	13484:21	13413:24 13417:24
buses 13394:19	car 13402:25 13403:4,4	13403:10 13442:16	click 13388:23	13424:3 13447:1,23
bush 13420:14	caravan 13459:8	13444:18 13445:1	13391:19 13441:14	13449:11 13450:7
bushes 13491:12	care 13447:18	13464:13 13493:23	clicks 13396:11	13468:6 13470:16
busses 13395:20	career 13335:19	13494:9 13519:22	climbed 13486:16	13501:16 13502:14
busy 13387:4 13426:22	13336:24 13341:24	13520:2	clip 13509:15	13503:7 13514:8
button 13504:21	13342:20 13344:10	chaired 13483:20	clips 13508:24 13514:4	command 13350:6
bystanders 13375:15	carried 13367:11	Chairman 13390:25	13514:23	13374:14,16,18
~jouride10 100/0.10	carry 13361:5 13371:2	challenge 13373:24	clock 13386:24	13420:23 13421:25
C	13375:4 13396:2	challenged 13371:11	close 13358:13 13376:1	13420:23 13421:23
C 13346:3 13398:3	13404:4 13436:24	challenges 13414:21	13392:13 13402:25	13440:5 13444:15
Calitz 13379:21,21	13486:25	13495:19	13423:20 13431:6,10	13456:16 13458:19
13380:3,21 13444:12	carrying 13364:22	chance 13427:1	13468:3,10,11	13458:24
13445:10 13453:10	13416:5 13421:4	13476:13	13473:15 13489:1	commander 13346:22
13454:25 13456:21	case 13337:9 13398:5	change 13343:16	closer 13385:13	13346:22,24
13460:1 13487:9	13401:7 13413:21	changed 13482:6	13401:8 13409:9	13379:25 13401:4
13502:17,19 13503:3	13421:15 13424:16	13487:24	13429:8,16 13465:6	13431:14 13434:15
13504:11	13430:7 13437:12	channelled 13470:11	13465:23 13470:23	13435:12 13453:11
call 13334:12 13346:7	13451:21 13457:9	channelling 13495:7	13488:15,17	13453:13,14,14,15
13348:25 13353:1	13465:24 13467:18	channels 13440:4	closest 13433:23	13454:10 13458:6
13362:20 13383:25	13491:2 13500:12	13487:15	13445:17 13476:9	13459:14 13490:3
13390:15 13399:13	catch 13408:4	chanting 13446:23	close-knit 13423:24	13497:22 13498:21
13404:21 13429:20	cattle 13460:5,12,22	charge 13338:9	closing 13468:9	13498:23
13430:15 13432:19	caught 13421:15	chart 13485:10	cluster 13453:11	commanders 13342:24
13433:13 13439:15	cause 13372:17	Chaskalson 13332:6	code-named 13338:4	13345:1,10,14
13440:6 13441:1	13431:3 13468:22	13385:20,21	Coin 13409:15 13504:9	13355:4,7,14
13440:013441.1	13470:11 13472:14	13386:19,21 13387:8	13504:14	13357:16 13359:18
13458:17,19	13488:14 13495:11	13388:10 13389:13	cold 13392:13	13419:20 13420:8
13465:21 13477:8	causes 13497:8	13389:22 13390:12	13393:22 13461:20	13427:21,22
13480:21 13493:2	causing 13492:16	13390:22 13390:12	collate 13444:2	13427.21,22
13497:12 13513:17	caution 13422:22	13395:24 13396:3,15	collateral 13468:16	13440:23,24 13441:1
13497:12 15515:17 13519:5	cautions 13409:8	check 13386:12	colleague 13332:6	13440.23,24 13441.1
called 13344:2	CCTV 13502:4	checklist 13485:10	13460:10	13441:5,5,5,5
13348:15 13389:2,25	cease 13505:4	checkpoints 13403:18	colleagues 13428:16	13444:7,10,13
13399:23 13400:4	ceased 13478:15	checks 13459:10,13	colour 13514:11	13445:8 13453:13,13
13424:6 13427:20	centre 13339:16	choice 13488:13	colours 13398:13	13453:13,14,16
13424.0 13427.20	13508:9	choose 13358:3	combat 13338:12	13456:12 13458:13
13432.24 13440.24 13444.9 13445:7	centred 13519:19	13374:22	13375:3	13459:9,16,20,25
13456:3 13461:10	certain 13338:12	choosing 13360:16	combating 13365:15	13478:5,7 13484:24
13478:18 13483:4,7	13353:8 13373:19	chopper 13503:7	combined 13343:7	13485:6 13486:18
13511:23 13516:13	13378:1 13420:11	chose 13375:23	13423:2	13490:3 13499:22
calling 13388:21	13423:23 13431:14	13478:1 13502:9	come 13351:9 13352:14	13501:5 13506:5
13415:18 13502:19	13433:3 13434:23,24	chosen 13442:1	13357:5 13374:13,15	13512:9
13502:23 13505:4	13437:19 13453:21	13468:7	13376:20 13384:12	commanding 13410:14
calls 13389:15 13490:4	13465:17 13483:21	chronologically	13393:10,19 13394:8	commanding 13410.14 commands 13374:4,25
candidates 13336:13	13492:3,4	13425:13,17	13399:1 13402:11	commence 13485:18,20
Canine 13491:14	certainly 13494:1	circle 13383:2	13403:5,12 13405:3	commenced 13358:22
canines 13491:6	certificate 13330:25	13396:16	13406:13 13413:10	commencement
cannon 13472:11	13331:2	circles 13467:2	13425:21 13431:13	13515:25
13493:3,5,6,16	cetera 13376:17	circumstances 13466:4	13436:22 13441:4	commendations
13500:1	13378:5 13379:17	13468:18	13453:24 13461:19	13344:9 13345:17
cannons 13367:18	13382:17 13429:8	cite 13341:22	13475:19,21,21	comment 13406:17
13375:24 13465:6	13430:3 13434:1	civilians 13433:1	13476:10 13482:21	13518:18
A R C H I V E E O	RUUSTICE			

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

Pretoria

				Page
comments 13513:13	comprising 13428:25	confrontation 13358:5	13407:5 13410:11	13344:10,16,18
commission 13326:2,25	computer 13386:24	13374:23 13376:25	13421:20,21 13422:3	13345:1,2,4,6,12,12
13343:1 13350:22	13387:14 13417:18	13377:13 13435:19	13423:12 13499:21	13371:11 13374:4
13380:11,11,12	13485:9 13486:17	confronted 13361:6	13503:17 13515:21	13422:7 13425:25
13440:2 13444:22,22	conceived 13407:22	confronting 13372:1	continuum 13373:23	13429:24 13430:10
13444:23 13464:9,9	13433:8 13518:1	conscience 13326:15,22	13373:25 13374:8	13432:1 13438:8
13464:10 13490:20	conceiving 13370:12	consciously 13335:12	13375:9 13376:1	13448:11 13451:22
13494:3,3,4 13510:18	concentrated 13443:3	consecutive 13466:22	13379:1 13465:4	13456:1 13473:23
13512:5,5,20 13513:4	13443:6	consider 13336:9	13472:22 13487:23	13476:6 13479:17
13514:11,19 13515:3	concept 13354:1,3,9	13384:8 13419:10	13489:6 13500:25	13480:14 13485:4
13515:5,25 13516:11	13361:24 13369:11	13431:11 13437:23	contrast 13442:20	13493:20 13505:21
13516:19 13517:7	13382:7,11 13391:15	13461:6 13463:10,11	contravened 13371:22	13516:21
13520:13	13391:20 13398:8	13472:21 13489:4	contravening 13363:21	courses 13336:19
commissioned 13328:4	13408:13 13409:4	13505:9,10 13520:8	13364:16	13341:9,13 13342:19
13328:15	13410:5 13412:16	consideration 13438:13	control 13337:9	13359:14
Commissioner	13413:19 13417:9	13461:2 13464:14	13444:12 13445:10	cover 13410:12
13333:20,23,24	13421:24 13436:14	considered 13405:7	13458:25 13511:12	13457:4 13476:19
13338:17 13351:9	13439:22 13457:12	13412:15 13432:19	13515:14,16	covered 13397:21
13353:19 13354:13	13461:8 13462:18	13446:17 13462:25	convenient 13380:8	13455:5 13471:12
13354:16,23,24,25	13479:13 13480:25	13467:23 13469:8	13444:18 13493:24	13487:23
13355:9,12,17	13486:14	13470:13 13471:5	13519:24	covering 13442:2
13356:8 13358:25	concepts 13354:19	13479:12 13484:8	conversation 13335:5	co-author 13334:13
13359:18 13361:22	13455:24 13477:17	13485:12	conversations 13335:7	co-ordinated 13438:11
13365:4 13404:7,11	conceptualise 13349:19	considering 13367:25	convey 13384:8	co-ordinating 13382:9
13480:23 13481:2	conceptualised 13366:5	13451:5 13519:20	13387:10 13404:3	13424:6,9
13508:7,13,18	conceptualising	consistent 13396:18	13494:13	co-ordination 13346:15
13509:2,25 13513:10	13380:4	consolidated 13330:13	conveyed 13483:18	create 13452:6,23
13513:21	concern 13389:12	13331:4 13334:16	convoy 13421:3	13488:16 13495:7
Commissioners	13390:9 13394:22	consolidating 13512:25	coordinated 13503:2	13508:17
13326:8	13452:1	constitute 13471:5	coordinates 13396:9,12	created 13386:15
Commissioner's	concerned 13356:11,19	constitution 13364:8	coordinating 13456:2	13387:6 13479:10
13356:4 13425:2	13389:7 13391:4,5	constraints 13439:7	13457:5 13459:12	13480:25 13489:24
commitment 13475:5	13492:9	consult 13476:4	coordination 13504:10	13490:18 13504:6
committed 13373:19	concerning 13465:17	consultation 13363:9	copied 13387:20,24	creating 13488:12
committee 13510:7,10	concerns 13356:8	contact 13369:10	copies 13336:4	crevices 13491:12
communicate 13420:21	13517:7	13449:18	13385:11 13386:1	13499:15
communicated 13518:1	concert 13420:24	contained 13333:4	Cops 13341:5	crime 13338:12
communication	concluded 13361:22	contains 13327:21	copy 13328:24	13365:15 13401:12
13458:21,23,24	13364:3 13413:18	CONTD 13380:19	13329:25 13330:2	13424:23 13430:21
13459:4 13501:23	13444:8 13445:3	contemplate 13499:6	13331:1 13336:8	13431:20 13437:8
13502:19 13504:25	conditions 13357:1	contemplated 13385:22	13381:8 13397:2,4,18	13447:19,23
13508:9	13393:21 13415:25	13421:10 13434:7	13402:3	13453:11 13455:8
communications	13469:19	13469:23 13479:4,18	cordon 13425:13	13477:11
13501:25 13504:20	conduct 13348:11	13498:7,9 13499:3	13480:1,8,9	criminal 13431:18
community 13339:15	13364:16 13467:1	contemplating	cordoning 13435:6	criminals 13340:21
13416:19 13419:5,8	13477:7	13486:12	core 13392:10,15	crisis 13345:2,3
13423:24 13454:15	conference 13341:4	contents 13329:3,10	13394:1 13404:9,17	critical 13392:7
company 13354:23	confidence 13368:19	13333:4	13404:19 13406:25	crossed 13360:20
13381:16	confirm 13329:9	context 13334:21	13408:8	cross-training
compare 13411:9	13331:4	contingency 13373:15	corner 13441:14	13337:16
compared 13330:3	confirmation 13411:21	13379:7 13421:6	correction 13452:9	crowd 13352:17
compares 13390:22	confirmatory 13333:3	13429:7 13433:4	correctly 13395:22	13370:3 13373:12
compilation 13334:12	13333:4	13434:13 13436:7	13406:7	13376:6,11,18,20
13512:19	confirming 13329:3	continually 13465:20	couldn't 13398:5	13379:4,4 13430:1,7
compile 13512:14		continuation 13515:20	13414:25 13420:13	13430:9 13435:3,7
	confiscate 13425:5			
13514:14	confiscate 13425:5 conflict 13359:19	continue 13357:10.14	count 13505:8	13404.2 13490.2.)
13514:14	conflict 13359:19	continue 13357:10,14 13363:8 13365:3	count 13505:8 counted 13503:11	13464:2 13498:25 crowds 13358:4
13514:14 compiling 13513:3	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15	continue 13357:10,14 13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5		crowds 13358:4
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10	counted 13503:11	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8 13389:1	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22 13463:25 13476:13	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10 13428:24 13441:17	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13 country 13338:21 13373:17 13450:25	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14 culminating 13425:13
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8 13389:1 completed 13328:14	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22 13463:25 13476:13 conflictive 13344:1	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10 13428:24 13441:17 13445:12 13446:18	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13 country 13338:21 13373:17 13450:25 couple 13440:14	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14 culminating 13425:13 culture 13475:16
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8 13389:1 completed 13328:14 13336:18 13339:7	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22 13463:25 13476:13 conflictive 13344:1 13371:9	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10 13428:24 13441:17 13445:12 13446:18 13449:22 13450:12	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13 country 13338:21 13373:17 13450:25 couple 13440:14 13455:23 13485:9	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14 culminating 13425:13 culture 13475:16 cum 13342:11
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8 13389:1 completed 13328:14 13336:18 13339:7 completion 13338:15	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22 13463:25 13476:13 conflictive 13344:1 13371:9 conflicts 13365:19	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10 13428:24 13441:17 13445:12 13446:18 13449:22 13450:12 13450:17 13451:11	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13 country 13338:21 13373:17 13450:25 couple 13440:14 13455:23 13485:9 course 13331:15	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14 culminating 13425:13 culture 13475:16 cum 13342:11 Cup 13338:11,20
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8 13389:1 completed 13328:14 13336:18 13339:7 completion 13338:15 complicated 13469:10	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22 13463:25 13476:13 conflictive 13344:1 13371:9 conflicts 13365:19 confront 13360:21	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10 13428:24 13441:17 13445:12 13446:18 13449:22 13450:12 13450:17 13451:11 13452:21 13497:23	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13 country 13338:21 13373:17 13450:25 couple 13440:14 13455:23 13485:9 course 13331:15 13336:1,13 13341:4	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14 culminating 13425:13 culture 13475:16 cum 13342:11 Cup 13338:11,20 13340:20
13514:14 compiling 13513:3 complete 13335:25 13336:7 13343:8 13389:1 completed 13328:14 13336:18 13339:7 completion 13338:15	conflict 13359:19 13387:5 13393:1,15 13405:5 13415:20 13431:5,10 13432:22 13463:25 13476:13 conflictive 13344:1 13371:9 conflicts 13365:19	13363:8 13365:3 13367:24 13400:5 13407:9,12 13422:10 13428:24 13441:17 13445:12 13446:18 13449:22 13450:12 13450:17 13451:11	counted 13503:11 counter 13393:13 country 13338:21 13373:17 13450:25 couple 13440:14 13455:23 13485:9 course 13331:15	crowds 13358:4 13375:14,14 13376:15 13433:14 culminating 13425:13 culture 13475:16 cum 13342:11 Cup 13338:11,20

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

iamage 1378:4 13490:23 13501:10 department 13487:7.8 desire 13371:22 13493.8 13516:12 13377:14 13507:13 13508:11 disprial [3371:22] 13372:25 13373:8 died 13347:24 died 13337:25 13349:16 13392:2 13367:51 13419:11 13510:24 13511:15 13373:23 desired 13488:12 13349:16 13392:2 13366:13 1337:23 desired 13488:12 13330:9 depict 13495:11 desired 13330:2 13370:24 13370:8 13456:7 13487:25 13368:13 13369:19 13332:13 depict 13400:12,13 13448:6 13446:17 different 1332:13 13401:8 13405:20 13370:22 13370:23 13413:19 1341:2 detail 13332:1 13366:17 different 1348:12 13366:7 13487:25 1342:25 13463:1 13370:22 13370:2 13413:19 1341:2 13492:16 1342:25 1342:25 1342:25 1342:25 1342:25 1342:25 13468:17 13469:15 13468:17 13469:15 13448:21 1345:1 13468:17 13469:15 13442:25 13442:25 13442:25 13442:25 13435:1 13443:1 13458:17 13469:15 13468:17 13469:16 1342:25 13442:25 13442:25 13442:25 1					Page
D 1347:10 1349:11 1339:5 1339:5 1339:7:19 1348:8:13 1339:5:13	cut 13421:16	13471:18 13472:3	demarcated 13400:1	13351:16 13386:8,17	13443:17,19,20
D 13498.7 1348.12 departing 1349.51 13395.5 13397.12 13395.5 13397.12 1348.84.23 1348.84.23 1348.84.23 1348.84.23 1348.84.23 1348.84.23 1348.84.23 1348.84.12 1348.84.12 1348.84.12 1348.84.12 1347.24 1350.24 1351.15 1330.24 1337.22 1337.23 1337.24 1337.22 1337.24 </td <td></td> <td>13473:11,12</td> <td>demobilising 13511:23</td> <td>13386:20,23 13387:3</td> <td>13463:9 13481:23</td>		13473:11,12	demobilising 13511:23	13386:20,23 13387:3	13463:9 13481:23
D 13398/7 13482:1 1349.6/ departmet 13477.8 design 13410.22 13482.1 1349.6/ 13472:1 1 13507.13 13508:11 departmet 13477.8 13372.2 13373.8 13472.81 13372:1 1 13507.21 13508:11 depiced 13898.23 desire 13371.22 13372.23 desire 13371.21 13368:1 13377.4 dealing 13330.9 depiced 13498.23 depiced 13498.21 depiced 1349.61 different 1332.13 1340:8 1340:02.0 13332.6 133370.3 depiced 13498.21 13442.21 different 1332.21 list 1332.21 <	D				
$ damage 13378.4 \\ 13472.14 \\ 13507.51 31508.11 \\ 1357.51 31508.11 \\ 1357.51 31508.11 \\ 1357.51 31508.11 \\ 1357.51 31508.11 \\ 1357.51 31508.11 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ 1356.19 \\ $	D 13398:7			design 13410:22	13488:4,25 13491:17
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$				0	
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
$ \begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
1336:13 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:6 1332:2 13336:2 1332:					
13368:13 13369:19 13343:16 13322:15 depicts 13400:12,13 13492:16 13492:16 13322:13362:13362:13362:13362:13362:13362:13362:13362:13366:13352:13366:13371:2113372:20 13413:19 13414:2 13371:2113372:20 13413:19 13414:2 13322:12 13366:17141577.13362:13366:1714157.1 1344:12 13472:2134362:1 13437:22 13435:19 1344:2 1344:1336:11 1344:22 1334:19 1344:2 13435:11 1344:2 13456:14 1344:22 1345:11 1344:2 1345:11 134	8	8	-		
1340:8: 13405:20 13356:23 13370:3 1349:53 1349:52 1349:51 1342:53 134371:21 13372:21 13345:11 13445:21					
13425:513463:1 13371:2113372:20 13415:1913414:2 detail 1332:12 13366:7134157.1 13464:1913482:24 13375:1143300:5 13427:231340:0 133468:101340:5 134482:1351.2 1341:125 13345:113300:5 13427:231340:0 13435:1213438:15 13457:12 1331:125 13445:12345:21 13435:1913432:15 13437:113438:15 13468:1713438:15 13382:11 13386:14 13445:12 dealing:13475:12 dealing:13475:12 13475:1134328:15 13475:1214342:12 13387:1513810:4 13339:151344:20 13359:1713368:14 13495:181346:13 13457:113472:141348:15 13495:181349:15 13387:1513810:4 13339:1014333:14 13441:1330:19 13457:113472:2 13478:1113448:12 detaile13338:7:1 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 13448:18 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:7:13 detaile1338:11:1344:2:14 detaile1338:11:1342:12 detaile1338:11:1342:14 detaile1333:14 detaile1333:13:133:133:133:133:133:133:133:133					
$ \begin{array}{lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					
dark 1332:1 3440:11347:21 1343:2213434:11 1342:3213477:11 15 1343:11difficult 1366:191341:2513445:2 13434:2113438:11 1342:2413437:13 13438:1313437:13 13438:1313437:13 13438:1313437:13 13438:1313437:13 13438:1513472:10.11 1345113472:10.11 1345113386:1813386:1413386:1413343:21 13344:2013357:13 1368:213471:21 13474:1513396:1413397:13 1348:1513396:1413386:1813386:1413338:11 1344:2413396:14 1342:1213478:11 1348:1513496:1213476:11 1348:14difficulty 13387.413355:71 1355:72dealt 1336:0:1213448:71 134417:2213447:2113477:11difficulty 13387.413377:24 13359:72debatable 13387:1313449:1213447:2213437.7difficulty 13382:1213377:24 13359:72debatable 13387:13debird 1344:2113437.7difficulty 1338:1213377:24 13392:17debatable 13387:13debird 1344:2113437.7134312:02difficulty 1338:121340:21 13377:24decird 13370:10deployment 13349:20deter 1336:1deter 1336:1deter 1336:11344:25 13411:1413400:1113406:1413406:1313447:1113442:1513447:1113442:111344:25 13437:1113446:1413406:1413406:1313447:141342:1613392:111344:25 1342:14decird 1336:1713446:1513446:1513447:141342:151346:161344:25 1342:1413406:1413406:1413406:1413446:1513446:1513446:					
date 1332:8:8.14 1345:14 1342:25 13478:15 13472:13 1348:15 13472:10,11 1348 13472:10,11 1348:15 13472:10,11 1348:15 13472:10,11 1348:15 13472:10,11 1348:15 13472:10,11 1348:15 13472:10,11 1348:15 13472:11,11 1348:15 13472:11,11 1348:15 13472:11,11 1348:15 13472:11,11 1348:15 13495:11 13345:21 13344:24 13355:11,11 1348:12 13495:11 13355:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 13495:11 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:16 1345:11 1345:11 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
1332:11 1338:6:11 dealings 13475:12 13478:16 13443:12,11 13445:12,11 13445:15 1346:14 1336:14 1336:14 1336:14 1336:14 1336:14 1335:1 1346:21 1336:14 1336:14 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:15 1336:12 1336:15 1336:12 1336:15 1336:12 1336:15 1336:12 1336:12 1346:15 1336:12 1336:12 1346:15 1336:12 1336:12 1346:15 1336:12 1336:12 1346:15 1336:12 1346:15 1336:12 1346:15 1346:15 1347:15 1347:12 1346:15 1347:15 1347:12 1346:15 1347:12 1346:15 1347:12 1346:15 1347:15					
13386:18 13387:11 deals [3334:12] deployed [3336:19] 13455:18 1346:2 difficulty [3387:4] 13387:15 13510:4 13343:21 1344:20 13355:71 1368:2 lifficulty [1387:4] 13396:4 dawed [346:6:25 13345:21 1344:20 13398:14 1342:12 1344:8:1 1348:12 1344:4:8 detailet [1342:2:1] diffusity [1387:4] 13355:7:15 1364:2:2 13345:21 1345:2:3 13445:71 1344:2:8 1348:7:1 1344:7:1 1345:7:1 346:1 diffusity 1387:4 1346:1 1346:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1347:1 1346:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:1 1344:2:					·
13387:15 13342:21 13342:21 13357:55 13457:12 134457:13447:22 13457:12 13457:12 13457:12 13457:12 13457:12 13457:15					
dated 13330:19 13339:15 13442:4 13339:14 1342:20 13478:11 13448:8 diffuse 13359:6 dawned 1346:25 13435:21 13434:25 13426:21 13434:25 13480:7.11 digital 13332:9 dawned 1346:71 13352:12 13455:72 134457:13447:22 13485:12 1344:8 diffuse 1332:9 13355:7.15 detaths 13358:7.1 13445:71 13447:25 13455:9 direct 13350:14 13393:16 13390:17 debate 13387:12,13 deploying 13338:10 13400:3 13431:20,22 direct 13360:49 13427:18 13440:6 decide 13370:10 deployment 13349:20 determine 13476:5 13402:3 1340:22 13445:14 1345:12 decide 13370:6 13429:17 1345:1 decide 13345:5 13402:3 1340:23 13478:21 13451:13 decide 1379:6 13429:17 1345:1 developed 1345:5 13442:15 13430:8 13478:21 13451:13 decide 1379:6 13429:17 1345:11 direct 13338:10 13447:18 1349:2 13478:11 34575.8 13456:13 1346:51 13445:14 1346:51 13478:11 3446:51 13478:11 3446:15 13478:11 134575.8 13445:13 13466:51 13446:51 34					
1332-9 1333:4 dealt 1336:6 1334:2 1342:21 1343:22 1342:21 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:21 1342:21 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1343:22 1344:21 1344:21 1342					
dawned 13466:25 13345:21 13455:23 13445:71 1344:8 13480:7.11 diminishing 1346:2 day 13346:17 13352:11 13519:7,8 13445:71 13479:25 13455:9 diploma 1336:11 13358:4,7 13359:20 debate 13387:12,13 13489:13 1340:21 13400:31 1340:22 diploma 1336:21 13393:16 13397:52 debate 1337:12,13 debate 1337:12,13 debate 1337:12,13 debate 1337:12,13 debate 1337:12,13 detate 13436:12 distore 1346:21 distore 1336:14 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1336:14 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 13402:13 1340:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 distore 1346:21 13402:13 1340:21 distore 1346:21 dis					
day 13346:17 13352:11 13519:7.8 13445:7 13447:22 detective 13435:12 diploma 13362:11 13355:7.15 13357:22 deaths 13358:7 13449:3 13479:5 13455:9 13455:9 direct 13365:12 13375:7.15 13397:52 debatable 1338:712.13 deploying 13338:10 13400:3 13431:20.22 direct 13366:14 13492:12 13419:19 debrief 13449:16 debrief 13449:16 decriate 13382:7 133423:1 34434:21 direct 13366:14 13443:20,25,25 decride 13382:7 13360:1 3404:24 determine 13476:5 13402:3 13402:5 13412:16 13422:14 1345:1 13402:1 13432:1	,				
133557.15 13357.22 deatable 13387.13 13449.3 13479.5 13459.14 13400.3 13400.3 1340.3 13400.3 1340.3 13400.3 1340.2 1340.3 1340.2 1340.3 1340.2 1340.3 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2 1340.2					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	-				
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		0			
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $,		
13494:1613513:13 13451:12decision13360:21 13450:1613460:513465:17 13457:13de-escalate13371:125 13374:1013468:5 directly13468:5 directly13468:5 directly13478:17 13478:17dayi 13335:3,6,8decisions13335:8 decisions13477:1813477:1813477:17 de-escalates13374:11 de-escalates13374:11 de-escalates13374:11 dialogue13478:17 de-escalates13374:11 dialogue13478:17 de-escalates13374:11 de-escalates13374:11 dialogue13478:17 de-escalates13374:11 dialogue13478:17 de-escalates13374:11 dialogue13478:17 d			-		
13514:12 13520:113450:16 13483:1313467:13 13477:1713374:10directly 13347:213451:1313483:1813477:18 13479:813374:1113478:1days 1335:3,6,8decisions 13335:813495:11 13498:1813374:1113478:113452:213497:2313498:20dialogue 13344:213473:2313510:21declaring 13431:14deposed 13328:2213358:8,10,12dirt 13398:6dayshift 13448:16dedicated 13343:913333:16 13334:2213357:17 13371:10,15dirt 13398:6day-to-day 13426:213345:7depth 13405:213371:17 13375:1213425:2 13462:10deal 13327:11deemed 13435:2513441:21 13462:1713378:19,22,2413463:1 13467:1813335:15,19 13340:1513457:8depty 13388:1713416:18,2013476:17 13482:1313340:19,24 13314:3deefuy 13406:1113441:113490:61213476:17 13482:1413340:19,24 13314:3defend 13374:6derivel 13392:513442:15,16disarmament 1342813354:8 13366:13definitely 13460:1113339:11 1360:1213447:24 13449:2213483:11336:19 13375:213384:17 13385:1,113462:16 13483:1513490:111336:28 13363:4,813363:19 13375:213386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:91336:19 13375:213386:3,4 13389:1,013519:13,14,1913453:91336:13 139:12,113467:13 1347:313486:2discomfort 13488:141336:20 13385:413399:1913355:9,17 13356:413497:21 13778:24discomfort 13488:14133					
daylight 13461:1313483:1813477:18 13479:8de-escalates 13374:1113478:1days 13335:3,6,8decisions 13335:813495:11 13498:1813374:1113374:11Dirk 13446:1513454:24 13466:2213497:2313495:20dialogue 13344:213473:23dayshift 13448:16declicated 13343:913333:16 13334:2213358:8,10,12dirt 13398:6dayshift 13448:16dedicated 13343:913333:16 13334:2213371:17 13375:1213425:2 13462:10dayshift 13448:16deemed 13435:2513441:21 13462:1713378:19,22,2413463:1 13464:1813335:19 13336:6deeper 13403:13deepths 13406:1113405:8,15 13416:1513470:5,7 13471:213340:19,24 13341:3defend 13374:6derivel 13392:513442:14 13424:1413490:6 13496:1813344:5,8 1336:14defensive 13368:20describe 13322:3,1213447:24 13492:2113483:113355:23 13366:2513442:12 1359:1513371:16 13372:313462:16 13483:1513490:1113356:31 1336:34defensive 13368:20describe 13322:3,1213446:21 1348:21disarming 13471:2413356:32 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13398:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:913365:13 1336:481366:2013325:2113407:12,18 13421:213490:11discomfort 13488:1413376:15 13379:4,17delayed 13413:213497:12,18 13437:313462:1213490:1113366:2413365:41 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:913365:15 13379:4,17delayed 13413	13494:16 13513:13				
days13335:3,6,8 13454:24decisions13335:8 13497:2313495:1113375:11 13498:20Dirk13446:15 13498:2013510:21 dayshift13497:23 declaring13497:23 declaring13498:20 13333:1613328:22 13328:2213358:8,10,12 13355:7,1371:10,1513473:23 dirt13398:6 dirt13495:23 dirt13398:6 dirt13498:20 dirt13375:12 13355:7,1713375:10,1513457:2 13441:2113333:16 1336:613328:22 deeper13375:17 13375:1213425:2 13441:21 13465:213375:171713375:12 13378:19,22,2413463:1 13463:1 13445:1513470:5,7 13470:5,7 13471:213338:19 13340:15 13340:1513457:8 deputsdeputs 13406:11 13441:113405:8,15 13425:213470:5,7 13471:213470:5,7 13471:213344:5,5,8 13346:4 13344:5,5,8 13346:4defensive 13368:20 definitely 13462:12derived 13392:5 1339:11 13360:1213447:24 13450:9,1213462:12 13452:1213483:1 disarmament 13482:1213355:20 13366:4 13366:4definitely 13366:413375:2 1338:1713482:13 13386:14 13366:2513442:12 13375:213386:3,4 13389:11 13386:3,413462:10 13389:1313483:16 13482:1213366:4 13366:4 13366:2513442:12 13392:1413389:23 13389:2313407:5,10 13486:21discomfort 13486:21 13480:2013464:14 13499:20 13399:1913355:9,17 13356:4,1 13399:1913389:23 13407:12,1813482:21 13487:3discomfort 13489:20 13489:201340:1	13514:12 13520:1		13467:13 13477:17		
13454:241346:2213497:2313498:20dialogue 13344:213473:2313510:21declaring 13431:14declaring 13431:14depts 13328:2213358:8,10,12dirt 13398:6dayshift 13448:16dedicated 13343:913457.7depth 13405:213359:7 13371:10,15discrm 13416:16dayshift 13448:16deemed 13435:25depth 13405:213371:17 13375:1213425:2 13462:10deal 13327:11deemed 13435:25depth 13406:1113405:8,15 13416:1513470:5,7 13471:213338:19 13340:1513457:8depty 13406:11depth 13374:6derived 13392:5dayshift 13344:5,5,8 13346:4defensive 13368:20derived 13392:513424:15,16disarmanet 1342813357:20 13359:14defensive 13368:20describe 13332:3,1213447:24 13449:2213483:113362:8 13363:4,813363:19 13375:213384:17 13385:1,113446:216disarmanet 1342813368:14 13369:20degrees 13392:1413389:23 13407:5,10dictate 13378:8discoptiens 13430:2013366:15 13379:4,17delayed 13413:213407:12,18 13421:2discrepancies 13516discrepancies 1351613396:4,5 13399:1913345:9,17 13356:413428:2,13 1347:313489:22discrepancies 13516:31340:14.14 18 13408:813481:1113516:313452:8 13507:17didn't 13352:2discrepancies 1351613396:4,2 13398:813481:1113516:313452:8 13507:17discrepancies 13516discrepancies 1351613396:4,2 13398:813481:1113516:313452:8 13507:17discrepancies 13516			13477:18 13479:8	de-escalates 13374:11	
13510:21declaring 13431:14deposed 13328:2213358:8,10,12dirt 13398:6dayshift 13448:16decicated 13343:913333:16 13334:2213357:7 13371:10,15disarm 13416:16day-to-day 13426:213345:7deept 13405:213371:17 13375:1213425:2 13462:10data13335:5,19 13336:6deeper 13403:13depth 13406:1113405:8,15 13416:1513462:1713338:19 13340:1513457:8depty 13338:1713416:18,2013476:17 13482:1313342:2 13343:14defend 13374:6derived 13392:513442:15,16disarmament 1342813344:5,5,8 13366:4defend 13374:6derived 13392:513442:15,16disarmament 1342813345:7:0 13359:14degree 13342:1513339:11 1360:1213450:9,12 13462:12disarming 13471:2413362:8 13366:2513442:1513375:213384:17 13385:1,113448:2 13486:21disarming 13471:2413365:20 13365:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,19disciplines 13400:0113365:20 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,19discovered 13447:111330:5,20 13359:1913355:9,17 13356:413452:8 13507:1713489:22discovered 13447:111340:12 1349:12delivert 13481:2113428:24dictate 13378:8discovered 13447:141340:13 1341:6:1513489:1213385:4 13406:2113477:21 13378:24discovered 13447:141340:14:14:18 13408:813481:1113516:313422:1213437:313489:22discretion 13514:141340:14:14:18 13		decisions 13335:8	13495:11 13498:18	13374:11	Dirk 13446:15
dayshift 13448:16 day-to-day 13426:2dedicated 13343:9 13345:713333:16 13334:22 depth 13405:213359:7 13371:10,15 13375:12disarm 13416:16 13425:2 13462:10day-to-day 13426:2 dag 1332:15,19 13336:613345:7 deeper 13403:13 deeper 13403:1313445:12 depth 13406:11 depths 13406:1113378:19,22,24 13441:21 13461:15disarm 13416:16 13465:1 13446:1513338:19 13340:15 13340:19,24 13341:3 13340:19,24 13341:4deepy 13406:11 defend 13374:6 defend 13374:6depths 13406:11 derved 13392:513412:14 1342:14 13422:14 13424:1413490:6 13496:18 disarmament 13428 13447:24 13449:2213354:8 13356:13 13355:21 13365:24 13366:25defend 13375:2 degree 13392:14 delayed 13413:2 degrees 13392:1413381:10 13385:2513422:12 13486:21 disarming 1344:20disarming 13471:24 disarming 13471:2413365:23 13366:25 13366:2513442:12 13519:15 13442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,19 13386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,19 13462:16 13483:15discomfort 13488:14 discomfort 13488:14 discovered 13449:1913305:20 13385:25 13404:14,18 13408:81641121 13435:2413466:21 13355:9,17 13356:413496:21 13428:2,13 13437:313489:22 13377:21 13378:24 discrepances 13516 discrepances 13516:13404:14,18 13408:8 13441:1816410er 13465:12 deliberate 13435:2413406:21 13436:12 deliberate 13435:2413406:21 13426:21,3191430:11 discuss 13381:1013404:14,18 13408:8 13447:22 13448:11 delivery 13359:2313447:413406:21 13426:21,319330:2513426:2,3,191330:12 13430:2113404:14,18 13408:8 13447:22 1344	13454:24 13466:22			dialogue 13344:2	13473:23
day-to-day13426:213345:7dept13405:213371:1713375:1213425:213462:1013335:15,191336:6deeper13435:25deeper13435:25depth13462:1713378:19,22,2413463:113470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713471:113490:613470:5,713471:113490:613470:5,713471:213470:5,713471:213470:5,713471:213470:5,713471:213470:5,713471:213470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:5,713470:113470:5,713471:213470:613470:5,713470:113470:5,713470:113470:5,713470:113470:5,713470:113470:113490:613470:5,713471:113490:613470:5,713471:113490:613470:113480:113490:613470:113480:113480:113480:113480:213483:113480:213483:113480:213483:113480:213480:213480:213480:213452:813471:113452:813471:113452:913462:113480	13510:21	declaring 13431:14	deposed 13328:22	13358:8,10,12	dirt 13398:6
deal13327:11deemed13435:2513441:2113462:1713378:19,22,2413463:113463:113464:1813335:15,1913336:613457:8depths13406:1113405:8,1513416:1513470:5,713470:5,713471:213340:19,2413341:3deeply13406:1113441:113422:1413424:1413490:613470:5,713476:1713482:1313342:213343:14defend13374:6derived13392:513442:15,1613470:5,713476:1713482:1313353:14defensive13368:20describe13332:3,1213447:2413449:2213483:113354:813356:13definitely13460:1113339:1113450:9,1213462:12disarming13471:2413355:2013363:1913375:213384:1713385:1,113486:2113490:11diserplines13490:1113365:2313366:2513442:1213371:1613377:313486:2113490:11diserplines13490:1013365:2313366:2513442:1213389:2313407:5,10dictate13378:8discomfort13488:1413376:1513399:1913355:9,1713365:413407:12,181347:313489:22discrepance13471:1113404:14,1813488:14deliberat13437:113452:813507:1713477:2113378:24discrepance13491:1413404:14,1813418:24deliberat13437:11356:313422:1213404:1313415:14discre	dayshift 13448:16	dedicated 13343:9	13333:16 13334:22	13359:7 13371:10,15	disarm 13416:16
deal13327:11deemed13435:2513441:2113462:1713378:19,22,2413463:113463:113464:1813335:15,1913336:613457:8depts13406:1113405:8,1513416:1513470:5,713476:1713472:113340:19,2413341:3deepty13406:1113441:113422:1413424:1413490:613476:1713482:1213344:5,5,813344:5,5,813346:4defend13374:6derived13392:513442:15,1613476:1713482:1213357:2013359:14definitely13460:1113330:1213457:8describe13322:3,1213447:2413449:2213483:113362:813363:4,813363:1913375:213371:1613372:313462:1613482:12disarmanent13490:1113365:2313366:2513442:1213371:1613372:313462:1613486:2113490:11discriptines13402:1013365:2313366:2513442:1213389:2313407:5,10dictate13378:8discomfort13488:1413376:1513392:14dagrees13342:213407:12,1813489:22discomfort13488:1413396:4,513385:9,1713356:413407:12,1813477:2113378:24discrepance13516:113396:4,513399:1913355:9,1713355:413406:2113421:1213490:13discrepance13516:113404:14,1813448:24deliberate13437:113516:313422:1413404:13131		13345:7	depth 13405:2	13371:17 13375:12	13425:2 13462:10
13335:15,1913336:6deeper13403:13depths13406:1113405:8,1513416:1513470:5,713471:21338:1913340:19,2413341:313457:8deputy13338:1713416:18,2013476:1713490:613496:1813342:213343:14defend13374:6deenive13392:513424:15,16disarmament1342813354:813356:13definitely13460:11disarming13471:2413490:613490:1213354:813356:13definitely13460:11disarming13471:2413483:113355:2013359:14degree13327:2013359:1113365:1913365:31913371:1613372:313462:1613483:1513490:1113365:2313366:2513442:1213377:1213386:3,413389:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:9disciplines13430:2013365:2013442:1213492:1413389:2313407:12,1813489:21discoplines13430:2013365:4,13399:4,17delayed13413:213467:12,1813421:2discoplines13452:913396:4,513399:1913355:9,1713355:9,1713428:2,1313489:22discrepance13516:113404:14,1813418:14deliberate13435:2413406:11discretion13514:1413404:14,181348:8deliberate13435:2413406:2113426:2,3,1913436:2013439:1613439:221348:8deliberate13436:4213436:2113436:20134		deemed 13435:25	13441:21 13462:17	13378:19,22,24	
13338:19 13340:1513457:8deputy 13338:1713416:18,2013476:17 13482:1313340:19,24 13341:3deeply 13406:1113441:113422:14 13424:1413490:6 13496:1813342:2 13343:14defend 13374:6defend 13374:6derived 13392:513424:15,1613428:1413344:5,5,8 13346:4defensive 13368:20defensive 13368:20describe 13332:3,1213447:24 13449:2213483:113357:20 13359:14degree 13342:1513371:16 13372:313462:16 13483:1513490:1113365:23 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:913365:23 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513389:23 13407:5,10dicate 13378:8discomfort 13488:1413376:15 13379:4,17delaget 13413:213428:2,13 13437:313489:22discomfort 13488:1413396:4,5 13399:1913355:9,17 13356:413452:8 13507:1713489:22discrepance 13447:1113416:18,1418:13418:24deliberate 13435:24delescribed 13384:2413404:13 13415:14discrepance 1329:1329:131349:22 13440:2,3deliberate 13435:24deliberate 13435:24discrepance 13392:16discrepance 13392:1613422:13 13437:313481:11deliberate 13435:24described 13384:2413404:13 13415:14discrepance 13329:1613422:13 13437:21 13378:24deliberate 13435:24describen 13384:2413404:13 13415:14discresa 13381:1013439:22 13440:2,3delivered 13406:18describing 13390:2513430:2 13433:313436:20 13462:1,1613439:22 13440:2,3delivered 13406:18de	13335:15,19 13336:6		depths 13406:11	13405:8,15 13416:15	13470:5,7 13471:22
13340:19,24 13341:3 13342:2 13343:14 13342:2 13343:14 13342:5,8 13346:4 13344:5,5,8 13346:4 13354:8 13356:13 13357:20 13359:14deeply 13406:11 defensive 13368:20 definitely 13460:11 degree 13342:1513441:1 13490:6 13496:1213422:14 13424:14 13424:15,16 13447:24 13449:22 13447:24 13449:22 13450:9,12 13462:12 13462:16 13483:1513490:6 13496:18 disarmament 13428 13483:113362:8 13363:4,8 13365:23 13366:25 13366:2513442:12 13519:15 13442:12 13519:1513371:16 13372:3 13384:17 13385:1,113462:16 13483:15 13462:16 13483:1513490:11 disciplines 1340:20 13386:3,4 13389:8,19 13389:23 13407:5,1013365:23 1366:25 13366:2513442:12 13519:15 degrees 13392:14 delayed 13413:213386:3,4 13389:8,19 13389:23 13407:5,10 13386:3,4 13389:23 13407:5,10 dictate 13378:8 discovered 13447:11 discovered 13446:9discovered 13480:9 discovered 13447:11 discrepances 13516 discrepances 13516 discrepances 13516 13428:2,13 13437:313404:14,18 13408:8 13411:413404:13 1344:20 13436:4,21 13437:1 13415:4413406:21 13385:4 13406:21 13385:4 13406:21 13422:114 13423:25discrepancy 1329:13 discrepance 13321:10 13439:16 discuss 13381:1013439:22 13440:2,3 13439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:11delivered 13406:18 delivered 13406:18 delivered 13406:18 delivered 13406:18 delivery 13359:23describing 13390:25 13447:413430:2 13433:3 13435:2,3 13436:22					13476:17 13482:13
13342:2 13343:14 13344:5,5,8 13346:4defend 13374:6 defensive 13368:20 definitely 13460:11 defensive 13368:20 definitely 13460:11 dagree 13342:15derived 13392:5 describe 1332:3,1213424:15,16 13447:24 13449:22 13450:9,12 13462:12 13450:9,12 13462:12 disarming 13471:24disarmament 13428 13483:113357:20 13359:14 13362:8 13363:4,8definitely 13460:11 degree 13342:15degree 13342:15 13363:19 13375:213371:16 13372:3 13386:3,4 13389:8,1913462:16 13483:15 13484:2 13486:21disarming 13471:24 disarming 13471:2413365:23 13366:25 13366:2513442:12 13519:15 degrees 13392:14 delayed 13413:213386:3,4 13389:8,19 13389:23 13407:5,1013484:2 13486:21 discupt 13480:9discomfort 13488:14 discovered 13447:11 discovered 13447:11 discovered 13442:2013360:5,20 13385:25 13396:4,5 13399:19delegation 13344:20 13355:9,17 13356:413428:2,13 13437:3 13428:2,13 13437:313489:22 discrepances 13516 discrepances 13516 discrepances 13516:3dictate 13378:8 discrepances 13516:3discrepances 13516 discrepances 13516:13377:21 13378:24 discrepances 13381:10 13436:4,21 13437:1discupt 13426:2,3,19 13430:1 discupt 13486:12 discupt 13486:12 discupt 13486:12discupt 13486:12 discupt 13430:2013439:22 13448:11 deliver 13486:12 discupt 13446:12described 13384:24 13500:1513426:2,3,19 13430:1 discupt 13430:12discupt 13426:2,1 discupt 13430:1213439:22 13448:11 deliver 13486:12 discupt 22 13448:11deliver 13486:12 discupt 13406:18 deliver 13430:2313430:20 13462:1 discupt 2313430:20 13462:1 discupt 2313447:22 13448:11 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>					
13344:5,5,8 13346:4 13354:8 13356:13 13357:20 13359:14defensive 13368:20 definitely 13460:11 degree 13342:15describe 13332:3,12 1339:11 13360:1213447:24 13449:22 13450:9,12 13462:1213483:1 disarming 13471:2413357:20 13359:14 13362:8 13363:4,8 13365:23 13366:25degree 13342:15 13442:12 13519:1513371:16 13372:3 13386:3,4 13389:8,1913462:16 13483:15 13484:2 13486:21disarming 13471:24 disarming 13471:2413365:23 13366:25 13442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,19 13366:3,4 13389:23 13407:5,1013484:2 13486:21 discate 13378:8disciplines 13430:20 discored 13447:11 discored 13480:913380:5,20 13385:25 13396:4,5 13399:19degrees 13392:14 13355:9,17 13356:413428:2,13 13437:3 13428:2,13 13437:3dictate 13480:9 13452:8 13507:17discoregancy 1329:14 discrepancy 1329:1113404:14,18 13408:8 13441:18 13418:2413481:11 deliberate 13435:24 13436:4,21 13437:113385:4 13406:21 13385:4 13406:2113421:14 13423:25 13421:14 13423:2513439:16 discussed 13427:16 discussed 13427:16 discussed 13427:1613439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:11delivery 13359:2313447:413430:2 13433:3 13435:2,3 13436:2213436:20 13462:1,121	-				
13354:8 13356:13 13357:20 13359:14 13362:28 13363:4,8definitely 13460:11 degree 13342:1513339:11 13360:12 13363:19 13375:213450:9,12 13462:12 13371:16 13372:3disarming 13471:24 13462:16 13483:1513365:23 13366:25 13365:23 13366:2513442:12 13519:15 13442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,19 13386:3,4 13389:8,1913484:2 13486:21 13389:23 13407:5,10disciplines 13430:20 13489:2213365:23 13366:25 13365:24degrees 13392:14 delayed 13413:213389:23 13407:5,10 13389:23 13407:12,18 13421:2dictate 13378:8 dictate 13378:8discomfort 13488:14 discovered 13447:11 discovered 13447:1113380:5,20 13385:25 13396:4,5 13399:19delegation 13344:20 13355:9,17 13356:413428:2,13 13437:3 13452:8 13507:17 13452:8 13507:17discrepancies 13516 discrepancy 13329:1013404:14,18 13408:8 134411:8 13418:24 13422:1 13431:6,24deliberate 13435:24 13436:4,21 13437:1described 13384:24 13385:4 13406:21 13385:4 13406:21 13422:1 13430:1discusse 13381:10 13426:2,3,19 13430:1 13430:2 13433:3 13436:20 13462:1, 13430:20 13462:1, 13430:22 13433:3discussed 13427:16 13430:22				-	
13357:20 13359:14 13362:8 13363:4,8 13362:23 13366:25degree 13342:15 13363:19 13375:213371:16 13372:3 13384:17 13385:1,1 13386:3,4 13389:8,19 13368:14 13369:2013462:16 13483:15 13484:2 13486:21 13484:2 13486:21 13519:13,14,1913490:11 disciplines 13430:20 13453:913368:14 13369:20 13368:14 13369:2013442:12 13519:15 degrees 13392:14 delayed 13413:213386:3,4 13389:8,19 13407:12,18 13421:2 13407:12,18 13421:213519:13,14,19 dictate 13378:8 dictate 13378:8discomfort 13488:14 discoper 13447:11 discoper 13486:12 13432:2 13438:813404:14,18 13408:8 1342:2 13438:8 1342:2 13438:8 13439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:1113371:16 13372:3 13462:2 13422:213462:16 13483:15 13484:21 13386:3,4 13389:8,19 13386:3,4 13389:8,19 13487:313462:16 13483:15 13484:21 13386:3,4 13389:8,19 dictate 13378:8 discrepancies 13516 discrepancy 1329:113404:14,18 13408:8 13421:14,18 13408:8 13431:6,2413481:11 deliver 13486:12 deliver 13486:12 deliver 13486:12 deliver 13406:18 deliver 13406:18 deliver 13359:2313371:16 13372:3 13447:413462:2,3,19 13430:1 13430:2 13433:3 13436:2213430:2 13433:3 13436:22					
13362:8 13363:4,813363:19 13375:213384:17 13385:1,113484:2 13486:21disciplines 13430:2013365:23 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:913368:14 13369:20degrees 13392:1413389:23 13407:5,10dictate 13378:8discomfort 13488:1413376:15 13379:4,17delayed 13413:213407:12,18 13421:2dictate 13480:9discomfort 13488:1413396:4,5 13399:1913355:9,17 13356:413428:2,13 13437:313489:22discrepancies 1351613404:14,18 13408:813481:1113516:313452:8 13507:17discrepancy 1329:1discrepancy 1329:113424:13 13431:6,2413481:1113516:313385:4 13406:2113404:13 13415:14discuss 13381:1013432:2 13438:813436:4,21 13437:113385:4 13406:2113426:2,3,19 13430:1discussed 13427:1613439:22 13440:2,3delivered 13406:18describing 13390:2513430:2 13433:313436:20 13462:1,13447:22 13448:11delivery 13359:2313447:413435:2,3 13436:2213468:2 13471:21					
13365:23 13366:2513442:12 13519:1513386:3,4 13389:8,1913519:13,14,1913453:913365:20degrees 13392:1413389:23 13407:5,10dictate 13378:8discomfort 13488:1413376:15 13379:4,17delayed 13413:213407:12,18 13421:2dictate 13480:9discovered 13447:1113380:5,20 13385:2513355:9,17 13356:413428:2,13 13437:313489:22discrepancies 1351613404:14,18 13408:813481:1113452:8 13507:1713377:21 13378:24discrepancy 1329:113404:14,18 13408:813481:1113516:313377:21 13378:24discrepancy 13329:113422:13 13431:6,2413436:4,21 13437:1deliberate 13435:2413385:4 13406:2113421:14 13423:2513432:2 13438:8deliver 13486:1213500:1513426:2,3,19 13430:1discussed 13427:1613439:22 13440:2,3delivered 13406:18describing 13390:2513430:2 13433:313436:20 13462:1,13447:22 13448:11delivery 13359:2313447:413435:2,3 13436:2213468:2 13471:21		8			
13368:14 13369:20 13376:15 13379:4,17 13380:5,20 13385:25degrees 13392:14 delayed 13413:2 delegation 13344:20 13355:9,17 13356:413389:23 13407:5,10 13404:14,18 13408:8 13404:14,18 13408:8discomfort 13488:14 discovered 13447:11 13481:1113404:14,18 13408:8 13411:8 13418:24 13422:13 13437:213355:9,17 13356:4 13481:1113428:2,13 13437:3 13452:8 13507:17 13516:313489:22 didn't 13352:2discomfort 13488:14 discovered 13447:11 discrepancies 13516 discrepancy 13329:1613404:14,18 13408:8 13424:13 13431:6,24 13422:13438:8 13432:2 13438:8 13439:22 13440:2,3 13439:22 13440:2,313385:4 13406:21 13406:18 deliverd 13406:18 delivery 13359:2313390:25 13447:413430:2 13433:3 13435:2,3 13436:22discussed 13427:16 13436:22			-		
13376:15 13379:4,17 13380:5,20 13385:25 13396:4,5 13399:19delayed 13413:2 delegation 13344:20 13355:9,17 13356:413407:12,18 13421:2 13428:2,13 13437:3 13452:8 13507:17 13452:8 13507:17 13516:3dictated 13480:9 13489:22 didn't 13352:2 didn't 13352:2discovered 13447:11 discrepancies 13516 discrepancy 13329:113404:14,18 13408:8 13404:14,18 13408:813481:11 deliberate 13435:24 13424:13 13431:6,24 13424:13 13431:6,2413436:4,21 13437:1 13436:4,21 13437:1 13436:4,21 13437:1 deliver 13486:12 13439:22 13440:2,3 13439:22 13440:2,3discrepancy 1329:1 discrepancy 1329:1 discrepancy 13388:4 13385:4 13406:21 13500:15discrepancy 1329:1 discrepancy 13399:1913439:22 13440:2,3 13439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:11deliver 13486:12 delivery 13359:2313407:12,18 13421:2 13407:12,18 13427:16 13385:4 13406:21 13390:25 13430:2 13433:3 13435:2,3 13436:22discussed 13447:11 discussed 13427:16 13436:20 13462:1, 13468:2 13471:21					
13380:5,2013385:25delegation13344:2013428:2,1313437:313489:22discrepancies1351613396:4,513399:1913355:9,1713356:413452:813507:1713452:2didn't13352:2discrepancy13329:113404:14,1813408:813481:1113516:313516:313377:2113378:24discrepancy13329:113424:1313436:4,2113435:24described13384:2413404:1313415:14discrepancy13381:1013422:13438:813436:4,2113436:1213500:1513426:2,3,1913430:113439:1613439:2213440:2,3delivered13406:18describing13390:2513430:213436:201346:2113447:2213448:11delivery13359:2313447:413435:2,313436:2213468:213468:2					
13396:4,5 13399:1913355:9,17 13356:413452:8 13507:17didn't 13352:2discrepancy 13329:113404:14,18 13408:813481:1113516:31347:1213516:3discrepancy 13329:113411:8 13418:24deliberate 13435:24described 13384:2413404:13 13415:14discrepancy 13329:113424:13 13431:6,2413436:4,21 13437:113385:4 13406:2113404:13 13415:14discuss 13381:1013432:2 13438:8deliver 13486:1213500:1513426:2,3,19 13430:113439:1613439:22 13440:2,3delivered 13406:18describing 13390:2513430:2 13433:313436:20 13462:1,13447:22 13448:11delivery 13359:2313447:413435:2,3 13436:2213468:2 13471:21	-				
13404:14,18 13408:813481:1113516:313377:21 13378:24discretion 13514:1413411:8 13418:24deliberate 13435:24described 13384:2413404:13 13415:14discuss 13381:1013424:13 13431:6,2413436:4,21 13437:113385:4 13406:2113421:14 13423:2513439:1613432:2 13438:8deliver 13486:1213500:1513426:2,3,19 13430:1discussed 13427:1613439:22 13440:2,3delivered 13406:18describing 13390:2513430:2 13433:313436:20 13462:1,13447:22 13448:11delivery 13359:2313447:413435:2,3 13436:2213468:2 13471:21					
13411:8 13418:24 13424:13 13431:6,24deliberate 13435:24 13436:4,21 13437:1described 13384:24 13436:4,21 13437:113404:13 13415:14 13385:4 13406:21 13406:15discuss 13381:10 13421:14 13423:2513432:2 13438:8 13439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:1113436:4,21 13437:1 deliver 13486:1213385:4 13406:21 13500:1513421:14 13423:25 13426:2,3,19 13430:1 13426:2,3,19 13430:113439:16 discuss 13427:1613439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:11deliver 13486:12 deliver 13359:2313407:413404:23 13415:14 13500:1513426:2,3,19 13430:1 13430:2 13433:313436:20 13462:1, 13436:22 13468:2 13471:21					
13424:1313436:4,2113437:113385:413406:2113421:1413423:2513439:1613432:213438:8deliver13486:1213500:1513426:2,3,1913430:1discussed13427:1613439:2213440:2,3delivered13406:18describing13390:2513430:213433:313436:2013426:2,1,13436:2213447:2213448:11delivery13359:2313447:413435:2,313436:2213468:213471:21	(3) L95-				
13432:2 13438:8 13439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:11deliver 13486:12 delivered 13406:18 delivery 13359:2313500:15 describing 13390:25 13447:413426:2,3,19 13430:1 13426:2,3,19 13430:1 discussed 13427:16 13430:2 13433:3 13436:20 13462:1, 13436:22 13468:2 13471:21	11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				
13439:22 13440:2,3 13447:22 13448:11delivered 13406:18 delivery 13359:23describing 13390:25 13447:413430:2 13433:3 13435:2,3 13436:20 13462:1, 13435:2,3 13436:22		2			
13447:22 13448:11 delivery 13359:23 13447:4 13435:2,3 13436:22 13468:2 13471:21					
a marter has a first a first and the first					
13401:24 13403:3.20 13500:7 16escription 13339:7 13442:12.22 discussing 13357:19.	a martin beauting he				
ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE			aescription 13339:7	13442:12,22	aiscussing 13357:19,20

RealTime Transcriptions

13423:19 13492:21 documents 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13327:12 13334:3 13340:11 elevated 1346:20 13466:15 1347:21 13352:12 13332:21 13332:20 13334:3 13340:11 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13332:20 13338:4.4 disorganised 1346:29 13491:9 13453:25 13440:12 13440:20 embraced 13358:2 1346:23 13490:11 13425:20,20 embraced 13358:19 13468:7 1346:12 13357:7 13393:10 13422:2 13393:14 early 13339:18 13475:18 13492:2 disorientate 13375:7 13398:10 13424:31 13449:18 13499:18 13475:18 13492:2 13490:12 13442:41 13449:14 13397:17 13399:10 13466:20 13375:17 13495:18	,7 enter 13422:14 entered 13410:3 enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 1 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 1346:3 13415:18 13425:16 13467:18 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
discussion 13465:913327:12 13328:1813334:3 13340:11elevation 13332:1513466:15 13472:1913331:22 13332:4,513341:13 13349:613332:20 13385:11347:413375:21 13386:1213351:11 31339:191332:20 13385:113467:21dog 13453:25 13491:613392:16 13402:20embrace 13369:11discussions 13461:9,1713396:19 13513:2013365:5 13392:17,25embrace 13369:1113467:21dog 13453:2513440:12 13443:4embrace 13369:11disorganised 13462:913491:1513467:4 13472:813491:1513442:23 13464:1413491:1513467:4 13472:813491:1813467:2413491:1513467:24 13499:1813362:23 13377:2413500:22 13503:19disorientate 13375:713382:22 13393:14early 13336:2313479:18 13492:1disorientate 13375:713491:18 13492:113397:11,16,2513468:22dispersal 13469:2113442:4 13443:22,2413397:11,16,2513468:2413470:23 13473:4,813449:18 13490:113337:1713467:12 13518:25employ 1336:1413467:24 13498:2313387:6 13390:2513409:16 13466:20earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:13499:413390:2513485:1713385:10,24 13386:613369:13 13373:13499:413390:2113463:13,1713386:13,1713386:13,1713386:13,1713499:413463:13,1713386:13,1713386:13,1713386:13,1813374:2313492:1213491:1913495:1513446:12,131346:2413492:1213480:1213480:15<	19 entails 13343:25 ,7 enter 13422:14 entered 13410:3 enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 1 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 1346:3,10 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
discussion 13465:913327:12 13328:1813334:3 13340:11elevation 13332:1513466:15 13472:1913331:22 13332:4,513341:13 13349:613332:20 13385:11347:2413375:21 13386:1213351:11 13379:1913388:4,4discussions 13461:9,1713396:19 13513:2013365:5 13392:17,25elevations 13385:113467:21dog 13453:25 13491:613393:16 13402:20embrace 13369:11disorganised 13462:913491:9,2113425:20,20embraced 13369:1213464:24 13467:2413491:1513467:4 13472:813431:9 13468:713472:4,8 13490:11doing 13353:6 13362:213479:4 13499:1813491:81349:813362:23 13377:2413500:22 13503:19emotional 13469:2disorientate 13375:713382:22 13393:14early 13337:20 13394:1013468:22disorientate 13375:713491:18 13402:113467:21 13451:113468:213470:2 13473:413336:13334:513579:1213468:213470:2 13473:413337:18 13375:17earn 13391:11 13467:12 13518:25employ 1336:1413499:413390:2513409:16 13466:0133371:18 13375:17earn 13391:1213499:413499:2313387:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:13499:413463:13,1713465:17 13478:313369:13 13373:13499:413463:13,1713386:9,17 13388:1713369:13 13373:13499:213491:1913396:13 13373:13492:1213491:1913463:13,1713461:12,1313462:2413499:1913496:1413492:1213486:	19 entails 13343:25 ,7 enter 13422:14 entered 13410:3 enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 1 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 1346:3,10 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13466:151347:1913331:2213332:4,513341:1313349:613332:2013335:213475:413375:2113386:1213352:1113365:513392:17,25elevations13388:4,4discussions13462:913491:9,2113425:20,20embrace13369:1113458:2513446:2113491:9,2113425:20,20embrace13469:11disorganised13461:414341:2513461:413491:1513467:413472:813431:913468:713472:4,813490:11doing13353:613362:213479:413499:1813469:2disorientate13375:713382:2213377:2413500:2213304:10emotional13469:2disorientate13375:713382:2213392:1413397:1413491:813469:2disorientate13375:713382:1013424:413397:1413397:1413469:2disorientate13375:713492:113442:413443:22,2413397:1413469:213472:2513473:4813449:1813397:111613468:2213457:1813469:2113472:2513479:413337:1813375:17earnacked1336:24employ13436:1113376:12,2513379:413337:1813375:17earn13391:1513469:1213349:2413462:2,2113464:1613441:2013452:1713485:1013495:2513455:2513455:2513499:413391:1513411:1613466:1390:25earn13396:1213355:	,7 enter 13422:14 entered 13410:3 enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 1 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 1346:3 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13475:413375:21 13386:1213352:11 13359:1913388:4,4discussions 13461:9,1713396:19 13513:2013365:5 13392:17,25elevations 13385:513467:21dog 13453:25 13491:613393:16 13402:20embrace 13369:11disorganised 13462:913491:9,2113425:20,20embrace 13358:213462:23 13464:17dogs 13453:2513440:12 13443:4emergency 13430:213472:4,8 13490:11doing 13353:6 13362:213479:4 13479:813491:18disorientate 13375:513382:22 13393:14early 13336:2313475:18 13492:disorientate 13375:713389:10 13426:313379:20 13394:10emotional 13469:2dispersal 13469:2113442:4 13443:22,2413399:11 13377:11,6,25emphasis 13370:1713490:9 13500:8dom't 13332:1113409:16 13466:2013519:15disperse 13358:4,13don't 13332:1113467:12 13518:25employ 13436:1113376:12,25 13379:4133376:13334:513519:213499:1313369:13 13373:13499:413391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013379:12 13415:13499:413463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:6713335:13335:6 13394:2513499:413463:13,1713390:6 13396:6313353:6 13434:113492:1213491:1913369:13 13373:13492:1213483:19 13485:1313386:17en 13488:1713492:1213467:2113490:213460:2413492:1213467:1213492:1413369:1213492:1213467:1213492:1213492:1313492:1213462:7 <t< td=""><td>entered 13410:3 enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 1342:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13468:11 13472:5,16</td></t<>	entered 13410:3 enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 1342:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13468:11 13472:5,16
discussions13461:9,1713396:1913313:2013365:513392:17,25elevations13385:513467:21dog13453:2513491:613393:1613425:20,20embrace13365:113462:2313464:2413462:2413491:9,2113425:20,20embraced13358:213462:2313464:2413491:1513467:413472:813431:913436:713472:4,813490:11doing13353:613362:213379:413499:1813431:913431:913496:1813395:513382:2213393:14early13365:313475:1813475:1813475:1813475:1813475:18disorientated13375:713398:1013426:313379:2013394:10emotional13469:2disorientated13375:713398:1013426:313379:2013394:10emotions13358:16dispersal13469:2113442:413442:413492:5emphasis13370:1713490:1613465:20emphasis13370:171340:0913500:8dom't13332:1013467:1213369:1313365:1313365:1213495:2413373:1813373:1813373:1813373:1813373:1813373:1913492:1213462:413373:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213369:1213462:2113462:2113462:2113462:2213492	enters 13374:4 entire 13448:13 13501:5 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 1342:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisal 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13467:21dog 13453:25 13491:613393:16 13402:20embrace 13369:11disorganised 13462:913491:9,2113425:20,20embrace 13358:213462:23 13464:17dogs 13453:2513440:12 13443:4emgrace 13369:1113464:24 13467:2413491:1513467:4 13472:813491:1513472:4,8 13490:11doing 13353:6 13362:213479:4 13479:1813491:1913496:18 13499:1813362:23 13377:2413500:22 13503:19emotional 13469:2disorientate 13375:713398:10 13426:313379:20 13394:1013475:18 13492:disorientate 13375:713398:10 13426:313397:11,16,25emotional 13469:213472:25 13473:4,813449:18 13490:113397:11,16,25employ 1350:16dispersal 13469:2113449:18 13490:113397:11,16,25employ 13436:1113376:12,25 13379:413333:6 13334:513519:2employ 13436:1113376:12,25 13379:413337:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213463:13,1713462:8,21 13464:1613441:20 13462:4213353:51 13385:6,713435:25 13438:113499:413463:13,1713386:9,17 13386:1713449:1913492:1213483:19 13485:1313386:9,17 13386:17employ 13436:1113492:1213483:19 13485:1313366:13390:25earn 13391:1213353:6 13342:113492:1213463:13,1713386:9,17 13386:17employ 13436:24employ 13436:24dispersing 13376:18draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413452:5 13438:1613492:1213480:713440:10 13409:413452:13 13470:25134	entire 13448:13 1 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 1 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 1342:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3
disorganised 13462:913491:9,2113425:20,20embraced 13358:2:13462:23 13464:17dogs 13453:2513440:12 13443:4emergency 13430:213464:24 13467:2413491:1513467:4 13472:813431:9 13468:713472:48, 13490:11doing 13535:6 13362:213377:2413500:22 13503:19emotional 13469:2disorientate 13375:513382:22 13393:14early 13336:2313475:18 13492:13491:8disorientate 13375:713382:10 13426:313379:20 13394:10emotional 13469:213468:2dispersal 13469:2113442:4 13443:22,2413397:11,16,2513468:2emplosis 13370:1713490:9 13500:8dominated 13392:2513409:16 13466:2013519:1513468:2disperse 13358:4,13don't 13322:1113467:12 13518:25emplogy 13436:1113475:12,25 13379:413337:6 13390:25earm 13391:1213452:13 13373:13490:413441:20 13462:4,2213353:15 13385:6,713435:25 13438:113499:413441:20 13462:4,2213353:15 13385:6,713435:25 13438:113492:1213483:19 1348:1313386:9,17 13388:1713435:25 13438:413492:1213480:713449:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 1334:213492:1213480:713449:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 1334:213492:1213480:713449:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 1334:213492:1213480:713446:13 441:20 13462:213460:25 13461:13492:1213480:713446:19 13432:113462:213462:7 13465:4drafti 13431:1 1	13501:5 entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13468:11 13472:5,16
13462:2313464:17dogs13453:2513440:1213443:4emergency1340:213472:4,813490:1113491:1513467:413472:813431:913469:2113475:1813492:1213491:813492:1213442:413442:413442:213391:1613462:20emotional13492:24employ 13436:111359:15employ1359:151359:151359:151359:1213495:2413455:1713495:2413455:1713495:2413455:1713495:2413455:1713495:2413359:1213495:1213495:1213455:1713495:1213455:1713495:1213455:1713495:1213455:1713455:1713485:1213485:1213455:1713485:1213466:22employ 13436:1213456:22employ 13436:1213456:2513455:1313359:1313455:1313359:1313455:1313455:1713455:1713455:1713455:1713455:1713455:17 </td <td>I entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 5 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 49:5 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16</td>	I entirely 13466:16 entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 5 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 49:5 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13464:24 13467:2413491:1513467:4 13472:813431:9 13468:713472:4,8 13490:11doing 13353:6 13362:213479:4 13499:1813491:813496:18 13499:1813362:22 13377:2413500:22 13503:19emotional 13469:2disorientate 13375:713382:22 13393:14early 13336:2313375:7dispersal 13469:2113442:4 13443:22,2413394:1013397:20 13394:1013490:9 13500:8dominated 13392:2513409:16 13466:20emotions 13358:10disperse 13358:4,13don't 13332:1113467:12 13518:2513499:16 13466:2013470:2 1377:413337:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213495:2413467:24 13498:2313387:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:13499:413391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013379:12 13415:13499:413491:1913386:10,24 13386:4employed 13343:1413488:13,1713385:10,24 13386:6,713452:13390:6213369:13 13373:13492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13348:1913492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 1334:1dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:513440:2213470:2,15 13471:1313480:713441:12,13enicrele 13406:2213470:2,15 13471:1313480:713495:1913495:1913496:1313492:1213491:1913396:61 13396:2313466:2413492:1213491:1913396:61 13396:2313466:201346:27 13465:4drawn 1335:1413455:17 13478:313460:2213492:15	entrapped 13431:4 enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13472:4,8 13490:11 13496:18 13499:1813491:813491:813496:18 13499:1813362:23 13377:2413500:22 13503:19emotional 13469:2disorientate 13375:713382:22 13393:14early 13336:2313475:18 13492:dispersal 13469:2113342:43 1342:2,2413394:14 13395:813468:2213472:25 13473:4,813449:18 13490:113397:11,16,25emphasis 13370:1713490:9 13500:8dominated 13392:2513409:16 13466:2013519:15disperse 13358:4,13don't 13332:1113467:12 13518:25employe1 3343:1413376:12,25 13379:413333:6 13334:513519:213468:2213462:8,21 13464:1613373:18 13375:17earm 13391:1213369:13 13373:13499:413391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013369:13 13373:13499:413461:13461:1313463:13,1713385:60,7113492:1213483:19 13485:1313380:61 3390:66,813346:2413492:1213491:1913390:61 3396:6,813348:19,24 13313492:1213480:713441:12,1313462:4dispersing 13376:18draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:513446:2413462:7 13465:4draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:513446:25 13461:1213462:7 13465:4draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413466:25 13461:1213462:7 13465:4drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:513460:25 134	enumerate 13342:18 environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13352:2 13355:23 13352:2 13362:25 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 19:5 envisage 13415:18 13472:516 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13496:18 13499:1813562:23 13377:2413500:22 13503:19emotional 13469:2disorientate 13375:513382:22 13393:1413379:20 13394:1013475:18 13492:dispersal 13469:2113442:4 13443:22,2413394:14 13395:813468:2213472:25 13473:4,813449:18 13490:113397:11,16,2513468:20disperse 13358:4,13dom't 13332:1113409:16 13466:2013519:15disperse 13358:4,13don't 13332:1113467:12 13518:25employ 13436:1113376:12,25 13379:413333:6 13334:513519:2earm arked 13336:2413462:8,21 13464:1613373:18 13375:17earm arked 13336:24employed 13343:1413467:24 13498:2313391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013379:12 13415:13470:2 13473:1013463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:6,713452:5 13438:113492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 1334:113492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:113462:7 13465:4draft 13335:2213410:8 13422:513486:24dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:13472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:13472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:1348:12,21drawin 1355:1413398:3 13428:1213460:25 13461:151348:12,21drawin 13355:14drawin 13352:1413450:21 13406:1613495:24,25drive	environment 13337:10 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
disorientate 13375:5 disorientated 13375:7 dispersal 13469:2113382:22 13393:14 13398:10 13426:3 13449:18 13490:1early 13336:23 13379:20 13394:10 13399:14 13395:813475:18 13492: emotions 13358:16 13468:2213472:25 13473:4,8 13490:9 13500:8 disperse 13358:4,13 disperse 13358:4,13 13462:8,21 13464:16 13462:8,21 13464:16 13467:24 13498:23 13467:24 13498:23 13499:413373:18 13375:17 13376:13390:25 13376:13390:25 13467:12 13473:1013467:12 13518:25 13463:13,17 13385:10,24 13385:6,7 13385:10,24 13386:4,17 13385:10,24 13386:4,17 13386:9,17 13388:17 13492:12 dispersen 13376:18 dispersen 13376:18 dispersing 13376:18 dispersing 13376:18 draft 13431:1 13513:17 drafted 13335:22 13401:10 13409:4 	 5 13352:2 13355:23 13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 49:5 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
disorientated13375:713398:1013426:313379:2013394:10emotions13358:16dispersal13469:2113442:413443:22,2413394:1413395:813468:22emphasis13370:1713490:913500:8dominated13392:2513409:1613466:2013519:15emphasis13370:1713490:913530:8don't13336:13334:513467:1213518:15emphasis13370:1713467:1213464:1613373:1813375:17earmarked13336:1313373:2013495:2413467:2413498:2313387:613390:25earn13391:1213369:1313379:1213495:2413499:413391:1513411:16Earth13332:1013379:1213495:2413379:1213495:2413499:413391:1513411:16Earth13332:1013379:1213495:2413379:1213495:2413490:213470:213443:13,1713385:10,2413356:6,713435:2513455:2513435:2513435:2513483:1913483:1913483:1913483:1913455:2513436:24empower13486:24empower13486:24empower13486:24empower13466:2413456:24emble13456:2413456:2413456:2413456:2413456:2413456:2413456:2513456:2513456:2513466:1613460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:2513460:25	13362:25 13363:1,4 13372:14 13375:9 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13415:6,15 13422:4 13415:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
dispersal 13469:2113442:4 13443:22,2413394:14 13395:813468:2213472:25 13473:4,813449:18 13490:113397:11,16,25emphasis 13370:1713490:9 13500:8dominated 13392:2513409:16 13466:2013519:15disperse 13358:4,13don't 13332:1113467:12 13518:25employ 13436:1113376:12,25 13379:413333:6 13334:513519:2employ 13436:1113462:8,21 13464:1613373:18 13375:17earmarked 13336:24employed 13343:1413467:24 13498:2313387:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:113499:413391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013379:12 13415:1dispersed 13464:1613441:20 13462:4,2213353:15 13385:6713435:25 13438:113490:213463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4empower 13438:1113492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1disperses 13376:21draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:5enable 13384:813471:2213480:713449:1913496:2313462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13466:2213484:12,14drawn 13355:1413396:2313461:18 13462:213484:12,21drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:1213400:6 13496:1713488:15,21 13493:6drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:12east 13395:13,1813495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:221	13372:14 13375:9 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13472:25 13473:4,8 13490:9 13500:813449:18 13490:1 dominated 13392:2513397:11,16,25 13409:16 13466:20 13467:12 13518:25emphasis 13370:17 13409:16 13466:20 13519:15disperse 13358:4,13 13376:12,25 13379:413333:6 13334:5 13333:6 13334:513467:12 13518:25 13467:12 13518:25employ 13436:11 13495:2413462:8,21 13464:16 13467:24 13498:23 13499:413377:18 13375:17 13387:6 13390:25 13391:15 13411:16earmarked 13336:24 earn 13391:12employed 13343:14 13369:13 13373:12dispersed 13464:16 13492:1213463:13,17 13463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4 13385:10,24 13386:4empower 13438:11 en 13348:19,24 133dispersed 13464:16 13492:1213483:19 13485:13 13463:13,1713386:9,17 13388:17 13492:12empower 13438:14 empower 13438:11 en 13348:19,24 133dispersing 13376:18 13471:22draft 13431:1 13513:17 draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:4 13401:10 13409:413486:24 enable 13384:8 13472:3dispersion 13428:5 13462:7 13465:4 13462:7 13465:4drafting 13513:4 drafting 13513:4 drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3 13495:19encircle 13406:22 13460:2113462:7 13465:4 13448:12,14drawing 13517:10 drawing 13517:10 13488:15,21 13493:6drawing 1355:14 drawing 1355:1413490:6 13496:12 13496:1313495:24,25 13488:15,21 13493:6drawing 1355:14 	22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13472:25 13473:4,8 13490:9 13500:813449:18 13490:1 dominated 13392:2513397:11,16,25 13409:16 13466:20 13467:12 13518:25emphasis 13370:17 13409:16 13466:20 13519:15disperse 13358:4,13 13376:12,25 13379:413333:6 13334:5 13333:6 13334:513467:12 13518:25 13467:12 13518:25employ 13436:11 13495:2413462:8,21 13464:16 13467:24 13498:23 13499:413377:18 13375:17 13387:6 13390:25 13391:15 13411:16earmarked 13336:24 earn 13391:12employed 13343:14 13369:13 13373:12dispersed 13464:16 13492:1213463:13,17 13463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4 13385:10,24 13386:4empower 13438:11 en 13348:19,24 133dispersed 13464:16 13492:1213483:19 13485:13 13463:13,1713386:9,17 13388:17 13492:12empower 13438:14 empower 13438:11 en 13348:19,24 133dispersing 13376:18 13471:22draft 13431:1 13513:17 draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:4 13401:10 13409:413486:24 enable 13384:8 13472:3dispersion 13428:5 13462:7 13465:4 13462:7 13465:4drafting 13513:4 drafting 13513:4 drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3 13495:19encircle 13406:22 13460:2113462:7 13465:4 13448:12,14drawing 13517:10 drawing 13517:10 13488:15,21 13493:6drawing 1355:14 	22 13376:22 13391:17 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13490:9 13500:8 disperse 13358:4,13 13376:12,25 13379:4dominated 13392:25 don't 13332:1113409:16 13466:20 13467:12 13518:25 employ 13436:11 13467:22 13518:25 employ 13436:11 13467:24 13498:23 13499:413333:6 13334:5 13375:17 13387:6 13390:25 13391:15 13411:1613467:12 13518:25 earmarked 13336:24 earn 13391:12Imploy 13436:11 13495:24dispersed 13464:16 13449:2113376:13390:25 13499:413387:6 13390:25 13391:15 13411:16earth 13332:1013379:12 13415: 13385:6,7dispersed 13464:16 13449:2113463:13,17 13463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4 13386:9,17 13386:4 13386:9,17 13388:17empower 13438:11 en 13348:19,24 133 13390:6 13390:6 13396:6,8disperses 13376:21 dispersing 13376:18 13471:22draft 13431:1 13513:17 13480:713401:10 13409:4 13440:2113486:24 enable 13384:8dispersing 13376:18 13471:22drafting 13513:4 drafting 13513:413452:17 13478:3 13495:19encircle 13406:22 13470:2,15 13471:1313462:7 13465:4 13462:7 13465:4 13477:2 13473:14drawn 13355:14 13479:19 13480:15 ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:4 13460:25 13461:413487:12,21 	 13415:6,15 13422:4 13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
disperse 13358:4,13 13376:12,25 13379:4don't 13332:1113467:12 13518:25 13333:6 13334:5employ 13436:11 13495:2413462:8,21 13464:16 13467:24 13498:23 13499:413373:18 13375:17 13387:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:1213499:4 dispersed 13464:16 13441:20 13462:4,2213353:15 13385:6,713379:12 13415:313470:2 13473:10 13488:2 13490:2 13492:1213463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4 13492:12empower 13438:11 empower 13438:1313492:12 dispersing 13376:18 13492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1 dispersing 13376:18 draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24 emable 13384:813471:22 13462:7 13465:4 13462:7 13465:4drafting 13513:4 draft 13334:2213441:12,13 13492:1613470:2,15 13471:13 dispersion 13428:5 drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3 13460:25 1346:413480:7 13480:7 13441:12,1313460:25 1346:4 13445:13encircle 13406:22 13460:25 1346:413480:7 13480:713480:7 13441:12,1313460:25 13461:4 13460:25 13461:413490:6,1399:6,1399:6,1399:6,1313460:25 13461:4 13460:713462:7 13465:4 13472:1 3473:14 13479:19 13480:15 13488:15,21 13493:613462:10 13495:1413481:12,14 13493:6 13488:15,21 13493:6drawing 13517:10 drawn 13355:1413488:15,21 13493:6 13493:6dressed 13449:6 13433:25 13445:16 encirclement 13400 13495:24,2513497:1613429:20 13471:613492:1213460:20 13461: 13429:20 13471:6	13431:12 13437:25 13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13468:11 13472:5,16
13376:12,2513379:413333:613334:513519:213495:2413462:8,2113464:1613373:1813375:17earmarked13336:24employed13343:1413467:2413498:2313387:613390:25earn13391:1213369:1313373:313499:413391:1513411:16Earth13332:1013379:1213435:2513379:12dispersed13464:1613441:2013462:4,2213353:1513385:6,713435:2513438:1113482:113490:213463:13,1713385:10,2413386:9,1713386:9,1713348:19,2413313492:1213491:1913390:613390:613396:6,813353:613434:1disperses13376:18drafted13335:2213410:813440:25enable13848:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:313472:3encircle13406:2213462:713465:4drafting13513:413455:1713472:3encircle13406:2213477:213477:12drawn13334:2213495:1913460:2513460:2513460:2513462:713465:4drawn13355:1413398:313428:1213460:2513460:2513460:251348:12,14drawn13555:1413398:313428:1213490:613490:613490:613490:613490:613495:24,25drive13398:2113409:313445:2313470:2213460:2013460:2013460:1513495:24,25drawn </td <td>13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13468:11 13472:5,16</td>	13438:1 13473:16 13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13468:11 13472:5,16
13462:8,21 13464:1613373:18 13375:17earmarked 13336:24employed 13343:1413467:24 13498:2313387:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:313499:413391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013379:12 13415:3dispersed 13464:1613441:20 13462:4,2213353:15 13385:6,713435:25 13438:313470:2 13473:1013463:13,1713386:9,17 13386:4empower 13438:1113488:2 13490:213483:19 13485:1313386:9,17 13388:17en 13348:19,24 13313492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1disperses 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:5enable 13384:8dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913460:25 13461:213477:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413487:12,21drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1213488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:1613460:20 13461:1513495:24,2513429:20 13471:613445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:1513497:1613429:20 13471:613445:23 13470:2213466:16,20 1346	13491:15 13492:11 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisage 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10
13467:24 13498:2313387:6 13390:25earn 13391:1213369:13 13373:13492:413391:15 13411:1613491:1913353:15 13385:6,713435:25 13438:1713488:2 13490:213483:19 13485:1313463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4empower 13438:1113492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13394:213353:6 13394:2disperses 13376:21draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:5enable 13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913460:25 13461:413472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413488:15,21 13493:6drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:1213490:6 13496:1713495:24,25drawn 13355:1413433:25 13445:1613445:23 13470:2213497:1613429:20 13471:613445:23 13470:2213466:16,20 13461:5	4 environments 13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13499:413391:15 13411:16Earth 13332:1013379:12 13415::dispersed 13464:1613441:20 13462:4,2213353:15 13385:6,713435:25 13438::13470:2 13473:1013463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4empower 13438:1113488:2 13490:213483:19 13485:1313386:9,17 13388:17en 13348:19,24 13313492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1disperses 13376:18draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:5enable 13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2313470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:41348:12,14drawing 13517:10easter 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1713488:15,21 13493:6drawn 13355:1413433:25 13445:16encircled 13461:1513495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:1513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 13461:15	13372:20,21 13420:9 13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
dispersed13464:1613441:2013462:4,2213353:1513385:6,713435:2513435:1313470:213463:13,1713463:13,1713385:10,2413386:9,1713348:19,2413313492:1213491:1913390:613396:6,813353:6133431:1disperses13376:18draft13431:113513:1713401:1013409:413486:24dispersion13428:5drafting13513:413455:1713410:813422:5enable13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:313472:3encircle13406:2213462:713465:4drafting13513:413455:17134778:3encircle13406:2213470:2,1513471:1313380:2213402:16ease13360:2113460:2513466:2213472:213477:1913480:15ease13395:13,1813490:613496:1413472:213473:1413479:1913480:15ease13395:13,1813490:613496:1413487:12,21drawing13517:10east13395:13,1813490:613496:1413495:24,25dressed13449:613433:2513445:16encircled13461:1513495:24,25drive13398:2113409:313445:2313470:2213460:2013460:2013497:1613429:2013471:6eastern13420:1813466:16,2013460:20	13442:13 13475:14 13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13470:2 13473:1013463:13,1713385:10,24 13386:4empower 13438:1113488:2 13490:213483:19 13485:1313386:9,17 13388:17en 13348:19,24 13313492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1disperses 13376:21draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:5enable 13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2113470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1213488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encircle 13406:2213495:24,2513429:20 13471:613445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	13492:3 13517:23 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13488:2 13490:213483:19 13485:1313386:9,17 13388:17en 13348:19,24 13313492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1disperses 13376:21draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:513486:2413471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2113470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413484:12,14drawing 13517:10ease 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1213487:12,21drawing 13517:10drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1213495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:1513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	49:5 envisage 13396:3 envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13492:1213491:1913390:6 13396:6,813353:6 13434:1disperses 13376:21draft 13431:1 13513:1713401:10 13409:413486:24dispersing 13376:18drafted 13335:2213410:8 13422:513486:2413471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2313470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1713488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encircled 13461:1513495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:1513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	envisaged 13471:21 envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
disperses 13376:21 dispersing 13376:18 13471:22draft 13431:1 13513:17 drafted 13335:2213401:10 13409:4 13410:8 13422:513486:24 enable 13384:813471:2213480:713410:8 13422:5enable 13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2313470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13396:2313461:18 13462:913484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1713488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encircled 13461:1513495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:1513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	envisioned 13413:19 13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
dispersing13376:18drafted13335:2213410:813422:5enable13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion13428:5drafting13513:413455:1713478:3encircle13406:2213462:713465:4draw13334:2213495:1913416:913436:2213470:2,1513471:1313380:2213402:16ease13360:2113460:2513460:2513472:213473:1413479:1913480:15ease13396:2313461:1813462:513484:12,14drawing13517:10east13398:313428:12encircled13490:613496:1'13488:15,2113493:6dressed13449:613433:2513445:16encirclement1340'13495:24,25drive13398:2113409:313445:2313470:2213460:2013466:16,20134613497:1613429:2013471:6eastern13420:1813466:16,201346	13415:18 13425:16 13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
dispersing13376:18drafted13335:2213410:813422:5enable13384:813471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion13428:5drafting13513:413455:1713478:3encircle13406:2213462:713465:4draw13334:2213495:1913416:913436:2213470:2,1513471:1313380:2213402:16ease13360:2113460:2513460:2513472:213473:1413479:1913480:15ease13396:2313461:1813462:513484:12,14drawing13517:10east13398:313428:12encircled13490:613496:1'13488:15,2113493:6dressed13449:613433:2513445:16encirclement1340'13495:24,25drive13398:2113409:313445:2313470:2213460:2013466:16,20134613497:1613429:2013471:6eastern13420:1813466:16,201346	13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
13471:2213480:713441:12,1313472:3dispersion 13428:5drafting 13513:413455:17 13478:3encircle 13406:2213462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2313470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13396:2313461:18 13462:513484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1713487:12,21drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:12encircled 13461:1513488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encirclement 1340713497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	13467:8 13468:3,10 13468:11 13472:5,16
dispersion 13428:5 13462:7 13465:4drafting 13513:4 draw 13334:2213455:17 13478:3 13495:19encircle 13406:22 13416:9 13436:2313470:2,15 13471:13 13472:2 13473:1413380:22 13402:16 13479:19 13480:1513495:19 ease 13360:2113416:9 13436:22 13461:18 13462:513484:12,14 13487:12,21 13488:15,21 13493:6 13495:24,25 13497:16drawing 13517:10 drawn 13355:14east 13396:23 13498:1513490:6 13496:12 east 13398:21 13409:313495:24,25 13497:16drive 13398:21 13409:3 13429:20 13471:613445:23 13470:22 eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	13468:11 13472:5,16
13462:7 13465:4draw 13334:2213495:1913416:9 13436:2313470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15ease 13396:2313461:18 13462:913484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1213487:12,21drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:12encircled 13461:1513488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encirclement 1340213495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	
13470:2,15 13471:1313380:22 13402:16ease 13360:2113460:25 13461:413472:2 13473:1413479:19 13480:15easier 13396:2313461:18 13462:913484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1213487:12,21drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:12encircled 13461:1513488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encirclement 1340213495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	
13472:213473:1413479:1913480:15easier13396:2313461:1813462:913484:12,14drawing13517:10east13395:13,1813490:613490:613490:613487:12,21drawn13355:1413398:313428:12encircled13461:1513488:15,2113493:6dressed13449:613433:2513445:16encirclement1340'13495:24,25drive13398:2113449:313445:2313470:2213460:2013461:1513497:1613429:2013471:6eastern13420:1813466:16,201346	8
13484:12,14drawing 13517:10east 13395:13,1813490:6 13496:1313487:12,21drawn 13355:1413398:3 13428:12encircled 13461:1513488:15,21 13493:6dressed 13449:613433:25 13445:16encirclement 1340013495:24,25drive 13398:21 13409:313445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:1513497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 1346	-
13487:12,21 13488:15,21 13493:6drawn 13355:14 dressed 13449:613398:3 13428:12 13433:25 13445:16encircled 13461:15 encirclement 134013495:24,25 13497:16drive 13398:21 13409:3 13429:20 13471:613445:23 13470:22 eastern 13420:1813466:16,20 13461:15 encirclement 1340	1 11
13488:15,21 13493:6 13495:24,25 13497:16dressed 13449:6 drive 13398:21 13409:3 13429:20 13471:613433:25 13445:16 13445:23 13470:22 eastern 13420:18encirclement 13400 13460:20 13461:3 13466:16,20 13461	
13495:24,25 13497:16drive 13398:21 13409:3 13445:23 13470:2213460:20 13461:3 13445:23 13470:2213497:1613429:20 13471:6eastern 13420:18	escalate 13375:20
13497:16 13429:20 13471:6 eastern 13420:18 13466:16,20 1346	
	escalated 13377:18
display 13388.22 13486.6 13515.8 0 11 13428.23 ancircling 13200.2	7:9 13483:16
13700.22 $13700.013313.0.7.11$ 13720.23 Clicit cling 13379.24	escalating 13433:8
13389:2,5 13410:8 driven 13443:9 easy 13480:14 13404:8 13413:20	
displayed 13391:1 driving 13430:11 echo 13398:24 13399:5 13416:24 13436:	-
13485:1 13470:15,18 13399:8,25 13420:17 13449:24 13462:'	
dispute 13387:7 drove 13408:19,25 edged 13482:24 13467:12 13490:	-
	8
13373:12 13434:4 dual 13338:8 13343:6 effect 13442:23 encounters 13474:2	
13435:19 13401:1 13491:9 13473:9 13488:12 ended 13456:1	13368:1 13374:6
dissuading 13433:13 dually 13354:17 effectively 13356:14 engage 13405:15	13392:3 13398:7,16
dissuasion 13372:3 due 13376:6 13378:18 13442:25 13419:7 13465:9	13399:21 13408:6
13466:12 13413:1 13415:19 eight 13339:14,18 13502:24	13423:25 13434:13
distance 13375:25 13436:17 13438:9 13351:2 13413:25,25 engagement 13501	2 13443:7 13450:23
13395:23 13409:8 13439:5 13441:24 13413:25 engaging 13416:3	13452:2 13458:6
13434:24 13452:4 13442:13,22 eighth 13419:14 Engelbrecht 13423	
13487:25 13488:18 13453:22,22 either 13373:7 13455:4	13487:15 13489:3,7
13488:25 13502:5,8 13461:22 13514:2 13389:24 13399:3 English 13348:11	13490:7 13491:9
distinction 13389:6 duly 13330:1,7 13401:13 13406:13 enhancing 13337:1	
diverted 13492:5 Duncan 13326:12,14 13406:13 13434:16 enlighten 13364:25	essentially 13369:24
divided 13419:24 13326:20 13327:6 13450:15 13454:10 eningitien 13504:25	
division 13337:20 13330:13 13380:18 13482:23 enquire 13336:3	13493:10,16
document 13327:13,15 duration 13478:19 electronic 13385:24 13404:7	establish 13354:7
13328:1,3,17,21 Durban 13341:5 13386:1 13389:16 ensure 13438:12	13400:16 13416:24
13329:20,21 13330:3 duty 13361:6 13371:2 element 13364:12 13459:13	established 13403:17
13330:5,9,16,22 13495:5 13368:1 13369:13 ensuring 13404:3	13459:8
13332:23 13333:2,9 d.s.s 13327:6 13398:16 13466:20 13423:5	estimated 13349:14
13334:17 13339:12 13466:22 entail 13337:6	estimates 13366:3
13385:13 13387:11 E elements 13431:7 13343:11,24 133	
$13387:14\ 13407:10 \qquad \boxed{\mathbf{E}\ 13398:24\ 13399:8,23} \qquad 13500:22 \qquad \qquad 13354:2\ 13382:8$	3:4 et 13376:16 13378:5
13307.14 13407.10 E 13396.24 13397.8,25 13500.22 13334.2 13334.2 13382.8 elevate 13487:2,2 entailed 13428:3	
15411.6 15459.5 15599.25 15405.10 elevate 15487.2,2 entaned 15428.5	3:4 et 13376:16 13378:5 13379:17 13382:17 13429:8 13430:3

RealTime Transcriptions

$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$					Page
13439:5 13440:14 executed 1340:12 extend 1340:14 extend 1340:1 extend 1337:1 extract 13423:6 13415:21424412 fladk-8:1348 1349:12 1356:21 13328:41 1330:23 extract 13423:6 13440:21 1444:12 fladk-8:1348 1336:21 1356:24 1338:41 1333:12 eys 1340:21 13448:145:7 13496:5.10 1336:21 1336:24 1338:21 1336:24 1338:21 1336:2.1 fleidk 1349:5.8.12 fleidk 1349:5.8.12 fleidk 1349:5.8.12 fleidk 1349:5.8.12 fleidk 1349:5.8.12 fleidk 1349:5.11 fleidk 1349:5.11 fladk-8:5 fleidk 1349:5.11 fladk-8:5 fleidk 1349:5.11 fladk-8:5	3434:1 13437:8,20	excite 13475:17	exposing 13491:20	FFF18 13327:13,21	firstly 13352:3 13374:3
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $,				, i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
13484:12,14 exercise 13387:4 external 13344:5 feld 13337.8,9,9,11 fixing 13485:14 13491:12 1351:4 exhansted 13378:10 extra 1342:5 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 13535:11 exhibit 13377:22,23 extra 1342:5 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 13352:1356:21 1338:41:1338:42 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 1340:22 1349:18 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:14 1340:22 13449:18 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:16 1340:21 1345:17 fixing 1348:14 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:16 1340:21 1345:12 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:16 fixing 1348:17 1340:12 13475:17 13490:12 fixing 1348:17 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 13470:12 13475:17 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 13470:12 13475:17 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 fixing 1348:18 13470:12 1348:14 fixing					five 13464:8 13486:7
13518:10 exhausted 13378:10 extract 13423:6 13426:22 13441:7 13487:15.18,19 135362:12 13358:4 13330:22 extremel 3406:10 13444:8 13406:5.10 13360:2,15 1336:24 13384:15,15,17 E Fields 13495:8,12 Fields 1340:8,13 Fields 1340:8,14 Fields 1340:8,13 Fields 1340:8,14 Fields 1340:14 Fiel					
etcetern 13355:11 exhibit 13327:22.23 extreme 13406:10 13444:8 134457. 13496:5.10 13354/2013356:23 13328/4 13302.2 13328/4 13302.2 13490:5.10 13490:2 fisknis 13496:6 13452:13362:24 13384:15 15.17 Est 13400:21 Fields 13495:8.12 fields 13495:8.12 fields 13495:8 fields 13495:20 fields 13495:21 fields 13495:21 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13354/20 1336/23 13328/1 13328/2 13328/2 13328/2 13328/2 13328/2 13340/2 Father 1346/2 Father 134/2 Father 1346/2 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13357:2 13358:4 13331:16 13334:15 even 13400:21 fields 13495:8,12 fieeting 1346:5.1 13300:21 1348:15 1338:620 1338:620 1334:15 1334:20:17 Fields 13495:8,12 fiesting 1346:5.1 13445:61 1338:620 1338:620 1338:620 1334:19 1346:5.3 figure 1340:5.3 figure 1340:5.1 1341:21 1341:21 1342:19 figure 1340:5.1 1341:2.23 figure 1340:5.3 figure 1340:5.1 1341:2.23 figure 1340:5.1 1342:1.1 figure 1340:5.1 figure 1342:1.1 figure 1342:1.1 figure 1342:1.1 figure 1342:1.1 figure 134:1.1 figu					
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $					
134002 13386:25 13386:8,17 I 13340:20 flight 13371:23 flight 1340:10 flight 1340:10 flight 1345:1 13400:21 13440:21 13440:21 1351:420 1351:420 1351:420 1351:420 1351:420 1348:21 1348:21 1338:24:24 1338:24:24 1338:24:24 1332:21 floor 1348:10 flight 13370:21 floor 1348:10 flight 13370:21 floor 1348:10 flight 1330:25 floor 1348:12 flight 1330:25 flight 1340:21 flight			-	,	
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$					
13454:6 13396:24 13420:3 face 13341:19 13465:3 figure 13403:3 13413:23 13467:5 13409:11,6 13425:10 13425:10 face 13381:24 face figure 13403:3 figure figure 13403:3 figure figure 13403:3 figure figure 13403:3 figure 13423:19 fioding 13423:19 fioding 13423:19 fioding 13435:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:25 13385:25 13385:25 13385:25 13385:21 fisting 13385:25 fisting 13443:22 fisting 13438:16 fisting 13385:25 fistins 13385:25 fistins	,		F		
13470:12 13470:12 13425:10 13425:10 faceless 13357:8 fgures 1340:19:10 fliphart 1345:10 13491:1 13492:10 13492:14 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:19 13423:12 13386:34,49,15;18 13386:34,49,15;18 13386:34,49,15;18 13388:16 1000r 13484:9 100r 13484:9 100r 13484:9 100r 13484:9 100r 1348:12 1346:16;13450:19 existed 1336:18 13390:16;13400:6 13389:16;24,25 focus 1343:21:13 100r 1348:11 13388:16;124,25 focus 1343:21:13 134370:23 fodu 1370:23 fodu 1342:11 13338:15 fadu 1345:1 fadu 1346:1 fad		-	face 13341.19 13465.3		
13470:12 13490:14,23 facilitated 13381:24 [13330:6113330:6113333:1 13491:8 13495:20 13514:201351:6.68 facilitated 13341:24 [13330:6113330:6113336:1] floor 1348:9 13365:2513352:6 exhibited 13494:8 fact 13329:4,413334:2 13388:24,424 13386:1 floor 1348:4.9 13365:2513352:6 13385:213387:2 13388:2513382:2.1 flowed 13424:21 13449:1613450:19 existed 13361:8 13390:1613400:6 13389:16,624,25 focus 13343:213 13470:2513474:23 existen 21387:21,14 13448:161400:6 filling 1341:2.4 floar 13370:23 13507:18 exist 13398:2313405:9 factor 13488:16 fillering 13353:7 13404:41324: 13425:17 expanded 13473:25 factor 13470:10 13390:2513401:7 13425:13.18 13364:413351:7 expect 13375:12 factor 13486:12 finance 13453:16,16 follow 13501:11 13360:1513376:16 13376:16 13376:17 expect 13352:1341:4 falle 13496:11 find 13328:13329:12 fistel 13335:151330:12 follow 1320:21 13500:112150:710 expectations 13422:11 fallis 1335:1348:12					
13491:8 13495:20 1351:4:20 1351:6:8 facilitis 13446:8 facing 1348:5:1 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:25 13385:25 13385:21 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:24 13385:25 13385:21 13385:25 13385:21 13385:25 13385:21 133372:21 133372:21 <th< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>0</td><td></td></th<>				0	
13499:1 exhibita 13494:8 facing 13419:12 13386:34,24,24,13386:1 floore 13484:9 00ved 13424:21 13385:25,13392:6 13385:22,13387:2 13386:15,13387:11 13386:34,49,91,51,8 floore 13484:21 13409:16,1450:19 13385:22,13389:2 13387:19 13387:19 13388:13 13389:16,162,4,25 fold 13370:23 13470:25,13474:23 existen 13361:8 13390:16 13399:16 flill 1362:5 fold 1370:23 fold 1370:23 fold 1370:23 fold 1370:23 fold 1370:23 flill 1344:12 1348:11 flill 1362:5 fold 1370:23 fold 1370:23 fold 1370:23 factor 13488:16 flitering 13353:7 13404:4,1342:4 13404:1342:4 13405:11 1340:41,1342:0 1348:11 1340:41,1342:4 1342:41,134:41,144:41,134:44:44:44:44:44:44:44:44:44:44:44:44:4		-			
evening 13351:1 exhibits 13384:14 fact 1329:4,4 13334:2 13386:3,4,4,9,15,18 flowed 13424:21 13365:25 13392:6 13385:22 13387:2 13387:10 13388:13 13389:16,24,25 focus 13342:12 1340:17 13422:12 13387:12,14 13484:12 13467:4 fill 13388:13 13389:16,24,25 focus 13342:12 13470:25 13476:7 existe al 13361:8 13390:16 13400:6 13391:2 foll 3170:23 foll 31302:25 foll 31302:23 foll 31302:23 foll 3336:13 13389:16,24,25 foll 31302:25 foll 31302:23 foll 31302:23 foll 3336:14 13464:1 13464:1 13448:12 13404:4 13449:14 13432:13 13404:4 13449:1 13444:14 13432:15 13404:4 13444:11 13444:1 13444:1 13444:11 13444:1 13444:1 13444:1 13446:1 13444:1 13444:1 13444:1 13444:1 13446:1 1346:1 1344:1 13444:1 13446:1 13446:1 13444:1 13444:1 13446:1 13444:1 13446:1 13446:1 13446:1 13446:1 13446:1 13446:1 13446:1					0
1336:25 1339:26 13385:22 13364:15 13387:11 13388:25 13389:2,16 fty 13452:23,24 13449:16 13450:19 existed 13381:12 13388:13 13389:16,24,25 focus 13343:21 13381:2 13381:2 13381:2 13391:2 fold 13370:23 focus 13342:13 13352:2 13442:12 13447:12 13462:4 13352:2 1340:4 13322:13 13352:1330:2 1340:4:1342:4 13352:1330:1 13352:1330:1 13362:5 1340:4:1342:4 13352:1330:1 1340:4:1342:4 13352:1340:1 1340:4:22:5140:1 1340:4:1342:1 1340:4:22:5140:1 1340:4:22:5140:1 13464:1341:1340:1 13464:1343:1 13464:1343:1 13464:14 13452:1340:1 13464:14 13452:1348:1 1340:4:22:5140:1 13464:14					
13410:17 13389:8 13387:19 13387:19 13389:16,24,25 four 13343:2133 13449:16 13361:19 existence 13387:12,14 13390:16 13390:12 fold 13370:23 13470:25 13476:22 13476:2 13476:23 fold 13370:23 fold 13370:23 13470:25 13476:2 1348:11 13486:12 filtering 13399:25 13404:1 13425:13,18 13455:17 expanded 13473:25 factor 13476:1331:5 13404:1 13461:1 13463:21 134461:1 13463:21 13463:21 13483:14 13453:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13453:1 13463:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13463:1 13453:1 13463:1 13453:1 13463:1 13453:1 13463:1 13453:1 13463:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1 13453:1	-				
13449:16 13450:19 existed 13361:8 13390:16 13400:6 13391:2 fold 13370:23 13470:25 13474:23 exists 13515:6 13448:12 1346:12 13362:5 follow 13348:11 13507:18 exists 13515:6 exists 1355:7 1340:4:132:4 13359:12 1340:4:132:4 13359:12 1340:4:132:5:1 1340:4:132:5:1 1340:4:132:5:1 1340:4:132:5:1 1340:4:132:5:1 1340:4:132:5:1 1346:1 1345:1:1 1346:1 1346:1:1 1345:1:1 1345:1:1 1346:1:1 1335:1:1 1350:1:1 1345:1:1 1345:1:1 1345:1:1 1350:1:1 1350:1:1 1350:1:1 1351:1 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13470:25 13474:23 existence 13387:12,14 13448:12 13467:4 fill 13362:5 follow 13348:11 13475:2,25 13476:7 exit 13382:23 13405:1 13302:4 filling 13353:7 13304:4 13359:25 13408:10 filtering 13353:7 13404:4 13428:18 factor 13399:25 13401:7 13448:11 13444:1 13425:1 13448:12 13402:22 13404:22,25 13404:22 13443:11 13464:1 13478:18 13464:1 13478:18 13464:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 13463:1 fall 13463:1 13463:1 fall 13463:1 fall 13463:1 fall 13453:1 fall 13478:1 1340:21 fall 13463:1 fall 13453:1 fall 13462:1 fall 13452:1 fall 13452:1 fall 13452:1 fall fall fall <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>					
13475:2.25 13476:7 exists 13515:6 13502:4 filling 13413:24 13359:2 13309: 13502:1 13428:18 factor 13488:16 factor 13488:16 filling 13413:24 13359:2 13404:4 13399:2 13452:17 13428:18 factor 13488:16 factor 13470:10 13399:2 13404:4 13329:12 13405:11 13402:13.18 13404:22.25 13405:11 13423:13.18 13404:22.25 13405:11 13436:14 13336:12 13436:14 13436:12 134436:11 13466:14 fald 13470:10 13486:14 fald 13391:20 13420:15 134435:15 13463:12 fald 13391:20 13420:16 fald 13391:20 13420:25 fald 1339:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13335:21 13442:21 13335:21 13442:21 13354:21 fald 1349:25 follow-up 13490:20 follow-up 13490:21 13340:25 follow-up 13490:21 13445:13 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 1350:41 135					
13507:18 exit 13398:23 13405:9 factor 13488:16 filtering 13353:7 13404:4 13424: 13452:17 expanded 13473:25 factor 13488:16 filtering 13353:7 13404:4 13424: 13452:17 expanded 13473:25 factor 13329:17 13331:8 13402:12,25 13405:1 13431:1 13466 13376:15 13375:10 expect 13375:12 failed 13436:1 13463:2,15 13492:12 followed 13501:12 13448:7 13455:1 13333:3 13464:5 failed 13436:1 failed 13436:1 find 13328:18 13329:12 followed 13501:12 13507:17.20 expectations 13422:11 fall 13391:20 13420:25 fall 3336:15 13360.4 follow-up 13490:12 13508:24 13509:7 13373:20 13442:2 13442:16 13411:16 13439:5 follow-up 13490:12 13513:17 expecting 13409:23 far 1385:55 13392:21 13447:10 13409:24 filleri 13469:17 footage 13430:14 1348:20 13439:20 13359:12 1337:14 13409:24 1341:35 13492:20 footage 13432:9 13359:12 13370:10 fastin 13399:2 13447:10 13409:24 filler 13465:17 footage 13432:9 13454:24 13489:1 13346:12 fasti		· · · · · ·			13359:2 13390:10,22
event 13362:21 13428:18 factored 13470:10 13399:25 13401:7 13425:13,18 13452:17 expanded 13473:25 facts 13329:17 13331:8 13404:22,25 13405:1 13443:11 1346 13346:4 13351:7 expanded 13473:25 failed 13436:1 13346:4:22,25 13405:1 13448:14 13346:4 13351:7 expect 13375:12 failed 13436:1 13463:2,15 13492:12 followed 13501:11 13485:1 13435:1 13435:3 13464:5 failed 13436:1 finance 13453:16,16 followed 13501:12 13500:12 13507:10 expected 13354:14 faile 1339:20 13420:25 finance 13453:16,16 follows 13329:12 13335: 13422: 13500:10 13512:2,4 13443:7 faile 1339:20 1342:2 13447:15 13469:17 fooldows 13329:12 fooldows 13329:12 13357:20 13441:16 rass35:19 rass5:13392:21 13447:15 13469:17 fooldage 13430:14 13438:29 13357:19 rass5:13392:21 faile 13439:5 fooldows 13329:12 faile 13439:12					
13452:17expanded 13473:25facts 13329:17 13331:813404:22,25 13405:113443:11 1346013346:1 13351:713478:1413347:18 13364:2513405:11 13413:2013486:1413346:1 13351:7expect 13375:12failed 13436:113463:14 13492:12followed 1350:1213370:13 13376:1613376:2 13382:13,1413483:15 13486:21finance 13453:16,16followed 1350:1213501:12 13507:10expectations 13422:11fall 13391:20 13420:2513335:15 13360:4follower 13329:2113505:17,20expectations 13422:1fall 13391:20 13420:2513335:15 13360:4follow rup 13490:113510:10 13512:2,413343:70:23far 13355:5 13329:2113348:124 13489:9food 13461:2013513:17expertince 1335:3,9far 1385:5 1339:22113447:13 13469:17food 13461:201353:91 1353:91 1353:9113447:10,14 13452:4fine 13411:121350:981337:20 13441:1613399:11,15,20,23,2413447:10,14 13452:4fine 13411:1213509:81337:21 13372:19 13376:10fashion 13399:213447:10,14 13452:4fine 13411:12footage 13439:913438:20 13439:2013359:12 13372:16fashion 13399:21346:23 13447:12fire mis 1360:17footage 1339:4213391:20 1340:513440:12 13372:13fastin 1351:4fire mis 1360:1413336:13 13377:813352:8fire mis 1360:1913372:23,38,2213391:20 1340:513440:12 13470:24fasti 1339:26fire mis 1336:1913372:23,38,2313371:11,11,13,2313407:23 1342:2313447:10 1350:11favourable 13412:					
events13331:513335:713478:1413347:1813364:2513405:1113413:2013486:1413346:413357:12failed13463:2113463:21,513463:2,1513422:1following1357:2113470:1213507:1613376:213376:2133382:13,1413483:1513486:11finance13453:16,16following13327:2113501:1213507:17,00expectations13422:11fall13391:2013420:2513335:1513360:4following13329:2113507:17,20expected13354:14fall13391:2013420:1613411:1613349:5follow-up13352:2113507:17,20expecting13442:213420:1613411:1613349:5follow-up13469:17food13461:2013510:1013512:2,413443:7familiar13309:2113447:131349:2513409:211350:121355:913358:13expecting13409:23far13347:1413492:2013504:913504:913504:913375:2013441:161339:11,15,20,23,2413487:1513472:20footage13345:1913329:2113376:101339:2213465:17footage13345:1913329:241348:2013359:1213376:10fashion1399:2213465:1413360:2113346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:23 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>					
13346:4 13351:7 13370:13 13376:16expect 13375:12 1348:15 13486:1failed 13436:1 1348:15 13486:1113463:2,15 13492:12 finance 13453:16,16followed 13501:12 following 13342:1013448:7 13455:113433:3 13464:5failt 13496:11finance 13453:16,16following 13342:1013501:12 13507:10expectations 13422:11failt 13391:20 13420:2513335:15 13360.4follows 13329:2113505:12 13509:713375:00 13442:213420:1613411:16 13439:5follow-up 13490:1313510:10 13512:2,413443:7failt 13505:2213447:13 13469:17food 13461:2013510:10 13512:2,413413:2,7 13484:113409:24 13413:513492:25 13494:2013504:9 1350:1213535:10 1355:13experime 13355:13experime 13335:3,1913447:10,14 13452:4fine 13469:17footage 13430:1413352:0 13441:1613339:11,15,20,23,2413487:15 13515:14fine 13461:7footage 13432:913352:0 13441:1613339:12 13376:10fashion 13399:213472:20footage 13432:913452:19 13376:10fashion 13399:213485:1413346:23 1334713462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fine 13465:17fore 13339:241339:125 1339:2013400:513400:21 13477:8fast 13493:613472:20foothall 13338:131339:125 1339:201336:15 13377.813352:8firearm 1366:13firearm 1366:13firearm 13361:191339:125 1339:2013400:513440:12 13470:24fastlites 13351:4firearm 13361:1913372:2,3,8,8,21339:22 1349:2013400:5<		-			
13370:1313376:113376:213376:213382:13,1413483:1513486:21finance13453:16,16following13322:2213501:1213507:10expectations1342:21fail13391:2013420:2513335:1513360:413357:2113501:1213507:77,20expectations1342:2213420:2513335:1513360:4follow:ng13329:2113508:2413509:713373:2013442:213420:1613411:1613495:5follow-up13490:2313510:1013512:2,413443:7familiar13409:2413449:1513449:17footage13430:14eventually13337:101341:2,713444:113409:2413409:2413449:2513449:19footage13430:1413353:913358:13experience13335:1,1513409:2413492:2513492:2513494:2013504:1913409:2413354:2013359:1113372:10fastin13472:10footage13329:1413426:27footage13329:2413454:2413459:1313372:1913370:10fashion1339:2213485:1413346:2313346:2313371:6113391:2513361:1913372:23,38,2213391:2513396:2013363:1513377:813326:2513442:1113346:2313371:11,32313346:2313371:11,3331346:2313371:11,3331346:2313371:11,3331346:2313371:11,3331346:2313371:11,33313361:1913372:2,38,8,213371:11,33313361:137					
13448:7 13455:113433:3 13464:5faint 13496:11find 13328:18 13329:1213357:2113501:12 13507:17,20expectations 13422:11fall 13391:20 13420:2513335:15 13360:413335:2 13422:13508:24 13509:713373:20 13442:2falls 13389:2113371:6 13385:213335:2 13422:13510:10 13512:2,413443:7familiar 13505:22fall 1:3192:2113447:13 13469:17food 13461:2013513:17expecting 13409:23far 13385:5 13392:2113447:13 13469:17food 13461:2013535:13 3358:13experience 13335:3,1913447:10,14 13452:fine 13411:1213509:813375:20 13441:1613339:11,15,20,23,2413487:15 13515:14fine 13411:1213509:81346:2713376:14 13376:10fast isini 13399:213487:15 13515:14fine 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 133461346:7713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fire 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 1334613391:25 13396:2013363:15 13377:8fast 13493:6fire and 1336:1913372:2,3,8,213391:25 13396:201346:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:16 13376:913372:2,3,8,213391:25 13396:201346:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813362:12 13361:1913372:2,3,8,213491:19 13432:2,31346:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:12 13376:913372:2,3,133713491:19 13432:2,31346:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:12 13376:1913374:9,10,11,113431:19 13432:2,31346:13 465:24fear 13482:7fire 13337:16 13332:813374:9,10,11,113431:					
13501:12 13507:10 13507:17,20expectations 13422:11 expected 13354:14fall 13391:20 13420:25 falls 13389:2113335:15 13360:4 13371:6 13385:2follows 13329:21 13373:20 13442:213508:24 13509:7 13510:10 13512:2,4 13510:10 13512:2,413373:20 13442:2 13443:713409:21 falls 13389:2113411:16 13439:5 13447:13 13469:17follow-up 13490:1 food 13461:2013510:10 13512:2,4 13535:9 13358:13 13535:9 13358:13 13357:20 13441:1613339:11,15,20,23,24far 13385:5 13392:21 13447:10,14 13452:4fine 13445:17 foot 13447:10footage 13430:14 footage 13430:1413438:20 13439:20 13452:21 13471:1613339:11,15,20,23,24far-reaching 13488:13 fashion 13399:2fine 13465:17 footage 13432:9footage 13432:9 footage 13432:913454:24 13459:13 13454:24 13459:13 13462:713376:10 13376:14 1348:23fashion 13399:2 13426:25 13442:11fine 13465:17 footage 13432:9footage 13432:9 footage 13432:9evidence 1326:25 13331:16 13386:13 13309:2013363:15 13377:8 13363:15 13377:8fashion 13399:2 fast113493:6fire 13400:21 13431:3,3 firearm 13364:2313367:11 13366 firearm 13364:2313371:11,13,23 firearm 13364:2313407:23 13424:23 13407:21 13424:24fast113493:66firearm 13365:10 13370:913374:9,10,11,1 13374:9,10,11,113411:19 13432:23 13407:21 13424:23fast13493:67:11 fire-hose 13442:2313376:10 13370:913374:9,10,11,1 13374:9,10,11,113411:19 13432:23 13365:12 13506:14expertise 13465:24 fearibel 13467:11fire-hose 13442:23,2313376:10 13376:913407:23 13424:23 1344					
13507:17,20expected 13354:14falls 13389:2113371:6 13385:213335:2 13422:13508:24 13509:713373:20 13442:213420:1613411:16 13439:5follow-up 13490:113510:10 13512:2413443:7familiar 13505:2213447:13 13469:17food 13461:2013513:17expecting 13409:23far 13385:5 13392:2113447:12 13489:9food 13461:20eventually 13337:1913413:2,7 13484:113409:24 13413:513492:25 13494:201350:49 13507:13353:9 13358:13experience 13353:3,1913447:10,14 13452:4fine 13465:17footages 13432:9everybody 13419:1213339:12 13372:16far-reaching 13488:13finished 13445:2footages 13432:913454:24 1349:2013359:12 13377:16far-reaching 13488:13finished 13445:2footages 13432:913462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fine 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 1334713391:25 13396:201336:15 13377:8fashion 13399:213491:8 13505:413367:11 1336613391:25 13396:2013363:15 13377:8fatallities 13351:4firearm 13364:2313372:2,3 8,8,213399:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:8firearms 13361:1913372:2,3 8,2,213399:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:8fire-hose 1342:2,3,213375:10,13779:913407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113376:9,10 133713407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113376:9,10 13371350:22 13507:10<					
13508:24 13509:713373:20 13442:213420:1613411:16 13439:5follow-up 13490:113510:10 13512:2,413443:7familiar 13505:2213447:13 13469:17food 13461:2013513:17expecting 13409:23far 13385:5 13392:2113481:24 13489:9footage 13430:1413537:1913413:2,7 13484:113409:24 13413:513492:25 13494:2013504:9 13507:13535:9 13358:13experience 13335:3,1913447:10,14 13452:4fine 13411:1213509:813375:20 13441:1613339:11,15,20,23,2413487:15 13515:14finer 13465:17footage 13432:91345:21 13370:1013340:25 13341:4,7Farm 13513:613472:20footage 13329:241345:24 13459:1313372:19 13376:10fashion 13399:213485:14finshed 13445:2force 13339:2413462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fire 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 13347evidence 13326:2513518:14fast 13493:613491:8 13505:4firearm 13364:2313367:11 133661339:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:8133351.10 13370:913372:2,23 13313407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113375:9,10 133713431:19 13432:2,3experise 13460:24fear 13482:7fire-hose 13442:23,2313378:10 1337913407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113378:10 1337913506:22 13506:1expertise 13460:3fear 13482:7fire-hose 13442:23,2313378:10 1337913505:22 13506:1 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>					
13510:10 13512:2,4 13513:1713443:7 expecting 13409:23 13413:2,7 13484:1familiar 13505:22 far 13385:5 13392:2113447:13 13469:17 13481:24 13489:9 13492:25 13494:0food 13461:20 footage 13430:14eventually 13337:19 13353:9 13358:13 13355:20 13441:1613413:2,7 13484:1 1339:11,15,20,23,2413409:24 13413:5 13447:10,14 13452:413492:25 13494:0 13492:25 13494:013504:9 13507: 13505:17everybody 13419:12 13482:0 1340:25 13341:4,7 13452:1313340:25 13341:4,7 13359:12 13372:161347:15 13515:14 far-reaching 13488:13 fashion 13399:2finished 13445:2 13472:00footage 13432:9 footall 13338:11 force 13339:2413452:25 13352:2513372:19 13376:10 13376:14 13482:23fashion 13399:2 13426:25 13396:2013363:15 13377:8 1356:15 13377:8fashion 13399:2 fatalities 13351:4firearm 13364:23 firearm 13364:23 13365:10 13370:913371:11,13,23 13372:2,3,8,8,2 13375:11 13400:13 13407:23 13424:231340:12 13470:24 fatalities 13351:4firearms 13361:19 firearm 13364:23 13375:10 13370:913372:2,3,8,8,2 13375:10 13370:913437:11 1340:13 experiences 13360:37 13407:11 13404:13 experiences 13360:37fear 13482:7 fearing 13482:8fire.hose 13442:23,23 first 13327:16 13332:11 133375:10 13377:913375:10 13376:10 13370:9 13375:10 13378:10 13376:10 13375:913437:11 1340:13 experiences 13460:22feasible 13467:11 feasuble 13467:1113328:11 13338:10 13376:10 13377:013437:10 1350:1:11 stor:11 stor:21 1350:6:1 stor:21 1350:12experiences 13360:37 feasible 13467:11first 13327:16 13328:11 133376:10 13377:1013451:1					
13513:17expecting 13409:23far 13385:5 13392:2113481:24 13489:9footage 13430:14eventually 13337:1913413:2,7 13484:113409:24 13413:513492:25 13494:2013504:9 13507:13353:9 13358:13experience 13335:3,1913447:10,14 13452:4fine 13411:1213509:813375:20 13441:1613339:11,15,20,23,2413487:15 13515:14fine 13465:17footage 13430:241348:20 13439:2013359:12 13372:16far-reaching 13488:13fine 13445:2footage 13439:2413452:713372:19 13376:10fashion 13399:213485:1413345:19 1334613462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fire 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 13347evidence 13326:2513518:14fast 13493:613491:8 13505:413367:11 1336913339:12 13376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11firearm 13364:2313371:11,13,2313391:25 13396:2013363:15 13377:813352:8firearm 13361:1913372:2,38,8,213399:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813455:10 1370:913372:2,31,331347:11 13440:13experiences 13360:3fear 13482:7fire-hose 1342:23,2313374:9,10,11,11350:522 13506:1expertise 13465:24feasibility 13414:1113333:22 13358:1113379:16 1340013516:22 13517:10expired 13496:3feasibile 13467:1113358:12 13366:2513401:2 13421:1350:6,7explain 13328:11feature 13497:713369:10 13371:1013422:19 13423evidence-in-chief13391:13 13428:9feed14342:513376:14 1338:					-
eventually 13337:1913413:2,7 13484:113409:24 13413:513492:25 13494:2013504:9 13507:13353:9 13358:13experience 13335:3,1913447:10,14 13452:4fine 13411:1213509:813375:20 13441:1613339:11,15,20,23,2413487:15 13515:14fine 13411:1213509:8everybody 13419:1213340:25 13341:4,7Farm 13513:6fine 13452:17footages 13432:913454:24 13459:1313359:12 13372:16far-reaching 13488:13fine 13445:2force 1339:2413462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fine 1340:21 13431:3,313346:23 13347evidence 13326:2513518:14fast 13493:613491:8 13505:413367:11 1336613331:16 13386:13experienced 13359:23fatalities 13351:4firearm 13364:2313371:11,13,2313407:23 13424:2313460:12 13470:24fataly 13447:813365:10 13370:913372:2,3,8,8,213399:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fataly 1342:6firearms 13361:1913372:2,3,8,8,213497:21 13424:231347:10 13501:11favourable 13412:16fire-hose 13442:23,2313375:9,19 13313407:22 13506:1experiences 13360:3fear 13482:7fire-hose 13442:23,2313378:10 1337913505:22 13506:1experise 13465:24fearing 13482:8first 13327:16 13332:813378:10 1337913505:22 13506:1expired 13496:3featily 13414:1113338:12 13366:2513401:2 13421:13506:16 13387:1013399:13 13428:9feed 13432:513371:17 13375:2413421:19 1342313506:16 13387:1013454:10 134	,				
13353:913358:13 13375:20experience13335:3,19 13339:11,15,20,23,2413447:10,1413452:4 13487:15fine13411:12 1446:2513509:8 footages13375:2013441:16 13399:1213339:11,15,20,23,2413487:1513513:6fine13465:17 13472:20footages13329:213488:2013439:2013359:1213372:1913372:10far-reaching13488:13 fashionfinished13445:2footages13339:2413462:713376:1413376:1413426:2513442:11fire13430:211345:1913346:2313462:313331:1613386:13 1339:20experienced13359:23 13363:15fatalitiesfastfire13365:1013377:11.1,3,2313399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatally13442:26firearm13365:1013372:2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatally13442:7fire-hose13442:23,2313375:9,1913437:1113426:24fatally13482:7fire-hose13442:23,2313378:1013379:1613379:1613505:2213506:1expertise13465:17fasibili 13467:1113333:2213378:1013372:2413401:2113505:2213506:1expired13496:3fearing13482:8first13371:1713379:1613402:1913505:2213518:10fasibili 13467:1113338:1213369:1013371:1013422:1913422:1913422:1913505:22 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>					
13375:2013441:1613339:11,15,20,23,2413487:1513515:14finer13465:17footages13432:913438:2013340:2513340:2513372:16far-reaching13488:13finshed13472:20football13339:2413454:2413359:1213372:1913376:10fashion13399:213485:14finshed1345:141345:1913346:231346:2313462:713376:1413376:1413488:2313426:251346:251346:231346:231346:2313346:231346:231346:231346:2313367:1113367:1213377:12,2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatally13447:813365:1013370:913373:2,2313375:9,1913372:2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213465:24fearfire-hose1342:23,2313375:9,1913375:2,3,8,8,213407:2313424:2313465:24fearfire13322:1613375:9,1913375:9,1913375:9,1913375:9,1913375:9,1913375:9,1913329:1613379:161340013505:2213506:1experts13466:3fear13497:7first13369:1013379:161340013505:2213516:1	-	·			
everybody 13419:1213340:25 13341:4,7Farm 13513:613472:20football 13338:1113438:20 13439:2013359:12 13372:16far-reaching 13488:13finished 13445:2force 13339:2413454:24 13459:1313372:19 13376:10fashion 13399:213485:1413345:19 1334613462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fire 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 13347evidence 13326:2513518:14fast 13493:613491:8 13505:413367:11 1336613331:16 13386:13experienced 13359:23fatalities 13351:4firearm 13364:2313371:11,13,2313399:20 13400:513460:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:10 13370:913372:2,3,8,8,213407:23 13424:2313440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:10 13370:913373:2,23 13313407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:19 13432:2,3experiences 13360:3fear 13482:7fire-hose 13442:23,2313375:9,19 13313505:22 13506:1experis 13430:22feasibility 13414:1113338:1113379:16 1340013520:6,7explain 13328:11feature 13497:713369:10 13371:1013422:19 13422evidence-in-chief13391:13 13428:9feed 13432:513371:17 13375:2413424:18,1813380:16 13387:1013454:10 13455:17feedback 13413:2313376:4 13378:1913425:22 13433evidenc 13357:4explained 13352:713414:6 13430:1413388:5,8 13391:2,1613434:4,22 13413433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213		-	,		
13438:2013359:1213372:16far-reachingfinished13445:2force13339:2413454:2413459:1313372:1913376:1013488:13finished13485:1413345:191334613462:713376:1413438:2313426:2513445:12fire13430:2113431:3,313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1113367:1213377:2,2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatalities13352:8firearms13365:1013370:913372:2,3,8,8,213407:2313424:231347:1013501:11favourable13412:1613425:2513491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:1913432:2,313487:101350:3fearfatality13482:7fire-hose13328:1113379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613379:1613422:1913					
13454:2413372:1913376:10fashion13399:213485:1413345:191334613462:713376:1413376:1413438:2313426:2513442:11fire13430:2113431:3,313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313346:2313367:1113367:111336713391:2513396:2013363:1513377:813352:8firearm13364:2313377:1113372:2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatally13447:813365:1013370:913372:2,3,8,8,213407:2313424:2313487:1013501:11favourable13412:1613425:2513491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:1913432:2,3experiences13360:3fear13482:7fire-hose13442:23,2313378:101337913437:1113440:13experts13465:24fearing13482:8first13327:1613379:161337913505:2213506:1expired13496:3feasible13467:1113358:1213376:1013479:161342213505:2213506:1expired13496:3feature13497:713369:1013472:191342213505:221357:10expired13492:517feed13432:513371:1713375:2413424:18,1813380:1613387:1013454:1013352:713414:613430:14 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13462:713376:14 13438:2313426:25 13442:11fire 13430:21 13431:3,313346:23 13347evidence 13326:2513518:14fast 13493:613491:8 13505:413367:11 1336913331:16 13386:13experienced 13359:2313363:15 13377:813352:8firearm 13364:2313371:11,13,2313391:25 13396:2013440:12 13470:24fatallites 13351:4firearms 13361:1913372:2,3,8,8,213399:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:10 13370:913373:2,23 13313407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:19 13432:2,3experiences 13360:3fear 13482:7fire-hose 13442:23,2313378:10 1337913505:22 13506:1expertise 13465:24fearing 13482:8first 13327:16 13332:813378:10 1337913520:6,7explain 13328:11feasible 13467:1113358:12 13366:2513401:2 13421:13380:16 13387:1013454:10 13455:17feed 13432:513371:17 13375:2413424:18,1813380:16 13387:1013454:10 13455:17feedback 13413:2313376:4 13378:1913425:22 13433evidence in-chief13454:10 13455:17fatlites 13430:1413385:5,8 13387:2513434:4,22 134313433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213446:25 13455:713388:8 13391:2,1613434:4,22 134313433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213446:25 13455:713388:8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:					
evidence13326:2513518:14fast13493:613491:813505:413367:1113367:1113331:1613386:13experienced13359:23fatalities13351:4firearm13364:2313371:11,13,2313391:2513396:2013363:1513377:813352:8firearms13361:1913372:2,3,8,8,213407:2313424:2313487:1013501:11favourable13412:1613425:2513491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:1913432:2,3experiences13360:3fear13482:7fire-hose13442:23,2313375:9,19133713437:1113440:13experts13465:24fearing13482:8first13327:161332:813378:101337913505:2213506:1experts13496:3feasible13467:1113358:1213366:2513401:213401:213520:6,7explain13391:1313428:9feed13422:513371:1713375:2413422:1913422:1913380:1613387:1013454:1013455:17feedback13413:2313376:413378:1913425:2213434:4,2213433:2013434:1513427:1413352:713446:2513446:2513376:413388:813391:2,1613436:113438:13433:2013434:1513427:1413455:1213446:2513455:713388:813391:2,1613436:114338:					
13331:16experienced13359:23fatalities13351:4firearm13364:2313371:11,13,2313391:2513363:1513377:813352:8firearms13361:1913372:2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatally13447:813365:1013370:913373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:2,2313373:9,1013374:9,10,11,113431:1913432:2,313487:1013500:3fear13482:7fire-hose13422:23,2313375:9,19133713505:2213506:1expertise13465:24fearing13482:8first13327:161332:813378:101337913505:2213506:1expired13496:3feasibility13414:1113333:2213379:161340013520:6,7expired13496:3feature13497:713369:1013371:1013422:1913422:191380:1613387:1013428:9feed13432:513371:1713375:2413424:18,1813380:1613387:1013452:17feedback13413:2313376:413385:5,813387:2513434:4,2213434:4,2213434:4,2213433:2013434:1513427:1413457:1213446:2513455:713388:813391:2,1613436:113436:113438:				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
13391:2513363:1513377:813352:8firearms13361:1913372:2,3,8,8,213399:2013400:513440:1213470:24fatally13447:813365:1013370:913373:2,2313374:9,10,11,113437:1113432:2,3experiences13360:3fear 13482:7fire-hose13422:23,2313378:1013375:9,19133713505:2213506:1experts13465:24fearing13482:8first13327:1613378:1013378:1013379:161340013516:2213517:10expired13496:3feasible13467:1113358:1213366:2513401:213421:113520:6,7explain13328:11feature13497:713369:1013371:1013422:1913423:1evidence-in-chief13391:1313428:9feed13432:513376:413376:413376:413326:1213424:18,1813380:1613387:1013454:1013455:17feedback13413:2313376:413385:5,813387:2513434:4,2213436:113433:2013434:1513427:1413457:1213446:2513455:713388:813391:2,1613436:11					
13399:20 13400:513440:12 13470:24fatally 13447:813365:10 13370:913373:2,23 13313407:23 13424:2313487:10 13501:11favourable 13412:1613425:25 13491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:19 13432:2,3experiences 13360:3fear 13482:7fire-hose 13442:23,2313375:9,19 13313437:11 13440:13expertise 13465:24fearing 13482:8first 13327:16 13332:813378:10 1337913505:22 13506:1experts 13430:22feasibility 13414:1113333:22 13358:1113379:16 1340013516:22 13517:10expired 13496:3feature 13497:713369:10 13371:1013422:19 1342313520:6,7explain 13328:11feature 13497:713369:10 13371:1013422:19 13423evidence-in-chief13391:13 13428:9feed 13432:513371:17 13375:2413424:18,1813380:16 13387:1013454:10 13455:17feedback 13413:2313376:4 13378:1913425:22 13433evident 13357:4explained 13352:713414:6 13430:1413388:5,8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:13433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213446:25 13455:713388:8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:		-			
13407:2313424:2313487:1013501:11favourable13412:1613425:2513491:1113374:9,10,11,113431:1913432:2,3experiences13360:3fear13482:7fire-hose13425:2513375:9,19133713437:1113440:13expertise13465:24fearing13482:8first13327:1613332:813378:101337913505:2213506:1experts13430:22feasibility13414:1113333:2213379:1613401:213401:213516:2213517:10expired13496:3feasible13467:1113358:1213366:2513401:213421:113520:6,7explain13328:11feature13497:713369:1013371:1013422:1913423:1evidence-in-chief13391:1313428:9feed13432:513371:1713375:2413424:18,1813380:1613387:1013454:1013455:17feedback13413:2313376:413376:413378:1913425:2213434:4,2213434:4,2213433:2013434:1513427:1413457:1213446:2513455:713388:813391:2,1613436:113438:					
13431:1913432:2,3 13437:11experiences13360:3 13437:11fearfire-hose1342:23,2313375:9,19133713437:1113440:13 13505:2213506:1 13505:22expertise13465:24 13430:22fearing13482:8 feasibilityfirst13327:1613332:813378:101337913505:2213506:1 13505:22experts13430:22 expiredfeasibility13414:11 13436:213333:2213379:1613401:213516:2213517:10 13520:6,7 explainexpired13496:3 explainfeature13497:7 feed13369:1013371:10 13328:11 13391:1313428:9 feedfeed13432:5 feed13371:1713375:24 13376:413424:18,18 13385:5,813380:1613387:10 explained13352:7 13427:1413446:2513430:14 13457:1213385:5,813387:25 13388:813391:2,1613438:2013434:1513427:1413457:1213446:2513455:713388:813391:2,16					
13437:1113440:13expertise13465:24fearing13482:8first13327:1613332:813378:101337913505:2213506:1experts13430:22feasibility13414:1113333:2213378:1013379:161340013516:2213517:10expired13496:3feasible13467:1113358:1213366:2513401:213402:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1913422:1213432:1013422:1213432:1013425:1213424:18,1813355:5,813357:413434:4,2213434:4,2213436:113436:113436:113436:113436:113436:113436:113436:113436:1<					· · · · ·
13505:22 13506:1 13516:22 13517:10experts 13430:22 expired 13496:3 explain 13328:11feasibility 13414:11 13333:22 13358:1113379:16 13400 13358:12 13366:2513520:6,7 evidence-in-chief 13380:16 13387:10explain 13328:11 13454:10 13455:17feasible 13467:11 feature 13497:713369:10 13371:10 13369:10 13371:1013422:19 13423 13369:10 13371:10evidence in-chief 13380:16 13387:1013454:10 13455:17 13454:10 13455:17feed 13432:5 feedback 13413:2313376:4 13378:19 13385:5,8 13387:2513424:18,18 13424:2 1343evident 13357:4 13433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213446:25 13455:713388:8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:	,				, , ,
13516:22 13517:10 13520:6,7expired 13496:3 explain 13328:11feasible 13467:11 feature 13497:713358:12 13366:25 13369:10 13371:1013401:2 13421: 13422:19 13423evidence-in-chief 13380:16 13387:1013391:13 13428:9 13454:10 13455:17feed 13432:5 feed 13432:513371:17 13375:24 13376:4 13378:1913424:18,18 13425:22 13433evident 13357:4 13433:20 13434:15explained 13352:7 13427:14 13457:1213414:6 13430:14 1346:25 13455:713385:5,8 13387:25 13388:8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:		-			
13520:6,7 evidence-in-chiefexplain 13328:11 13391:13 13428:9feature 13497:7 feed 13432:513369:10 13371:10 13371:17 13375:2413422:19 13423 13371:17 13375:2413380:16 13387:10 evident 13357:4 13433:20 13434:1513454:10 13455:17 explained 13352:7feed 13432:5 feedback 13413:2313371:17 13375:24 13414:6 13430:1413425:22 13433 13385:5,8 13387:2513433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213446:25 13455:713388:8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:			e e		
evidence-in-chief13391:13 13428:9feed 13432:513371:17 13375:2413424:18,1813380:16 13387:1013454:10 13455:17feedback 13413:2313376:4 13378:1913425:22 13433evident 13357:4explained 13352:713414:6 13430:1413385:5,8 13387:2513434:4,22 13413433:20 13434:1513427:14 13457:1213446:25 13455:713388:8 13391:2,1613436:1 13438:					
13380:1613454:1013455:17feedback13413:2313376:413378:1913425:2213433evident13357:4explained13352:713414:613430:1413385:5,813387:2513434:4,2213413433:2013427:1413457:1213446:2513455:713388:813391:2,1613436:113436:1		-			
evident 13357:4 13433:20 13434:15explained 13352:7 13427:14 13457:1213414:6 13430:14 13414:6 13430:1413385:5,8 13387:25 13388:8 13391:2,1613434:4,22 1342 13436:1 13438:					-
13433:20 13434:15 13427:14 13457:12 13446:25 13455:7 13388:8 13391:2,16 13436:1 13438:					
		-			-
		13484:9 13486:18	13474:22 13475:2	13394:13 13395:19	13451:21,25 13452:1
5			-		13460:5 13465:4
13396:12 13500:24 feel 13482:7 13399:25 13400:20 13466:10,12 12100 12100 12100 12100 12100 12100					
exactly 13389:11 explaining 13392:23 feeling 13419:5 13429:19 13440:18 13472:12,22					
	1 PD. 77 A 44 44				13474:12 13481:16
13409:3 13428:9 explains 13394:9 felt 13415:2 13476:15 13454:2 13459:13 13481:17,19,23	Di 11 1 Datier				
					13487:22 13489:6,12
					13493:21 13500:25
13327:7 13380:19 exploring 13495:10 13495:14 13506:2 forced 13428:18	man / Provide the second secon				
example 13390:4 exposed 13506:8 fetch 13453:25 13454:1 13509:18 13513:5,17 forces 13338:10			fetch 13453:25 13454:1	13509:18 13513:5,17	forces 13338:10

RealTime Transcriptions

Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

Pretoria

			i an g	i i otori
				Page
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				i aye
13379:16 13415:1,10	13467:8 13494:7	Gauteng 13354:24	13400:23 13403:21	13404:14 13405:14
13415:10 13417:21	13516:16	13456:21	13414:20 13427:11	13414:4 13416:12
13421:13,13,14	foundation 13421:23	general 13331:20	13443:12 13454:16	13417:4 13423:22
13429:7,10,20,25	four 13362:15 13415:6	13346:14 13351:9,22	13455:9 13456:16	13424:13 13429:22
13430:8,16 13432:1	13415:12 13504:17	13352:25 13355:1,1	13458:17 13477:9	13430:1,7,12
13436:23 13440:25	13504:23	13356:21 13363:10	13478:4,6 13484:9	13432:15 13449:10
13441:2 13450:24	fourth 13345:6	13401:23,25 13402:3	13495:2 13498:19,23	13449:13 13450:8
13465:22 13473:14	frame 13363:6	13403:20 13415:7	13499:1 13502:5	13451:11 13455:24
13478:20,22	frames 13427:6	13426:9,21,22,24	13503:19 13506:21	13456:4 13461:24
13479:15 13484:17	French 13362:25	13427:3,10 13430:14	13514:19	13462:3,16,19
13489:22,23,25,25	Friday 13508:9,22	13450:20 13453:4	gives 13394:15 13396:9	13468:25 13470:15
13491:4,17 13497:19	13513:5	13454:9 13455:13	13466:12	13470:22 13473:5,6
13497:21	Fritz 13346:8,10,12,19	13457:21,25 13458:4	giving 13374:25	13473:19 13474:7
			0 0	
forecast 13504:1	13346:20 13347:4,10	13458:8 13459:21	13409:19 13422:14	13475:20 13480:8,11
forensic 13399:18	13347:11 13348:6	13461:10 13466:15	13462:22 13502:4	13483:10 13484:6
13400:3 13431:22	13349:7 13479:22	13477:7,16 13479:22	13504:11 13507:1	13485:6,7 13486:12
13432:2	front 13329:22	13481:10 13483:7,20	13509:25	13489:13,15
foresaw 13398:12	13343:13 13429:8,9	13485:9,19 13491:5	glance 13459:23	13491:10,24 13492:4
		-		-
13436:21	13433:4 13446:22	13512:3 13516:24	go 13333:19 13334:17	13492:20 13500:4
form 13327:10	13460:2 13464:1	13518:17 13519:18	13335:15 13347:4,15	13520:6
13362:19 13388:14	13465:24 13474:13	generally 13376:18	13350:14 13355:18	Goldstone 13342:25
13389:16 13390:2,15	13494:23 13495:1	13454:13	13357:21 13358:3	good 13384:5 13392:14
				8
13400:17 13432:22	13496:1 13497:6	generals 13426:11,15	13373:18 13374:1,18	13393:24 13394:25
13434:13,20 13435:1	frontline 13379:5	13459:21 13483:11	13384:5 13385:10,16	13467:10
13487:15 13495:25	frustrated 13467:1	generation 13416:2	13388:23 13392:21	Google 13331:12,15
13500:8	13504:20	generic 13371:5	13393:2 13400:14,15	13332:10,11 13352:4
formalised 13465:12	fulfilling 13477:24	geographical 13499:22	13401:8 13402:15	13352:12 13353:15
format 13391:18,19	full 13326:14,19	13512:10	13405:2 13406:9,10	13384:21 13385:2,6,7
13411:15 13439:9	13339:4 13353:12	geographically 13415:4	13414:7 13415:9,25	13385:10,24 13386:3
formations 13343:15	13392:4 13427:20	geography 13363:18	13423:22 13424:25	13386:9,17 13388:17
formatting 13410:17	13440:6 13442:10	George 13326:12,20	13425:4,23 13426:20	13390:6 13396:6,8
formed 13335:8	13444:10 13445:9	13327:6 13380:18	13433:1 13435:4	13400:17 13401:10
13359:20 13459:17	13454:5 13463:6	getting 13409:8,9	13437:19 13439:15	13403:22 13409:4
forming 13413:20	13482:22	13460:19 13484:24	13439:18 13441:16	13410:8 13411:10
formulated 13354:21	fully 13439:6 13441:7,9	13501:19 13513:20	13444:14 13450:11	13422:5 13438:19
formulating 13349:1	functioning 13517:14	GGG39 13327:21	13453:25 13455:20	13441:11,13
formulation 13361:24	functions 13457:14,16	13328:19 13329:25	13457:19 13459:9,22	13455:17,24 13474:1
forward 13337:9	further 13330:23	13330:7	13462:4,8 13463:17	13478:2 13484:9,10
13340:3 13357:21,25	13333:21,25	give 13326:25 13327:23	13465:20 13470:6	13485:1,14 13494:19
13369:23 13374:7	13334:11 13370:5	13344:23 13347:8	13478:21 13479:15	13495:19
13400:2,4,20	13385:16 13392:23	13351:16 13358:10	13480:19 13483:13	Government 13510:10
13403:16 13406:17	13403:22 13406:17		13483:24 13484:6,16	Graham 13351:19
		13373:6,10 13375:16	,	
13408:2 13429:6,9,13	13418:24 13430:5	13382:10 13384:15	13484:22 13486:19	granted 13326:9
13429:15,25 13430:4	13435:10 13436:2	13384:16 13385:23	13487:11 13488:12	grass 13460:16
13430:19 13431:13	13461:17 13497:23	13390:17 13392:4	13489:5,8,15,15,16	grateful 13330:8
13431:23 13433:10		13393:4 13395:5	13489:24 13490:4,6	13395:4
13434:3 13445:14,16	G	13397:14,19	13492:11 13495:24	gratitude 13391:12
· · · · ·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		0
13449:21 13451:16	gain 13362:3 13375:6	13398:16 13399:7	13501:8 13516:14	great 13385:25 13396:3
13451:19,20 13452:6	13425:25 13437:22	13418:4 13427:3	13519:20	13396:5
13452:24 13456:8,10	gained 13355:22	13430:14 13439:19	goals 13359:22	greater 13332:12
13456:16 13459:5	13451:7	13440:6,9,18	God 13327:2,3	13360:21 13368:10
			goes 13396:10,11	13375:25 13411:9
13473:20 13474:14	gaining 13344:20	13442:21 13449:17	0	
13475:4 13476:5,11	13446:6	13454:5,16 13457:25	13440:15 13462:5	13478:11
13478:20,21,23	Game 13513:6	13462:4,6 13463:15	13518:8	green 13400:11,12
13479:9 13481:18,23	gap 13362:5 13493:14	13476:12 13477:18	going 13327:11	13495:15
13484:17,22,25	gaps 13493:17	13477:20 13481:2	13334:5 13336:6	Greenpoint 13340:16
	gather 13418:9			grenades 13367:18
13485:22 13486:6		13486:22 13487:11	13340:2 13347:9	
13491:3,24 13492:10	gathered 13363:9	13489:4,4 13496:24	13350:10 13351:9	13431:3 13488:17,18
13492:18 13493:4	13381:9 13424:24	13499:21 13510:5	13352:15 13353:18	13489:5
13494:17,22	13431:19 13486:15	given 13327:20	13357:25 13374:7	grey 13364:18
13495:23 13496:2,17		13337:11 13359:17	13378:15,20	grid 13420:2,15,16
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		13362:10,16	-	
12/06.20 12500.12	anthomas 12402 C 01		13380:23 13382:16	gridded 13420:7,8
13496:20 13500:12	gatherers 13423:6,21			
13502:23 13517:19	gathering 13353:6,12	13363:10,13,17	13384:23 13385:9,19	grids 13478:8,9
			13384:23 13385:9,19 13393:11 13395:12	grids 13478:8,9 ground 13343:13
13502:23 13517:19 forwarding 13432:13	gathering 13353:6,12 13363:22 13394:9	13363:10,13,17 13366:3 13371:4	13393:11 13395:12	ground 13343:13
13502:23 13517:19 forwarding 13432:13 found 13363:1 13387:3	gathering 13353:6,12 13363:22 13394:9 13423:15 13507:19	13363:10,13,17 13366:3 13371:4 13375:12 13376:12	13393:11 13395:12 13396:5,23 13397:24	ground 13343:13 13345:8 13349:3
13502:23 13517:19 forwarding 13432:13	gathering 13353:6,12 13363:22 13394:9	13363:10,13,17 13366:3 13371:4	13393:11 13395:12	ground 13343:13

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

				Page
13420:13 13430:16	13356:24,25	hid 13488:23	hour 13380:10	13479:14
13445:16 13466:10	13425:24 13431:18	hidden 13491:11,12	13441:21,22	implemented 13425:19
13470:17 13473:13	13432:10 13472:15	hide 13463:21 13473:7	13443:24,24 13486:4	13425:20 13457:10
13499:14	13506:21,25 13511:6	hiding 13489:9	hours 13379:20	13479:19 13480:14
grouped 13512:10	happenings 13448:22	high 13335:22 13340:7	13410:3 13461:14	importance 13353:18
grouping 13392:15,16	happens 13336:12	13351:23 13358:16	13477:4,5	important 13336:7
13392:17,19,22	13468:20 13504:20	13370:8 13372:20	housekeeping 13326:4	13365:22 13419:4
13393:1 13461:24	hard 13385:11 13386:1	13379:17 13473:18	13440:3	13444:2 13488:25
13463:8	13402:3 13440:12	13473:20 13488:23	houses 13518:9	13517:20
groupings 13474:14	13515:8,9,11	13491:16 13503:23	human 13361:3	impossible 13423:21
groups 13353:8	hardcopies 13396:23	13518:7	13405:6 13461:17	13437:23
13415:24 13438:24	13397:13	higher 13473:13	13472:14	impression 13412:21
13462:9,23 13464:18	hardcopy 13396:16	13499:14	hundred 13409:24	improved 13422:4
13467:25 13468:18	13397:9,22 13401:22	highest 13367:10	hybrid 13370:13,23	inasmuch 13472:22
13470:5,8 13471:23	13402:5,16 13403:7	highlighted 13336:9	hyperlink 13441:12	incident 13335:5
13472:4 13473:11	harm 13472:14	13390:1	hyperlinks 13441:15	13346:13 13347:13
13490:6,11 13496:18	harm's 13369:25	highlights 13336:6		13355:13 13359:19
13499:17 13512:25	hasn't 13330:25	highly 13443:14	I	13361:15 13463:22
guard 13428:22	havens 13369:21	13492:15	icon 13396:8 13441:13	13508:25 13511:17
guess 13361:3	13488:9 13500:7	highway 13394:12	13495:2	13512:10
guidance 13357:15	haven't 13330:3	13395:10	icons 13353:16	incidents 13432:20
guidelines 13357:22	13385:3 13397:13	hindsight 13335:11	13388:18,21,23	13448:6 13451:23
13362:19 13422:11	head 13337:22	13366:21 13377:22	13389:4 13390:1	13505:15 13512:9
13470:4	13346:21 13456:21	13443:23 13449:9	13391:1,20 13410:8	include 13340:21
guiding 13362:17	hear 13449:4 13503:17	13507:5	13439:25 13485:2	13472:23
13421:22 13439:20	13503:22 13504:13	historic 13512:24	13495:16,20	included 13345:4
Guinea 13341:1	13504:24 13520:5	history 13355:25	13496:20	13378:21 13384:19
Guthrie 13505:3	heard 13447:11	13363:14 13364:10	idea 13377:24	13411:2 13426:14
H	13460:11 13502:18	13365:19 13446:6	13406:21 13409:22	13456:9 13509:15
H 13331:19	13503:16 13504:8,14 13505:8,14,25	13507:24 hit 13349:3	13409:22 13417:24	13510:14,14
hacked 13347:23	13517:10,11 13520:7	hoc 13453:17	13419:15 13432:8 13443:24 13449:24	including 13507:23 inclusion 13456:7
hadn't 13488:2	hearing 13359:17	holding 13400:2	13443.24 13449.24 13450:14 13476:12	13478:17 13509:20
half 13351:1,1	13361:17 13475:23	13403:16 13408:2	13496:24	13478.17 13509.20
13398:19,21	13504:15 13505:3	13429:6,7,9,13,15	ideal 13464:21	incoming 13395:16
13441:22 13477:5	13517:7	13430:1,4,20	13466:10 13468:14	13450:25
13486:4	held 13339:3 13340:2	13431:23 13433:10	ideas 13357:24	incorporated 13422:6
halt 13497:9	13341:5 13441:4	13445:15 13451:16	identified 13393:20	incorrect 13494:20
hand 13327:2 13373:8	13458:19	13451:19,20 13452:6	13396:9,12 13414:22	increase 13502:18
13383:25 13397:6	helicopter 13350:8	13456:8,10,16	identify 13328:1	increased 13433:19
13405:11 13420:7	13409:15 13411:20	13476:11 13478:23	13382:6 13388:21	indebted 13331:23
13431:6 13457:7	13420:11,13	13479:9 13484:17,22	13423:6 13464:18	indentation 13496:11
13514:6	13430:10,13 13433:5	13484:25 13485:22	illegal 13363:25	13496:25
handed 13508:4	13447:13 13449:10	13486:6 13491:4,25	13364:12,21,22,23,24	indicate 13519:25
handle 13433:15	13460:13 13466:6	13492:10,18 13493:4	13365:10	indicated 13402:4,13
handlers 13491:7,9	13481:20,22 13492:4	13494:17,22	illegality 13358:11	13402:19,24 13425:9
handouts 13478:6	13503:4 13504:9,14	13496:20 13500:12	13378:18 13405:16	indicating 13397:4
happen 13357:25	helicopters 13350:3,6	hope 13444:20	ill-advised 13358:19	13403:25
13376:11 13382:17	13429:23 13432:4	13462:12 13519:12	image 13332:9,11	individuals 13368:13
13392:19 13407:6	help 13327:2 13371:23	hoped 13464:22	13385:6,7 13387:18	13471:23
13420:4 13438:15	13373:2 13391:11	hopefully 13473:11	13391:25 13395:5	influence 13353:25
13442:8 13467:25	13395:2 13401:6	hoping 13484:1	images 13390:21	informal 13426:25
13473:7 13483:1	13432:5 13435:19	13497:18	immediate 13368:24	13461:11 13469:15
13487:13 13495:18	13509:10	horizontal 13420:21	13431:24 13465:21	13496:22
13499:13	helped 13403:21	horse 13492:3	13479:10 13491:5	informed 13351:10
happened 13338:15	helpful 13382:25	horseback 13492:2,6	immediately 13349:1	13360:17 13413:9
13340:22,25	helping 13507:19	horses 13454:2 13492:1	13371:11 13374:5	13458:11
13361:17 13377:13	HEMRAJ 13333:20,24	Hospital 13445:18	13489:3 13506:15	informers 13423:22
13419:6 13446:7	13404:7,11	hostage 13343:21	imminent 13434:18	infrastructure 13360:9
13447:3 13451:23	he'd 13381:23	hosted 13338:21	impact 13372:13	13378:1,2 13430:5
13454:14,23	13392:24	hostel 13392:21	13409:23	13452:5 13469:16
13463:22 13464:5	he's 13487:9,9	13393:19 13403:19 13433:25 13480:8	impasse 13462:13 13519:10	13470:3,23 13471:1
In II price		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1 11719.10	13474:1
13483:6 13506:15,15	HHH 13331:4 HHH20 13327:21			
1348 3:6 13 50 6:15 , 15 13511:20 13514:11	HHH20 13327:21	hostels 13383:21	implement 13353:11	initial 13366:4 13376:5
13483:6 13506:15,15				

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

				Page 10
13450:2 13451:20	13455:5 13460:18	13502:6	13333:3,4 13385:6	killed 13347:13
13461:2	13477:11 13480:18	issued 13376:17	JJJ3.1 13333:10,13,24	13361:4,8
initialised 13433:18	intelligence-driven	issues 13360:6 13439:5	13334:3	killing 13347:19
initially 13352:21	13518:10	13459:4 13461:18,23	JJJ3.2 13333:10,16,17	13360:19
13404:13,23 13447:9	intelligible 13391:4,6,8	13489:18	JJJ4 13384:25 13386:2	kilometre 13395:10
13459:1 13468:11	13396:4	item 13332:5,7	13386:9	kind 13372:14 13397:1
13487:4 13491:4	intend 13387:10	13384:24	job 13339:7 13405:14	13449:1 13463:14
13495:17 13515:19	intended 13367:12	items 13389:1	13489:7	kmz 13390:20
13515:21	13448:13 13461:4	13425:25	JOC 13348:20	kmz2 13390:20
initiated 13359:7	intensity 13502:18	it'll 13384:12,25	13351:22 13355:17	knew 13366:23
13502:17	intention 13375:15	13385:17 13389:10	13381:10,13	13370:8 13380:22
initiative 13432:12	interaction 13416:18	it's 13328:4,25 13330:5	13419:19 13421:1,25	13424:11 13460:19
initiatives 13342:2	13416:21	13330:25 13353:6,11	13432:13 13445:14	13464:3 13483:22
injured 13431:7	interface 13474:17	13356:19 13362:20	13447:1,21 13448:6	13486:25
13505:10,11	interfere 13450:10	13366:19 13379:15	13449:13 13454:18	know 13331:8
innocent 13433:1 13468:15	interim 13417:8	13381:19 13382:11	13459:2,9,22	13332:11 13333:7
input 13440:14	13430:13 13480:20	13382:12,18	13460:12,18	13334:5 13351:3
13446:2 13458:2	internal 13343:5,7,17	13384:19,20 13386:21 13387:5	13465:12,14 13467:6 13475:2 13482:2,5,12	13352:3 13356:12
13446:2 13458:2	internationally 13337:17	13392:4 13394:1,13	13475:2 13482:2,5,12	13357:6 13360:1 13362:15 13364:8,22
13485:13 13509:14 13510:15 13518:13	interpret 13358:6	13394:25 13396:17	13483:12 13486:5 13501:8,11,25	13362:15 13364:8,22 13373:16 13375:14
inputs 13353:22	interpret 13358:6	13394:25 13396:17 13396:20,22 13397:3	13501:8,11,25 13502:1,13 13503:15	13373:16 13375:14 13377:21,22
13362:16 13507:23	interpreting 13348:10 interrogate 13458:13	13397:20 13400:1	13504:15 13506:6	13378:24 13379:1,25
13513:14 13515:22	interrupt 13327:19	13397:20 13400:1	JOCCOM 13380:23	13378:24 13379:1,25 13382:16 13386:10
Inquiry 13512:5	13388:11 13394:21	13402.7,24 13411.12	13406:17 13407:7	13387:6 13392:13
inserted 13330:5	13397:12 13402:2	13413.5 13419.4	13408:16 13412:21	13400:15 13401:22
13494:25	13518:20	13425:19 13429:8	13427:20 13436:24	13400.15 13401.22
inserts 13494:23	interruption 13395:25	13436:21 13437:20	13440:18 13441:4	13415:17,24
inside 13373:17	intersections 13394:14	13437:23 13440:11	13442:13,16 13444:2	13418:16 13419:4
13399:3 13401:11	intervention 13369:6	13443:22 13450:1	13444:8 13445:3	13420:14,23 13423:9
13405:9 13421:15	13400:13 13401:2	13458:9 13461:14	13450:19,22 13451:3	13426:2,3,18 13430:1
13460:11,18	interviewed 13399:11	13463:9,23,23	13453:4,21 13454:8	13430:2 13431:2,4
13468:16 13474:15	inter-departmental	13469:12 13471:15	13457:24 13459:16	13433:3 13437:7,10
13483:12	13338:2	13472:10,11	13459:19 13460:4	13443:18,19,20
instance 13367:22	inter-ministerial	13473:15,17 13480:7	13461:11 13465:10	13446:2 13447:10,14
13371:17 13374:6	13510:6	13486:3 13491:21	13465:13 13467:16	13449:9,23 13455:21
13396:10 13420:16	intimidate 13374:25	13519:24	13475:7 13476:23	13456:14 13457:24
13428:19 13435:6	intimidation 13372:10	I'd 13381:21 13436:20	13477:2,7 13478:11	13458:6 13467:19
13436:10 13453:22	13418:5	I'll 13397:14,25	13479:21 13483:4,8	13468:14,16
13491:10	introduce 13342:3	13398:1,3	13483:10,11	13475:14,15
instruction 13337:11	13419:15 13463:2	I'm 13360:13,14,15	13484:15	13483:23,25 13486:5
13375:17 13380:2,20	introduced 13351:19	13397:10,12	JOCCOMs 13457:25	13487:7 13493:8,13
13435:12 13438:23	13351:21 13379:20	13402:17 13403:6,7	13518:17	13494:20,21
13464:15 13504:11	13379:21 13381:21	13445:5 13449:8	join 13394:9	13506:14,19,20
instructions 13338:16	13446:15	13463:15,23,24	judgment 13490:4	13516:21
13382:8,10,10	investigation 13344:16	I've 13341:25 13415:5	July 13330:19 13334:5	knowing 13354:17
13424:6,10 13425:2	13430:22	13456:14 13475:12	J1 13331:20,22	13368:24 13373:7
13457:5 13459:13	invite 13334:17	i.e 13428:4 13433:8	J2 13331:22	13393:15,17,19,21
instructor 13336:25	13507:9	T		13415:2,3 13437:19
13337:3 13341:9,16	involved 13347:24	<u>J</u>	$\frac{\mathbf{K}}{\mathbf{V}}$	13450:11 13462:2
insufficient 13350:20	13359:18 13361:15	J 13331:19,22	Karee 13392:21	13488:21
13439:10,11,12	13394:1 13411:2	ja 13331:10 13402:22	13393:5,6,9	knowledge 13329:17
13467:19	13423:6 13463:25	13403:2 13406:8	keep 13396:2 13464:6	13371:4 13384:19
integrate 13444:3	13513:3	13449:2 13450:5	13474:11 13487:25	13439:11 13446:1,5
integrated 13340:8	isn't 13327:22	13452:15 13455:3,19	13493:9,12 kooping 13306:4	13448:9 13468:19
13417:20 intelligence 13344:16	13328:25 13329:4	13467:17 13491:1	keeping 13396:4	13472:15 13480:16 13515:14
intelligence 13344:16 13344:21,21,22	13384:16 13397:7,17 isolate 13394:2 13398:9	13501:24 13515:9	kept 13491:6,7 13511:11 13514:23	13515:14 knowledgesble
13344:21,21,22 13356:17,19,20,22	13408:7 13435:5	jammed 13504:18,18 January 13332:9	13511:11 13514:23	knowledgeable 13468:24
13394:6 13401:12	13470:6	JJJ 13331:25	key 13388:18,20	known 13364:11
	isolated 13433:2	JJJ1 13331:25 JJJ1 13332:2,19	13389:1 13436:4	13369:5 13406:9
13423:21 13424:3	isolating 13423:4	13385:6 13388:3,7	13445:23 13466:19	13448:7 13485:17
13425:21 13434:17	13471:23	13397:15	13445.25 15400.19 13512:9	13448.7 13485.17 13491:21
13438:5 13439:12	issue 13365:8 13367:25	JJJ2 13332:2,20	keying 13504:25	knows 13350:22
	13388:12 13424:13	13385:7 13388:4	keys 13481:20,23	kinows 13350.22 koppies 13460:12,15
1,7442,14 1,747,111				
13442:14 13453:11 13454:14,15,15	13429:17 13473:12	JJJ3 13332:25 13333:2	kill 13360:16	13473:7 13487:19

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

Marikana Commission of Inquiry

				Page 1
13497:21	learnt 13477:23	13392:20 13398:13	13466:21 13515:15	13454:23 13457:12
K4 13378:3 13452:17	leave 13326:7,9	13398:14,20,22	longs 13396:24	13457:17 13465:9
K9 13453:13 13491:21	13375:18,19	13399:25 13401:7	Lonmin 13348:2,20	13474:5 13479:8
K9's 13500:18	13402:14 13404:17	13402:7,8,9,14	13350:13 13413:4	13508:17 13509:6,14
	13431:25 13441:2	13403:1 13404:21,21	13423:2 13453:19	Major-Generals
L	13462:23 13463:14	13404:22 13405:1,1,6	13467:20 13502:4	13453:9
L 13334:12 13420:3	13469:25 13470:1	13405:11 13413:20	13513:6	male 13455:8
13425:10 13490:14	13471:14,14	13420:22 13425:1	look 13331:12 13358:8	Malema 13510:25
13490:23 13514:20	13475:22 13476:4	13446:23 13465:24	13362:19 13363:1,2	man 13343:13
13515:6,8	led 13349:24 13366:10	13469:21 13470:4	13415:25 13457:7	13487:10
labour 13359:23	13461:17 13462:8	13473:3,4,8,15	13462:3 13481:10	manage 13337:10
13360:7	left 13355:17 13357:11	13482:10 13488:15	13490:13 13496:15	13431:20
lack 13356:11,19,19,21	13388:20 13399:3	13488:21 13489:1,3	13507:9 13514:5	manageable 13464:18
13413:1 13424:3	13403:1 13413:4	13489:24 13492:12	looked 13330:4	13472:4
13436:18 13438:9	13416:9 13440:25	13492:24,24 13493:6	13352:3 13362:15	management 13336:24
13459:4	13476:1 13481:25	13493:10,18,20,21	13406:14 13465:21	13355:18 13410:19
lady 13328:15	13485:7 13487:15	13495:3,10,13,14,17	13481:14 13494:8	13426:15,19 13437:8
laid 13462:20	13489:23,24 13492:8	13496:11,12,15	looking 13357:22	13453:17 13516:15
language 13439:5	13493:4 13496:5	13497:11 13499:10	13360:2 13362:18	mandatory 13336:19
13477:25 13484:21	13497:5 13498:21	13503:19 13504:2	13371:9 13387:1	map 13352:4,12
lapa 13351:21	legal 13378:12 13397:9	13506:2,18,25	13388:2,6 13389:14	13353:15 13384:5,6
large 13363:24	13516:18	lined 13473:14	13389:20,22 13392:1	13384:11,15 13400:2
13372:17 13376:11	length 13342:6	lines 13468:6	13406:11 13418:14	13401:10 13403:22
13377:25 13381:8	lenses 13502:7	list 13332:5,7	13449:20 13514:9	13410:8 13411:10
13417:17 13467:13	lesser 13442:12	listen 13502:10	13518:9	13418:11,13 13420:7
13470:14	13473:18	listened 13358:24	looks 13327:22 13330:2	13438:19 13446:7
larger 13366:2 13408:9	lethal 13367:11,12	listening 13447:21	13397:15 13437:19	13455:17 13474:1
13451:12 13461:24	13369:24 13375:4	13501:24	lorries 13400:4	13484:9,10 13485:14
13464:2 13489:13	13488:13	literally 13348:12	lot 13396:19 13414:14	mapped 13446:16
lat 13396:24	letter 13327:23	13400:23 13455:21	13477:24 13478:20	mapping 13446:14
late 13453:22 13454:3	13331:19,22	13458:1 13485:15	13480:18 13520:3	13451:22
13474:4 13482:21	13397:11 13400:8,9	little 13369:3 13389:4	loud 13374:24	maps 13331:15
13505:2	13400:14 13507:19	13411:8 13423:13	lower 13369:5	13352:4 13384:13,21
laude 13342:11	Let's 13404:19	13441:13 13453:24	13374:10	13385:2 13420:7
launched 13430:12	level 13343:13	13454:3 13457:7,9	lowest 13375:19	13455:24
law 13363:22 13364:16	13359:21 13360:5,15	13459:7 13461:11	lunch 13444:20	march 13393:2
13371:22 13378:16	13367:10 13371:14	13475:11 13486:4,11	lying 13503:11 13505:9	13402:15 13434:4,18
lawful 13378:12	13371:15 13374:8,10	13486:17 13492:19		13452:2
lawlessness 13436:2	13374:11 13375:19	13497:5	M	marched 13435:3
lay 13358:12 13475:9	13433:19 13437:24	live 13372:25	M 13362:24	marchers 13376:15
13475:20 13478:16	13462:21	lives 13428:17	machine 13384:14	marching 13435:5
13479:10	levels 13359:22	13431:15	Macintosh 13449:17	13446:22
laying 13475:5	13374:10 13375:20	loaded 13399:10	13454:25	Marikana 13327:17
layout 13363:18	13433:9	loading 13400:5	Madam 13333:23	13331:5 13335:3,5
13454:8 13478:2	liaison 13447:10	local 13344:5 13419:1	Magaliesburg 13348:9	13346:4,13 13347:5
layouts 13480:16	Lieutenant 13339:6	locals 13417:25	13349:9	13347:14 13348:15
LCRC 13453:14	13408:13 13454:25	located 13381:9	magnitude 13491:23	13350:11,23
13455:9	13457:23	13395:15 13432:24	MAHLANGU	13351:13 13355:4,22
lead 13395:16	Lieutenant-Colonel	13447:15	13384:21	13365:16 13366:5
13403:21 13406:12	13379:22 13380:3,21	locating 13457:19	mailed 13508:8	13375:22 13395:12
leader 13337:4,7,8	13381:17 13412:17	location 13351:15	main 13333:12 13460:5	13395:17 13407:19
13341:13,19 13345:5	13503:9 13504:10	13447:12,13	maintain 13492:1	13423:3 13451:25
13345:6	13505:3,8 13508:4	13452:18	maintaining 13511:7	13510:11,25 13511:6
leaders 13337:14	13519:17	logic 13361:6 13376:24	major 13370:13	13511:17,23 13512:4
13345:1,7 13386:13	life 13374:6 13401:4	13471:11	13376:16 13410:12	13513:17 13519:10
13441:1	13422:18	logically 13371:24	13432:21 13438:12	Maritzburg 13339:15
leadership 13340:1	light 13398:16	13424:21	13450:19 13455:12	mark 13394:23
13406:25 13408:7	13412:13 13450:7	logistics 13410:14	13477:6 13481:9	13396:17,23 13397:2
leading 13326:5	13453:23	long 13391:24	majority 13392:9	13397:4,10,25
13327:8 13336:4	limitations 13423:15	13441:18 13460:8	13418:15 13499:4	13398:1,3,23
13340:6 13366:14	limited 13363:19	13477:1 13486:1	Major-General	13401:21,25 13402:3
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	13366:20 13371:4,4	13503:23	13347:5 13348:15	13402:4 13403:6,7
13309:9 13393:11	2	longer 13366:6	13350:14,17	13467:14
13369:9 13395:11 13517:9	13376:14 13454:20	1011gel 15500.0		
	13376:14 13454:20 line 13340:24 13369:10	13413:21 13414:4	13419:14,19	marked 13327:12
13517:9		-		
1351 7:9 leak 13460:17 13467:5	line 13340:24 13369:10	13413:21 13414:4	13419:14,19	marked 13327:12

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

				Page 12
13333:2 13385:3,4	13461:11 13465:13	13494:5,13	minutes 13389:4	13366:1 13393:23
13389:2,5 13397:15	13477:7 13478:11	met 13377:8 13452:22	13464:8 13486:7	Mountains 13348:10
13397:16,17 13399:8	13483:4,10,20	meters 13461:16	13502:18 13504:17	mounted 13453:15
13401:9 13405:10	meetings 13362:16	method 13403:25	13504:23	13454:1 13491:7,24
marking 13397:5	13426:11,15 13453:8	13420:10,15	mission 13362:17,19	mouse 13396:11
markings 13397:23	13467:16 13477:2	methodologies	13363:5 13410:13	move 13331:19
martyrdom 13372:23	meets 13420:22	13337:13 13396:7	13421:23 13423:1,10	13366:25 13369:22
mass 13395:20 13434:4	member 13375:7	methodology 13390:13	13439:19,19,21	13371:14 13375:4,6
masse 13434:1	13517:15	13396:18	13455:20,21	13377:17,19,25
material 13513:25	members 13345:8	methods 13396:21	mistake 13330:6	13379:2 13383:16
13514:18 13515:2,6	13346:17 13367:5,10	metres 13332:20,21	13384:14 13504:21	13391:19 13392:9
materialised 13482:14	13367:12,16 13368:1	13385:7,8 13388:4	mitigating 13472:21	13397:25 13398:19
Mathunjwa 13481:24	13368:3,9,14,18	13428:12 13447:16	mobile 13453:14	13400:19 13401:6
matric 13342:10	13369:20,22,23	13488:24	mobilisation 13451:21	13402:21 13403:12
matriculating	13370:10 13371:2	mid 13447:15	mobilise 13377:25	13404:25 13414:18
13335:21	13374:23 13379:8	middle 13420:17	13430:2,8 13434:2	13404.23 13414.18
matter 13327:17	13381:22 13395:9	13487:17 13493:7	13430.2,8 13434.2	13435:7 13439:19
			mobilising 13377:19	13444:25 13452:2,4
13409:25 13431:4	13401:5,13,14	13496:5		
13434:22 13454:1	13404:23,23	midnight 13413:5	mobility 13478:24	13454:13 13461:15
13458:25 13459:3	13408:14 13413:10	mid-morning 13419:18	modified 13386:14,18	13464:12 13465:22
13460:25 13465:3	13413:19 13415:8	mike 13326:17	13387:6	13468:7,13 13470:10
13475:23 13492:16	13416:19 13417:20	milestones 13345:24	modus 13362:23	13473:5 13485:2
13516:9,23	13418:9 13419:7	milieu 13362:25	moment 13389:8,11,20	13487:16,18,22
matters 13326:4	13420:10 13421:2,5	militant 13366:3,23	13392:2 13427:15	13488:4,14,20
13340:20 13507:4	13422:17,22	13407:1 13446:21	13469:14	13491:5 13495:12
McIntosh 13519:18	13423:18 13424:12	13451:10 13462:2	Monday 13346:6	13496:2,7 13499:2
mean 13359:25	13427:22 13428:10	13463:8,19 13464:1	13350:23 13361:16	moved 13383:7
13362:1 13364:6	13428:11,16,17	13468:15 13471:16	13365:20,25 13377:9	13400:20 13429:18
13400:8 13405:20	13429:13 13433:9	13473:1 13488:10	13377:13,23 13393:9	13430:9 13447:22
13408:23 13423:23	13435:11 13440:10	13493:11 13499:7	13410:17 13419:7	13466:19 13473:9
13424:7 13472:24	13442:13 13444:8	13506:1	13426:19 13463:22	13485:5 13496:21
13476:17 13487:9	13445:7 13449:16	military 13481:19	13463:25 13464:5	13497:18
meaning 13451:11	13458:4 13459:16	mimics 13377:13	13468:24 13518:21	movement 13414:14
means 13363:2,2	13464:16 13473:18	mind 13349:22,23	13519:1,21	13456:4 13468:12
13378:10 13382:5	13481:18,21 13482:6	13350:2,5,10 13369:3	monitoring 13427:24	movements 13377:21
13387:6 13395:21	13483:11 13487:1,13	13369:17 13397:18	13445:15 13446:23	13383:5 13407:14
13416:16 13446:10	13492:18 13494:25	13403:8 13409:4	13458:9 13507:25	13441:25 13479:1,2
13462:6 13487:3	13500:3 13512:13	13464:6 13483:25	monitors 13502:4	13497:24
meant 13485:3	13513:13 13518:5,6	13484:4 13486:25	months 13339:15,18,19	moves 13376:21
media 13336:5,7	memory 13460:8	13490:24 13500:14	Mooinooi 13394:8	13489:23
13358:5 13360:2	men 13392:22 13449:5	13504:6	13395:11 13407:19	moving 13354:5
13432:25 13434:17	13475:16	mindful 13377:7	morning 13379:20	13358:13 13375:1
13447:9,10,12	menace 13362:20	minds 13334:1	13380:24 13383:8,15	13394:16 13398:17
13468:7 13482:6	mental 13504:5	mindset 13370:7	13394:8 13406:15,18	13399:24 13400:24
13491:19 13507:25	mention 13342:23	13374:13	13406:19 13407:7	13401:16 13403:1
13508:12,18 13509:3	13343:5 13344:13	mine 13348:2,20	13408:19 13409:16	13414:16 13416:8
13509:21,25	13373:5 13499:10	13350:14 13351:23	13411:20 13412:20	13427:23 13445:16
13510:14 13513:6	mentioned 13347:13	13352:4,9 13355:18	13413:14 13414:5	13460:5 13465:6
13514:4	13348:8,18 13379:2	13378:1,2 13383:20	13422:3 13423:17	13468:19 13469:15
medical 13430:21	13392:20,24 13394:6	13393:19 13397:14	13436:25 13443:5	13473:16 13482:9
13431:6 13491:8	13398:9 13401:15	13409:1,2 13410:19	13449:19,21 13450:4	13488:15
meet 13350:14	13423:20 13460:4,9	13413:4 13423:3	13450:5,7,12,21	Mpembe 13331:20
13355:18 13373:24	13460:10 13467:3,17	13426:15,19 13430:6	13454:5 13460:4	13355:1 13415:8
13374:9 13412:22	13488:8 13501:23	13446:8 13452:5	13462:15 13466:20	13419:15,19
13449:19	13502:3	13453:19 13467:20	13467:12 13476:23	13426:22 13453:9
meeting 13356:5	mentioning 13487:5	13470:20,20,23	13477:4 13478:21	13459:21 13509:6,14
13357:11,17,20	Merafe 13408:13	13471:1,9 13474:1	13482:22 13484:11	13519:18
13380:23 13392:6	13412:17 13457:23	13480:16	13485:4 13508:19,22	multiple 13375:6
13407:7 13408:18	13458:3	miners 13352:6	13509:4,24 13518:21	13417:10
13410:19 13421:2	Merafi 13379:22	13353:17 13370:10	13518:25 13519:2	multi-disciplinary
13422:12 13426:18		13383:22 13392:24	13518.25 13519.2	13340:7 13517:16
13426:20 13427:21	13380:3,21 13381:17 13381:21 13392:6	13433:2 13460:19	mornings 13477:3	Munis 13516:23
13420:20 13427:21	13518:15,21	13435:2 13460:19	motion 13496:6	Munu 13516:23,24
	Mercedes 13486:16			-
13449:21 13450:19		minimal 13347:14	moulding 13354:1	murder 13365:9
13450:22 13455:1	merely 13334:12	minimum 13421:3	mountain 13348:8,10	murdered 13455:8
13459:16,19	message 13483:18	mining 13423:24	13348:10 13349:8,9	
ARCHIVE FO	K JUSIICE			1

				Page 1
N	13421:13 13424:14	13403:13,19	observation 13400:10	13397:10,24 13402:1
N 13394:12,12	13434:16 13435:4	13421:15 13468:12	13400:10 13414:7,12	13403:9 13404:6
Naidoo 13355:1	13443:14 13465:13	13471:8 13492:13	13448:14 13460:11	13411:11,19 13421:1
13426:21 13453:10	13465:24 13467:7	nodal 13515:18	observations 13376:13	13425:12 13454:22
13491:6	13469:21 13476:16	non 13367:12 13369:24	observe 13505:17,19	13467:22 13475:24
name 13386:5 13429:6	13478:15 13480:12	non-lethal 13376:7	obtain 13361:22	13479:3,17 13482:25
named 13443:3,7	13483:14 13484:24	13379:15 13421:17	obtained 13365:19	13507:13 13520:10
names 13326:14,19	13486:12 13487:11	non-technical 13422:15	13422:6 13432:5	old 13487:3
naming 13461:3	13517:21	normal 13360:14	13438:4 13444:13	once 13354:5 13364:17
national 13335:23	needs 13349:3 13354:5	13376:1 13419:7	13517:15	13375:7 13406:11
13338:17 13342:10	13371:12 13374:8,12	13448:19 13459:24	obtaining 13362:7	13414:24 13431:13
13351:8 13353:18	13480:7,15,19	13460:14 13469:17	obvious 13364:12	13449:24 13453:23
13354:13,16,23	13485:11	normally 13360:5,8,9	obviously 13330:5	13462:18 13464:14
13355:9,12,17	negative 13446:11	13362:21 13374:20	13336:5 13361:17	13473:3 13500:4
13356:3,8 13358:25	13469:5	13441:12,13	13366:17 13378:25	ones 13425:9 13464:17
13359:18 13361:22	negotiate 13378:25	13454:17 13475:15 13480:6 13486:13	13385:11 13409:23	13471:17
13365:4 13369:6	13497:9 13519:17		13424:15 13425:1	ongoing 13348:2 13363:25 13370:17
13394:13 13400:13	negotiating 13358:22	north 13354:25	13426:5 13429:19	13370:24 13441:24
13401:1 13508:7,12	negotiation 13358:9	13395:10 13398:4,7	13438:2 13440:25	
13508:18 13509:2,25	13436:22 13445:15 13458:9	13398:21,22	13443:9 13448:15 13450:10 13457:6	onlookers 13375:16
13513:10,21	13458:9 negotiations 13426:23	13470:16 13495:13 northern 13487:14	13450:10 13457:6 13459:6 13462:1	onward 13353:22 onwards 13413:7
nationally 13337:17	13427:24 13435:25	Northwest 13453:10		13511:6
natural 13495:9	13427:24 13455:25	North-West 13453:10 North-West 13510:9	13464:6 13465:5,19 13466:23 13472:25	open 13470:3,14,17
13497:7	13519:11,17,18	13512:15	13473:15 13483:24	13473:10 13495:8,12
nature 13361:3	negotiators 13343:21	note 13507:14 13508:8	13484:13 13487:22	13475.10 13495.8,12
near 13519:20	13359:8 13365:5	noticed 13516:4,11	13488:15 13492:21	opened 13477:7
necessarily 13349:4	13373:5 13450:7	notwithstanding	13495:21	operandi 13362:23
13364:23 13370:6	13453:12	13365:14	occupied 13340:15	operate 13418:23
13372:24 13386:22	neutral 13415:19	November 13328:22	occupy 13445:16	13468:17 13469:18
13393:6 13405:3,12	13418:21 13419:10	13330:1	occur 13434:18	13473:17 13475:13
13408:9 13415:16	13434:14 13445:19	null 13491:20	13443:23 13476:21	operating 13414:12
13426:16 13492:20	13468:4,8	NUM 13392:25	occurred 13355:14	13431:8 13436:8
necessary 13364:15 13386:20,22 13437:9	never 13409:2	13393:2 13415:21	occurring 13350:19	13437:10,20
13457:10 13458:10	13431:10 13461:4	13434:1 13435:7	13365:16 13401:5	13498:25 13519:5
13472:23 13489:10	13491:14	13445:17 13474:6,20	13432:20 13436:9	operation 13338:3,8,10
need 13344:2 13354:10	new 13337:18 13362:9	13474:24	OCT 13342:24	13338:16 13340:11
13354:18 13362:3	13362:10 13455:22	number 13330:23	October 13328:5,16	13340:16,17,21
13368:1 13369:9,11	13456:13 13458:16	13332:5 13342:19	odd 13407:18 13408:10	13346:16 13348:12
13370:8 13373:9,14	13458:18 13483:25	13352:17 13372:17	offensive 13367:10,19	13348:25 13349:19
13373:18,20 13374:6	newly 13415:10	13384:16,17	13368:20 13377:17	13349:24 13354:4,19
13374:23 13377:3	13417:19 13479:10	13385:25 13399:7	offer 13409:15	13355:21 13368:9
13378:15 13388:12	news 13360:2	13418:9	offered 13467:20	13370:23 13382:16
13396:18 13422:18	night 13377:23 13378:3	numbering 13408:9	office 13435:7	13391:22 13398:12
13424:15,20,22	13383:8,12 13392:13	numbers 13372:14	officer 13374:3,7,20	13398:16 13399:22
13429:20 13431:5	13415:3 13422:8	13411:21	13447:11	13405:18 13410:23
13434:25 13436:10	13426:19 13452:17	nutshell 13344:3	officers 13360:16	13411:1,2,6,7,14
13438:11 13450:11	13454:14 13461:20	Nyala 13474:12,15	13361:4,8,18 13375:2	13413:10,14
13451:1,16 13452:23	13475:3 13508:16	13485:4	13381:18 13410:18	13416:24,25 13420:9
13458:9 13461:23	13518:16,23 13519:1	Nyalas 13369:21	13422:13 13519:16	13421:9 13423:1
13462:3,19,21	nightmare 13461:22	13398:11 13421:3	offices 13328:16	13429:4 13430:12
13464:4 13470:1	nightshift 13448:17	13434:7,24 13479:4	13393:2 13415:21	13431:11 13432:21
13471:17 13472:23	night/Tuesday	13485:4 13495:3,4,4	13434:1 13445:17	13432:22 13437:2
13483:9,24 13487:2	13518:21	13500:5	official 13371:8	13439:21 13442:21
13520:1	nine 13419:14	N1 13395:10	13372:7 13513:17	13480:8,9 13481:1
needed 13346:14,15	NIU 13349:24 13369:6	0	officials 13360:19	13485:18 13490:5
13356:14 13358:8	13370:1 13407:11		13433:2 ab 12222:1 12220:10	13497:24 13502:17
13362:6 13364:4	13421:5 13425:22	o 13478:21	oh 13332:1 13339:10	13504:24 13505:3
13365:10,11	13445:22 13466:1 13479:9 13481:21	oath 13326:11,15,22	13385:3 akay 12227:11	13506:25
	1 5/1 / 9' 9 1 5/1 X 1 5/1	13329:3 13380:13	okay 13327:11	operational 13339:24 13340:16 13342:24
13366:25 13367:6		12111.01 10101 11		
13366:25 13367:6 13368:12,17	13489:12 13493:20	13444:24 13464:11	13328:17 13329:5,15	
13366:25 13367:6 13368:12,17 13378:20,25	13489:12 13493:20 13495:16 13496:1	13494:10	13335:14 13344:4	13344:23 13345:8
13366:25 13367:6 13368:12,17 13378:20,25 13381:21 13393:23	13489:12 13493:20 13495:16 13496:1 Nkaneng 13383:16,21	13494:10 OB 13425:4	13335:14 13344:4 13348:21 13357:10	13344:23 13345:8 13354:1,9,18
13366:25 13367:6 13368:12,17 13378:20,25 13381:21 13393:23 13415:13,17,23	13489:12 13493:20 13495:16 13496:1 Nkaneng 13383:16,21 13398:25 13401:11	13494:10 OB 13425:4 objection 13458:3	13335:14 13344:4 13348:21 13357:10 13357:14 13363:7	13344:23 13345:8 13354:1,9,18 13355:14 13361:24
13366:25 13367:6 13368:12,17 13378:20,25 13381:21 13393:23	13489:12 13493:20 13495:16 13496:1 Nkaneng 13383:16,21	13494:10 OB 13425:4	13335:14 13344:4 13348:21 13357:10	13344:23 13345:8 13354:1,9,18

Still September 2013	Wa			
				Page 1
				Ŭ
13382:11 13391:15	13473:2 13476:20	o'clock 13380:23	13398:12 13399:21	period 13341:9
13391:20 13398:8	oral 13510:15	13406:15 13407:7	13412:4 13423:10	13342:19 13345:17
13401:4 13408:13	orange 13398:13,20	13408:15 13423:18	13430:18 13431:9	13439:4 13482:20
13410:5 13417:9	13403:1 13493:19	13427:3 13440:17	13437:14 13446:1,3	13494:21 13495:19
13421:21,24 13424:7	13495:3	13453:3 13475:8	13456:2 13459:12	13504:23 13511:5
13431:13 13434:15	order 13339:20	13476:23 13481:9	13462:5,22 13463:12	periods 13414:18
13435:12 13437:14	13343:3 13356:13	13482:20 13486:6	13463:13,17	permanent 13421:21
			-	
13438:1 13439:7,8,22	13357:23 13362:5	13508:22 13520:12	13466:19 13468:22	permanently 13402:5
13443:14 13451:1	13363:3 13366:10,19		13470:2 13471:15	permission 13327:8
13455:24 13456:1,21	13367:1 13368:4	P	13491:14 13511:19	13454:2
13457:12 13490:3	13369:12,20	packed 13446:22	13514:19	permit 13369:22
13497:22	13371:12,14 13375:8	page 13328:8 13330:17	participated 13489:20	perpetrator 13372:6
operationalise	13375:11,13,21	13333:8,13,13,15	particular 13356:8,18	13373:6
13354:10	13376:6,8 13378:11	13334:23 13335:16	13390:4 13427:11	perpetrators 13348:12
operationally 13336:20	13378:16 13379:4,14	13339:12 13342:6,7	13440:22	13357:5 13471:22
operations 13340:7	13379:15,18			
-		13344:4,8,13 13345:2	particularly 13363:9	person 13458:2
13348:5 13359:12	13398:11,15 13400:4	13345:7,22,25	13491:19	13459:2 13464:19
13367:10 13369:12	13404:22,24	13360:12 13368:17	parties 13341:4	13503:22 13517:9
13393:18 13453:14	13431:25 13435:1	13377:2 13381:3	13519:16	personalised 13475:16
13469:9 13489:20	13436:11 13437:2	13407:4 13408:11	parts 13430:9	personnel 13413:9
13517:16	13440:1 13469:13	13413:18 13428:1	party 13360:8	13431:6 13433:1
operatives 13401:13	13473:3,4,14 13488:6	13436:14 13437:4	13426:16 13467:21	13453:17 13457:20
opinion 13359:24	13489:1,2,17 13492:1	13441:24 13445:3	path 13383:22	13488:6 13491:7
-			-	
opponent 13362:21	13496:7 13497:19	13446:5 13476:23	paths 13406:12	13496:21 13518:18
13372:21 13374:3,22	13517:22 13518:13	13479:21 13481:8	pathway 13359:1	persons 13371:21
13374:25 13489:23	orderly 13394:22	13486:9 13492:23	13398:5,6	13412:1,11 13424:23
opponents 13363:4	13399:2 13423:5	13498:14 13500:16	patrol 13415:5,9,12,25	13431:24 13483:21
13393:13,14,15	ordinating 13340:7	13507:10	13417:12,16	13491:25 13503:10
13496:16	13382:8	painted 13340:16	13419:24 13420:4,6	13505:9,10,11
opportunistic 13383:25	organising 13338:9	panga 13364:24	13424:12 13440:24	13518:7,13
13392:11 13461:7	13340:6	13405:24 13406:4	patrolling 13416:3,13	pertinently 13460:21
	orientate 13391:16		patrols 13416:18,21	peruse 13450:21
opportunities 13458:13		pangas 13347:24	-	-
opportunity 13358:10	13403:16 13415:4,12	13361:15	13417:9 13419:15	pessimistic 13476:21
13372:6 13373:8	13418:1 13439:17	Papa1 13502:20	13444:9 13445:8	phases 13370:5,7
13404:18 13422:15	13455:22 13490:20	parade 13459:17,18,24	13448:19	13425:9 13427:4
13454:16 13458:1	orientated 13355:11	13459:24	peaceful 13428:4	13438:3,6 13443:2,4
13462:4,6 13463:16	13383:21 13417:20	paragraph 13329:12	pen 13397:21	13443:8 13457:4,8
13518:18	orientating 13352:2	13334:2,22 13337:25	people 13349:12	13472:20 13486:23
opposed 13452:13	13408:24	13338:14,23	13352:18 13357:5	13487:2,3
opposite 13398:24	orientation 13351:15	13339:11,17 13340:2	13362:22 13366:4	Phiyega 13351:9
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Opsplatinum.kmz	13354:16 13383:20	13340:14,20 13342:2	13372:25 13375:19	phone 13346:7
13386:6,7,9,18	13384:6 13409:10,14	13342:21 13348:1	13376:11 13385:2	photo 13381:8 13390:2
13388:14 13389:3,16	13422:5	13350:10,21	13386:13 13389:10	photograph 13388:19
13390:1,3,15	originated 13357:17	13352:20 13359:4,16	13391:17 13393:4	13409:5,5
Opsplatinum2 13389:3	Oryx 13432:17,18,22	13360:12,18	13394:15 13400:6	photographs 13331:12
Opsplatinum2.kmz	13466:7,9,11	13361:21 13363:8	13401:16 13403:5	13432:13 13508:3,23
13389:24	13481:20,22	13365:7,25 13370:21	13405:13,13,15	13514:3 13516:6,12
optimally 13473:17	outline 13355:21	13381:2 13407:4,13	13406:22 13407:18	photography 13478:7
optimistic 13462:16	13486:22			
		13408:12 13410:16	13407:18 13409:21	photos 13417:18
13476:20	outside 13394:16	13417:8 13419:20	13411:21 13415:15	13422:5 13432:9
option 13358:3,19	13418:1 13425:24	13438:9 13441:23	13415:16 13420:12	photostatted 13397:6
13366:6 13367:7	13459:9 13483:8	13445:4 13450:19	13420:12,22	physically 13372:2
13373:16 13377:3,7	13488:7 13495:25	13452:9 13457:23	13423:25 13425:2	13464:16 13487:22
13377:17 13378:21	13515:6 13519:16	13463:3 13472:18	13431:4,11,23	pick 13393:18
13413:21 13424:20	overall 13346:22	13479:20 13481:4	13439:1,5,25	picked 13449:10
13424:22 13426:1	overlapping 13495:21	13486:9 13498:11	13448:25 13449:15	pictorial 13478:1
13435:24 13436:11	overnight 13392:9	13499:20 13500:15	13455:22 13458:7	picture 13387:19,21,25
13450:6,11 13462:6	13404:9,17 13443:22	13501:22 13502:16	13460:14 13461:4	13400:17 13440:13
13463:6,10,12	13476:2	13505:7 13511:16	13467:12 13468:5,15	13485:1 13494:19
13483:14 13519:20	overview 13432:6	13516:4	13472:12,13 13488:4	13499:23 13504:6
options 13343:14	13477:18,21	part 13366:2 13370:7	13488:5 13489:9,9,11	13514:11
13358:14 13368:20	overwhelmed 13429:19	13372:12,13	13493:15 13494:17	pictures 13385:17
100001110000.00			pepper 13375:5	13387:23 13432:14
13375.4 13378.0	overwhelming 13372.8			100000000000000000000000000000000000000
13375:4 13378:9	overwhelming 13372:8 o'clock 13351:2	13375:18 13383:6,11 13386:20 22		
13381:10 13406:14	o'clock 13351:2	13386:20,22	perception 13358:15	13438:25 13439:1
13381:10 13406:14 13451:5 13458:7	o'clock 13351:2 13412:21 13413:14	13386:20,22 13391:15 13392:15	perception 13358:15 perform 13492:11	13438:25 13439:1 13478:8 13502:5
13381:10 13406:14	o'clock 13351:2	13386:20,22	perception 13358:15	13438:25 13439:1

Pretoria

Pingk 13399:14 13420:1 3430:2 13488:0 1488:0.1 31311 13432:1 1435:5 134116:0.105.912.77.23 Pink 13398:23 13447:21 1348:0 13470:21 13440:1 1345:0 13440:0 1345:0 13440:0 1345:0 13351:17 1335:81 13470:21 1343:18 13460:0 1340:1 13436:0 1340:0 13439:1.4 13351:17 1335:81 13370:13 1330:6 13363:83.9,9.17 13372:1.0.2 13372:1.0.2 13442:1 1345:8 13441:0 13438:1.1 4337:1.1 13309:6 13393:6.4 13340:1.1 435:8 13390:1 13392:1.5 13494:2.1 1344:5:1 13441:0 13438:1.1 4342:1.4 13377:1.7 13379:8 13392:1.1 337:8.5 13399:3.1 124 13441:0 13438:1.1 4342:1.4 13377:1.7 13379:8 13392:1.1 337:8.5 1349:2.1 3136:0.1 134:0.2 13442:1 1348:1 13400:1.1 344:2.2 13440:1.1 344:2.2 1347:1.1 337:1.2 1349:2.1 3136:0.1 134:0.2 13444:1 1348:1.0 1340:2.1 1346:1.1 34:0.2 1344:2.1 436:1.1 34:0.2 1339:1.1 14:3.1.1 1344:1.1 134:1.1 1340:1.1 14:3.2 1349:1.1 14:3.2 1349:1.1 14:3.1.1 1341:1.1.1 1341:1.1.1.1 1341:1.1.1.1.1.1 1341:1.1.1.1.1.1 1341:1.1.1.1.					Page 1
Pinghi (13392:14) 13422:11 13432:11 13432:11 13432:11 13435:15 13441:16,103402: Pinghi (13382:2) 13444:11 13440:10 13441:16,103412: 13441:16,103412: 13351:17 13356:13 13356:13 13357:3,13 133438:14 13440:10 13439:10,21 13441:11,11,2,17 13391:11 13390:11 13300:13390:60 13363:3,9,1,11 13377:1,17 13379:81 13302:10 13342:11 13442:13440:21 13441:10 13432:11 13439:14 13390:61 13390:61 13390:61 13390:61 13390:12 13442:13 13440:12 13440:12 13442:13 13440:12 13440:12 13442:13 13441:14 13442:14 13440:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:12 13400:13 1341:11 1350:12 13400:13 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11 1341:11	PILLAY 13331:25	13411:6 13416:3	13469:13 13473:3,4	13427:6 13430:5	13391:21 13408:15
pinki 13446:1 13462:1 13442:1 13462:1 13442:1 13462:1 13442:1 13462:1 13462:1 13442:1 13462:1 13462:1 13444:1 13462:1 13462:1 13444:1 13462:1	Pingla 13397:14	13420:3 13430:2			
Pinec 1333:1:7 1335:1:7 1336:1:7 1346:2:0 1346:2:0 1346:2:0 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1345:1:7 1335:1:7 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></t<>					
1355:117 1355:11 1355:12 1344:11 11,12,17 1335:11 1335:11 1335:11 1335:11 1335:11 1335:11 1335:11 1335:12 1335:12 1335:12 1335:12 1335:12 1335:12 1355:12 1350:12 1352:12 1350:12 1352:12 1350:12 1352:12 1350:12 1352:12 1350:12 1351:12 1352:12					
13355:13 1357:3.13 13343:18 13343:18 13345:2 possibly 1338:5 13441:11.11,12,17 13391:21 13391:21 13391:21 13372:10.22 13442:21 13432:11 1343:21 13392:11 13375:10 13372:10.22 133442:11 13432:11 13372:10.22 13442:13 13442:13 13372:10.22 134442:13 13444:13 13372:10.22 13444:21 13444:21 13372:10.22 13444:21 13372:10.23 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13394:17 13395:12 13494:23 1346:12 13494:17 1345:12 13494:13 13394:13 13392:13 13392:13 13392:12 13492:13 1345:13 13492:13 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11 1344:11					
1339:21 1339:417 13307:5,10,11,16.25 13372:10.22 13424:21,2142:21,21434:22,11434:21,21436:7. 1339:417 13309:11,337:20,1379:20,3376:20,1379:25,21,3390:21,1339:21,52,3390:21,1339:21,52,3390:21,1339:21,52,3390:21,13390:21,13390:21,52,3390:21,13490:21,13390:21,13390:21,13390:21,13					
13394:11 13390:61 13396:61 13368:3.9.9.17 13376:20 13379:3 13454:51 13459:12 13454:51 13459:12 13392:15 13454:51 13599:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13392:15 13492:15 13392:15 13492:15 13392:15 13492:15 13392:15 13492:15 13392:15 13492:15 13392:15 13492:15 13392:15 13492:16 13392:15 13492:16 13492:16 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 13411:7 13312:13 13411:7 13312:13 13411:7 13312:13 13411:7 1345:13 13411:7 1345:13 13411:7 1344:11 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1342:12 1342:12 1342:12 13432:14 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:17 1344:					
13415:12 13431:11 13430:01 13369:01 13392:15 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16 13392:16					
13438:10 13438:10 13477:17 13399:2 13312:1 13312:1 13312:1 13312:1 13312:1 13312:1 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13312:2 13349:1 13412:1 13414:7 1344:1 1344:1 1341:7 1344:1					
13438:10 1344:21 13379:11,25 13399:11,26 13399:11463/24 13500:3,11,24 1344:11 1344:12 13370:11,24 13397:81 1463/24 13500:3,11,24 13500:2,11,25,12 13500:3,11,24 13500:2,11,25,12 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13444:11 13446:2 1330:41 1340:14 1340:14 1340:14 1340:14 1346:13 1346:14 1347:15 1351:16 1351:16 1351:16 1351:14 1347:16 1346:14 1347:16 1346:14 1347:16 1346:14					
134625 1346452 1348411 1357820 13453143 1346451 1347820 13453143 1346451 1347820 13454513 1346451 13454513 1346451 1345514 1345514 1345514 1345514 1345514 1345514 1345514 1345514 1345514 13455144514514514542 13455145 133561			-		
11430:219 13430:21 13432:24 1342:21 1342:24 1342:21 1342:21 1347:27 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13474:17 1345:22 1344:023 1343:32 13471:18 1345:15 1351:52 13478:22 1348:11 1348:51 13472:16 1346:61 13492:5 13492:5 1551:24 1348:11 1348:51 13472:16 13472:16 13492:5 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 13339:8 1344:19 13346:15 133378:20 13348:15 13348:15 13429:11 1346:11 1335:5:3.5 13358:14 13358:14 13346:11 13357:3.5 13358:13 13376:11 1346:11 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.5 13357:3.6 13357:3.6 13357:3.6 1346:3.1 1357:3.7 1344:11 1336:5.2 13357:3.6 1347:7.1 1346:3.1 1357:3.7 1344:11 1346:3.2 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1.4 13457:1					
13478:21 13480:1 1341:7 13456:1 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 13466:4 1346:4 1346:1					
13480:11 13480:11 13480:11 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13470:15 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:11 13460:11 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13460:17 13470:17 13460:17 13470:17 13530:10 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134171:13 134					
13484:11 13472:22 13472:22 13473:83 post 13339:8 1340:10 13442:17 1345:12 13497:16 13572:22 1345:18 13497:16 1350:32 1345:12 13497:16 1345:12 13497:16 1345:12 13497:16 1345:12 1346:12 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·</td> <td></td>				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
13487:10 13492:113495:16 13492:113495:16 13402:113495:16 13402:113495:16 13402:113495:16 13402:113495:16 13402:113376:20 13445:18 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 13344:19 1344:18 13352:13 1346:11 13507:10 1346:11 1345:13 1346:11 1345:13 1346:11 1345:13 1346:11 1345:13 1346:11 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1345:13 1347:17 1347					
13497:16 13517:23 papers 13453:22 13499:10 13500:3.8 13445:22 13456:20 13344:19 13378:20 13430:3 13431:23 placed 13426:5 13445:18 1351:29 13505:12 13368:13 13376:14 13446:1 13519:13 13446:20 13519:10 13384:15 1340:7 13368:13 13376:14 13446:1 13519:13 13445:18 1351:29 placing 13352:16 plotted 13322:5,5,9,11 13458:51 3446:3.6 pottel 13339:21 3345:25 13487:10,13,21 pover 13395:14 13445:11 13476:22,0 1348:11 13507:15 13429:13 point 13339:21 3345:25 13487:10,13,21 pover 13395:14 1346:12 13470:11 13490:12 13479:11 13370:12 13370:12 13370:12 13370:12 13370:12 13370:13 1339:23 13390:23 13394:24 13490:10 1310:11 13490:10 1342:17 postel 13355:0 1347:15 president 348:16 13390:12 13390:42 13390:42 13399:4,5 13490:10 1330:10 1 pretoria 1333:18 presume 1333:14 13490:12 13470:11 13496:1 13496:11 13499:12 1344:11 13496:10 1 pretoria 13370:12 1333:18 1347:13 1346:12 13470:11 13496:10 1350:12 1 presume 1333:1426:13 1347:13 1346:14 13400:114 1340:11 presumi 1333:133:1426:13					
placed 13426:3 13436:3 13428:1 13436:3 13428:1 13438:3 13436:3 13428:1 13438:3 13436:3 13428:1 13438:3 13436:3 13428:1 13438:3 13438:3 13438:3 13438:3 13438:3 13438:3 13438:3 <th< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-</td></th<>					-
134303 1343123 please 13327:1,4 POP 13343:14 posted 13462:0 1345:18 135:5,5 jatese 13328:15 13403:7 13463:13 1336:15 1336:15 135:5,5 presided 1345:5 preside 1355:5,5 preside 135:5,5 preside 134:6:1 134:7:1,12 134:6:1 134:7:1,12 134:7:1,12 134:7:1,12 134:7:1,13 134:7:1,13 134:7:1,13 134:7:1,13 134:7:1,13 134:7:1,14 13		1 0			
13446:20 1318:15 13368:15 13368:15 13368:13 13376:14 13446:1 13315:2.5 places 13425:13 13486:8 1345:5:3 postponement 13520:6 president 1347:2:4.2 places 13353:16 13382:12 1348:12 1348:12 1348:12 1348:12 1348:12 1348:12 1348:12 13520:8 president 1347:2:4.2 president 1347:2:4.2 1349:11 1350:12 13520:8 president 1347:2:4.2 president 1348:1:1	-				
13519:13 1348:68 13421:12,14,15 postponement 13520:6 presided 13453:5 placing 1353:16 1358:19 13458:513465:3.6 13520:8 president 13472:42,42 13429:13 point 13339:213345:25 13473:17,18 power 13350:14 13410:12 13479:11 13353:91,01,11 13363:513370:18 13390:23 13394:23 13491:11,13507:12 13490:12 13479:11 13378:20,22 13370:7 13394:24 13394:12 13493:0131,14 13495:10,1344 13491:11 13473:17,18 13378:20,22 13370:7 13394:24 133994:25 13493:20,13495:24 13439:13,14 president 3426:16 president 3426:17 1338:22 13390:15 13403:13 140:12 portfolio 1350:10 president 3436:25 president 3436:24 13391:16 13402:11 3442:17 post 13464:3 precedes 13337:26 president 13432:24 13409:13 1424:17 post 13464:3 precedes 13337:26 president 3436:24 13409:21 13424:17 post 13464:3 precedes 13337:26 president 3436:24 13409:22 13424:17 post 13464:12 precedes 13337:26 precedes 13337:26 13409:24 13478:1 1344		-		-	
places 13425:14 plotted 13352:55,9,11 134385:13465:3,6 13520:8 president 1377:17,18 placing 13353:16 13388:19 13388:19 13473:17,18 potential 13336:21 13481:11 13507:15 place 13353:18 13389:14 13336:12 13389:14 13410:12 13473:7,19 13376:12 13339:21 13389:14 13391:12 13491:13,14 13495:9,10 13473:7,19 13377:12 13399:12 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13399:42 13393:42 13383:43 president's 13438:5 president's 1348:5 president's 1348:16 13399:12 13496:13 1340:13 1340:13 1346:13 1346:13 president's 1338:16 president's 1348:12 13399:13 13402:13 13402:13 1346:13 1346:13 1346:13 1346:13 1346:13					,
jacenergi 13353:16 13388:19 13473:17,18 potential 13336:25 13481:11 13507:15 jalap:13 point 13339:2 13345:25 13487:10.13,21 pover 13395:14 13407:12 jalap:13 13353:6:12 13339:2 13345:25 13487:10.13,21 pover 13395:14 13407:12 jarderid 13363:15 13379:18 13396:25 13487:10.13,21 pover 13395:14 13407:13 jarderid 13396:25 13394:23 13394:24 13394:24 13394:24 jarderid					
13429:13 point 13339:21 3345:25 13487:10.13.21 power 13395:14 13507:20 13510:42 plan 13353:910.11 13365:15 1339:14 13365:15 1339:14 13491:13.14 power 1346:12 13491:13.14 president's 1342:23 13354:18 13350:12 13380:23 13389:14 13392:14 13495:10 1347:7.19 president's 1342:23 13379:12 02:12379:7:13 13390:22 13399:17 13393:12 13399:13 13495:10 Power 13377:18.20 13437:15 13507:20 13437:15 13507:20 13437:15 13507:21 13438:16 13432:17 presume 13385:14 presume 13385:14 presume 13383:25 presume 13383:25 presume 13337:18.20 13337:15 13300:21 13342:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13438:23 13352:25 preceige 13337:16 Pretorin 13340:22 presume 13385:14 presume 13385:14 presume 1338:15 13351:13 presume 1338:14:12 13442:13 13442:13 13442:13 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:15 13432:17 1343					-
plan 13353:9:10.11 13363:15 1339:18 13491:13.14 13491:10.12 13474:7.19 13354:18 13380:22 13380:23 13394:24 13390:23 13394:24 13495:10.1348:12.14 13370:12 13370:7 13390:24 13390:24 13491:11 13485:10 president's 13481:5 13370:12 13370:7 13390:24 13390:42 13491:10 13441:10 13423:17 pressing 13435:10 13391:16 1340:11 1340:12 portfolio 13510:10 precisel 13337:15 1503:18 13393:12 13392:11 13416:11 1344:25 posed 13356:22 precept 13377:16 Pretorius 1343:10 13431:13 13497:13.20 13351:23 13352:29 13340:21 1344:21 1348:23 1348:23 1348:23 1337:16 Pretorius 13454:17 13424:17 13464:13 1347:16 13424:17 13424:13 1347:13 1342:15 13424:13 1342:15 13424:12 13441:21 1342:13 1342:					
13354:18 13385:613389:14 population 13419:1 1349:59.10 13474:7.19 13370:12 13372:13 13390:23 13394:23 POP's 13484:12,14 PowerPoint 13438:19 president's 13481:51 13378:20.22 13399:17 13396:11 13496:1 13439:13,14 pressimg 13485:16 1338:25 13391:15 13403:18 13401:12 portfolio 13510:10 practices 13337:18,20 presumed 1336:14 13391:16 13392:11 13446:11 13449:12 portayed 13335:9 precept 13377:16 Pretorin 1340:22 13404:13,14 13428:17 posed 1356:22 posing 13491:22 precept 13377:16 Pretorin 13340:22 13433:19 13428:16 13464:3,12 posing 13491:22 precise 13441:20 13342:15 13484:23 13433:19 13434:13 13471:13 20 13351:23 13432:15 13484:23 13484:23 13484:23 13484:23 1348:23 1350:21 13484:23 13484:23 13507:23 13515:18 pointel 13379:16 13406:11 13496:14 13406:11 13496:14 13406:21 1344:23 1344:23 1344:23 1348:23 13432:15 <td></td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td>-</td> <td></td>		-		-	
13370:12 13370:12 13370:12 13390:23 13394:23 PÓP* 13484:12,14 PowerPoint 13438:19 president's 13481:5 13379:12 13380:22 13399:115 13399:115 13493:20 13495:24 13439:13,14 13439:13,14 13442:1,17 13383:25 13391:15 13400:13 1342:17 portrayed 13335:9 post 13355:12 post 13355:12 post 13355:12 prescent 13377:16 presume 13335:14 13404:13,14 13408:3 13428:17 13444:12 post 13444:25 post 13444:25 post 13355:22 precedes 13337:16 precise 13337:16 presume 13340:22 13439:13424:15 13446:3,12 13471:5 post 13491:22 precise 13441:20 precise 1337:16 13442:21 13342:13 13447:13 1348:52 precise 1337:16 13442:21 13342:13 13447:13 1348:72 13342:13 13447:13 1348:72 13342:13 13447:13 1348:72 13342:13 13447:13 1348:72 13446:10 13442:17 13448:12 13446:10 13442:14 13495:14 13406:11 13357:16 13406:10 13442:11 13441:20 precise 1337:16 13406:10 13442:17 1348:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 1346:12 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-</td></td<>					-
13378:20.22 13399:42 13493:20 13495:24 13493:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13495:13 13411:10 13445:11 13495:12 13495:12 13441:10 13442:1,17 presume 13358:14 presume 13358:14 13405:11 13442:11 13422:15 13432:41 13432:42 13456:12 post 13356:22 precupt 13377:16 presume 13383:42 13340:21 13448:14 13492:14 13422:15 13340:13 13441:14 13492:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442:14 13442				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2
13379:7 13389:2 13399:17 13496:1 13496:1 13441:10 13442:1,17 presume 13358:14 13391:15 13403:18 13410:12 portfolio 13510:10 portacices 1337:15 13433:25 13393:12 13396:8 13420:13 13424:17 posed 13352:9 precept 1337:16 presume 13383:25 presuming 13383:44 13409:12 posed 13464:3,12 13442:17 posed 13352:9 precise 13342:15 13442:15 13442:15 13442:15 13442:15 13442:15 13442:21 13485:7 13442:15 13442:15 13442:15 13442:11 13497:14 13497:14 13497:14 13407:13 13456:17 13466:10 13509:25 13377:19 13436:4 13477:11 13376:24 pretorinantly 13441:21 prevent 13497:13 13441:21 13464:11 13405:13 13462:11 13462:13 13429:21 13441:21 prevent 13376:24 pretorinantly 13441:21 13441:21 13441:21 13441:21 13441:21 13446:11 13441:21 13441:21 13441:21 13441:21 1344					
13383:2513403:1813403:1813410:12portfolio13510:10practices13337:18,20presumed13433:2413391:1613392:1113446:111344:25pose13352:9precedes13333:25precedes13332:2413404:13,1413408:313428:1713444:25pose13356:22precedes13333:25precedes13342:1513348:2313409:2313428:1713446:25posed13352:9precedes13337:16Pretoria13402:2213431:1343:1343:1413497:13,2013351:2313352:9precise13437:13Pretoria13432:34:1513432:2413437:113407:13,2013351:2313352:913409:2113448:2313485:713436:19,2413437:813503:2113515:1213428:1713409:2113458:1713406:1013442:2,1013441:24pretise13377:16pretise13377:16pretise13477:1313442:2,1013446:1413406:1413400:1413497:1613377:16pretise13377:1613442:2,1013446:1413406:1413400:1413497:1613376:1713466:1913477:131348:7213452:1713456:1713466:1913477:1313485:72prediminantly13404:1913405:1213466:7113466:1713466:1913477:1313485:72prepared1336:1313406:1213466:1713466:1913477:2013485:72prepared13356:1313406:121346					
13391:1613492:1113416:1113419:9portayed13335:913437:1513503:1813393:1213342:1713424:17pose13356:22precede13333:25precise13343:421340:13.1413408:313428:1713448:2413456:23position13339:9precise1337:16Pretorius1342:151342:1513434:231342:1513434:231342:1513342:1513434:231342:1513342:1513434:231342:2113434:2313442:2313435:23precise13437:2313432:1513436:1913437:2313435:1513437:2313436:1913437:2313435:1513437:2313435:1513437:2313436:1013436:1013441:2113441					
13393:12 13396:813420:13 13424:17 13404:13,14 13408:3poset 13464:3 poset 13356:22 poset 13357:16precedes 13333:25 precept 13377:16presuming 13383:413404:13,14 13408:313428:17 13444:25 13438:21 13451:21poset 13365:22 position 13339:9precedes 13333:25 precept 13377:16Pretoria 13340:22 precisel 13389:1313433:41343:1313464:3,12 13471:5 13436:19,24 13437:813464:3,12 13471:5 13436:19,24 13437:813464:3,12 13471:5 13436:12 13451:1313467:13 1348:72 13436:12 13451:13Pretoria 13336:12 precisel 13389:1313436:19,1434:5 13445:21 13445:513464:3,12 13471:12 pointed 13406:11positioned 13379:16 13395:91 13395:91 13395:91 13395:25predeimined 13436:41 13471:1 13392:22,25 13466:9prevail 13376:2413452:17 13466:12,7 13446:12,71points 13397:14 13446:17 13466:12,7 13466:12,71 13466:12,71 13466:12,71 13466:12,71 13466:12,71 13466:12,71 13466:12,71 13465:17 13466:19prejarei 13351:20 13469:12precent 13335:11 precent 13335:13 13407:14preparei 13355:20 13409:12preparei 13355:10 13406:14 13490:25 13342:15 13343:11 13472:20 13493:13preparei 13355:12 13469:12preparei 13352:14 13402:14prevoitioning 1340:22 13362:141347:10,25 13518:5 13369:20policing 13339:11,15 13349:14positioning 13400:25 13349:15preparei 13352:14 13409:25previous 13350:12 13349:141347:10,25 13352:10policing 13339:11,15 13349:14positioni 13340:12 13349:15present 13352:17 13468:12previous 13350:12 13349:141347:10,25 1338:21 13349:15policing 1339:					-
13404:13,1413408:313428:1713444:25posedprecept13377:16Pretoria13340:2213409:2313424:1513448:2413456:23posing13491:22precise13441:2013342:1513340:2213433:413497:13,2013437:313497:13,2013351:2313352:913409:2113484:2313482:313436:19,2413437:813503:2113515:1,2513542:113436:113477:1913435:23Pretorius13484:2313485:713436:19,2413406:25pointing13458:113518:2,613377:1613436:4134377:113377:6Pretorius13377:2313515:1.213442:2,1013442:2pointing13496:1413406:1413400:1,1413401:1113436:413377:1913376:2413442:2,1013444:413446:1413466:1413466:1413466:1713466:1213328:1113376:2413458:2013468:1313416:2013445:2313474:13134488:72413388:1113406:1213458:121346:1713466:1913474:13134488:72413388:1113406:1213468:1213466:713466:1213472:2013499:1313492:10,19preparation13326:1413404:1213470:913471:2113452:1713468:12prevointon13320:1413428:1713468:1213470:913471:2113452:1013468:12prevointon13320:1413428:1713468:1213470:913471:211345					
13409:2313424:1513448:2413445:23posingprecise13441:2013342:15 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13431:913432:8,1613464:3,1213471:5position13339:9precisely13389:13Pretorius13453:1013433:413437:413497:13,2013351:2313352:913409:2113448:2313448:2313448:713436:19,2413437:513518:2,613504:213377:1913435:23pretty13377:1913435:2313439:7,813440:25pointing13458:113309:2913399:2513377:1913436:413437:11pretty13371:613406:1013444:213495:1413496:1413400:1,1413401:1113392:22,2513466:9pretul13376:2413444:413495:1413496:1413400:1,1413428:12prefor13338:1113416:2013458:2213461:2,713446:11,12,1613430:1913438:16preparation13335:1313406:1213466:713469:2313472:2013493:1313492:10,19preparet13351:1313406:1213470:913471:2113515:1813502:12preparet13352:1413488:7,2413488:72413471:1613472:2313421:1513349:15positions13340:113448:1413452:1713468:1213471:12police 's13342:1513423:1913439:24prepositioned13472:1713468:1213471:1413499:23134452:1513342:1113457:2013445:1413452:1713452:1713481:1213342:1513342:1513342:1113457:2013445:14 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>					
13433:4 13434:1313497:13,2013351:23 13352:913409:2113484:23 13485:713436:19,24 13437:813503:21 13515:1,2513424:1 13485:513504:213477:19 13435:2313507:23 13515:1813437:23,24 13438:513518:2,6pointed 13403:11positioned 13379:1613476:1 13435:2313377:19 13435:2313377:19 13435:2313442:2,10 13443:5pointed 13403:11positioned 13379:1613436:1 13436:1 13436:113395:9 13399:2513436:1 13371:6 13406:101345:17 13458:1313446:12 0 13445:2313400:1,14 13428:12predominantlyprevail 13376:2413458:22 13461:2,713446:11,12,1613430:19 13435:16preparation 13335:1313405:13 13418:513463:1,2 13464:1413465:17 13466:1913477:13 13488:7,2413338:11 13515:2013468:1213470:9 13471:2113515:18poicemen 13347:13,19positions 1340:12prepare 13326:14prevoius 13350:2113477:16 13479:18pole 13420:14positions 13340:113488:22 1348:1413488:7 13410:2313497:14 13498:6,9police's 13335:1113452:10 13400:25prepositioned 13479:713422:12 13451:1413498:12 13499:3police's 13335:1113457:20 13458:1913374:13 2348:713442:1213498:12 13499:3police's 13336:1113479:1613449:11 13448:1813442:1213406:12 1351:513369:2013342:1513369:21134451:1213442:1213406:13 1349:513368:51 13379:2,514positive 13370:913461:22 13511:8prevoisioning 13434:713406:61 13499:1313365:13 13				-	
13436:19.2413437:2313503:2113515:1,2513424:113485:5predetermined13507:2313518:2,613437:23,2413438:513518:2,613509:2513406:1013379:1613436:113377:1913436:413437:1013441:2113442:2,1013444:413495:1413495:1413395:1313399:251346:113399:22,251346:113406:1013450:2,6,15pointing13451:171346:1213409:1,1413401:1413428:12predominantly13441:2113454:1713454:12,713446:11,2,1613499:4,5,11,16premises13395:1313405:1313405:1213452:121346:12,713446:11,2,1613492:40,1913437:1313488:7,24prepare13356:1313405:1313466:713469:2313472:2013472:2013492:10,19prepare13356:1313405:1313405:1213470:913471:2113515:1813502:12prepare13326:1413350:21prevention13404:2113470:913479:18police*s13331:1113423:1913439:2413480:2213507:1413411:1413415:213470:913479:16police*s13339:11,1513322:1013402:14prepositioned13370:1213422:1213445:1213497:1413499:2313362:311346:1213445:1413452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1213449:1013491:1013399:2413369:2413349:1513322:1013445:1213448:12 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
13437:23,2413438:513518:2,613504:213377:1913435:23pretty13328:1513439:7,813440:25pointed13403:11pointing13436:1413437:113436:413437:113436:413376:2413442:2,1013444:413495:1413496:1413395:913395:913395:913395:913395:22,2513466:1913404:1213458:1713458:1313416:2013445:2313429:4,5,11,1613492:10,1913335:1613405:1313405:1213466:713466:1713466:1713472:2013493:1313492:10,1913355:12134368:12preparation13335:1313405:1313405:1213470:913471:2113515:1813377:2313492:10,1913458:713512:4prevoitoni13404:2113471:1613472:2013493:1313492:10,1913458:713512:4prevoitoni13404:2113471:1913460:7,11policing13377:1913435:713432:1413468:12prevoitioni1340:2313497:1413490:2513347:2313349:113439:2113440:25prepositioni13472:1013452:1213452:1713452:1213498:1213399:2313366:5113366:5113366:13positive13472:1613479:1613411:1413492:1213498:1013499:2313366:5113366:5113366:13positive13471:5present13362:1113452:1213452:1213406:1213370:5113366:5113379:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
13439:7,813440:25pointed 13403:11positioned 13379:1613436:413436:413437:113371:613406:1013442:2,1013443:413445:113495:1413496:1413395:913395:913395:913395:913416:101345:2,6,1513445:1213495:1413496:1413400:1,1413428:1213396:2513496:12prevail13396:211345:2,1345:2,113416:2013445:2313429:4,5,11,16premises13413:4prevail13405:1213463:1,213464:1413465:1713466:1913474:1313488:7,2413338:1113305:1213405:1313466:713466:713472:2013472:2013472:2013472:2013472:2013472:2013472:2013470:1913472:2013472:1313492:10,19prepare13326:1413405:1213468:1213470:1913440:1413492:10,19prepare13326:1413480:2213458:713405:2113477:1613420:14policemen13347:13,1913423:1913439:24prepositioning1342:1213452:1713497:1413498:6,9policing13339:11,1513352:101300:15prepositioning1342:1213452:1713452:1713452:1713498:1213498:69policing1339:2013342:1113457:2013458:1913474:1913452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1213445:1213444:121349:161349:121349:10				-	
13442:2,10 13443:5pointing 13458:113395:9 13399:25predominantly13441:2113443:14 13444:413495:14 13496:1413400:1,14 13401:1113392:22,25 13466:9prevail 13376:2413450:2,6,15points 13397:1413401:11 13401:1113392:22,25 13466:9prevail 13376:2413454:17 13458:1313416:20 13445:2313429:4,5,11,16prefer 13396:21prevail 13376:2413458:22 13461:2,713446:11,12,16134329:4,5,11,16preparation 13335:1313405:13 13418:513463:1,2 13464:1413465:17 13466:1913474:13 13488:7,2413338:11 13515:2013468:1213466:7 13469:2313472:20 13493:1313492:10,19prepare 13354:13prevention 13404:2113470:9 13471:2113515:1813502:1213458:7 13512:4prevoiton 13404:2113479:19 13480:7,11policemen 13347:13,19ja423:19 13439:24ja480:22 13507:1413411:14 13415:213499:10 13490:2513347:23 13349:15positionig 13400:25prepositionig 13434:713452:17 13455:213498:12 13499:3policing 13339:11,1513352:10 13400:25prepositionig 13434:713452:17 13455:213498:12 13499:3policing 13339:11,1513499:2 13445:14presence 13372:17prevoiusly 13359:2213518:121336:3 1336:11,19positive 13471:5ja369:24 13370:9ja368:9 13382:21ja491:101346:10 13493:513379:2,5,14posibility 13361:8ja49:21 13441:8pre-positionigjaaning 13388:2.91337:5,13375:9ja369:24 13370:9ja368:9 13382:21ja491:10ja3	·				
13443:1413495:1413496:1413400:1,1413392:22,2513466:9prevail13376:2413450:2,6,15points13397:1413401:1413428:12prefer13396:21prevent13394:313454:1713446:11,12,1613442:11,1613492:4,5,11,16premises13402:1313402:12prevent13392:22,251346:213452:21346:12,713446:11,12,1613402:14,1613429:4,5,11,16premises13402:1313402:1213466:713466:1713466:1913474:1313488:7,2413338:1113402:1313402:1213466:713469:2313472:2013493:1313492:10,19preparet13352:1313402:1213470:913477:1213515:1813502:1213458:713480:2213507:1413410:2313479:1913480:7,11poicemen13347:13,1913422:1213480:2213507:1413411:1413415:213497:1413492:1513349:1513342:1113452:1713446:1213446:1213446:1213422:1213411:141345:213498:1213499:241339:2013342:1113457:2013445:14presotioned13479:1613422:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1713452:1213452:1213452:1213452:1213452:1213452:1213492:1213442:1213492:1213442:1213492:1213442:1213492:1213442:1213492:1213442:1213492:1	-				
13450:2,6,15 13454:17 13458:13points 13397:14 13416:20 13445:2313401:14 13428:12 13429:4,5,11,16 13429:4,5,11,16 preparation 13335:13prevent 13394:3 13402:1213458:22 13461:2,7 13463:1,2 13464:14 13465:17 13466:1913446:11,12,16 13446:17 13466:1913430:19 13435:16 13472:20 13493:13preparation 13335:13 13492:10,1913405:13 13418:5 13338:11 13515:20 prepare 13354:13 prevotion 13404:2113466:7 13469:23 13472:20 13493:1213472:13 13488:7,24 13472:20 13493:1313492:10,19 13492:10,19prepare 13554:13 prepare 13354:13prevotion 13404:21 prevotion 13404:2113474:16 13479:18 13479:19 13480:7,11 13480:11 13490:25police's 13335:11 13347:23 13349:15 police's 13335:11positioning 13407:23 13422:19 13439:24prepare 13326:14 13480:22 13507:1413515:12 prepositioning 13434:7 prepositioning 13434:7 prepositioning 13340:113422:12 1345:14 13492:10 13400:25 prepositioning 13342:17 13352:10 13400:25prepositioning 13434:7 prepositioning 13434:7 prepositioning 13342:17 13452:17 13455:21349:10.25 13369:2113366:11,19 13366:13 1366:11,19 13369:23positive 13471:5 13369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:21 13369:24 13370:913463:10 13493:5 13360:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14 13366:51 13369:20positive 13471:5 13465:12 13453:8,21 13450:12 13451:8precositioning 13441:151340:13388:29 13366:51 1346:5213376:5 13379:2,5,14 13366:51 1346:52present 13355:5 13360:20precositioning 13465:12 13453:8,21 13450:12 13453:8,211340:12 13451:2 13366:5213366:13369:20 13366:51 1399:25,51present 13355:5 <b< td=""><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></b<>	-				
13454:17 13458:1313416:20 13445:2313429:4,5,11,16premises 13413:413404:19 13405:1213458:22 13461:2,713446:11,12,1613430:19 13435:16134335:1613404:19 13405:1213463:1,2 13466:1413465:17 13466:1913474:13 13488:7,24133338:11 13515:20preparation 13335:1313466:7 13469:2313472:20 13493:1313492:10,19prepare 13354:1313468:1213470:9 13471:2113515:1813502:12prepare 13352:14previous 1350:2113479:19 13480:7,11policemen 13347:13,1913423:19 13439:24prepared 13326:1413358:7 13410:2313497:14 13498:6,9police's 13335:1113352:10 13400:25prepositioned 13479:5prevoius 13350:2113498:12 13499:3police's 13335:1113457:20 13458:19prepositioning 13434:713452:17 13455:213498:12 13499:3police's 13335:1113457:20 13458:1913377:4 13399:2313366:5 13369:20presence 13372:1713506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14positive 13471:513466:12 13511:813449:113448:18planning 13338:2,913376:5 13379:2,5,1413450:21 13353:713452:10 1346:213491:1013340:6 13346:151340:6:12 13417:12possibility 13361:813419:21 13445:213491:1013340:6 13346:151340:6:12 13417:12possibil 13353:713456:10,14,1413421:22 1342:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					-
13458:22 13461:2,7 13463:1,2 13464:1413446:11,12,16 13465:17 13466:1913430:19 13435:16 13474:13 13488:7,24preparation 13335:13 13338:11 13515:20 prepare 13354:1313405:13 13418:5 13468:1213466:7 13469:23 13470:9 13471:2113472:20 13493:13 13472:20 13493:1313492:10,19 13515:18133492:10,19 13492:10,19134388:7,24 13492:10,19134388:7,134 13492:1213474:16 13479:18 13479:19 13480:7,111policemen 13347:13,19 policeren 13347:13,19positioning 13407:23 13423:19 13439:24prepared 13326:14 13423:19 13439:24prepositioned 13479:5 prepositioned 13479:513411:14 13410:23 13422:12 13517:10,25 13518:513498:12 13499:3 13517:10,25 13518:5policeres 13339:11,15 policeres 13339:11,1513352:10 13400:25 13342:1113457:20 13458:19 13349:2 13445:14prepositioning 13434:7 presence 13372:1713452:17 13455:2 prepositioning 13434:7planned 13369:21 13368:5 13369:2013368:5 13366:11,19 13368:5 13369:20positive 13471:5 possibility 13361:8present 13355:5 13461:22 13511:8 present 13355:5presont 13365:12 13461:22 13511:8 primary 13367:12plannig 13338:2,9 13364:5 13366:24 13340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:7 13404:22,24 13416:713454:10 13456:24 13454:10 13456:2413465:12 13453:8,21 13465:12 13453:8,21 13465:10,14,14principle 13487:23 principle 13371:5planing 13338:2,9 13366:5 13366:24 13340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:7 13404:22,24 13416:7possible 13353:7 13450:1313465:10,14,14 13421:22 13442:213349:5 13365:24 13341:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19<		-			-
13463:1,2 13464:1413465:17 13466:1913474:13 13488:7,2413338:11 13515:2013468:1213466:7 13469:2313472:20 13493:1313492:10,1913458:7 13512:4prepare 13354:1313408:2113470:9 13471:2113515:1813502:12prepare 13354:1313458:7 13512:4previous 13350:2113470:19 13480:7,11pole 13420:14positioning 13407:23prepared 13326:1413458:7 13410:2313497:14 13490:2513347:23 13349:15positions 13340:1prepositioned 13479:513422:12 13451:1313498:12 13499:3police's 13335:1113352:10 13400:25prepositioning 13434:713452:17 13455:213498:12 13499:3policing 13339:11,1513439:2 13445:14prepositioning 13434:713452:17 13455:213518:12policing 13339:11,1513439:2 13445:14presence 13372:1713452:17 13455:2planned 13369:2113363:3 13366:11,19positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,23pianned 13369:2113363:5 13369:20possession 13361:13present 13355:5primary 13367:1213463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:9possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:5primary 13367:1213340:6 13346:1513404:22.24 13416:713504:413450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,2113491:1013349:5 13365:2413404:22.24 13416:713504:413456:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113416:12 13417:12possibil 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1					
13466:7 13469:2313472:20 13493:1313492:10,19prepare 13354:13prevention 13404:2113470:9 13471:2113515:1813502:1213458:7 13512:4previous 13350:2113479:19 13480:7,11policemen 13347:13,1913423:19 13439:24prepared 13326:1413358:7 13410:2313490:2513347:23 13349:15police's 13335:1113423:19 13439:24prepositioned 13479:513422:12 13451:1313498:12 13499:3police's 13339:11,1513439:2 13445:14prepositioned 13479:513422:12 13451:1313517:10,25 13518:513339:20 13342:1113457:20 13458:1913374:19,20 13418:413409:613518:1213342:15 13343:313479:1613461:22 13511:813462:21 13148:413409:6planned 13369:2113368:5 13369:20positiol 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313463:10 13493:513375:5 13375:9positiol 13366:11,19positiol 13366:1313461:12 13416:1213340:6 13346:1513376:5 13379:2,5,14positility 13361:813419:21 13441:5primciple 13487:2313340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					
13470:9 13471:2113515:1813502:1213458:7 13512:4previous 13350:2113474:16 13479:18pole 13420:14positioning 13407:2313458:7 13512:4previous 13350:2113479:19 13480:7,11policemen 13347:13,1913423:19 13439:2413480:22 13507:1413411:14 13415:213490:2513347:23 13349:15positions 13340:1prepositioned 13479:513422:12 13451:1313498:12 13499:3policing 13339:11,1513352:10 13400:25prepositioning 13434:713452:17 13455:213498:12 13499:3policing 13339:11,1513439:2 13445:14presence 13372:17previously 13359:2213517:10,25 13518:513339:20 13342:1113457:20 13458:1913374:19,20 13418:413409:613518:1213363:3 13366:11,19positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,23planned 13369:2113368:5 13369:20possession 13361:13present 13355:5primary 13367:1213463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:101340:2513376:5 13379:2,5,1413450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21principle 13487:2313340:6 13346:1513404;22,24 13416:713504:413451:12 13453:8,21principle 13371:513349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7			,		
13474:1613479:18pole13420:14positioning13407:23prepared13326:1413358:713410:231349:1113480:7,111349:2513347:2313349:1513423:1913439:2413480:2213480:2213577:1413411:1413415:21349:121349:313347:2313349:15police's13335:1113352:1013400:25prepositioned13479:513422:1213455:221349:121349:3police's13339:11,1513439:213445:14prepositioning13434:713452:1713452:1713452:1713517:10,2513518:1213342:1513342:1113457:2013458:1913374:19,2013418:413409:6planned13369:2113366:5113369:20positive13471:513461:2213446:1213434:21,2313463:1013493:513377:513369:20positive13370:913368:913382:2113491:1013506:2513379:15,1813404:22,2413416:713504:413450:913451:1213453:8,21principle13374:713374:713379:213340:613346:1513404:22,2413416:713504:413454:1013456:2413374:713374:713379:213349:513365:2413416:1213416:1213416:1213453:713465:10,14,1413421:2213421:2213442:213381:2513382:2113424:1313431:2513382:613398:19presentation13335:1113519:7 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td>			-		
13479:1913480:7,11 1349:25policemen13347:13,19 13347:2313423:1913439:24 13439:2413480:2213507:14 1340:2513411:1413415:2 13422:121349:111349:2313347:2313349:15 police's13347:2313349:15 13339:11,15positions13340:1 13352:1013400:25 prepositioning13422:1213422:1213422:1213422:1213422:1213455:21349:121349:331339:2013342:11 13342:1513439:213445:14 13457:2013374:19,2013418:4 13448:1813409:6planned13369:21 13369:2113363:313366:11,19 13366:5positive13471:5 13369:2013461:2213461:2213434:21,23 13462:1213463:1013493:5 13376:513371:513369:20 13376:5possession13361:13 13369:20present13355:5 13369:24premary13434:21,23 13362:2113463:1013493:5 13376:513371:513369:24 13379:2,5,1413450:913419:2113441:5 13441:5primary13491:10 principle13340:613340:613340:613404:22,2413416:7 13504:413451:1213453:8,21 13452:1013497:1513349:513365:24 13340:613404:22,2413416:7 13421:2213465:10,14,1413421:2213422:1213381:2513382:2113424:1313431:2513382:613398:19presentation13335:1113519:7					-
13480:11 13490:25 13497:14 13498:6,9 13498:12 13499:3 13517:10,25 13518:513347:23 13349:15 police's 13335:11 policing 13339:11,15positions 13340:1 13352:10 13400:25 13439:2 13445:14 13457:20 13458:19prepositioned 13479:5 prepositioning 13434:7 presence 13372:1713422:12 13451:13 13452:17 13455:2 previously 13359:2213517:10,25 13518:513339:20 13342:11 13342:15 13343:313457:20 13458:19 13457:20 13458:1913377:4:19,20 13418:4 13419:1 13448:1813409:6 pre-positioningplanned 13369:2113363:3 13366:11,19 13368:5 13369:20positive 13471:5 possibility 13461:1213461:22 13511:8 13369:24 13370:913461:22 13511:8 13368:9 13382:2113434:21,23 present 13355:5planning 13338:2,913376:5 13379:2,5,14 13340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:7 13404:22,24 13416:7possibility 13361:8 13450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21 13455:10,14,1413421:22 13442:2 13374:7 13379:213381:25 13382:2113416:12 13417:12 13424:13 13431:25possible 13353:7 13382:6 13398:1913465:10,14,14 presentation 13335:1113519:7			positioning 13407:23		
13497:14 13498:6,9 13498:12 13499:3 13517:10,25 13518:5police's 13335:11 policing 13339:11,1513352:10 13400:25 13339:20 13342:11prepositioning 13434:7 presence 13372:1713452:17 13455:2 previously 13359:2213518:1213342:15 13343:313457:20 13458:1913374:19,20 13418:413409:613518:1213363:3 13366:11,1913479:1613461:22 13511:813434:21,23planned 13369:2113368:5 13369:20positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:1013506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,1413450:9 13476:1613419:21 13441:513491:1013340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413451:12 13453:8,2113471:513349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					
13498:12policing 13339:11,1513439:2 13445:14presence 13372:17previously 13359:2213517:10,25 13518:513339:20 13342:1113457:20 13458:1913374:19,20 13418:413409:613518:1213363:3 13366:11,1913479:1613419:1 13448:1813419:1 13448:18planned 13369:2113368:5 13369:20positive 13471:5positive 13471:5pre-positioning13463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:1013506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:5principle 13487:23planning 13338:2,913379:15,1813450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21principle 13487:2313340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413451:12 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7			-		
13517:10,25 13518:513339:20 13342:1113457:20 13458:1913374:19,20 13418:413409:613518:1213342:15 13343:313479:1613419:1 13448:1813409:6planned 13369:2113363:3 13366:11,19positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313377:4 13399:2313368:5 13369:20positive 13471:5positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:1013506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:513491:10planning 13338:2,913379:15,1813450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,2113471:513340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7		-			
13518:1213342:15 13343:313479:1613419:1 13448:18pre-positioningplanned 13369:2113363:3 13366:11,19positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313377:4 13399:2313368:5 13369:20positive 13471:5positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:1013506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:5principle 13487:23planning 13338:2,913379:15,1813450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21principles 13371:513340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					
planned 13369:2113363:3 13366:11,19positive 13471:513461:22 13511:813434:21,2313371:5 13379:213368:5 13369:20possession 13361:13present 13355:5primary 13367:1213463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:1013506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:5principle 13487:23planning 13338:2,913379:15,1813450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21principles 13371:513340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7				-	
13377:4 13399:2313368:5 13369:20possession 13361:13present 13355:5primary 13367:1213463:10 13493:513371:5 13375:913369:24 13370:913368:9 13382:2113491:1013506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:5principle 13487:23planning 13338:2,913379:15,1813450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21principles 13371:513340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					
13463:10 13493:5 13506:2513371:5 13375:9 13376:5 13379:2,5,1413369:24 13370:9 possibility 13361:8 13450:9 13476:1613368:9 13382:21 13419:21 13441:513491:10 principle 13487:23 principle 13487:23 principle 13471:5planning 13338:2,9 13340:6 13346:15 13349:5 13365:24 13381:25 13382:2113379:15,18 13404:22,24 13416:7 13416:12 13417:12 13424:13 13431:2513369:24 13370:9 possibility 13361:8 13450:9 13476:16 13504:413368:9 13382:21 13451:12 13445:8,21 13455:10,14,1413491:10 principle 13487:23 principles 13371:513349:5 13365:24 13381:25 13382:2113404:22,24 13416:7 13416:12 13417:12 13424:13 13431:2513362:6 13398:1913368:9 13382:21 13355:1113491:10 principle 13487:23 principles 13371:5	-				2
13506:2513376:5 13379:2,5,14possibility 13361:813419:21 13441:5principle 13487:23planning 13338:2,913379:15,1813450:9 13476:1613451:12 13453:8,21principles 13371:513340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7				-	
planning13338:2,913379:15,1813450:913476:1613451:1213453:8,21principles13371:513340:613346:1513404:22,2413416:713504:413454:1013456:2413374:713379:213349:513365:2413416:1213416:1213417:12possible13353:713465:10,14,1413421:2213422:2213381:2513382:2113424:1313431:2513382:613398:19presentation13335:1113519:7	/ 31 1 1 25-				
13340:6 13346:1513404:22,24 13416:713504:413454:10 13456:2413374:7 13379:213349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					
13349:5 13365:2413416:12 13417:12possible 13353:713465:10,14,1413421:22 13442:213381:25 13382:2113424:13 13431:2513382:6 13398:19presentation 13335:1113519:7					
13381:25 13382:21 13424:13 13431:25 13382:6 13398:19 presentation 13335:11 13519:7					
N. WOLFT, J. MANAGET, M. J. K. Kolashid, MCPTL.					
1/2N/2CT + 2/11/2/1 + 1/2/1N/11/2/1N/2CT + 1/2/2CT + 1/2CT + 1/2	the many r . I have a star he	Prof. Ward and the second seco		-	
13383:2 13340:1 13406:23 13424:23 13355:22 13357:16 print 13381:8			15400:25 15424:23	15555:22 15557:16	print 15581:8

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

				Page
printed 13385:11	proportionally	purchased 13515:10	raise 13327:2 13388:12	reasoning 13358:8
13388:5 13397:18	13422:19	purple 13399:3	raised 13458:3 13459:4	13360:18 13368:2
privy 13426:10	proportionate	purpose 13401:1	13461:12 13489:18	13373:1 13376:4
proactively 13423:4	13374:12	13408:2 13428:3	13516:17 13517:7	13392:12 13393:4
probabilities 13365:8	proportionately	13430:24 13433:12	ran 13488:22	13405:1 13451:19
probably 13396:23	13371:12	13434:10	Randfontein 13335:22	reasons 13356:24
13397:7 13520:7	proposal 13358:1,21	purposes 13387:10	ranges 13373:25	13434:3 13467:11
problem 13329:2	13427:18	13389:19 13390:24 13417:10	rapid 13408:3 13435:1	13468:13
13352:14 13354:6,6,8	propose 13519:22		rapidly 13429:21	reassemble 13444:20 reassess 13496:15
13382:2,6 13385:22	proposed 13427:20	pursue 13349:17 push 13470:3 13495:23	13438:25 13492:6 rationale 13377:16	reassess 13496:15 reassurance 13368:4
13389:20 13390:14 13391:7 13392:2	proposing 13519:4,5,6 Protea 13504:9,14	13496:6,17	13464:2 13517:3	recall 13356:7
13406:23 13447:18	protect 13368:3	pushed 13497:19	razor 13398:10,14,19	13357:19 13358:2
13464:4 13476:13	13422:18,22	13504:21	13404:25 13405:4,8	13380:22,23
problematic 13342:3	13445:23 13492:19	pushing 13470:16	13429:10 13430:3,7	13383:18 13385:5
procedure 13349:5	protected 13431:12	put 13334:6 13354:18	13460:23 13467:19	13427:8 13438:13
13437:20 13498:25	13469:22	13356:12 13369:23	13468:9 13469:22	13441:20 13449:16
procedures 13431:8	protection 13379:11	13389:9 13391:15	13478:18,22 13479:5	13451:4 13455:19
13436:8 13437:10	protective 13344:15	13394:11 13396:24	13484:13 13485:5	13456:3 13460:3
13484:22 13519:5	13368:1	13397:21 13405:4,8	13487:7,8,14,16	13465:11 13467:16
proceed 13380:16	protest 13363:22	13415:9 13424:11	13490:8 13492:22	13483:17,20
13387:18 13391:25	13364:9 13378:12	13427:6 13430:6	13493:10,12,18	13485:13 13486:10
13450:15	protester 13491:17	13434:3 13439:3,10	13495:4,6,10	13505:2 13512:7
proceedings 13326:1	protesters 13360:5	13439:13 13441:13	reaction 13372:17	recalling 13335:7
13453:5	13376:16 13421:16	13448:3 13458:8	13400:16 13401:3	recapping 13408:12
process 13349:1	13422:14,23 13467:2	13461:19 13464:24	13435:15 13465:22	receive 13437:11
13353:2 13354:20	13518:8	13474:10,17	13479:10 13491:5	13454:2
13382:3 13437:10	protesting 13405:17	13480:10 13484:11	read 13334:25	received 13341:23
13463:3 13479:23	protestors 13405:5	13486:17 13491:12	13343:17 13359:19	13344:9 13345:17,18
13480:19	13470:7,22 13498:23	13493:1,24 13494:19	13386:25 13389:9,10	13346:7 13349:7
processed 13399:2	13504:2	13495:6,20 13505:9	13390:10,10,20,21	13350:20 13352:25
13431:18	provide 13361:23	13507:9 13509:11	13395:3,6 13404:3	13383:14 13412:3
processing 13399:11,19	13371:23 13376:4	13515:13	13412:17 13452:10	13414:6 13449:13
13399:20 13400:5	13421:23 13430:13	putting 13327:8	reads 13335:2	13494:5 13503:15
13405:10 13423:5	13432:9 13455:1	13333:21 13511:7	ready 13393:18	13507:22
13424:22 13437:7	13457:3 13461:21		13450:21,24	receiving 13437:17
13496:19	provided 13508:22	Q	realign 13485:5	receptive 13427:19
produce 13391:8	13509:14	qualifications 13342:9	realised 13352:20	recollection 13335:4
producing 13391:4	providers 13344:5	quarter 13380:10	13366:4 13414:2	13392:21 13411:13
product 13438:10	provides 13335:3	13444:21 13473:15	13417:19 13451:16	13411:17 13494:15
programme 13385:10	providing 13382:22	question 13499:10	realising 13335:11	13494:18 13501:16
13385:12 13411:17	13448:18 13503:3	questioning 13396:5,19	13365:25	
				recommence 13494:5
13441:15,16	province 13459:2	questions 13327:9,10	realistically 13518:19	recommend 13375:23
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3	recommend 13375:23 recommendation
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512:
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promote 13475:18	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promote 13475:18 promoted 13339:8	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promote 13475:18 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promote 13475:18 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8 proper 13343:3	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512:: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promised 13476:18 promised 13476:18 promoted 13475:18 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promised 13476:18 promised 13476:18 promoted 13339:8 promoted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13459:10,10,13	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promote 13475:18 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18 13353:10 13356:12	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17 13398:11 13404:22	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13484:18,19,21,22,25	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3 13375:24 13392:15	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3 13396:4 13397:2,4,2
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18 13353:10 13356:12 13436:24 13439:12	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17 13398:11 13404:22 13404:24 13431:25	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13484:18,19,21,22,25 13501:19,23,25	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3 13375:24 13392:15 13393:24 13401:15	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3 13396:4 13397:2,4,2 13400:8 13404:4
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18 13353:10 13356:12 13436:24 13439:12 properties 13396:8,11	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17 13398:11 13404:22 13404:24 13431:25 13439:25 13469:13	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 1344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13484:18,19,21,22,25 13501:19,23,25 13502:10,13,19	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3 13375:24 13392:15	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3 13396:4 13397:2,4,2 13400:8 13404:4 recorded 13331:21
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promoted 13339:8 prompted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18 13353:10 13356:12 13436:24 13439:12	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17 13398:11 13404:22 13404:24 13431:25	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13484:18,19,21,22,25 13501:19,23,25 13502:10,13,19 13503:10 13504:11	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3 13375:24 13392:15 13393:24 13401:15 13405:9 13424:4	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3 13396:4 13397:2,4,2 13400:8 13404:4
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promoted 13475:18 promoted 13475:18 promoted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18 13353:10 13356:12 13436:24 13439:12 properties 13396:8,11 property 13370:18,24	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17 13398:11 13404:22 13404:24 13431:25 13439:25 13469:13 13473:3,4,14 13488:6	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 1344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13484:18,19,21,22,25 13501:19,23,25 13502:10,13,19	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3 13375:24 13392:15 13393:24 13401:15 13405:9 13424:4 13452:7 13472:20	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3 13396:4 13397:2,4,2 13400:8 13404:4 recorded 13331:21 13402:5
13441:15,16 progress 13520:4 progressively 13465:6 prohibit 13424:19 13471:3 Project 13409:15 prominent 13469:17 promise 13482:13 promised 13476:18 promises 13396:1 promoted 13475:18 promoted 13475:18 promoted 13465:8 proper 13343:3 13493:2 properly 13350:18 13353:10 13356:12 13436:24 13439:12 properties 13396:8,11 property 13370:18,24 13418:6 13422:18	province 13459:2 13512:15 13515:19 provinces 13417:24 Provincial 13354:24,25 13425:1 13480:22 13481:1 13510:10 provision 13435:14 provoking 13422:22 proximity 13402:25 Pruis 13338:17 public 13339:20 13343:3 13358:5 13366:10,19 13367:1 13368:4 13369:12,20 13375:8,11,13 13379:4,14,15,17 13398:11 13404:22 13404:24 13431:25 13439:25 13469:13 13473:3,4,14 13488:6 13489:1,2,17	questions 13327:9,10 13356:22 quick 13420:10 quickly 13438:25 13442:24 13489:21 13492:3 quite 13332:1 13342:5 13344:6 13352:3 13383:2 13391:13 13483:22 13502:5,8 R radio 13447:1,21 13448:4 13449:3 13453:16 13459:1,7 13484:18,19,21,22,25 13501:19,23,25 13502:10,13,19 13503:10 13504:11 13504:17,22,25	realistically 13518:19 reality 13484:3 really 13349:8 13367:15 13383:1 13393:22 13402:24 13406:11 13427:10 13433:3 13462:17 13483:25 13495:21 13511:7 13519:19 real-time 13432:14 rear 13419:11 13428:12,22 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:11 reason 13371:24 13372:9 13373:3 13375:24 13392:15 13393:24 13401:15 13405:9 13424:4 13452:7 13472:20 13492:13 13513:2	recommend 13375:23 recommendation 13342:25 13484:7 reconnaissance 13409:16 13411:20 13412:5,9 13413:23 13414:6 13437:22 reconnaissances 13409:18 reconstructing 13512: reconvened 13476:23 record 13326:19 13384:17 13387:1,2 13389:9,10,19 13390:9 13391:5,6,8 13394:22 13395:3 13396:4 13397:2,4,2: 13400:8 13404:4 recorded 13331:21 13402:5 recruit 13423:21

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

				Page
13492:9 13495:2,15	13459:22 13465:3	requirements 13378:12	results 13359:20	13472:19 13477:24
refer 13331:15	13471:15 13472:11	reserve 13428:25	resumes 13326:2	13489:13 13491:10
13397:19 13420:19	remained 13355:20	13429:3,9,20,25	13380:11,12	13491:23 13500:19
reference 13334:3	13377:3 13404:9	13430:8,19 13451:21	13444:22,23 13464:9	13509:7 13512:9
13340:11 13420:10	13461:19 13470:1	13451:25 13478:20	13464:10 13494:3,4	13507:13512:2
				-
13505:11	remaining 13471:17	13478:22	retain 13371:14	roles 13340:15
referred 13334:8	13478:23	reserved 13331:19	retaliation 13358:6	13369:13 13370:4
13500:22 13504:12	remains 13392:8	13450:6	retreat 13488:9	13457:14,16
referring 13349:8	13404:17 13519:23	reserves 13429:7	retrieve 13425:14	13517:24
13353:23,24	remember 13420:11	13434:3	retrieved 13365:11	role-players 13413:1,4
13356:16 13360:14	13453:8 13460:21	residence 13393:17	return 13372:9	13465:10,13
13384:24 13385:8	13483:8 13485:8	13475:22	13393:6,11,16,17	roll 13454:9,18 13477
13426:18	13504:19	resident 13425:15	13405:17 13410:4	room 13381:13,13,15
refers 13363:2	remembered 13485:11	resist 13436:16	13474:13	13410:4
reflect 13454:23	remove 13388:24	resistance 13469:10	returned 13356:4	Roots 13490:19
13474:1 13501:16	reorganisation	resolution 13387:17	13383:8 13449:16	13506:9 13511:20,2
13510:20	13496:14 13497:13	13422:15 13427:25	13459:16	13512:3 13513:13,2
reflecting 13335:6	13503:18	13428:5 13476:13	reveals 13407:23	13513:23 13514:8
13470:24	reorganise 13489:21,24	13484:1 13486:21	reverse 13382:19	13515:10,11
refuge 13499:14	13489:25 13490:10	13519:14	reverted 13414:21	round 13388:1
refuse 13378:23	13496:15,16	resolve 13344:2	review 13382:7	rounds 13367:21
13424:17	13497:10	13360:22 13368:18	13508:7	route 13348:19,24
refused 13405:3	reorganised 13497:13	13378:9 13387:7	re-evaluating 13414:22	13349:5 13351:11
13461:19 13471:22	reorganising 13444:10	13435:24 13436:11	re-orientate 13343:2	13353:6 13366:5
refusing 13499:7	13445:9	13437:2 13450:9	Rhino 13410:23	13415:17 13418:19
regard 13327:16	repeat 13370:20	13462:12 13483:14	13411:1,7,14	13486:24
13365:1 13429:17	repeatedly 13502:23	13517:19 13519:10	riding 13491:25	routes 13418:12,14
			-	
13442:19 13461:18	reply 13458:7	13519:13,19	rifle 13503:23	routine 13453:4
13479:24	report 13336:8	resolving 13390:14	rights 13461:17	rubber 13367:19,21
Regardia 13516:23	13346:14 13347:1,5	resort 13361:9	ringed 13492:9	13488:19,19
regarding 13352:13	13412:2 13477:9	13371:10 13488:19	rise 13392:10 13394:15	rules 13501:2
13383:3 13447:7	13482:2 13484:25	resources 13354:7,8	13468:22	run 13348:8 13455:23
13458:21,23	13511:24 13512:14	13362:4,6,7 13363:2	risk 13340:7 13370:8	13509:3
13476:16 13507:20	reported 13414:16	13439:11 13449:25	13372:20 13379:17	running 13349:3
13507:24 13508:24	13448:6 13477:12	13457:13 13477:8	13431:16 13472:21	13402:7,10 13454:8
13510:3	13482:5 13486:5	respect 13404:8	13472:21 13473:19	13492:15
regroup 13470:6	reportedly 13366:2	respectfully 13385:23	13473:20 13491:16	rural 13475:14
13495:23	reporting 13426:9	respective 13417:21	13518:7	rush 13460:22
reinforce 13394:3	13447:10 13460:13	13444:10 13445:8	risks 13439:18	rushing 13449:5
reiterate 13472:18	reports 13430:15	13457:14	rituals 13449:1	Rustenburg 13328:15
rejected 13464:15	13484:20 13503:10			13363:14 13379:25
0		respond 13371:12	river 13489:19,24	
related 13360:7	represent 13338:2	13401:3 13428:11	13497:10	13516:10
relating 13356:20	13513:18	13436:8 13466:4	riverbed 13496:12,25	
13517:8	representative	responding 13422:19	road 13395:10,13,15,16	S
relation 13342:24	13453:18,19 13455:9	response 13345:2,3	13395:16,19,20	SAA 13453:18
13351:13 13361:12	13467:20 13477:12	13369:5 13377:8	13396:10,16	SAAF 13350:3
13385:22 13396:6	represented 13372:1	13429:16 13443:18	13397:10 13398:3,6	safe 13369:21 13409:8
13421:9 13423:15	13454:11			
		13456:21 13463:14	13415:25 13452:3	13431:14 13468:4,8
13429:4 13437:13	representing 13456:20	13488:24 13489:4	roadblock 13394:17,17	13474:11 13488:9
13438:15 13442:21	13510:15 13516:18	responses 13475:18	13394:25 13395:1,1,2	13493:9 13495:7,25
13448:21 13458:22	request 13358:11	responsibilities	13395:2,4,11	13500:7
13478:12 13500:12	13371:25 13397:8	13338:24 13391:9	13397:15,17 13398:1	safety 13371:1 13379:
13511:3 13516:4,9,22	requested 13399:1	13500:19	13398:2	13482:9
13517:13	13401:3 13418:24	responsible 13517:24	roads 13394:11,13,17	Saffy 13445:18
relative 13490:17		responsive 13348:25	13469:16	-
	13441:4 13455:13			sake 13490:20
relevance 13334:10	13481:9 13509:3	rest 13400:21,24	rock 13461:16	SAP 13339:15
relevant 13333:3	13510:5	13415:16 13443:2,10	13503:23	SAPS 13422:13,17
13334:14 13336:10	requesting 13405:17	13457:4	rocks 13473:7,16,16	13423:2 13480:10
13338:20 13388:11	13424:1 13477:18	restore 13376:6,7	13488:23 13489:9	13489:25 13515:8,1
13389:5 13390:5,21	require 13426:7	13378:11,16 13423:2	13491:11 13499:15	13515:24 13516:18
13439:16 13448:21	required 13347:15	restraints 13436:18	role 13340:6 13366:14	sat 13446:15 13477:5
13457:23 13494:6	13360:22 13361:23	result 13378:23	13369:9,16 13370:2	satellite 13353:15
relied 13415:4	13363:25 13366:7,10	13422:25 13464:6	13407:11,13	13381:8 13390:2
rely 13368:13	13368:20,25	13468:5	13428:15 13429:23	13400:17 13409:4
rely 15506.15				10410 0 10417 10
	13437:13 13466:4	resulted 13415:20	13432:17 13453:21	13410:8 13417:18
relying 13366:20 remain 13392:10	13437:13 13466:4 13517:17 13518:8	resulted 13415:20 13466:16	13432:17 13453:21 13454:19 13472:16	13410:8 13417:18 13422:5 13455:17

Pretoria

				David
				Page 1
13478:8	13416:12,17	13486:9	13414:18 13439:3	13370:2,3,13
satisfactory 13387:17	13417:12 13419:24	separate 13385:24	13464:7 13495:19	13384:11 13424:3
Saturday 13365:19	13420:6 13424:12	13474:12 13495:18	shortly 13421:20	13439:23 13440:11
13393:1	13440:24 13444:9	13510:5	shot 13374:4,5	13440:13 13442:11
save 13390:15	13445:8 13511:10	separately 13426:12	shouldn't 13484:18	13464:5 13504:13
13410:21	sectors 13415:7,12	September 13326:1	show 13371:23 13372:2	Similarly 13489:12
saved 13386:24	secure 13418:20	13328:9,14 13333:14	13372:3,7,8,8,24	simple 13416:18
13387:6 13388:14,17	security 13351:23	13333:17 13511:25	13373:2 13379:3	simplicity 13438:12
13388:25 13389:3,17	13352:9 13362:8	13513:8	13384:6 13385:12,17	simply 13355:11
13390:3,16 13391:18	13382:23 13392:24	sequence 13382:13	13385:25 13388:23	13368:7 13373:6,10
saw 13363:24 13392:16	13393:20 13403:17	13424:7 13427:8	13397:3 13403:18	13376:21 13378:14
13405:4 13414:24	13408:20 13453:19	13456:4 13457:8	13408:25 13409:3	13378:22 13382:10
13430:7	13461:21 13474:6	13492:20	13411:15 13421:8	13388:1 13391:13
saying 13337:24	see 13327:13,20	sequencing 13424:10	13423:4 13424:18,18	13393:4 13394:2
13367:16 13394:25	13328:2,9,19,20	sequential 13370:6	13433:13 13434:4,22	13420:13,15
13394:25 13439:6	13333:8 13334:15	13425:8 13443:10	13435:19 13436:1	13432:22 13434:22
13449:18 13450:8,11	13345:3,6 13350:21	sequentially 13425:17	13440:9 13451:25	13436:6,19 13437:6
13503:22 13505:4	13372:2 13373:1	13426:5	13454:19 13455:13	13440:12 13454:19
says 13333:24	13374:20 13375:22	series 13388:18	13466:10,12	13457:18 13461:14
13349:23 13409:14	13385:3 13387:19	serious 13472:14	13480:25,25 13484:7	13484:1 13492:1
scale 13363:25 13420:9	13389:17 13394:11	service 13335:23	13485:2,6 13496:9,23	13518:8 13519:5
scatter 13469:8	13394:18 13396:25	13339:16 13342:20	13510:19	simultaneously
scattering 13472:12,13	13397:15,16	13343:3 13359:23	showed 13352:7,10	13434:25
scenario 13362:10	13398:12,25 13399:5	13360:7 13373:17,21	13383:20,22	Sinclair 13351:19,21
13435:10 13464:22	13400:11,16 13401:9	services 13399:18	13499:22	13351:24 13352:1
13504:1,1	13404:18,20	13400:3 13425:21	showing 13383:19	13353:1 13361:16
scenarios 13359:14	13406:16 13407:12	13430:21 13431:9,22	13391:20 13397:10	13363:11 13381:8,17
scene 13349:4 13359:8	13411:25 13412:14	13432:2 13456:22	13464:1 13495:16	13381:20 13382:21
13373:4 13424:23	13426:19 13427:25	13468:8 13491:8	13496:20	13392:7,20 13394:5
13430:22 13431:20	13430:16,17 13439:1	session 13356:9	shown 13388:13	13401:15 13403:15
13432:3 13437:8	13439:23 13440:16	13381:25	13395:4 13400:6	13404:16 13407:17
13447:19,23 13455:8	13441:11 13445:3	sessions 13444:2	13492:22 13494:16	13408:19 13409:13
School 13335:22	13463:8 13465:5,20	13512:8	13495:22 13501:16	13422:6
Scott's 13386:22	13481:5 13492:8,21	set 13327:12 13351:14	13510:14	sir 13326:20,23
13387:14	13492:24 13493:22	13395:11 13428:20	shows 13420:3,7	13380:25 13396:22
screen 13384:12	13494:14,24 13495:2	13458:24 13459:19	13493:19	13479:12
13388:13 13389:15	13495:12 13496:4,6	13459:23	shunned 13474:23	sister 13337:16
13397:1 13398:13	13496:20 13497:6,21	sets 13516:12	side 13344:23 13362:8	sit 13380:21 13406:13
13402:4 13423:20	13503:10,11	setting 13399:24	13363:3 13367:16	site 13332:10
13436:20 13439:2,23	seeing 13509:19	settlement 13383:16,21	13372:9 13392:23	sits 13504:22
13441:11 13494:13	seek 13411:21 13428:4	13401:11,24 13402:8	13398:20,25	sitting 13376:16
13494:14 13497:3	seeking 13376:24	13402:10 13403:13	13420:18 13426:25	13443:22 13454:18
scribe 13507:19	13452:10	13403:19 13468:12	13428:23 13436:5	13460:24 13467:4
search 13425:14	seemingly 13468:24	13469:5 13492:8,14	13451:24 13461:16	13516:11 13520:5
13447:14 13480:2,8,9	seen 13357:7 13364:17	13492:14,19	13476:20,21	situation 13350:18
13480:21 13491:10	13364:24 13366:21	13496:22	13487:14,20	13352:20 13356:1,13
seated 13327:4	13402:25 13451:23	settlements 13468:19	13493:11 13496:21	13356:14 13357:21
13460:16 13483:22	13462:18 13466:11	13469:1,15	sides 13358:16	13359:7 13360:23
second 13332:10	13497:10 13502:8	seven 13351:1,1	sight 13400:18	13361:23 13362:8
13343:5 13356:4,9	13515:2	13486:7	sign 13458:20 13459:10	13365:1 13366:6
13395:15 13397:17	sees 13390:25	shack 13459:7	13493:2	13367:5 13368:18
13397:17 13402:24	selection 13336:1	shacks 13468:14	signals 13410:14	13369:19 13371:6,9
13403:4 13412:8	self-defence 13375:3	shade 13486:17	13440:4	13371:21 13372:18
13417:5 13451:16	send 13491:18	shaft 13378:3 13452:17	signature 13328:7	13372:23 13373:12
13452:6 13473:12	senior 13410:18	13452:18	13330:17	13373:23 13377:4
13486:9 13493:5,7	13421:25 13422:13	sharp 13379:18	signed 13329:4 13330:1	13378:9,17,19
secondary 13370:4	13453:12 13456:12	13482:24 13518:2,5	13330:7,25 13333:7	13380:5 13401:7
13472:24,24	13516:15 13519:16	shield 13340:16,17,17	significant 13399:22	13410:13 13414:22
section 13335:15,18	sense 13348:11	shifts 13448:12	signified 13399:8	13423:13 13430:15
13336:9 13337:22	13425:18 13444:12	shining 13502:7	signifies 13386:23	13435:25 13436:12
13346:3,21 13480:21	sensible 13397:7	shock 13488:16	13399:6	13437:2 13439:10,15
12401.0 12517.0	sensitive 13470:19,19	shoot 13504:2	signifying 13400:10	13439:17 13441:24
13481:2 13517:2				12451.6 12452.10
sections 13459:25	sent 13413:22 13414:7	shooting 13505:15	signing 13480:22	13451:6 13452:10
sections 13459:25 13460:1 13469:14	sent 13413:22 13414:7 13481:22 13512:13	shops 13468:21	signs 13458:17	13454:6 13477:9,12
sections 13459:25 13460:1 13469:14 13509:14	sent 13413:22 13414:7 13481:22 13512:13 13515:19	shops 13468:21 13469:1		
sections 13459:25 13460:1 13469:14	sent 13413:22 13414:7 13481:22 13512:13	shops 13468:21	signs 13458:17	13454:6 13477:9,12

Tel: 011 021 6457 Fax: 011 440 9119

RealTime Transcriptions

			J	
				Page 1
10505 15 10511 11	12404 20 12401 22	12424 24 12465 22	4 11222 (11	
13505:15 13511:11	13484:20 13491:22	13424:24 13465:22	stand 13326:11	13464:24 13490:23
13517:19 13519:13	13504:21,24	specialist 13509:11	13368:19 13461:15	statements 13327:16
situational 13503:3	13517:21	specific 13354:11	13472:9 13520:8	13334:14
situations 13344:1	soon 13483:22	13382:11 13403:11	standard 13411:16	states 13344:19
13368:12,15 13401:5	sorry 13326:3	13446:11	13431:2,8 13436:8	13345:5,13 13364:8
13488:5 13517:18	13327:19 13329:24	specifically 13343:21	13437:9,14,20	static 13466:9
six 13343:8,17	13330:24 13331:20	13352:5 13356:10	13498:24 13508:6	stating 13358:2
13412:20 13413:7,7		13357:8 13383:19	13519:5	13378:15
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	13332:1,20 13370:19			
13413:14 13425:8	13381:2 13388:11	13393:19 13419:6	standby 13373:15	station 13395:14
size 13349:16 13352:13	13394:20,21	13426:5 13478:2	13431:24 13432:23	13445:18 13479:11
13366:18 13376:6	13397:12 13402:2	13487:9	13458:8,10 13481:19	13495:9,10
13498:25	13429:24 13456:2	speech 13484:22	standing 13399:6	stationed 13502:12
skills 13401:6 13517:15	13506:11 13518:20	speed 13398:15	13461:16 13481:15	stay 13392:22 13493:16
13518:4,6	13518:24	13452:23 13454:24	13503:23	stayed 13377:23
skinned 13421:4	sort 13431:5 13495:16	speedily 13466:4	standoff 13375:25	13481:21
slide 13411:14 13420:6	sorted 13459:7	spent 13335:5,6	13491:16	staying 13392:12,14
13420:6 13456:3	Soshanguve 13340:22	13383:12	stands 13356:10	13393:23 13480:17
13480:25 13490:14	sound 13475:19	split 13415:6 13417:25	13363:5	step 13373:13
13490:15,17,18,19	sounded 13503:25	spoke 13367:2 13392:7	start 13326:5,18	steps 13379:1 13443:11
13492:21,25	13505:11	13423:17 13434:20	13348:25 13349:1,5	13443:12 13487:1
13493:22,24 13494:7	sounds 13480:15	13443:4 13454:25	13353:1 13354:5	13507:24
13494:7,13,18,19,22	source 13514:4	13457:18 13477:17	13362:17,18	STF 13336:1,24
13496:23 13497:1	sources 13360:2	13483:21 13490:7	13374:18,24	13337:3,3,10,22
13501:13,20	13394:6 13507:23	spoor 13348:12	13375:18 13380:4	13341:8,12,19
13510:19	13508:3	sporadically 13365:16	13391:14 13397:11	13348:5 13349:23
slides 13411:7,15	south 13338:13	13413:23 13426:24	13410:4 13424:14	13359:12 13369:7
13440:14 13441:14	13342:20 13344:19	spot 13402:24	13427:23,24	13370:3 13407:11
13454:21 13455:23	13345:11 13364:18	spray 13375:5	13455:21 13469:15	13414:6 13435:15
13477:23 13478:2	13398:2,22 13402:9	13493:10,17	13472:12 13473:3	13465:25 13479:9
13510:15	13407:19 13447:15	spraying 13472:11	13479:23 13491:3	13495:17 13496:2
slightly 13427:7	13447:16 13479:10	spread 13460:14	13495:10 13496:19	13517:9,15
13487:24	13487:18	square 13492:9	started 13337:16,18	stick 13357:23
slow 13497:8		Squeeze 13340:21		
	southern 13398:20	–	13350:19 13355:21	13405:22
small 13329:11	spaza 13468:20	SSS3 13423:10	13362:2 13410:17	stipulates 13429:6
13357:19 13383:11	13469:1	stability 13343:6,7,17	13414:25 13430:4	stolen 13364:23
13383:11 13398:23	speak 13374:2,17	13423:2 13425:6	13432:12 13433:18	13425:25 13484:19
13400:18,19	13375:21 13384:6	13511:7	13446:7,13 13447:14	stones 13360:15
13406:22 13416:9	13385:14 13388:8	stage 13347:21	13472:20 13482:9	stood 13365:1
13436:15 13449:24	13396:17 13398:2	13352:16 13370:6	13485:1,10 13501:13	13403:16 13452:2
13461:11 13474:10	13416:4 13419:14	13378:23 13380:8,10	13503:3 13510:19	13486:18 13502:9
13492:8 13496:9			13513:4 13519:25	stop 13369:2 13394:19
	13420:12,13,25	13383:3 13384:5		-
13499:7	13424:17 13438:25	13388:11 13389:6	starting 13326:3	13395:20 13489:25
smaller 13392:16	13439:3,24 13441:15	13390:5 13399:10,22	13369:4 13374:13	13496:14 13497:10
13414:4 13436:25	13442:12 13459:3	13403:10 13414:2	13382:2 13454:6	13497:20
13446:21 13451:10	13475:5 13478:1	13415:7 13417:5	13465:5 13482:7	stopped 13497:7
13462:2,8,23	13490:17 13491:19	13425:1,19,20	13484:13	stopper 13398:4,7
13463:19 13464:18	13504:22 13507:3	13426:1 13436:9,14	starts 13366:18	strange 13475:11
13467:24 13470:8	speaking 13361:16	13438:14 13443:19	13376:18 13431:14	strategic 13357:15,22
13471:23 13473:11	13392:5,18 13438:23	13444:18 13450:10	13471:13	13362:16,18
13490:5,6,11	13442:14 13463:5,15	13458:5,9,10,11	state 13360:6 13472:6	13422:11 13426:22
13496:18	13477:23 13509:7	13460:21 13461:1,1	13483:25 13494:15	13437:25 13462:20
SMEAC 13439:15	speaks 13353:9	13462:11,15 13464:8	Stated 13368:7	13470:4,20 13471:9
13440:7 13442:10	13386:14 13420:6	13471:11 13481:17	statement 13327:22	13519:18
13486:14	13439:14	13484:5,15 13485:2,3	13328:13 13329:6,7,8	strategies 13337:18
smelter 13395:17	spear 13364:24	13485:8,16,18	13330:13,23 13331:4	13367:1 13369:11
13408:20	spears 13361:15	13487:4,6 13490:8,9	13332:23 13333:19	13467:6 13517:18
soft 13421:4 13431:11	special 13339:24	13490:12 13494:2	13333:21,22,25	strategise 13465:19
sole 13390:9	13344:12 13345:18	13495:5 13519:24	13334:17 13335:3,9	strategist 13517:17
solution 13354:4,9	13346:21,23	13520:5	13335:13,16 13336:4	strategy 13349:2
13358:22 13406:23	13347:15 13359:15	stages 13426:6	13345:22,25	13350:21 13353:10
/ 35 1 1/02			13349:23 13354:4	13364:4 13366:5
solutions 13382:7	13369:6 13400:12,19	13472:18 13486:24	15517.25 15551.1	
solutions 13382:7 solve 13329:2		13472:18 13486:24 13487:2,3,5 13506:22	13359:4 13362:18	13376:5 13380:5
solve 13329:2	13369:6 13400:12,19 13401:2 13474:11	13487:2,3,5 13506:22	13359:4 13362:18	
solve 13329:2 solving 13382:3	133 69:6 13400:1 2,19 13401:2 13474:11 13481:16,17	13487:2,3,5 13506:22 staging 13435:16	13359:4 13362:18 13375:23 13381:3	13392:5,11 13398:8
solve 13329:2 solving 13382:3 somebody 13337:8	13369:6 13400:12,19 13401:2 13474:11 13481:16,17 13483:10 13489:12	13487:2,3,5 13506:22 staging 13435:16 13444:11 13445:10	13359:4 13362:18 13375:23 13381:3 13385:3 13407:4,12	13392:5,11 13398:8 13403:22 13406:16
solve 13329:2 solving 13382:3 somebody 13337:8 13372:22,23 13446:3	13369:6 13400:12,19 13401:2 13474:11 13481:16,17 13483:10 13489:12 13493:21	13487:2,3,5 13506:22 staging 13435:16 13444:11 13445:10 13445:13 13459:12	13359:4 13362:18 13375:23 13381:3 13385:3 13407:4,12 13428:2 13436:14	13392:5,11 13398:8 13403:22 13406:16 13414:25 13417:12
solve 13329:2 solving 13382:3 somebody 13337:8	13369:6 13400:12,19 13401:2 13474:11 13481:16,17 13483:10 13489:12	13487:2,3,5 13506:22 staging 13435:16 13444:11 13445:10	13359:4 13362:18 13375:23 13381:3 13385:3 13407:4,12	13392:5,11 13398:8 13403:22 13406:16

				Page 20
13422:3 13424:7,11	summarised 13501:4	13366:24 13367:2,6	13430:5 13433:24	13499:21
13427:14,20	summary 13343:10	13368:2,8,14,20	13435:5 13446:17	tells 13361:6 13406:21
13430:10 13439:13	13358:25	13369:3,5,13	13474:2	ten 13349:14 13351:4
13441:10 13443:4,9	Summit 13341:1	13373:16 13374:1,20	Taser 13375:5	13352:15
13448:16,18 13451:1	sun 13412:13 13502:7	13377:3,7,17	task 13339:24	tend 13372:9
13454:19,20	Sunday 13352:8	13378:21 13379:11	13345:18 13346:21	tends 13372:9
13455:14 13456:1	13365:19 13378:3	13379:16 13416:25	13346:23 13347:15	tenfold 13440:15
13460:20 13462:3	13452:17	13417:5 13419:9	13374:2 13400:19	tense 13477:12
13463:20 13466:17	supplementary	13421:4,13,13,14	13401:2 13418:8	term 13422:3 13499:18
13467:1,11 13472:1,3	13333:19	13424:20,22 13432:1	13425:22 13465:19	termed 13398:4
13474:10 13495:24	supply 13453:16,17	13435:24 13436:5,11	13474:11 13481:16	13400:1
13496:1 13511:11	support 13368:3,24	13437:1,24 13440:1	13481:17,19,22	terms 13427:10
13519:6,10	13369:14 13421:5	13450:6,11 13451:5	13489:12 13493:21	13490:25 13500:4
streamlining 13342:3	13453:15,17	13458:7 13462:5	tasked 13337:22	terrain 13414:11
streets 13435:6	13471:18	13463:6,10,12	13338:1 13405:12	13497:7
strength 13414:1	supporters 13394:7	13469:13 13472:22	13415:24 13479:15	terrorist 13372:23
strike 13348:2	supporting 13369:16	13472:23 13473:13	13479:22 13492:11	testified 13341:13
13356:25 13357:1	supposed 13353:12	13473:19 13483:14	13508:17 13512:3	testimony 13387:5
	13412:22 13498:2,4		taskforce 13359:15	TF 13453:13
13363:14 13377:17	sure 13336:11	13485:12 13488:24 13489:22 13491:16		thank 13327:21
striker 13415:22			13369:7 13400:12	
striking 13366:22	13381:22 13384:4	13497:20 13517:20	taught 13393:12	13332:22 13333:18
13468:23	13394:12 13397:3	13518:5 13519:20	taxi 13395:20	13334:15 13339:10
struck 13475:11	13399:6 13448:13	tactically 13360:23	tea 13380:10 13494:2	13380:14 13404:11
structure 13353:10	13463:24 13483:22	13368:18	team 13345:3,4,6	13445:1 13464:13
13382:11 13421:22	13496:8 13511:11	tactics 13368:5	13394:10,14 13395:9	that'll 13386:3
13440:5	13515:4	13398:19 13421:18	13397:9 13400:16,19	thereabouts 13440:18
structured 13436:23	surprise 13398:17	13491:18	13401:3 13412:5	thereof 13338:9
13440:18 13469:14	13414:3 13466:21,23	take 13326:11,14,21	13414:6 13432:23	13479:14
13490:5	surrendered 13406:2	13360:21 13365:3	13435:15 13441:1	thereto 13354:9
structures 13437:19	surrendering 13375:1	13372:7 13373:7	13481:19 13488:24	there's 13329:11
13456:2	surround 13414:3	13380:9,15 13387:17	13516:18	13333:8 13334:3
structuring 13353:8	surrounds 13409:10	13405:19 13432:21	teams 13345:2 13369:5	13364:18 13384:21
struggled 13383:1	suspect 13372:6	13441:19 13444:19	13440:1	13388:16 13392:9
struggling 13459:6	suspects 13346:16	13459:24,25 13460:2	teargas 13367:17	13396:5 13397:20
student 13343:1	13347:16 13348:8	13460:2 13463:5	13488:12	13398:13 13402:8
stun 13367:17 13431:2	13365:9 13366:2	13464:7,11 13474:14	technical 13453:16	13403:3,19 13404:17
13488:17,18 13489:5	13423:6	13475:17 13483:10	13459:1	13414:14 13419:10
submission 13396:6	suspicious 13475:23	13484:11 13487:13	Technikon 13342:15	13424:21 13437:8
submit 13491:18	swear 13326:24	13494:1,7 13497:23	tell 13328:24 13338:15	13462:2 13480:18
subsequent 13389:10	13327:2,3	13499:14 13520:4	13338:24 13340:5,10	13483:9 13489:19
subsequently 13389:15	sweep 13489:8	taken 13337:17	13344:13 13346:7	13490:4 13491:18
13395:7 13404:4	swept 13491:13	13355:13 13359:21	13347:25 13349:18	they'd 13393:10
13501:12 13506:8	swing 13487:16,19,20	13376:18 13399:4,10	13350:9,16 13351:18	13450:17
succeed 13443:10	13488:22 13496:3	13409:5 13428:3	13351:25 13352:19	they'll 13437:22
succeeded 13336:13	swinging 13470:16	13436:19 13450:17	13353:15,21	they're 13362:23,23
success 13466:19,20	synopsis 13393:25	13483:13,18	13354:14,22	13373:1 13391:18
successfully 13438:5	13422:11	13485:12 13492:2	13357:15 13359:3,11	13399:7 13437:18
suddenly 13429:18	system 13373:20	13497:16	13361:20 13363:20	they've 13437:21
suffice 13481:1	systems 13342:3	takes 13337:8 13409:7	13365:13 13370:11	thing 13387:8 13443:22
sufficient 13439:4	13504:17	13463:16	13370:16,22 13376:4	13470:24
sufficiently 13391:6	s.u.o 13380:18	take-downs 13375:7	13377:2,6,15 13378:7	things 13338:19
suggest 13385:23		talk 13362:15 13447:2	13382:20 13384:2,10	13339:3 13365:23
13390:13 13391:1	T	13504:21 13505:1	13384:16 13407:3,16	13382:13,14
13517:18	T 13362:15 13363:5	talked 13389:11	13408:1 13409:14	13389:23 13424:21
suggested 13446:3	13388:24	13448:4	13412:25 13413:18	13426:10,23
13479:13	table 13342:5 13381:10	talking 13348:6	13414:11 13417:7	13449:10 13451:24
suggesting 13388:16	13461:11	13360:14,15 13397:1	13426:8 13433:17	13461:12 13506:24
13390:3	tabled 13423:1	13416:6 13449:4	13442:15 13444:6	think 13331:18
suggestion 13358:21	tabulate 13342:21	13482:15 13515:7,8	13454:22 13457:11	13336:7 13364:14,20
13365:4 13452:5	tabulated 13454:12	talks 13440:3	13466:14 13469:8,20	13364:22 13379:13
13467:23	tackle 13491:22	target 13377:19	13475:4 13486:8,15	13382:25 13384:20
suggestions 13335:8	tactic 13372:3	13388:24 13445:17	13487:8,10 13503:18	13386:12 13388:1
13517:3	13429:19	targeted 13378:3	13508:15,21	13389:3 13392:1
suicidal 13372:22	tactical 13343:14	13446:8 13468:23	13509:13,19	13393:13 13394:22
suited 13414:12	13345:1 13358:3,14	13469:2 13471:1	13510:22 13513:8	13395:22 13396:18
sum 13372:6	13358:18 13363:3	targets 13415:23	telling 13407:10	13399:12 13402:13
A R C H I V E E O	13558:18 13505:5	uigus 13413.23	coming 15407.10	15577.12 15402.15
			•	

				Page 2
13402:15 13403:24	13349:15 13352:17	13500:8	unacceptable 13378:18	13454:1,11 13491:7
13411:8 13412:17	13361:14 13379:24	trucks 13399:9	unarmed 13375:3	13491:24 13515:20
13416:12 13426:17	13384:14 13394:5	13405:10	13475:21	United 13344:19
13436:4 13438:22	13423:25 13427:14	true 13329:10,17	unattested 13328:25	13345:5,13
13459:21 13460:10	13446:20 13479:3	13331:8 13348:10	unaware 13409:2	units 13337:16 13340:8
13467:18 13477:3,5	13483:9,12 13486:19	truly 13364:22	unawares 13408:5	13349:20 13366:24
13482:21 13484:23	13487:11 13506:15	trust 13397:2	uncalled 13475:18	13367:3 13368:2,8
13507:6 13513:20	tomorrow 13520:6,12	truth 13327:1,1,1	uncertain 13357:8	13369:3,13 13370:5
13515:5	top 13328:8 13342:6	try 13361:7 13370:23	13478:24	13379:11 13407:14
thinking 13370:6	13344:13 13358:11	13374:10 13375:19	uncertainty 13441:25	13407:23 13411:3
13390:19 13393:14	13445:3 13446:4	13376:1 13393:13	unclothed 13449:5	13417:24,25
13413:3 13417:5	13478:17 13489:16	13404:19 13425:24	undated 13330:4	13420:21 13424:25
13419:8 13429:12,14	13503:23	13429:19 13434:4	undergone 13341:8	13437:17 13444:3,14
13471:11 13486:11	torch 13411:25	13439:3 13461:4,13	understand 13334:21	13447:21 13457:19
thinks 13396:22 13453:20	touched 13479:18 town 13395:12,12,17	13462:9 13481:24 13488:4,19 13489:20	13351:5 13354:6 13361:18 13363:18	13472:23 13473:19 13517:20
third 13344:13 13360:8	Township 13421:15	13493:1 13502:9,13	13374:21 13375:21	unknowledgeable
13402:25 13403:4	track 13348:12	trying 13327:25	13376:19,19	13398:18
13452:9	13349:12	13361:5 13392:4	13379:14 13386:14	unknown 13357:8
thought 13348:4	traditional 13364:20	13393:11 13404:2	13390:8,9 13391:3,7	unlawfulness 13364:5
13349:8,11,17	13364:24 13425:3	13416:16,23 13433:1	13395:3 13416:19	13364:7
13365:24 13383:4	13475:15 13482:23	13447:13 13460:9	13424:2 13426:21	unnecessarily 13435:2
13400:17 13402:20	tragic 13359:20	13463:5 13470:6	13438:24 13439:1,2,6	unprepared 13398:18
13402:23 13403:5	trailer 13493:14	13493:12	13439:25 13455:25	13408:5
13405:6 13406:9,25	trailers 13429:1,11	Tuesday 13379:20	13480:17 13484:24	unrest 13359:23
13446:11 13448:21	train 13345:10	13404:15 13406:18	13490:24	13423:7 13474:2
13460:21 13467:7	trained 13337:2	13425:17 13436:21	understanding	unsettling 13461:7
13473:6 13484:11	13368:14 13375:1	13440:5 13441:6	13335:10 13348:9	unsigned 13328:25
13489:15 13493:8	13437:18,18	13442:9 13447:4,6	13349:2 13352:14	13330:4
13520:1	13473:18 13517:9,15	13450:3,5 13451:7,22	13355:19 13361:5	unsuccessful 13424:16
thoughts 13335:7	training 13336:1,25	13452:11 13458:25	13375:13,22 13393:3	13424:18 13436:1
threat 13372:1	13337:11,19,20	13459:5 13463:7	13393:3,7 13402:17	unsure 13427:7
13377:18 13433:19	13341:8,23 13342:24	13484:19 13518:16	13406:6 13415:1	13443:17 13458:3
13455:5 13478:19	13343:2,7,8,9,11,12	13518:23,24 13519:1	13418:15 13423:16	untoward 13388:16
13483:16 13486:20	13345:1,4,5,7	turn 13390:4	13443:8 13447:20	update 13455:12
13491:22	13375:2	turned 13384:14	13451:6 13497:17	updating 13501:13,20
threaten 13428:17	tramlines 13330:13	Twala 13455:8	understands 13439:20	13510:19
threatened 13500:4 threatening 13401:4	transcribing 13400:7 transferred 13515:11	tweak 13494:23 twice 13505:4	13471:11 understood 13351:22	upgrade 13514:5 upgraded 13413:3
13518:7	transgressing 13423:5	two 13330:3 13331:11	13352:21 13356:25	urban 13337:3,9,13
three 13339:19	transgressors 13371:24	13331:11,15,22	13357:1,3 13358:9	13341:9,12
13406:12 13421:3,4	transpired 13505:23	13334:3,13 13336:20	13364:9,25 13393:7	urbanised 13469:17
13445:23 13473:2,9	13506:9 13514:16	13343:8,18 13349:15	13395:6 13403:4	USA 13344:14 13345:3
13445.25 15475.2,5	transport 13395:21	13352:8 13381:22	13517:22	use 13326:13 13331:21
throwing 13360:15	13474:6 13481:11	13385:2 13388:5	undertake 13475:19	13332:14 13353:18
13488:17	transportation 13399:9	13389:23,23	undertaken 13449:19	13368:17 13371:10
thrown 13488:18	13481:5	13390:20 13392:6	13475:9	13371:17 13396:16
Thursday 13442:11	travel 13413:5 13421:2	13394:17 13395:10	undertaking 13482:12	13411:3,16 13418:12
13462:15 13468:2	travelling 13348:22	13396:7,21 13398:13	underway 13405:18	13418:19 13420:21
13476:22 13478:1,21	13395:13	13398:15 13399:5,15	13515:21	13460:22 13467:23
13479:14 13481:21	tree 13420:14	13400:11,13 13409:6	unfold 13469:23	13472:8 13483:14
13507:18	trees 13473:16	13442:20 13444:21	13472:18 13498:7,9	13488:2,19 13518:2,5
tidying 13519:23	tried 13335:12 13393:1	13456:13 13473:5	unfolding 13351:8	usual 13477:6
tied 13460:12	13393:8 13427:5,7	13477:4,5 13487:19	13362:10	utilise 13367:2
tightly 13446:21	13473:4 13485:5	13516:11 13518:16	unfortunately	13398:10 13488:3
till 13462:15 13464:3	13493:17 13501:10	type 13347:24 13361:9	13420:16	13489:5
times 13364:18	triggered 13460:8	13462:7 13473:18	unfurled 13506:3	utilised 13362:7
13372:6 13373:4,10	13483:24 trouble 13432:25	typographical 13329:6	Union 13341:1	13369:12 13375:24
13374:12 13376:20		typos 13331:7 T-junction 13395:12	unions 13426:23	13426:6 13430:11,13
13414:17 13426:11 tip 13496:10	TRT 13349:24 13369:5 13369:17,18,22	T-junction 13395:12	unison 13411:3 13512:23	13432:19 13481:16 13491:15,21 13492:6
TLT 13421:5	13309:17,18,22	U	unit 13336:24 13338:2	utilising 13362:17
today 13339:4	13404.23,23	ultimate 13367:19	13339:20 13369:6	13468:15
13384:22	13453:13 13474:13	ultimately 13378:15,19	13373:4,5,9 13374:18	15700.15
told 13342:10 13346:13	13489:3,4 13493:20	13378:21 13395:15	13379:25 13400:13	V
13347:18,22	13495:16 13496:1	un 13390:14	13401:2 13453:15,25	vacant 13339:7
A R C H I V E E O			10.01.2 10.00.10,20	

RealTime Transcriptions

				Page 22
vague 13403:10	13516:14	13434:18 13466:3	13475:15,20,22	wider 13467:4
vaguely 13502:8	vigilant 13476:16	13471:2,14 13476:4	13482:23,24,24	willingness 13359:21
validity 13386:12	violence 13357:2	13485:20 13487:25	13516:5,5,13	win 13462:16
various 13334:21	13360:4,8,14,16	13493:16	weather 13393:21	wing 13453:15,22
13339:3 13340:15	13361:9 13363:15	wanting 13393:16	Wednesday 13426:4	wire 13398:11,14,19
13341:8,22 13342:2	13364:11 13365:16	warned 13407:17	13436:25 13442:11	13404:25,25 13405:4
13344:9 13345:16	13370:17,24	13465:5	13446:14 13447:3	13405:8 13429:1,10
13349:20 13353:16	13377:18 13418:5	warning 13376:12	13450:7,15 13451:4	13429:10 13430:3,7
13353:17 13369:13	13448:6,8,10 13492:4	13394:10,14 13395:9	13454:5 13455:20	13434:8,11,19,21,25
13407:14,23 13411:3	13507:24	13397:11,16,25	13467:17,18 13474:4	13435:1,2,4,6
13417:24,24	violent 13365:15	13463:12,12 13470:1	13477:23 13479:13	13460:23,23
13419:25 13420:21	13435:11 13466:13	13471:13 13487:11	13479:23 13481:17	13467:19 13468:9
13427:4 13430:20	visible 13390:6,7	13488:3 13489:5	13481:18 13484:20	13469:22 13478:18
13434:7 13440:10	13423:4 13453:11	13498:12,18	week 13343:17 13345:4	13478:22 13479:5
13442:5 13444:3	13496:8 13511:13	warnings 13376:17	13511:16	13484:13 13485:5
13448:12 13453:8,12	visibly 13426:19	13496:3	weekend 13446:7	13487:7,8,14,16
13453:15 13467:1	vision 13425:6	warrant 13480:22	weeks 13343:8,9,18	13490:8 13492:22
13468:13 13506:22	visit 13510:25 13511:3	wary 13463:19	weight 13519:6,9	13493:10,13,18
13518:2	visiting 13510:6	wasn't 13331:21	well-trained 13374:21	13495:4,6,11
vehicle 13408:25	Visser 13327:23	13347:22 13348:3	went 13383:2,19	13498:18,20 13506:3
13459:14 13481:10	13331:13 13332:24	13390:2,7 13412:13	13426:18 13433:4	wish 13327:21
13481:14,24	13333:21 13334:4	13460:17 13462:19	13447:22 13458:14	13479:19
13485:15 13493:14	13490:23 13512:15	13487:10 13488:11	13459:11 13463:2	withdraw 13369:21
vehicles 13378:5	13512:23 13513:9	13518:20	13473:13 13485:15	witness 13326:6
13399:5 13400:11	13514:5,14 13515:17	wasn't 13370:6	13486:22 13492:17	13333:15,16
13401:2 13421:4	13516:13	13446:1,3 13459:21	13519:16	13334:13 13507:4
13428:10,19,19	Visser's 13334:11	13465:12 13467:20	weren't 13391:2	witnessed 13451:12
13429:1,10 13459:11	visual 13374:19	watch 13485:24	13460:15	Wolf 13338:5,16
13474:12 13481:15	Vito 13486:16	13502:9	west 13354:25	13340:11
13481:16,20	voice 13503:2,22	watching 13477:25	13395:19 13398:1	wonder 13388:22
13486:16 13488:7,8,8	void 13491:20	water 13367:18	13452:1,6,18	13390:12 13467:5
13492:25 13495:3,13	volume 13514:3 vulnerability 13423:23	13375:23 13461:21 13465:6 13472:10,13	13470:14,17 13471:6 13495:8,12 13496:7	wondered 13460:17
13495:15 13497:6,8 veld 13402:9 13431:3	vullerability 13423:23	13403:0 13472:10,13	13495:8,12 13496:7	Wonderkop 13383:20 13392:23 13403:19
verbal 13374:3,13,14	W	13488:2,11 13493:3,5	western 13451:24	13415:20 13433:25
13374:16,18,24	wait 13349:4 13459:20	13493:6,16 13499:25	we'd 13424:11	13445:18
13375:17 13376:11	13494:6	13502:23	13450:25 13481:22	won't 13385:16
13376:17 13440:9,14	waiting 13489:10	waving 13446:23	13516:15	Woodman 13456:18,24
13462:22 13464:15	wake 13410:2	way 13348:14,22	we'll 13329:1,13	word 13357:7 13362:25
13471:13 13488:3	walk 13395:22	13350:11 13366:24	13375:22 13380:9	13412:17 13416:25
13489:5 13496:3	13403:13,14	13369:25 13387:2	13396:12 13397:2,22	13439:3 13472:8
verbally 13465:4	walking 13410:9	13390:13 13391:6	13439:19 13444:19	words 13434:17
verified 13439:8	13425:3	13393:9 13394:8	13464:7	13436:4 13488:1
verifying 13344:22	want 13334:1 13372:24	13395:25 13396:13	we're 13326:3	13495:24
Vermaak 13432:12	13373:18 13374:23	13397:7 13403:6	13373:16 13375:1	work 13363:4 13368:10
13453:24 13503:3,10	13375:17 13380:15	13404:3 13406:17	13384:23 13387:4	13373:17 13394:4
13504:10 13505:8	13385:20 13386:16	13448:3 13455:25	13390:5 13391:4,25	13411:13 13414:4
13508:4	13388:21 13389:6	13465:14 13470:11	13393:12 13397:24	13421:20,21 13422:3
version 13388:17,25	13390:25 13391:8,19	13475:4 13476:5	13419:11 13458:8	13425:23 13431:15
13512:14	13391:22 13393:6,17	13486:11 13487:12	13461:24 13462:3	13433:2 13437:9
vertical 13420:22	13394:11 13398:9	13517:19	13518:9 13520:5,6	13462:19 13487:1
viable 13425:21	13399:7 13405:5,6	ways 13389:24	we've 13327:20	13494:22 13512:8
vicinity 13414:14	13406:9 13421:14	13421:16	13362:3 13364:17	worked 13373:3
13460:6	13431:3,12 13433:20	wayward 13432:20	13385:3,4 13387:2,18	13421:12 13512:22
video 13494:6 13504:9	13435:2 13442:23	weak 13493:13	13390:21 13403:24	worker 13447:7
13508:24 13509:8,15 13514:4,19,23	13444:24 13449:9 13450:10 13458:6	weapon 13341:19 13347:24 13364:19	13406:11 13419:10 13436:19 13475:13	working 13354:17 13371:5 13403:25
13515:2,6	13462:5,22 13463:13	13364:20 13367:19	13486:19 13489:21	13411:3 13403.23
videos 13509:19	13463:17 13464:12	weapons 13358:12	what's 13376:20	13415:11 13426:12
view 13359:20	13469:25,25	13361:12 13363:22	whilst 13440:15	13436:10 13448:16
13360:20,24 13361:2	13470:22 13476:1	13364:22 13367:12	13503:15	13469:14 13485:1,8
13367:8 13368:8	13489:1 13490:24	13375:5 13399:3	white 13485:10	13486:24 13513:20
13377:10 13385:13	13491:17,19	13405:11,20 13423:6	13494:24 13497:6	13513:25 13515:24
13385:13 13416:4,20	13493:24	13425:3,5,14	who'd 13411:21	13516:11
13419:6,9 13463:23	wanted 13418:16	13446:23 13463:2	who're 13356:22	works 13388:17
13473:2 13514:15	13433:21,23	13464:20 13475:6,9	wide 13388:9 13403:10	World 13338:11,20
ARCHIVE FO				

				Daga 2'
I		 		Page 23
13340:20	06:30 13412:10	1430 13445:2	20 13339:23 13412:10	5 13326:1 13332:5,7
worried 13468:18	09:45 13326:2	147 13334:23	13503:11	13384:24 13420:17
13492:14		148 13330:17 13331:1	20:15 13354:14	13425:1,19 13426:6
worse 13373:12	1	149 13331:1 13334:23	2001 13345:4	13437:13
wouldn't 13349:3	1 13335:18 13340:16	15 13345:22 13389:4	2002 13342:25	5.10 13340:2
13372:24 13405:12	13400:22 13414:17	13412:10	2003 13342:16	5.10.3 13340:15
13406:1 13431:3	13414:18 13427:23	15th 13451:4	2004 13341:16	5.12 13342:2
13460:24	13428:2 13429:17	15:15 13501:7,12	2007 13337:21 13338:1	5.13.2 13342:21
wouldn't 13507:6,8	13442:19,25 13443:3	15:16 13494:4	13338:24	13343:5
wounded 13431:7	13443:6,7,9 13445:13	15:30 13485:20	2009 13341:10,14,17	5.4 13337:25
13447:8	13446:25 13447:15	15:35 13508:21	2010 13338:20	5.5 13338:14
writing 13477:24	13447:16 13449:4	15:46 13389:17	2012 13328:5,9,22	5.6 13338:23
13485:11	13450:17 13451:13	13390:3	13346:8 13423:3	5.9 13339:11
written 13327:10	13451:19,20	150 13330:17	13511:24	5.9.1 13339:18
13330:13	13454:20 13455:17	16 13336:12 13345:25	2012.08.14 13386:19	5:45 13452:22
	13466:9 13473:8	16th 13334:4 13448:5,7	2013 13326:1 13330:20	5:46 13388:14
X	13476:11 13478:14	13448:10 13456:25	13332:10 13334:4	5:46AM 13388:25
xenophobia 13468:20	13478:16,17,23	13470:25 13507:10	21 13360:12	50 13441:24
	13479:9 13484:17,23	13507:18 13508:16	229 13496:23 13497:1,2	52 13445:3
Y	13485:22 13487:6,17	13508:25 13510:21	23:00 13357:11	52.20 13334:22
year 13339:14,18	13489:14 13490:8	16:00 13445:13	24th 13511:23	53 13446:5
13409:6	13491:4,5 13494:17	17 13341:5	24/7 13448:14	
years 13336:20	13495:3,5 13497:22	17th 13508:16,19	25th 13332:9	6
13339:23 13517:16	13503:7	13509:20 13513:5	27 13377:2	6 13339:12 13380:23
yellow 13401:9	1st 13332:9	18 13501:22	27th 13511:24	13407:6 13408:15
13404:21 13423:19	10 13342:6 13412:1	18th 13328:5,16	28 13381:3	13423:18 13425:20
13492:22	13481:4 13509:23	13510:4 13511:6	29 13407:5	13426:1,6 13437:13
you'd 13334:1 13349:4	10th 13330:19	181 13494:13		13442:20 13450:21
13397:1 13418:23	10:04 13340:19	19 13502:16	3	13453:3 13476:23
13420:21 13431:10	10:24 13356:17	19th 13330:1 13510:5	3 13340:17 13352:18	13479:24 13485:4
13431:19 13438:13	10:44 13371:7	19.8 13505:7	13366:3,21 13392:8	13495:3 13513:8
you'll 13391:12	100 13428:12 13447:16	19:30 13351:1	13400:14,15	6am 13403:23
13438:25 13458:11	13488:24	1986 13335:22	13404:14 13408:9	6.11 13359:4
you're 13330:9	11 13342:7 13427:2	13342:10	13414:1,8,17,18	6.12 13359:17
13332:1 13333:21	13509:23	1992 13343:6,17	13435:23 13436:9,14	6.13 13360:18
13334:5 13336:5	11:29 13380:12	1993 13336:1,16	13436:20 13443:5	6.14 13361:21
13372:25 13378:14	11:49 13394:20	1995 13336:20	13452:2 13461:1,1,24	6.16 13363:8
13380:13 13381:2	1114 13332:20	1996 13337:2	13462:17 13465:10	6.19 13365:8
13382:16 13385:19	1145 13332:18,20	1997 13342:11	13467:14 13471:20	6.2 13348:1
13389:14,22 13397:1	13385:7 13388:4	1998 13337:3 13341:14	13472:19 13476:13	6.20 13365:25
13397:5 13408:4	1149 13332:17,20		13477:17 13483:13	6.24 13370:21
13427:13 13444:24	13385:8 13388:4	2	13483:24 13484:8	6.30 13381:3
13447:3 13480:7	12 13341:13 13481:9	2 13329:12 13331:20	13485:3,18 13486:5	6.33 13407:4
you've 13381:17,19	12:08 13408:24	13334:2 13335:16	13486:20 13487:6	6.36.4 13407:13
13395:3 13397:18,21	12:28 13423:12	13339:20 13340:17	13490:8,9,12,12	6.38 13408:12
13402:4,19 13438:24	12:48 13438:2	13388:7 13394:7	13495:6 13496:17	6.4 13350:10
13440:25 13447:2	13 13344:5 13345:3	13406:15 13407:18	3rd 13333:14	6.6 13352:20
13472:10 13520:3,7	13499:20	13433:8,18 13434:6	3,000 13461:4 13463:6	64 13420:6
	13th 13346:6,8	13434:11,20,24	30 13333:13 13511:16	65 13420:7
Z	13350:24 13377:9	13435:11,15 13436:6	30th 13334:5	
zero 13392:14	13509:7,17	13440:17 13443:19	310 13336:13	7
zone 13495:7	13 (7) 13480:21 13481:3	13456:8,10,16	32 13408:11	7th 13511:25
zones 13419:25	13.1 13486:9	13457:3,9 13465:17	33 13516:4	7.11 13419:20
zoomed 13387:18	13.16 13500:15	13465:23 13466:8,10		7.2 13410:16
zooming 13398:3	13.8 13498:11,13	13472:19 13473:7	4	7.22 13438:9
	13:30 13483:3	13477:17 13478:12	4 13399:22,23 13437:4	7.26 13441:23
0	13:44 13444:23	13478:15,17,18,22,23	13517:2	7.29 13445:4
000 13352:18 13366:4	14 13336:1 13341:9	13479:4 13484:10	4th 13328:8,14	7.37 13450:19
13366:21 13392:8	13344:8,13 13345:7,7	13485:2 13487:20	13333:17	7.8 13417:8
13394:7 13404:14	13423:3	13489:8 13490:9	400 13461:16	73 13476:23
100/11/1010111	14:04 13460:3	13492:11,24 13493:4	42 13428:1	77 13479:21 13481:8
13407.18 13408.9		13494:22 13495:23	45 13388:3	
13407:18 13408:9 13414·1 13452·2	14:13 13464.10			
13414:1 13452:2	14:13 13464:10 14:30 13444:6			8
13414:1 13452:2 13467:14	14:30 13444:6	13496:20 13497:21	46 13436:14	<u>8</u> <u>8</u> 13508·22
13414:1 13452:2 13467:14 04:30 13410:3	14:30 13444:6 13485:22,25	13496:20 13497:21 13500:12		8 13508:22
13414:1 13452:2 13467:14	14:30 13444:6	13496:20 13497:21	46 13436:14	

		Page 2
8.2 13452:9 8.22 13457:23 8.29 13472:18 81 13486:9 13490:14,15 13490:16,17 83 13498:14 87 13335:23 88 13335:23 13500:16 9 9 13342:6 13475:8 13482:20 13520:11 9.5 13479:20 96 13341:9 13507:11		Page 24
- 20 An	2012	
to obtain a final to contract and the	A Canada	