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
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UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

NATIONAL OFFICE

UDF UNITESI APARTHEID DIVIDESI



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October 3

CIRCULAR TO ALL AFFILIATES

Re: Campaign for National *Unity United Action*

United Action

The Campaign for National *Unity* in opposition to the State of Emergency was launched at a press conference on October 2 1986 held in Johannesburg. This comes after months of consultation primarily within the ranks of UDF and COSATU. While this matter was referred to UDF regions, Area Committees and affiliates, some affiliates may not have had an opportunity to discuss the campaign fully. Consultations were also held with representatives of the SACC, Southern African Catholics Bishops' Conference and the NECC.

The aim of the campaign is firstly to embark upon united action at the local and national level in opposition to the Emergency, and secondly to create the maximum possible unity at a local and national level on the basis of the following demands:

- 1). An end to the State of Emergency
- 2). The release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners
- 3). The unbanning of the Anc and all other banned organisations
- 4). The re-opening of schools, the repeal of the draconian controls imposed on students and the establishment of People's Education
- 5). An end to rent evictions
- 6). Freedom of expression and association
- 7). A living wage for workers, an end to retrenchments, jobs for all, adequate social security and the right to strike.

The programme for the first three weeks of October will involve:

A. A popularisation of the Campaign for National *Unity United Action*

This can be achieved by:

- 1) Discussing the campaign in all structures
- 2) Distributing leaflets

Here it is important that those areas and affiliates that are able to produce their own media like posters and pamphlets do so.

- 3). Organise mass meeting where possible and ask your local church to allow for the distribution of media or for our leaflets or press statements to be read during services.


B. Consultation of the *President: Albertina Sisulu, National Treasurer: Azhar Cachalia*
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, National Publicity Secretary: Mosises Tseko Lekota
In principle by the *President, National Treasurer, National Publicity Secretary, Mosises Tseko Lekota*

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
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United Democratic Front



**Report of the National Working Committee
Conference held on 24 and 25 May 1986**



Influx control - the 1986 model

ent changes to the influx control have been hailed by some people and abroad. Their enthusiasm is shared by the UDF and most South Africans.

The UDF said in a statement that it welcomed any move that eased the burden of the people, but the government is known for "giving with one hand and taking with the other." At the same time as FW Botha was announcing the changes to the influx control, Le Grange was being given ministerial powers.

This indicates the governments intended use and intensification of repressive measures. Legislation under which apartheid will maintain its grip till its existence.

It is clear to our people who have suffered centuries of exploitation and oppression, that the government's intentions are merely an attempt to embellish the grand design of apartheid and make it more acceptable to the people.

The government's changes to influx control have been made for a number of reasons:

- 1) It was finding it increasingly difficult to enforce the pass laws.
- 2) It wanted to avoid losing total control - an increasing possibility as a campaign to burn passes drew nearer.
- 3) It wanted to reinforce controls over the movement of black people,

using different, more effective methods.

4) It desperately needed to diffuse local and international opposition to its policies; and to deflect attention away from the central demand for majority rule being made by the people of South Africa.

A study of the "Orderly Urbanisation" white paper and the "Abolition of Influx Control Bill" reveals that what is being put forward is a more "subtle" but equally oppressive system of controls over movement and that they achieve exactly the opposite of what they proclaim.

The general thrust of these measures is to try and halt the flow of the people from the bantustans to the major townships, into other areas.

All the measures to control urbanisation are aimed at black people. Whites have always had free access to the cities. Control over accommodation won't affect whites. Policing will be by the racists and their lackeys.

The legislation to control movement will rely heavily on the various cornerstones of racist domination - the 1936 Land Act, bantustans legislation, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act.

The "new" urbanization schemes plan to use the racial exclusion of African people from the land to regulate and relocate the urbanization of African people. Housing and land

will be the two pillars of the influx control measures.

"Approved Housing": Hidden Influx Control

State control over housing has always been a fundamental component of influx control. By refusing to provide housing for those moving to the cities, the regime deliberately created a critical housing shortage. This forced people to look elsewhere for housing. This is illustrated in 1968 when the government placed a total freeze on all the building of houses in the townships and instead ploughed money into the building of houses in the bantustans.

Thus if the state refused to approve accommodation in the urban areas, people would be unable to move there legally and would be placed in areas where the regime wanted them to live.

How the controls will work

Step 1: Confine black people through the Group Areas Act to land zoned for African occupation. Little or no expansion of the land is allowed. At the same time no new houses are provided by the state. Prevent black people by law from occupying empty houses in nearby white areas.

Step 2: Selectively approve the building of shacks in the townships on the so called site and service schemes. Apart from those "approved shacks", shacks built by residents will be demolished under the slum regulations

or anti-squatting laws.

In this way the regime would be able to make homeless those black people exceeding the quota of people allowed to live in the urban townships; and deny homes to those wanting to come into the cities from rural areas.

Step 3: Harass or arrest black homeless people in the cities under trespassing, vagrancy and other laws. This forces the homeless to look elsewhere for housing.

Step 4: Ensure the expulsion of people from cities through a combination of "disincentives" which includes bulldozing squatter communities and demolishing shacks and "incentives" which includes the development of state approved squatter communities far from the cities and the building of townships in the rural areas.

Step 5: Keep unemployed and other "economically unproductive" black people out of the cities by using rising rents and service charges. The cost of housing will be cheaper in state squatting areas and bantustans.

Step 6: There are still hints in the government white paper that the labour bureau will direct the flow of rural migrants away from the main urban centres to remote "rural ghettos".

It will thus be very difficult for people to get access to the cities. Hounis made the threat clear when he

said "freedom of movement should not be seen as a free-for-all." He warned that people living in our rural areas, should not be under the false impression that the grass will be greener and the lights brighter in the cities."

Bantustans and "Orderly Urbanisation"

The white paper on influx control excludes the nine million South Africans from the independent homelands. They will not have their South African citizenship restored to them and will be subject to far stricter controls under the Aliens Act.

Non-independent homelands have also been granted extended powers and can pass legislation without consulting the South African authorities. They have also been given increased powers to control the mobility of people entering and leaving their homelands.

The homelands play a crucial role in influx control and the "reform" strategy and thus when we talk about dismantling apartheid, the abolition of the homeland system in its entirety is a critical aspect.

In addition, for as long as the South African regime has these puppet bodies to fall back on, it can disclaim responsibility for many of the horrors perpetrated on the oppressed majority of our country.

Consequences of the new controls

The creation of squatting zones

where the regime deems it convenient will have a number of consequences.

Firstly, it will lead to even greater squalor than we experience today since the state will completely abdicate its responsibility to provide proper housing and facilities.

Secondly, the concentration of thousands of unemployed people in these squatter camps will create a massive supply of cheap and defenceless labour.

Thirdly, because many of them will be situated some distance from the cities, there will still be dramatic increase in the number of people coming into the cities.

And fourthly, the regime is aware that it is difficult to create political cohesion in squalid and depressing squatter camps. By disrupting settled communities and herding people into squatter camps, the regime hopes to promote political disorganisation and undermine our struggle.


The "orderly urbanisation" programme is being linked to a scheme of "regional development". What this means is that control of oppressed communities is being handed over to regional and local powers. We have already seen the incredible abuses perpetrated by the bantustan structures and the Black Local Authorities.

Now the regime is giving greater powers and its full backing to its local organs such as the community guards, "blackjacks", vigilantes and death squads.

In this way the government hopes to deflect attention away from itself as the main enemy and be able to project these actions as "factional conflict between black people".

The linking of orderly movement and

urbanisation is an attempt to regain control over the people, to push them into a greater position of poverty and subservience and to break the growing national challenge which the people are presenting to apartheid.



Unban the ANC!

The NWC made a decision to intensify the campaign calling for the unbanning of the ANC and the release of all political prisoners. Here is the press release issued for the launch of the campaign on June 5, 1986.

For the past two years or so, South Africa has been languishing in a crisis of enormous proportions. This crisis is the product of the stubbornness of an intransigent government to initiate a process that would meaningfully and peacefully resolve the fundamental problems facing South Africa today.

The crucial question that is being posed in all quarters is: "What is to be done?"

The government's answer is naive and short-sighted. Instead of examining the root causes of the crisis and tackling them with courage and statesmanship, it has opted for intensified repression. This is specifically designed to crush the democratic movement which has continued to dictate the pace and the course of political developments in the country, and nullify the gains it has made. During the breathing space thus gained the government hopes to restore the credibility of its puppets and dummy institutions, and resume its reform initiatives which presently lie in tatters.

But the democratic movement narrows the question differently!

By virtue of its monopoly of

political and economic power, the white minority alone has the right to shape the destiny of this country. Nor is the government based on the will of the people.

Thus the government is not merely undemocratic; it is, in fact, ILLEGITIMATE. And it maintains the status quo through force, and through the violence of the evil and immoral system of apartheid.

Our answer is therefore straight-forward and to the point: THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID, AND THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE PEOPLE has become a historical necessity. Such a process can be initiated through creating an appropriate climate for discussions and negotiations - a climate that would demonstrate the government's seriousness and its sincerity to resolve South Africa's problems meaningfully and peacefully. This in turn would entail, among other things:

- * The immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees.
- * The return of those in exile.
- * THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC and other banned organizations.

From the time the ANC was formed in 1912, until it was outlawed half a century later, the ANC has conducted a peaceful and non-violent struggle against injustice and oppression. From petitions, deputations and representations in the earlier years, it employed higher forms of non-violent struggle such as strikes, boycotts, stayaways and civil disobedience in later years.

But its only reward for half a century's patience, perseverance and peaceful struggle was to be banned. This was based on the government's contention that the oppressed had no right to protest against their oppression.

The ANC refused to submit, and resorted to the armed struggle. It did so, not because it cherished the loss of life or the destruction of property, but having exhausted peaceful and constitutional methods of struggle, it felt that retaliatory violence against the violence of apartheid was an additional and viable option for realizing the aspirations of the people.

For three quarters of a century now, the ANC has conducted a determined and relentless struggle against oppression - irrespective of the odds.

It has long established its reputation, both nationally and internationally, as the champion of the oppressed people in this country, and occupies a place of honour in the hearts and minds of the people.

It represents the aspirations of the oppressed people and white democrats, and their vision of a future South Africa based on the Freedom Charter - which was democratically formulated and accepted in 1955 at the Congress of the People.

The ANC has long established its leadership of the struggle for freedom in this country. It has tried and tested leadership, with the vision, the skills and the experience to guide the people of South Africa towards their cherished goal of establishing a just, democratic and non-racial society. Only such a society can end the conflicts and the crisis in the country.

Broad sectors of the population as well as the international community, have granted the ANC the credibility that it truly deserves. Delegations after delegations of leaders from the student movement, from the business community, from the churches and from the trade union movement have flocked to Lusaka to have talks with the ANC.

It has generally come to be accepted that there can be no solution to South Africa's problems without the involvement of the ANC.

It goes without saying that the unbanning of the ANC is an absolute necessity, and must be seen as the first step in the process of resolving the problems in this country.

Failure to do so can only plunge the country into a deeper crisis than hitherto, and render the resolution of the problems far more difficult.

We have said that the situation

demands boldness, the UDF is today prepared to offer our country the boldness required. The initiative is now in the people's hands.

We call on all South Africans who want peace, to join us in an active campaign towards the release of our leaders and the unbanning of the ANC. In making this call, we are abundantly clear that this is not furthering the aims of a banned organisation. It is merely furthering our advance towards a non-racial democratic South Africa.

Our call is for our people to, in the next period, take concrete steps

towards the unbanning and release of our leaders. We must clearly demonstrate what our choice is.

Let the ANC be unbanned and let our leaders be released unconditionally.

Let us notch up a major victory for people's power, people's choice and freedom of assembly and expression.

In making this call we are mindful of the possibility of greater repression by the regime. We call on them to back off their armed forces to allow our march to peace and security.

Letter to the Eminent Persons Group from the National Executive Committee of the United Democratic Front

As a result of a decision taken at the National Working Committee, the following letter was sent to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG):

At the time when your secretariat was attempting to make arrangements for meetings with you, you will recall that the UDF had mixgivings about the commonwealth accord. Despite these mixgivings the UDF decided to give its full co-operation to your effort to "initiate a process of dialogue" because of the commitment of the UDF to encourage any genuine peace-making initiative which may result in the eradication of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule on the basis of free and fair exercise of universal adult franchise by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. We were assisted in arriving at this decision by the obvious integrity and sincerity of members of your group.

And despite our serious mixgivings about the genuineness of the government's decision to negotiate a peaceful solution we co-operated with your group in the hope that the process would lead to fair and fruitful negotiations.

However we are pessimistic of the outcome. The reality is that we are now even further away from a peaceful resolution than we were when at the time of the Nassau Accord. Since then the crisis which our country is facing has deepened. At the same time whatever its public pronouncements the South African government has by its actions set itself against any genuine dialogue.

1. A de facto state of emergency exists throughout the country with organisations like the UDF finding it almost impossible to function. Our activists are continually harassed and our meetings are banned, but permission was given to the white extreme right wing to hold an open air mass rally to celebrate Republic Day at the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria on the 31st May 1986.

2. The talks late in the morning that eight cabinet ministers met with the group confirms that the South African government will continue to destabilise its peaceful

neighbours which refuse to be huddled into its sphere of influence.

3. The security laws are being tightened and extended which will make free political activity impossible. Two bills are presently before parliament:

(a) The Public Safety Amendment Bill which enables the Minister of Law and

Order to suspend what is left of the rule of law by declaring 'unrest areas'.

This will enable the security forces to apply emergency powers in these areas

without having to formally declare a state of emergency.

(b) Section 50 (a) of the Internal Security Act which will allow the police to detain any person without trial for 180 days.

In both cases the jurisdiction of the courts will be ousted. The South African government will bulldoze these bills into law over weak parliamentary opposition. If implemented these may spell the end of the legal democratic movement in

South Africa.

4. The government has announced the formation of a national statutory council to 'accommodate' blacks in a new constitutional arrangement. This would directly contradict your efforts.

5. While the resistance of the oppressed has continued, the daily death rate of our people has increased alarmingly. There is evidence that the police are actively co-operating with vigilantes and Inkatha to destabilise the townships.

Whatever the South African government may say to you, we are convinced that it is not interested in a peaceful solution which will result in genuine majority rule. All the evidence points to the contrary.

It is our view that after all that you have seen and heard, you can only recommend the total isolation of the apartheid regime, politically, economically and culturally.

Anything less can only appease this government and prolong the suffering of the oppressed.

Yours,

Resolutions

Frontline States

This UDP NWC noting that: -

Continued SADF cross border raids constitute a terrorist campaign to destabilise the Frontline States.

Therefore resolves to: -

1. Condemn these attacks on the sovereignty of these states as contrary to international law and so attempts to prevent them states from supporting our liberation struggle.
2. Call upon those states who have handed refugees over to the apartheid regime to stop such actions and to fulfill their international obligation to provide assistance to victims of apartheid terror.
3. Pledge support for the states under attack and undertake to express our solidarity in all possible ways with all those countries who support our struggle and provide refuge to apartheid opponents.

Cosatu

This UDP NWC recognising that: -

Cosatu is a leading progressive force amongst trade unions.

Therefore resolves that: -

1. The UDP encourages all workers who have not joined Cosatu affiliated unions to do so.
2. Affiliates of the UDP should give maximum support to Cosatu's programme.
3. All UDP regional committees should assist in the strengthening of existing unions and help to organise unorganized workers.
4. The UDP should involve itself in disputes when requested to do so by relevant organisations.

Relationships with other organisations

This UDF NWC having realised that: -

1. Azapo, Azanyu, the Azanian Youth Congress and Azam have been identified and seen at scenes of brutal murders, burning of houses, kidnapping and physical attacks on opponents of apartheid and members and supporters of progressive organisations.
2. Concrete evidence has been collected linking these organisations mentioned above, in collaboration with the SADF and SAP, to the above mentioned criminal acts.
3. Names of people's leaders have been vilified and bismirched in a campaign to project these organisations as contenders to leadership of the masses.
4. These acts are aimed at diverting our attention away from building our organisations and confronting the enemy.
5. In their quest for credibility and power power, these organisations project themselves as leftists and ultra-revolutionaries.

Therefore believing that: -

1. These organisations and individuals have by these activities wittingly or unwittingly become agents of Pretoria.
2. Whilst having revolutionary sounding slogans, speeches, policies and resolutions, we should judge them by their actions.
3. Our tolerance and open door policy towards them having on numerous occasions been treated with scorn.

Therefore concludes that: -

Their actions are tending to force people to identify them with the enemy.

And resolves: -

1. That we shall from henceforth not share any platform with them.
2. To call on all individuals within these organisations committed to the liberation of our people to publically disassociate themselves from these reactionary activities and join the forces of progress.

Organisational guidelines

Our style of work and organisational methods must be in tune with the needs

and demands of the struggle. The tasks and challenges which face the Front today is vastly different from that of 1983.

Our organisational challenges

Amongst the demands that our organisations must meet are:

1. We must develop an ability to understand the views and consciousness of the millions of people whose efforts will one day bring about change.
2. We should be able to implement decisions with the active and willing participation of all our people, i.e. youth, workers, students, women and residents. It is only in this way that the struggle can be intensified.
3. We must ensure that the lessons on one area are generalised to be of benefit to us all.
4. Let us not forget the lessons of the emergency. We must be able to continue operating effectively even under the hardest repressive conditions.
5. A democratic practice and style of work must be instilled at all levels of our organisations. At the same time we must guard against referring matters all the time and failing to act decisively.

UDF's organisational guidelines

1. Decision making

Always involve the maximum number of people in any decision. The UDF should not merely obtain mandates from officials of its affiliates, but must ensure that as far as possible structures like street committees and democratic SRC's are also consulted.

Decisions must also be reported back to the grassroots structures.

2. Representation

Regional Executive Committees (REC's) of the Front must have as its main component people who represent constituencies. This would ensure that the Front is constantly accountable.

We need discussion on whether the numerical size of affiliates should influence representation at General Council meetings.

3. Accountability

Not only should the REC's be accountable, every affiliate must be fully accountable to its membership. Individuals and groups who provide services must be integrated into organisations.

4. Constant evaluation

Constant evaluation and reflection on our activities must occur at every level.

United Democratic Front

Programme of Action

as adopted by the extended National Working Committee on 24 and 25 May 1986

1. Bantustans

UDF needs to intensify its efforts in the bantustans. Conditions in the bantustans especially the role of vigilantes and bandits from neighbouring countries, needs to be exposed nationally and internationally. International corporations who invest in bantustans must also be exposed.

Opposition to the proposed independence of KwaNdebele must be intensified and supported nationally.

Organisation must be intensified and tribal structures should be replaced with democratic organisations.

2. Women

The task of organising women should not be seen as the task of women alone. UDF is committed to the revival of the Federation of South African Women in the year of the 30th anniversary of the women's march to Pretoria.

Women's organisations should be formed where none exist and should affiliate to regional structures which need to be built and strengthened to pave the way for a strong national structure.

3. Education

The Education Charter campaign must be supported and closely linked to the campaign for people's education. The UDF is committed to the formation of a national student organization. A first step towards this should be the development of strong regional structures.

4. Civics

Civic associations must engage in a national campaign to counter the attempt to establish Regional Services Councils. In the course of the coming year, the UDF must also realize the aim of forming a national movement of civic structures. This will not only intensify struggles on the civic front but will also ensure that the present unevenness in terms of development is overcome.

5. The release of political prisoners and the unbanning of the ANC

These campaigns are to be given a boost at a press conference to be held on 5 June 1986 in Johannesburg. June 16th meetings this year must call for the unbanning of the ANC and "Unban the ANC" rallies should be held in all centres on 26 June.

Through a massive campaign we must make it intolerable for the state to persist with its refusal to unban the ANC and release political prisoners.

6. Youth

The UDF is committed to the formation of a national youth organization at a national level. The formation of this structure must mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprisings. As a first step, regional youth structures must be formed in all parts of the country.

7. Call to whites

More and more whites are losing confidence in the ability of the government to secure a peaceful future for them. This has resulted in many whites looking towards the democratic movement for an alternative. Our task is to spare no effort in welcoming such people and calling upon others to join the democratic movement. Every region should investigate the possibility of initiating this campaign.

8. Solidarity with Frontline States

The recent raids by the fascist SADF into neighbouring states is a direct result of the uncompromising stand which these countries have adopted against apartheid. We cannot remain silent on this matter. Protest actions must be mobilized whenever such attacks are mounted.

9. Sport and culture

Due to the interest displayed by sportspersons and artists, committees are to be established in each region to mobilize these sectors. In addition a national UDF sports and culture department is to be established.

10. Political education

With the rapid expansion of our ranks and the unprecedented scale on which the struggle is being waged, the need for political education and cadre development is greater than ever. Political education programmes in each area must be launched. Our journal, *Isizwe* must be read and studied by all activists.

INTRODUCTION

On 12 June 1986, the apartheid regime declared a nationwide state of emergency.

In what ways does this emergency differ from the previous emergency? What does the regime hope to achieve? How can we frustrate those aims and take our struggle for freedom and democracy to a higher level?

These are some of the questions we in the UDF need to answer if we are to respond correctly.

The present State of Emergency is a major assault on the progressive movement.

Over the last 18 months the people have created a new situation in our country. They have seized the initiative from the state and begun to create conditions for the transfer of power to the people.

By declaring the Emergency, the state in turn is attempting to create completely different conditions. It sees these as a precondition to lay the basis for a new formula to retain minority rule.

To do this, it aims to wipe out the democratic movement; to close off all legal space for mass mobilisation and organisation through detentions and beatings; to crush township and rural uprisings with whatever force is necessary; and finally to intensify attacks on the Frontline States with the aim of militarily defeating the ANC.

In declaring a nationwide emergency today, the government has similar aims to those it had in 1960. In 1959, the ANC decided to embark on a national anti-pass campaign. This decision came after ten years of mass mobilisation and united oppressed people throughout the country. Branches of the ANC existed in almost every town and village. The strength and support of the Congress Alliance was a major threat to the apartheid regime. On 21 March 1960, police opened fire on a peaceful pass demonstration at Sharpeville.

The massacre and the uproar that followed it were used as an excuse by the

regime to launch a full out offensive to destroy the Congress Alliance.

It took the regime five years to crush the democratic movement. It took the democratic movement a further five years to re-emerge.

The crushing of the democratic movement created the conditions for the State to implement grand apartheid. The political stability which the repressive conditions created, led to a period of unparalleled economic prosperity for the apartheid regime.

The actions of the apartheid regime since the declaration of the nationwide State of Emergency suggest that the state is once again trying to create the political conditions for the continuation of white minority rule and economic prosperity.

CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE DECLARATION OF THE EMERGENCY

In the 18 months prior to June 1986, the apartheid regime faced a number of serious challenges to its continued rule. These challenges have come from a progressive movement that is increasingly militant and united. The result is that the apartheid regime is isolated both at home and in the international community. Serious conflicts within the ruling group have for some time prevented the state from working out a clear strategy to deal with the challenges to its authority.

What follows is an overview of the conditions facing the apartheid regime prior to its declaring the Emergency.

Un-governability

The mass struggle against the Tri-cameral Parliament, the Local Authorities and the Bantustans made it clear that the government was unable to impose minority rule on our people.

The resignation of Councillors in the main urban centres throughout the country led to the collapse of the Local Authorities and the Community Councils.

In their place, civic associations and youth and student congresses formed

As a result, all government attempts to 'reform' apartheid have been stillborn, and have failed to attract any popular support.

In the eyes of the masses, the scrapping of the pass laws meant little in the face of rising unemployment, and renewed attempts to demolish shacks. To the hundreds of thousands living in overcrowded matchboxes and shanties. Freehold tenure did not realise the people's demand for housing and security. The National Statutory Council does not meet the people's demands for real political leadership.

Dissunity within the white power bloc

The collapse of apartheid rule in many areas, together with the strength of the oppositional forces has resulted in serious disputes within the enemy camp over the most effective way to maintain white minority rule. These disputes have served to weaken or divide the apartheid forces. As a result they have been unable to regain the initiative or to work out a coherent strategy for maintaining minority rule.

On the one hand, big business, the PFP and sections of the NP favoured an acceleration of reform and the incorporation of Africans into central government.

On the other hand, the right wing has demanded the preservation of old style apartheid and the use of greater force against anti-apartheid activists.

These disputes within the enemy camp have reached new levels over the last year. Thus making it impossible for the government to mobilise support for its policies whether reformist or repressive. The AWD together with the CP and HNP launched an open attack on the government by breaking up National Party meetings, and mobilising the Afrikaner folk in defence of apartheid.

Sections of big business and the PFP have realized that the scrapping of the pass laws, the national statutory council and freehold tenure were too little too late.

Big business and the PFP have opposed the implementation of RSC's. From the rightwing these measures have been described as a betrayal of the folk.

At the same time, big business, the PFP, prominent churchmen and intellectuals have visited the ANC. They have further undermined the legitimacy of the government by demanding the release of Nelson Mandela and negotiations with the ANC for SA's future.

The tensions and disputes within the enemy camp reached a climax when Le Grange's laws were rejected in the House of Delegates and House of Representatives. By steam-rolling this unpopular legislation through the Presidents' Council, the government further weakened cohesion within the ruling bloc, and exposed the authoritarian nature of the new constitution.

International Isolation

The apartheid regime has also grown increasingly isolated internationally. The International Anti-apartheid organizations have mobilized hundreds of thousands of people against apartheid. This pressure has become so strong that even Reagan and Thatcher can no longer hold out against some form of sanctions. As a result there are increasing tensions between the regime and its major international allies. The non-aligned countries also increased pressure for action against the South African government. The EPG was established by the Commonwealth to facilitate negotiations and peaceful change in SA. At the end of its month term, the EPG concluded that the SA government had made no attempt to dismantle apartheid and therefore recommended sanctions.

Economic Crisis

The political upheavals in the country also had a serious effect on SA's crisis ridden economy.



Unemployment and the high cost of living have increased people's suffering and contributed to the unprecedented level of mass mobilisation and organisation. At the same time the recession has prevented the government from offering significant economic incentives to buy off sections of the oppressed.

The effects of unemployment and the recession have also affected the privileged position of the white working class. Many have joined the IWB, firmly believing that the government is selling them out.

For the government the most serious aspect of the crisis has been the effect of the political upheaval on the economy. The SA economy is heavily dependent on foreign loans and investment for its economic stability and growth.

However, political instability makes foreign investors nervous and unwilling to lend their money or invest it in SA. Without foreign investment and foreign loans, the SA economy declines, exacerbating unemployment and inflation. The government also finds it increasingly difficult to finance apartheid and its war at home and in Namibia.

AIMS OF THE EMERGENCY

The conditions prior to the declaration of the emergency were a real threat to the continued existence of the apartheid regime on a number of fronts.

All attempts to implement piecemeal solutions such as the partial state of emergency, the scrapping of pass laws and national statutory councils, failed to crush the uprising or win mass support. These measures merely deepened opposition to the regime and isolated it further.

The declaration of the emergency must be seen as a major attempt by the State to regain the initiative from the progressive movement by fundamentally restructuring the political terrain in the country on a long-term basis.

This aim could not be achieved regionally or sector by sector as the strength of the progressive movement over the last eighteen months has demonstrated. For this reason a national initiative was needed. The declaration of the emergency was such an initiative.

The broad aims of the emergency are to :

- *Eliminate the democratic movement
- *Crush the uprising and thereby regain control over ungovernable areas of the country
- *Prevent the advance of the armed struggle
- *Re-unite the ruling group against the majority
- *Restore business confidence in the economy

Eliminate the democratic Movement

Over the last six years the democratic movement has successfully operated openly and legally. This has allowed us to mobilise and organize thousands of people against apartheid. It is this mass support which is one of the fundamental strengths of the democratic movement.

The nature of the state's actions since the declaration of the emergency suggests that it is trying to close off the legal space within which the democratic movement has operated in order to turn back the process of mass mobilisation and organization. To do this the state is attacking all fronts of democratic activity: trade unions, human rights organisations, civic, student and youth organisations, newspapers, and the United Democratic Front itself.

The detention of thousands of members of the democratic movement is aimed at undermining mass organisation. Those detained are from all ranks of the democratic movement: executive members of the United Democratic Front, unions and community organisations, members of street committees, SRC's and striking workers.

The stringent curbs on the press are aimed at silencing the democratic movement and stopping our organisations from responding publicly to the state attacks. It also aims to disorganize and demoralize through an information blackout.

Meetings are banned, regulations control funerals, and prevent organisations

calling for strikes, boycotts, an end to conscription or the lifting of the emergency itself. These measures are aimed at stopping mass mobilisation, to deprive the progressive movement of further support.

Smash the uprising and regain control over ungovernable areas

We said earlier that in many areas, apartheid structures like the bantustan chiefs and black local authorities had been forced to resign. In their place civic, youth and student congresses have formed rudimentary organs of people's power to take control of local administration.

Under the guise of preventing conflict between 'radicals', 'moderates', thousands of SADF and SAP have occupied the townships and bantustans.

Their presence is aimed at terrorising the local population, thereby discouraging them from participating in organisations. The government knows that this is the only way to enable Councillors and Bantustan Chiefs to operate.

Repression has been most severe in those areas where the structures of Apartheid rule have been subject to the greatest challenge: the Eastern Cape, Pretoria and KwaNdebele.

Here thousands have been detained at the grassroots level. High SADF and SAP presence have placed whole communities under siege.

Prevent the advance of the Armed Struggle

Immediately prior to the State of Emergency, the government signalled its intention to ignore international censure by attacking the Frontline States.

Since then, the SADF has conducted aerial exercises over the Kruger National Park and demonstrated its might in central Johannesburg. This show of strength have been linked to direct threats to the Frontline States.

There have been a number of battles between the Security Forces and ANC guerrillas, and attempts to populate the high risk areas in the Northern Transvaal, by providing security and financial aid to farmers.

Re-organise the enemy camp

We spoke earlier of the disputes and divisions within the enemy camp that reached a new intensity prior to the declaration of the Emergency.

The apartheid regime hopes to re-unite the ruling group by showing the right wing it is capable of controlling the African majority. It hopes to win the support of the liberal and business community by proving that the restoration of 'law and order' is a necessary pre-condition for continued and successful reform initiatives.

To do this, the State is placing considerable emphasis on (its ability to) project a different reality in the vacuum left by press restrictions.

Its propaganda aims to create the impression that the major conflict in the country is between black 'moderates' and 'radical' groups and not between the supporters and opponents of apartheid.

The State is demonstrating to the rightwing that it is not prepared to bow to international pressure.

Restore business confidence in the economy

After the crushing of the mass movements in the 1960s, the SA economy experienced a period of growth. It was this boom that made SA's ruling minority one of the richest in the world. It was also the boom that financed and created the conditions for the imposition of grand apartheid.

There is little doubt that the SA government is hoping to repeat this part of our country's history. Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr de Kock, said that foreign investors need to be convinced that SA is not on the brink of a revolution, that their assets are safe and that they will be able to reap their profits. Economists claim that the Emergency in fact restored confidence.

The government is also trying to restore ordinary people's confidence in the ability of the present economic system to provide for their well being. In this regard, the government announced it was going to spend R1,5 million to encourage economic growth.

TASKS OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

The apartheid regime has launched its greatest offensive against the democratic movement. This offensive is a response to the serious challenge the regime is facing. Over the last eighteen months the democratic movement has taken the struggle forward from merely opposing apartheid structures, to replacing them with democratic organs of peoples power.

In this sense the political initiative remains in the hands of the people and the democratic movement. The apartheid regime has no clear long term strategy for the maintenance of minority rule. The regime can only remain in power through the use of extreme force.

While our organisations are under heavy attack, our struggle against apartheid continues. When we say it continues, we do not necessarily mean in exactly the same way as before. The regime's present offensive makes many of the old ways of organising and mobilising the masses impossible and inappropriate in this new phase.

In the past, the central strategic role of the UDF has been to engage in the mass mobilisation, mass organisation and politicisation of our people. This role remains unchanged in essence. We need to find new ways to continue to mobilise our people as we have not yet achieved maximum mobilisation.

At the same time we need to protect and maintain the heart of democratic structures through which the mass movement exists.

If we do not continue to mobilise the masses and build our organisations we will never be strong enough to defeat the apartheid regime. If we merely build our organisations, but do not engage the regime, we will not prevent it reshaping the political terrain. For this reason, defending our democratic structures and intensifying the assault on the enemy must be part of the same process.

While the regime's offensive makes organising and mobilising in the old way difficult, it also throws up new conditions and new contradictions

which make new strategies and alliances possible.

In this regard the regime's offensive against the trade union movement and against the liberal press is of particular significance.

We said earlier that in attempting to close off the legal space, the state has launched an offensive against sections of the democratic movement which have not experienced serious repression in the immediate past. In doing this, the regime has greatly increased the range of organisations and individuals opposed to its policies.

Employers have complained that the restrictions on union activities threaten the system of industrial relations which has taken six years to build.

The recent call by businessmen for the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC is a serious blow for the government's attempt to rally all sections of the ruling block behind its emergency strategy.

The severe press clamp has also mobilized editors of the commercial press against the regime's attempts to re-create SA reality. A number of prominent editors and writers have recently opposed emergency press restrictions.

These initiatives raise the possibility of forming new alliances to frustrate the enemy and to isolate it still further.

Our immediate tasks are to:

- *Create broad popular unity against the emergency
- *Intensify the national offensive against apartheid
- *Build mass organization and people's power
- *Replace those activists detained or killed
- *Win the propaganda war.

Create broad popular unity against the emergency

We must draw together the widest possible range of groups and organisations to campaign against the emergency. This unity must be based on the following set of minimal demands: release of detainees lifting of the emergency,

scrapping of La Grange's Laws, freedom of the press, freedom of association and unbanning of the ANC.

But our opposition to the new form of apartheid rule cannot stop here.

Intensify the National Offensive against apartheid

We must continue to call for the resignation of councillors, policemen, bantustan chiefs and MPs. We must refuse to allow our ranks to be used to maintain puppet structures, or to finance the onslaught by the SAP or BAPF.

We must intensify our call for the resignation of members of the Tricameral parliament. After La Grange's Laws were steamrolled through the Presidents council, the toothlessness of the House of Delegates and House of Representatives has been totally exposed.

Build mass organization and people's power

Our aim is not just to replace apartheid tyranny with a new form of coercion. Our aim is to build a country free of oppression and exploitation.

To build organizations that will withstand the present onslaught we need to root our structures in the masses. We must build small committees in every street and school that will be able to meet and operate even under the harshest repression.

It is not enough to build our organizations. We must also extend the control over our lives by transforming street committees into rudimentary organs of people's power.

In addition to establishing street committees, we need to establish defence committees in every street to protect our people against the armed onslaught of the apartheid regime.

Replace those activists detained or killed

The enemy is trying to crush us by removing leading activists from our ranks. Our task is to ensure that for every leader that is taken our other activists are waiting in readiness to step into his or her boots. This can only be ensured by the all-round political training of all our activists.

Every activists should remember that there is no telling when history will call upon him or her to take over the leadership. Political education must be taken as seriously as the campaign against puppet structures. Only in this way can we ensure that the emergency is rendered unworkable.

Win the propaganda war

The tight press curbs, the information blackout and the unwillingness of the press to carry statements of the democratic movement, all place a new emphasis on the need for propaganda. Without propaganda it will be impossible to counter the state's attempts to silence the progressive movement, nor will it be possible to launch a coherent and united response to the state's offensive. No mass movement can grow or even sustain itself without appropriate propaganda. At a time of intense political conflict, the role of propaganda becomes vital.

Propaganda is not only the task of the executives of organizations.


Every activist, every street committee must become a broadcasting centre for our line.

The tasks of defending our democratic structures and intensifying the assault are inseparable.

RENDER THE EMERGENCY USELESS!

LONG LIVE THE ADVANCING STRUGGLE!

AMANDLA!



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→ UDF leer

Hiermee erken ek, Anton Murray Theron, ontvangs van die dokumente vervat in omslae met die volgende onderwerpe gemerk:

UDF Metodes Anti-verkiesingsveldtog

UDF Metodes Teen geweld

UDF Metodes Strategië

UDF Metodes Verbruikers-boikot

UDF Metodes Intimidasie

UDF Metodes Aanvalle op Swart Raadslede (BLA)

UDF Metodes Nasionale Konvensie

UDF Metodes Arbeid

UDF Metodes Skool-boikotte

UDF Metodes Black Christmas

UDF Metodes Million Signature Campaign

UDF Metodes Anti-diensplig (ECC)

UDF Metodes Disinvestering

UDF Methods

UDF Metodes Buitelandse steun



nms Staatsprokureur, Durban

Datum: 21.10.86

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13-Perse
22/10/86

→ UDF leei

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OF
SOUTH AFRICA



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Vol. 256

PRETORIA, 9 OCTOBER 1986
OKTOBER 1986

No. 10486

PROCLAMATION

by the

State President of the Republic of South Africa

No. 190, 1986

DECLARATION OF AN ORGANIZATION TO BE AN AFFECTED ORGANIZATION

Under the powers vested in me by section 2 (1) of the Affected Organizations Act, 1974 (Act 31 of 1974), I hereby declare the organization known as the UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT to be an affected organization.

Given under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Africa at Pretoria this Sixth day of October, One thousand Nine hundred and Eighty-six.

P. W. BOTHA,
State President.

By Order of the State President-in-Cabinet:

L. LE GRANGE,
Minister of the Cabinet.

PROKLAMASIE

van die

Staatspresident van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika

No. 190, 1986

VERKLARING VAN 'N ORGANISASIE TOT 'N GEAFFEKTEERDE ORGANISASIE

Kragtens die bevoegdheid my verleen by artikel 2 (1) van die Wet op Geaffekteerde Organisasies, 1974 (Wet 31 van 1974), verklaar ek hierby die organisasie bekend as die UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT tot 'n geaffekteerde organisasie.

Gegee onder my Hand en die Seël van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika te Pretoria, op hede die Sesde dag van Oktober Eenduisend Negehoenderd Ses-en-tagtig.

P. W. BOTHA,
Staatspresident.

Op las van die Staatspresident-in-Kabinet:

L. LE GRANGE,
Minister van die Kabinet.

13- Bere
19/10/86

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(c) 'n Memorandum van die Kommissaris van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie waarin verdere notas oor die UDF se bedrywighede uiteengesit word.

Hoogagtend die uwe

LOUIS LE GRANGE



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DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING
PRIVAATSAK X655
PRETORIA
0001

h Afskrif vir u inligting. U verwysingsnommer 2/4/2/121 (DDVz)
verwys.

ADMINISTRATIEWE SEKRETARIS



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Lêer No. 2/4/2/121 (DDVz)
File No.

DIREKTORAAT VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY LEGISLATION

DIE DIREKTEUR / MINISTER
THE DIRECTOR

OPTREDE KRAGTENS ARTIKEL 2 VAN DIE WET OP
GEAFFEKTEERDE ORGANISASIES, 1974 (WET 31 VAN
1974) "UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT" (UDF)

MINISTERIE VAN WET EN ORDE
1986-10-02
MINISTRY OF LAW AND ORDER

DIREKTORAAT: VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING
1986-10-03
DIREKTORAAT: SECURITY LEGISLATION

HDV 29/10/86
DRW 13/9/10/86
DRX
DDV 11/9/10/86

11/9/10/86
11/9/10/86
11/9/10/86

1. Die memorandum direk hieronder verwys.

(Memo)

2. Daar is besluit dat 'n nuwe proklamasie waarby die UDF tot 'n geaffekteerde organisasie verklaar word, vir die Staatspresident se ondertekening voorberei word.

3.1 'n Staatspresidentsminuut en konsep-proklamasie in dié verband is in die omslag gevlag "Minuut" vir die Minister se oorweging asseblief.

3.2 Die bewoording van die Staatspresidentsminuut is met dr Heunis van die Kantoor van die Staatspresident uitgeklaar.

4.1 Tydens die samesprekings met dr Heunis is daar besin oor die feit dat artikel 2(1) van die Wet vereis dat die Staatspresident oortuig moet wees dat 'n organisasie aan die vereistes in die artikel gestel, moet voldoen, alvorens hy dit tot 'n geaffekteerde organisasie kan verklaar. Die interpretasie van die regsposisie soos tydens die

samesprekings voorgehou is, word hieronder kortliks geskets.

4.2 In die lig van die feit dat die Staatspresident ingevolge artikel 19(1)(b) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1983 (Wet 110 van 1983) in aangeleenthede van dié aard (algemene sake) "in oorleg met die Ministers" optree en nie "handelende op advies" van die Kabinet soos dit voor die inwerkingtreding van die Grondwet was nie, blyk dit dat die Staatspresident nou regtens self "must apply his mind to the matter" alvorens hy 'n besluit in dié verband neem. Dit beteken dat hy self die feite moet oorweeg, alvorens hy tot 'n besluit geraak.

4.3 Die moontlikheid bestaan dat die UDF in 'n hofaansoek mag beweer dat die Staatspresident nie sy aandag aan die aangeleentheid geskenk het toe hy dié organisasie tot geaffekteerde organisasie verklaar het nie. Indien dit sou gebeur, sal daar 'n antwoordende beëdigde verklaring van die Staatspresident geliasseer moet word.

4.4 Daar bestaan nie enige twyfel nie dat die Staatspresident behoorlike aandag aan die aangeleentheid geskenk het en hy sal dus in 'n beëdigde verklaring gepas op so 'n bewering kan antwoord. Dit kan egter net ons saak versterk indien die Staatspresident ook in sy verklaring sal kan konstateer dat hy self ook oorweging geskenk het aan die verslag wat deur die feitekomitee opgestel is, alhoewel die Wet dit nie pertinent vereis nie. Dr Heunis

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het dan ook voorgestel dat die feiteverslag aan die Staatspresident voorgelê word.

5. In die lig van voorgaande, wil die Minister moontlik oorweeg om die feiteverslag, asook verdere inligting in dié verband tesame met die nuwe kennisgewing aan die Staatspresident voor te lê. Vir dié doel is 'n brief aan die Staatspresident voorberei, waarby die feiteverslag, 'n opsomming daarvan en notas wat deur Kompol opgestel is, aangeheg is. Dit is in die omslag gevlag "Brief aan die Staatspresident" indien die Minister daarvan gebruik wil maak. (Dr Heunis het voorgestel dat dit op dié wyse voorgelê word).



DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

25.9.86 29/9/86

Minuut en konsep-proklamasie GOEDGEKEUR/

Brief aan Staatspresident ONDERTEKEN/

Afgehandel. Om gesprek te wees.


MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE

7/10/86
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More work of UDF
UDF
18/2/86

REPORT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN A UDF DELEGATION AND THE
ADVANCE PARTY OF THE EPG ON TUESDAY 18 FEBRUARY.

EPG DELEGATION: MALCOLM FRASER, OLUSEGUN OBASANJO,
JOHN MALECELA, DAME NITA BARROW, HUCHE CRAFT
and M MALHOTRA.

At the outset of the meeting, we asked the EPG Advance what their terms of reference were and how they differed from the full EPG.

It was explained to us that the Advance's terms were limited in time and scope since this was a preliminary visit. The purpose of the Advance was to supplement the larger EPG's work and to establish a confidence in the EPG in so far as the EPG is not a substitute for pressure but an attempt to broaden international support against apartheid. In terms of the scope, the UDF's participation was seen to be crucial.

From our side we explained that we were unmandated to meet with the Advance EPG since time and repression worked against securing a mandate. The UDF delegation had come to the meeting in order to see what the EPG was about and what it had to offer in the struggle against apartheid. Furthermore, there is quite a bit of suspicion about the EPG because of the emphasis by the EPG on dialogue and negotiation as well as the presence and dominant role of BRITAIN in the COMMONWEALTH.

The Advance explained that they were not in SA to push us towards dialogue, instead they were here to get a sense of the conditions in SA so that a report could be compiled. They indicated that they understood our scepticism since so many people were streaming into the country presenting quick solutions. On the question of BRITAIN they explained that the NASSAU accord was unanimously accepted and that BRITAIN would find it difficult to go against the report of the EPG. Also, THATCHER had been pushed from her original anti-sanctions position to accepting the NASSAU ACCORD.

After explaining that this meeting with the Advance EPG did not mean necessarily, that the UDF will meet with the full EPG, we proceeded to discuss the following aspects of the UDF's work

BACKGROUND.

At a meeting of commonwealth heads in Nassau on October 20, 1985 the following call was made:

- (1) That the SA regime declare that apartheid will be dismantled;
- (2) The emergency must be lifted;
- (3) Political prisoners must be released;
- (4) The ban on the ANC and other organisations must be lifted; and
- (5) That violence from both sides must be suspended so the process of dialogue can take place for a non-racial representative government.

With special regard to the latter point, the EPG was set up to contribute to peaceful change.

THE PROGRAMME OF COMMON ACTION.

To impress on Pretoria the urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structure of democracy the commonwealth agreed on a programme of common action against South Africa.

- (1) Support for the strictest enforcement of the voluntary arms embargo;
- (2) discourage sports contact by reaffirming the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977;
- (3) ECONOMIC MEASURES: stop import of Krugerrands; ban new govt loans to SA; ban sale and export of computer equipment, nuclear materials, oil, embargo all military co-operation; and to discourage cultural and scientific events which do not contribute to the dismantling of apartheid.

If the demands set by the commonwealth are not met within six months, they will embark on additional action:

THEY will ban air links with SA, new investment and reinvestment of profits, import of agricultural goods, government procurement in SA, government contracts with majority-owned SA companies, promotion of tourism; Besides banning these, they will also terminate double taxation agreements with SA and government assistance to investment in, and trade with SA.

If these don't show fruit within reasonable time, they will consider further action.

- (1) Establishment and growth of UDF emphasising especially things like the unity built up by UDF, the spread into rural areas and the vision of UDF;
- (2) Campaigns of the UDF - Million Signature, anti-election
- (3) Repression faced by the UDF focusing on detentions, banning of meetings, the State of Emergency, incidents like the Trojan Horse in THORNTON ROAD, the public violence trials.....
- (4) We also put forward some of our immediate demands like the lifting of the State of Emergency, the release of detainees, the unbanning of people and the lifting of restrictions on people, the release of political prisoners and the UNBANNING of the ANC.

Much of the information presented on the above were a synopsis of information readily available through press reports, articles etc. The UDF delegation steered clear of political debate around these issues because such an exchange would be more appropriate at a National Level should we meet the EPG.

From the above discussions, the ADVANCE responded to the following issues:

- (1) The growth of the UDF in White Areas - here we focussed on the mass-meetings in White Areas; the developing awareness amongst Whites, the work of our area committees and the anti-conscription campaign.
- (2) Specific details of repression eg. restrictions, sentences, counter media etc.
- (3) Sanctions - they could not really explain why they only speak about divestment (no new investment) and no reinvestment of profit.
- (4) They wanted to know our position with regard to dialogue and negotiation. We explained that there was no mood for dialogue especially since our people have been exposed to the brutality of the state; there was nothing the government could offer us since they were in a deep crisis and the initiative was not with them.



We were informed that the full RRC would probably arrive in MARCH. It was suggested that the DUF gather whatever reports were available on the situation in the country for handing over to the RRC.

- SAHA
- We listed the following preconditions:
- They asked which conditions would possibly change the mood for dialogue.
- (1) Release of political prisoners and the unbanning of organisations like the ANC.
 - (2) Return of Exiles.
 - (3) The dismantling of Apartheid.
 - (4) The Disbanding of the SADF and the SAP.

W. J. van der Merwe
DR 1004/86
TOESPRAAK GELEWER DEUR MINISTER LOUIS LE GRANGE, MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE TYDENS DIE SITTING VAN DIE PRESIDENTSRAAD TE KAAPSTAD OP DINSDAG, 18 FEBRUARIE 1986

004554

MP 25/2/86 V/S
Meneer die Voorsitter en agbare lede - dit is vir my vandag 'n besondere eer en voorreg om voor u op te tree, veral ook omdat ek die eerste gewone lid van die Kabinet is wat dié eer te beurt val. Dit is my eerste besoek aan hierdie agbare Raad in sitting en ek voldoen graag aan u uitnodiging om met u gedagtes te wissel oor

- die onrustoestand in die land
- die redes wat tot die toestand gelei het, en
- die stappe wat die Regering gedoen het en nog van voorneme is om te doen ten einde die toestand te bekamp.

W. J. van der Merwe
225 2000
Nou Staeken
- 2 -
Wanneer enige land onluste van die omvang en intensiteit beleef soos wat die RSA sedert 1984 ondervind, is dit van kardinale belang dat die owerheid en al sy instellings so 'n situasie met erns en verantwoordelikheid sal benader en dat daar 'n voortdurende soeke na blywende oplossings sal wees. Oplossings van blywende aard kan egter slegs gevind word indien die situasie in diepte ondersoek word en die werklike aanleidende oorsake geïdentifiseer word. Ek wil u verseker dat die regering en al sy instellings sedert die aanvang van die onluste in September 1984 die onlustesituasie op 'n deurlopende grondslag volle aandag skenk en in die proses reeds ver gevorder het met die identifisering van die oorsake en die neem van stappe om nie net die oorsake uit die weg te ruim nie, maar ook maatreëls ter bekamping daarvan te neem.

Ter aanvang is daar een baie belangrike aspek wat ons altyd voor oë moet hou en dit is dat die RSA met 'n kommunistiese aanslag wat oor baie jare strek, te doen het. Die aanslag word basies bedryf deur die onwettigverklaarde SAKP/ANC-alliansie asook 'n groot getal organisasies in die buite- en binneland, en dit is geen geheim dat hulle dit ten doel het om die huidige bewind omver te werp en Suid-Afrika vir die kommunistiese magsblok in te palm nie.

Ons vyande beseft terdeë dat 'n magsoorname deur hulle nooit kan plaasvind, terwyl die bevolking van die land in 'n toestand van vrede en geluk leef nie, gevolglik is al hulle aksies daarop gerig om die bevolking ontevrede te stem. Voorts beseft

- 4 -

hulle dat die regering van dag tot dag besig is om aandag te skenk aan daardie sake wat die bevolking tot ontevredenheid stem en is hulle bevrees dat daardie aksies wat geneem word om vrede en geluk vir die mense van hierdie land te skep, hulle doelwit van 'n magsoorname sal verydel. Gevolglik is ons vyande op 'n deurlopende grondslag besig om griewe en gewaande griewe uit te buit en ontevredenheid aan te stig.

Dit is egter nie net die ANC/SAKP-alliansie wat die uitbuit van griewe ens. aanwend met die oogmerk om politieke verandering teweeg te bring nie, ~~is~~ organisasies soos die PAC, UDF, Swartmag-organisasies, sekere vakbonde en talle ander organisasies op hierdie terrein bedrywig.

INLEIDING

Behalwe die SAKP/ANC-alliansie is daar 'n paar organisasies waarna ek net in enkele hooftrekke wil verwys, omdat hulle die belangrikste radikale belangegroeppe by uitstek verteenwoordig.

(a) Die UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT en sommige van sy affiliale soos byvoorbeeld die Congress of South African Students, die Azanian Peoples' Organisation en sekere vakbonde is ongetwyfeld van die belangrikste organisasies wat as een van hul doelwitte die politisering en mobilisering van die massas en die werkers ten doel het.

Die dwarsboming deur die UDF van die Gemeenskapsraadsverkiegings,

asook die Indiër- en Kleurlingverkiegings is welbekend, maar dit is van uiterste belang dat daar kennis geneem sal word van hierdie organisasies se doelstellings en bedrywighede en hoedat hierdie binnelandse organisasies se doelstellings met dié van die verbanne ANC en SAKP ooreenkom.

Reeds in 1979 het die SAKP gesê dat "All revolutionary Blacks and Whites should strive to build in the RSA a broad democratic front unifying all progressive forces under the revolutionary leadership of the ANC and on the basis of the principles laid down in the Freedom Charter."

Verder word in die African Communist van die eerste kwartaal 1984

soos volg na die stigting van die UDF verwys :

"The years of painstaking work by the Party (d.w.s SAKP) and the ANC are showing results. There is the continued tremendous growth of internal, organised opposition exemplified by, among other events, the momentous gathering in Cape Town during last month which launched the UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT." Van sy kant het die UDF ook eer betoon aan Dr Dadoo by sy afsterwe. In die AFRICAN COMMUNIST, eerste kwartaal van 1984 word hy op bladsy 13 gerapporteer onder 'n subopskrif UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT SOUTH AFRICA dat ; "We salute Yusuf Dadoo, hero of the nation, architect of national unity, freedom fighter, upholder of justice."

Na die loodsing van die UDF word die volgende verklaring van Oliver TAMBO in die Dawn van 1983 Vol 7 (mondstuk van UMKHONTO WE SIZWE, die militêre vleuel van die ANC) aangehaal "the National liberation alliance headed by the ANC shall be able to guide the UDF only if we have our own underground structures within the UDF. These structures must be skilfully, give the correct guidance to the UDF and above all raise the tasks of the front."

Voorts is dit belangrik om daarop te let dat by die stigting van die UDF 'n groot aantal oud ANC-ampsdraers en lede tot die bestuur verkies is.

Die UDF het sedert sy stigting in 1983 daarin geslaag om 'n massa organisasies, by benadering oor die 600, by hom te laat

affilieer.

Deur knelpunte en gewaande griewe en sogenaamde ongeregtighede aan te gryp en onder die massa bekend te stel by wyse van byeenkomste, pamfletverspreidings, persberigte en dies meer, word 'n groot deel van die bevolking rondom hierdie strydpunte gemobiliseer en verpolitiseer. In die proses word sekere onderwerpe ook gepopulariseer soos byvoorbeeld die FREEDOM CHARTER, EDUCATION CHARTER, WORKERS CHARTER, WOMAN'S CHARTER en die Vrylating van sekerheidsgevangenes in besonder NELSON MANDELA, geniet voorrang.

(b) Die AZANIAN PEOPLES' ORGANISATION - Azapo - beywer hom vir 'n swart sosialistiese eenparty-staat.

Dié organisasie se bedrywighede het reeds tot uiting gekom in aksies soos :

- anti-verkiesingsveldtogte tydens die Kleurling- en Indiërverkiesing
- boikot en betogings teen besoekende vermaaklikheidsterre;
- kampanje teen verpligte militêre diensplig;
- wegbly-aksies;
- werkstaking;
- verbruikers- en skoolboikotte;
- AZAPO bepleit ook 'n sport- en kultuurboikot teen die RSA en was verantwoordelik vir die aksies rondom die aflas van die 1985-All Black toer; en
- is besig met die organisering van 'n anti-Johannesburg Eeufeesvierings kampanje.

AZAPO is op die skolevlak bedrywig deur middel van sy jeugvleuel - die AZANIAN STUDENTS MOVEMENT (AZASM).

Op die arbeidsvlak word AZAPO verteenwoordig deur verskeie vakbonde wat deur hom gestig is.

AZAPO is net soos die ANC, SAKP, UDF en ander radikale organisasies besig om 'n klimaat van opstand aan te stig en het ten doel die omverwerping van die bestel.

DIE ROL VAN DIE VAKBONDE

Die verpolitisering en mobilisering van die werkersklas is een van die SAKP se hoofdoelmerke. Hierbenewens was die ANC se

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arbeidsvleuel, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) deur al die jare meestal op klandestiene wyse saam met ander radikale vakbonde op die arbeidsgebied betrokke. SACTU sowel as die ANC het deel gevorm van die vroeëre kommunistiesbeheerde "Congress Alliance." Die vakbondfederasie naamlik die Congress of SA Trade Unions (COSATU) wat in Desember 1985 gestig is, maak egter geen geheim daarvan dat hy met die ANC skakel-en ook sover moontlik met die ANC wil saamwerk nie. COSATU-amptenare het reeds met die ANC- en SACTU-besture in Zimbabwe samesprekings gevoer. Formele samesprekings tussen die ANC en COSATU het onder meer op die stigtingsvergadering die werkers aangemoedig om hul identiteitsdokumente te verbrand indien die regering nie aan hul eise voldoen nie. Hulle eise is soortgelyk aan dié van die UDF en SACTU, naamlik :

- die vrylating van sekerheidsgevangenes;
- 'n opheffing van die noodtoestand;
- onttrekking van die Veiligheidsmagte uit onrusgebiede;
- skrapping van instromingsbeheer;
- die aanstel van Nelson Mandela as Staatspresident; en
- die nasionalisering van nywerhede en myne.

Die National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), COSATU se grootste filiaal het byvoorbeeld Nelson Mandela die afgelope naweek tydens hul vierde jaarkongres as ere vise-president verkies in 'n poging om die radikale vakbondwese verder te politiseer ten einde uitvoering te gee aan SAKP/ANC-strategie.

Verskeie ander organisasies van minder belang is ook aktief,

maar ek ag dit nie nodig om in veel besonderheid na hulle te verwys nie.

Die huidige onlussituasie kan sonder twyfel teruggevoer word na hoofsaaklik twee komponente naamlik die skep en uitbuiting van 'n gees van ontevredenheid en die dwarboming van die regering se inisiatiewe. Laasgenoemde inisiatiewe van die regering is, soos u bewus is, gerig op die uitskakeling van kneelpunte op die politieke-, ekonomiese- en maatskaplike terreine om sodoende vrede, voorspoed en stabiliteit te verseker.

Pogings is aangewend om Regeringsinisiatiewe te dwarsboom tydens die verkiesing van Swart gemeenskapsrade en die Indiër- en

Kleurlingverkiesings. Kampanjes is gevoer waartydens die publiek selfs op geweldadige wyse geïntimideer is om nie aan die verkiesings deel te neem nie. Kampanjes teen hierdie instellings duur steeds voort.

Na die verkiesing en instelling van Gemeenskapsrade het die aanslag op hierdie regeringsinisiatief 'n ander dimensie aangeneem en is dit van belang om kennis te neem van Oliver TAMBO se uitspraak in die ANC-spreekbuis - Sechaba van Maart 1984 - waar hy die volgende oproep doen -

"It is clear that we have the ability to raise the struggle to greater heights. Having rejected the community council by boycotting the elections, we should not allow them to be imposed

on us. We do not want them. We must ensure that they cease to exist. Where administration boards take over their functions, then these must be destroyed too."

Die geweldadige optrede teen gemeenskapsraadslede is welbekend - maar die vraag is onwikkekeurig waarom hierdie instellings so 'n doring in die vlees is. Die antwoord is eenvoudig dat die vyande van Suid-Afrika besef het dat hierdie instellings 'n eerlike poging van die regering is om aan die aspirasies van die Swart man te begin voldoen.

Aanvalle is ook gedoen op Kleurling- en Indiër parlamentslede, onder andere handgranaat en petrolbomaanvalle.

die handelaar en die verbruikerspubliek meebring. Waar persone die boikot verontagsaam het, is hulle aangerand en goedere vernietig, met gepaardgaande finansiële verlies.

Gevalle het voorgekom waar intimideerders persone gedwing het om skadelike stowwe soos vloeibare seep wat hulle aangekoop het te eet of te drink in hul poging om diegene en andere te intimideer.

Op die arbeidsterrein het grootskaalse ontwrigting van werkers voorgekom, deurdat wegbly-aksies deur radikale organisasies onder andere ook vakbonde, georganiseer is en by wyse van intimidasie op die publiek afgedwing is.

Die volgende is

Aangeleenthede wat aangegryp is om ontevredenheid by die bevolking te skep en die bevolking te mobiliseer

Die mobilisering van die gekleurde bevolking deur versetgroepe, is vergemaklik deur die onvergenoegdheid onder 'n groot deel van veral die Swart stedelike bevolking oor knelpunte op die politieke, ekonomiese en maatskaplike terrein. Die volgende probleme/omstandighede/gebeure het 'n rol daarin gespeel :

- Die legitimiteit- en geloofwaardigheidskrisis van Swart plaaslike owerhede vanweë hulle onvermoë om aan die verwagtinge van gematigdes te voldoen en raadslede wat 'n sigbare teiken vir radikales geword het om hulle ontevredenheid met die stelsel te demonstreer.

- Kostestygings oor 'n wye front (onder andere brandstof, vervoer, huishuur en dienstevoorsiening) te midde van stygende werkloosheid in die huidige resessie.
- Gegriefdheid oor instromingsbeheer wat beweging in die arbeidsmark inkort, haglike plakkertoestande en hervestiging.
- Die wydverspreide voorkoms van skoleboikotte, wat dikwels gelei het tot onrusvoorvalle in die betrokke woongebiede en tot solidariteitsoptrede deur middel van wegbly-aksies, boikotte en stakings deur werkers, ouers en studente.
- Emosioneel uitbuitbare geleenthede soos herdenkingsdae en begrafnisse, wat op konfrontasie met die veiligheidsmagte uitgeloop het.

- Individuele en organisasies wat by wyse van uitsprake en geskifte bygedra het tot die verhoging van Swart gemeenskapsverset, asook die negatiewe beriggewing van 'n deel van die binne- en buitelandse media.
- Gebrek aan politieke seggenskap in die besluitnemingsproses.
- Ongelykheid in onderwys.

THE UNREST SITUATION

Since the beginning of 1984 this climate gradually culminated through school boycotts, sporadic incidents of unrest and the exploitation of real and imagined grievances in fullscale riots in the Vaal Triangle on September 3, 1984. Thereafter the

unrest was intensified systematically throughout the country, particularly by COSAS and other community and youth organisations affiliated to the UDF. The highest incidence of unrest was in the Eastern Cape and the PWV-area, but after the attempted protest march to Pollsmoor Prison, the Cape Peninsula became the focal point.

Unrest was isolated and sporadic until September 1984, but then occurred in more organized and co-ordinated fashion leading to chronic unrest situations in certain areas. It also led to geographical expansion of the unrest and an increase in the intensity of violence. This situation led to the proclamation of a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts on July 12, 1985.

The situation in the Western Cape degenerated to such an extent that the State of Emergency had to be extended to a further eight magisterial districts on October 27, 1985. The revolutionary climate was further intensified through protest actions. Internal unrest became an integral part of the revolutionary onslaught.

Gatherings, stone-throwing and arson marked the unrest, attacks on the property of SAP members, third-tier government officials and other Government - "collaborators", the throwing of grenades, petrol bombs and acid bombs and the use of firearms on members of the Security Forces during incidents of unrest also occurred. The ANC backed the actions of protest organizations by providing small arms, handgrenades, cash training courses and by perpetrating acts of terror by the use of limpet mines and explosive devices.

The proclamation of a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts resulted in a definite decrease in the number of incidents in those districts. This could be ascribed mainly to the following -

- the wider powers granted members of the security forces by the emergency regulations.
- detention of the ringleaders.
- the restrictions which emergency regulations place on those released.
- the ~~large~~ number of young activists who left the RSA.
- Divisional Commissioners prohibiting inciting meetings.

Since the proclamation of the State of Emergency, incidents rose sharply in those areas where the State of Emergency did not apply. This could be attributed to the attempts of radicals to extend the unrest into those areas.

Declaring COSAS illegal made possible immediate action by the SAP. Several COSAS leaders, who at that time had not been arrested, fled and left the organisation leaderless and inactive organisationwise.

COSAS members have been prosecuted successfully and about 290 former COSAS members are in custody. About 17 charges, which include subversion, public violence and promoting the aims

and objectives of a banned organisation, are being investigated. A number of ex-COSAS members have sought political asylum abroad.

The number of incidents of unrest have generally levelled off since the proclamation of the State of Emergency and since COSAS was declared illegal.

Some of the points characterising the revolutionary situation, are

- the obvious use being made of the UDF and its affiliates by the SACP to confront the RSA Government and to propagate ANC/SACP ideologies and to strengthen their power base in the RSA.

- Increasing terrorist involvement in the country by the ANC in

politics and propaganda with the aim to develop unrest along the guidelines of the ANC's revolutionary strategy for a peoples' revolt)

- attempts by protest groups within the country to make the RSA ungovernable and to establish alternative structures to take over and execute the administrative, judicial and disciplinary functions in specific communities.

- the casting of suspicion on all governmental initiatives, especially those concerning political adaptations.

- intensified efforts to isolate the RSA internationally.

- deliberate attempts to spread the unrest from emergency-regulation areas to those areas where those regulations do not apply.
- action against Whites and their property, especially in areas adjoining Coloured and Black areas, albeit on a limited scale.
- "non-violent" protest methods (eg. school and consumer boycotts, stay-aways, mass marches and mass funerals) which are increasingly used as an effective method in the so-called Freedom Struggle. In many cases these protest methods lead to incidents of violence.
- consumer boycotts of White businesses aimed at persuading white businessmen to apply pressure on the Government because of the worsening business climate and their financial losses.

- violence against members of third-tier government, the SAP, and Indian and Coloured members of parliament, their families and property.
- a criminal element exploiting the unrest for its own end. Activities of this criminal element have become so alarming that the ANC and the UDF have become concerned because of damage it has caused their own image and because they cannot control the situation.
- intimidation in an effort to gain control over the populace and to enforce participation in protest activities to create an impression of spontaneous mass participation.

- planned and spontaneous action, especially by young people and the unemployed who maintain the momentum of the unrest and compel those who do not take part to become involved.
- the prominent role played by some churches, ecclesiastical organisations and their leaders, who are protagonists for countrywide consumer boycotts and civil disobedience.
- continued conflict between the supporters of opposing protest organizations within the Republic, causing violent clashes



between these factions.

The proclamation of the state of emergency led to the most negative reporting on the RSA since 1976. Important reform initiatives of the government made virtually no impact on the foreign media, while ANC and UDF statements and remarks enjoyed increasing prominence, boosting ANC and UDF credibility.

While the number of unrest incidents have levelled off, it is doubtful whether the revolutionary climate in the RSA has decreased.

The ANC has already made it known through its president, Oliver TAMBO, that distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' targets is to disappear. The recent landmine and bomb explosions should be seen in this light. It can be expected that the ANC will during 1986 attack especially whites, so-called "soft" targets. In the programme "Let the people's war engulf the entire country" broadcast by Radio Freedom in Ethiopia on September 6 and 7, 1985 the following remarks were made about the violent onslaught against the RSA :

- Whites should realize that unrest would not remain restricted to black areas.
- The same action against black SAP members in black residential

areas must be taken against white SAP and SADF members.

- the RSA, including white residential areas "must go up in flames" and a State of Emergency must be proclaimed throughout the country.

The ANC decided in 1981 to declare the border area between Mafikeng and the Kruger National Park an operational area of the ANC. In 1981 and 1983 groups of terrorists were specially trained in the Caxito Camp in Angola in rural guerilla warfare techniques, including the laying of land- and anti-personnel mines. Six landmines have since been found in arms caches of the ANC which indicates that the ANC plans to use this kind of warfare increasingly. Since November 26, 1985, seven landmine

incidents have occurred in the Messina magisterial district. Seven people were killed and 19 injured in the explosions. 5 more landmines were found and defused in the same area.

16 terrorists were arrested and 15 who received military training overseas under the auspices of the ANC were killed in the RSA during 1985. Two foreign-trained terrorists and 16 other people of whom some received crash courses in Swaziland and some were trained inside the RSA, as well as local collaborators, have been arrested in connection with the bomb blast in Amanzimtoti on December 23, 1985 and other acts of terrorism in Natal. A large quantity of arms of Soviet origin were found.

It has become known that an elementary form of military training is being given either in the neighbouring states or within the RSA. Of the 136 terror acts reported in 1985, 67 were handgrenade attacks on persons or property. This represents an increase of nearly 38 percent on the 1984 figures. The increase can be ascribed to the fact that a handgrenade is simple to master, easy to carry or to hide on the body and that it can be used extremely effectively. The handgrenade attacks have been aimed chiefly at members of the SAP and government officials such as councillors and members of Parliament.

Police investigations into the terror onslaught yielded effective results regarding the training and elimination of those involved

in terror and the finding of terrorist weapons within the borders of the RSA.

The ANC does not have a military infra-structure in the RSA or in the independent black national states, although a constant effort is being made to create such a structure. The SAP remains in control of the situation and successfully traces terrorist infiltrators and is able to prevent many planned acts of terror.

While the ANC may not be the initiator of all internal unrest, it makes capital gain by claiming that the unrest is the result

of its call to the population. In this way the ANC attempts to create the impression that it does have a successful structure, which is simply not true.

Sedert die afkondiging van die Noodtoestand het die onluste in die 36 landdrosdistrikte waar die noodtoestand op 21 Julie 1985 van krag geword het, wesentlik afgeneem. In die Wes-Kaap en Boland waar 'n noodtoestand op 26 Oktober afgekondig was, was die afname aansienlik hoër.

Die regering se benadering ten opsigte van die Noodtoestand is dat opheffing eers oorweeg kan word sodra wet en orde in 'n distrik herstel is en gehandhaaf word. In totaal is 'n Noodtoestand in 44 landdrosdistrikte afgekondig, terwyl opheffing reeds in 21

distrikte plaasgevind het. Tans geld die noodtoestand nog in 23 landdrosdistrikte.

Die omvang van die onluste het reeds afgryslieke afmetings aangeneem, veral met betrekking tot die getal persone gedood of beseer asook die skade wat aangerig word en dit is veral belangrik om te beklemtoon dat meer as 'n derde van ^{alle} sterfgevallen en/of beserings ~~word~~ veroorsaak deur burgerlike persone teenoor hulle eie burgerlike. Dit word gedoen by wyse van die wreedaardigste optredes moontlik. Die skade aan geboue en ander fasiliteite word deur die betrokkenes tot hul eie nadeel berokken en hulle kan verseker wees dat fondse nie maklik in begrotings beskikbaar gestel sal word om dit

te herstel nie.

Pogings wat aangewend word om alternatiewe strukture daar te stel, sal ook nie geduld word nie en daar sal streng opgetree word in dié verband. Daar kan nie toegelaat word dat ons vyande die beeld probeer skep asof hulle in staat is om hul eie administrasie te handhaaf nie. Die Staat se gesagsinstellings en sy gesag moet beskerm en gehandhaaf word.

STAPPE WAT DIE REGERING GEDOEN HET EN NOG VAN VOORNEME IS OM TE DOEN TEN EINDE DIE TOESTAND TE BEKAMP

Dit is uit die aard van die saak nie vir my moontlik om u volledig

in te lig oor die Regering se planne in dié verband nie en u verwag dit ook nie van my nie, maar ek beklemtoon nogtans graag sommige van die Regering se optrede soos ook sekere departementele reëlings deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie.

1) Onder leiding van die Staatspresident is 'n Veiligheidsbestuurstelsel ontwikkel wat effektief en doeltreffend is en waarop ons almal met goeie reg baie trots kan wees.

Die Regering het egter vroegtydig beseef dat die Veiligheids- en Welvaartbestuurstelsel nie onafhanklik van mekaar suksesvol kan opereer nie en die Staatspresident het gevolglik besluit dat die twee stelsels se optrede gekoördineer moet word en dit word

tans gedoen met 'n lid van die kabinet as koördinator. Die resultaat was onmiddellik positief en welvaarts- en veiligheidskneelpunte word sonder vermorsing van tyd gekoördineer met goeie gevolg.


Die praktiese toepassing van die twee stelsels sal deur Adjunk-
Minister Adriaan Vlok met u handel word.

2) In Junie 1985 het die Regering 'n bedrag van R100 miljoen vir spesiale werkskepping- en opleidingsprogramme ten opsigte van werklose persone bewillig. Omdat hierdie programme goeie vrugte afgewerp het, is hierdie bedrag op 7 Oktober 1985 na R600 miljoen verhoog en dit is aan die Minister van Mannekrag

opgedra om die uitvoering van die programme te koördineer.

Daar is goeie vordering met die uitvoering van die program gemaak, aangesien daar goeie samewerking van die verskillende owerheidsinstansies en 'n uitstekende reaksie van die privaatsektor was.

Ook van die kant van die werkloos was daar 'n baie gunstige reaksie op die programme en groot getalle werklose persone meld hulle vrywillig aan vir deelname aan die verskillende programme dwarsoor Suid-Afrika.



'n Bedrag van R307,5 miljoen is vir werkskepping toegewys en daar was 110,7 miljoen mandae gewerk en 151 000 persone betrokke by projekte op 31 Desember 1985. Vir voedselverspreiding is 22 miljoen beskikbaar gestel en is 679 000 voedselpakkies teen 31 Desember 1985 versprei.

Die bedrag wat vir opleiding toegeken is, was R85 miljoen en teen 31 Desember 1985 was 75 000 werkloos reeds opgelei en dit is die mikpunt om 239 000 teen 31 Maart 1986 op te lei.

Aan die Ontwikkelingsbank is R38,5 miljoen toegewys en is daar 1 491 werkgeleenthede teen 31 Desember 1984 bewaar.

Die Kleinsake Ontwikkelingskorporasie het R75 miljoen gekry, en het 6 623 werkgeleenthede tot 31 Desember 1985 bewaar.

Addisionele bystand van R75 miljoen is aan die Werkloosheids-versekeringsfonds verleen.

'n Groot aantal projekte veral op plaaslike bestuursvlak, het eers in die nuwe jaar op dreef gekom en die globale resultate sal na verwagting as gevolg daarvan aanmerklik verbeter.

3) Die maatskaplike omstandighede in baie Swart en ander gekleurde woonbuurte is sonder twyfel 'n bydraende faktor tot

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die huidige onrussituasie en die Regering het reeds dringend aandag gegee aan die verbetering van sodanige omstandighede. 'n Bedrag van ± R126 miljoen is vir die doel beskikbaar gestel en word reeds oor die hele land aangewend vir die verbetering en opgradering van spesifieke gebiede en/of fasiliteite. Die saak geniet hoë prioriteit.

4) In direkte opdrag van die Staatspresident, gee elke departement dringend aandag aan enige spesifieke aangeleentheid wat enigsins kan bydra tot die onrussituasie. Alle's moontlik word gedoen om 'n situasie te bekamp voordat dit in 'n probleem ontwikkel.

5) Meer bepaald met betrekking tot die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie, beklemtoon ek graag die volgende -

(a) Alhoewel ons deurlopend ons eie metodes en tegnieke in oënskou neem, is dit belangrik om tred te hou met die jongste verwikkelinge in die buiteland en gevolglik hou ons goeie en deurlopende kontak met polisiemagte in die buiteland. Ek het onlangs twee senior offisiere na sommige toonaangewende lande in die Weste gestuur om hulle metodes en tegnieke van naderby te beskou en ek is tevrede dat ons baie goed vergelyk teenoor ~~hulle~~, met betrekking tot metodes van opleiding en toerusting asook ons algemene praktiese benadering in die bekamping van onluste.



(b) Die huidige onrussituasie het baie duidelik uitgewys dat die personeelsterkte van die Polisie totaal ontoereikend is vir ons land se behoeftes en die Regering het gevolglik besluit om die Mag uit te brei na 87 000 lede. Die nodige finansiële reëling is getref en die verhoogde getal studente word reeds aan ons opleidingskolleges opgelei.

Ek is dankbaar om te getuig dat die getal aansoekers steeds ons verwagtings in redelike getalle oortref. 'n Belangrike rede hiervoor is die feit dat die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie - met ons verbeterde diensvoorwaardes en fasiliteite - vir lede 'n toekoms bied waarop nie verbeter kan word in die openbare sektor ni

(c) Ons opleidingsmetodes word deurlopend ontleed en opgeskerp en 'n groot aantal lede is die afgelope 18 maande spesiaal opgelei

in onlusbeheer. Tans word alle studente en nuwe offisiere opgelei in alle aspekte van onlusbeheer.

(d) Die Polisie gee reeds vir baie jare, in samewerking met die WNR, Krygkor, die S A Weermag en ander instansies, dringend aandag aan die ontwikkeling van toerusting en hulpmiddels wat ons in staat kan stel om so effektief moontlik op te tree, maar nogtans altyd met die doel om die absolute minimum lewensverlies of beserings te veroorsaak. In die verband beskik ons oor toerusting waaroor sommige ander polisiemagte ons beny en het ons selfs al op versoek, enkele items ~~en~~ toerusting uitgevoer na ander lande.

(e) Dit is ook tans ons beleid om meer en kleiner polisiestasies daar te stel sodat ons meer direk betrokke kan wees by 'n

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gemeenskap en verskeie sodanige stasies is gedurende die afgelope jaar reeds gevestig, met baie goeie gevolge. Die standpunt geld vir alle bevolkingsgroepe.

SLOT

Laastens - wil ek graag verwys na die kwessie van gesindhede of benadering tot die onrussituasie. Sommige mense, synde welmenend, of oningelig of soms kwaadwillig, maak die opmerking of beskuldiging dat die Polisie of te kragdadig of te sag optree. Die twee standpunte verteenwoordig basies die houding van links en regs in die deurlopende debat.

Die Regering se standpunt in dié verband is duidelik, naamlik

(a) Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie en ander Veiligheidsmagte is gedissiplineerde Magte wat binne die bepalings van die Wet optree.

(b) Geweldenaars, wat die Staat se gesag uitdaag, moet verwag om met die gesag van die Staat kennis te maak tot sodaniges se nadeel.

(c) Die Veiligheidsmagte sal effektief optree en alhoewel dit soms nodig mag wees om geweld te gebruik ter bekamping van geweldadige optrede, sal altyd sodanig opgetree word dat dit 'n minimum lewensverlies en/of beserings veroorsaak.

(d) Daar word ook dikwels die beskuldiging gemaak dat die wetlike vrywaring wat die Veiligheidsmagte ingevolge die Noodregulasies geniet, so wyd is dat dit lede van die Veiligheidsmagte onvoorwaardelik van alle tipe handeling vrywaar - hetsy sodanige handeling bona fide of male fide is en dat dit daarop neerkom dat die Veiligheidsmagte 'n "licence to kill" het. Ons regsposisie, wat betref vrywaring in omstandighede waar onrus en wanordelikhede bekamp word, is baie duidelik. Die beginsel is dat dit in die belang van die gemeenskap is dat die individu wat in tye van wanorde of terreur moet handel om die orde te herstel, moet weet dat hy nie persoonlik aanspreeklik

sal wees as hy 'n bona fide fout maak nie.

Regulasie/ 11(1) van die regulasies afgekondig by Proklamasie R.121 van 1985 bepaal dat die vrywaring slegs geld ten opsigte van 'n handeling wat deur die betrokke persoon by die uitvoering van sy pligte, of die uitoefening van sy bevoegdhede of die verrigting van sy werksaamhede ingevolge hierdie regulasies, ter goeder troue verrig is, met die bedoeling om die veiligheid van die publiek, die handhawing van die openbare orde of die beëindiging van die noodtoestand te verseker. Dit is geensins 'n vrypas aan die veiligheidsmagte om aanrandings of ander misdrywe te pleeg nie.

Uiteindelik is dit slegs die houe wat kan besluit of 'n handeling ter goeder troue was al dan nie, gevolglik is die beweerde mala fide optrede van enige lid van 'n Mag 'n aangeleentheid waaroor die houe kan beslis.

Daar is dus geen sprake dat onverantwoordelike of enige onwettige optrede deur lede van die Veiligheidsmagte toegelaat of gekondoneer sal word nie. Intendeel - daar word streng teen enige sodanige lid opgetree.

Meneer die Voorsitter, ek gee graag vir die agbare Raad die versekering dat die Regering se optrede met betrekking tot die huidige onrussituasie tot 'n groot mate suksesvol was.

Daar is in sekere gebiede 'n merkbare afplating in insidente en 'n verbetering in die algemene klimaat terwyl daar op sekere terreine en enkele gebiede, nog rede tot kommer is. Die situasie word deurlopend gemonitor en indien nodig, sal die Regering nie huiwer om enige situasie te bekamp met selfs groter magte as wat in die verlede gebruik is nie. Ons is absoluut gedetermineer om die magte van geweld en anargie te vernietig en wet en orde in ons land te herstel en bestendig. Geweld is nie die antwoord op probleme nie, maar redelike, ordentlike en verstandige dialoog en daarvoor is die Regering altyd beskikbaar.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie en ander Veiligheidsmagte sal die persone en instansies wat ons demokratiese bestuurstelsels

en beskaafde lewenswyse en norme wil vernietig, beveg met alle middele tot ons beskikking, totdat hulle tot ander insigte kom of vernietig is.