

DIREKTORAAT VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING
DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY LEGISLATION

LEER NR.
FILE NO. 2/4/2/121 Deel

LEER NR. 2/4/2/121 Deel 1
FILE NO. 2/4/2/121 Deel 1

HOOFREKES
MAIN SERIES: Sinneloose Veiligheid

ONDERWERP
SUBJECT: Santokking Persone


LEER
FILE: United Democratic Front (UDF)

GEOPEN OP
FILE OPENED ON: 15.5.85 LEER GESLUIT OP
FILE CLOSED ON: 30.5.86

BESKIRKINGSVOORSKRIFTE
DISPOSAL DIRECTIONS

SUBLEER OF GEVAL
SUBFILE OR CASE

LEER NR.
FILE NO. 2/4/2/121 DEEL
PART 4



DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
120: [REDACTED]
Breyl
[REDACTED]

Die Kommissaris van die
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak X302
PRETORIA
0001

1986-05-30

STAATSVEILIGHEIDSRAADBESLUIT: UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF) EN
ANDER ORGANISASIES

Die besluit wat die Staatsveiligheidsraad op 12 Mei 1986 ten opsigte van die UDF, "Natal Indian Congress" en die "Transvaal Indian Congress" geneem het, word hieronder vir u inligting aangehaal:

"Aanstelling van 'n Advieskomitee oor die United Democratic Front (UDF) en ander organisasies"

Minister le Grange lig die betrokke bylae 2 wat die agenda vergesel het, verder toe.

Die aanbevelings van die dokument soos vervat in paragrawe 6 en 7, word goedgekeur met die verstandhouding dat daar nie teen sekere prominente figure sonder voorafgaande beraadslaging met die Voorsitter, opgetree sal word nie."

'n Afskrif van die betrokke bylae waarna verwys word, is aangeheg.

[REDACTED]
DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Sekretariaat van die Staatsveiligheidsraad
Secretariate of the State Security Council


Bylae 2

VERWYSING
REFERENCE

NAWAAI
ENCLOSURES

TELEFON
TELEPHONE

HENDRIK VERWOERDGEBOU/BUILDING
PARLEMENTSTRAAT/PARLIAMENTARY
KAAPSTAD/CAPE TOWN



7 Mei 1986

Aan al die lede van die Staatsveiligheidsraad

AANSTELLING VAN ADVIESKOMITEE : "UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT" EN ANDER ORGANISASIES

1. 'n Komitee, bestaande uit twee beamptes van die Departement van Justisie is gedurende 1985 aangestel om die Minister van Wet en Orde onder andere te adviseer oor die wenslikheid, al dan nie, van die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee kragtens artikel 7 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 ten opsigte van die "United Democratic Front" (UDF), "Natal Indian Congress" (NIC) en die "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC).
2. Die Komitee het nou sy verslag uitgebring en 'n opsomming daarvan volg hierna:
3. Die geskiedenis van die betrokke organisasies soos deur die Komitee geskets, kan soos volg saamgevat word:
 - a. Die "Natal Indian Congress" en die voorloper tot die "Transvaal Indian Congress", die "Transvaal British Association", is in 1894 en 1903 onderskeidelik gestig.
 - b. Onder beïnvloeding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party (SAKP) het genoemde organisasies en verskeie ander linksgesinde organisasies later die "Congress Alliance" gevorm. Dié organisasies het die "Congress of the People" in 1955 verteenwoordig te Kliptown waar die "Freedom Charter" aanvaar is.
 - c. Na 'n tydperk van onaktiwiteit het NIC weer gedurende 1980 aktief geraak, terwyl TIC in 1983 heraktiveer is. Op 'n vergadering van NIC en die Transvaalse tak van die "Anti South African Council" op 9 Januarie 1983 het Zac Yacoob vir die stigting van 'n "United Democratic Front" gepleit. Die UDF is daarna op 23 Januarie 1983 gestig. Die Nasionale loodsing van die UDF het op 20 Augustus 1983 plaasgevind.

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4. Die vernaamste bevindings van die Komitee word hieronder uiteengesit:

- a. Die ANC en die UDF het presies dieselfde doelstelling as die SAKP om die massas te politiseer en te mobiliseer om die bestaande bestel omver te werp en 'n bestel gebaseer op die beginsels van die "Freedom Charter" daar te stel.
- b. Die verrigtinge tydens die nasionale loodsing van die UDF was oorwegend ANC georiënteerd.
- c. Die alliansie tussen die ANC en UDF is duidelik weer-spieël in die samestelling van die nasionale bestuur wat tydens die Algemene Jaarvergadering wat in April 1985 verkies is. Die UDF se metodes ter bereiking van sy doelwit het mettertyd meer militant geraak. Sekere veldtogte en begrafnisdienste wat deur die UDF-lede toegesprek is, het tot die uitbreek van geweld met gepaardgaande lewensverlies gelei.
- d. UDF beskermhere het hulle ten gunste van die ANC uitgesprek; UDF-lede is in die hantering van wapens en plofstowwe opgelei en lede van die UDF het hulle ten gunste van geweld uitgesprek, asook dreigemente van weerwraak ge-uiteer.
- e. Beide NIC wat 'n belangrike rol gespeel het in die stigting van die UDF en TIC is aan die UDF geaffiliseer. Beide organisasies streef die doelstellings van die UDF na en neem aan die bedrywighede van die UDF deel.

5. Die Komitee het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat daar voldoende inligting is om 'n advieskomitee aan te stel om die bedrywighede van die betrokke organisasies te ondersoek. Die Komitee beveel egter om die volgende redes aan dat 'n advieskomitee nie aangestel word nie:

- a. Ondervinding het geleer dat sodra 'n organisasie onwettig verklaar word sonder optrede teen ampsdraers/lede die bedrywighede van die organisasie voortgesit word in 'n veranderde vorm met gewysigde doelstellings.
- b. Dit te laat is om nou optrede te oorweeg omdat veral die UDF binnelands en buitelandse erkenning geniet.
- c. Alhoewel dit betwyfel word of die UDF aan onderhandelings met die Regering sal deelneem, kan optrede teen die UDF in hul guns aangewend word deur te argumenteer dat die Staat teen partye opgetree het wat aan die onderhandelinge wou deelneem, maar deur die Staat se optrede verhoed word om dit te doen. Dit mag ook ander belanghebbende partye ontmoedig om deel te neem.

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d. Optrede teen die organisasies kan nie gelyktydig met die Hoogverraad verhoor (verwysende na die Pietermaritzburg en Delmas-sake) oorweeg word nie. In die Transvaal verhoor staan die UDF as sulks op verhoor en gevolglik is die bevinding van 'n advieskomitee nie voor die einde van die verhoor bekend gemaak kan word nie omrede die gevaar bestaan dat die bevinding van die komitee en die van die hof mag verskil. Twee verskillende uitsprake oor die bedrywighede van die UDF sal noodwendig verleenheid skep. Die Komitee mag besluit om getuies roep wat ook in die verhoor getuig het of moet getuig. Dit behels 'n risiko, indien die komitee besluit het die houe van die verrigtinge nie bekend te maak nie, en die werksaamhede van die komitee bekend sal word. Indien die komitee besluit om kennis aan organisasies van die ondersoek te gee, sal die verdediging kan argumenteer dat hulle op twee fronte deur die Staat aangeval word om sodoende die beskuldigdes se verdediging beïnvloed.


e. Alhoewel die organisasies nie as sulks in Pietermaritzburg op 'verhoor' was nie, vertolk die algemene publiek dit so. Die Staatsadvokaat het in die ope hof tydens argument gesê dat die Staat nie sal beweer dat 'Natal Indian Congress' en die 'Transvaal Indian Congress' betrokke was in die omverwerping van die regering nie, maar dat persone in die organisasies besig om 'n rewolusionêre klimaat te skep. 'n Teenoorgeste bevinding deur 'n advieskomitee sal beslis verleenheid skep.

5. Die Komitee beveel egter aan dat oorweging daaraan geskied word om kragtens artikels 18, 19 en 20 (Inperking) van die Wet Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 teen 27 persone wat deur hulle geïdentifiseer is, opgetree word.

AANBEVELINGS

6. Die aangeleentheid is op 7 Mei 1986 deur die Werkkomitee oorweeg. Kennis is daarvan geneem dat die Direktoraat : Veiligheid wetgewing in oorleg met die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie reeds besig om aandag aan die moontlike inperking van die 27 geïdentifiseerde persone te gee. Genoegsame inligting met betrekking tot die bedrywighede van sekere van die persone om inperkings te regverdig ontbreek en dringende aandag word aan dié aspek gegee.

7. Die Werkkomitee steun die Komitee se aanbeveling dat 'n advieskomitee nie in die stadium aangestel word nie om die bedrywighede van die UDF, NIC en IIC te ondersoek met die oog op die wettigverklaring van die organisasies.



SEKRETARIS VAN DIE STAATSVEILIGHEIDSRAAD

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ingevolge veiligheidswetgewing opgetree word, sal daar moontlik gesê word dat die Regering die uitspraak van die Hof vooruitloop. Dit is selfs nie uitgesluit nie, dat so 'n stap kommentaar van die Regbank kan uitlok. Die Regter-president van die Natalse Provinsiale Afdeling van die Hooggeregshof het juis onlangs 'n beroep op die "owerheid" (die polisie) gedoen om hom te weerhou van uitsprake oor die UDF solank die saak teen Ramgobin en andere hangende is. 'n Verdere aspek wat hier in gedagte gehou moet word, is dat indien daar met optrede gewag sou word tot na afhandeling van die bogenoemde verhore (Durban-saak en Vaaldriehoek-saak) en skuldigbevindings wel verkry sou word, dit die voordeel sou inhou dat optrede kragtens veiligheidswetgewing daarna makliker geregverdig sou kan word. Soos in ons vorige memorandum uitgewys, is dit ook so dat ernstige verleentheid veroorsaak kan word indien daar nou teen die UDF kragtens veiligheidswetgewing opgetree sou word en dit later by implikasie in die bogenoemde sake bevind sou word dat die UDF se bedrywighede nie van so 'n aard was dat dit optrede kragtens artikel 4 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 regverdig het nie.

5. Aan die ander kant is dit egter so dat beide bogenoemde sake klaarblyklik 'n geruime tyd sal duur. Enersyds is die getuienis wat die Staat sal aanbied van 'n groot omvang. Andersyds het sake van dié aard reeds bewys dat die verdediging die verhore gewoonlik sover as moontlik probeer uitrek. Daar is dan ook al aangedui dat verwag kan word dat die Durban-saak ten minste agtien

maande sal duur. Verder het ondervinding nou in die
ondersoek ten opsigte van COSAS geleer dat 'n
advieskomitee tyd nodig het om al die inligting en
getuienis ten opsigte van 'n organisasie deur te werk en
te evalueer, alvorens 'n aanbeveling aan die Minister
gemaak kan word. Indien daar dus gewag sou word tot na
afhandeling van die sake, voordat 'n advieskomitee ten
opsigte van UDF aangestel word, kan dit daarna nog 'n
rukkie duur voordat die advieskomitee 'n aanbeveling
uitbring. Die argument kan dus aangevoer word dat dié
"verdragings" tot gevolg kan hê dat die UDF intussen met
sy bedrywighede kan voortgaan en dat die meeste kwaad
reeds gedoen sal wees teen die tyd dat daar teen die UDF
opgetree word, indien daar wel uiteindelik besluit sou
word om stappe teen die organisasie te doen. Soos daar
egter in ons vorige memorandum uitgewys is, is ons van
mening dat die bedrywighede van die UDF intussen sover as
moontlik met optrede teen individue en deur strategiese
kommunikasie-aksies geneutraliseer moet word. Wat
laasgenoemde betref, blyk dit reeds dat die onmin tussen
die UDF en AZAPO wel 'n remmende effek op beide
organisasies se bedrywighede het en kan dié situasie
verder uitgebuit word. In dié verband is dit opvallend
dat die onmin klaarblyklik tot kommer van die
ANC-leierskap strek. Die ANC het byvoorbeeld ook op 9
Mei 1985 'n persverklaring vrygestel waarin die "Multi
Racial United Democratic Front" en "More Radical Black
Consciousness Groups" versoek word om hul onderlinge
geskille by te lê.

6. Hoe dit ook al sy, die vraag of daar nou teen die UDF opgetree behoort te word, al dan nie, blyk van so 'n aard te wees dat dit nie behoorlik in 'n memorandum soos hierdie uitgemaak kan word nie. Daar word dus aanbeveel dat samesprekings tussen die Minister, Kompol, senior beamptes van die Veiligheidstak en senior beamptes van die Direktooraat: Veiligheidswetgewing gereël word om die aangeleentheid te bespreek. Indien die Minister dus so goedkeur, sal samesprekings in oorleg met die Minister se Privaatsekretaris so spoedig doenlik na afloop van die huidige Parlementsitting, in Pretoria gereël word.

6/6/85
DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

4/6/85

11/5/85

Aanbeveling in paragraaf 6 GOEDGEKEUR!

Die saak is uiters belangrik.

L. Le Grange
L LE GRANGE
MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE

11/6/85

Samesprekings in die verband op 18.7.1985 gehou. Die Minister het aangedui dat die nou daadwerklike oorweging geskenk moet word om teen die UDF, sy geaffilieerde organisasies en ander radikale organisasies op te tree.

2/8/85



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2/4/2

Lêer No. 2/4/2/121 (DDVz)
File

DIREKTORAAT VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY LEGISLATION

DIE DIREKTEUR
THE DIRECTOR

MINISTER

OORWEGING VAN DIE AANSTELLING VAN 'N
ADVIESKOMITEE: UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)

REKORDNO. VAN WET-EN-ORDE	1985-06-10	ORDE
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VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING	28-06-1985	LEGISLATION
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Handwritten notes:
 HEN
 DRV
 DRX
 DDV
 datum met
 My Cofford
 Kuning
 20/7/85

1.1 Daar is gedurende Februarie 1985 'n omvattende memorandum aan die Minister voorgelê waarin die Minister geadviseer is oor die wenslikheid, al dan nie, van die aanstelling van advieskomitees om die bedrywighede van die UDF en ander organisasies te ondersoek.

1.2 Daar is aan die Minister in die memorandum uitgewys dat daar onses insiens voldoende gronde bestaan om die betrokke organisasies aan die ondersoek van advieskomitees te onderwerp. Daar is egter op sekere aspekte gewys wat dit na ons mening onwenslik gemaak het om advieskomitees in daardie stadium ten opsigte van die betrokke organisasies aan te stel. Daar is naamlik onder andere aan die Minister uitgewys dat dit nie wenslik sou wees om advieskomitees aan te stel, alvorens die saak te Durban waarin ampsdraers van die UDF en ander organisasies ([redacted], [redacted] en andere) van hoogverraad aangekla word, afgehandel is nie.

1.3 Die Minister het dan ook aangedui dat die besluit oor die aanstelling van advieskomitees moes ontstaan.

(Memo)

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2.1 Nadat die Minister se besluit in dié verband aan Kompol (Veiligheidstak) oorgedra is, het hy nou 'n afdruk van die akte van beskuldiging in die saak die Staat teen M Ramgobin en andere (Durban-saak), asook 'n samevatting van die bewerings teen die beskuldigdes wat na bewering almal ampsdraers van die UDF is, voorgelê. Kompol merk in die verband soos volg op:

"Soos u kennis dra, word 'n verdere saakdossier tans deur die Veiligheidstak, in samewerking met die prokureur-generaal van Transvaal, ondersoek met betrekking tot die betrokkenheid van die UDF by die onlusvoorvalle gedurende Augustus/September 1984 aan die Vaaldriehoek. Na verwagting sal die betrokke ondersoek binne die afsienbare toekoms afgehandel wees en word verwag dat verskeie lede en ampsdraers van die UDF sowel as geaffilieerde organisasies, tereg sal staan as gevolg van hul betrokkenheid by die gemelde geweldplegings.

In die lig van bogemelde feite en inhoud van die aangehegte dokumente word graag verneem of die onwettigverklaring van die UDF nie onmiddellike aandag kan geniet nie".

([REDACTED])

2.2 In die samevatting van die bewerings teen die beskuldigdes (Ramgobin en andere) word gemeld dat die saak op die feit berus dat die beskuldigdes deur die gebruikmaking van organisasies en leierskapposities beklee, die UDF in 'n front ten behoeve van die

ANC/SAKP/SACTU/CONGRESS ALLIANCE/CONGRESS MOVEMENT
probeer omskep het in die politiserings- en
mobiliseringsfase van 'n rewolusie. Daar word ook gemeld
dat die ANC en SAKP sedert die ontstaan van die UDF geen
geheim daarvan maak nie dat hulle deur gebruikmaking van
ondergrondse strukture die UDF wil manipuleer en beheer.
Daar word ook in die getuienis beweer dat die "Transvaal
Indian Congress", "Natal Indian Congress", "South African
Allied Workers Union", "Anti-Residents Council" en die
"Release Mandela Committee" sodanige strukture van die
UDF uitmaak.

(X)

3.1 Kompol het ook 'n aanvullende memorandum van die UDF
se bedrywighede sedert Oktober 1984 voorgelê. Daarin
word onder andere verwys na die rol wat die UDF in die
sogenaamde "Stay-Away" kampanjes gespeel het; pamflette
wat die UDF laat versprei het en protesvergaderings wat
deur die UDF gehou is. Daar was byvoorbeeld 13
protesvergaderings gehou en by 14 geleenthede pamflette
oor die voorval te Uitenhage, waar verskeie persone
tydens polisie-optrede gedood is, versprei. Volgens
Kompol het die UDF met hierdie kampanje 'n ernstige
klimaat van vyandigheid teenoor die polisie in die
besonder en die owerheid in die algemeen, geskep.
Volgens Kompol het die klimaat beslis aanleiding gegee
tot meer aggressiewe optrede teen die polisie en
owerheidsinstellings wat weerspieël word in die toename
van aanvalle op die polisie en gemeenskapsleiers.

3.2 In die memorandum wat Kompol voorgelê het, word ook berig dat die UDF op sy Nasionale Algemene Jaarvergadering die volgende besluite geneem het:

"om die Staat effektief uit te daag;
 om die Staat se voornemens te frustreer en die Staat te forseer tot agteruitgang;
 massa protesvergaderings en burgerlike ongehoorsaamheid aan te moedig; en
 teen buitelandse beleggings te protesteer maar nie direk op disinvestering aan te dring nie".

3.3 Na afloop van die vermelde vergadering, het Terror Lekota, publisiteitsekretaris van die UDF in 'n persverklaring onder andere gesê dat:

"die tyd aangebreek het vir 'n nuwe aanslag teen die regering;
 daar nog tyd vir die regering is om met die 'ware' leiers te onderhandel en 'apartheid' af te breek;
 die UDF knelpunte aanhoudend sal opneem en aanval en nie net met persverklarings tevrede sal wees nie;
 daar nie geskroom sal word om met aktiviste in die strate 'n opmars te hou nie;
 daar ander maniere gevind sal word om 'nee' te sê;
 daar teen die Nieu-Seelandse rugbytoer betoog sal word; en
 burgerlike ongehoorsaamheid nie die regte woord is vir wat beplan word nie want dit kom neer op erkenning van bestaande wetgewing en daar is geen wetgewing in die RSA wat hul agting afdwing nie".

3.4 Volgens Kompol val al die huidige protes-, verset- en boikotaksies binne die raamwerk van die ANC se oproep by monde van Oliver Tambo en ander ANC-leiers om Suid-Afrika onregeerbaar te maak.

(X,Y,Z)

4.1 Soos in ons vorige memorandum aan die Minister uitgewys is, bestaan daar onses insiens voldoende gronde om die UDF aan 'n ondersoek deur 'n advieskomitee te onderwerp. Die vraag bly egter steeds of die tyd nou ryp is om teen die UDF op te tree. Dié vraag blyk nie so maklik te wees om te beantwoord nie, aangesien daar verskeie argumente vir en teen die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee en moontlike optrede teen die UDF in dié stadium, aangevoer kan word.

4.2 In die eerste plek geld die argumente wat in ons vorige memorandum teen optrede teen onder andere die UDF aangevoer is, onses insiens steeds. Al dié argumente word nie hier herhaal nie. Daar moet egter op gewys word dat die voorgenome saak teen Ramgobin en sy makkers alreeds wye publisiteit hier en in die buiteland geniet het en almal is deeglik ingelig dat die beskuldigdes ampsdraers of lede van die UDF is. Daar kan dus verwag word dat die saak beskou sal word en voorgehou sal word as nie soseer slegs die beregting van aanklagte teen die beskuldigdes as sulks nie, maar ook as 'n verhoor waarin die bedrywighede van die UDF blootgelê sal word. Indien daar dus nou, solank die saak hangende is, teen die UDF

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MINISTERIE VAN WET EN ORDE
1985-03-06
MINISTRY OF LAW AND ORDER

Ministerie van Mannekrag

Ministry of Manpower

Privaatsak X9090
8000 KAAPSTAD

1985-03-06

Sy Edele L le Grange, DVD, LP
Minister van Wet en Orde
Hendrik Verwoerdgebou 915
8001 KAAPSTAD

Geagte Kollega,

**BEDRYWIGHEDA: "SOUTH AFRICAN CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS" (SACTU)
EN "SOUTH AFRICAN ALLIED WORKERS UNION" (SAAWU)**

Ek skrywe na aanleiding van u brief (MP 8/4) van 4 Maart 1985, in die bogenelde verband.

Na my mening, moet die volgende faktore baie noukeurig oorweeg word alvorens daar op enige optrede besluit word:

- (a) My voorganger en ekself, asook andere van ons Kollegas, het in die verlede by herhaling beklemtoon dat daar in Suid-Afrika nie teen vakbondorganisasies as sodanig opgetree word ingevolge veiligheidswetgewing nie, maar teen bepaalde individue wie se optrede 'n bedreiging vir landsveiligheid inhou. In die laasgenoemde verband is dit ook telkens duidelik gestel dat daar nie teen individue opgetree word vanweë hul vakbondverbintnisse of -bedrywighede nie. Optrede soos oorweeg, kan 'n ernstige vertrouensgaping skep wat uitgebuit sal word en moeilik herstel sal kan word.
- (b) Optrede soos oorweeg, sal ongetwyfeld verdere stukrag aan die disinvesteringveldtog in die VSA verleen, en al die pogings van die Regering en die private sektor om dit te gaan grootliks, indien nie algeheel, verydel nie. Dit kan op sy beurt, lei tot spanning tussen die private sektor en die Regering wat ons in die huidige ekonomiese klimaat nie kan bekostig nie.
- (c) Die jaarlikse Konferensie van die Internasionale Arbeidsorganisasie wat in Mei/Junie in Genève plaasvind, sal soos dit met Pole 'n jaar of wat gelede die geval was, totaal oorheers word deur die optrede teen die bogenelde organisasies en sal hulle in der waarheid 'n internasionale en nasionale aansien verleen, wat hulle geensins verdien nie.

2. / ...

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2.

- (d) Die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee deur die Staatspresident ingevolge artikel 7 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1950, kan negatief reflekteer op die amp van Staatspresident en die bekleër in 'n spervuur van kritiek laat beland. Dit sal ook die positiewe aard en inhoud van die Staatspresident se onlangse Openingsrede onder groot verdenking laat kom.

In die lig van al die voorgaande faktore, wil ek ernstig waarsku teen die aanstelling van die advieskomitee soos oorweeg, en wil ek pleit dat die aangeleentheid desnoods na die Werkgroep van die Staatsveiligheidsraad verwys word met die opdrag om ondersoek in te stel na alternatiewe en minder skadelike metodes van optrede en om met aanbevelings te kom.

*Vriendelike groete,
P. T. C. du Plessis*

P T C DU PLESSIS, MP
MINISTER VAN MANNEKRAG



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5/7

2/3/1/1(V/Bv)

J G Adendorff

211043/4

20 Jan 1986

Beve op les vol
USF asb.

Die Kommissaris van die
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak X302
PRETORIA
0001

ONDERSOEK NA DIE "UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT", "NATAL INDIAN CONGRESS" EN "TRANSVAAL INDIAN CONGRESS"

[Handwritten signature]
51

1. Mnr [redacted] en adv [redacted] wat na die bedrywighede van die bovermelde organisasies ondersoek ingestel het, het aanbeveel dat oorweging daaraan geskenk word om kragtens artikels 18, 19 en 20 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 teen onder andere die volgende persone op te tree:

[Large redacted block of names]

VERSEND/ONTVANG PER FAKSINAAL

Datum 86 103/05 Tyd 14.52

[Handwritten signature]
HANDTEKENING VAN LB

2. U kommentaar in die verband sal waardeer word.

3. Indien u van oordeel is dat daar oor voldoende inligting beskik word om optrede kragtens enige van die vermelde artikels of enige ander bepaling van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 teen enige van bovermelde persone te regverdig, sal dit waardeer word indien u my dringend wil voorsien van: -

(a) 'n volledige memorandum en ander beskikbare stawende inligting met betrekking tot die bedrywighede van die persone ten opsigte van wie u spesifieke optrede aanbeveel;

DECLASSIFIED

~~GEHEIM~~
DECLASSIFIED

- (b) n voltooide vraelys ten opsigte van elk van die persone ten opsigte van wie u optrede aanbeveel, en
- (c) u voorstelle oor die aard van die beperkings wat ingevolge die bepalings van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 ten opsigte van elk van die persone in paragraaf (a) genoem, opgelê behoort te word.

ten einde my in staat te stel om die Minister in die verband te nader.

Het ~~##/##/##~~ JH BREYL

DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING



~~GEHEIM~~
DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om h
aanbeveling te maak nie.

[REDACTED]

Maandeliks gemoniteer. Geen aanbeveling tot dusver ontvang.
Kopol is aangemaan oor maandelikse verslag.

[REDACTED]

Voorlegging is van Kopol ontvang, voor [REDACTED]-beslissing.
Verdere inligting word afgewag na aanleiding van beslissing.

[REDACTED]

In lig van [REDACTED]-beslissing word verdere inligting van Kopol
verlang.

[REDACTED]

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om h
aanbeveling te maak nie.

[REDACTED]

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om h
aanbeveling te maak nie.

[REDACTED]

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om aanbeveling
te maak nie.

[REDACTED]
Sedert haar inperking op [REDACTED] verstryk het, is geen inligting oor haar bedrywighede ontvang nie.

[REDACTED]:
Terugverwys na Kompol vir verdere inligting n.a.v [REDACTED]-beslissing.

[REDACTED]
Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kompol versoek is om h aanbeveling te maak nie.

[REDACTED]
Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kompol versoek is om h aanbeveling te maak nie.

[REDACTED]
Verdere inligting word afgewag.

[REDACTED]:
Terugverwys na Kompol op 22.4.86 na aanleiding van [REDACTED]-beslissing vir verdere inligting.

[REDACTED]
Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kompol versoek is om h aanbeveling te maak nie.

[REDACTED]:
Inperking word tans oorweeg.

_____:

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om 'n aanbeveling te maak nie.

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Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om 'n aanbeveling te maak nie.

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_____:

Terugverwys na Kopol op 22.4.86 na aanleiding van _____-beslissing vir verdere inligting.

_____:

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om 'n aanbeveling te maak nie.

_____:

Geen aanbeveling ontvang sedert Kopol versoek is om 'n aanbeveling te maak nie.



Lêer No. 2/4/1/1(ADX/v)
File No.

DIREKTORAAT VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY LEGISLATION

DIE DIREKTEUR / MINISTER
THE DIRECTOR

AANSTELLING VAN ADVIESKOMITEE: "UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT" EN ANDER ORGANISASIES

MINISTRE VAN WET EN ORDE
1986-03-12
MINISTER G. M. VAN DER MERWE

DIREKTORAAT VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING
1986-03-20
DIR. SECUR.

HDX
DRV
DRX
ADV
ADX
Beoordeling
aan
1/30/86

1.1 Na aanleiding van die Minister se versoek gedurende Augustus 1985 dat 'n advieskomitee(s) ten opsigte van die "United Democratic Front" (UDF), die "Natal Indian Congress" (NIC), die "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC), die "Azanian Students Organisation" (AZASO), die "Azanian Peoples Organisation" (AZAPO), en die "Azanian Students Movement" (AZASM), aangestel word, het die Minister van Justisie aan die Direkteur-generaal, Justisie opdrag gegee dat -

- (a) die Minister van Wet en Orde van feitelike gegewens omtrent die samestelling van die bovermelde organisasies en hulle doelstellings en bedrywighede, bedien moet word;
- (b) die beskikbare en tersaaklike getuienis wat deur enige advieskomitee(-s) oorweeg sal moet word, versamel en georden moet word om 'n advieskomitee se taak te vergemaklik, indien so 'n advieskomitee aangestel sou word; en
- (c) 'n beeld van die organisasies en hulle bedrywighede asook die persoonlikhede daarby betrokke geskets moet word ten einde te kan beslis of optrede teen sodanige persone nie verkieslik of wenslik is nie.

CM
23/7
Beoordeling

1.2 Die betrokke Direkteur-generaal het 'n komitee bestaande uit senior beampptes (mnr [REDACTED] en [REDACTED]) van sy Departement vir hierdie doel aangewys. Die Direkteur-generaal het op 8 Januarie 1986 aangedui dat die Komitee slegs ten opsigte van die UDF, die NIC en die TIC 'n verslag moet uitbring. Die betrokke Komitee het nou 'n verslag ten opsigte van dié drie organisasies uitgebring. Die verslag is hieronder gevlag "Verslag" indien die Minister daarna wil verwys.

2. Die bevindings van die Komitee kan soos volg opgesom word:

2.1 Die ANC en die UDF het presies dieselfde doelstelling as die SAKP om die massas te politiseer en te mobiliseer om tot aksie oor te gaan om die bestaande bestel omver te werp en 'n bestel gebaseer op die beginsels van die "Freedom Charter" daar te stel.

2.2 Alhoewel die ANC reeds vir etlike jare die vereniging en mobilisering van die massas bepleit om sy doel te bereik laat hy die verantwoordelikheid daarvoor oor aan die binnelandse magte en plaas 'n spesiale verantwoordelikheid vir die uitvoering daarvan op lede van die ANC.

2.3 Dit stigting van die UDF wat vir etlike jare bepleit is, het momentum gekry en is verhaas deur die besluit van die Arbeiders Party van Suid-Afrika (APSA) om aan die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling deel te neem. Die

voortbestaan van die UDF na die implementering van die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling het genoodsaak dat die doelstelling van die UDF gewysig word om "Apartheid" in die geheel te beveg. Die vernietiging van "Apartheid" deur die massas sou noodwendig die val van die Regering teweeg bring.

2.4 Die verrigtinge tydens die nasionale loodsing van die UDF was oorwegend ANC georiënteerd. Oud-ANC lede is as presidente verkies en ANC/SAKP lede/simpatiseerders is as beskermhare aangewys, die name van ANC leiers is uitgeroep en vryheidsliedere is gesing. Daar is ook tussenin na die ANC verwys.

2.5 Die alliansie tussen die ANC en UDF is duideliker weerspieël in die samestelling van die nuwe nasionale bestuur wat tydens die Algemene Jaarvergadering in April 1985 verkies is. Die nuwe bestuur is meer Swart-georiënteerd en gekenmerk deur lede met meer ou ANC verbintnisse. Die wysiging van die UDF se doelstellings by dieselfde geleentheid bring die UDF nader in lyn met dié soort verenigde front waarvoor verskeie oproepe in die verlede gedoen is. Die UDF se metodes ter bereiking van sy doelwit het ook verander nadat hy goedgekeur het dat sy geaffilieerdes tydens veldtogte meer militant mag raak en ook die "Freedom Charter" mag propageer. Dié besluit ten opsigte van sy gewysigde beleid oor geweld het tot gevolg gehad dat sekere veldtogte en begrafnisdienste wat deur die UDF lede toegespreek is tot die uitbreek van geweld met gepaardgaande lewensverlies gelei het.

2.6 Die beskermhere het hulle ook ten gunste van die ANC uitgespreek: dr Boesak het in Maputo na die ANC as "our organisation" verwys terwyl Biskop Tutu in die VSA 'n beroep op die Westerse lande gedoen het om die ANC te erken. UDF President Oscar Mpetha het lede aangemoedig om militêre opleiding te ondergaan. UDF-lede is in die hantering van wapens en plofstowwe opgelei. Lede van die UDF het hulle ten gunste van geweld uitgespreek asook dreigemente van weerwraak ge-uiter.

2.7 Die "Natal Indian Congress" het reeds sedert 1971 'n oproep vir 'n verenigde front gedoen. Op 9 Januarie 1983 het adv Zac Yacoob tydens 'n gesamentlike NIC-TASC vergadering 'n oproep vir 'n verenigde front gedoen. Die NIC, wat die inisieerders van die UDF was, het gedurende 1980 reeds die grondslag daarvoor gelê deur die gebruikmaking van die teorieë van Auret van Heerden tydens "workshop" sessies van gemeenskapsorganisasies. Die NIC het 'n belangrike rol gespeel in die heraktivering van die "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC). Beide "Natal Indian Congress" en "Transvaal Indian Congress" is aan die UDF geaffilieer. Lede van die NIC en TIC dien ook op die bestuur van die UDF-Natal en -Transvaal streekraade, en van die UDF (Nasionaal). Beide is politieke organisasies wat die doelstelling van die UDF nastreef en aan die bedrywighede van die UDF deelneem. Die metodes wat deur hulle, òf in eie naam òf in die naam van die UDF, aangewend word, is identies. Beide beklemtoon voortdurend die feit dat hulle die enigste oorblywende lede van die "Congress Alliance" van die vyftigerjare is

en steeds die tradisies, insluitende doelstellings, van dié alliansie voortsit.

3.1 Op bladsy 298 van die verslag word daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die UDF, die NIC en die TIC organisasies is wat hulle besig hou met bedrywighede wat die veiligheid van die Staat of die handhawing van wet en orde in gevaar stel of bereken is om dit in gevaar te stel. Op grond hiervan kom die Komitee tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar voldoende inligting is om 'n advieskomitee kragtens artikel 7 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 (Wet 74 van 1982) aan te stel om die bedrywighede van die betrokke organisasies te ondersoek. Die komitee beveel egter om die volgende redes aan dat 'n advieskomitee om die bedrywighede van die drie organisasies te ondersoek, nie aangestel word nie:

- (i) "Ondervinding het geleer dat sodra 'n organisasie onwettig verklaar word sonder optrede teen ampsdraers/lede die bedrywighede van die organisasie voortgesit word in 'n veranderde vorm met gewysigde doelstellings.
- (ii) Dit te laat is om nou optrede te oorweeg omdat veral die UDF binnelands en buitelandse erkenning geniet. Binnelands ondersteun 'n groot meerderheid van die anderskleuriges die UDF. Buitelands geniet hy steun van state wat die Republiek nie goedgesind is nie en moontlik oproepe vir verdere sanksies en disinvestering kan doen.

- (iii) Die heersende politieke klimaat regverdig nie tans dat daar opgetree word teen organisasies wat moontlik aan onderhandelings mag deelneem nie. Alhoewel dit betwyfel word of die UDF aan onderhandelings met die Regering sal deelneem kan optrede teen die UDF in hul guns aangewend word deur te argumenteer dat die Staat teen partye opgetree het wat aan die onderhandelinge wou deelneem, maar deur die Staat se optrede verhoed word om dit te doen. Dit mag ook ander belanghebbende partye ontmoedig om deel te neem.
- (iv) Optrede teen die organisasies kan nie gelyktydig met die Hoogverraad verhoor (verwysende na die Pietermaritzburg- en Delmas-sake) oorweeg word nie. In die Transvaal verhoor staan die UDF as sulks op verhoor en gevolglik sal die bevinding van 'n advieskomitee nie voor die einde van die verhoor bekend gemaak kan word nie omrede die gevaar bestaan dat die bevindings van die komitee en dié van die hof mag verskil. Twee verskillende uitsprake oor die bedrywighede van die UDF sal noodwendig verleentheid skep. Die Komitee mag besluit om getuies te roep wat ook in die verhore getuig het of moet getuig. Dit behels 'n risiko, indien die komitee besluit het om die hou van die verrigtinge nie bekend te maak nie, dat die werksaamhede van die komitee bekend sal word. Indien die komitee besluit om kennis aan

organisasie van die ondersoek te gee, sal die verdediging kan argumenteer dat hulle op twee fronte deur die Staat aangeval word en sodoende die beskuldigdes se verdediging beïnvloed. Munt sal veral in die buiteland uit so 'n argument geslaan kan word.

- (v) Alhoewel die organisasies nie as sulks in Pietermaritzburg op 'verhoor' was nie, vertolk die algemene publiek dit so. Die Staatsadvokaat het in die ope hof tydens 'n argument gesê dat die Staat nie sal beweer dat die 'Natal Indian Congress' en die 'Transvaal Indian Congress' betrokke was in die omverwerping van die Regering nie, maar dat persone in die organisasies besig was om 'n revolusionêre klimaat te skep. 'n Teenoorgestelde bevinding deur 'n advieskomitee sal beslis verleentheid skep."

3.2 Die Komitee beveel egter aan dat oorweging daaraan geskenk word om kragtens artikels 18, 19 en 20 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 teen 27 persone wat deur hulle geïdentifiseer is, opgetree word.

([REDACTED])
([REDACTED])

3.3 Die Komitee meld dat daar weens ooglopende redes geen aanbevelings gedoen word oor individue wat reeds in die Pietermaritzburgverhoor ontslaan is en/of die UDF lede

wat tans in die Hoogverraadsaak te Delmas verhoor word.

([REDACTED]).

4.1 Ons het destyds in ons voorleggings aan die Minister met betrekking tot die aanstelling van advieskomitees, onder meer gewys op van die aspekte wat nou deur die Komitee uitgewys word.

4.2 Wat moontlike optrede kragtens veiligheidswetgewing teen individuele persone (wat ampsdraers, beamptes of lede van die betrokke organisasies is) betref, het ons namate die Komitee se ondersoek gevorder het, die name van persone wat moontlik van veiligheidsbelang kan wees by die Komitee verkry, waarna Kompol met betrekking tot die gevalle genader is. Van die gevalle is dan ook reeds aan die Minister vir oorweging voorgelê. Kompol is reeds met betrekking tot die ander gevalle genader. Daardie gevalle sal ook mettertyd aan die Minister voorgelê word.

5. Dit is nie bekend waarom daar besluit is dat die Komitee nie ook oor die organisasies AZAPO, AZASO EN AZASM verslag moet doen nie. Daar word egter aanvaar dat die Minister van Justisie die Minister nog van 'n antwoord in die verband sal voorsien.

6. In die stadium beveel ons aan dat die bevindings en aanbevelings van die Komitee aan die Werkkomitee van die Staatsveiligheidsraad voorgelê word om 'n aanbeveling aan die Staatsveiligheidsraad te maak oor die wenslikheid daarvan al dan nie om 'n advieskomitee ten opsigte van die drie organisasies wat die [redacted]-komitee ondersoek het, aan te stel.

DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

[Handwritten signatures and dates: 10/3/86, 10/3/86, 10/3/86]

Aanbeveling in paragraaf 6 GOEDGEKEUR/

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L LE GRANGE
MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE

17/3/86



REPORT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN A UDF DELEGATION AND THE
ADVANCE PARTY OF THE EPG ON TUESDAY 18 FEBRUARY.

EPG DELEGATION: MALCOLM FRASER, OLUSEGUN OBASANJO,
JOHN MALECELA, DAME NITA BARROW, HUGHE CRAFT
and M MALHOTRA.

At the outset of the meeting, we asked the EPG Advance what their terms of reference were and how they differed from the full EPG.

It was explained to us that the Advance's terms were limited in time and scope since this was a preliminary visit. The purpose of the Advance was to supplement the larger EPG's work and to establish a confidence in the EPG in so far as the EPG is not a substitute for pressure but an attempt to broaden international support against apartheid. In terms of the scope, the UDF's participation was seen to be crucial.

From our side we explained that we were unmandated to meet with the Advance EPG since time and repression worked against securing a mandate. The UDF delegation had come to the meeting in order to see what the EPG was about and what it had to offer in the struggle against apartheid. Furthermore, there is quite a bit of suspicion about the EPG because of the emphasis by the EPG on dialogue and negotiation as well as the presence and dominant role of BRITAIN in the COMMONWEALTH.

The Advance explained that they were not in SA to push us towards dialogue, instead they were here to get a sense of the conditions in SA so that a report could be compiled. They indicated that they understood our scepticism since so many people were streaming into the country presenting quick solutions. On the question of BRITAIN they explained that the NASSAU accord was unanimously accepted and that BRITAIN would find it difficult to go against the report of the EPG. Also, THATCHER had been pushed from her original anti-sanctions position to accepting the NASSAU ACCORD.

After explaining that this meeting with the Advance EPG did not mean necessarily, that the UDF will meet with the full EPG, we proceeded to discuss the following aspects of the UDF's work

BACKGROUND.

At a meeting of commonwealth heads in Nassau on October 20, 1985 the following call was made:

- (1) That the SA regime declare that apartheid will be dismantled;
- (2) The emergency must be lifted;
- (3) Political prisoners must be released;
- (4) The ban on the ANC and other organisations must be lifted; and
- (5) That violence from both sides must be suspended so the process of dialogue can take place for a non-racial representative government.

With special regard to the latter point, the EPG was set up to contribute to peaceful change.

THE PROGRAMME OF COMMON ACTION.

To impress on Pretoria the urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structure of democracy the commonwealth agreed on a programme of common action against South Africa.

- (1) Support for the strictest enforcement of the voluntary arms embargo;
- (2) discourage sports contact by reaffirming the Gleneagles Declaration of 1977;
- (3) ECONOMIC MEASURES: stop import of Krugerrands; ban new govt loans to SA; ban sale and export of computer equipment, nuclear materials, oil, embargo all military co-operation; and to discourage cultural and scientific events which do not contribute to the dismantling of apartheid.

If the demands set by the commonwealth are not met within six months, they will embark on additional action:

THEY will ban air links with SA, new investment and reinvestment of profits, import of agricultural goods, government procurement in SA, government contracts with majority-owned SA companies, promotion of tourism;

Besides banning these, they will also terminate double taxation agreements with SA and government assistance to investment in, and trade with SA.

If these don't show fruit within reasonable time, they will consider further action.

- (1) Establishment and growth of UDF emphasising especially things like the unity built up by UDF, the spread into rural areas and the vision of UDF;
- (2) Campaigns of the UDF - Million Signiture, anti-election
- (3) Repression faced by the UDF focusing on detentions, banning of meetings, the State of Emergency, incidents like the Trojan Horse in THORNTON ROAD, the public violence trials.....
- (4) We also put forward some of our immediate demands like the lifting of the State of Emergency, the release of detainees, the unbanning of people and the lifting of restrictions on people, the release of political prisoners and the UNBANNING of the ANC.

Much of the information presented on the above were a synopsis of information readily available through press reports, articles etc. The UDF delegation steered clear of political debate around these issues because such an exchange would be more appropriate at a National Level should we meet the EPG.

From the above discussions, the ADVANCE responded to the following issues:


- (1) The growth of the UDF in White Areas - here we focussed on the mass-meetings in White Areas, the developing awareness amongst Whites, the work of our area committees and the anti-conscription campaign.
- (2) Specific details of repression eg. restrictions, sentences, counter media etc.
- (3) Sanctions - they could not really explain why they only speak about divestment (no new investment) and no reinvestment of profit.
- (4) They wanted to know our position with regard to dialogue and negotiation. We explained that there was no mood for dialogue especially since our people have been exposed to the brutality of the state; there was nothing the government could offer us since they were in a deep crisis and the initiative was not with them.

They asked which conditions would possibly change the mood for dialogue.


We listed the following preconditions:

- (1) Release of political prisoners and the unbanning of organisations like the ANC.
- (2) Return of Exiles.
- (3) The Dismantling of Apartheid.
- (4) The Disbanding of the SADF and the SAP.

We were informed that the full EPG would probably arrive in MARCH. It was suggested that the UDF gather whatever reports were available on the situation in the country for handing over to the EPG.



FREE MANDELA



Join the UDF and the world. Demand the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners on:

MASS

Sunday 15 December 1985

RALLY

2pm

Methodist Church
Lamontville

FREE MANDELA NOW IN SOUTH AFRICA UNCONDITIONALLY!

Nelson Mandela, 67 years of age, is beginning his 23rd year in prison. This stalwart, grew to be a people's leader through his courageous efforts in the struggles of the 40's and 50's.

In 1964 there was a world-wide outcry against the life sentence that was imposed on him and leaders like Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada and others.

Even in prison, Mandela has remained a leader - an inspiration - to his people. The freedom loving people of South Africa continue to look towards Robben Island for leadership. It is there that their true leaders are kept from them, while the government tries in vain to impose puppet leaders.

Over the recent years the call for the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners has been growing inside the country and the world over. Mandela has become the proud symbol of the struggle for freedom.

Everybody now recognises the valuable contribution of Mandela and others. Even the government knows that the solution to this country's prob-

lems cannot be found without the Mandelas and Sisulus of this country.

Mandela has been made a number of offers by P.W. Botha to be freed under certain conditions. Firstly, to be released in the Transkei and secondly that he be released only if he condemned violence. Each time Mandela's answer was a loud NO!!

Today we are seeing the people posing a mighty challenge to a collapsing apartheid system and a growing demand for a non-racial democratic South Africa. The call to resolve this situation has been loud and clear, this government must now speak to the real leaders of the people!

The oppressed people of South Africa are demanding the release of Mandela and all political prisoners

The democratic forces of the world are demanding their release.

Big businessmen are demanding their release

Even some members of this government are demanding their release.

Yet after 23 years this government refuses to listen!

UDF CAMPAIGN TO FREE MANDELA & OTHERS

South Africa is in chaos. Botha cannot give us peace. The oppressed people know this. More and more Afrikaners know this. Even the big white businessmen accept this. There can be no peace and democracy with Mandela and others in jail.

All South Africans, except those who still actively support Apartheid, today want the release of Mandela and others.

The UDF, as the leading force in the democratic movement in South Africa, believes that it is its historic responsibility to launch a mass campaign for the release of Mandela, Sisulu, Kathrada, Govan Mbeki and others.

We call on all democratic forces in the country, indeed throughout the world, to join the UDF in campaigning for the release of all these political leaders.

We call on the workers movement, the students, youth, women, community organisations, churches and businessmen to give their support to this campaign and actively participate.

Let us take this campaign to every factory and house. To every university, school and church. To the urban and the rural areas.



NELSON MANDELA

Was born in Umtata in 1918. He began a B.A. degree in 1938 but was suspended in 1940 after a student protest.

In 1942 he completed his B.A. degree through UNISA and studies law at Wits University the following year. He opened up a legal practice with Oliver Tambo.

THE STRUGGLE WAS HIS LIFE

In the late 1940's, Mandela played an important role in changing the A.N.C from a letter-writing, petition and deputisation type of organisation, to an organisation (of the people) which challenged Apartheid in mass campaign, demonstrations and unity.

In 1944 Mandela, Sisulu & Tambo founded the A.N.C Youth League. In 1948 he became its National Executive and in 1950 became president of the Youth League.

In 1952 Nelson Mandela was volunteer chairman of the Defiance Campaign. During this campaign, thousands of people of all races to break (defy) unjust Apartheid laws and go to jail, rather than obey Apartheid. Nelson Mandela was among the first to defy these laws and be jailed. During this campaign over 8500 people were jailed.

After this campaign Mandela became Transvaal President of the A.N.C and in December 1952 he became deputy National President under Chief Albert Luthuli. In the same year, the government banned him from attending gatherings.

In 1956 Nelson Mandela, together with 155 Congress leaders were arrested and charged with high treason. This Treason Trial followed the historic Congress of the people of 1955 when the Freedom Charter was adopted by the A.N.C, the Indian Congress, Coloured people Congress, the White Congress of Democratic and the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

In the Treason Trial, the State argued that the Congress Alliance was part of an International Communist inspired effort to overthrow the government by violence. The trial ended only in 1961 and all 156 leaders were found not guilty. Mandela, together with people like Billy Nair, were among the last to be acquitted.

During the trial, peaceful protests of the people was increasingly met with violence from the state. During the anti-pass campaign of 1960, police killed 67 people at Sharpsville. The government declared a state of emergency and the ANC was banned on April 8 1960.

With the banning of the ANC and the killing of peaceful protesters by police, it was clear that the government had closed the avenues for peaceful protest. The ANC decided to take up arms.



Yusuf Dadoo and Nelson Mandela together break their banning orders by attending a gathering during the Defiance Campaign of 1952.

In 1962 Mandela appeared at the Pan African Congress in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia canvassing arms and support for the military wing of the ANC.

He secretly slipped back into South Africa and was arrested in Durban. He was tried and sentenced to 5 years hard labour for illegally leaving the country.

MANDELA WAS ACCUSED NO.1 IN THE RIVONIA TRIAL

In July 1963, Walter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrada, Govan Mbeki, Denis Goldberg, Raymond Mhlaba and other leaders were arrested on a farm in Rivonia. When the historic Rivonia trial started in October 1963; Mandela was brought from prison as accused No. 1.

Mandela argued in the trial that he felt himself neither morally nor legally bound to obey laws made by a government in which he and his people had no representation.

Life imprisonment was the sentence of all 8.

In 1967 while serving his sentence on Robben Island, Mandela became President of the ANC.

Mandela believes in a South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, Black and White. His beliefs in the struggle are guided only by the will of the people. He is committed to the Freedom Charter as it is a document drawn up by the people.

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

1964

- Honorary President of Leeds University Union.
- Honorary President of University College of London.

1973

- Nuclear Particle discovered at Leeds was named after him.

1975

- Honorary life membership conferred on him by London University in recognition of the historic role he has played in the world-wide fight against racism.

1979

- Doctor of Laws - University of Lesotho
- India - Jawaharlal Nehru Award for international understanding

1981

- Freedom of the City of Glasgow
- Bruno Kreisky foundation award for meritorious work in human rights - Austria

1982

- Freedom of the city of Rome (highest award in Rome)
- Leeds City Council names City Hall gardens after him

1983

- Honorary citizen of the Greek village of Ancient Olympia
- Doctor of Laws - City College of New York
- Street in Camden, North London named after him
- Elected first patron of the UDF

MY NEIGHBOUR ON ROBBEN ISLAND

by Billy Nair.



For almost 20 years I lived just 15 feet away from Nelson Mandela. We were kept in the same section on Robben Island.

I knew Nelson in the fifties. We got to know each other better during the treason trial in 1956. After four wasted years, all 156 of us were found not guilty.

It was a few years later in 1963 that hundreds of members of Unkhonto we Sizwe (MK) were charged for sabotage. Nelson together with other great leaders, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and Ahmed Kathrada were given life sentences. In what was known as the mini Rivonia trial, among others, Curnick Ndlovu and I received 20 year sentences.

We lived in the same section on the Island, isolated from all the other prisoners. Nelson, a tall imposing figure, always smiling and full of spirit was an inspiration to us. During our first 7 years we worked in the lime quarry. He worked hard and kept himself fit. He jogged every morning and is a keen sportsman.

We often played tennis together. I took advantage of his slow movement and played the ball at the extreme ends of the court. He retaliated by smashing at the net, always with a smile of renewed confidence. I won't say who won the games!

He remained a leader, even in prison. Nelson was the chief spokesperson of the inmates. Never afraid, he made bold the cause of the prisoners on Robben Island. To all who came - foreign visitors, parliamentarians or judges - he put the case of the prisoners in strong terms. It was through his guidance and under his leadership that life for prisoners improved on the Island.

Nelson is a leader, brought up in the proud tradition of the congress movement. He practiced his beliefs at all times. He never used his seniority to make others feel small. I treated everybody equally. It was not surprising that many wardens at the Island would be seen in his cell, having tea and biscuits, while he would explain to them in detail what he stood for and the free and democratic South Africa of the future. He was not a racist, and believed strongly that South Africa belonged to all who live in it. It was his task always to win over anybody, including the wardens to support the struggle of the oppressed people. Nelson showed in the fifties and sixties, through his tireless efforts and willingness to sacrifice, that he never thought about himself, his people and his organisation always came first.

Mandela was part of a generation which produced some of the greatest leaders of our time. Our fellow cell mates, included committed freedom fighters of the highest calibre - heroes like Walter Sisulu - who had served as the secretary general of the ANC and was known even by the judge that sentenced him to life as the "engine" of the ANC.

Ahmed Kathrada, was 34 years of age when sentenced to life imprisonment. He was an executive member of the South African Indian Congress and served with Mandela on the Joint Planning Council of the Defiance Campaign.

Govan Mbeki, 74 years old today, will always be remembered for his clear thinking and decisiveness which steered the ANC into becoming a mass-based peoples organisation.

I know that Mandela and all other political prisoners will be freed, and will make an important contribution to building a better South Africa for all of us.

UDF leer

REPUBLIEK
VAN
SUID-AFRIKA



REPUBLIC
OF
SOUTH AFRICA

Staatskoerant Government Gazette

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Vol. 247

PRETORIA, 17 JANUARIE 1986
JANUARY 1986

No. 10070

GOEWERMENSKENNISGEWINGS

DEPARTEMENT VAN BINNELANDSE SAKE

No. 130 17 Januarie 1986

PUBLIKASIES OF VOORWERPE.—ONGEWENSTE PUBLIKASIES OF VOORWERPE

'n Komitee bedoel in artikel 4 van die Wet op Publikasies, 1974 (die Wet), het kragtens artikel 11 (2) van die Wet beslis dat die ondergenoemde publikasies of voorwerpe ongewens is binne die bedoeling van artikel 47 (2) van die Wet:

LYS/LIST P86/4

Inskrywing No. Entry No.	Publikasie of voorwerp Publication or object	Skrywer of voortbringer Author or producer	Artikel 47 (2) Section 47 (2)
P86/1/3	<i>Stag</i> —set no 1	Viclen Promotions (Pty) Ltd, Turffontein	(a)
P86/1/5	<i>Stern</i> —Nr 48, 21 Nov 1985	Gruner + Jahr AG & Co. (Hamburg)	(a)
P86/1/7	<i>Stadsgezichten van Erwin Olaf en Guus Luijters</i>	Erwin Olaf en/and Guus Luijters	(a)
P86/1/20	<i>Prank</i> —Vol 1, No 117 met 1986 dagboek/with 1986 diary	Sonskyn Uitgewers (Pty) Ltd, Johannesburg	(a)
P85/12/113	<i>Mandela's response to PW</i>	UDF	(e)
P86/1/19	<i>Arise and Bear witness</i>	Quibla, Athlone	(e)
P86/1/79	<i>Stag's World Famous Topless Models</i> (Foto's/ Photos)	Viclen Promotions (Pty) Ltd, Turffontein	(a)

No. 131 17 Januarie 1986

PUBLIKASIES OF VOORWERPE.—APPÈL: VERTOË EN VOORWAARDES

Die Direkoraat van publikasies het op 13 Januarie 1986 kragtens artikel 14 van die Wet op Publikasies, 1974 (die Wet), appèl aangeteken teen die beslissing op 9 Januarie 1986 van 'n Komitee bedoel in artikel 4 van die Wet dat die ondergenoemde publikasie nie binne die bedoeling van artikel 47 (2) van die Wet ongewens is nie.

Die Direkoraat appelleer vir die oplegging van voorwaardes deur die Appèlraad.

807—A

No. 131 17 January 1986

PUBLICATIONS OR OBJECTS.—APPEAL: REPRESENTATIONS AND CONDITIONS

On 13 January 1986 the Directorate of Publications appealed under section 14 of the Publications Act, 1974 (the Act), against the decision on 9 January 1986 of a Committee referred to in section 4 of the Act, that the undermentioned publication is not undesirable within the meaning of section 47 (2) of the Act.

The Directorate appeals for the imposing of conditions by the Appeal Board.

10070—1

13/1/86
10070/1/86

Die Appèlraad oor Publikasies het kragtens artikel 14 (4) (b) (i) (aa) van die Wet voorlopig beslis dat die ondergenoemde publikasie nie binne die bedoeling van artikel 47 (2) van die Wet ongewens is nie, onderhewig aan die voorwaarde dat die publikasie nie vir doeleindes van verspreiding met enige van die binnekantste bladsye oop uitgestal mag word nie.

Die tydperk waarin persone bedoel in artikel 14 (3) (b) van die Wet vertoë tot die Appèlraad oor Publikasies, Priwaatsak X114, Pretoria, ten opsigte van genoemde publikasie kan rig, word hierby bepaal as 10 dae vanaf die datum van hierdie kennisgewing.

Indien geen vertoë ontvang word nie word die Appèlraad se beslissing finaal.

The Publications Appeal Board has provisionally decided under section 14 (4) (b) (i) (aa) of the Act that the under-mentioned publication is not undesirable within the meaning of section 47 (2) of the said Act, subject to the condition that the publication may not be displayed with any of the inner pages open for purposes of distribution.

The period within which persons referred to in section 14 (3) (b) of the Act may make representations to the Publications Appeal Board, Private Bag X114, Pretoria, in respect of the said publication is hereby determined as 10 days from the date of this notice.

If no representations are received the Appeal Board's decision will be final.

Inskrywing No. Entry No.	Publikasie Publication	Skrywer of voortbringer Author or producer
P86/1/5	<i>Stern</i> —Nr 48, 21 November 1985	Gruner + Jahr AG & Co, Hamburg.

No. 132**17 Januarie 1986****PUBLIKASIES OF VOORWERPE.—VERBOD OP BESIT VAN ONGEWENSTE PUBLIKASIES OF VOORWERPE**

'n Komitee bedoel in artikel 4 van die Wet op Publikasies, 1974 (die Wet), wat kragtens artikel 11 (2) van die Wet beslis het dat die ondergenoemde publikasies ongewens is binne die bedoeling van artikel 47 (2) van die Wet, het kragtens artikel 9 (3) van die Wet die besit van genoemde publikasies verbied. Genoemde verbod is kragtens artikel 9 (5) van die Wet deur die Appèlraad oor Publikasies bekragtig.

No. 132**17 January 1986****PUBLICATIONS OR OBJECTS.—PROHIBITION ON POSSESSION OF UNDESIRABLE PUBLICATIONS OR OBJECTS**

A committee referred to in section 4 of the Publications Act, 1974 (the Act), which decided under section 11 (2) of the Act that the under-mentioned publications are undesirable within the meaning of section 47 (2) of the Act, has under section 9 (3) of the Act, prohibition the possession of the said publications. The said prohibition was confirmed by the Publications Appeal Board under section 9 (5) of the Act.

Inskrywing No. Entry No.	Publikasie Publication	Skrywer of voortbringer Author or producer	Artikel 47 (2) Section 47 (2)
P85/10/40	<i>Skin Deep</i>	Intermark, Durban	(a)
P85/10/44	<i>Enemy is weak—how do we move forward, The</i> (Pamflet/Pamphlet)	RMC	(e)
P85/10/56	<i>President O R Tambo—address to the nation— Radio Freedom—22 July 1985</i>	ANC	(e)
P85/11/8	<i>Best of Penthouse girls, The—No 3</i>	Penthouse Publications, London	(a)
P85/11/9	<i>Penthouse—Vol 18, No 5, 1983</i>	Penthouse Publications, London	(a)

No. 133**17 Januarie 1986****PUBLIKASIES OF VOORWERPE.—TERSYDESTELLING VAN VERKLARING DAT PUBLIKASIES ONGEWENS IS**

'n Komitee bedoel in artikel 4 van die Wet op Publikasies, 1974 (die Wet), het kragtens artikel 15 (2) van die Wet op hersiening beslis dat die ondergenoemde publikasies nie binne die bedoeling van artikel 47 (2) van die Wet ongewens is nie. Die ondergenoemde inskrywings ten opsigte van die publikasies word hierby geskrap:


No. 133**17 January 1986****PUBLICATIONS OR OBJECTS.—SETTING ASIDE OF DECLARATION THAT PUBLICATIONS ARE UNDESIRABLE**

A committee referred to in section 4 of the Publications Act, 1974 (the Act), decided under section 15 (2) of the Act on review that the undermentioned publications are not undesirable within the meaning of section 47 (2) of the Act. The undermentioned entries in respect of the publications are hereby deleted:

Inskrywing No. Entry No.	Publikasie of voorwerp Publication or object	Skrywer of voortbringer Author or producer	Inskrywing geskrap Entry deleted
P85/12/12	<i>No neutral ground</i>	Joel Carlson	In SK./G.G. 3956, GK./G.N. 1124 van/of 1973-06-29
P85/86/1/15	<i>Namibia—the last colony</i>	Green, R; Kiljunen, M; Kiljunen, K.	In SK./G.G. 8167, GK./G.N. 791 van/of 1982-04-16.

Help om ons land, Suid-Afrika, skoon te hou!
Please keep our country, South Africa, clean!

Werk mooi daarmee

Ons leef  daarvan

water is kosbaar

Use it

Don't abuse  it

water is for everybody

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DIREKTORAAT:
VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

1986 -01- - 2

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DIRECTORAAT
SECURIT



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2/1/86
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lee
Verwysings Reference
11/5/2
VR - 121

Telegramadres: "LANDDROS"
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Privaatsak X54308
Private Bag
Poskode 4000
Postal Code

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Enquiries : N C Cloete/kv

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MAGISTRATE'S OFFICE
DURBAN

Die Direkteur van Veiligheidswetgewing
Privaatsak X655
PRETORIA
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1985.12.23

AANSOEK INGEVOLGE WET OP BINNELANDSE VEILIGHEID : WET 74/82
TELEFOON GESPREK MNR CRONJE/JUFFROU CLOETE VERWYS

En Afskrif van die aansoek en goedkeuring is aangeheg.

[Signature]
J J PIENAAR
LANDDROS : DURBAN



Kennisgeneem -
Plaas op UDF leer

[Signature]
2/1/86

DDK
MDK
Therese
7/1/86
VR
7/1/86
JKD 13/1/86

[Signature]
13-1-86

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11/5/2

X54308

4000

Enquiries : H C Cloete/dn

Mr Yunus Ismail Mahomed
United Democratic Front
20 St Andrews Street
DURBAN
40001

DURBAN

1985.12.12

Dear Mr Mahomed

APPLICATION IN TERMS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT 74/1982

In reply to your application dated 10th December 1985, permission is hereby granted in terms of Government Notice 705/85 dated 22 March 1985 for the holding of the requested open-air meeting, subject to the following conditions and restrictions :

- (a) No banners, placards, flags or literature of any banned organisation be displayed or distributed at the venue of the meeting.
- (b) No singing or ensemble singing be initiated by the speakers during the meeting except for the anthem.
- (c) No poems be read to the audience.
- (d) No mention is made either directly or indirectly by any speaker about any organisation which has been banned in terms of Act 74 of 1982 or any other Act, provided that such mention might be made if it would be in order to engender a climate conducive to a more peaceful transition to a democratic South Africa. No quotations from banned organisations is, however, permitted.
- (e) Only the following persons are allowed as speakers at the meeting -

MR BILLY NAIR
MR CURTICK MDLOVU
MISS ZINZI MANDELA

MR ARCHIE GUMEDE
MRS ALBERTINA SISULU
MR HENRY FAZI

Yours faithfully

J J PIENAR
CHIEF MAGISTRATE : DURBAN

SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE


SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE

P/Sak-P/Bag Posbus-P.O. Box 391

Verw./Ref:	[REDACTED]
Navrae/Inq.:	[REDACTED]
TEL:	322322 x 355

Office of the Divisional Commissioner
Kantoor van die Afdelingskommissaris
Port Natal Division, P.O. Box 391
Afdeling Port Natal, Posbus 391
DURBAN

4000



1985.12.12

The Magistrate
DURBAN

APPLICATION TO HOLD AN OPEN-AIR MEETING BY THE U.D.F. -
Curries fountain - 15 DECEMBER 1985.

1. There is no objection to permission being granted to the holding of the requested open-air meeting, subject to the following conditions and restrictions being placed on the meeting :
 - (a) that no banners, placards or flags be displayed at the venue of the meeting;
 - (b) that no singing or ensemble singing be allowed during the meeting;
 - (c) that no poems be read to the audience;
 - (d) that no mention is made either directly or indirectly by any speaker about any organisation which has been banned in terms of ACT 74 of 1982 or any other ACT; and
 - (e) that only the following persons be allowed as speakers at the meeting, to witt:-

MR. BILLY NAIR,
MR. CURNICK NDLOVU,
MISS ZINZI MANDELA,
MR. ARCHIE GUMEDE and
MRS. ALBERTINA SISULU.

[REDACTED]
f/DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER : PORT NATAL
[REDACTED]

ssw/mler.

DECLASSIFIED

XXXXXXXXXX

PNV.13/436/22

Brig. Van Niekerk

031-322322 Ext. 400

OFFICE OF THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER
SECURITY BRANCH : PORT NATAL

1985-12-12

4000

The Divisional Commissioner
PORT NATALAPPLICATION TO HOLD AN OPEN-AIR MEETING BY THE U.D.F. - CURRIES FOUNTAIN
15 DECEMBER 1985.
24/1/5/127 DATED 1985-12-10.

1. There is no objection to permission being granted to the holding of the requested open-air meeting, subject to the following conditions and restrictions being placed on the meeting:-

- (a) that no banners, placards or flags be displayed at the venue of the meeting; *if any banned organisation*
- (b) that no singing or ensemble singing be *encouraged by or motivated by participants* allowed during the meeting;
- (c) that no poems be read to the audience;
- (d) that no mention is made either directly or indirectly by any speaker about any organisation which has been banned in terms of ACT 74 of 1982 or any other ACT; and
- (e) that only the following persons be allowed as speakers at the meeting, to witt:-

MR. BILLY NAIR,
MR. CURNICK NDLOVU,
MISS ZINZI MANDELA,
MR. ARCHIE GUMEDE and
MRS. ALBERTINA SISULU.

J.C. VAN NIEKERK

BRIGADIER.

DIVISIONAL COMMANDER : SECURITY BRANCH.

DIVISION PORT NATAL :

JCVN/ddur

Are you going ahead in Lament - are they coming to Durban



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DURBANSE STADSPOLISIE

16 Old Fort Place / Ou Fortoord 16
DURBAN 4001

P.O. BOX
POSBUS

1172


DURBAN
4000

TELEPHONE
TELEFOON

306-4422

DCP 36

Chief Magistrate
Law Courts
Somtseu Road
4001 Durban



Ref: 8/15/2 852801
ZX/mg 0064A
Ext: 3204

11 December 1985

Dear Sir

OPEN-AIR GATHERING : UDF - CURRIES FOUNTAIN SPORTS GROUND : 15 DECEMBER 1985

I refer to a letter dated 10 December 1985 addressed to you by Seedat, Pillay and Govindasamy in connection with the above and have to advise that it is not anticipated that any serious traffic problems will arise as a result of the holding of the above Open-Air Gathering.

Yours faithfully

For CHIEF CONSTABLE

Seedat, Pillay & Govindasamy ^{1100 (Home)}

ATTORNEYS - CONVEYANCERS - ADMINISTRATORS OF ESTATES


SUITE 1501, 15th FLOOR
PERMANENT CORNER
102 FIELD STREET
DURBAN 4001

OUR REF.: BP/RG/

PHONE 319822
P.O. BOX 48043
QUALBERT
DURBAN 4078

1985 : 12 : 10

YOUR REF.:



The Chief Magistrate
Magistrate's Court
Somsteu Road
DURBAN
4001

See 1.05.1972
To Off. of S.A.P.
2/50. 10/12. 116

Dear Sir

We act for the Natal Region, United Democratic Front. Our instructions are, to make an urgent application, as we hereby do, to hold an open-air, public rally at the Curries Fountain Sports Ground, Durban on Sunday 15 December 1985 between the hours of 14H00 to 17H00.

Our client has over 50 student, youth, church, community and political organisations affiliated to it.

The meeting is being convened to mark December 16, traditionally known as "Heroes Day". It is a day on which people come together to demonstrate their unity and pay respects to people that have contributed and sacrificed in the interests of human rights.

The urgency of this application must be seen in the light of the recent Supreme Court decision and the States withdrawal of charges against 12 leaders of my client who were facing a treason charge.

The twelve leaders enjoy a very strong following. This acquittal of the leaders, has generated tremendous excitement among the people. There is consensus both within the ranks of my client and the people that this victory must be celebrated.

The application for permission to hold an open-air meeting is being made to ensure that the people's expression of their joy and paying of tributes to their leaders takes place in a calm, peaceful and orderly circumstances.

Public response and enthusiasm indicates that the Curries Fountain Sports Ground, which has been made available for the meeting would be ideal for the occasion.

The /

The Chief Magistrate

1985 : 12 : 10

The venue has a pavillion which will hold a major part of the 10 000 people expected to attend. The venue is situated next to a bus rank, which will be minimally used on a Sunday. This space will comfortably accomodate the buses and cars expected at the rally. This venue is used to accomodate large numbers of people, and has the necessary features that will allow for an easy flow of both vehicle and pedestrian traffic.

Our client will undertake to provide skilled marshalls to direct all traffic and assist in keeping order before, during and after the rally.

The meeting is scheduled to start at 14H00. People will begin to arrive from 13H00. The meeting will end at 17H00.

The programme for the meeting is restricted to 5 speakers, with no other activity. The speakers will be Billy Nair, Curnick Ndlovu, Zinzi Mandela, Archie Gumede and Albertina Sisulu, who are all leading members of the National Executive Committee of my client.

Our client provides the assurance that the entire event will be conducted professionally and in a disciplined and orderly manner. The necessary precautions will be taken to ensure that the sound from the stadium will not disturb the residents within the proximity of the stadium.

Please send me your reply before 15H00 on Thursday the 12 December 1985. Should you require any further information or a meeting with the organisers my office would be willing to arrange for it.

Yours faithfully



SEEDAT, PILLAY & GOVINDASAMY

DECLASSIFIED UDF 1ee 12/

UITERS GEHEIM

SB

249/84 (A5)

LIG 06/85

1985-10-24

DIE DIREKTEUR:
VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

WET OP BINNELANDSE VEILIGHEID, 1982 (WET 74 VAN 1982)
ARTIKEL 1(XV) (B) EN (XVIII)

U memorandum 2/4/2/121 van 14 Oktober 1985 verwys.

Die Staatsregsadviseurs merk soos volg op:

Ons word met verwysing na ons vorige mening van 26 November 1984, en na stukke wat bykomende inligting bevat, gevra -

1. of ons nog steeds die mening toegedaan is dat die United Democratic Front (UDF) 'n "organisasie" is soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 (Wet 74 van 1982); en

2. of enige organisasie wat by die UDF geaffilieer is as 'n "tak, afdeling, komitee, plaaslike, streek- of hulp-liggaam" van die UDF beskou kan word, en deur enige optrede teen die UDF geraak sal word.

1. Wat die eerste vraag betref, meen ons dat die tans voorgelegde stukke, en veral die "grondwet" of "Working Principles"

DECLASSIFIED

UITERS GEHEIM

Beene
B
12/12/85

van die UDF, soos aanvaar op 7 April 1985, nog méér gronde bied vir 'n gevolgtrekking dat die UDF as sodanig 'n "organisasie" is soos in genoemde Wet bedoel. Soos in die jongste voorlegging aangedui, kan nou selfs geargumenteer word dat die UDF 'n regspersoon is (vgl. klousule 5 ("Legal Status") van genoemde "Working Principles"). Ondanks pogings wat in die stukke aangewend word, om die UDF as 'n losse "affiliatie" te bestempel, en die gebruik soms van vae woorde en uitdrukkinge, meen ons dat feitlik elke klousule van die nuwe "Working Principles" die argument ondersteun dat die UDF 'n vereniging van ander verenigings is (vgl. klousule 7.8.1: "Any organization may apply ... for membership as an affiliate of the UDF ..."), en op grond van die oorwegings in ons vorige mening genoem as 'n "organisasie", soos bedoel in genoemde Wet, beskou moet word.

2. Die tweede vraag verwys na terminologie wat in die Wet voorkom: vgl. in die omskrywings van "ampsdraer", "beampte" en par.(b) van "onwettige organisasie" (art.1) die uitdrukkinge: "'n tak, afdeling of komitee van die organisasie", en "'n plaaslike streek- of hulpliggaam wat deel van die organisasie uitmaak" (ons beklemtoning).

Ons ag dit vir huidige doeleindes onnodig om genoemde uitdrukkinge volledig, wat die volle onderskeie betekenis daarvan betref, te ontleed.

3.

Om die gestelde vraag egter te beantwoord, meen ons dat soos volg onderskei moet word:

- (a) Wat die organisasies bedoel in genoemde klousule 7.8.1 van die "Working Principles" betref, meen ons dat dit duidelik is dat hulle (hetsy met regs persoonlikheid bekleed al dan nie) niks anders as lede van die UDF is nie. 'n Onwettigverklaring, kragtens artikel 4(1) van die Wet, van die UDF, sal nie hierdie organisasies as sodanig raak nie, maar hulle net verhinder om as lede daarvan aan te bly (artikel 13(1)(a)(i) van die Wet), en verder aan sy bedrywighede deel te neem (artikel 13(1)(a)(ii) - (v)).
- Afhangende van die feite rondom elke sodanige organisasie meen ons dat dit onwaarskynlik is dat bevind sal kan word dat hulle as "takke" of "komitees", of "afdelings" en "liggame" hierbo bedoel (sien ook par (b) van die omskrywing van "onwettige organisasie" in artikel 1 van die Wet) ten opsigte van die UDF beskou sal moet word. Die individuele lede van hierdie organisasies sal egter, soos in ons vorige mening aangedui, waarskynlik in die meeste gevalle kwalifiseer as "aktiewe ondersteuners" van die UDF, soos bedoel in bv. artikel 6(2) van die Wet.

(b) Die posisie van die afsonderlike streeksliggame in die voorlegging genoem (vgl. klousule 2 van die "Working Principles": "The UDF shall consist in the first instance of regional formations ..."), is, soos blyk uit die voorgelegde stukke, redelik ingewikkeld, maar op grond van die beskikbare feite en inligting kom dit ons voor dat hulle posisie soos volg is:

(i) Ten eerste is so 'n liggaam (vgl. die voorgelegde konstitusie van die "United Democratic Front - Transvaal Region (UDF)" blykbaar 'n afsonderlike liggaam met sy eie grondwet, lidmaatskap, bestuur, finansies, ens. Lidmaatskap is blykbaar beperk tot "organizations" (klousule 2 van die pasgenoemde konstitusie), en hoewel die doelstellings van dié streeksliggaam nie uitdruklik in daardie konstitusie vermeld word nie, sal op die feite, weens dié liggaam se skakeling met die (nasionale) UDF, waarskynlik bevind moet word dat dit dieselfde doelstellings as dié van die (nasionale) UDF nastreef.

Vir ons kom dit dus voor dat 'n volledige ooreweging van alle tersaaklike feite rondom so 'n streeksliggaam, aan die lig sal bring dat dit

as sodanig, om dieselfde redes as in ons vorige mening genoem met betrekking tot die (nasionale) UDF, ook 'n "organisasie" is soos in die Wet bedoel, en as sodanig ook onwettig verklaar sal kan word, met dieselfde gevolge, hierbo genoem, ten opsigte van die betrokke lede-organisasies. Vir huidige doeleindes word egter blykbaar nie 'n finale mening van ons hieroor verlang nie.

- (ii) Ten tweede is so 'n liggaam egter ingeskakel by die (nasionale) UDF op so 'n wyse dat dit ons voorkom dat met reg argumenteer kan word dat dit as 'n "afdeling" of 'n "plaaslike" of "streek-" of "hulp-" liggaam van die (nasionale) UDF bestempel moet word. Soos hierbo aangedui praat die Wet van "n afdeling van" die betrokke "organisasie", en van sodanige liggame wat "deel van" die "organisasie" "uitmaak".

Dat die streeksliggaam "deel van" die (nasionale) liggaam "uitmaak" (volgens die gewone betekenis van hierdie woorde), blyk onses insiens ten oorfloede uit die klousules van die (nasionale) UDF se "Working Principles"; vgl.:

6.

(aa) klousules 2 (en 6): "The UDF shall consist of regional formations..";

(bb) klousules 7.2.3 en 4: verteenwoordiging van bestuurslede en ander lede van 'n streeksliggaam op die "National Executive Committee", "National Secretariat" en "National Working Committee" van die (nasionale) UDF;

(cc) klousule 7.5: die "National General Council" van die (nasionale) UDF (wat sy "supreme decision making body" is), bestaan uit "delegations from the Regional Councils"; en

(dd) klousule 7.8: aangeleenthede betreffende lidmaatskap van die (nasionale) UDF, word deur die streeksliggaam hanteer, onderworpe aan die finale gesag van die "National General Council".

Hoewel die bogenoemde klousules letterlik net die bestuurs-
lede en bestuursliggame van die streeksliggame betrek, blyk
dit tog uit 'n klousule soos 7.6.2 dat die (nasionale) UDF deur
middel van die hele streeksliggaam op streeksvlak opereer:

"The RGC shall adopt subsidiary working principles which go-
vern the functioning of the UDF (d.w.s die nasionale UDF) with-
in its jurisdiction." Ook moet 'n organisasie wat lid van die
(nasionale) UDF wil word, ooreenkom "to abide by the UDF Na-
tional and Regional Working Principles" (klousule 7.8.1.2).

Ondanks dus dat in 'n klousule soos 8.1 bepaal word dat "(a)11
regional formations ... shall have complete independence with-
in the umbrella of the UDF", blyk dit uit hierdie klousule
self soos uit ander ook, dat die streeksliggaam onderworpe is
aan die oppergesag van die (nasionale) UDF, en 'n element is
van die organisatoriese struktuur van laasgenoemde. Anders
gestel: 'n streeksliggaam is nie 'n lid nie maar maak deel uit
van laasgenoemde.

Dit kom ons dus op die beskikbare inligting voor of 'n onwettigver-
klaring van die (nasionale) UDF noodwendig die streeksliggame di-
rek moet tref: hulle sal, as struktuurelemente van daardie UDF
ook onwettig word, sodat bv. artikel 13 van die Wet ook op die
streeksliggaam toegepas kan word (die woorde "onwettige organisa-
sie" soos gebruik in bv. art. 13(1)(a)-(c) sluit, volgens die om-
skrywing daarvan, die streeksliggame in).

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8.

Ons gee egter ter oorweging dat volledigheidshalwe oorweeg kan word om, indien die redes en gronde waarom en waarop die (nasionale) UDF onwettig verklaar word op die feite in gelyke mate vir sy streeksliggame geld, terselftertyd beide die (nasionale) UDF en sy streeksliggame onwettig te verklaar. Dit kan allerlei twyfel en argumente by die toepassing van bv. artikel 13(1) uitskakel. Natuurlik kan organisasies wat afsonderlik lede van die UDF is, ook onwettig verklaar word indien al die vereiste stappe ingevolge die Wet met betrekking tot sodanige lede gedoen word, en die vereiste redes en gronde ten opsigte van hulle 66k aanwesig is.

1985-10-17

(AC)
24/10/85

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Draaglike Veiligheidsaansig
no 182/85 ged. 2/10/85

→ UDF leer

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1.2 STUTORGANISASIES

1.2.1 UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)

1.2.1.1 MASSAVERGADERING : HANOVERPARK, KAAPSTAD

Ongeveer 3 000 persone (sowat 800 Blankes en die res Kleurlinge en Swartes) het 'n UDF massavergadering op 19 Oktober 1985 in die

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3

Hanover Park gemeenskapsaal, Kaapstad bygewoon.

Verskeie bekende UDF persoonlikhede, waaronder [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] en [REDACTED], het as sprekers opgetree.

Die volgende is van die belangrikste uitsprake wat deur hulle gemaak is:

- daar sal opgetree word teen Kleurlingmoeders wat die verbruikersboikot van Blanke winkels oortree - hulle sal gedwing word om rou wors en hoeders te eet en visolie te drink;
- die inwoners van Kruispad sal nie hoër huishuur betaal nie;
- die regering maak 'n fout deur te dink hulle kan die UDF vernietig deur hul leiers aan te hou - die stryd gaan voort en die UDF sal nooit stilgemaak kan word nie;
- die tereggestelde ANC terroris, Ben MOLOISE, is 'n held wat deur die regering vermoor is;
- daar oor 'n datum vir 'n opmars na Caledon Plein besin moet word ten einde aangehoudene Shirley DUNN te gaan bevry;
- veiligheidsmagte moet uit die woongebiede onttrek;
- alle aangehoudenes moet onmiddellik vrygelaat word; en
- die stryd moet voortgaan want die FREEDOM CHARTER is die enigste basis waarvolgens die rykdom en regering van die land gedeel kan word.

Die vergadering het ordelik verloop en verdaag en geen insidense is rapporteer nie.

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- 4.2 Kleurling- en Swartgemeenskappe is gedemoraliseer en geïntimideer;
 - 4.3 Swart lede van gemeenskapsrade en ander Swart Staatswerknemers is vermoor om die doeltreffende uitoefening van owerheidsgesag te verhinder;
 - 4.4 Swartmassas is aangehits tot burgerlike ongehoorsaamheid, openbare geweldpleging en ander dade van wanorde en terreur;
 - 4.5 inisiëring van skoolboikotte deur Swart leerlinge; en
 - 4.6 die opstel en verspreiding van vlugskrifte waarin 'n beroep op buitelandse instansies sowel as binnelandse nywerhede en besighede gedoen is om die RSA enersyds polities en diplomaties te isoleer en andersyds druk op die RSA-regering toe te pas ten einde aan die UDF se eise toe te gee met die doel om die Staatsbestel tot 'n val te bring.
5. Deur aktiewe beplanning en mobilisering is die massas aangehits en aangemoedig om bogenoemde handeling te verrig terwyl die ideologie van die ANC voortdurend op 'n subtiele wyse as 'n alternatiewe vorm van Staatsbestel voorgehou is.
 6. Ondergenoemdes het voorts nie geskroom om hul beskikbaar te stel om op die bestuur te dien van die UDF wat soos hierbo uiteengesit dit ten doel het om die owerheidsgesag op elke denkbare gebied te konfronteer en uit te daag en tot 'n val te bring.

[REDACTED]
n/BEVELVOEREND OFFISIER : VEILIGHEIDSTAK
[REDACTED] HOOFKANTOOR

/61

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AANHANGSEL A

1. Mansoor JAFFER - lid van die INTERIM COMMITTEE.
2. Andrew Jacob HENDRICKS - publisiteitsekretaris van UDF-Grensstreek.
3. Lucille Yvonne MEYER - addisionele lid van UDF Grensstreek.
4. Ntombazana Gertrude Winifred BOTHA - assistent-tesourie van UDF-Grensstreek.
5. Mzuzuana MDYOGCO - lid van die UDF-Grensstreek.
- x 6. Percival John SMITH - mediabeampte van UDF Oos-Kaapstreek.
- 7. Oliver Jani MOHAPI - lid van die Nasionale Uitvoerende Komitee.
8. Mildred Mamolungoane RAMAKABA neé LESIEA - addisionele lid van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
9. Graeme BLOCH - addisionele lid van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
10. Christmas Fihla TINTO - vise-president van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
11. Yusuf ADAM @ Joe - tesourier van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
12. Mountain QUMBELA - addisionele lid van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
13. Wilfred RHODES - vise-president van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
- 14. Zolile MALINDI - president van UDF Wes-Kaapstreek.
- x 15. Joseph Johannes MARKS @ Joe - voorheen lid van die uitvoerende komitee.
- 16. Muzuvukile Curnick NDLOVU - voorsitter van UDF Nasionale Uitvoerende Komitee.
17. Ittynian Rangasamy NAIR @ BILLY - vise-voorsitter van UDF Natal-streek.
- 18. Yunus Ismael MAHOMED - sekretaris van UDF Natal-streek.
19. Bekizwe Russel MAPANGA - lid van UDF Natal-streek.
20. Patrick Themba NXUMALO - lid van UDF Natal-streek.
- 21. Ndabakyise Erasmus GCWABAZA - lid van UDF Natal-streek.
- 22. Mcebisi Osman XUNDU - voorsitter van UDF Natal-streek.
- x 23. Ronald Mafika Macasha KHOZA - lid van UDF Natal-streek (studentevertegenwoordiger)
24. Liza Mathews KAPA - organiseerder van UDF Boland-streek.
25. James Victor ISSEL - organiseerder UDF Boland-streek.
26. Edwin Ronald MAKUE - sekretaris van UDF Transvaal-streek.
27. Mmankati Amanda KWADI - "Women's Portfolio", UDF Transvaal-streek.

28. Titus Magashe MAFOLO - Tesourier van UDF Transvaal-streek en lid van die Nasionale Uitvoerende Komitee.
29. Mathews SATHEKGE - "Student Portfolio" van UDF Uitvoerende Komitee van Transvaal-streek.
30. Johnson Mahlomola KGASU - voorsitter van UDF Noord-Kaap-streek.
31. Siphon Ian MKIZE - lid van die UDF Natal-streek.

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Mourners returning from a funeral for unrest victims at the Duncan Village township, East London, yesterday attacked and killed two white men and injured two others. *Pretoria News*

Those killed were Mr Piet Cordier and Mr At Scholtz, and the injured men are Mr Hendrik van Niekerk and Mr Johannes Struwig, a spokesman for the Police Directorate of Public Relations said in Pretoria. A spokesman for the Frere Hospital in East London said Mr Van Niekerk was in a satisfactory condition, and Mr Struwig's condition was fair.

Life saved 85-09-02

The attack followed a funeral for 18 victims of unrest at Duncan Village. Witnesses also said a clergyman at the funeral saved the life of a suspected police informer, who was about to be set alight by the crowd.

A leading anti-apartheid campaigner drew thunderous cheers from the mourners at the Duncan Village funeral when he warned that segregated white cities, virtually unscathed by the mass unrest in black communities, could also be affected.

Steve Tshwete, a local official of the United Democratic Front, emerged from hiding to tell the mourners: "What makes (State President P. W.) Botha secure at the moment is that the fires are burning in the townships, but it will not be long before the fires burn in Oxford Street (a main street in nearby white East London)."

berig op verslag
leiba. *Pretoria News*

85-09-02.

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gedeelte " " aan vs
Groen en van of hul
dit kan bevestig.

As by steeds streekwet
waardiger van die UDF is
is dit ook UDF optrede.

NB

J. Buis

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Privaatsak X463
 PRETORIA
 0001

Minister H J Coetsee
 Minister van Justisie
 Privaatsak X276
 PRETORIA
 0001

1985-06-28

Geagte Kollega

WET OP BINNELANDSE VEILIGHEID, 1982: ADVIESKOMITEE

Na oorweging van inligting rakende die bedrywighede van die ondergenoemde organisasies is ek van oordeel dat dié organisasies kragtens artikel 4(1) van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 (Wet 74 van 1982) tot onwettige organisasies verklaar behoort te word:

"United Democratic Front" (UDF)
 "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC)
 "Natal Indian Congress" (NIC)
 "South African Congress of Trade Unions" (SACTU),
 "South African Allied Workers Union" (SAAWU),
 "Azanian People's Organization" (AZAPO)
 "Azanian Students Organization" (AZASO)
 "Azanian Students Movement" (AZASM)

Dit sal waardeer word indien u ooreenkomstig die bepalings van artikel 7(2) van die Wet die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee om ondersoek na alle aangeleenthede met betrekking tot die bovermelde organisasies in te stel, by die Staatspresident wil aanbeveel.

Met vriendelike groete

L. Le Grange
 L LE GRANGE
 MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE

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UDF ←

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2/4/1/1(DDV/b)

Lêer No. File

DIREKTORAAT VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY LEGISLATION

DIE DIREKTEUR / THE DIRECTOR

MINISTER

AANSTELLING VAN ADVIESKOMITEE: "UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT" EN ANDER ORGANISASIES

MINISTERIE VAN WET EN ORDE
1985-08-06
MINISTRY OF LAW AND ORDER

VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING
09 03 1985
LEGISLATION

1. Die Minister het gedurende Maart 1985 aangedui dat 'n finale besluit in verband met die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee kragtens die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 (Wet 74 van 1982) ten opsigte van die ondergenoemde organisasies voorlopig oorgehou moes word:

- "United Democratic Front" (UDF) ←
- "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC)
- "Natal Indian Congress" (NIC)
- "South African Congress of Trade Unions" (SACTU)
- "South African Allied Workers Union" (SAAWU)
- "Azanian People's Organization" (AZAPO)
- "Azanian Students Organization" (AZASO)
- "Azanian Students Movement" (AZASM)

(A; B)

2.1 Tydens samesprekings tussen onder andere die Minister, Kompol en die Direkteur op 18 Julie 1985 het die Minister aangedui dat daar nou daadwerklike oorweging daaraan geskenk moet word om teen die UDF, geaffilieerde organisasies van die UDF en ander radikale organisasies wat 'n bedreiging vir die veiligheid van die Staat of die handhawing van wet en orde inhou, op te tree.

(C)

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DVC 6/1/85
RVD 15/8/85
RVD 15/8/85
DV 11/11/85
K. ...
... daarna in ...
... 10 dae ...
... 12/1/85 - hieraan ophou ...
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2.2 Die Minister het intussen aangedui dat daar in die alternatief ook oorweeg moet word of die UDF nie tot 'n geaffekteerde organisasie verklaar moet word nie.

2.3 Na aanleiding van die Minister se besluit, is Kompol versoek om inligting wat intussen met betrekking tot die organisasies in paragraaf 1 genoem, ter hand gekom het, asook volledige verslae ten opsigte van ander organisasies waarteen na sy oordeel opgetree behoort te word, voor te lê. Aanvullende inligting ten opsigte van die UDF, NIC, TIC en AZASO is nou van Kompol verkry en is in die omslae hieronder gepas gevlag, indien die Minister daarna wil verwys. Kompol is tans besig om die nodige stukke in die verband met betrekking tot die ander organisasies voor te berei. Weens die dringende aard van die aangeleentheid word hierdie memorandum egter nou reeds aan die Minister voorgelê.

3. Kompol is van mening dat indien daar teen die UDF opgetree word, dit kragtens artikel 4 van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 moet geskied en nie kragtens artikel 2 van die Wet op Geaffekteerde Organisasies, 1974 nie. Kompol meld ook dat twee senior advokate wat onderskeidelik die Pietermaritzburg- en Pretoria-hoogverraadsaak hanteer, van mening is dat optrede kragtens veiligheidswetgewing teen die UDF nie die betrokke sake sal benadeel nie.

4.1 Wat optrede kragtens artikel 2(1) van die Wet op Geaffekteerde Organisasies, 1974 betref, gaan ons met Kompol se siening akkoord dat optrede in die verband nie aangewese is nie. In dié verband kan gemeld word dat die nadele wat ten opsigte van die onwettigverklaring van die UDF sal geld, byvoorbeeld kritiek, ook in 'n groot mate ten opsigte van optrede kragtens die Wet op Geaffekteerde Organisasies, 1974 sal geld. Aan die ander kant sal die voordele wat uit laasgenoemde optrede mag voortspruit, onses insiens minimaal wees en daar word betwyfel of dit die UDF veel aan bande sal lê. Die probleem is ook dat om die optrede effektief te maak, die filiale van die UDF ook tot geaffekteerde organisasies verklaar sal moet word, anders kan hulle steeds geld namens die UDF vanuit die buiteland ontvang. Alhoewel dit op 'n misdad sou neerkom, kan dit op so 'n bedekte wyse gedoen word dat bewys daarvan moeilik sal wees.

4.2 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Raad van Kerke sal ook betrokke wees. Die Eloff-kommissie het egter reeds op die moontlikheid van optrede kragtens die Wet op Geaffekteerde Organisasies, 1974 teen die Suid-Afrikaanse Raad van Kerke (SARK) ingegaan en bevind dat so 'n stap nie aangewese is nie. In die lig van die Eloff-kommissie se aanbeveling, sal daar dus nou goeie argumente gevind moet word ten gunste van optrede ingevolge daardie Wet teen die SARK, voordat daar tot so 'n stap oorgegaan kan word. In die omstandighede is ons van mening dat optrede ingevolge daardie Wet nie die kool die sous werd sal wees nie.

5.1 Wat die onwettigverklaring van die UDF en ander organisasies in paragraaf 1 hierbo genoem, betref, is daar reeds in die memorandum hieronder, gevlag 'A', 'B' en 'C' aan die Minister uitgewys dat daar onses insiens voldoende gronde bestaan om daardie organisasies aan die ondersoek van 'n advieskomitee te onderwerp. Daar is egter in die memoranda verskeie aspekte uitgewys wat die besluit om 'n advieskomitee aan te stel, beïnvloed. Die onderskeie argumente geld steeds en word nie hier herhaal nie.

5.2 Dit is egter so dat die organisasies wat in paragraaf 1 genoem word en ander soortgelyke organisasies, intussen met hulle bedrywighede voortgaan en klaarblyklik in sommige gevalle veld wen. In die lig hiervan en aangesien daar onses insiens voldoende gronde bestaan om daardie organisasies aan die ondersoek van 'n advieskomitee te onderwerp, wil die Minister moontlik oorweeg om die Minister van Justisie nou te nader met die oog op die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee ten opsigte van daardie organisasies. 'n Konsepbrief in die verband aan die Minister van Justisie gerig, is derhalwe in die omslag gevlag 'A' vir die Minister se oorweging asseblief.

5.3 Toe die aanstelling van advieskomitees gedurende Maart 1985 oorweeg is, het die Minister die Minister van Mannekrag se kommentaar oor die wenslikheid van so 'n stap ten opsigte van SAAWU en SACTU verkry. Daardie Minister was van mening dat daar nie teen vakbondorganisasies as

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sodanig kragtens veiligheidswetgewing opgetree behoort te word nie, maar eerder teen individue wie se optrede 'n bedreiging vir landsveiligheid inhou. Daardie Minister het onder ander gemeld dat optrede teen SAAWU en SACTU stukrag aan die disinvesteringsveldtog in die VSA sal verleen. Optrede teen SAAWU en SACTU kan ook volgens daardie Minister tot spanning tussen die Regering en die private sektor lei. Die Minister het daarna teenoor die Minister van Mannekrag onderneem om enige optrede wat hy in dié verband oorweeg eers met hom uit te klaar en deur die inligtingsgemeenskap te laat oorweeg, alvorens hy finale stappe in die verband doen. (); () In die lig van die Minister se onderneming in die verband, word aanbeveel dat die konsepbrief in die omslag gevlag 'B' aan die Minister van Mannekrag gerig word, indien die Minister sou besluit om nou 'n advieskomtee ten opsigte van SAAWU en SACTU te laat aanstel.

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6. Voorleggings ten opsigte van ander organisasies wat moontlik ook betrokke mag wees, sal aan die Minister gemaak word, sodra sodanige organisasies deur die Polisie geïdentifiseer is en verslae oor hulle deur Kompol voorgelê word.

5/8/85
DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING
2-8-85


Paragraaf 4.2 GOEDGEKEUR/
Konsepbrief gevlag 'A' ONDERTEKEN/
Konsepbrief gevlag 'B' ONDERTEKEN/
Paragraaf 5.3 GOEDGEKEUR/

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L LE GRANGE
MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE
7/8/85

U ITERS GHELM
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DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

h Afskrif vir u inligting. U no 2/4/2 verwys.


ADMINISTRATIEWE SEKRETARIS



U ITERS GHELM
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Privaatsak X463
 PRETORIA
 0001

Minister H J Coetsee
 Minister van Justisie
 Privaatsak X276
 PRETORIA
 0001

1985-08-08

Geagte Kollega

WET OP BINNELANDSE VEILIGHEID, 1982: ADVIESKOMITEE

Na oorweging van inligting rakende die bedrywighede van die ondergenoemde organisasies is ek van oordeel dat dié organisasies kragtens artikel 4(1) van die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982 (Wet 74 van 1982) tot onwettige organisasies verklaar behoort te word:

- "United Democratic Front" (UDF)
- "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC)
- "Natal Indian Congress" (NIC)
- "South African Congress of Trade Unions" (SACTU),
- "South African Allied Workers Union" (SAAWU),
- "Azanian People's Organization" (AZAPO)
- "Azanian Students Organization" (AZASO)
- "Azanian Students Movement" (AZASM)

Dit sal waardeur word indien u ooreenkomstig die bepalings van artikel 7(2) van die Wet die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee om ondersoek na alle aangeleenthede met betrekking tot die bovermelde organisasies in te stel, by die Staatspresident wil aanbeveel.

Met vriendelike groete


L. Le Grange
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 MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE

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UITERS GEHEIM

DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING.

h Afskrif vir u inligting. U no 2/4/2 verwys.



ADMINISTRATIEWE SEKRETARIS



DECLASSIFIED
UITERS GEHEIM

MP 8/4

Privaatsak X463
PRETORIA
0001

1985-08-08

Minister P T C du Plessis
Minister van Mannekrag
Mannekraggebou
Schoemanstraat
PRETORIA
0001

Geagte Kollega

BEDRYWIGHEDE: "SOUTH AFRICAN CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS" (SACTU)
EN "SOUTH AFRICAN ALLIED WORKERS UNION" (SAAWU)

Met verdere verwysing na u brief van 6 Maart 1985 wens ek u mee te deel dat ek na oorweging van die inligting met betrekking tot die bedrywighede van bogenoemde organisasies en sekere ander organisasies van oordeel is dat daar nie langer weggekram kan word van die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee kragtens die Wet op Binnelandse Veiligheid, 1982, om die bedrywighede van die betrokke organisasies te ondersoek nie. Ek het gevolglik 'n versoek tot die Minister van Justisie gerig om by die Staatspresident die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee aan te beveel.

Indien 'n advieskomitee aangestel word, sal die feit van sodanige aanstelling moontlik nie dadelik bekend gemaak word nie. Ek sal u egter op die hoogte hou van enige besluite in dié verband.

Alhoewel ek nie die werksaamhede van die advieskomitee vooruit kan loop of aan hom kan voorskryf nie, kan daar aanvaar word dat u Departement ruim geleentheid gegun sal word om insette by die advieskomitee te lewer. Daarbenewens sal daar, afhangende van die advieskomitee se bevindings en aanbeveling, weer met u oorleg gepleeg word voordat enige besluit met betrekking tot die onwettigverklaring van bogemelde twee organisasies geneem word.

Met vriendelike groete

L. LE GRANGE

L LE GRANGE
MINISTER VAN WET EN ORDE

THE CHURCH'S ROLE IN A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The extent to which certain sections of the Christian Church are involved in revolutionary activities in South Africa is illustrated by the prominence given to two well-known churchmen at a funeral cum political rally held in Cradock, Cape, on July 20. They were Dr Allan Boesak and the Rev Beyers Naude, respectively senior vice president and general secretary of the South African Council of Churches. Dr Boesak is also president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches.

They spoke under the hammer and sickle of a huge flag of the Soviet Union, the country responsible for the death of millions of Christians. Other flags represented the African National Congress, a Marxist terrorist movement, a banner proclaimed the "South African Communist Party" and the Communist clenched fist salute was repeatedly given. The meeting was organised by a militant political organisation, the United Democratic Front, which, to support its claim to be an alternative government, set up a roadblock outside the Eastern Cape township where the funeral took place and would only allow in journalists and diplomatic personnel accredited by it.

Far from criticising these arrangements, Dr Boesak urged the intensifying of a UDF-inspired boycott of food purchased from white-owned supermarkets, even though those who have dared defy the boycott have been hacked to death and burned.

In order to understand more fully the extent of the political activism of churchmen and church related organisations, SIGNPOSTS reviews the recent activities of the South African Council of Churches in the light of the findings of the Eloff Commission of Inquiry into the SACC, which published its findings in February 1984.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

The Commission noted the SA Defence Force's fear that the SACC was conducting a campaign to encourage resistance to military service, induce churches to withdraw their chaplains and to discredit the SADF in the eyes of the community. The Commission also noted that the SACC appointed the Rev Rob Robertson to publicise conscientious objection, which it saw as a lever for a general rejection of the South African system, and to establish links with other groups promoting this issue.

The Commission found that the SACC was creating a climate of sympathy for terrorists and discrediting the SADF by representing it as an instrument of oppression identified exclusively with white interests. It feared that an appreciable escalation in the number of conscientious objectors could impair the SADF's capability of ensuring the safety of the Republic. *The Commission therefore concluded that by supporting conscientious objection to the extent it had noted, the SACC was acting in a manner inconsistent with the national interest.*

Far from heeding the warning given by the Commission, the South African Council of Churches has greatly stepped up its activities linked with conscientious objection.

Towards the end of 1983, even before the Commission's report was released, Mr Robertson issued a 172 page Resource

Manual for Counsellors of Conscientious Objectors. It was initially banned but the ban was lifted on appeal.

Shortly before, the End Conscription Campaign was launched in Durban. With its formation, the campaign in favour of conscientious objection took on a new form, but all the old elements were there – the demand for exemption from military service for all who objected on moral and ethical as well as religious grounds and the stress that the army was involved in an unjust war. At the end of 1984, the demand that the army be withdrawn from the townships was added.

Its well publicised activities culminated recently in a three day "Peace Festival" at the University of the Witwatersrand, which called for the withdrawal of troops from South West Africa and from the townships. Speakers included Bishop Desmond Tutu (former general secretary of the SACC), Dr Beyers Naude and Archbishop Denis Hurley, president of the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC). Cardinal Paul Arns, the Brazilian liberation theologian who is heavily involved in the politically activist basic communities, was also due to have addressed the gathering, but the government prevented his entry into the Republic.

The festival was publicised in a leaflet "The Call to End Conscription" which was issued by the SACBC and widely distributed in Catholic Churches. The leaflet included the following statements. "We live in a society in a state of civil

Soviet Flag Flies over SA Town

from page 1

Alarmed by falling sales, businessmen have begun negotiating with the intimidation leaders. Part of the negotiation process involves passing on to the authority lists of demands, which, of course, include the removal of the police and army units from the townships.

These events coincide perfectly with ten steps into which some strategists divide the process whereby a non-Marxist government is replaced by a Marxist one. Step 8 is the collapse of central government control over significant areas of the country. In step 9, the insurgents set up their own administration in those areas. Step 10 is the collapse of the central government.

Although the businessmen are probably unaware of it, by negotiating with the intimidators, they are recognising them as the de facto government of the townships and are helping them move from step 8 to 9. They are laying the foundations for the setting up of a permanent Azania.

...that the SACC was assuring terrorists that their ... was well nigh justified, that if they were caught it would ... their defence and, if convicted, it would provide for their ... and get them bursary facilities.

The Commission concluded that the SACC could cause considerable harm if it continued to display sympathy for terrorist organisations and perpetrators of violence, if it continued to hold the ANC up as being a respectable organisation, and if at any time and place it associated with the ANC and its representatives.

Despite this very strong, clear warning, the South African Council of Churches has done nothing to reduce its sympathy for the ANC and those involved in acts of terror.

This is demonstrated by the great display of solidarity given by the SACC and its senior clergymen to COSAS (Congress of South African Students - a UDF affiliate) militants who were killed by prematurely exploding hand grenades which they intended throwing at homes of black policemen. Within 36 hours of their deaths, the SACC suspended their national conference to allow more than 100 delegates led by SACC president Bishop Manas Buthelezi and Dr Beyers Naude to attend a memorial service in Duduza for the militants. Bishop Buthelezi said, "We share the belief of the people of Duduza that the violence perpetrated there came from the side of the authorities."

The show of solidarity continued when Bishop Tutu and other senior clergymen attended their funerals at KwaThema and Duduza. Although two men accused by the mob of being informers were saved from being burned alive by the clerics, they did nothing to prevent the funerals being turned into political rallies where ANC flags were flown, praises sung to ANC leaders and those who attacked the homes of the police are exalted as martyrs of the liberation struggle whose heroism is held up as an inspiration to the youth and a model to be followed. Moderate leaders like Gatsha Buthelezi are equated with "those who killed our comrades". Neither are to be forgiven.

Far from distancing themselves from this revolutionary emotionalism, the clerics present themselves as "your leaders". Anglican Bishop Simeon Nkoane urged the youths not to run from the police because "their guns cannot kill the spirit of freedom we are looking forward to. If they shoot you, they must shoot you in the forehead and not in the back running away." Bishop Tutu told them they must fight for their freedom and denegated the authorities, "We know that the people in authority in Cape Town tell lies."

There was no appeal for the end of violence, no criticism of the attacks on the homes of police and councillors, no word of sympathy for the police, no suggestion that the dead were responsible for their own deaths, no reminder of the words of Jesus that "those who live by the sword will die by the sword."

Is it surprising that after one of the funerals, the home of the mayor of KwaThema, Father Joe Mzamane, also an Anglican priest but one identified with the "system", was attacked? Police guarding the house were forced to open fire and two of the attackers were killed. Another seven rioters were killed when

First, and most important of all, **FIX YOUR EYES ON THE LORD**. Do not be overcome with fear. Put your complete trust in Him who said, "I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." (Mt 28:20). Claim the promise, "Therefore will we not fear, though the earth be removed and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea." (Ps 46:2).

Secondly, get to know the Word of God. Remember Jesus said, "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away" (Mt 24:35). Perhaps a good place to start would be to get hold of a concordance and go carefully through all the passages containing the words, "Fear not".

Thirdly, pray daily for all in authority that peace may be re-established in our country so that the Word of God can continue to be freely proclaimed. Use I Tim 2:1-4 as the basis for your prayer, "I exhort, therefore, that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men; for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth."

Fourthly, write to the **State President, Private Bag X80, Pretoria 0001**, urging him to stop the revolutionary violence which is sweeping the black townships and spilling over into other areas in the form of boycotts and strikes. Remind him that a Marxist takeover was only prevented in the early 1960's because the organisations responsible for the violence (the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress) were banned and all their militants were imprisoned. Tell him that only similar action will end the present violence. Urge him to take whatever action necessary, even if he has to resort to martial law.

Point out that unless the killings are stopped within the next few weeks, by, say, September 1, **it will be impossible to prevent the destruction of the way of life South Africans have known since the beginning of this century, which has brought material, social and political improvements to people of all races. By then the slide towards a Marxist orientated government will be irreversible**, which will bring to all the people of our country, poverty, starvation and death, as has happened in the Soviet Union,

they petrol-bombed the home of a policeman. Thus further opportunities to whip up emotion at political funerals were created.

A week after the SA Defence Force raid on ANC installations in Gaborone, Bishop Tutu preached at a memorial service held

where brother is called to fight brother." "Young men are conscripted to assist in the implementation and defence of apartheid policies." "We also encourage Catholics to help promote peace by working for an end to conscription in whatever ways lie open to them." The Catholic Church is an observer member of the SACC.

The role of army chaplains was a major and divisive issue at the Synod of the Church of the Province of South Africa held in Pietermaritzburg early in July. A motion providing for the removal of the chaplains from the control of the army and making them responsible to local bishops, among other things, was passed. However, it became clear that the Anglican Bishop of Namibia, the Rt Rev James Kauluma, a vocal supporter of Swapo, would not "licence" chaplains to a "foreign army in Namibia", which would have resulted in the withdrawal of Anglican chaplains from the operational area. Lay members of the synod, many of whom had sons and other relatives serving as national servicemen, therefore rejected an attempt to change the church's canon law. However, the synod did approve a resolution calling for the demilitarisation of the chaplaincy, including an end to chaplains wearing uniforms or carrying guns. The resolution also gave bishops discretion to place chaplains under the bishop of the diocese where they were working. This could ultimately place them under Bishop Kauluma.

It is unlikely that the army will accept these conditions and some of the Anglican chaplains are reported to be considering resigning. It is also unclear how the church, which is already facing a declining income, will find the money to pay and house its chaplains, costs previously borne by the army. If the conditions are unacceptable to the army, young Anglican conscripts in the operational area may be left without spiritual ministrations, unless they turn to chaplains of other churches. The synod also gave its general support to the End Conscription Campaign.

Anglican attempts to remove chaplains from army control are likely to be repeated soon in other SACC member churches, notably the Methodist and Roman Catholic churches.

2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Noting Bishop Tutu's statement about disobeying laws on a massive scale to make the country ungovernable, the Commission commented that, having accepted the principle of civil disobedience and established the moral justification for disobeying laws deemed unjust, the SACC had become fully involved in a campaign of civil disobedience. It also drew attention to the "clarion call" issued by Dr Allan Boesak at the 1979 SACC conference. He saw the church as "a vehicle of the expression of the legitimate aspiration of the black people" and urged it to "initiate and support programmes of civil disobedience on a massive scale to actively defy the apartheid laws". The Commission quoted Dr W Kistner, the mastermind behind the SACC, as seeing a wave of strikes and school boycotts in 1980 as a consequence of his organisation's efforts to promote civil disobedience. He admitted that such acts could lead to prosecution, violence and bloodshed.

The Commission warned that this was dangerous thinking and that civil disobedience was a very dangerous operation which could easily lead to incalculable harm. It advised the

SACC to change course and to preach steadfastly against violence.

Far from accepting the Commission's advice, the South African Council of Churches has continued to issue statements justifying the present politically motivated violence as an understandable reaction to the structural violence and oppression of the South African system.



Dr Beyers Naudé pledged the support of the South African Council of Churches for the liberation struggle.

The campaign of civil disobedience climaxed at the end of May when, at a press conference, Dr Allan Boesak, senior vice president of the SACC, and Prof Charles Villa-Vicencio called for the downfall of the South African government and presented a controversial booklet issued by the Western Province Council of Churches in response to a call by the SACC's executive council. It included the prayer that "God will replace the present structures of oppression with ones that are just, and remove from power those who persist in defying His laws, installing in their place leaders who will govern with justice and mercy." The SACC's expanded presidium subsequently confirmed its call for prayer for the end of unjust rule while Dr Boesak reiterated his belief that the SACC had called for the downfall of the government.

Later at the SACC National Conference, Bishop Tutu's successor as general secretary, the Rev Beyers Naude, called on the Christian community relating to the SACC to initiate and support "more meaningful and effective non violent actions including a well planned action of civil disobedience."

3. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The Commission dwelt at length on the long history of contacts between the SACC and the African National Congress. It noted Bishop Tutu's public statements designed to bolster the image of the ANC and give it respectability, and the extensive provision of funds for the legal defence of persons, many of whom were ANC terrorists, charged with violent "political" crimes. It

IMMEDIATELY

Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique and every other country where Marxists have come to power. Urge him to resist all pressure to release Nelson Mandela, the Marxist leader of the African National Congress, convicted on charges of high treason. His release will accelerate the revolutionary process.

It is imperative that hundreds of letters be sent to the State President NOW in order to strengthen his hand to stop the anarchy which is sweeping the country.

Similar letters should be sent to:

Mr Louis le Grange
Minister of Law & Order
Private Bag X463
0001 Pretoria

Gen Magnus Malan
Minister of Defence
Private Bag X427
0001 Pretoria

Gen Constand Viljoen
Chief of the Defence Force
Defence Headquarters
Potgieter Street
0002 Pretoria

Gen Johan Coetzee
Commissioner of Police
Private Bag X94
0001 Pretoria



and to the member of parliament in your area.

Although the state of emergency has been declared in certain areas, it has not stopped the violence. Security force patrols are still being attacked and off-duty black policemen murdered. The black people we are in contact with are desperate for normality to be restored in the townships and for the elected community councils to resume their functions.

IGNPOST reader, please take action NOW!
Tomorrow may be too late!

Edward Cain

the Regina Mundi Church, Soweto, for the 12 people, mainly ANC activists, killed in the raid.

According to press reports, immediately following an interview with Bishop Tutu, French Premier Laurent Fabius ordered the upgrading of the bureaux of both the ANC and Swapo in Paris.

The Commission noted that the SACC's marked involvement in political affairs was demonstrated by the fact that the council made Khotso House available for the foundation meeting of the United Democratic Front's Transvaal Branch and that Bishop Tutu and another SACC official, Mr Tom Manthata, took part in the establishment of the National Forum and that both, together with SACC president, Bishop Manas Buthelezi, were appointed to its National Forum Committee. The Witwatersrand Council of Churches is a member of the Transvaal UDF.

The State President has described the United Democratic Front, as acting as the internal wing of both the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. Despite this warning and the violence in the townships directed against the community councillors and police, violence which has often been linked with the UDF, the NF and their affiliates,

Dr Allan Boesak blamed the authorities for the deaths of political militants, but failed to mention the burning of elected councillors by mobs.

neither SACC nor its officials have severed their ties with these organisations, condemned the violence against law-abiding citizens or expressed sympathy with them.

It should also be noted that, echoing Bishop Tutu's statement, the ANC claims that making South Africa "ungovernable" falls within strategy.

4. DISINVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

After examining at length the position of the SACC on disinvestment, the Commission concluded it promoted disinvestment. It had abundant evidence to show that Bishop Tutu was indefatigable in his efforts to get the international community to bring pressure on South Africa to effect fundamental change. Because disinvestment could lead to a slackening of economic output and unemployment, *the Commission warned that the*

WANTED: A MORATORIUM ON SYNODS

ly's Anglican Synod, following hard on the heels of Bishop Tutu's appointment to Johannesburg, has reduced the Church in the Province of Southern Africa to an all-time-low. The synod's overtly political character and its savage onslaught on military chaplains has proved, for many Anglicans, the last straw.

With broken hearts a sizeable number of lifelong Anglicans have gone, and the loss to the Church is vastly more than their money. Others are quietly slipping away – some to no church at all. It is not plain that the hierarchy cares.

What are the rest of us to do?

First, we must commit the Church and its leaders in prayer to the Church's Lord.

Prayer, however, does not absolve us from the obligation of practical action. We cannot acquiesce in a policy which turns the Gospel of salvation into crypto-Marxism and activist liberation theology."

In the Anglican Church in South Africa the technique by which historic Christianity is transformed into a political ideology is simple. It is the synodical process. True synods are virtually a thing of the past. Contemporary practice is based on the belief that if you get enough people together and manipulate them on prescribed lines they will ultimately succumb to the new false teaching – and propagate it. The trick is based on the assemblies, conferences and consultations of the World Council of Churches, and it works. Faith in the immutability of the Gospel is eroded, and the way is cleared for disguised Marxism and the promotion of revolution.

The remedy is therefore straightforward. We need a moratorium on synods. The bishops and clergy should be firmly directed back to their Bibles, their dioceses, their parishes and their work. The infiltrators will then be denied their main field of activity. The Church will be free to get on with its job.

SERVANTS

Scriptures makes it plain that the bishop and clergy are the servants of the people of God, not their masters. The Anglican Church divided from Rome on this very point. It is now the duty of the laity to take up and exercise their responsibility. No synod can be held without the financial support of the faithful, who should make it clear that moneys will not be forthcoming for these time-wasting and subversive extravaganzas. The donor laity should assume control of the funds which they supply, insisting that they are used for clergy stipends and strictly religious work.

A first step would be for the laity to require a full accounting of the use made of all diocesan and provincial funds (including those used on synods and church meetings, or sent to the South African Council of Churches). A second would be the temporary freezing at their present level of assessments paid to the dioceses. Obviously, stronger pressures are available if the message is not heard.

The sanction that must not be used is absence from worship, unless the worship itself is politicised. That is the time for vocal protest.

Father Arthur Lewis

ANGLICAN PROTEST ORGANISATION FORMED

The widespread dissatisfaction within the Anglican Church has crystallised into a movement protesting against the political line being followed by the church.

Anglicans Concerned for Truth and Spirituality (ACTS) was formed in Pretoria on July 24th by a group of lay people from various parts of the Transvaal.

The dissatisfaction long stirring in the Church of the Province of South Africa was greatly intensified by the controversial decision to appoint Bishop Desmond Tutu to the Johannesburg diocese and reached a climax over recent synod decisions to remove their chaplains from the control of the army.

Speaking for ACTS, Mrs Beryl Mentz urged all Anglicans "to write to Archbishop Russell, their bishops and local priests, asking them to ensure that nothing is done to interfere with the essential functions of the chaplains."

She stresses that "our purpose is not to bring division in the church but to return to spirituality for all."

ACTS is dedicated to the maintenance and furtherance of the Gospel as enshrined in the Scriptures and universal creeds and received by the Anglican Church in the South African Prayer Book.

It opposes the recent change in the message of the church from a spiritual one dealing with man's relationship with God to a political one. It also opposes attempts from within the church to undermine the faith of Christians serving in the security forces.

ACTS appeals to all Anglicans, present and past, who share its concerns to contact it for more information. Write to:

Anglicans Concerned for Truth and Spirituality
P O Box 23205
0031 Innesdale


In a related development, four clergymen and 150 lay members opposed to chaplains being separated from the Defence Forces, protested to Archbishop Russell following a meeting held in Natal.

HOW MARXISTS OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS

Marxist guerilla warfare is conducted on two levels. The first is the visible armed offensive using bombs, sabotage and assassinations. The second is invisible and probably more important. It consists of spiritual factors like strengthening the morale of the insurgents by convincing them of the justness of their cause and the inevitability of ultimate victory. Aware of this, the Soviets maintain control of their East European satellites by constantly stressing that no uprising could possibly succeed against their military might.

Conversely it is vital to sap the spiritual forces of the enemy, the target government, by portraying their struggle as unjust and unwinnable. The battle is fought in the hearts and minds of three groups, the insurgents, the defenders and the vast bulk of the people who are uncommitted and must be swayed to support one or other of the fighting groups.

All these factors are present in South Africa at this time with



SIGNPOSTS is a periodical to inform Christians of all denominations of the threat posed to their faith by the infiltration of marxist-based ideas under the guise of new interpretations of the Gospel.

SIGNPOSTS adheres to the conservative Biblical understanding of the faith as traditionally held by Christians.

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churchmen and the media playing an important role by constantly repeating statements like, "God is the God of liberation and He is on our side." "Our liberation is coming and nothing can stop it." The government is consistently portrayed as unrepresentative, unjust and oppressive. Echoing Mao Tse-tung's call "to build a new China of freedom and equality", the public is bombarded with calls for a new, just and free South Africa. While excusing the African National Congress' use of terror as an understandable reaction to the oppression of the government, ANC leaders are portrayed as the authentic representatives of the people, high minded Christian gentlemen striving for a democratic South Africa. The horrific murders of political opponents, such as the burning of "informers" which has now become a feature of political funerals, are overlooked.

Conversely any deaths at the hands of the security forces, even in self-defence, are magnified and presented as typical of the barbarities committed by them. They are portrayed as oppressive and involved in an unjust war. All the publicity given to conscientious objectors, end conscription and the withdrawal of the chaplains, plays its role in undermining the morale of the people and especially the security forces.

The classic example of the undermining of a people's will to resist was the spiritual defeat of the United States in Vietnam. Although the Americans won the war militarily, the North Vietnamese communists inflicted such a psychological and political defeat on them that they withdrew allowing the communists to over-run the country.

Having undermined the morale of the government forces, the insurgents' next objective is to create a climate of political and economic collapse in the country. By giving wide publicity to a serious, even though small, insurgency which the government is unable to control, a feeling of instability is engendered among the population, especially the business community, overseas investors, the established political leadership and foreign governments.

This is followed by exerting tremendous pressure on the government to negotiate with the insurgents who are described as the "authentic leaders" of a significant sector of the community. But as Sir Robert Thompson, the British counter-insurgency specialist, points out any negotiations favour the insurgents. "The mere opening of negotiations favour the possibility as it does of a prospect of peace, automatically reduces the will of the defence to continue fighting."

Calls in South Africa for the release of Nelson Mandela, negotiations with the "authentic leaders of the people," and a national convention must be seen in this light.

SIGNPOSTS is published by Signpost Publications and Research Centre, P.O. Box 26148, Arcadia 0007, South Africa (Tel. 012 - 98-2680) and all correspondence should be sent to this address.

DECLASSIFIED

DDV V/A 7/8/85
2/8/85

Nota

15/8/85

→ UDF leer

Minister skabel op 31 Julie 1985 om 18h00

Ura dat hy geadresseer word toe optrede
→ ten UDF en [redacted]. Deel Minister mee

dat t.o.v U.D.F ons reeds in skrywe in die
verband van Poline gerig is enbel doe gelede
waan ons na die sameprekings op 19 Julie 1985
met Minister veruys en verdre inlygty toe
verskeie organisasies aanwa. Ons wag nog op
antwoord. Ek onderneem om met Poline te besprek
ten einde te bespoedig Minister wa dat ook geky
word of UDF tot Geaffekteerde Org verblow behoort te w

Op 1 Augustus 1985. Sameprekings met Brig.
[redacted]. Dra Minister te versiek oor. Hy sa
ons so goue doentid van inlygtyg voorreien. Hulle wel
reeds doaraan. Sal ook aardog van [redacted]-ge
gee. Ten verblary van UDF tot Geaffekteerde Organs
is hy van voordeel dat liep nei onwettighele
gebyk moet word.

Minister skabel op 1 Augustus 1985. Deel mee dat
drek t.o.v optrede teen UDF groot is. Ons moet
doadwerkelid bespoedig en voorlegging van han doe
Hy sal met Vampal praat oor verbelkyg wa
inlygtyg van ons en of daar vertraging is.

1 Augustus 1985 om 15h00 sameprekings met
Minister en Vampal. Ek lig han in
aangrade geskiedenis ten opsigte van menwanda
ens wat reeds toe UDF voorberei is en
die verloop daarvan. Daar was nie enige

DECLASSIFIED

Be
13/8

ostrygery nie. Lig hom ook in vergaarde
statistiek t.o.v. aanhoudings/inpakkings.

Sedert 1 Augustus 1984. is 51 verslae van
Kontrole ariery vir aanhouding/inpakking van persone
Tou van 17 van die gevalle het Kontrole later die
verslae teruggegee. In 30 gevalle is aanhoudingsreine
gevoeg deur die Minister antwdele en t.o.v. 1
geval is inpakkingsreine gevoeg. 3 gevalle is nog
hangende. Minister meld dat in huidige
omstandighede moet weer inpakkings ooreweg word.

Hy roem veel die geval van [redacted]
t.o.v. wie ook mense hom verhoor het dat daar nie
aan hom opgetree word nie. Ook die geval
van [redacted] moet dringend aandag kry. Na
die UDF, AZAPO en ander organisasies of
geassosieerde organisasies van die Hooforganisasies
moet sake gelyk word. Genl [redacted] ordenen
om van Polisiebat die nodige te laat doen
en voorstelle aan die Direkteur te maak.

Op 2 Augustus 1985 07h30 lig Brig [redacted]
in t.o.v. rassensake. Inligting sal so spoedig
moontlik verskaf word. T.o.v. UDF hoopelik
vandag nog.


Om 09h15 skakel maj [redacted] van SAP (V/T). Hy
deel my mee dat va aanleiding met
my gespreek gester met Brig [redacted]
hy besig is om voorlegging aan ons
oor [redacted] te doen. Hulle kontroleer ten
seker toespake van hom met die betrokke
dokumente van die toespake. Daar is ook nog

video wat voorgeen word. Hy ondeneem an
voorlegging vroeg valgende week aan ons deur
te stuur.

Om 11h00 skakel Brig [REDACTED] my.
Hy deel mee dat hulle op hul Vrydag-beroen
vinnigste optrede ten UDF blysoek het en
ook ten Swartwagorganisasie soos AZAPO.
Hulle gevoel is dat as ten die Swartwagorganisasie
gelyktydig opgetree word as die UDF-organisasie
dit die breidings tussenspalt tussen die
twee groepe mag vermetig en hulle in een
breed veld. Dit was nie gewens was nie
sig aan in dat die aspek ook gister by
die Minister groeper is. Die Minister voel dat
daarval die organisasie gekop moet word

Paul
2/1/85

SAHA



Handwritten initials and date: HDV, DDV, 21/8/85

P/sak-P/Bag X302 Tel. adr.-add. "KOMPOL"

Verw./Ref.: [REDACTED]
Navrae/Enq.: [REDACTED]
TEL.: 214511 x 317

VEILIGHEIDSTAK
SECURITY BRANCH
HOOFKANTOOR
HEAD OFFICE
PRETORIA
0001

1985-08-02

Die Direkteur
Veiligheidswetgewing
Privaatsak X655
PRETORIA
0001

ONWETTIGVERKLARING VAN DIE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)

1. Hierdie kantoor se skrywe met bylaes gedateer 1984-10-18, 1985-04-30 en 1985-05-14 in hierdie verband het betrekking.
2. Uit uiters delikate maar betroubare bronne blyk dit dat die bedrae soos aangedui vanuit die buiteland op die UDF se bankrekening gedeponeer is:

1984-12-27 : Arbeids Instituut Solidariteitsfonds
Swede : R241 008 58

1985-02-12 : Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Washington : R3 350-00.

3. Dit blyk uit 'n ander bron en uit dokumente [REDACTED] dat die begroting van die UDF vir die 1985 boekjaar R1 130 000-00 beloop.

Uit dieselfde stukke blyk dit ook dat die Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) reeds R900 000-00 aan die UDF bewillig het en is daar ook 'n finansieringskontrak met die staatsgesteunde Netherlands Organisation for International Development Co-operation (NOVIB) wat 'n bedrag van R190 000-00 beloop.

Verder blyk dit uit dieselfde dokumente dat die UDF vir die 1984 boekjaar bykans R1 000 000-00 uit eie geleedere bekom het.

4. Gesien in die lig van paragraaf 2 en 3 supra en die moeilike en delikate wyse waarop gegewens bekom word is dit duidelik nie die volledige beeld van fondse wat deur die UDF verkry word nie.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5. [REDACTED]
6. Ten opsigte van die vraag of die UDF as 'n geaffekteerde of onwettige organisasie verklaar moet word is hierdie departement van oordeel dat die UDF 'n onwettige organisasie verklaar moet word met terugwerkende krag vanaf 1983-01-23 omdat:
- die gemelde datum die eerste was waarop die gedagte aan 'n UDF te voorskyn kom.
 - dit die instel van regstappe ten opsigte van indiening van dokumente vereenvoudig;
 - die houvas van die UDF op die massas onmiddellik verbreek sal word,
 - die beheer oor buitelandse befondsing verbeter word omdat fondse dan nie deur middel van filiale bekom kan word nie
 - die staat in geheel gesien 'n beter houvas op bedrywighede sal hê. //
- Verder is dit ook onwenslik om die UDF 'n geaffekteerde organisasie te verklaar omdat dit nie gewenste uitwerking sal hê nie, waarvan NUSAS 'n sprekende voorbeeld is.
7. Dit dien verder gemeld te word dat verdere dokumentasie of gesertifiseerde afdrucke daarvan en wat as bewysstukke in die Pietermaritzburg Hoogverraadsaak dien tans afgewag en moontlik reeds op 1985-08-05 met u kantoor bevorder sal word.
8. Uit onderhoude met die twee senior advokate wat onderskeidelik die Pietermaritzburg en Pretoria Hoogverraad sake behartig, het beide aangedui dat hulle van oordeel is dat enige optrede in die verband nie die betrokke sake sal benadeel nie.

[REDACTED]
n/KOMMISSARIS : SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIE
[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

→ 2/4/1/1

2/4/2(DDV/b)
Breyl

1985-07-25

211043/4

Die Kommissaris van die
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie
Privaatsak X302
PRETORIA
0001

OORWEGING VAN DIE AANSTELLING VAN ADVIESKOMITEES: UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT EN ANDER ORGANISASIES

1. Soos u weet, het die Minister gedurende Maart 1985 aangedui dat finale besluit in verband met die aanstelling van 'n advieskomitee te opsigte van die ondergenoemde organisasies, voorlopig oorgehou moes word.

- "United Democratic Front" (UDF),
- "Transvaal Indian Congress" (TIC),
- "Natal Indian Congress" (NIC),
- "South African Congress of Trade Unions" (SACTU),
- "South African Allied Workers Union" (SAAWU),
- "Azanian People's Organization" (AZAPO)
- "Azanian Students Organization" (AZASO)
- "Azanian Students Movement" (AZASM)

2. Tydens samesprekings tussen die Minister, generaal Coetzee, and senior polisieoffisiere en myself op 18 Julie 1985, het die Minister aangedui dat daar nou weer daadwerklike oorweging daaraan geskenk mo word om teen die UDF, geaffilieerde organisasies van die UDF en ande radikale organisasies wat 'n bedreiging vir die veiligheid van die Staat of die handhawing van wet en orde inhou, op te tree.

3. Dit sal derhalwe waardeer word indien enige inligting wat intussen met betrekking tot die organisasies wat in paragraaf 1 hier genoem word, ter hand gekom het, asook volledige verslae ten opsigte van ander organisasies waarteen na u oordeel opgetree behoort te wor voorgelê kan word.

A. A. 90351

DIREKTEUR VAN VEILIGHEIDSWETGEWING

14.8.85

DECLASSIFIED

1/3 - Breyl
19/8/85

1. RELATIONS WITH THE COMMERCIAL MEDIA.

Bill 29/1/85

DRV 1/29/85
DDV 25/7/85
ADV 25/7/85
VIA 26/7/85
VIB 2/1/85
VIC 2/1/85
VID 2/1/85
to insal
② Tembora DRX
art
25/7/85

1. What are the commercial media?

This section of the workshop deals with relations between progressive organisations and the commercial media. The questions we are addressing are:

- what should this relationship be?, and
- how should we practically go about establishing the kind of relationship we think it is best to have?

Before we can begin to answer such questions, though, we must be clear on what exactly the commercial (particularly the liberal) media and its major characteristics are.

(i) First, when we talk about the local commercial media here we are referring mainly to the English-language mass media which are privately owned by companies such as SAAN and Argus. At an international level we are referring to the international newsagencies e.g. Reuters, or foreign press and broadcasting services, mainly European, British or American e.g. BBC. We are concentrating mainly on the local and national newspapers here, but some of the things that we cover (e.g. interviewing) may be relevant for radio and T.V.. It is clear, though, that the issue of relations with the state-owned media, specifically the SABC, raises several political questions which we do not go into in these notes. Hereafter we will refer to the English-language commercial press as the E.C.P..

It is also important to stress that although the E.C.P. does form a category of media, not all the newspapers that make it up are exactly the same e.g. there are important differences between the Evening Post, the E.P. Herald and City Press and their respective approaches to news. We should try and have an understanding of these if we are to use the E.C.P. most successfully to our advantage (see section II for more detail here)

(ii) Second, there are some important things to note about the E.C.P..

Three of these are:

(a) Its mass nature. The E.C.P. consistently reaches a very wide audience, in the townships as much as in the white areas, every day. So although the E.C.P. is owned by big companies the news has to tell the mass of ordinary people things about their own lives which are meaningful to them, and not only to the bosses. This, and particularly the fact that the

majority of readers are black makes it possible for us to use the E.C.P. to our advantage in various ways. It also makes it important for us to become involved at this level as the enemy will very easily take advantage of this even if we don't.

(b) Its liberal nature. What we mean by this is that because it claims to be liberal and neutral, the E.C.P. allows for the presentation of different viewpoints in and through it. Thus the E.C.P. will often quote the UDF or PEBCO etc. on issues (e.g. P.E. stayaway) whereas the Afrikaans press or the SABC will not. We can often use this fact to the advantage of our struggle.

(c) The E.C.P. is seen and respected as an important source of opinion among the authorities and the "establishment". It can thus sometimes form a significant pressure on the rulers of South Africa and their economic, political and bureaucratic representatives.

2. How can we use the E.C.P. to our advantage

It is clear, then, that it is both possible and important for our organisation to have relations with the E.C.P. and to use these relations to our advantage. Obviously, though, this does not just happen automatically. We need to organise these relations in our favour. This means that we must understand the E.C.P. and the potential and possible dangers of the role that it can play, and we must be committed to developing these relations in the best possible way.

There at least three areas in which progressive organisations can use the E.C.P. :

(a) To give your organisation and/or the progressive views of your organisation a public profile and present in a favourable light. The UDF nationally has been particularly good in using the E.C.P. in this way.

(b) To advertise particular events e.g. mass meetings, and to create an atmosphere around political events or issues e.g. stayaway.

(c) As a form of pressure on the government or any other opponent of the progressive movement and its democratic organisations. This involves using the E.C.P. to air your views on a political event or issue e.g. GWU used the press effectively in this way during the 1982 dockworkers strike. Using the E.C.P. around the Uitenhage Massacre issue would be another example here. The international media are particularly important in this respect.

IV. THE COMMERCIAL PRESS: SIMULATION GAME

Scenario

It is Sunday morning, June 26, 1985. A funeral is being held in the P.E. townships for two people killed by police during recent "unrest". While a group of mourners, which includes members of your organisation, is proceeding from the church towards the graveyard where the bodies are to be buried they are fired on by police/army. At least 15 people are killed immediately, and at least a further 25 are injured.

This is the situation which faces your organisation - a prominent youth/student/community/worker organisation in P.E.. How are you going to respond at a publicity level? Some suggestions are set out in the sequence below.

Day One

- (i) Find out exactly what happened (see attached for guide here)
- (ii) Draw up press statement (under pressure from reporters who are constantly phoning you for details. You have to move quickly to get your version of the incident + your views on it to the journalist before the copy deadline.)
- (iii) Get eyewitnesses to phone through to the newspapers with the story. How can your organisation support these people?
- (iv) Face difficult questions from a conservative journalist who has heard other accounts of the incident.

Day Two

- (i) Respond to police statement (see attached sheet) which has been published in the morning newspaper.
- (ii) Get public responses from other organisations e.g. UDF on the incident.
- (iii) Details of further "unrest" and police brutality come in. How are you going to use these?

Day Three

Call a press conference around the incident. Possible issues to raise here:

- (i) the incident itself
 - (ii) discrepancies between your version and that given by the police
 - (iii) your organisation's strategy in response to the incident
 - (iv) general political repercussions
 - (v) the situation in the townships at the moment
- etc. etc.

Day Four

Send a delegation to the editor of the Herald to express concern at the way in which the newspaper is handling the issue/your organisation.

PA2 11/7

Addendum to commercial press simulation game - "Things to find out!"

For the purposes of the game the questions to be investigated here are clearly those which the newspaper will require information about. Broadly, these are covered by the "who, what, where, when, how" formula. More specifically the kinds of details to look for in this case would be:

- where and when exactly did the shooting occur?
 - size and mood of the crowd: who exactly was involved, how were they proceeding and so on?
 - how did the shooting start? What kind of ammunition was used? How many police and police vehicles (SADF?) were present?
 - details of killed and wounded i.e. numbers, names, ages, addresses, severity of wounds etc.
 - what happened afterwards (in the hospitals etc.)?
- and so on.

SAHA



UDF leër X

SUID-AFRIKAANSE UITSAAIKORPORASIE

Uitsaaisentrum, W/ Annetweg en Canarystraat, Johannesburg 2001
Postbus 2808, Johannesburg 2008. Telefoon 714-3321

Kommentaar: "Die roede teen Politieke Aktiwisme".

Datum: 25.4.85.

Die aankondiging deur die United Democratic Front dat hy massabetrogings sal organiseer teen die Nieu-Seelandse rugbytoer (met 'n waarskuwing deur sy leierskap dat dit kan uitloop op geweld) was 'n duidelike verskerping van die organisasie se aktivistiese rol in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek. Die besliste versekering wat nou gegee is dat sodanige optrede nie toegelaat sal word nie, is dus 'n noodsaaklike reaksie van die Staat op 'n uitdaging wat reeds die perke oorskry het van wat geduld kan word in 'n samelewing wat demokratiese ideale nastreef.

Die UDF se bestuur het sy waarskuwing tot die wêreld gerig op die onlangse kongres waarop hy besluit het om te begin met wat genoem is 'n "nuwe fase" in sy bedrywighede. Daar is berigte dat hy juis nou besig is om met Nieu-Seelandse ekstremistegroepe saam te werk in aanvalle op rugbyklubs, wat beslis nie tot vreedsame protes beperk is nie. Dié sogenaamde "nuwe fase" moet summier gestuit word - beslis ter wille van die toer, maar ook ter wille van die voortbestaan van die stemme van gematigheid en versoening wat uit Swart geledere opgaan.

Dat die endemiese onrus in sommige van Suid-Afrika se Swart stedelike gebiede gekenmerk word deur die sistematiese uitbuiting van gemeenskapsgriewe, word deesdae net deur die uiterste randeiers van die linksgesinde politiek ontken. Vanselfsprekend is daar regmatige griewe. En die ontevredenheid wat dit veroorsaak word veral deur jongmense skerp ervaar, wat die eerste geslag Swartmense is wat as massa tot hoërskoolvlak en selfs hoër opvoedkundige peile vorder. Terselfdertyd word dié griewe nie net uitdruklik erken nie, maar word besliste programme aangepak om die oorsake uit die weg te ruim. Die afgesaagde beskuldiging dat die situasie van die Swartmense oor die jare agteruitgegaan het, is soos mnr Harry Oppenheimer verlede week gesê het, bewysbaar onjuis. Om dié verlies te laat vlytleef is net in belang van diegene wie se belangen onderaan die voet word deur vreedsame, evolutionêre vooruitgang.

Daardie faksie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Swart politiek wat onderhandeling teenstaan as middel ter oplossing van politieke verskille, word die duidelikste verteenwoordig in die leierskap van die UDF. Hy maak geen geheim van sy doelstelling om sy dogma van nie-samewerking deur die hele Swart stedelike gemeenskap te versprei nie - 'n proses wat gepaard gaan met geweldpleging waarvan die aard en wreedheid byna daagliks uit berigte in die media blyk. Die politieke doel is duidelik. UDF-leiers sê hulle sal nie deelneem aan die nasionale forum nie omdat dit nie hulle hele reeks konkrete eise vir die herstrukturering van die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing sal akkommodeer nie. Die eis is dus dat toegegee word aan hulle besondere politieke program, wat maar een van talle is wat deur ewe veel Blanke en Swart politieke groepe voorgedou word. Daardeer maak die UDF-leiers 'n bespotting van onderhandeling en die demokratiese aspirasies van die massa mense.

Twee fundamenteel strydige sieninge van die toekoms van die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing is deesdae in Swart gebiede duidelik in konflik met mekaar. Een sien in dié toekoms van die land 'n demokratiese bestel, lomp en omslagtig soos demokrasieë maar is, maar waarin die beginsels van groepsekerheid en individuele vryheid en geleenthede gehandhaaf word soos net in 'n demokrasie verseker kan word. As dit die siening is wat gehandhaaf moet word, kan sy aanhangers nie aan terrorisme in die Swart gebiede uitgelewer word nie.

ATS/lt

--- ooo ---

V3 - Bere op
UDF se
leer
EJW 21/6/85



By beantwoording meld asb.
In reply please quote

Republiek van Suid-Afrika · Republic of South Africa

Ministerie van Wet en Orde
Ministry of Law and Order

1) DR ~~10/17/85~~ 24 ulgely

2) DDV ~~8/7/85~~

3. Bsc op UDF leer
~~8/7/85~~ D 24.17/85

→ Adels Bosch,

See telefonies besprek, heelty
in afskif van in dokument wat
dew die UDF-gerindes in die Aes-
Kaap versprei word.

Dit is daardop gewil om
maksimale propoganda in hul
saak te bewerkstellig dew die
media te "gebruik".

Ceor Miller

B-Bezi op UDF leer
24/1/85

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It is also important to stress that although the E C P does form a category of media, not all the newspapers that make it up are exactly the same e.g. there are important differences between the Evening Post, the EP Herald and City Press and their respective approaches to news. We should try and have an understanding of these if we are to use the E C P most successfully to our advantage (see section II for more detail here).

(ii) Second, there are some important things to note about the E C P.

Three of these are :

(a) Its mass nature. The E C P consistently reaches a very wide audience. In the townships as much as in the white areas, every day. So although the E C P is owned by the companies the news has to tell the mass of ordinary people things about their own lives which are meaningful to them, and not only to the bosses. This, and particularly the fact that the majority of readers are black makes it possible for us to use the E C P to our advantage in various ways. It also makes it important for us to become involved at this level as the enemy will very easily take advantage of this even if we don't.

(b) Its liberal nature. What we mean by this is that because it claims to be liberal and neutral, the E C P allows for the presentation of different viewpoints in and through it. Thus the E C P will often quote the UDF or PEBCU etc, on issues (eg P E stayaway) whereas the Afrikaans press or the SABC will not. We can often use this fact to the advantage of our struggle.

(c) The E C P is seen and respected as an important source of opinion among the authorities and the "establishment". It can thus sometimes form a significant pressure on the rulers of South Africa and their economic, political and bureaucratic representatives.

2. How can we use the E C P to our advantage?

It is clear, then, that it is both possible and important for our organisations to have relations with the E C P and to use these relations to our advantage. Obviously, though, this does not just happen automatically. We need to organise these relations in our favour. This means that we must understand the E C P and the potential and possible dangers of the role that it can play, and we must be committed to developing these relations in the best possible way.

There are at least three areas in which progressive organisations can use the E C P

(a) To give your organisation and/or the progressive views of your organisation a public profile and present in a favourable light. The UDF nationally has been particularly good in using the E C P in this way.

(b) To advertise particular events eg mass meetings, and to create an atmosphere around political events or issues eg stayaway.

(c) As a form of pressure on the government or any other opponent of the progressive movement and its democratic organisations. This involves using the E C P to air your views on a political event or issue eg UDF used the press effectively in this way during the 1982 dockworkers strike. Using the E C P around the Uitenhage Massacre issue would be another example here. The international media are particularly important in this respect.

(b) News editor

He or she co-ordinates the smooth running of a newsroom. The news editor stays in the office all day, compiles the news diary (the events to be covered by the newspaper that day), and sends reporters out to follow up news items. She/he attends a news conference twice a day with the editor. At these conferences the news for the day is discussed. These conferences are very powerful because if a story is not mentioned by an obstructionist newseditor, the story - usually one of the more "progressive" ones - has very little chance of getting into the paper. All the different editorial departments are represented at the conference. They decide which stories must go on page 1 and on the next most important pages: page 3, page 2, page 5 and page 6.

The newseditors are the link between the editor and the reporter. They are an important contact for progressive organisations to cultivate, as they assign people to press conferences, decide to follow up or ignore tip-offs etc.

(c) Chief Sub-editor

She/he decides which story will go where on which page, apart from those whose position was determined in conference. The chief sub also approves headlines and layout, both of which form an important part of the newspaper's ideological approach.

(d) Sub-editors

"Subs" go through stories with a fine comb, looking for mistakes and, more important, cutting down reports to the amount of space allocated for them on the page. As a rule they tend to be the most conservative group in the editorial department. If they object to an article, they often protest to the night-editor about some aspect of the story. If the reporter who wrote it has gone home, the night staff may decide it would be safer not to publish the story at all.

(e) Night-editor (Herald only)

She/he scrutinises each story, looking for legal problems etc. The night-editor phones the editor every night to tell him which stories have been placed on which page. If the editor is unhappy about a story, it will be read to him.

(f) Editor (and some points about differences between the E P newspapers)

The editor plays an important role in shaping the newspaper's approach.

In Port Elizabeth the EP Herald and the Evening Post are politically fairly far apart. The Herald is seen by the editor as a flag-ship of press liberalism in South Africa, a feeling which has recently been stimulated. The Herald attempts to investigate and represent the "truth" about the recent "unrest" for example. But, on the other hand, the editor has good friendly relations with the police and the crime reporter and other conservatives on the staff. This means he has to play off the more conservative elements on the paper against the more liberal or even progressive elements on a daily basis, but in such a way as not to alienate too many white or black readers, and in such a way as to keep as much harmony as possible between himself, the state and the bosses.

Because of his position, the editor's personal feelings on any story will hold enormous sway. He sees himself as being a man of liberal morals and ideas. This is important in understanding how his weight will fall on any issue, and has certain lessons for progressive organisations.

The Post, on the other hand, is a moderate paper with a smaller and less wide-spread readership. It does not circulate in the rural areas surrounding P E as does the Herald. The news bosses, the editor and sub-editors live in constant fear of closure. They do not have the same financial muscle to back them up in hard times, or the time to write stories containing much political or intellectual death. The paper is often more protective of white interests and more hostile to progressive organisations and ideas than the Herald is. It has grown accustomed to writing one-sided stories because they are easier to write under pressure.

Yet the Post also runs an "Extra" edition aimed specifically at blacks, which sells the majority of the papers in a day. The most important issues of the day affecting blacks and often covered here, and this edition is normally a bit more "progressive" than the others, but it is possibly more dangerous in the long term because of the way it parcels out news along racial lines.

The differences between the Herald and the Post should not be ignored. Different strategies should be developed with respect to the different papers in order that the progressive movement make maximum gains in their relationship with them.

3. Limitations and problems in our use of the E C P

Having pointed to various ways in which the E C P can be used, it is necessary to say something about the limits and possible problems in our use of the E C P. Two of the most important of these are :

(a) Although there are certain "gaps" with the E C P that our organisations can use (eg to put their viewpoints to a large audience) we should not forget that the E C P is owned and controlled by the establishment. Thus the E C P will tend towards following and protecting the interests of the authorities and the bosses. It will also often give more of their view than that of the progressive movement. We should also remember that the E C P is censored and restricted by the apartheid government through over 100 laws (eg the Defence Act and the Prisons Act which make it illegal or very difficult to report on certain matters to do with prisons and the SADF).

Finally, here, it should be stressed that although we can put our views to the E C P and although there may be sympathetic journalists on the E C P, the progressive movement does not have any final control over what is presented in the pages of the newspapers. This is decided on by the newspaper hierarchy (see chart and section II)

(b) Secondly we should remember that although the E C P can be used as a public weapon it is not an organisational tool as such, and we should not rely on it to perform our organisational and ideological tasks. Use of the E C P should be seen as a publicly-directed complement to organisation and not a substitute for it. This is particularly the case because the E C P is a capitalist commercial enterprise.

This means that it can never, in its present form, be a paper of the people expressing their interests consistently. Also because its aim is to sell newspapers (to maximise its profit) the E C P tends to sensationalise issues. In other words political issues and processes are presented as events when they happen and are usually dropped from the pages of the newspaper when they are a few days old. This is clearly not the kind of understanding of politics we would like our activists or our constituencies, to develop.

We must be careful then, that we do not allow ourselves to see the struggle as being fought out only, or even mainly, in the papers of the E C P. The struggle is the struggle of the masses. Mass progressive organisations can and should use the E C P as a particular strategy in this struggle, but it must not replace the ongoing educational and organisational work among the people, and it must not hinder their participation in the struggle.

(II) STRUCTURES, CHANNELS AND HIERARCHIES OF THE COMMERCIAL PRESS

Between the time a reporter collects information/news to the time it appears in the newspaper as a report, the information passes through many hands and can be altered in many ways. A report can be cut to two paragraphs and tucked away on page 11, or it can be "spiked" i.e. sent to a section in the computer where all rejected stories lie unpublished for a few days and are then wiped out. The political persuasions of the people in the editorial department of a newspaper - as well as other factors such as experience, sex, position etc - and the degree of power they hold in their respective positions all play a part in shaping the story. For this reason it is useful to look at newspapers' hierarchies.

(a) Reporters

While reporters are on the lowest rung of the newspaper's editorial hierarchy, they carry considerable power in determining what line reports will take. The crime reporter, for example, deals predominantly with the police and, consciously or unconsciously, represents their interests on the paper. The crime reporter has to attend a press conference with the police first thing every morning. At the conference Lieutenant Col Gerrie van Rooyen, the liaison officer tells reporters about incidents the police think are newsworthy. During the day, the crime reporter phones the police regularly to check for more "crime" stories. Because the crime reporter has to keep up a good relationship with the police, he or she will be reluctant to criticise their actions.

The journalist who is sympathetic to the progressive movement is often in a far less structured position. He or she is usually at the beck and call of the news editor. If, as is often the case, relations between such a reporter and the news editor are strained, the news editor will often take delight in sending the sympathetic journalist to cover a beauty contest and send an uninterested, or even hostile reporter to report on a UDF press conference. Progressive journalists have a daily battle with their bosses, with the police and bureaucratic and political authorities whom they have to approach in order - in the newspaper's definition of "objectivity" - get both sides of the picture.

So reporters have the first hand in shaping the news and can concentrate only on the official view of events, or can ensure that such opinions are contrasted with the eye witness accounts, experiences and opinions of those who oppose the authorities.

(III) USING THE COMMERCIAL PRESS

Newspapers work on a day-to-day basis and news is defined as such according to quite strict criterium of "newsworthiness". What is news today may not be news tomorrow, so organisations should seize opportunities as quickly as possible when they arise. The following are some brief notes on some of the most important means the progressive organisations may use in their relations with the press.

(a) Publicity Secretary or Officer.

Ideally the publicity secretary, (or individual in your organisation responsible for publicity) should be able to respond on behalf of the organisation immediately, though arrangements should be made for emergency consultation between him/her and other members of the organisation (eg executive or president) when this is necessary. The publicity secretary should be easily contactable. Should reporters phone the publicity secretary for comment it would be ideal if he or she could give a good, factually based response on behalf of the organisation. But it is fully acceptable for the publicity secretary to ask when the reporter's deadline is and ask for 15 minutes or a couple of hours to consult with other executive members.

It is important to note that not all events need be responded to. If the crime reporter phones the UDF office to ask for comment on a policeman's death, for example, the executive may decide to issue no comment at all. It would be preferable to ask the reporter, in such a case, not to mention that the UDF was consulted.

at all. But a hostile reporter might put the "no comment" in such a way as to implicate the Front. All these tactics and possibilities should be borne in mind.

(b) Information Blitzes

Organisations can encourage their members to play a direct role in feeding the news: papers the real facts as they affect people in communities. If, for example, four people are shot dead by police on their way home from a funeral, every person who witnessed the event should phone the newspaper and tell them what they saw. If a group of 20 or 50 all take the same action the chances of victimisation are much smaller. If they would feel more secure, they could go to a priest or a professional such as a lawyer and get him to phone the newspaper. Organisations can also play a role in co-ordinating such action.

Another crucial point to remember is that news must get out before charges are laid. Once there is a legal investigation underway the matter is "sub judice" and cannot be commented on by the press. What often happens is that police give the first account of events. After some individuals phone the papers to say that the account was incorrect, but by this time charges have been laid against, for example, three youths who were injured in police action and the eye-witness account is never published. One also cannot rely on what comes out in court hearings to be covered fully in the papers.

(c) Interviews

These are usually arranged at the request of the journalist, but a member of the organisation can phone the newseditor and suggest that Mr Z the president of the organisation might have something of interest to say about this or that issue or event.

For an interview a person needs to be knowledgeable on current events in the papers and have clear views on these. Today such issues would include the "unrest", disinvestment, government clampdown on progressive organisations, the treason trial and so on. One should try to find out who will be interviewing you and prepare yourself accordingly. Should it be a hostile or an ambitious reporter you can be sure that questions such as the Minikini killing will feature prominently. You are fully entitled to have a few notes about what you wish to say, but try to chat in a relaxed manner. Don't be afraid to volunteer information, stress certain facts etc. One way of building up good relations with a reporter is to give them a clue that important or sensational matters will be discussed at the next general meeting and they should be there or at the press conference afterwards etc.

(d) Press statements

These are not the same as statements read out in meetings. Generally "revolutionary jargon" - eg castigating "P W's fascist state" - should be avoided as such statements will not get published. Ideally statements should be legibly written or

typed, signed and brought into the offices during the day (unless, of course, the statement is delivered telephonically) - early in the morning for the Post and by early evening at the latest for the Herald.

Press statements are two things : A factual response to a particular crisis issue or event, and a statement of the organisations position in response to this. Thus it is acceptable to say that the UDF condemns the brutal murder of 35 Landa residents. Perhaps after this, instead of or at least in addition to attacking the system in general, your organisation could use such an opportunity to get across statistics which the authorities deny.

Another useful tool would be to present an argument eg "Under Botha's leadership a number of people have died, been detained etc. Is this the phase out of the vicious system of apartheid? Again it should be remembered that new arguments or points will often carry more news value than the old ones.

Overall one should try to be brief, topical and accurate, giving relevant facts or examples. Remember when newspapers are asking for information about a particular event they usually want to know five basic things :

- what happened
- when did it happen
- who was involved
- where did it happen
- how did it happen

(e) Press Conferences

These should normally be arranged at least a day in advance, but don't hesitate to call one at an hour's notice if the issue is hot and you have the facts. Make sure that everything is organised and that you are ready to start at the set time, even if the journalists are late.

- If possible have a prepared statement or agenda to give each reporter
- come straight to the point
- introduce your organisation briefly and spell out why you have called the conference
- give details of the event, the organisation's response, and the action planned
- if the issue is strong and there is a good turn-out of journalists you can seize the moment and make contentious (but carefully thought out) statements.

If you are attacking an individual be careful to refer to their professional role only.

The more exciting the news you give the paper, the bigger your slice of the page and the more chance of ongoing coverage.

IV THE COMMERCIAL PRESS : SIMULATION GAME

Scenario

It is Sunday morning, June 26, 1985. A funeral is being held in the P E townships for two people killed by police during recent "unrest". While a group of mourners, which includes members of your organisation, is proceeding from the church towards the graveyard where the bodies are to be buried they are fired on by police/army. At least 15 people are killed immediately, and at least a further 25 are injured.

This is the situation which faces your organisation - a prominent youth/student/community/worker organisation in P E. How are you going to respond at a publicity level? Some suggestions are set out in the sequence below :

Day one

- (1) Find out exactly what happened (see attached for guide here)
- (2) Draw up press statement (under pressure from reporters who are constantly phoning you for details. You have to move quickly to get your version of the incident + your views on it to the journalist before the copy deadline).
- (3) Get eye witnesses to phone through to the newspapers with the story. How can your organisation support these people?
- (4) Face difficult questions from a conservative journalist who has heard other accounts of the incident.

Day two

- (1) Respond to police statement (see attached sheet) which has been published in the morning newspaper.
- (2) Get public responses from other organisations eg UDF on the incident.
- (3) Details of further "unrest" and police brutality come in. How are you going to use these?

Day three

Call a press conference around the incident. Possible issues to raise here :

- (1) the incident itself
- (2) discrepancies between your version and that given by the police
- (3) your organisation's strategy in response to the incident
- (4) general political repercussions
- (5) the situation in the townships at the moment, etc, etc.

Day four

Send a delegation to the editor of the Herald to express concern at the way in which the newspaper is handling the issue/your organisation.

ADDENDUM TO COMMERCIAL PRESS SIMULATION GAME : "THINGS TO FIND OUT"

For the purposes of the game the questions to be investigated here are clearly those which the newspaper will require information about. Broadly, these are covered by the "who, what, where, when, how" formula. More specifically the kinds of details to look for in this case would be :

- where and when exactly did the shooting occur?
- size and mood of the crowd: who exactly was involved, how were they proceeding and so on?
- how did the shooting start? What kind of ammunition was used? How many police and police vehicles (SADF?) were present?
- details of killed and wounded i.e. numbers, names, ages, addresses, severity of wounds etc.
- what happened afterwards (in the hospitals etc)? and so on.

ADDENDUM TO COMMERCIAL PRESS SIMULATION GAME - POLICE STATEMENT

The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis Le Grange said that police were forced to open fire on a crowd of between three and four thousand people on Sunday morning.

Mr Le Grange said "The crowd, armed with stones, sticks, petrol bombs and bricks was marching toward Algoa Park (a white area) on the way from New Brighton Township." He said the crowd was headed by a man dressed in black carrying a brick

About 2 km from Algoa Park a police unit of 19 men led by a lieutenant had confronted the marching crowd. The officer climbed onto his vehicle and told the leader the march was illegal in terms of the prohibition on open-air gatherings, he said.

The officer's instructions to order his people back were ignored.

Mr Le Grange said that when the crowd was about five meters from the police the lieutenant had fired a warning shot into the ground next to the leader.

"It still had no effect and the police were suddenly surrounded and pelted with stones and other missiles, including petrol bombs," he said.


"The police had no alternative but to open fire in self-defence."

The Minister said police later found traces of exploded petrol bombs and an unexploded petrol bomb bearing fingerprints.

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Legislation and civil liberties in South Africa

AS Mathews

LAST YEAR IN Zimbabwe a number of high-ranking air force officers, were acquitted by the courts on charges relating to the destruction of military aircraft, but immediately re-detained. It was not until several months later that the last of them was released. The legislation which made this possible was enacted by the Smith government, which certainly did not envisage that men in control of its war machine would quite soon become the victims of that law. A similarly ironic event was acted out more recently in the Ciskei where General Charles Sebe and Major-General Taillefer Minnaar became the victims of a detention law which they had reportedly drafted themselves in a form which made the decision to detain proof against court 'interference'.

History is replete with similar twists of fate, but the lesson which they teach – that arbitrary laws are weapons with a double cutting-edge – is seldom learnt by men in power. Even when it is, it is usually soon forgotten. This is not because men of vision or learning have failed to draw the appropriate moral in their writings. More than 2000 years ago the historian Thucydides reflected:

Indeed, it is true that, in these acts of revenge on others, men take it upon themselves to begin the process of repealing those general laws of humanity which are here to give a hope of salvation to all who are in distress, instead of leaving those laws in existence, remembering that there may come a time when they, too, will be in danger and will need their protection.

He was echoed by the nineteenth-century historian Thomas Carlyle who, describing the plight of members of a government whose own laws were turned against it when voted out of office into the opposition benches, observed wryly that it was only then that the light of understanding dawned upon their eyes. Again, in Robert Bolt's play *A Man For All Seasons* the following dialogue takes place between the lawyer and one-time chancellor of England, Sir Thomas More, and his impetuous son-in-law, the biographer William Roper:

ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that.

MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you – where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat?

One of the most important reasons, therefore, for seeking to secure the legal guarantee of basic civil rights, a part of the general laws of humanity of which Thucydides speaks, is that the freedom of no one in society is ultimately secure without that protection. Do we wish to learn that lesson in South Africa? Assuming the will to do so, are the social and political conditions favourable for its implemen-

tion through the restoration of the 'laws of humanity'? Before seeking to answer these questions we need to look a little more closely at the concept of civil rights.

THE RIGHTS OF man may conveniently be classified into political, social and civil liberties. Political liberty denotes the right to vote and to be eligible for public office; social liberty refers to both economic and cultural rights such as the right to a decent wage, to a roof over one's head and to a good education. Our concern, in this article, is with the third category – civil liberty. Though focusing primarily on it, however, it is well to keep in mind that programmes for evolutionary change need to address all three kinds of liberty and that stability in society will be fragile if any one of them is ignored.

The nature of basic civil liberties is fairly well agreed in Western culture: they encompass personal freedom (with the attendant remedy of *habeas corpus*), freedom of expression, freedom of movement and association and the right of public assembly. Where the law of a given society gives substantial effect to these liberties, and provides remedies for their infringement, we are justified in saying that the rule of law prevails in that society. South African common law is basically favourable to civil liberty because one of the underlying principles of the legal system is that every person is free to enjoy all liberties, except to the extent that they are qualified or removed by enactments of the law itself. Statute law, especially in the past few decades, has encroached heavily on civil rights. Before we can consider the chances of reform it is essential, therefore, to take stock of that encroachment by examining the present condition of civil liberty in South Africa.

While not the worst in the world, the state of civil liberties in South Africa is at the lower end of the scale of achievement. Personal freedom, the most basic of human rights, has been reduced to vanishing point mainly by laws authorizing detention without trial and the banning of individuals. The Internal Security Act of 1982, which is the statutory outcome of the report of the Rabie Commission [appointed by the State President in 1979 to enquire into security legislation and report and make recommendations on its necessity, adequacy, fairness and efficacy], provides for four different kinds of detention, of which the most drastic is the indefinite detention of persons suspected of committing either of two very broadly-defined crimes of terrorism and subversion, or of persons suspected of having information about the commission of these crimes. Theoretically, the

detention may be indefinite and although provision is made for consideration of each case by a board of review where the detention is to exceed six months, the board is not independently constituted, as courts of law are. The remedy of *habeas corpus* (described by the English writer Thomas Macaulay as the most stringent curb that legislation ever imposed on tyranny) is specifically abolished by a clause that denies the courts the right to pronounce on any detention under this provision.

Another provision of the Internal Security Act authorizes the detention, on the instruction of the Attorney-General, of any witness whom he believes will be intimidated, tampered with or will abscond. Again, there is no control by the regular courts over such detentions. Two forms of preventive detention are also authorized by the Act, of which the most severe is the potentially indefinite detention of persons thought by the Minister of Law and Order to be endangering state security. Though the Act provides for the consideration of such detentions by a review committee appointed by the Minister of Justice, and for referral of the matter to the Chief Justice of South Africa if the review committee differs from the decision of the Minister of Law and Order that the person in question should be detained, the safeguards are of limited value because the referral to the Chief Justice takes place only if the committee appointed by the government disagrees with the decision to detain and because the grounds on which the Chief Justice may set aside the detention order are restricted to cases of ministerial bad faith or abuse of power, both of which are difficult to establish.

THE BANNING OF an individual under the Internal Security Act of 1982 is a drastic interference with personal freedom (especially where it takes the form of house arrest) and also with freedom of movement, association and expression. A banned person is restricted to a defined magisterial district (or to his home in the case of house arrest), may not attend most kinds of gatherings or work for a long list of specified organizations, and cannot have his verbal or written utterances quoted or reproduced by any other person. Banning, in a nutshell, restricts all of the civil liberties to a greater or lesser extent. While banning orders are considered by a review committee, and by the Chief Justice where the review committee differs from the Minister, for the reasons already mentioned these 'safeguards' are inadequate to prevent injustice. There are a large number of South Africans who have been banned for reasons that appear to have little to do with subversion in any real sense.

Freedom of association is restricted by a number of laws, of which the most serious is that which allows the Minister of Law and Order to declare any organization unlawful on the ground that it is a threat to state security. The 'safeguards' which the Internal Security Act provides in such cases are the same as for the banning of individuals and are inadequate for the same reasons. What is worse is that the Act confers upon the Minister the power, unfettered even by these limited safeguards, to declare that any given organization is the same as one already declared unlawful. When he does this, the courts are bound to accept, in criminal proceedings resulting from the charge of furthering the aims of an unlawful organization, that members or supporters of the organization so declared equivalent are in effect members or supporters of the unlawful organization. The declaration of equivalence is absolutely binding on the judiciary, with possibly disastrous consequences for justice to individuals charged in the courts.

Almost all the major black political organizations have been banned, including the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress. On the same day in 1978, 18 were declared unlawful, though no convincing evidence of subversion was presented by the government. One of these, the Christian Institute, was manifestly a body committed to Christian protest politics. Had the Christian Institute, or any other of the 18 organizations, been engaged in subversion, they or their members could have been tried for breaching any number of a host of wide-ranging security crimes. The Internal Security Act of 1982 confirmed the banning of all organizations still unlawful at the time of its enactment, and made provision for power to ban further groups.

Freedom of speech is restricted by a number of security law measures of which the most prominent are those authorizing the prohibition of publications (such as books, newspapers, pamphlets); demanding of newspapers, if so required by the Minister of Law and Order, to deposit up to R40 000 as a guarantee of 'good behaviour'; and rendering criminal the production or distribution of material declared undesirable by government-appointed committees. Free speech is also legally restricted by a variety of sweeping crimes such as terrorism, subversion, sabotage and intimidation, all of which range well beyond terrorism or subversion in the ordinarily understood sense. Without going into detail, the advocacy of many forms of protest politics is criminal under these laws where some kind of illegality, even of a highly technical or trivial nature, is envisaged by the protestor.

Finally, the right to public assembly is restricted under the Internal Security Act of 1982 which gives

both the Minister and magistrates the power to ban meetings. The power given to the Minister is of an absolute nature and enables him, without independent check or control, to ban either specific meetings or meetings of any class or kind anywhere or everywhere in the Republic. For several years now, it has been illegal to hold outdoor meetings other than sports meetings without permission, all such meetings having been banned by the Minister. One of the drastic effects of this ban is that outdoor meetings of workers to discuss grievances are illegal unless prior permission has been obtained. The police therefore have the power, which has often been exercised, to disperse such meetings by force. For black South Africans who do not have large halls or similar venues at their disposal, this is a grievous restriction on a vital civil liberty.

THE TOTAL EFFECT of the laws briefly surveyed in the preceding paragraphs can be very simply summed up by stating that all the civil liberties of South Africans have been converted into privileges exercisable only to the extent that the ruling party is prepared to permit. The officers of the government have it almost entirely within their discretion to allow citizens to exercise a particular right or to withdraw it from them; they need not prove to some independent body, such as a court, that there is a real security justification for limiting or withdrawing liberties. In other words, a clear demonstration of abuse of liberty is not a condition precedent to its withdrawal. Liberties in South Africa have been put under licence, and the licensing authority is the government itself, which has virtually unfettered power to decide whether its opponents may exercise basic civil rights. Where a participant in the political process, even if it happens to be the government of the day, has such authority there can be little claim to adherence to the rule of law or to open politics.

Naturally, there is an explanation which the government and its supporters put forward for this state of affairs; as one might expect, it is the age-old 'law and order' justification. For two main reasons, it cannot be summarily dismissed but deserves serious thought and close evaluation. Firstly, the creation of order and stability is indubitably one of the prime tasks of the government of any society. Without political stability there can be no general and secure enjoyment of the economic and cultural benefits of modern life. Disorder and strife make the advantages of civilization extremely fragile and their widespread enjoyment relatively impermanent. In the second place, in societies with deep social cleavages like South Africa, the maintenance of order must

necessarily involve greater reliance on the coercive machinery of the state than in those countries that have a more homogeneous community and have achieved a resolution of major social conflicts.

OUR COUNTRY HAS several distinct racial groups that are separated by language, culture, colour and education. The tensions caused by these divisions are aggravated by economic and political disparities. Many would accept that where ethnic or racial differences are reinforced by political and economic inequalities, and power and wealth are concentrated in one or more privileged groups and are denied to others, one is faced with a dangerously polarized social structure that is potentially explosive. In that kind of society coercive measures will inevitably have a prominent place in political programmes that are designed to secure stability.

This is true even if (perhaps, especially if) the government has embarked on a course of reform and liberalization. During such periods the conflict that was previously suppressed tends to rise to the surface on account of the expectations generated by a reform programme and the loosening of political controls. A total withdrawal of coercive measures cannot precede the resolution of economic and political conflicts without undermining stability and order.

Thus the maintenance of order through coercive measures necessarily implies a restriction on the civil liberties of the citizen. When restrictive measures are introduced there must be diminished civil rights. It follows that the ritualistic advocacy of a full-scale, American-style bill of rights by well-meaning visitors from the established democracies lacks a sense of political realism and awareness of the differing social imperatives of divided societies. Inspired and eloquent lectures and articles on human rights do serve one important purpose: to remind us of the moral ends or goals of human political endeavour. They are not, however, realistic blueprints for immediate realization; nor do they provide a helpful model for communities in a state of transition towards a stable political order. The premature introduction of the whole panoply of civil rights is frequently a prelude to full-scale repression and to the cynical rejection of bills of rights as irrelevant to the political realities of modern Africa. In order to avoid that calamity, with which our neighbour Lesotho has already been afflicted, we need to work for the acceptance of two related major propositions: first, full civil rights, while remaining an admirable goal, are the product of a just and stable order rather than the means to achieve it; and

second, that a partial programme of civil rights, which takes account of both the requirements of political stability and the goal of human freedom, is needed for societies that lack social justice and political stability but are committed to the achievement of both.

The fact that the law and order argument, with its corollary of reduced civil liberties, is a powerful one does not imply that the law and order programme of the South African government is convincing or acceptable. The security laws which restrict civil liberties in our country do not strike a sensible balance between the demands of freedom and order. Those laws are heavily weighted against liberty and in favour of state power. They invest the government *permanently* with all the rights and powers which are normally exercised in times of emergency. Crisis rule is entrenched without any requirement for regular review and renewal of the drastic laws which authorize it.

THE SECURITY LAWS are not, moreover, limited in their scope and application to subversives in the true sense. They consist of draconian security crimes which are so broad that all effective forms of challenge to the status quo may be heavily punished. The authors of a leading work on peaceful change in South Africa (Theo Hans et al: *South Africa and the prospects of peaceful change*, published by Rex Collings, London) have rightly said that the 'state acts against anyone outside the racially limited democracy who questions the limits of this democracy'. The criteria for banning and detention are so broad and unspecific that its victims are frequently opponents of the government rather than terrorists or saboteurs. The banning of the Reverend Beyers Naudé (of the Christian Institute), of the Defence and Aid Fund and of newspapers like *The World* were essentially restrictive state actions and punishments for protest politics, not for subversive activities. The activities of Naudé, and of the banned institutions just mentioned, were open and well-known and could easily have been punished under criminal law had they constituted subversion in terms of the broad definitions of anti-state activity that our legislature has adopted.

Few objective observers of South African politics will deny that suppression of that kind of opposition is one of the major reasons for the enactment of sweeping security laws and the consequential restriction of civil rights. In summary, a major flaw of the South African security law package is that it is bound up with the maintenance of National Party rule and the enforcement of its policies. The detachment of the security programme from those imper-

missible objectives is vital both for the restoration of civil liberties and for the creation of a stable society.

THE PROPOSITION THAT a grossly swollen programme of security legislation threatens human freedom is an obvious one that is frequently made. Much less obvious is the argument that the system of drastic process is a threat to the very goal with which it is usually associated: the attainment of order and stability in society. Advocate D.P. de Villiers, a cautious and 'responsible' critic of government policy in South Africa, has recently questioned the 'unspoken assumption . . . that the more drastic the measure, the more likely it was to be effective' and quotes with clear approval the point that 'measures which might be effective in a strictly short-term situation, might well be less effective or even counter-productive in . . . circumstances of prolonged unrest'.

There are also signs, admittedly too faint to inspire much cheer, that the government itself is beginning to understand that its overkill security measures have become a threat to the order it is bent on maintaining. Banning orders on individuals have for the moment been cut back, detentions are being more carefully monitored to prevent a repetition of a Biko or Aggett tragedy, and security activities are less oppressive in the labour field. The lesson has not yet been learned, however, to the degree required for a legislative rolling back of the security programme.

Such a process has begun in other societies with comparable security problems. In Israel, where the security threat, both internal and external, is of daunting proportions, a law was introduced in 1979 requiring every detention to be confirmed by a judge of the Supreme Court within 48 hours of arrest. The ordinary courts in Israel have the right to see all the evidence against the detainee and the power to set aside the detention if not satisfied with the government case.

The security crisis in Northern Ireland is infinitely worse than our own (2 000 deaths attributable to terrorist activities since 1972), yet detention in Northern Ireland is limited to a maximum of seven days and may be used only for the interrogation of terrorism suspects. Moreover, detention is subject to strict monitoring to ensure that there is no maltreatment of detainees. For some years now, the emphasis in Northern Ireland has been the prosecution in the ordinary courts (which employ slightly modified rules of procedure) of persons alleged to have committed acts of terrorism or other security crimes. In both these countries, drastic laws have been repealed or modified for

reasons transcending the belief in freedom and civil rights. They have been changed partly because of the recognition that harsh laws have been found to have the capacity for generating disorder; for producing the very response that they were designed to avoid.

IN PASSING, THE response of the West German authorities to the Baader-Meinhof terrorist threat is worth recording. Notwithstanding the ruthlessness of this and other terror groups in West Germany, legislative restriction of liberties has been minimal. The most important of the measures introduced provide for temporary isolation of prisoners from outside contacts, broader powers of search under warrant, restrictions on the choice of counsel by accused persons (the number of defenders was limited to three and a lawyer could not defend more than one accused in the same case) and qualifications on the freedom of written contact between counsel and client. (Though there is power to ban extremist organizations in West Germany, the power is under control of the courts and may be exercised only for precisely defined reasons.) Even this moderate legislative response to terrorism in the Federal Republic aroused vigorous opposition and criticism.

ASTUTE OBSERVERS OF the political and security situation in Israel attribute the success of the internal security policy, and the maintenance of a remarkable degree of openness and democracy in a society under siege, to the judicious and limited application of restrictive laws. They observe that where the authorities have become more hawkish, as under Prime Minister Begin on the West Bank, the security situation has worsened and the possibility of accommodation with moderate Arab leaders dangerously weakened. There is no doubt that Israel is an example of the virtues of moderation in internal security policy.

Is this true also of Northern Ireland? It is in the limited sense that moderating harsh laws has not worsened the security threat. Despite the intractability of its political and security problems, Northern Ireland does provide support for the proposition that the denial of rights through harsh laws is counter-productive to the goals of political order. It is precisely because of a long history of discriminatory laws and practices and harsh repression that the security threat has assumed its grim and fearsome dimensions. The treatment of the Irish by the British, and of the Catholic minority by the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, is a tragic chronicle of severe and frequently brutal repression and of a counter-reaction that grew ugly in proportion to that

repression. Northern Ireland is an example of the predicament we may reach in a decade or so if we do not remove discrimination and extend rights by moderating the repressive apparatus of the state.

Whatever official assurances South Africans may be given from time to time, the security situation is undoubtedly serious and appears to be growing steadily worse. Black political opposition has moved through the classic phases that are characteristic of a rightless group struggling for social and political justice. The first was one of gentlemanly politics and civilized pressures. That gave way to public demonstrations, including massive protest marches, and these, in turn, were replaced by passive resistance and non-violent defiance. Thereafter, campaigns of sabotage were launched, but these were soon to be replaced by terror attacks directed at the authorities and, with increasing and alarming frequency in recent times, at ordinary civilians. In the past year there have been dozens of bombs and defused bombs, and a dismaying number of civilian deaths. During this whole period the laws have become progressively tougher in form and application. What seems significant is that the growth of violence and the toughening of the laws have run parallel with each other. The laws have not diminished violent opposition; instead, that kind of resistance has intensified in almost direct proportion to legalized repression.

THERE ARE TWO major lessons to be learnt from this unpalatable fact. The first is that the denial of basic human rights through the policy of apartheid, and the grievances felt by those subject to it, are a major source of conflict in South Africa. Commentators on Northern Ireland have drawn that same lesson from Irish history:

'Where violence stems from deeply felt and widely held grievances, the security response is likely to cause further grievance. In these conditions it may also generate more widespread support for violent action.' (Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard: *Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland*. Published by Martin Robertson, Birmingham, England)

The second lesson, also expressed in this quotation, is that in a situation of social injustice, the application of harsh laws to curb dissent tends to be counter-productive and to drive opposition towards increasingly violent strategies. The mailed fist may bring short-term relief against security threats; in longer perspective, it could have calamitous results.

Men in power, when faced with challenges to law and order have a natural inclination to increase coercion and to diminish freedom; but in such a

situation of crisis, civil rights have a vital contribution to make towards the achievement of peace and stability. This does not mean civil rights for terrorists and saboteurs, since these are people whom no government can afford to tolerate even if its policies have contributed to their presence. There should be civil rights for everyone else, however, regardless of their political views.

A MORE EXTENSIVE reform of security laws than that envisaged by the Rabie Commission is now urgently needed to turn opposition in the direction of negotiation and away from violence. The fundamental principle of such a programme of reform should be that punishment and restriction are reserved for a narrowly-defined group who are found by the courts, or other genuinely independent tribunals, to be involved in or committed to politics of violence, or to be working towards a political order that will suppress human freedom. All others should be legally free to organize and to appoint leaders to take part in negotiation politics for a better social order.

Violence in South Africa has grown from a condition in which opposition groups working against official policies, and especially their chosen leaders, have suffered repression whether or not they have been guilty of sabotage or terrorism. For leaders, this has resulted in the dilemma which is well described in the following words:

'The possibility of reaching an acceptable resolution of conflict is rendered particularly difficult by the fact that the white power élite recognizes only those black leaders who - whatever their reasons - either accept their policy or have accepted an official rôle within the framework of this policy. Black leaders who refuse to go along with this are not accepted as participants in discussion and negotiations.' (Theo Hanf et al: *South Africa and the Prospects of Peaceful Change*. Published by Rex Collings, London)

Negotiation politics will not replace strategies of conflict and violence unless the leadership of opposition groups is allowed to emerge without the fear of jail, banning or even death for activities that are peaceful. Otherwise we shall continue to construct a law-and-order tinder box which, though it may take time to ignite, will eventually bring us to a Northern Ireland situation. At that stage, as in Northern Ireland, all remedial measures could become futile.

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Serious security position

An extract from an article by Professor A. S. Matthews of the University of Natal on legislation and civil liberties in South Africa, published in the Anglo-American journal Optima.

WHATEVER official assurances South Africans may be given from time to time, the security situation is undoubtedly serious and appears to be growing steadily worse.

Black political opposition has moved through the classic phases that are characteristic of a rightless group struggling for social and political justice. The first was one of gentlemanly politics and civilised pressures. That gave way to public demonstrations, including massive protest marches, and these, in turn, were replaced by passive resistance and non-violent defiance. Thereafter, campaigns of sabotage were launched, but these were soon to be replaced by terror attacks directed at the authorities and, with increasing and alarming frequency in recent times, at ordinary civilians.

In the past year there have been dozens of bombs and defused bombs, and a dismaying number of civilian deaths. During this whole period the laws have become progressively tougher in form and application. What seems significant is that the growth of violence and the toughening of the laws have run parallel with each other. The laws have not diminished violent opposition; instead, that kind of resistance has intensified in almost direct proportion to legalised repression.

There are two major lessons to be learned from this unpalatable fact. The first is that the denial of basic human rights through the policy of apartheid, and the grievances felt by those subject to it, are a major source of conflict in South Africa. Commentators on Northern Ireland have drawn that same lesson from Irish history:

Grievance

"Where violence stems from deeply felt and widely held grievances, the security response is likely to cause further grievance. In these conditions it may also generate more widespread support for violent action." (Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard: "Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland." Published by Martin Robertson, Birmingham, England).

The second lesson, also expressed in this quotation, is that in a situation of social injustice, the application of harsh laws to curb dissent tends to be counter-productive and to drive opposition towards increasingly violent strategies. The mailed fist may bring short-term relief against security threats; in longer perspective, it could have calamitous results.

Men in power, when faced with challenges to law and order have a natural inclination to increase coer-

cion and to diminish freedom; but in such a situation of crisis, civil rights have a vital contribution to make towards the achievement of peace and stability. This does not mean civil rights for terrorists and saboteurs, since these are people whom no government can afford to tolerate even if its policies have contributed to their presence. There should be civil rights for everyone else, however, regardless of their political views.

A more extensive reform of security laws than that envisaged by the Rabe Commission is now urgently needed to turn opposition in the direction of negotiation and away from violence. The fundamental principle of such a programme of reform should be that punishment and restriction are reserved for a narrowly defined group who are found by the courts, or other genuinely independent tribunals, to be involved in or committed to politics of violence, or to be working towards a political order that will suppress human freedom. All others should be legally free to organise and appoint leaders to take part in negotiation politics for a better social order.

Violence in South Africa has grown from a condition in which opposition groups working against official policies, and especially their

chosen leaders, have suffered repression whether or not they have been guilty of sabotage or terrorism. For leaders, this has resulted in the dilemma which is well described in the following words:

Difficult

"The possibility of reaching an acceptable resolution of conflict is rendered particularly difficult by the fact that the white power elite recognises only those black leaders who — whatever their reasons — either accept their policy or have accepted an official role within the framework of this policy. Black leaders who refuse to go along with this are not accepted as participants in discussion and negotiations." (Theo Hamf et al: "South Africa and the Prospects of Peaceful Change." Published by Rex Collings, London).

Negotiation politics will not replace strategies of conflict and violence unless the leadership of opposition groups is allowed to emerge without the fear of jail, banning or even death for activities that are peaceful. Otherwise we shall continue to construct a law-and-order tinder box which, though it may take time to ignite, will eventually bring us to a Northern Ireland situation. At that stage, as in Northern Ireland, all remedial measures could become futile.

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF) : VELD TOG VIR MILJOENHANDTEKENINGE-
VELD TOG

1. Sedert die nasionale loodsing van sy landwye miljoenhandteke-
ningeveldtog teen die nuwe grondwetbedeling het dit geblyk dat die
UDF, benewens sekere openlik verklaarde doelstellings, ook sekere
bedekte motiewe daarmee het.

2. Die openlik/verklaarde doelstellings met die veldtog wat aan=
vanklik op 22 Januarie 1984 in Pretoria geloods is, soos uiteenge=
sit deur leiersfigure van die UDF en soos blyk uit pamflette en pe=
tisielyste wat in dié verband versprei word is die volgende:

- a. Die verwerping van "apartheid" en alles wat dit behels.
- b. Die daarstelling van 'n "nie-rassige demokratiese Suid-
Afrika, vry van onderdrukking, ekonomiese uitbuiting en
rassisme".
- c. Die verwerping van die nuwe grondwet omdat dit Blanke oor=
heersing en "apartheid" verskans, asook van die sg Koorn=
hof-wette, "wat Swartmense hulle geboortereg ontnem".
- d. Die skep van 'n geleentheid vir die UDF om met die massa
te kommunikeer, hulle in te lig oor die "gevaar" van die
nuwe grondwet en te verenig in die "stryd".
- e. 'n Demonstrasie aan die hele wêreld dat die oorgrote meer=
derheid van die bevolking van die RSA die nuwe grondwet
verwerp.
- f. Die stigting van nuwe UDF-takke en die uitbouing van be=
staande takke en geaffilieerde organisasies.
- g. Die bepaling en 'n demonstrasie van die omvang van die UDF
se steun asook die daarstelling van 'n wyer magsbasis vir
die UDF, veral op sport-, kerklike en kulturele terrein.
(Opmerking. Enige persoon wat die petisielyst onderteken,
sal bv outo-maties as 'n lid beskou word.)

3. Soos blyk uit 'n verslag van sy sekretariaat het die UDF 'n be=
rekende doelwit met die veldtog. Daar word geredeneer dat die UDF
tot dusver reaksiepolitiek bedryf het deurdat hy slegs op regerings=
inisiatiewe gereageer het (vgl sy anti-referendum- en sy boikotveld=
tog teen die verkiesing van Swart plaaslike owerhede). Die nadeel
van hierdie reaksiepolitiek is volgens die UDF-sekretariaat dat sy
optrede daardeur reg in die kraam van die RSA-regering pas omdat die
"etniese" aard van die Regering se inisiatiewe die UDF verplig om
ook op 'n etniese basis te reageer. Daarom is besluit dat die UDF
'n eie onafhanklike inisiatief moet loods wat eenheid oor etniese
grense heen sal bevorder en waardeur sy beginsel van nie-rassigheid
("non-racialism") bevorder kan word. Met hierdie uitgangspunt is
ook besluit dat so 'n onafhanklike inisiatief om massasteun te mobi=
liseer, tydens 'n relatief stil tydperk in die politiek in die RSA
geloods moet word.

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4. Uit ██████████ UDF-dokumentasie en uitlatings van UDF-leiers het dit geblyk dat die volgende oogmerke ook met die veldtog bereik moet word:

- a. Dit moet dien as 'n "people's referendum".
- b. Om die Regering se selfvertroue tov die implementering van die nuwe grondwet siekundig te ondermyn.
- c. Om die magsbasis van Kleurling- en Indiërpartye wat gaan deelneem aan die nuwe grondwetbedeling, te ondermyn. In dié verband het die UDF aanvanklik besluit om die veldtog binne drie maande (voor Mei 1984) af te handel voordat 'n Indiër- en/of Kleurlingverkiesing gehou word. Die beplanning was dat die einde van die veldtog moes saamval met by partye se verkiesingsveldtogte om die trefkrag van hulle eie veldtog te verhoog. Dit moet dien as 'n voorbereidingsfase vir 'n boikot van die komende Indiër- en Kleurlingverkiesings, aldus Oscar MPETHA, president van die UDF.
- d. Om die internasionale gemeenskap op die hoogte te hou met die vordering van die veldtog. Dokumentasie ivm die veldtog is reeds wêreldwyd aan "progressiewe" organisasies soos die OAE, VN, Wêreldbond van Gereformeerde Kerke (WBGK) en die Wêreldraad van Kerke (WRK) gestuur. 'n Video-opname wat tydens die nasionale loodsing van die veldtog gemaak is, is na VISNEWS in Londen versprei, terwyl die Zambiese nuusagentskap in sy nasionale nuusbuletins dekking daaraan verleen het.

5. Met die oog op die funksionering en koördinering van die veldtog het die nasionale uitvoerende bestuur van die UDF 'n nasionale komitee saamgestel olv Cheryl CAROLUS, streeksekretaresse van die UDF, Wes-Kaapland. Binne elke UDF-streek sal 'n streekkomitee aangewys word wat in noue samewerking met die nasionale komitee sal funksioneer. Die nasionale komitee is verantwoordelik vir die volgende:

- a. Die demografiese afbakening van die RSA in streke sodat dit persentasiegewys ingedeel kan word met die oog op insameling van handtekeninge.
- b. Die koördinering van voldoende publisiteit.
- c. Die verskaffing van die nodige petisielyste aan die onderskeie streke.
- d. Die finansiering van die veldtog.

6. Intussen is bekend gemaak dat die miljoenhandtekeninge veldtog op 19 Februarie 1984 op 'n deur-tot-deur-grondslag in elke streek van stapel gestuur gaan word en dat dit oor die tydperk 20 tot 24 Februarie 1984 deur 'n "Mass Media Blitz" ondersteun sou word. Tafels sou reeds vanaf 25 Desember 1983 landwyd beman word vir die insameling van die vereiste aantal handtekeninge. Streekkomitees en geaffilieerde organisasies van die UDF is verantwoordelik vir die

insameling van handtekeninge in digbevolkte gebiede en veral op plekke waar groot skares bymekaarkom, bv by sport-, kulturele, godsdiens- en vermaaklikheidsbyeenkomste, asook by vakbondvergaderings en onderwysinrigtings.

7. Die minimum kwota handtekeninge wat in elke streek ingesamel moet word, is bereken deur die bevolkingsgetalle van Kleurlinge, Indiërs en Swartes per provinsie as grondslag te neem. Daarvolgens is Transvaal, die Kaapprovinsie, Natal en die Oranje-Vrystaat (OVS) in die verhouding van 6 : 4 : 3 : 1 verdeel en is die minimum kwotas soos volg vasgestel:

Transvaal	420 857
Kaapprovinsie	280 571
Natal	210 429
OVS	70 143
<hr/>	
Totaal	982 000

8. Wat die Blankes betref, is die kwota in Transvaal, die Kaapprovinsie en Natal bepaal deur die verhouding 3 : 2 : 1. Volgens die UDF is daar in die OVS geen "progressiewe struktuur" onder Blankes nie en sal daar dus nie handtekeninge in die gebied ingesamel kan word nie. "Progressiewe Blanke organisasies" soos oa NUSAS en die Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC) sal daarvoor verantwoordelik wees om die oorblywende sowat 18 000 handtekeninge in Blanke gebiede soos volg in te samel:

Transvaal	9 000
Kaapprovinsie	6 000
Natal	3 000

9. Volgens 'n UDF-bestuursbesluit sal Suid-Afrikaners van alle rasse bo die ouderdom van 16 jaar kwalifiseer om die dokument te onderteken. Daar is op hierdie ouderdom besluit omdat Swartes van 16jarige ouderdom af bewysboeke moet dra en dus ook oud genoeg is om die petisie te onderteken.

10. Die loodsing van die handtekeningeveldtog in Transvaal het op 12 Februarie 1984 tydens 'n massabyeenkoms in Dube, Soweto, plaasgevind, waartydens Popo MOLEFE, nasionale sekretaris van die UDF, 'n beroep op die aanwesiges gedoen het om die veldtog te steun. 'n UDF-vergadering sal weekliks op Woensdae om 18h00 in Khotso House, Johannesburg, gehou word om die vordering te moniteer.

11. In Noord-Vrystaat is petisielyste vir die veldtog sedert 29 Januarie 1984 in omloop nadat 'n "werkskool" op dié dag in Welkom gehou is om mense in die gebied oor die veldtog in te lig. Na berig word, word beoog om 74 000 handtekeninge in dié gebied in te samel.

12. Die Wes-Kaapland se streeksveldtog is op 24 Januarie 1984 tydens 'n perskonferensie in Kaapstad geloods waar besluit is om verskeie aksies op belangrike de van stapel te stuur.

13. In Oos-Kaapland is die Port Elizabeth Youth Congress (PEYCO) as UDF-geaffilieerde organisasie genader om, in samewerking met die Congress of SA Students (COSAS), 20 000 handtekeninge in te samel.

14. Die Natalse streekkomitee het op Saterdag 21 Januarie 1984 'n "werkswinkel" in Durban gehou met die doel om die loodsing van die veldtog in dié streek te bespreek. Die veldtog is amptelik op 18 Februarie 1984 geloods met aartbiskop Denis HURLEY, president van die SA Katolieke Biskopsraad (SAKBR), as die eerste ondertekenaar.

15. Toeligting en Vertolking

a. Die veldtog is om "simboliese redes" op nasionale vlak vanuit Pretoria geloods ([REDACTED]):

- i. Die nuwe grondwet gaan nl vanuit Pretoria geïmplementeer word.
- ii. Die UDF wil ook hiermee voorgee dat hy in die voetspore van Albert LUTHULI, 'n voormalige ANC-president, wil volg wat in die vyftigerjare sy veldtog teen "apartheid"-wetgewing vanuit Pretoria geloods het.
- iii. Pretoria is die tuiste van eerw S P MKHATSHWA, die beskermheer van die UDF, wat steeds in Ciskei in aanhouding verkeer.

b. Dit blyk dat die UDF van elke moontlike geleentheid (van kerkdienste tot sportbyeenkomste) gebruik gaan maak om handtekeninge van die publiek in te samel, al sou 'n lid van die publiek (bv 'n trekarbeider) net beswaar teen 'n enkele aspek van "apartheid" hê. So bv is aanwesiges tydens 'n biddag op 29 Januarie 1984 vir die vrylating van MKHATSHWA gevra om 'n petisielys vir sy vrylating te teken, wat in der waarheid deel van die miljoenhandtekeningeveldtog was.

c. Dit is opvallend dat die UDF-mediaseminaar wat op 21 en 22 Januarie 1984 in Johannesburg gehou is, georganiseer is om die UDF se propagandamasjien op nasionale, streek- en plaaslike vlak betyds gereed te kry om maksimum publisiteit te verleen aan die vordering wat met die UDF se handtekeningeveldtog gemaak word.

d. Die musiekfees ("people's festival") wat die Transvaaltak van die UDF vir 4 Maart 1984 in Johannesburg gereël het en waar 30 000 mense verwag word, sal waarskynlik eweneens aangewend word om soveel handtekeninge as moontlik in te samel.

e. In die lig van die dilemma waarin die ANC verkeer nav die Regering se ontspanningsinisiatiewe in Suidelike Afrika, kan verwag word dat die ANC die uitslag van die UDF se handtekeningeveldtog in sy buitelandse propaganda sal gebruik om die beweerde omvang van binnelandse teenkanting teen die Regering se grondwetinisiatiewe aan te toon en op dié wyse munt uit die UDF-veldtog te probeer slaan. Die ANC-president, Oliver TAMBO, het op 8 Januarie 1984 verklaar dat die verdere mobilisering en organisering van die

binnelandse massa van besondere belang geword het en juis die stigting van die UDF uitgesonder as "... a historic achievement in our people's efforts to unite in the broadest possible front for the struggle against the inhuman apartheid system".

- f. Die Regering se aankondiging dat die Kleurling- en Indiërverkiegings op 22 Augustus 1984 gehou sal word, bied aan die UDF genoeg tyd om sy handtekeningeveldtog voor daardie datum af te handel. Hoewel die UDF die benaming "eenmiljoenhandtekeningeveldtog" gebruik, is hy inderdaad besig om sy eie referendum ("people's referendum") voor die verkiesing vir Indiërs en Kleurlinge te hou. Sou die UDF daarin slaag om 'n miljoen handtekeninge in te samel, sal hy die geloofwaardigheid van bg verkiesings en van die verkose verteenwoordigers as verteenwoordigend van die Indiër- en Kleurlingpubliek daardeur kan ondermyn. Deurdadig die UDF op 'n boikot van die Indiër- en Kleurlingverkie- sing besluit het, skakel die UDF ook die moontlikheid van 'n neerlaag by die stembus uit.
- g. Dit is tans not te vroeg om te bepaal watter mate van sukses tot dusver met die veldtog behaal is. Van die faktore wat invloed op die veldtog kan uitoefen, is "vryheidsge- rigte" herdenkingsdatums verla tussen Maart en Junie, ar- beid- en skole-onrus en ander maatskaplike knelpunte.

16. Kommentaar/optrede

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